Performative Analysis: Theorizing the Interpretation of Tonal Music
by
Jeffrey Swinkin

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Doctoral Committee:

Professor Kevin Korsyn, Chair
Associate Professor Frederick Amrine
Professor Patricia Hall
Associate Professor Wayne Petty
Associate Professor Ramon Satyendra
Associate Professor Silke-Maria Weineck
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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to redress three deficiencies, as I see them. First, music scholars tend to view the musical work as an abstract entity, as conceptually prior to its performances. I propose instead a music-ontological model that includes interpretation, both analysis- and performance-based, as integral components of the musical work. Second, performers and theorists alike tend to forget how much more heterogeneous music-making used to be, both within and among performances, as evidenced by the earliest recordings. My analytically-informed interpretive recommendations implicitly strive to recapture this “Romantic” style of performance. Finally, many older studies in performance/analysis, and some recent ones, mandate that a performance must somehow instantiate analytical assertions to be cogent, on the assumption that those assertions are factual. I argue that, on the one hand, analytical features are metaphorical and contingent rather than factual and immanent; and on the other hand, performed music, due to its semantic indeterminacy, cannot convey concepts, only the sentient states underlying them.

The first chapter identifies some academic trends that betray these deficiencies, in particular the authentic-performance movement and Platonic music ontologies. Against the latter, I propose that the musical work is not some idealized entity transcending performances but rather a repository of potentialities, both structural and emotive, that require interpretation to be actualized. In support of this view, I invoke Wolfgang Iser’s reader-response theory, which deems the literary text performative, as always engaging the reader and relying on his capacity to make, rather than excavate, meaning. The second chapter expounds on two ways in which analysis—
Schenkerian analysis in particular—is performative. First, it unearths ambiguities that elicit the performer’s response. Second, it poses metaphors for sentient experience that the performer can sonically embody. The third chapter applies the theory to the first movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet, Op. 18, no. 4, the fourth to Schumann’s “Du Ring an meinem Finger.” In the latter, I use analysis not just performatively but provocatively, using it to generate subtexts by which the singer can implicitly critique the evident misogyny of Schumann’s chosen text.
Music theory—or, more particularly, music analysis—and performance have less to do with each other than one might care to believe. As represented by the simple Venn diagram above, there is a relatively small area, I submit, in which they intersect. Many aspects of performance simply have nothing to do with analysis—sonic colors that express no analytic insight, technical demands that are impervious to theoretical thought. Conversely, many aspects of music analysis simply have nothing to do with performance—aspects, for example, that are more concerned to exemplify a theory than to elucidate particular pieces. This might seem a strange concession with which to open a dissertation on the relationship between music performance and analysis, but I believe it is a necessary, intellectually honest one. Moreover, accepting the mutual autonomy between the two

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1 Abbate (2004) argues these points, more on which below.
domains opens a space in which we can come to grips with that relatively small but precious area of overlap—to codify it more precisely and appreciate it more fully. Hence, I do not presume or posit an ideal or inevitable marriage between the two endeavors but rather aim to explore their potential for a fruitful relationship within rather circumscribed parameters.

1. A Preliminary Example

Prior to theoretical exposition, a brief example—Scriabin’s Prelude in G♯ major, op. 11, no. 13 (Ex. I-1)—will hopefully serve to capture the spirit of my approach and foreshadow its particulars.

Analysis

The form is rounded binary, with the second part beginning in m. 19 and the return occurring in m. 25. The first part comprises an interrupted period, the consequent of which (m. 9) expands the antecedent and arrives upon a V/vi in majestic fashion. The second part briefly develops the
Example I-1: Scriabin, Prelude in G, op. 11, no. 13

motive of m. 5; mm. 21–23 liquidate the two-bar module of mm. 19–20, alighting on a retransitory dominant. A lead-in figure, m. 24, provides an anacrusis to the main theme, which
originally had none. The return is truncated in relation to the beginning, reaching tonal closure on I, with Ŵ in the soprano, “prematurely,” in m. 28. Mm. 29–31 merely extend this sonority, after which the piece closes with two mysterious elements: a lone D♭ in the tenor, evocative of a horn tone fading into the distance, and an imperfect authentic cadence whose melodic Ŵ partially undermines the tonal resolution of m. 28. The piece ends on something of a question mark.

This last observation marks the first of a few ambiguities we will encounter in this brief piece (consult Ex. I-2 throughout). Does the piece traverse a Ŵ–Ŵ–Ŵ Urlinie or does it ultimately prolong just a single scale degree, Ŵ? A factor supporting the latter interpretation is that the ostensible melodic resolution that is Ŵ (Ŵ) in m. 28 is harmonically supported only weakly (the G♭ in the bass is something of an afterthought). Also, that Ŵ, G♭⁵, does not occur in the obligatory register, which would require G♭⁴. On the other hand, that G♭⁵ is perhaps the terminus of an ascending Urlinie, Ŵ–Ŵ–Ŵ–Ŵ, in which case the Ŵ at the end would merely embellish the final Ŵ.

---

² Neumeyer (1987) has compellingly argued for the feasibility of such a structure.
Example I-2: Scriabin: Rhythmic reduction with voice-leading overlay
Indeed, one might ask: which is the true Kopfton, 5 or 3? (Notice how Scriabin brings the antagonism between these two pitches to the fore in the last four bars, pitting 5 in the tenor against 3 in the soprano.) 5 as the Kopfton (this structural narrative is mapped out with red overlays in Ex. I-2) is supported by the ascending 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 but is partially undermined by the piece closing on 3. 3 as the Kopfton is at once supported and undermined by the fact that the piece begins and ends with it: if the piece does ultimately prolong 3, the latter proves an ultimately unsatisfactory or illusory Kopfton since it is unable to linearly resolve.

More localized factors exacerbate rather than resolve this Kopfton ambiguity: the first phrase describes 5 - 2, yet m. 2 establishes a recurrent motive, a descending fourth from D5 that seems to aim at a 5th-gesture but that does not reach 1, G5 (Ex. I-3). Granted, since D5 in m. 2 is non-harmonic (an appoggiatura), this motive is contra-structural—it falls outside a triadic framework. Still, the motive can be seen subtly to manifest or reinforce a global 5-line. The 5 in m. 2 also strives upward toward G5; that pitch, however, is displaced by a poignant A5 neighbor in m. 4 (see Ex. I-3). (The possibly illusory quality of this A5 is supported by the fact that the motive of m. 2 is reiterated in the alto voice of m. 4, creating a slight ambiguity as to which voice, soprano or alto, is more melodic in that measure.) The thematic reprise redresses both “deficiencies”: the D5 (m. 26) is now supported by a consonant G5 in the bass, a tonic pedal tone, which readies it for structural motion and resolution; and the line now leads up to G5 (m. 28) without equivocation.

In short, 5 may be a somewhat dubious Kopfton in competing with 3 and in leading upward rather than downward. Yet, the correspondence between the descending and ascending lines from 5—the former halting on A5 (m. 2), the latter displaced by A5 (m. 4)—ultimately reinforces the putative 5 Kopfton. Likewise, the fact that G5 is consistently evaded until m. 28 can
be seen not as undermining but actually as underlining the $\hat{5}$-line, insofar as it piques the listener’s expectation as to the fulfillment of that line. Indeed, when we finally reach G$s^5$ in m. 28, the melodic resolution is perhaps satisfying enough as to mitigate its initially weak harmonic support. This piece demonstrates Schenker’s notion that interesting pieces reach their goal not directly but only after having taken reversals and faced various obstacles along the way.

Another ambiguity pertains to the secondary tonalities ii and vi. The import of ii is established by its spacious expansion, mm. 5–7, the import of vi by being the key to which the second phrase modulates (see Ex. I-2). Notice the 5th-progression in the bass, mm. 15–17, leading decisively to E$b$ (this line rendezvous with its own inversion in the soprano, which leads to F$^5$; see dotted slurs in Ex. I-1). The two keys are not merely successive, however, but intertwined and interactive. In the antecedent, the ii in mm. 5–7 is expanded by means of a vi in m. 6. In the consequent, conversely, ii is co-opted by vi. That is, vi proves resistant to ii, pushing beyond it by means of the descending 5th line at the point (m. 15) where it yielded to ii in the previous phrase (m. m. 7). That this phrase goes beyond the previous phrase tonally, rather than merely aims at a different tonal target, is borne out by the phrase expansion this tonal redirection generates. That, in other words, vi metaphorically goes beyond ii is confirmed by the consequent phrase literally going beyond the antecedent. Hence, vi does not merely succeed ii but overtakes it, with a burst of aggressive energy that culminates in the emotional apex of the piece (m. 18). The relationship between the two tonal agents becomes murkier in the next part, starting in m. 19. Here, as in the opening phrase (starting in m. 5), ii is ostensibly composed out. After only one measure, the melody seems ready to settle into ii, by way of a melodic cadential figure in m. 20. But the bass in that measure is not on-board: whereas its first two notes imply the progression
shown in Ex. I-4, it gets waylaid instead, arriving on E♭ and thus attenuating the stability of A♭ in the soprano. The resulting 6 chord turns out not to be a cadential 6 within ii but rather a contrapuntal displacement of E♭ minor, vi, which congeals in the next measure, m. 21 (see Ex. I-2). In summary, the competitive struggle between the two tonalities in the first part gives way to a more subtle and complicated entanglement in the second.

Next, let us briefly consider some motives. If the G♭ in m. 28 achieves a crucial tonal goal, it achieves a crucial motivic one as well. As shown in Ex. I-5, motive x, a mere latency in m. 1, is subsequently actualized as a full-fledged motive by means of the various permutations it assumes. Some of those are inexact or approximate. For example, D♭–C♭–B♭ in m. 4 initially appear to describe RI(x) but the C♭–B♭ corrupt that permutation, as they enact R but not I. Likewise, B♭–C♭–E♭ of the next measure initially gesture toward T♭(x) but then C♭–E♭ perform I. However, the successive apices of A♭ in m. 4 (the climax of the theme), F in m. 18 (the end of the opening section, delineated by a fermata), and G♭ in m. 28 (the point of structural resolution) together describe an exact RI permutation. The partial permutations involving R and I find a wholeness in that large-scale motive. This process, moreover, help accounts for why that G♭ in m. 28 is so satisfying and resolute: it is the point at which both tonal and motivic procedures coincide, where two different processes terminate on the same pitch.
Another motive that begins as a latency and is eventually brought to fruition is the F-E♭-
D♯-D♭-C♭ in the left hand of mm. 4–5 (Ex. I-6). Here, however, these pitches do not yet form a
motivic unit, for they are not rhythmically distinguished as a group. In mm. 19–20, however, that
figure begins on a downbeat (tenor voice) with the first note (now F♭) accented agogically and the
last three accented with tenuti. That figure, in other words, is now presented with greater metric
clarity and stability such that we realize, in retrospect, it held motivic potential from the start. No
sooner, however, does this motive crystallize at the foreground than it recedes to a deeper, subthematic\textsuperscript{3} layer, traversing mm. 21–23, as shown in the example.

\textbf{Example I-4:} Recomposition of mm. 19–20

\footnotesize
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lllll}
7 & 6 & 5 & 6 & 13 \\
3 & 4 & 7 & & \\
vi\textsuperscript{7} & ii & V & V & ii \\
(Fr.) & & & & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{3} I borrow this term from Dahlhaus (1989, 208).
Example I-5: The x motive; G♭5 as motivic fulfillment

looser variations of x
(permutations only approximate)

motive x
([013])

apices = RI₅(x)

notes of x rearranged, linearized
Example I-6: A latent motive subsequently realized

Performance

The above analysis, though brief, has yielded several intriguing possibilities for interpretation (Ex. I-7 and Web Ex. 1). At the most basic level, it has proposed various features, in terms of tonal structure and motive, for instance, that the performer might delineate in some way. But more interestingly, the analysis has suggested various ambiguities for the performer to resolve and
latencies for her to actualize. It has also hinted at the emotive—and, by extension, narrative—dimensions of such features that in turn might motivate interpretive choices. I will offer some examples.

On the most basic level, the analysis uncovers entities the performer might choose to project in some way, and of which she might not otherwise be aware. For example, once the analysis has brought to light the 5th-motive in the bass, mm. 14–17, and has underlined its significance—it helps establish vi as a central tonal agent—the performer might well opt to delineate this line. Yet, such delineation, to be effective, is not, is never, simply a matter of “bringing something out,” as performers are often urged to do. It is equally a matter of shaping the line. In other words, to do justice to a line as a line, one must play it with a line, as it were—one must apply to it a linear dynamic trajectory. This may involve a crescendo, diminuendo, or
Example I-7: Some performance outcomes

- Lento \( \frac{3}{4} \)

- \( \textit{as if leading toward goal} \) sub \( p \)

- \( \textit{as if surpassing goal} \) subito \( p \)

- distinct shape

- similar shaping

- hint at motivic import

- \( p \), so as not to obscure asc. line

- \( \textit{rit.} \)

- \( \textit{cresc.} \)

- \( \textit{Voice} \)

- unstable, murky  increasing security . . .

- pt. of arrival

- \( \textit{shape line, bring to resolution, even within dim.} \)

- linger, catch in ped

- reticent, unsure
hairpin dynamic, depending on the context and on the composer’s notations. In this case, a crescendo is indicated (m. 13). But the precise execution of this dynamic will depend largely upon the particular emotion or intention as exposed, in part, by the analysis. Following that analysis, the performer might play with the intention to surpass (recall the struggle between ii and vi) and also to lead inexorably to the E♭, the goal of the motivic 5th. These tactics will create particular gradations of timing—both the tempo and the precise rate at which the crescendo unfolds—that might not otherwise arise. Granted, the resultant temporal profile will not necessarily convey to the listener the proposition, “this harmony/phrase surpasses the previous,” or, “this phrase leads inexorably toward E♭,” and so on, but it will convey on some level the general qualities of surpassing and leading inexorably, or something to that effect. I believe that the listener on some level perceives these qualities—even if unconsciously, and even if he would not put his perceptions into those exact words—from such a tempo profile. This is because, as I will later argue, variances of dynamic, tempo, and articulation create gestures that are isomorphic with human ones, through which, in turn, emotional and psychological states are conveyed, or from which they are inferred.

We saw how some tonal or motivic entities arose only retroactively. Recall, for example, the F–G♭–E♭ of m. 1, which comes into its own as a result of the various permutations, both partial and complete, it undergoes. Also recall the F(♮)–E♭–D–D♭–C♭ motive, which is merely latent in mm. 4–5 and is subsequently actualized at the foreground in mm. 19–20 and subthematically in the bass, mm. 21–23. In each case, one might wonder whether the subsequent clarification of a figure as motivic means the performer should initially downplay the figure, allowing it to be latent and gradually to become, or whether, conversely, he should imbue it with motivic import from the start, on the basis of what he knows to transpire later in the piece. In
other words, should the player approach the latencies as a “first-time listener” or a “second-time listener,” applying his synoptic vision of the piece throughout?⁴ There is no simple answer to this complex question, and it is one to which I will return. The performer might also mediate between these two extremes, hinting at the motive in mm. 4–5, then momentarily revealing it in m. 20, then rendering it with increasing certainty in mm. 20–23. There is no one exact way to render such actions, and whatever the interpretive outcome, the listener will not necessarily be cognizant of those actions or label them using the same terms the analyst used.

A phenomenon related to these initially nebulous or nascent modules is ambiguity, of which I proposed multiple instances in this prelude. I contend that any, even relatively simple piece will be rife with ambiguities; or more precisely, such ambiguities lie at the intersection of music and the analytical model(s) used to elucidate it. My applying to the prelude a Schenkerian model—a model that entails the presence of a single Kopfton from which the primary linear progression of the piece unfurls—yields an ambiguity by which the prelude wavers between two possible Kopftöne: ♯3 and ♯5. Such tonal indistinctness—also evinced by the intricate interplay between ii and vi—is simply a hallmark of advanced chromatic music generally, Scriabin’s music in particular. Hence, the music by itself posits no undecidable binary opposition (“♯3 is structurally antecedent to ♯5” or vice versa); rather, such an opposition arises from applying a theoretical paradigm to the score. The Schenkerian model exploits the general tonal haziness of Scriabin’s language, culling from it a more distinct tonal tension.

The question remains as to how the performer should treat such ambiguities. She may choose to express the ambiguity in some way, perhaps playing the prelude with a murky sound

⁴ I borrow this useful typology from Cone (1977).
generally and avoiding linear dynamics, not pointing toward particular tonal goals. Alternatively, though ambiguities are by definition undecidable, she may choose in this scenario, for the purpose of performing the piece in a decisive, distinct way on a particular occasion, to focus on one or the other Kopfton. Supposing she opted for \( \hat{5} \) and the ascending Urlinie it entails, she might create shadings that revolve around \( \hat{5} \) in its various contexts. See, for example, mm. 2 ff. in Ex. I-7. The line in m. 2 is a bridge to nowhere, whereas m. 3 is a bridge to an unexpected place—\( A_b \), which displaces the \( G_b \) that is the ostensible goal of the linear span. The crescendi leading to these respective points would thus be subtly different in character, rendered differently. The first crescendo leads to a goal that never arrives, the second overreaches it. The first thus has a left hanging quality, the second a surpassing quality. For another example, the middle section unfolds a dynamic of increasing realization or security, proceeding from the murky \( ii \) that settles on the dubious \( \frac{4}{4} \) in m. 20 to the \( vi \), which in turn serves as a predominant of the home key. The chromatic 4th-motive here, as we discussed, congeals along with the harmony. This analysis thus calls for the performer to play with increasing security, strength, and solidity. Different pianists will no doubt realize this intention in different ways.

Three main caveats apply to the above interpretive endeavor. First, any one analytical insight might imply for different people slightly or even vastly different physical and emotional connotations. Second, even those who derive from an analysis basically the same such connotation will probably use different language to describe it, which in turn will likely reflect subtly different conceptions. Third, even those who share basically the same analytic-cum-interpretive conception might realize that conception at the instrument very differently. That said, the possibilities are not infinite: a particular analysis, given a sensitive hermeneutic reading, will
likely produce emotional and somatic states that are in the same family; and those, in turn, will likely produce a set of performance realizations that are also related.

2. The Central Issues

The following three issues—the work concept, interpretive specificity and freedom, and the traditionally hegemonic stance of analysis toward performance—form the backdrop to my entire project. Hence, I consider them generally here, along with important theoretical literature relating to them. I will expose the set of ideological and disciplinary tensions to which my dissertation on some level responds.

The Work Bias

The preceding section harbors a host of assumptions and principles, ones relating to (a) the various ways a performer can respond to a preexistent analysis; (b) the non-objective nature of analysis and the non-propositional nature of performance; (c) the metaphorical and hermeneutic potential of seemingly formalistic analysis; and (d) the mechanisms by which performance can convey expressive states. I will expound on these and other points in the course of this dissertation. None of these points, however, is more central to my discussion than the idea, also implied above, that the score is a repository of potentialities, latencies, ambiguities, and lacunae, all of which directly implicate the interpreter and beg his involvement. Simply put, the musical work necessitates and thus entails performance—performance is one of its constituents. By this, I mean not merely that music is in essence a sonic artform and thus that the score requires sonic
realization, although this is true. I mean, more precisely, that the score is conceptually open—it wants elucidation through analysis and performance, not mere sonic embodiment.

Such a view—that performance and interpretation are integral rather than ancillary to the musical work—runs counter, in part, to the manner in which theorists and musicologists typically talk about music. They have tended to frame it, explicitly or implicitly, as an abstract entity, one conceptually prior to and independent of performances. They have in mind an idealized object, a structural substratum common to most if not all performances of that work. They have also tended to regard the score—its notations, and sometimes the various structural relations that supposedly inhere in such notations—as defining the work. When music scholars discuss music, they usually refer to a score, not an actual or hypothetical performance.

Dillon Parmer (2007) contends that this bias toward the work arises from a kind of academic insecurity: the music scholar, feeling the weight of more established, time-honored disciplines within the liberal arts and sciences, strives to make his claims verifiable and objectively grounded, at least to a high degree. For this purpose, the visual security of the score is preferable to the perceived elusiveness and evanescence of sounding music. Performing music entails its own kind of knowledge (practical and otherwise), but this is not regarded as genuine musicological knowledge. Parmer trenchantly states that

musicologists are programmed from the outset of their academic deformation not only to suppress performing (how-to knowledge), to look down upon it and those who undertake it as an inferior form of engaging with music; but also to uphold as superior, as more prestigious, those forms of knowledge about music (knowledge about) which can be produced without any recourse to actual music making (2007, 12, his italics).
In another, even more provocative paper, Parmer attributes this valuation of knowing over doing, or of abstract over practical knowledge, to a ruler-ruled mentality, one undergirding slavery, that can be traced back to Aristotle (Parmer, 2011).

The irony of this attitude, Parmer points out, is that musicologists claim to be concerned with the Real, but in actuality practice on imaginary objects—works as opposed to performances, which, though elusive, are real. Indeed, music is arguably first and foremost an activity—it truly exists only in performance. Christopher Small, in his landmark Musicking (1998), argues this point but also that the necessity of musical activity and participation extends to audiences as well, and that such participation is suppressed in modern concert culture. In particular, he unapologetically lays bare the conventions of the modern symphony orchestra concert, conventions that, he argues, encourage passive rather than active engagement on the part of audience and players alike. He calls for a return to the kind of participatory involvement that would have been de rigueur at the time in which much of the standard repertory was composed. For Small, music is in essence not about abstract works but about doing music, in whatever form. Small reminds us that listening was not always such an asocial and disembodied affair, and is not in all cultures still. He recounts, for example, the initial Parisian performances of the Beethoven symphonies, where “spectators applauded particularly striking passages and erupted into storms of applause at the end of each

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5 Another groundbreaking study in this regard is Goehr (1992), who claims that the concept of the musical work is historically contingent, beginning only around 1800 with Beethoven and arising from the complex shift of cultural values occurring at that time. Here and in Goehr (1989), she also exposes the contingency of the Werktreue concept—the notion that the performer ought to be “true to the work,” true to the putative intentions of the composer and to his notations.
movement, sometimes forcing its repetition” (1998, 44). These and other noises “do not suggest inattention, and certainly not disrespect, but betoken rather an audience that is active rather than passive in its attention, that considers, in fact, that its own audible responses are a legitimate element of the performance” (ibid.).

*   *   *

Some disciplines, such as ethnomusicology and the burgeoning ones of recording analysis and gesture and embodiment theory, do take performance very seriously. Ethnomusicology, of course, has always taken performance as its primary domain of inquiry, since the traditions of non-Western and popular musics it deals with rarely revolve around written scores or the hypostatized works they are typically considered to indicate. Ethnomusicologists have been applying this performance-based paradigm to classical music with increasing frequency. The turn away from work-centrism is also evident in the plethora of recent studies devoted to the analysis of

6 For an exasperated blog-post on this issue, see “The Awfulness of Classical Music Explained,” by Richard Dare, the recently-appointed managing director of the Brooklyn Philharmonic. A representative harangue:

And there are a great many “clap here, not there” cloak-and-dagger protocols to abide by. I found myself a bit preoccupied—as I believe are many classical concert goers—by the imposing restrictions of ritual behavior on offer: all the shushing and silence and stony faced non-expression of the audience around me, presumably enraptured, certainly deferential, possibly catatonic (Dare, 2012).

He proceeds to recount, as Small does, the much more extroverted, by modern standards unruly concert etiquette of pre-twentieth-century audiences.

7 See Kingsbury (1988), Shelemay (2001), and Taylor (2007), to cite just a few examples.
recordings. (The publication in 1992 of Robert Philip’s important study of twentieth-century performance trends as evidenced on recordings effectively kick-started the discipline of classical-music performance studies.) Practitioners of this subfield regard performances as worthy of study in their own right, apart from the works they are usually, or were previously, taken merely to instantiate. Many of these studies come from CHARM (Centre for the History and Analysis of Recorded Music), which is spearheaded by the indefatigable Nicholas Cook. Scholars at this institution have rigorously compiled, contextualized, and analyzed performances as captured on record. While their aims are laudable, their methodology, in my view, is problematic.

To explain why, I compare two essays—one by Joel Lester, the other by Cook—from the volume, *The Practice of Performance* (1995). Lester affirms that the role of performance is not merely to manifest invariable properties of the work as identified by analysis. Rather, performance can itself uncover structural properties and expand the range of analytical possibilities. Lester contends that analysis, although it makes certain factual (descriptive) claims, is mostly concerned with interpretation and can thus benefit greatly from the wisdom (if often intuitive) of performers.

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9 See their website at http://www.charm.rhul.ac.uk/index.html, which features extensive discographies, abstracts of and links to projects (both past and ongoing), and an e-monograph by Daniel Leech-Wilkinson (2009). CHARM’s more recent offshoot, CMPCP (Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice), deals with questions such as “what knowledge is creatively embodied in musical performance?”; “how does music in performance . . . take shape over time?”; and “how does understanding musical performance as a creative practice vary across different global contexts, idioms and performance conditions . . . ?” Taken from their website’s homepage: http://www.cmpcp.ac.uk/.
In this way, analysis and performance can interact on a coequal basis in the interpretive process—they are both moments within an interpretive continuum. Accordingly, Lester compares the structural interpretations by a theorist and a pianist—namely, Schenker and Horowitz, respectively—of a single piece, Mozart’s Piano Sonata in A, K. 331, second movement.

Whereas Lester offers cogent insights into Horowitz’s interpretation in relation to Schenker’s using nothing but his naked ear, Cook, in the same volume, uses a computer equipped with a CD-ROM player to parse Furtwängler’s interpretation of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in relation to Schenker’s. Cook argues that Furtwängler, in his two recorded performances of that piece (both from the early 1950s), intuitively produced what are essentially analyses in sound, ones that evince a distinct Schenkerian sensibility. The maestro achieved this primarily through flexible tempo: “Furtwängler’s dynamic tempo profiles convey the same organisation of the music into large spans that Schenker strove to express in his analyses. In fact, Furtwängler sometimes seems more successful in his articulation of these spans than Schenker managed to be at the relatively early stage of his career when he wrote the Ninth Symphony monograph” (1995, 120).

The thesis is intriguing, but the method, which ultimately led to the creation of more sophisticated software for recording analysis, gives me pause. Admittedly, this method is useful in comparing several performances (by the same artist or several) of a single piece, and in lending empirical support to assertions about broad trends in performance styles. In other words, it is useful in gathering statistical data. For those like myself, however, who are primarily concerned with how a particular piece, analytically-informed or –intuitive performer(s), and engaged,

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10 I refer to the sonic visualizer and Expression Algorithm software, which compute fine gradations of tempo and dynamic change and yield spectral graphs.
empathic listener(s) collectively generate structural and emotional/narrative meaning, this methodology is of little use. The minute variances Cook et al. are preoccupied with are largely irrelevant to that enterprise. For example, that a performer “phrase-archs” a particular passage might indeed hold significance in the context of a particular voice-leading or motivic analysis; but the quantitatively precise degree to which the performer does so will likely not. Moreover, I am concerned with what can be picked up by the human ear, with the meanings that can be generated in ordinary acts of listening, without the assistance of technology.

A second, broader concern is that, for Cook, a primary motive for studying recorded performances is to counter the “textualist” position, or score-centrism, as outlined above, that pervades music-academic disciplines. Yet, Cook’s project contravenes this aim on two levels. On one level, records arguably transform the sound phenomena they capture into texts; they turn what is inherently ephemeral into something permanent, something that can then be commodified and fetishized. Placing such analytic weight on recordings threatens to hypostatize performance even more. On another level, Cook’s computer-generated analyses are texts in their own right—and abstruse ones at that—ones that can be, and are perhaps supposed to be, perused independently of the original sound source. Cook’s methodology simply replaces one kind of textualist paradigm

11 This entails essentially an accelerando and crescendo to the climax, a ritardando and decrescendo away from it. See Cook (2009b).

12 By contrast, Leikin’s graphic technique (as used in Leikin [1996], shown below) is much simpler, more intuitive, and more transparent—in part because he superimposes the graph onto the score itself, which Cook does not, so that the graph never becomes an inscrutable end in itself. Incidentally, from Adorno’s three essays on records (1927, 1934, and 1969b), one suspects he might have sympathized with Cook’s project. In the middle essay, in particular, “The Form of the Phonograph Record,” Adorno valorizes the
with another. He concedes as much, stating, “there is a suspicion that recordings have opened up
a whole new territory in which analysts can ply their trade without rethinking their long
established scriptist assumptions: audio texts are still texts” (2010, 14). Yet Cook’s proposed
solution is not to rethink—much less jettison—his own paradigm as merely to counterbalance it
with studies of the social context of performance, gesture, teaching practices, and so on—in short,
all the topics taken up by CHARM’s successor, CMPCP. This, in my view, is a half measure; it
does not neutralize the ideological implications and self-contradictions of the original project.

Once again, I think studying performances is in itself a beneficial countermeasure to the
work- and score-centrism of traditional music scholarship; it is specifically the mechanical way
Cook and others do so that I object to. That said, I cannot claim to have devised a completely
satisfying conceptual paradigm and practical method for studying recordings either. For that
reason, and also because recordings, and their role within the ontological and methodological
framework I erect in this dissertation, would warrant a separate study, I will invoke them only
sporadically and without reference to the theoretical problems they raise.

For Adorno, the phonograph has value
insofar as it is a material entity in its own right, rather than a photograph, as it were, of preexistent music.
Moreover, he claims that the grooves of a record are indexical with respect to the sounds they encode—that
is, related to those sounds in a necessary rather than arbitrary way—but also that they possess a
“hieroglyphic” or enigmatic quality, which precludes overly facile comprehension. Music, rather than being
signified by writing, now itself becomes a kind of writing. Hence, if Adorno were around to behold Cook’s
spectral graphs, I suspect he might have endorsed them since they enhance the textual and hieroglyphic
dimensions of the records themselves.
Finally, performance has received increased attention in the last couple of decades not only
due to ethnomusicology and recording analysis but also to a crop of studies dealing with musical
gesture, embodiment, and the semiotics of performance generally.\textsuperscript{13} These studies range from
considering musical gesture as an abstract phenomenon, a result of rhythmic grouping (Graybill
[1994]) to considering it in its most literal sense, in terms of the physical actions of the performer
(Pierce [see previous footnote]). Between these poles lies the semiotics of gesture. Larson (2007),
for example, treats gestures neither as solely notational nor as actually physical, but rather as an
emergent property of notations, one understood by analogy to actual, physical forces. In this
sense, Larson, and also Hatten (2010), as we will see, view gesture as bridging the gap between the
abstraction of the score and the concreteness of performance.

\textit{Interpretive Particularity}

Collectively, these three bodies of work—ethnomusicology, recording analysis, and semiotics of
gesture and embodiment\textsuperscript{14}—help redress the bias by which music is conceived more in terms of

1994). I find Hatten (1993) particularly interesting. Here, he claims that physical gesture in Schubert is a
veritable secondary parameter, alongside timbre, dynamics, and the like. On this view, the performer’s
physicality is a bona fide component of the work, not merely ancillary to it.

\textsuperscript{14} I omit studies in performance practice and in the psychology of performance here, since the former, at
least in my view, is primarily a species of historical, empirical musicology, the latter one of cognitive science.
I find performance psychology especially problematic in that it does not often treat the performer as a
volitional agent and does not seem concerned with the qualitative aspects of interpretative choices.
abstract universals than of sonic, experienced particulars, and by which performance is basically
assumed to decorate a self-complete piece. Still, each must decide for herself what basic
ontological stance to adopt (and there are certainly many other stances that reside between these
two poles, as I will outline in Chapter 1). Which stance one chooses to adopt will inevitably be
influenced by, and will in turn influence, the kinds of things one values and wants to hear in
performances. In my view, a score-centered approach arises from and yields relative interpretive
homogeneity, a performance-centered approach relative interpretive heterogeneity—to put the
matter somewhat coarsely.¹⁵

I make no bones about being partial to the latter approach. Notwithstanding the increased
import recently granted by music-academic disciplines to performance, our current performing
Moreover, though obviously centered more on performance than on the work, it nonetheless perpetuates
the hegemony of abstraction, as Dogantan-Dack explains:

there is a need to include the performer’s authentic voice and discourse within [music performance
studies]. To be sure, various studies in music psychology represent this discourse, which the
researcher documents through questionnaires . . . , case studies, etc. However, the context within
which the words of the performer are . . . interpreted is embedded within the researcher’s
discourse. . . . The performer as the owner of knowledge and insights . . . i.e., the performer as
agent, disappears altogether. . . . This kind of research . . . does not represent the performer as an

¹⁵ A notable counterexample to the former principle is Glenn Gould, who justified his interpretive
“liberties” not on the basis of the work being open but on that of the work being fixed. In other words,
since he viewed the work as defined by the score—by its pitches and rhythms—he saw his subjective (some
might say, idiosyncratic) choices as licensed precisely because they had no ability to affect or corrupt the
culture still seems predominately score-centric, as evident in the interpretive inhibition by which, in my view, that culture is characterized. This trend is borne out by the recordings made within the last sixty or so years (what I will refer to as “modern” recordings), as compared with the ones made early in the twentieth century (“historical”). One must be careful not to overgeneralize, and, in particular, I am sensitive to Cook’s (2010) cautionary note about building grand historical narratives regarding performance styles. Still, I think it is safe to say that the Romantic tradition of interpretation—characterized by extreme detail-orientation, by ubiquitous alterations in sound, touch, and time in order to convey musical rhetoric—is largely defunct, carried on only by fringe performers.¹⁶ Even a cursory comparison of modern with historical recordings of a particular piece—say, of a Beethoven sonata performed by Alfred Brendel, Richard Goode, Murray Perahia, and Maurizio Pollini on the one hand, by Alfred Cortot, Samson François, Clara Haskil, and Joseph Lhevinne on the other—would no doubt reveal stark differences even to the naked and

¹⁶ The last world-renown practitioner of the Romantic style is generally considered to be Vladimir Horowitz, who died in 1989. Vestiges of it can be found in fringe pianists such as Andrew Rangell, a Boston-based freelancer whose recordings of Beethoven, for example, are often revelatory, and Kumaran Arul, a lecturer at Stanford, by whom I have been considerably influenced. I should clarify that “Romantic,” overtly rhetorical playing, characterized above all by continual alterations of tempo, has precedents in the canonical composers themselves—in their own statements as well as in statements by others about their playing. Both Mozart and Chopin, for instance, explicitly advocated asynchrony between the pianist’s hands (see Eigeldinger [1986, esp. 49–57]) and both Czerny and Schindler attest to frequent changes of tempo in Beethoven’s own performances of his sonatas (see Barth [1992, passim]). In this respect, the Romantic school does not merely practice interpretive excess and superimpose onto works subjective sentiment, as it is often accused of doing.
untrained ear. One can predict with a high degree of certainty that the latter group will display much greater dynamic and temporal breadth, both within any one performance and between them, than will the former group.

Robert Philip (1992) has provided statistical support for this intuition. Examining a wide range of recordings, he has documented a general decrease in dynamic and tempo range in recorded performances dating from roughly the 1930s to the present day. According to Philip, recorded performances at this time began to evince tendencies toward continuous vibrato, lack of portamento, stricter control and lesser extremes of tempo, avoidance of certain types of rubato, and so on. These tendencies in turn betray a more general proclivity for greater “power, firmness, clarity, control, literalness, and evenness of expression, and [an aversion to] informality, looseness, and unpredictability” (1992, 229).

Consider, for instance, his findings in the related arenas of tempo flexibility and tempo rubato. In surveying recordings of Elgar’s First Symphony, for example, he notes that Elgar, who himself conducted and recorded the work (Web Ex. 2), fluctuates the tempo throughout the fourth movement, including places where he did not explicitly notate tempo changes (see Table I-1).
The more modern performances he surveys, dating from 1963–1974, “do not take the movement at a constant speed, but the changes of tempo are almost invariably less extreme” (1992, 27). He also notes here, as elsewhere, that more recent performers, when they do alter tempo, are for some reason more inclined to ritard than to accelerando. After revealing similar trends in numerous other works—solo, chamber, and orchestral—he soundly concludes, “a greater range of tempo within movements was generally used in the 1920s and 1930s than in modern performances” (1992, 35). The range was also greater between the movements of a multi-movement work: “in pre-war performances, fast movements were often very fast, so that the contrast between fast and slow movements was very great. In modern performance, fast movements are usually more moderate in pace, so that the difference between fast and slow movements is less clearly defined” (ibid.).

17 He does acknowledge that, in some cases, pre-war performers might have chosen faster tempi in order to fit the music onto one side of a 78 r.p.m. record. Still, he notes, there are many examples from this period.

Table I-1: Elgar Symphony No. 1, fourth movement: tempo comparisons (after Philip [1992, 26])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rehearsal number</th>
<th>118</th>
<th>120</th>
<th>130</th>
<th>134</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London Symphony Orch. cond. Elgar (1963)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philharmonia cond. Barbirolli (1963)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Phil. cond. Boult (1967)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Phil. cond. Solti (1972)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Phil. cond. Barenboim (1974)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tempo rubato—basically, a more localized and continuous application of Philip’s “tempo flexibility”—is likewise employed to a much greater extent in recorded pre-war performances than in recorded post-war performances. This is true both of “wholesale rubato” (my term), in which all parts shift the tempo in sync, and of “contrametric rubato” (Rosenblum’s term [1988, 362–92]), in which various parts (normally the two hands of a pianist) are out of sync—one proceeds in a continuous tempo, the other pushes or pulls against it. While wholesale rubato is commonly used by modern performers (if to a lesser degree than historical performers), contrametric rubato is not. But the latter is ubiquitous among early twentieth-century pianists, and used ubiquitously by them within particular pieces, as we will see below. Philip says, “like the early twentieth-century tendency to accelerate, [contrametric rubato] has been firmly discouraged in the late twentieth century, and failure to play the left and right hands together is now generally regarded as carelessness.” But until the 1920s, many pianists, particularly those of the older generation (Paderewski, Pachmann, Rosenthal, et al.) made a habit of this non-synchronisation” (1992, 47). As one example, Philip notes Paderewski’s performance of the theme of Schubert’s B♭ Impromptu,

of records containing very fast performances that leave room at the end of a side, in which cases “there is no reason to doubt that the performers were close to their normal tempos,” the ones at which they would perform off record (1992, 36).

18 Hudson (1994) aligns contrametric rubato with “earlier” rubato, wholesale rubato with “later” rubato. Of course, the two types may be used in conjunction.

19 I would add that modern pianists largely abstain from accelerando because they are taught from the earliest stage that “rushing” is bad.
in which he frequently staggers his hands. Edwin Fischer and Arthur Schnabel, by comparison, play the theme in a much more straightforward manner, neither noticeably dislocating the hands.

Scriabin’s performance of his own Op. 11, no. 13 (Web Ex. 3), which I analyzed above, provides a vivid example of the radical temporal differentiation characteristic of the earliest recorded performers. Leikin’s Example 3.6 (2011), reproduced as my Ex. I-8, features a tempo

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20 Some view these rhythmic “distortions” as stemming from the vagaries of the Welte-Mignon piano roll, on which Scriabin recorded this prelude. While this issue is beyond the scope of my discussion, suffice to say that, while the Welte is somewhat deficient in capturing a wide dynamic range and touch (a deficiency to which Leikin attributes the diminished impact of Scriabin’s performances on the modern listener), it is fairly accurate in capturing temporal nuances. (Incidentally, for a fascinating cultural analysis of the player piano, see Taylor [2007], who traces its evolution from a gimmicky gadget, a physical commodity; to a do-it-yourself tool, a vehicle of democratization; to a medium for abstract music, for promoting art music as a cultural commodity; to a medium for extolling and fetishizing great performers.) It is thus preferable to regard Scriabin’s rhythmic nuances as redressing what William Rothstein grandiosely terms “the Great Nineteenth-Century Rhythm Problem” (1989, 184). Rothstein argues that the popularity in that period of short piano pieces for the amateur musician, usually based on popular folk or dance styles, entailed a tendency toward "too duple a hypermeter,” and toward four-square phrase rhythm, in contrast to the more fluid phrase rhythm of the Classical era. Dodson (2012), following Krebs (1999), suggests that composers like Schumann and Chopin mitigate this problem compositionally by using metric dissonance, among other techniques, and Romantic-style pianists, such as Horowitz, do so by foregrounding such metric dissonance by means of desynchronization and rubato. With respect to Scriabin’s compositional style, Leikin states that he “has often been chided for dryness of musical expression caused by the literal or sequential repeats of two- and four-measure symmetries” (2011, 27). But this is countered by Scriabin’s
Example 1-8: Scriabin’s tempo fluctuations in his performance of Prelude, Op. 11, no. 13 (Leikin’s Figure 3.6 [2011, 104–106]; reproduced with kind permission from Ashgate Press)

rubato, which is “unquestionably the most striking feature of his performance. . . . Scriabin’s tempos are continually in a state of flux” (ibid.).
graph as well as a transcription that clearly reveal the “liberties” Scriabin took with his own score.

Leikin notes in particular:

- Scriabin’s dramatic *accelerando* into m. 17;
- the waxing and waning of tempo mirroring the rising and falling of the melodic contour (which are also mirrored by *crescendi* and *diminuendi*);
- the many rolled chords and desynchronization of parts, both of which highlight the polyphonic layers of the texture;
- the localized articulation, despite the overarching slur in the score: “Scriabin’s performing slurs divide the treble and bass lines into much shorter motifs” (2011, 60);
• the alteration and addition of pitches.

A quantitative comparison of this performance with more modern ones is hardly needed. Clearly, the rhythmic style that Scriabin’s performance typifies is now largely extinct. I think this is a real loss. Of course, some might argue that we should no more regret the loss of an archaic performance style than we should the fact that modern-day composers no longer compose like J. S. Bach. Fair enough, but I have two concerns. The first is ideological. As Philip suggests above, musicians and teachers do not merely abstain from this style, which is of course their perogative,

21 This is no place for an extensive analysis of the cultural conditions that might account for the narrowing of interpretive scope in the modern era, but one obvious reason is the perfectionistic ideal that digitally edited recordings arguably instill. Adorno diagnosed this tendency early on: he deems Arturo Toscanini’s performance of Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony as suffering “from an absence of internal tension—as if with the first note everything had been decided in advance, as with a gramophone record, instead of gradually coming into being. It was as if the interpretation had already turned into its mechanical transmission” (1999b, 43, my italics). The stamp of technology upon live performances is clearly visible when performers treat pieces as foregone conclusions, as today they so often do. Philip echoes Adorno in saying, “the changes in recording and the recording studio have in turn fed back into the concert-hall. If pre-war recordings are remarkably like live performances, many late twentieth-century live performances are remarkably like recordings” (1992, 231). Similarly, with respect to modern Chopin performance, James Methuen-Campbell bemoans a uniformity of interpretation that perhaps results from the influence of the recording industry. With the ever-improving technology of sound reproduction there is a consequent demand for playing of the highest technical finish. In attaining this, the pianist generally sacrifices spontaneity, which is a very important factor in conveying the concentrated poetry of the mazurkas and the improvisatory mood found in many of the late works (1992, 204–205).
but they generally dismiss it as eccentric or manneristic, as a mere historical curiosity. In other words, this style is implicitly framed as a deviation from, as other to, what is held to be a normative, universally intelligible style of interpretation. The problem, therefore, is not the preference for a modernist, structuralist aesthetic per se, but rather that this aesthetic is falsely held to be non-contingent and non-ideological. The second problem, in my view, is that a relative lack of moment-to-moment rhetorical differentiation drastically compromises the ability of the performer to elude and express the various structural and narrative possibilities that inhere in any musical work. That is, if we equate the work not with the most obvious notational properties of the score but rather with a broad realm of potentialities as to structure and sense, and if interpretation is charged with telling a story of how the musical structure unfolds, then freedom and heterogeneity will be integral to the interpretive act. Just as one can hardly convey the sense of a story without continual inflections of vocal intonation and pacing, neither can the performer without continual inflections of dynamics, tempo, and touch.\(^\text{22}\)

**The Hegemony of Analysis**

These last thoughts point to the role of analysis. If we view the work as a repository more of potentialities than of fixed properties, analysis cannot be reduced to a fact-finding endeavor. Rather, it would have to be considered a mode of interpretation and actualization, coequal with, rather than conceptually prior to, performance. This assertion flies in the face of early essays in

\(^{22}\)Schoenberg suggests that changes of musical emotion dictate those of tempo, just as changes of human emotion inevitably entail those of a person’s inner tempo: “Who is able to say convincingly ‘I love you’, or ‘I hate you’, without his pulse registering?” (1975, 321).
the subfield of performance/analysis. Two such studies, Narmour (1988) and Berry (1989), place the two domains in an asymmetrical relationship. Presuppositions informing their work might be syllogized as follows:

(i) Rational endeavors are epistemologically prior to, more important than sensuous and intuitive endeavors, and thus licensed to constrain them in some sense.\textsuperscript{23} 

(ii) Analysis is a rational endeavor, performance a sensuous and intuitive one.

(iii) Analysis is epistemologically prior to, more important than performance and thus licensed to constrain it in some sense.

That is, both writers presuppose that performance must somehow rely upon or defer to a preexistent analysis in order to be interpretively valid. The prime imperative of performance, on this view, is to express structural relationships. Since the latter, according to these writers, can be objectively derived, performances can be objectively assessed. Hence, Narmour speaks outright of performances being “correct” or “incorrect” based on their conformity or lack thereof to a correct analysis. Cone (1968), though less draconian in his approach and rhetoric, likewise believes the primary duty of interpretation is to express pre-decided structure, in particular the rhythmic structure (“rhythmic life”) as derived from analysis.

If these analysts insist the performer play the piece in a particular way, others insist she do nothing but execute the score faithfully and neutrally, under the assumption that structural ideas inhere the notes, such that one need only play the correct notes in order to transmit a structural idea. Consider, for example, Leonard Meyer’s analysis of the opening of the D-minor Fugue from

\textsuperscript{23} Recall Parmer’s critique of this position above.
the *Well-Tempered Clavier*, Book 2 (Ex. I-9). In it, he locates several possible melodic patterns. As shown in the upper staves of the example, these are primarily (a) an arpeggiation of a D-minor triad with intervening passing tones and (b) a sequence of fourth-leaps followed by a scalar passage descending from D⁵ that fills the gap created by those leaps. He then admonishes, “If the richness and complexity of these intertwining implicative structures is to be preserved, the fugue should be performed as ‘neutrally’ as possible. . . . Because none of the subpatterns should be thought of as being dominant, no special articulation or phrasing is called for” (1973, 149–50).

I would counter this statement on at least two grounds. First, how is it possible to play “neutrally”? Even if the keyboardist were to play the passage at a single dynamic and tempo, surely his choice of dynamic and tempo would evince some stance toward, and affect our perception of, the musical relationships. But second and more importantly, why would Meyer think that playing neutrally—taken here to denote a relative lack of differentiation—would guarantee the “preservation” or perception of the relationships he posits? He clearly presupposes that these relationships are objectively present in the music, built into the notes. As such, the performer need only play the notes, with minimal interpretive “intervention,” and these relationships will automatically be apparent. Yet, I would object, the melodic patterns Meyer discerns are less objective facts than *potentialities*, possible melodic shapes that would have to be projected by the performer—by means of the subtle yet distinctive use of dynamics, tempo, and articulation—to be actualized. (I will develop this point extensively in the next chapter.) Moreover, given the multiple melodic trajectories Meyer notes, it would seem sensible to choose one in order to orientate the listener. To refrain from interpretation is not to afford the listener a richer experience but a...
vaguer one. Meyer’s subtext is well-taken—“don’t play this passage in an overly fussy way”—but that is a far cry from avoiding interpretation altogether.


* * *

In the past two decades or so, theorists have grown increasingly resistant to this hegemonic scheme. Some, while still charging performance with expressing structure, will deny that this structure is *a priori*, the sole property of the music analyst. Rather, they believe that a performer can intuitively arrive at a compelling reading of the structure of a piece, and thus that performance can influence analytical understanding as much as the reverse. On this view, performance and analysis stand in a symmetrical relationship relative to the work, each capable of realizing its potentialities and of offering equally valid interpretations. I have already cited Lester (1995) as evincing this view. Here are some others, surveyed chronologically:
• Both Howell (1992) and Nolan (1994) offer evenhanded expositions on the ineluctable tension between analysis and performance, even as the two domains share common ground.

• Fisk (1996 and 1997) posits that strict analysis is not a requisite for performance. Rather, the experience of interpreting and physically rendering a piece can entail implicit analytical decisions, and may subsequently lead performers more consciously to formulate analytical insights. He also posits the category of the “performer’s analysis,” which is less formal and systematic than a strict analysis, will arise in conjunction with a “characterological” analysis of the piece, and will conduce more than strict analysis to physically rendering the piece—it will arise from and cater to the particular needs of the performer.

• Rothstein (1995) guards against excessively conforming to an analysis, such as bringing out all instances of a motive (in an inner voice, say), fugal entries, *Urlinie* tones,\(^\text{24}\) and the like. In his view, if one wants to convey a musical narrative, one must not give away too much too soon.

• Cook advocates “the mutuality of the analyst/performer, as against the hegemonic relationship assumed by Berry and Narmour” (1999a, 245).

• Schachter (2001) asserts that analytical and performance-based perspectives complement each other: analysts must possess a performative disposition to guard against excessive

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\(^{24}\) Schenker himself—whose views on performance Rothstein elsewhere explains (1984)—bids the performer not to follow “the *Urlinie* slavishly and pluck it out of the diminution, just to communicate it to the listener” (1927, 109).
abstraction, while performers must go beyond the surface and grapple with higher-level complexities.

• Other, more practical studies that, to my mind, evince a sensible, equitable approach to performance and analysis are Schmalfeldt (1985 and 2011), Larson (1993), and McClelland (2004).

Several studies, naturally, fall in between these poles of the hegemonic and balanced. Hatten (2010), for example, wants to propose “theoretical approaches to musical interpretation [that] do not neglect issues of immediate concern to performers, or direct engagement with the moment of real-time performance” (50). To this end, he focuses on musical tropes, topics, and gestures, all of which “can help close the gap between analysis and performance, by highlighting those expressively motivated syntheses of greatest relevance to performers” (53). Yet, in his subsequent analysis of Chopin’s Fourth Ballade, he strictly polices the performer’s tempo choices, thus limiting, in my view, the performer’s capacity for gestural and topical expression. Of the barcarolle-like second theme, for example, he asserts that, “again, minimizing any interior rubato in the performance of the barcarolle’s metric gesture will allow the expressivity of melodic line and phrase structure to prevail over subjective dynamic bulges” (62, my italics). “Minimizing any,” in my reading, equates with “no rubato,” and rubato, in turn, apparently equates with self-indulgently subjective intrusions.

More generally, other writers, such as Parmer, as discussed, and also Carolyn Abbate, desire to counterbalance abstract musical knowledge of any kind, not just theoretical knowledge per se, with the real experience of the performer; they extol performance-based rather than intellectual
knowledge. Though an admirable aim, in discussing the need to lend credence to performance knowledge without really specifying what such knowledge would look like, they ultimately mystify it. That is, they render it an abstraction, which is precisely contrary to their aim. Parmer (2007) says what performance knowledge is not, or not exclusively—namely, “how-to” knowledge—but does not say what it actually is. Abbate (2004) implicitly builds on Susan Sontag’s (1967) rejection of the notion that artworks mean something other than what they are—that, in other words, artistic meaning is primarily symbolic or mimetic. Abbate calls this hermeneutic mentality “gnostic,” over against the “drastic,” which is the irreducibly, ineffably carnal experience of live performance.  

25 She, like Parmer, bemoans the bias in musicology toward the gnostic to the virtual exclusion of the drastic. Musicology, she admits, has dealt with performance practice and recorded performance, but not “one-off” live performances. The irony is, her protracted, rather abstruse defense of performance against institutionally sanctioned knowledge ultimately reproduces the very musicological abstraction of which she claims to be skeptical. Moreover, we walk away

25 This formulation echoes Edward Said’s celebrated formulation of “performance as an extreme occasion,” in his eponymous essay (1991). The crucial difference is that whereas Abbate celebrates the drastic nature of the concert experience, of the performer’s corporeality in particular, Said sees in it a possible vehicle of domination. The virtuoso in his view does not so much beneficently connect with his audience as overwhelms it: “Whether we focus on the repeatable mechanically reproduced performance available on disc . . . or on the alienating social ritual of the concert itself, with the scarcity of tickets and the staggeringly brilliant technique of the performer achieving roughly the same distancing effect, the listener is in a relatively weak and not entirely admirable position” (1991, 3). Said proceeds to portray “the listener’s poignant speechlessness as he/she faces an onslaught of such refinement, articulation, and technique as almost to constitute a sadomasochistic experience” (ibid.).
without a clear picture of what performing knowledge is, or worse, we worry it might turn out to be something rather trivial. As Hatten says, “but what does Abbate offer to displace the ‘cryptic truths’ of every form of analysis? Only her own testimony as the accompanist for a singer, in which she reports such personal reactions as ‘doing this really fast is fun’” (2010, 50).

Abbate’s perhaps unconscious ambivalence toward the performer also comes through in her stance toward recording technology. A possible drawback of digitized music, I believe, is that it has a disembodied quality; it creates the impression that the music has no performer, that the music is just there, ready-made.26 Naomi Cumming states, “It is obvious that musical sounds are not, in origin, an impersonal or accidental event, that they do not come to exist in the disembodied medium of a CD without the action of a performer’s body, but technological intervention can induce [us to forget] this fact” (2000, 21). She proceeds to note that such “complicity in technical illusion” (ibid.) is evident in people’s surprise upon hearing a well-known artist in person, having previously only heard her on recordings. Cumming recounts one such response to Midori, who came across to a particular critic as having a rather weak sound live compared to her stronger recorded, presumably digitally enhanced sound. Yet, as Cumming notes, Midori, like any well-known performer, is a persona, one constructed precisely through such doctored sound:

26 Recall Adorno’s view, which is that the record, though it potentially reifies music, is justified by possessing its own modicum of materiality—it is not transparent to the music it records. From an Adornian perspective, then, the CD, and even more so the MP3 file, are suspect due to a patent lack of materiality—neither has the grooves that for Adorno made the record an admirable kind of musical text in its own right.
the engineers have effectively created for her a musical ‘body’ and identity. . . . They are able to
effect this illusion because the characteristics of sounds are the aural ‘marks’ of bodily action. . . .
Although a listener’s attention, when playing a CD, may not be directed to bodily actions . . . the
impression of a ‘personality’ can be gained subliminally through the markers in sound of what
seem to be the performer’s characteristic physical responses. Sonic illusion is not, then, the
innocent cleaning up of a musical surface, but the construction of a personality (ibid., 22).27

Hence, if the digital medium potentially anonymizes and disembodies the actual performer, it also
potentially creates for her a virtual presence, it paints a picture of bodily action that the listener
attributes to an imagined persona.

Cumming thus shows two sides of digital technology, but Abbaté seems to acknowledge
only one. She maintains that digitized music “hardly shatters the subject except in the most literal
way. Masking or suppressing perception of individual performers serves, in fact, to enhance a
sense of the figural subject. . . . Subjectivity is dispersed, relocated, and made mysterious . . . but it
is by no means dissolved” (1991, 14).28 She thus agrees with Cumming’s point that a persona can
be sonically constructed, but she does not seem bothered by the possibility that media potentially
efface the actual performer. In other words, in 1991 she seems comfortable with the lack (or
illusory lack) of precisely that element—a real body—she so extols in 2004. Perhaps her views on

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27 The idea of performing oneself, over and beyond performing the piece or work one is playing, is, of course,
a central topos in performance studies, as discussed in Auslander (2001, 2004, 2006a and b). I will return
to this idea momentarily.

28 This statement must be understood in light of Abbate’s broader contention that pieces are populated “by
multiple, decentered voices localized in several invisible bodies” (1991, 13).
performance changed in the interim. In any case, I think we should never be complacent about the very real people behind classical performance, the very real labor such performance requires. While I agree that pieces commonly intimate several virtual personae, I also think that, in performed (as opposed to electronic) music, the performer, her presence, is very real—it does not fold under the weight of the virtual personae the music projects.

Another, somewhat contradictory stance is found in Cook (2001 and elsewhere), where he asserts that the score is nothing but a script, a working tool for the performer, one that coordinates his activities and his social interactions with other performers and the audience. “Whereas to think of a Mozart quartet as a ‘text’ is to construe it as a half-sonic, half-ideal object reproduced in performance, to think of it as a ‘script’ is to see it as choreographing a series of real-time, social interactions between players” (2001, parag. 15). In this model, performances relate to the work not in the “vertical,” veridical sense of realizing it more or less truthfully or accurately, but in a “horizontal” sense: the work comprises merely a series of performances, each of which derives significance from its relation to other performances.29

Auslander (2006a) is rightly skeptical of this stance:

Describing a musical work as a set of parameters for a social interaction among musicians, rather than an ideal object to be reproduced through performance, Cook goes against the grain of the musicological tradition. But his positing of the musical work as that which is performed ultimately leads to a privileging of the work, now renamed as a script, which remains consonant with that tradition (2006a, 101).

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29 This view is to be distinguished from Goodman’s (1976), which is that a work is nothing other than the collection of performances in perfect compliance with a score.
Auslander proposes an alternative view—that we perform not a script-cum-work but rather an identity, a persona. “The direct object of the verb to perform need not be something—it can also be someone, an identity rather than a text” (2006a, 101, his italics).

While I agree with his critique of Cook, I do not view Auslander’s solution as entirely satisfactory. For I believe we do indeed perform something, not just someone, when we interpret a score and lend it sonoric form. That something is neither a metaphysical work that transcends performance nor merely a script, instructions for the performer. For, on the one hand, we do not perform a work as something external, because performance is in some sense part of that work. On the other hand, the score does not merely serve performance (as according to Small and, at least ostensibly, Cook). To think so is to practice a reverse-discourse that preserves the underlying hegemonic binarism of work/performance while inverting the terms. Rather, as I have stated, performers help create a work in performing a score and realizing its multiple connotations and potentialities. Performers do many things in relation to a score—educe, unpack, crystallize, elucidate, actualize, exemplify, concretize—in the process co-creating along with it the musical work of which the score is a trace.

Moreover, unraveling the complexities and ambiguities that musical scores by their very nature entail requires some form of analytical insight or awareness. In my view, analysis and performance are distinct yet coequal and analogous attempts to elucidate the score, to present one or some of its many possible structural and narrative meanings. Analysis and performance are coequal and analogous in that they ultimately aim, or should aim, toward the same goal: interpretive insight, a compelling way to hear and understand the piece on a particular occasion (a particular recital, lecture, or lecture-recital). In this endeavor, good analysis draws upon what I
believe to be its innately artistic dimension in addition to the intellectual one with which it is more readily associated. Good performers, conversely, draw upon some analytical awareness, formalized or not, in addition to the more experiential and artistic dimension with which they are more readily associated. In this approach, I strive to circumvent the pitfalls of both the “gnostic” model, where performance is deemed subservient to theory, and the “drastic” model, where theory or any other intellectual pursuit is deemed wholly irrelevant to performance. The ideal, I feel, is that analysis inform performance in a non-dictatorial way, in a way that opens up fresh, creative possibilities. To this end, I advocate a more flexible and imaginative use of analysis, an approach that renders analytical insights more amenable to the kinds of things that a performer can express—namely, bodily states and emotional and psychological processes. How can established analytical models be employed so as to expand rather than constrict the range of cogent interpretive possibilities? My dissertation attempts to answer this question both theoretically and by analyzing various works from the tonal canon.

3. AN OVERVIEW

Here I offer a sense of how the above ideas will be mobilized, organized, and fleshed out in three of my four main chapters. I will not synopsize Chapter 3, since it is an extended analysis of a single work—Beethoven’s String Quartet in C minor, Op. 18, no. 4, first movement—an analysis that will serve to flesh out the ontological and methodological claims of the first two chapters.30

30 For that matter, Chapter 4 offers a large-scale analysis of a single work as well, Schumann’s Frauenliebe und·leben—“Du Ring an Meinem Finger,” in particular. In this respect, the dissertation divides somewhat neatly into two parts: the first two chapters are primarily theoretical, the second two primarily analytical.
Chapter 1

To reiterate, structural and emotive properties do not inhere in notation and are not self-evident; notation necessarily harbors multiple possible meanings. In this sense, interpretation is intrinsic to the musical work. Chapter 1 places this view against the backdrop of opposing ideologies, ones that view interpretation as extrinsic to the work, as having to defer to truths that supposedly inhere in a self-complete work or in historical circumstances surrounding the work.

The authentic-performance movement is an outgrowth of this view. I view this movement as an extension of the positivistic musicology criticized, most famously, by Tomlinson (1984), Kerman (1985), and Subotnik (1991). This movement has become something of an easy target, but I would be remiss not to touch on it, invoking in particular Taruskin’s (1995) celebrated critique. I supplement Taruskin by offering an alternative to the modernist mentality with which, according to Taruskin, authentic-performance practitioners approach music history. Namely, I discuss five composers, ranging from J. S. Bach to Lou Harrison, who evidently conceived of their compositional products not as fixed but as intertwined with performance—more so than is commonly assumed, especially of iconic, canonical composers. The potentially self-contradictory aspect of my critique, which I might as well acknowledge upfront, is that, in countering what I see as provincial historicism, I myself seek recourse to historical evidence. Nonetheless, I feel that, so long as one cannot and should not entirely ignore the historical context surrounding compositions, one does well to recognize that such context is weighted much more heavily on the

Nonetheless, the first two feature several analyses, the fourth devotes large sections to theoretical meditation.
side of interpretive liberty than on that of interpretive constraint.

As problematic as the authentic-performance movement—if less well known—are the music ontologies posited by Kivy (1993) and Walton (1988), among others, who view a work as a kind of Platonic ideal, complete in all essential respects prior to its materialization in performance. In this sense, they implicitly frame performance—to offer my own metaphor—as a kind of embellishing variation on a theme (read: work). In response to these models, I propose what I see as a more fruitful application of the theme/variation metaphor to the musical work/performance: I will suggest a theory of retroactive thematicity for which I have argued elsewhere (Swinkin [2012]). Here, the theme—particularly in the variation sets of Beethoven and Brahms—is less a concrete melodic-harmonic scaffold than an abstract repository of motivic potentialities that variations actualize to greater or lesser degrees, thus retroactively determining what the (non-obvious) thematic properties actually are. By analogy, a musical work is a repository of structural and corresponding emotive/narrative potentialities, as implied by the score’s notations, that performances actualize. Performances on this view are not supplemental to a work that is always already complete, but are integral to it. Performances continuously define, or redefine, what a work in fact is—which is to say, what a work can become.31

This alternate ontology has a strong counterpart in the phenomenological reader-response theory of Iser (1978) and, to a lesser degree, the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer (1960). Iser frames the literary work as precisely such a repository of potentialities and, insofar as the reader actualizes these, he deems the reader and act of reading necessary rather than ancillary components.

31 Thom (2007) also draws certain parallels between variations of a theme and performances of a work.
of the work. Gadamer argues that the text or work we seek to interpret is not frozen in a particular historical moment but rather continues to evolve into the present, such that we not only can but indeed must utilize our present perspectives in order to parse the work. For Iser, the gap between text and reader is no impediment to interpretation but rather a precondition of it; ditto for Gadamer, regarding the gap between past and present. Finally, Adorno’s *Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction* (2006), at least in my reading, provides a musical counterpart to both of these models. In it I find a liberating model of the musical work, one that includes interpretation as an essential component and that fosters the kind of interpretive breadth and flexibility for which I am arguing.

I conclude the chapter by considering some concrete interpretive corollaries of these views. The performer, I suggest, needs to employ his three primary domains—tempo, articulation, and dynamics—to the extent necessary to convey structural sense and emotive-narrative meaning. Adorno (2006) himself recommends opting for dynamic extremes, rather than mezzo forte, as the “default,” in order to express human sentience. Inevitably, Adorno’s musical preferences are inseparable from his broader ethical and ideological concerns, and so I enumerate some of these, as I think they are relevant to our current musical culture. These concerns bear on musical commodification and subjective autonomy. As to the latter, I posit, in an Adornian spirit, a model of interpretive autonomy, in which the performer/performance is, or should be, autonomous in relation to the score in some respects. This means, somewhat paradoxically, that the more freely the performer approaches the score, the more easily he will be able to illuminate structural-emotive facets of the score.

Such interpretive freedom, however, as I have been implying, is musical efficacious only if
wed with musical intelligence, with a keen cognizance of the score’s various structural potentials. Hence, music analysis plays an integral role in the interpretive process. It is to this role that I turn in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2

Here I propose that analysis is best understood not as a truth-seeking endeavor but rather as a means by which to expose various structural possibilities, ambiguities, and aporias that necessitate the interpreter’s participation. Yet, Schenkerian analysis in particular is often used with objectivist pretensions, with respect to both score and performance. Regarding the latter, both Burkhart (1983) and Folio (1992), for example, beseech the performer to “bring out” the underlying features exposed by their voice-leading analyses. In doing so, they presuppose that their analyses disinter the truth of the composition, which the performer must somehow project. The approach these writers represent (at least in these instances) impoverishes both Schenkerian analysis and performance—it reduces the former to a fact-finding endeavor, the latter to a fact-expressing one. I argue, by contrast, that higher structural levels are not truths to be expressed, perhaps not even actual pitches in the piece (much less ones that need be brought out), but constructs that imbue the foreground with particular dynamic qualities and thus elicit particular interpret shadings. In other words, I advocate that the performer sensuously shape foreground details in accordance with their relationship to higher structural levels.

This approach finds support in the rich philosophical tradition in which Schenkerian theory is ensconced. I suggest three models from German philosophy with which Schenkerian theory has been, or could be, aligned: Goethean organicism (Neff [2006] and Pastille [1990]),
Kantian transcendental apperception (Korsyn [1988]), and the Freudian dreamwork. The last of these entails a hidden meaning that must be excavated by the analyst: for Freud, the latent dream/unconscious is the truth; for Schenker, the Ursatz, he sometimes declares, is the truth. Yet, the Ursatz can be viewed more generously, as analogous to, or indicative of, the aforementioned Kantian faculty, by which the listener unifies a manifold. The Ursatz, on this view, is less a static truth underlying appearances than the unifying force of consciousness infusing appearances, rendering them coherent. In this way, the Ursatz is happily compatible with the diversity and particularity of musical surfaces, its generality is but “a foil for the sensed particular” (Van Den Toorn [1995, 55]). This stance, I argue, is in turn more compatible with the (coherent) differentiation and particularity that, in my view, is the aim of interpretation to exploit.

As for Schenker’s own views on performance, these resist easy summation, and may not even amount to a single, coherent stance. For, on the one hand, these views are dispersed throughout his entire analytical oeuvre; on the other, the one treatise he devoted exclusively to performance (Schenker [1911, pub. 2000]) was never completed. Nevertheless, as gleaned from his various and sundry remarks, and from his editorial piano fingerings (as parsed in Schachter [1975], Rothstein [1984] and Swinkin [2007]), his stance seems to be quite detail-oriented and bottom-up—quite at odds with the top-down, structuralist approach with which he is associated, and by which pedagogues sometimes rationalize imposing a “long line” upon pieces.

This incongruity prompts Cook to declare, “the relationship between analytical theory and performance practice is far from the unproblematical mapping assumed by the page-to-stage approach” (2010, 7). Indeed, as both Maus (1999b) and myself (2008) have previously argued, it is dubious whether performances can in fact convey propositional content—or even if they could,
whether they should. Of course, it is possible that a performance subliminally conveys to the listener something of the analytical insight by which it is informed and influenced, but that is not its primary function—analyses serve performances, not the other way around. Performances may derive a measure of cogency and coherence from the analytical viewpoint they adopt (wittingly or not), but their job is not to communicate such a viewpoint as a piece of abstract information.

Rather than communicate or instantiate analysis, the role of performance, Maus and I separately contend, is to respond to analysis. Of course, this ensures no consistency from one performance to another, and that, in my view, is a good thing. The variability with which performances respond to any one analytical insight actualizes and enriches the work, which always allows for divergent realizations.

Hence, rather than regard an analysis as a factual assertion, I prefer to view it as an implicit recommendation for how to hear, and by extension, perform a piece. In this model, analytical observations do not describe how we actually hear a piece, nor prescribe how we should, but rather suggest a way we could. Analysis thus becomes a performative rather than factual enterprise, a point Cook (1989a and 1989b) makes nicely. And one way to allow this (following Swinkin [2008]) is to recover the physical and emotive states for which Schenkerian and other analytical constructs are arguably metaphorical, as such states can be readily embodied in performance.

Moreover, interrelating such states as the expression of a single persona (or perhaps of several) can engender a musical narrative that, in turn, motivates a compelling interpretation, a universe of interrelated particulars that is a hallmark of narrative generally. Another facet of this approach is using analysis to disinter various structural problems or ambiguities the performer resolves, or, in some cases, retains or even exacerbates. In both these ways, analysis implicates and necessitates the
interpreter. Analysis both offers opportunities for sensuous embodiment and crystallizes the structural problems the pitches and rhythms of a score potentiate.

Here, in summary, are the three main points regarding the role of analysis in performative interpretation that Chapter 2 pursues:

1. Higher structural levels can be seen to highlight and particularize rather than reduce away the foreground phenomena that comprise the performer’s primary vehicle of expression.

2. The contentual or putatively factual element of an analytical insight is far less valuable for the performer than the somatic or emotive schema underlying such an insight. For performance cannot convey propositions but can convey, in fluctuations of sound and time, the somatic and expressive states connotated by such propositions.

3. A performative analysis will be less concerned to expose static features or properties than to expose dynamic structural-cum-narrative problems, lacunae, and ambiguities to which the performer can (or even must) respond in some fashion.

Chapter 4

Chapter 2 conceives of performative analysis as speaking directly to the performer’s need to express emotive and narrative meaning. Chapter 4 demonstrates that performative analysis can also critique, or allow the performer to critique, the ostensible meaning of a work, a particular meaning assigned by the presence of a text, as in vocal music. I use Schumann’s Frauenliebe und –leben—"Du Ring an meinem Finger" in particular—as a case study. Due to its evident misogyny, I set out to analyze this work in a deliberately polemical or provocative way so as to elicit performances that resist its apparent ideology.
A precedent for such a resisting performance is the New Coon Creek Girls’ cover of “Pretty Polly,” an Appalachian Murder Ballad, a genre that depicts the merciless killing of a woman, and that is usually performed with apparent indifference to the woman’s plight. Lydia Hamessley (2005) cites the New Coon Creek Girls, by contrast, as giving the woman a voice through their arrangement—specifically, in supplying a solo violin whose expressive gestures can be seen to represent the woman’s sentience. In this song, since the words are mainly those of the man (a composite of an apathetic third-person narrator and the homicidal character), resistance must occur on a non-verbal level. In Frauenliebe, the woman would seem to speak her own words, but they arguably articulate a masculine ideal of female passivity within the scheme of nineteenth-century bourgeois domesticity. Hence, it is not surprising that the instrumental postlude, as analyzed by Kristina Muxfeldt (2001), is a primary site of resistance. However, I am not content to relegate resistance solely to the postlude; I want it to percolate throughout the cycle, and I believe it does so, potentially, in the cracks and crevices of Schumann’s musical structures. These musical potentialities, conjoined with a performative-analytical scheme, can generate subtexts through which the performer conveys resistance on a largely non-discursive level. These inner monologues will yield interpretive and physical choices that telegraph resistance, on levels both large and small, both obvious and subtle.

My process will be to read the musical structure as consisting of parametric crosscurrents that cannot be fully integrated, thus educing a potential source of unease and resistance. In particular, I counterpose hierarchical and horizontal domains, the latter both motivic and melodic-implicative. I draw here upon a long-standing music-theoretical polemic between Schenkerians on the one hand and the implication-realization school of Leonard Meyer and Eugene Narmour on
the other. I tap into this polemic not to unpack or arbitrate among the arguments, but solely to avail myself of a heuristic vehicle by which to generate resisting performances. That is, I harness disciplinary tension to create interpretive tension. More precisely, the parametric tension derived from this theoretical dispute will serve both to symbolize the heroine’s resistance to her predicament and also to induce such tension between the performers and the cycle. The resistance will thus be both metaphorical and causal, iconic and indexical.

My critique relies in no small part on an irreducible plurality of interpretations, a standard feminist tack: different forms of analysis and different metaphorical readings of analytical scenarios will yield different strains of resistance, different resistant emotions, ranging from mere ambivalence to outright anger and defiance. I worked with soprano Jennifer Goltz on this project, and she and I offer four different interpretations along this continuum.

The final part of this chapter meditates on the implications of this interpretive exercise for issues taken up in the first two, theoretical chapters, in particular regarding the hegemonic models of work/performance and analysis/performance. What, if any, are the gendered dimensions of these models? I will pursue the idea, somewhat cautiously, that the work, conventionally conceived, assumes a male-dominating stance toward the performer-as-female. This view is empirically bolstered, of course, by the fact that most, if not all, canonical composers of the common-practice period are men and that most amateur performers, especially pianists, in the nineteenth century were women. I will inevitably draw upon much feminist musicology here, by McClary (1990), Citron (1993), Cusick (1994a and b), Leppert (1992), and Maus (1993), among others. I conclude that to catalyze performer-resistance by exploiting potential structural conflicts is not merely to do the aesthetic work of claiming a place for the performer in the very structure of
the work, but is also (as Cusick argues) to do the cultural work of countering male hegemony. In this model, the performer (read: female) refuses to “disappear” in deference to—or be rendered wholly transparent to—the supposedly fixed ideas of the composer (read: male).

4. Conclusion

Here, in summary, are the principal questions with which my dissertation will grapple. The first, most general one, is one I have already stated verbatim:

1. How do a particular piece, analytically-informed or -intuitive performer(s), and engaged, empathic listener(s) collectively generate structural and emotional/narrative meaning?

2. How might we model the musical work so as to include interpretation as an integral component? More specifically, how might we schematize the relationship among score, analysis, interpretation, performance, and perception?

3. How can music analysis be conceived or employed so as to allow for ample interpretive freedom, to open up numerous interpretive possibilities?

4. What constitutes performative (illocutionary) analysis?

5. What conception of Schenkerian theory allows for interpretive heterogeneity and particularity, embodiment, and musical narrative?

6. What constitutes a resisting performance, and how might analysis be used in its service?

7. In what respects is the work/performance hegemonic model gendered?
I will assay answers to these questions drawing on not just music theory and analysis (especially Schenkerian, formal, and motivic analysis\textsuperscript{32}) but also philosophy of music, music sociology, historical musicology, literary theory (reader-response theory in particular), continental philosophy, ethnomusicology, performance and theater studies, popular music studies, and feminist and queer theory. In addition to the written document, I have set up a companion website\textsuperscript{33} featuring audio and video recordings of, or links to, many of the performances I discuss, some of which are my own. Still, since some readers may not have access to this website for whatever reason, I will notate the interpretive choices derived from my analyses on the scores themselves.

To whom, precisely, am I speaking? Primarily, to music theorists and musicologists who, in light of the recent trends in the field surveyed above, are probably already sympathetic to performance and interpretation, and who view it as worthy of intellectual contemplation and possibly even of inclusion in the domain of the musical work. To this contingent, I endeavor to offer some specific strategies of performative analysis, as regards Schenkerian inquiry in particular. I also implicitly address musicians who consider themselves primarily performers but who are seeking ways to become more analytically informed and want not rigid analytical prescription but

\textsuperscript{32} The three principal models of motivic analysis are: (a) traditional: motives are surface configurations that are variously permuted; (b) Schoenbergian: motives are drawn from a Grundgestalt and subject to developing variation; and (c) Schenkerian: motives are higher-level entities (often comprised of triadic intervals and linear progressions) that tend to recur from level to level (in the form of motivic parallelisms). I shall employ all three models.

\textsuperscript{33} https://sites.google.com/site/jeffreyswinkin
rather creative collaboration. Finally, I hope to connect with scholars in related disciplines—
ethnomusicology, performance and theater studies, feminist and critical theory—for whom
performance, or the idea of the performative, is a central concern. My work draws generously on
all these disciplines and so, it is only reasonable to hope that my work gives back to them in some
small way. Those who are not professional music analysts will probably want to skip over the
particularly technical parts, including the penultimate section of Chapter 2, most or all of Chapter
3, and the middle section of Chapter 4. That still leaves plenty of theoretical food for thought.

* * *

Just as I began this Introduction with a concession or caveat, so must I end with one. My
overarching assumption is that the performer’s job is to interpret: to find meaning in a text (or
more precisely, in the interstice of a text and particular interpretive methodologies) and embody or
respond to it in sound and time. Enfolded in this assumption is another: that interpretation is a
higher station than mere execution. This may seem a somewhat self-evident, inevitable
contention, but it is not. Laurence Dreyfus (2007) reminds us that this valuation is historically
contingent and needs to be contextualized: “When we use a word as an unthinking badge of
identification, unaware of its history, we ignore the repertoire of meanings and nuances which
govern its contemporary usage” (2007, 255). C.P.E. Bach, for one, charged the performer with
rendering notation in accordance with good taste and propriety. In this conception, performance
is not unthinking physical labor but neither is it a high-minded endeavor. Others, such as Mozart,
emphasized the need not to construe the composer’s notations but to become the composer, as it
were—to adopt the persona of the rhetorician whose main task is to elicit particular emotional
responses from his audience. The notion of interpreter as exegete emerged only later, with the rise of instrumental music: Beethoven’s music in particular, listeners suspected, harbored secret, mystical, and transcendental meanings whose decipherment called for an insightful interpreter. (To be clear, my stance, on which I elaborate in Chapter 2, is not that the interpreter decodes hidden meanings but rather that he in a sense creates or constructs meanings from notational potentials conjoined with an analytical apparatus. However, the “gnostic” or hermeneutic stance is undeniably a precedent for the model of interpretation I avow.)

I won’t retrace the rest of Dreyfus’s fascinating historical unfolding of the concept of interpretation, but suffice to say, the notion of interpretation as a meaning-finding or -making endeavor is contrary to the ways people used to think about performance. I acknowledge, therefore, that my valorizing of interpretation is historically contingent and also potentially harbors elitist overtones (“conception trumps execution”) that I will endeavor to guard against. For I do not see interpretation and execution as fundamentally divergent enterprises, and certainly not as mutually exclusive. In fact, in Chapter 1, I fondly recall Adorno’s idea that execution, viewed as an end in itself, paradoxically fosters interpretive insight. Also, in Chapter 2, I argue that interpretive concepts, like concepts generally, are built on experiential substrata, and are thus naturally disposed toward physical embodiment. In this scheme, interpretive intellection and physical execution, while not strictly synonymous, are ineluctably tethered and co-dependent.
CHAPTER 1

CURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON INTERPRETATION AND SOME PROPOSED REMEDIES

The ultimate aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate how music analysis can help the performer discover interesting interpretive options and ideas. While a simple and modest aim in itself, it relies upon a complex network of ideological and theoretical assumptions that this opening chapter (along with the Introduction) makes explicit. My dissertation is a response to aspects of performance, musicology, music theory, and music philosophy that I find to be questionable or objectionable. I outlined three such trends (all interrelated) in the Introduction: work-centrism, interpretive restraint, and music-analytic hegemony. All have roots too numerous and complex to exhaustively dig up here.¹ I will, however, consider and critique two academic ideologies relating to the first two trends, saving a discussion of music analysis for Chapter 2. These two ideologies, in a word, are Authenticity, as evidenced by the authentic-performance movement, and Platonism, as evidenced by various statements and essays on music ontology. The former locates the “truth” of the work in an idealized past, the latter in some idealized, Platonic realm.

¹ I believe many of these roots are economic, political, cultural, and sociological. Though some of these will arise, as inevitably they must, in parsing Adorno’s theory of musical interpretation (later in this chapter), by and large I will save a more thoroughgoing critique along these lines for future projects.
My opening discussion will thus be somewhat critical and reactive, but toward the end of it I transition to a more constructive mode. Here I pose a music-ontological model that, more than Platonic models, fosters interpretive experimentation and specificity. This leads me to consider, in Part II, theories of interpretation, both literary and musical, that buttress this ontology. These works count interpretation generally as well as the interpreter’s particular perspective among the integral components of the artwork. In this, they encourage the interpreter to play an active role in shaping the work in highly individual ways. Part III, finally, spells out some concrete interpretive ramifications of all this theoretical exposition.

PART I: CRITIQUE

1.1. AUTHENTICITY

The most famous, effective, and trenchant critique of the authentic-performance movement (hereafter, “authenticity movement”) is still that of Richard Taruskin (1995). He levels the charge that this movement ironically arises from and evinces modernist rather than historicist precepts. That is, this movement shares with modernism a predilection for the impersonal, the timeless, the geometric, sound for its own sake, and the novel. The last of these, I noticed, is borne out in a small but striking way in Nicholas Kenyon’s description of Nikolaus Harnoncourt’s 1968 recording of Bach’s B minor Mass, which helped kick-start the authenticity movement: “it was the Harnoncourt Mass that made the most controversial impact, for it used not only ‘original’ instruments, but boys’ voices in the choir and new approaches to phrasing, balance, and articulation” (1988, 4, my italics). By “new,” Kenyon presumably means “old”—he means putatively authentic styles of phrasing and articulation. The infelicitous word choice (parapraxis?),
however, is telling: it implies that that the authenticity movement revives old, historical techniques exactly because they are in a sense “new”—new, that is, to modern ears. This is precisely Taruskin’s point: the sensibility that informs this movement is a modernist one, one preoccupied with novelty, not a historicist one.

This irony can play in reverse as well: not only do apparently conservative values often betray more progressive ones, but apparently progressive values often betray more conservative ones, as Taruskin himself observes in his Stanford Presidential Lecture (2009). Here, he muses that applicants to the composition faculty at U.C. Berkeley (where Taruskin teaches) uniformly and proudly avow their music to be “transgressive.” In doing so, they are oblivious to two ironies: first, transgression is the new conformity—to “transgress” in the current music-compositional climate is precisely to conform to what is expected of the composer (especially the academic one).

Incidentally, Kenyon displays some sense of this incongruity in his very next, parenthetical statement: “It is of course ironic, and a comment on the whole ‘authenticity’ business, that most of its artefacts are in the extremely inauthentic form of recordings without audience which sound the same every time one plays them” (1988, 4).

In a similar vein, Fredric Jameson diagnoses postmodern artistic genres, such as the pastiche in general and nostalgia films in particular, as representing not so much our historical past as “our ideas or cultural stereotypes about that past” (1983, 118). He continues,

Cultural production has been driven back inside the mind . . . it can no longer look directly . . . at the real world for the referent but must, as in Plato’s cave, trace its mental images of the world on its confining walls. . . . we seem condemned to seek the historical past through our own pop images and stereotypes about that past, which itself remains forever out of reach (ibid.)

To this extent, the authenticity movement is as much a postmodern phenomenon as, on Taruskin’s view, a modernist one.
Paradoxically, the transgressive artist works within well-defined constraints. Second, transgression itself is not even a new, radical value. Taruskin reminds us that it stems from the nineteenth-century aesthetics of autonomy. As he explains, aesthetic autonomy had a more benign moment, in which art was thought merely to be hermetically sealed from the external world. But then it had a more pernicious moment, in which the artist-as-hero—epitomized by Beethoven—was thought to rise above common humanity and effect social revolution. The first moment is problematic both in being widely assumed a self-evident, ahistorical principle and in establishing a basis for the second moment, for the artist’s “right” to transgress. Taruskin laments that the romantic ideal of the autonomous artist, operative to this day, fosters the presumption that artists are immune to codes of moral conduct. This notion has often produced “spectacular collisions” between artist and audience. Artists have used their supposedly inalienable right to self-expression to justify unsound ethical judgments—even a disregard of public safety, as in the case of a controversial

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4 Kevin Korsyn similarly claims that (seeming) radical individualism is not incompatible with false uniformity or consensus—both, in fact, characterize modern society. Taking academia as representative, he claims it establishes professionalized discourses that prescribe the ways in which one may be individual. That is, institutions at once allow for individual expression yet also carefully circumscribe the type and extent of it: “The type of originality that tends to be valued . . . must be classifiable according to norms” (2003, 26).

5 Taruskin traces these dual ethoi of autonomy and transgression back to “esthetic” and “historical” narratives, respectively. The latter “celebrates progressive (or ‘revolutionary’) emancipation and values artworks according to their contribution to that project. Both are shopworn heirlooms of German romanticism” (2010, xv). He denigrates Adorno and Dahlhaus, in particular, for subscribing to and perpetuating these values. On the latter figure, also see Hepokoski (1991).
2006 production of *Idomeneo* in Berlin, which proceeded under a bomb threat, to cite just one of Taruskin’s examples (Taruskin [2009]).

I juxtapose Taruskin’s pet peeves of authenticity and of transgression in order to note their converse relationship: the former is a modernist sentiment tricked out as a historicist one, the latter a historical (Romantic) sentiment tricked out as a modernist (or postmodernist) one. I should clarify that I do not think there is anything intrinsically wrong with, for example, Renaissance performance values per se, or Romantic aesthetic values per se. The problems arise when musicians (a) universalize contingent values, as is especially the case with Romantic aesthetics, or (b) peddle oppressive precepts on the basis of specious historical support, as is often the case with practitioners of “authenticity.” The latter spout the necessity of historical veracity and validation under the false supposition that their practices are historically pure.

Why, again, aren’t these practices “historically pure?” Not just for the most general reason we have been discussing, that the impulse to fetishize historical practices emanates from modernist values. More specifically, because the authenticity movement aspires to an ideal sound product and aims to produce it by closely adhering to an *Urtext*. However, in following the letter rather than spirit of the score, Taruskin observes, the authenticity movement undermines its own enterprise. A performer can approximate (though never precisely replicate) the practices of a particular era only by investing the performance with his own subjective inclinations—thus achieving insight, firsthand, into the subjective impulses that have become reified by notation (a claim Adorno will later help us fill out). This requires no submission or strict adherence to scholarly evidence. Taruskin avers, “To limit oneself to positive data is nothing but literalism, leading at best to an impersonation . . . of the past . . . And impersonation of anything, after all,
is the opposite of authentic” (1995, 79). What we need, then, for authentic authenticity is an honest appropriation of the past from our present perspective—an active rather than passive inheritance of tradition (a claim Iser and Gadamer will later help us fill out). Perhaps Taruskin’s stance toward performance can be encapsulated thus: in seeking “authenticity”—not in any literal, historicist sense but in the sense simply of wanting to bring music to life—we ought not to be surreptitiously modernist but rather ought to embrace our inevitable modernity, the necessity of our present and subjective perspective.

**Precedents for a Flexible Work Concept**

Yet, this is not to recommend we abandon all historical awareness. If capturing the spirit rather than letter of the composition requires us to embrace our ineluctable presentness, it may also require us to acknowledge historical circumstances devoid of modernist-ideological blinders. To be clear, I do not mean to imply that one can ever be entirely free of ideological prejudices or that there is some pure historical condition that is simply waiting to be retrieved. I only mean to say that to uncover the circumstances and practices surrounding pieces or works—those of virtually any period, in fact—is to recognize their malleability, their fluid identity, and thus the high degree

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6 Relatedly, Peter Rabinowitz suggests that historical reconstruction, ideally, should less determine the practices that governed an original performance than discover “the attributive screens through which [musical sounds] were processed by their intended listeners.” That is, “part of ‘the music,’ as the composer originally intended it, lies in the commonplaces and metaphors listeners were likely to use to organize their aesthetic experiences” (1992, 55).
of interpretive freedom they support. I will survey a handful of telling examples, proceeding chronologically.

1) Bach’s musical culture was one of shared performance conventions—as are, in some sense, most musical cultures—such that he left many elements unnotated, such as embellishments upon repeats (a notable and beautiful exception is the Sarabande from the English Suite in A minor). Likewise, Bach only rarely notated articulation and dynamics in his keyboard works; typically he provides only short, sporadic slurs. These elements might have been regulated by practice to some extent, but Bach no doubt wanted to grant the performer a generous degree of interpretive freedom. Bach’s lack of sanctimony toward his own texts is also evident in his having transcribed many of his own pieces for alternate instrumentations—and, in The Art of Fugue and The Musical Offering, having left the instrumentation mostly unspecified to begin with.

2) We witness similar circumstances with Beethoven, who, for example, allowed the “Hammerklavier” Sonata to be published in a version that excised the titanic fugal finale. Also, as is well known, he composed an alternate finale to the String Quartet, op. 130, relegating the original finale, the Grosse Fuge, to an independent opus. Maynard Solomon raises the possibility that these cases betray an aesthetic sensibility that musicologists are often reluctant to assign Beethoven, or composers generally—one that embraces the openness of the musical work, the presence of alternate solutions to compositional problems. Solomon asks whether Beethoven conceived for his works “a plurality of potential, dormant alternatives, dependent for their emergence on intuition, contingency, and whim” and concludes that “the real point, of course,
may be that in late-period Beethoven no work was necessarily final, nor was any form ineluctably
the only one capable of expressing his central ideas” (1991, 292). In short, Solomon implies that
Beethoven was not as wedded to the ideal of the sacrosanct, indivisible artwork as we are.

3) Jeffrey Kallberg points out that discrepancies among different versions of a single passage or
piece by Chopin is today viewed as a problem (what he dubs the “Chopin problem”). However,
the musical work in Chopin’s day, he claims, was more of a social process, a byproduct of the
interaction among Chopin, his publishers, and the public. Hence, the work was conceived as a
broader phenomenon, not inextricably linked with any one score or version but rather comprised
of multiple versions. Hence, “the sources preserving Chopin’s music reveal clearly the problematic
nature of the notion of ‘composer’s intentions’ in general, and ‘final intentions’ in particular”
(1996, 218). Similarly, John Rink (2003), referring to the three different versions Chopin
composed of the Nocturne, op. 9, no. 2, contends that to be “authentic” in this case is precisely not

7 Barbara Barry (1995) also devotes much thought to this idea in relation to op. 130, suggesting that the
original finale (the Grosse Fuge) functions as an oppositional agent with respect to the previous five
movements, thus creating a bipartite framework for the piece as a whole. The alternate finale, by contrast,
conforms to an overarching pattern by which the more serious and somewhat contrapuntal movements (1
and 3) alternate with the more playful, dance-like, homophonic ones (2, 4, and 6). Like Solomon but to a
greater extent, Barry frames this issue in terms of potentiality: the beginning of this work, as perhaps those of
all works, intimates a plurality of continuations. Normally, of course, the composer settles upon one
actualization but Beethoven, in the rare cases we have been considering, offered two possible actualizations,
each of which retrospectively affects the structural balance and dynamic of the previous movements and
thus the piece as a whole.
to conform to any one edition necessarily, or at least not grant any one edition authoritative status. Rather, the performer may take the plurality of editions and of variances among them to be emblematic of the wide range of interpretive possibilities open to her.

4) The flexibility or broadness of intentionality is particularly patent in composers from whom we have both verbal statements and recordings. Robert Fink recounts, for example, how Stravinsky, for his 1929 “first revised edition” of The Rite of Spring, felt compelled to rebar certain passages in order to clarify rhythmic grouping and accentuation. Specifically, he split measures in 5/16 meter into two shorter measures of 2/16 + 3/16. Crucially, he did so based on Pierre Monteux’s interpretation, on the latter’s rhythmic “analysis” of the “Danse sacrale” (Fink [1999, 319]). In other words, Monteux’s interpretation was subsequently incorporated into the completed work as one of its permanent properties. On the other hand, Stravinsky also felt compelled to re-beam a passage in order to clarify the grouping of some measures in 5/16 as 3+2 rather than, as Monteux had done, 2+3. Even here, Monteux’s “mistake” became integral to the work in inciting a notation Stravinsky had not previously conceived. In short, Monteux’s interpretation had become part of the revised work in both positive and negative senses.

Fink considers these events in light of Stravinsky’s aesthetic stance toward interpretation generally, as articulated in his Poetics of Music (1947). Here, the composer distinguishes between “potential music,” the composer’s intentions as notated in the score, and “actual music,” the sounding music by which those intentions are realized. Ideally, for Stravinsky, the latter will involve minimal interpretive “intervention,” minimal subjective response on the part of the

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8 Monteux conducted the notoriously ill-received premiere of the work in 1913.
performer. Stravinsky holds that potential music is logically prior to, and more desirable than, actual music, which always threatens to corrupt the supposed purity of the composer’s conception. Yet, Stravinsky’s revisions of The Rite demonstrate just how dialectically interwoven the work and performance are: as much as Stravinsky may have felt that his revisions in response to Monteux’s interpretation represent the way he had always wanted the music to sound, clearly that interpretation served to educe many of Stravinsky’s intentions, ones of which he was not conscious until having heard a performance. In Fink’s words, “Monteux’s incorrect interpretation of the text was not a betrayal of the composer’s prescriptions but the catalyst for them. Actual music, in this case at least, precedes and determines potential—if only dialectically, by contradiction” (1999, 323, my italics).9

This story, I would suggest, dramatizes the normative condition of the musical work. It reveals the extent to which interpretation continually expands the identity of the work, even when the composer happens no longer to be around in order to institute changes and inscribe them into the score. The story illustrates that the work is necessarily always evolving, and that the “real” music is not Platonic or conceptual in essence—the composer’s intentions comprise no pristine realm, one fully crystallized prior to performance. The score in this view is merely a moment within the ongoing exchange, actual or possible, between composer and performer. No single text can truly be definitive of a musical work.

9 Kevin Korsyn cautioned me, in a personal communication, that Fink overlooks the possibility that Stravinsky made editorial changes merely in order to renew copyright.
5) Less well known, finally, is the case of Lou Harrison’s *Grand Duo* (1988). In preparing the critical edition of this piece, Mark Clague recalls, Harrison asked the editor to include the articulation and bowing that Romuald Tecco, the violinist for whom the work was composed, wrote into his part. Clague muses:

> if Harrison was still living, would he have continued to tinker with the musical text in future performances as he had done so often in the past? . . . All of this raises questions about the absolute certainty of any edition and cautions against editorial hubris. An edition may capture a particular version of a work at a particular moment, but the vital creative contribution of performance as underscored by [this] example reminds us that a musical work is likely to be a moving, mutating target. At least for certain composers, the work itself is a *process of becoming* reconceived at each juncture of the publishing or performance (2005, 59–60, my italics).

To summarize, to approach a work with a relatively unclouded rather than ideologically distorted historical perspective is to encounter strong evidence in favor of interpretive necessity and freedom. It is only in the twentieth century that interpretive confinement and standardization became a distinct trend, as I discussed in the Introduction. And I base this claim not only on the genetic circumstances I just outlined but also on the various treatises (by Quantz and C.P.E. Bach), comments on Beethoven’s playing (by Czerny and Schindler), and various and sundry remarks made by Mozart and Chopin, among others, that paint a picture of much freer interpretive practices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than most musicians currently assume. However, it is beyond the scope of my dissertation to survey these treatises.
1.2. The Hermeneutic Impulse

We have seen that for the authenticity movement, historical context is less something that informs performance than something to which performance is reduced or indebted—performance serves history, not the other way around. Put differently, historical circumstance serves as a separable criterion, one supposedly guaranteeing the correctness of a performance. This tactic lends a falseness to and reifies both cultural context and performance in one fell swoop. On the one hand, it reduces the former to a repository of discrete elements—the right instrument, tuning, number of players, acoustical setting, performance techniques, and so on. On the other hand, it implicitly frames music as something neutral and prediscursive that is modified by certain cultural constraints. Yet, as Gary Tomlinson (1984) maintains, music is not something separate from culture and then conditioned by it. Rather, music informs the very culture it is informed by—the two domains are inseparable. Music, like the human subject according to Judith Butler (1990), has always already been inscribed by culture and is simultaneously a cultural force that inscribes other domains.

This specious historicism might be related to a hermeneutic impulse—hermeneutic in the sense of assuming truths to be buried behind sensuous appearances, truths that can or should be excavated by the canny interpreter. In the next chapter, I will critique this view in relation to music theory (Schenkerian theory in particular) and show how it does not foster perspicacious performance. Here, in preparation for that, I will consider the hermeneutic impulse in historical musicology (aside from the authenticity movement, which, in my view, is an extension of empirical
musicology), in performance culture, and in musical performance itself. In considering the last, I counter a commonly held view that the gestures and sound structures a performer creates in realizing a score express primarily his private, emotional and psychological states (if also those of the composer, for whom the performer is often considered a proxy). This discussion will provide an opportunity to sketch my basic beliefs about musical meaning and how it is generated in performance, beliefs that will inform the remainder of this dissertation.

**Historical Musicology**

What is the value of knowing a piece is in sonata form? Such a generic designation tells you little indeed unless you understand how the form is particularized in any given instance. What is more, Charles Rosen reminds us that sonata form as originally conceived by A. B. Marx was largely a codification of Beethoven’s practices prior to 1812—a highly circumscribed domain:

> those aspects of Beethoven (and of Mozart—not of Haydn) which had the greatest interest for the nineteenth-century composer were isolated; these were, principally, the order and the character of

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10 The hermeneutic impulse in music can arguably be traced back to Beethoven. (In fact, as Cook says more generally, “many of the ideas most deeply embedded in our thinking about music today can be traced back to the ferment of ideas that surrounded the reception of Beethoven’s music” [1998, 24]). Dahlhaus affirms that Beethoven’s music was basically the first to convey the sense that music contained clandestine meanings. Beethoven’s first audiences, Dahlhaus recounts, “felt basically that the acoustic phenomenon whose sense they were unable to grasp nevertheless harbored a meaning, which, with sufficient effort, could be made intelligible.” Beethoven’s music challenged audiences “to decipher, in patient exertion, the meaning of what had taken place in the music” (1989, 10–11).
themes. Harmonic and textual matters were consequently pushed into the background, as subsidiary to the thematic structure. . . . The method of defining a form by taking the works of a famous composer as models is rightfully discredited today (1988, 4).

On this view, sonata form, at least as formulated by Marx, is regrettably synecdochal: a limited number of traits, those of Beethoven’s music, speciously stands in for the whole of a form.

A dangerous consequence of this sort of generalizing procedure is that we are likely to view particular techniques as aberrant with respect to supposed norms. As an example, Rosen asks us to consider Haydn’s “monothematicism.”11 By the late 1780s, it was standard practice to use a different theme for the second tonal area, in relation to which, admittedly, “Haydn’s procedure was markedly eccentric” (1988, 5). Yet, though the typical listener in this period would initially have been surprised by Haydn’s use of the same theme, he would have quickly grown accustomed to it and taken it as normative for Haydn’s practice:

In short, the average music lover in the 1780s—as today—listened to Haydn not against a background of general practice but in the context of Haydn’s own style. He did not expect Haydn to sound like anybody else; by the 1780s his music was accepted on its own terms. We might, in fact, claim that the more Haydn was heard against general practice, the less he was understood” (ibid., 6).

Rosen’s is a cautionary tale, the moral of which is that the seemingly benign act of placing a work in a formal category is far from unproblematic, especially if that form, as with sonata form, was postulated ex post facto and falsely generalizes primarily the practice of a single composer

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11 Rosen deems this a misnomer, since even movements that use a variant of the opening theme to articulate the expository dominant invariably contain different themes elsewhere in the movement.
(Beethoven), or falsely objectifies the aesthetic preference of a given age (that of the nineteenth century toward thematic rather than tonal paradigms). Nor is it fruitful to label practices idiosyncratic or aberrant with respect to norms, since these so-called aberrant practices quickly constitute their own norms. Simply put, lurking behind sonata practices is not some Beethovenian truth or essence.

On a broader level, Adorno (1999a) argues that stylistic categories and distinctions are often erroneous or misleading. He claims that Classical music requires the critical subjectivity normally associated with Romanticism, Romanticism the objective grounding normally associated with Classicism. Similarly, DeNora (1994) reminds us that supposedly inviolable historical categories such as “Classical” and “Romantic” are social constructions. We might view substylistic distinctions with equal skepticism. For example, Solomon, in discussing the traditional tripartition of Beethoven’s oeuvre into early, middle, and late, proclaims that his “oeuvre is a single oeuvre, which we segment out of a penchant for classification, a need to clarify—and at our peril” (1988, 125). James Webster, finally, avers, “The concept ’Classical style’ (I must use quotation-marks) is an anachronism. Haydn was understood in his own time as modern, a bold pioneer; his progressive form and destabilizing rhetoric are incompatible with the shibboleths of balance,

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12 I problematize the conventional periodization of Beethoven’s music generally, Adorno’s distinctions between the middle and late styles in particular, in Swinkin (forthcoming B).

13 Note that, on this point, he and Rosen take issue—as we just discussed, Rosen does not see Haydn as a musical iconoclast. They also obviously disagree regarding the validity of the moniker, “Classical style.” I am concerned here, however, with their point of contact: sonata form is a false generalization for Rosen just as the Classical style is for Webster.
symmetry, architectonic form, and the rest. He and Mozart were not thought of as ‘classics’ until early in the nineteenth century” (1991, 9).

Hence, the question Rosen, Adorno, DeNora, Solomon, and Webster raise is, what do we really gain when we apply to a piece the general designations—such as “sonata” or “Classical”—that are the bread and butter of musicological practice? I would suggest that they are fine if used as a springboard for a more “particularist” analysis, an engagement with the irreducibly unique details of a particular composition—just as the Ursatz and other high-level constructs are valuable mainly insofar as they lead to this sort of engagement (or so I will argue in the next chapter).

**Concert Culture**

The hermeneutic impulse is also evident in our modern concert culture, where the musical factoids that populate program notes and pre-concert lectures (Beethoven’s deafness, Schubert’s syphilis, Tchaikovsky’s homosexuality, and so forth) pose as bona fide musical knowledge. Program annotators and pre-concert lecturers “sell” these nuggets of information to concert-goers hungry for them, in part because audiences think, are led to believe, that such information will help them understand something about the pieces being performed. The audience, moreover, enters the concert hall predisposed to such a hermeneutic sensibility. This predisposition derives

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14 Braunschweig (2012) valiantly endeavors to reconnect musicological knowledge (music-theoretical knowledge in particular) to the concrete historical particulars from which, in his view, it has been progressively dissociated in favor of abstractions.

from broader cultural trends, among the most influential of which, Abbate contends, is film (and technology in general):

> Consuming a diet rich in cinema with musical accompaniment . . . continues to nourish a deep conviction that musical configurations convey information. . . . Contemporary sensoria have been re-formed by modern technological multimedia, and this leads to amplified convictions about correspondences. The original sensorial transformation . . . is projected onto pretechnological high art objects (like symphonies), with correspondence becoming those works’ raison d’être. . . .

Perhaps hermeneutics was reborn of cinematic kitsch and manipulation (2004, 523).

Abbate does not univocally disparage this filmic predilection, nor shall I. After all, I endorse the view of Adorno and Gadamer, among others (to be discussed later) that a musical work—due in part to its indeterminate and polysemous character—is a continually “moving, mutating target” (to recall Mark Clague’s felicitous phrase), and that the various cultural paradigms through which it passes can possibly illuminate its various potentialities. Indeed, perhaps it is simply in the technological nature of our era that music is, as Abbate says, “sticky”—that images and associations readily adhere to it, and perhaps these cast a different and valuable light upon aspects of a composition. Yet, Abbate’s main thrust is that performing and the performing body—a sheer, irreducibly physical presence—are recalcitrant toward abstract, hermeneutic intellection, and I would affirm that the emphasis on bodily thought and on pure sensuality equally characterize the spirit of our age. Indeed, the hermeneutic and the somatic constitute polarized yet coexisting
epistemological frameworks in our society (musical and otherwise)—just as, similarly, metaphysics and materiality were competing aesthetic currents in nineteenth-century musical culture.\(^ {16}\)

We need not choose between these antithetical terms. On the contrary, a meritorious model of performance/analysis will, I believe, synthesize them—it will bring conceptual reflection and sensuous materiality into proximity. While it remains to be seen how this will work, for now it suffices to recognize that this project is not served by a hermeneutic drive to treat music as a symbol for something else or to reduce it to facts (especially facts that are mere biographical curiosities).

**Musical Expression**

Our propensity to seek categories into which we can fit sounds or to seek meanings behind sounds likely leads to, and also results from, a propensity to assume that a performance is transparent to

\(^ {16}\) The work concept and the cult of virtuosity arose roughly around the same time—the latter, of course, due in large measure to the efforts of Liszt. He, according to Lawrence Kramer, helped “establish music as a popular entertainment medium . . . [even as] many musicians . . . were simultaneously trying to establish music as a fine art” (2002, 69). In contrast to the Romantic ideal of pure, structural listening, Liszt’s performances lent veracity, even a spiritual dimension, to musical expression. His showmanship flouted the post-Enlightenment ideal of music as universal, as transcending particularity (especially that of the performer). A signal musical paradox of Liszt’s period, therefore, was that music “is supposed to possess independent symbolic value . . . but it can be transmitted . . . only by means of public spectacles that threaten to subordinate music to the histrionics of performance” (2002, 81). This was an era, then, in which the sensuous medium of sound competed with the artwork for ontological primacy, an era in which music was bifurcated into the extremes of metaphysical transcendence and sensuous immediacy.
the performer’s interiority, that it directly reflects her emotional state. We often conceive performance, in other words, as unmediated self-expression and often reduce it to emotional states that can be easily captured in words. Yet, the solo musician likely adopts a persona when she performs, and this in two senses: that of a protagonist—a narrator of, or character within, the musical plot—and, at least in the case of stars, of a public personage that has been more or less deliberately constructed so as to render the musician a brand-name product with readily identifiable characteristics. In neither case, necessarily, would the performer feel the emotions she portrays: as a narrator or character, she might empathize with them to the degree necessary to convey emotion in sound; as a persona, she might not even empathize with them but merely project their appearance to an audience using both sonic and visual cues.

Cumming (2000) expertly explains the means by which a musician conveys emotion in sound. To begin, she affirms that, in music, feeling is mediated by the sounds a performer creates, in all its nuances. Musical feeling is not a direct expression of the performer’s sentience but rather derives from certain interpretive strategies, sound profiles, to which we have granted intersubjectively stable meanings. To say a violin “sings,” to use her example, is, first of all, not to suggest that it represents someone actually singing; “when you hear ‘singing’ in a violin’s sound, the singing is in the sound, not somewhere else. . . . ‘Singing’ is not, then, an object to which you imagine [sounds] refer” (ibid., 73). To expand upon her example, the emotional quality such

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17 Auslander (2006a and b) is a strong proponent of this view; I will return to his argument later.

18 Put in Nelson Goodman’s (1976) terms, the violinist in this scenario exemplifies rather than denotes vocality; simply put, vocality is not separable from the sound in which it is manifest. As Treitler (1997) explains, while the phrase “sad person” refers to (denotes) the person over there who is crying, a sad piece is
violinistic singing exudes—pleading, soulfulness, dejection, or whatever—is one we listeners can recognize due to preestablished, intersubjective agreement as to what basic emotions correlate with what performative nuances. Consider Joshua Bell’s performance of the opening cadenza from Beethoven’s Violin Concerto, for example (Web Ex. 4). His interpretive choices, as roughly outlined in Ex. 1-1, create gestures that, in my hearing, wax and wane in degrees of confidence. Overall, he conjures a narrative by which one attempts to find a voice, to find a way into a discussion or, more broadly, a community. Of course, an introductory cadenza, by its very nature, will usually convey something along these lines, but Bell exploits this sentiment in his various hesitations, dynamics, phrasing, and points of arrival.19 I think it is fairly intuitive that each of these gestures are on some level analogous or isomorphic with non-musical motions and emotions.

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...itself a tangible instance of (it exemplifies) sadness. Hence, in listening to the piece, we are not led away from it, as with the phrase, but our attention is bound to each musical detail exuding that quality. (A possible consequence of this is that the referent is ultimately inextricable with and redefined by the artwork in which it is evident.) As Treitler aptly summarizes (in referring to a passage from Berg’s Lulu, but which he invokes to convey this general point), “The music signifies, unquestionably, but it is not absorbed in signifying. Reference flows from this complex signified back to the music, which, rather than vanishing once it has done its job of signifying, is richer as a result of the reference from the signified to it” (1997, 35).

19 Another good example of an introductory, written-out cadenza that somewhat cautiously introduces the soloist, brings her into the discussion, is the piano’s exordium of Mozart’s Piano Concerto in C, K. 467, first movement.
I will briefly expand on this principle of isomorphism, without pretending to offer a full-fledged theory of musical meaning or emotion. Kivy’s “contour” theory “explains the expressiveness of music by the congruence of musical ‘contour’ with the structure of [human] expressive features and behavior” (1989,77). Here Kivy draws a distinction between expressing emotion and being expressive of emotion (1989, 12–13). To cite his paradigmatic example, a Saint Bernard is not necessarily sad, but to a human observer his countenance is nonetheless expressive of sadness because it resembles the countenance of a person when he or she is sad. By contrast, the dour countenance of a person who is in fact sad expresses sadness—his countenance directly reflects how he is feeling. Music, Kivy submits, is more like the Saint Bernard than the sad person: a piece is expressive of sadness not because it is sad in any literal sense—nor because it expresses the sad feelings of the composer or evokes them in the listener—but because its contour closely resembles the physical forms we associate with sadness. A drooping façade or posture, whether of a Saint Bernard, flower, or melody—say, one in a minor key and replete with descending leaps, as in the first two measures of Mozart’s Mass in C minor, K. 427—is likely to convey a negative emotional quality, a dejected state; the opposite holds for an uplifted façade. In short, music is expressive partially due to its isomorphic relation to animate features.

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20 I do so in Swinkin (forthcoming A), on which the following few paragraphs are based.

21 Davies (1994, 201–278) similarly submits that music presents not felt emotion but “emotion characteristics in appearances”; that is, music utilizes the same primary expressions of feeling as operate in people. Small (1998, passim) expresses a related view: that music expresses emotions not directly but rather through the physical gestures with which emotions are associated. Incidentally, Kivy (1989) also locates a source of musical expression in musical convention, expressive codes with widely recognized denotations.
One type of these that he does not really discuss are the topics (topoi) of the Classical style, such as horn calls (horn fifths), which commonly express aggressiveness; *Sturm und Drang* angst; the lament bass (held over from the Baroque) ceremonious grief; the Mannheim rocket intense expectancy; the sigh (*Seufzer*) motif plaintive longing, and so forth. For a general introduction to classical topics, see Allanbrook (1983, 31–70) and Ratner (1980, 9–29). Of course, the expressive import of these and other musical conventions has in part to do with their contours. That is, the line separating contours and conventions is rather permeable, as Kivy himself recognizes.
Emotional contour is not confined to melodic physiognomy. We also detect emotion in musical behaviors that are analogous to human behaviors—in particular, to physical gesture and vocal utterance. As to the former, just as we might infer an emotion from a person’s gait, so might we from a musical gait, as conjured by tempo and rhythm. To take an obvious example, a slow tempo commonly intimates a sluggish gait, from which we infer sadness (especially if conjoined with the minor mode). On a more local level, much music is replete with gestures that can be understood as analogous to human ones; this is particularly true of the mature classical style, with its heterogeneous phrase rhythms and detailed articulations. Regarding vocality, Kivy states that we hear sadness in music when we “hear musical sounds as appropriate to the expression of sadness . . . when we hear them as human utterances, and perceive the features of these utterances as structurally similar to our own voices when we express our own sadness in speech” (1989, 51).

Kivy attributes musical contours, gestures, and behaviors to notational patterns, but they can also arise from patterns of sound, from the various inflections by which a musician lifts the notes off a page. Sometimes performance gestures will merely replicate those more or less built into notations; other times they will amplify or diminish them; other times they will be entirely novel and have little to do with the implications of notation. In any case, Kivy’s theory of contour-

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22 Although Kivy’s theory serves us well to a point, it is patently deficient in accounting for the wealth of music-emotional nuance that we associate with the music we know and love. To account for such nuance more completely, we need to incorporate considerations of structure, to examine in particular the interrelations between foreground contours and conventions on the one hand, high-level structural processes (Schenkerian and motivic) on the other (which Agawu [1991] does brilliantly). While I cannot fully theorize this process here, I will draw upon such an amalgam somewhat intuitively in the chapters and analyses that follow.
isomorphism can be readily applied to performance and help explain how a performer conveys expressive meanings to an audience. For example, perceiving music as evocative of speech depends in no small measure upon performance, especially regarding articulation. Interestingly, the eighteenth century witnessed a significant shift in the manner by which performers conveyed a linguistic sensibility. Barth (1992, 38 ff.) recounts how the “syllabic nonlegato” of C.P.E. Bach and Mozart gave way to Beethoven’s predominately legato touch. While the latter would seem far less conducive to a declamatory style than the localized articulation and pianistic punctuation of earlier composers, in fact, Beethoven’s “cherished innovations—the legato style, the slurs that more frequently crossed bar lines to subsume points of arrival, the lengthy passages of unarticulated figuration” (47)—became means of conveying larger dramatic arcs. Beethoven sublated the periodicity of eighteenth century rhetoric, preserving it but on a higher level, one compatible with his grander structural proportions. His use of legato less often conveyed long-lined lyricism than “dramatic breadth” (45).

The foregoing substantiates my basic point: while performers may feel the emotions they musically portray to various degrees, musical expression does not depend on it, because we hear expressive qualities in sounds as shaped interpretively, due to their analogous relations to extra-musical phenomena. Thus, we err in supposing that a composition is a mechanism by which to convey or transport the inner state of a performer (or composer) to the listener, as along an assembly line. Rather, music, as written and performed, works with an intersubjectively established community of gestures and tropes, such that we all participate in the generation of musical meaning.
In conclusion, hermeneutic-musical knowledge, ideas about a piece that are separable from it—whether historical, biographical, or having to do with performance—are just that: knowledge about a piece rather than knowledge of a piece. This notion applies to music-theoretical ideas as well and will serve as the foundation for the theory of Schenkerian embodiment I propose in the next chapter.

2.1. Ontologies of the Musical Work

Schoenberg and Stravinsky are two of the more famous figures who have outright degraded the interpretive act: Schoenberg deems it a gratuitous sonic realization of a self-complete work that one might as well audiate (aurally imagine) directly from the score.\(^{23}\) Stravinsky, as we have seen, deems it not only gratuitous but even potentially disruptive. In his scheme, Fink states, “the move from potential to actual [music] is always a fall from grace, especially if the performers have known Sin, letting their own musical ideas ‘contaminate’ the purity of the composer’s original conception” (1999, 323). But, as we already know, the genesis of The Rite gives the lie to Stravinsky’s own distinction, for (this quote bears repeating) “Monteux’s incorrect interpretation of the text was not a betrayal of the composer’s prescriptions but the catalyst for them. Actual music, in this case at least, precedes and determines potential [music]. . . ”

\(^{23}\) Note, however—as evident in his comments I peppered throughout the footnotes to this chapter—that Schoenberg often adopts quite a liberal, charitable stance toward performance, appearing to regard it as essential to the expression of human sentience in music. As I mentioned in connection with Glenn Gould (see Introduction), these two ideals of the abstract, non-material work and of interpretive license, though seemingly antithetical, can in fact be seen as compatible.
These stances on the part of Schoenberg and Stravinsky anticipate the Platonic ontologies more explicitly formulated by later twentieth-century analytic philosophers. Such ontologies, by their very nature, peripheralize performance. Let us survey various ontological positions, progressing from the most strictly Platonic on one pole to the most performance-oriented on the other. Peter Kivy (1993) defends, if not wholly advocates, the theory that a musical work is a Platonic entity that the composer discovers rather than creates, such that even if it never materialized in a score—or once it had been, all the scores were destroyed—it would still exist. Performances in this scheme are tokens of a type, mere instances of an entity that is essentially complete in its abstract form. Performance here is thus extrinsic to the work itself.

This view is closely related to, and perhaps derives from, a Romantic-period conception of music as ideal or as in essence a mental conception (of the composer and/or listener) and to a concomitant distrust of musical materiality. A statement by Hugo Riemann (although written in 1915) epitomizes this view:

The alpha and omega of music are not to be found in actual musical performance, but are to be found in the newly arising tonal relationships in the musical phantasy of the composer before they are notated, and again in the musical phantasy of the listener. The notation of a musical composition and even the actual performance are only expediens for transplanting the musical experiences from the mind of the composer into that of the listener. (“Ideen zu einer ‘Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen’” [“Ideas for a Theory of Tonal Concepts”] in Mickelsen [1977, 86]).

Schumann expresses this same view more poetically, exclaiming, “if only I had no fingers and could play with my heart on other hearts!”

24 “...hätt ich nur keine Finger and könnte mit meinen Herzen spielen auf andern!” Tagebücher 1, 361, translated by MacDonald (2002, 539). MacDonald also notes that Schumann generally embodied the
Kendall Walton (1988), similarly, advances a quasi-Platonic theory: he claims a musical work is defined by the sound patterns represented in the score. That is, the score specifies the sonic properties a performance must possess to be an instance of the work. These specifications comprising the work are basically pitches and rhythms. Other parameters, such as phrasing and dynamics, are recommendations as to how to perform the work well—how to interpret the essential elements—but do not affect the identity of the work. In Walton’s terminology, a performance both “presents” the sound pattern of a work, manifesting its defining features, and “portrays” that pattern, parsing it in particular ways. Performance in this theory, though more highly valued than in the full-fledged Platonic theory, is nonetheless peripheral to the work proper.

Jerrold Levinson (1980) refutes both of these views, arguing that musical works cannot be pure sound patterns since (a) works are composed; (b) the musico-historical (stylistic) context yields essential aesthetic attributes of the work; and (c) the performance medium is essential to the identity of the work. Musical works must encompass creation, historical context, and performance. The result is an “indicated” (rather than “implicit”) structure, one that arises from an act of human determination performed upon pure structure. In short, Levinson defines the musical work as a sound and performance structure as indicated by a composer at a particular moment in music history. For example, “Brahms’s Piano Trio in C, Op. 101, is not simply a sequence of sounds performed on a piano, violin, and cello, but rather that sequence-as-indicated-

aforementioned duality of nineteenth-century thought, the paradox by which music’s technical, material medium came to the fore just as music also came to be regarded as embodying spiritual essence. Schumann’s ambivalence in this regard, as documented by MacDonald, thus reflects not just his own artistic and psychological dilemmas but also an essential conflict of his age.
by-Brahms-in-the-summer-of-1880. . . . the aesthetic and artistic attributes of a work are not fixed solely by the relevant sound/performance means structure. This precludes identifying such works with the pure structures comprised in them” (1980, 64–65). Performance in this theory, then, is an essential constituent of the work.

Finally, Nelson Goodman, in his characteristically nominalist vein, claims that a musical work has no essential, defining properties and is nothing more than the collection of performances in perfect compliance with the score. Goodman’s requisite of “perfect compliance” is infamously draconian and runs counter to common experience, in which we have no trouble identifying a work even when its performance is technically imperfect. Hence, we benefit from José Bowen’s related but more nuanced, Wittgensteinian view: a work is nothing other than a series of performances related to each other by virtue of “family resemblance” rather than of conforming to essential properties. Performances mediate between the generic aspects indicative of a fixed work and the particularity and individuality of a specific musical utterance. They exist within a historical tradition of performances, both alluding to previous performances—displaying the qualities they take to constitute the work—and introducing changes, leading to a new conception of what constitutes the work. Performances, not the score, define the work (Bowen [1993]).

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25 Jean-Jacques Nattiez articulates this same notion but less technically: “the musical work is not merely . . . ‘structures’. . . . Rather, the work is also constituted by the procedures that have engendered it (acts of composition), and the procedures to which it gives rise: acts of interpretation and perception” (1990, ix).

In this cursory survey, the two polar extremes I mentioned are evident: on one pole, the work is entirely separate from its materialization in performance; on the other, the work is inextricable from its performances. The first, Platonic view, represented by Kivy, is patently untenable since, as Levinson suggests, it runs counter to the commonsense intuition that works are created, not merely discovered. Platonic musical universals are, if anything, melodic, contrapuntal, and harmonic schemata (of the Schenkerian sort, for example), which require substantial elaboration and embellishment to form a complete work. It makes little sense to posit that works in their finished detail and specificity are somehow predestined and inevitable (even taken as a metaphor, the value of the Platonic paradigm is far from clear). Moreover, if, as few would deny, music is a sonic art—just as painting is a visual art, literature a linguistic art, and so forth—then surely we would want to question a conception of the musical work that grants sound and its interpretive sculpting such low status.

The second, nominalist view, represented by Goodman, is equally problematic, for it reduces a work to mere notation and its realization, failing to include the meanings and relationships that notation might entail. Moreover, it adopts a stridently mechanistic view of performance, reducing its function to mere instantiation. This model, like its Platonic antithesis, has a precedent in nineteenth-century thought. Its precedent is located in the increased value granted to performance as a sensuous phenomenon over and above any transcendental ideas the work might communicate. Although my aim is to liberate performance from excessive abstraction, I still want to keep performance tethered to the larger work of which it is a necessary component. I want to demonstrate how performers parse notations in order to crystallize their structural-cum-
emotional potentials. For, the “all about performance” model evinces the same hegemonic dynamic but merely with the terms and valuations reversed: instead of the work on some level effacing performance, the performance effaces the work.

Walton and Levinson mediate these unpalatable extremes with some success. Walton’s theory, however, is less than ideal as it deems interpretation a merely decorative domain, as peripheral to the work itself. Levinson’s comes closest to my own in including performance among the work’s essential dimensions. Still, we need to specify further the relation between performance and the notational elements of the work. This I pursue in the next section.

2.2. A THEME-AND-VARIATIONS MODEL

I propose that a musical work is comprised of the configurations of pitch and rhythm denoted by a score, a range of expressive and structural potentials connoted by these configurations, and the interpretations/performances\(^\text{27}\) that both present the score’s denotative properties and actualize its

\(^{27}\) I share Paul Thom’s distinction between interpretation and performance: an interpretation is a type, an abstract conception of how one wants to play the piece (which might arise, however, from physical exploration); actual performances are tokens of that type, actualizing it to varying degrees of accuracy and efficacy (Thom [1993, 43]). In my view, the variabilities that arise in performing a work over a period of time may ultimately lead to a new conception, a new interpretive type (even if largely implicit or unconscious). Parmer recognizes this reciprocity between conception and realization when he states, “material realizations do not flow from preexisting sound images in a unidirectional circuit: each produces the other so that the realization of an idea into material form alters or conditions the idea that simultaneously gives rise to the realization” (2007, 35). This reciprocity does not, however, in my view
connotative possibilities. In triangulating these domains of work, score, and performance, I find the theme-and-variations model a useful analogy. Briefly put, a performance is like a variation of a score-as-theme in that it will both present its invariant, denotative properties, at least to a high degree, and also generate new properties, many of which will ultimately serve to actualize various of the score/theme’s potentialities.

This operation of actualization, however, is not common to all variations. Some variations, we all know, are solely or primarily decorative or embellishmental. It is variations of the nineteenth century—particularly those of Beethoven and Brahms—that possess especially potent actualizing capacity. In my article devoted to this topic (Swinkin [2012]), I have provided numerous instances of variations within variation sets (mostly Brahms’s opus 9) that realize myriad structural potentials with respect to tonal structure, voice leading, motive, rhythm, form, and so on.

However, this variational procedure is by no means limited to variation form per se. To offer just one example: in Brahms’s “Sommerabend” (the first of Six Songs, Op. 85), the opening gambit (Ex. 1-2) intimates a I–IV–vii–I progression—the middle two chords are merely “intimated” because they occur over a tonic pedal point. After a contrasting middle section

obviate the need to distinguish between interpretive conception and performative realization—on the contrary, such reciprocity depends on this distinction.

28 I will elaborate on this idea of structural potentiality, or music-structural imaginings, in the next chapter.
29 Markand Thakar holds precisely the opposite view: that the work is what remains after all the performance-variations are reduced away. “We are after the object that is the continuity across those infinite variations. We are after the essence of the piece itself” (2011, 11). Needless to say, I am highly skeptical of such essentialist thinking.
centered (at least initially) on D minor, the opening refrain returns (m. 25) but now fully realizing the initially latent chord progression, in the process producing an effect (or affect) of sensuous release. But this is not all: the roots of the first three chords implicit in the first refrain—B♭-E♭-A—suggest a descending-fifth sequence. This latency is also realized in the second refrain, where the B♭-E♭-A continues onto D-G-C-F-B♭-E. Indeed, the sequential possibility is so fully realized—Brahms gets so caught up in it—that he “overshoots” the ostensible tonal goal (B♭, I, in
m. 31), passing on to E that forms the root of a vi\textsuperscript{7}/V (we initially expect this V to be the structural dominant of the entire song, but this expectation is thwarted when the V discharges into another I\textsuperscript{7}).\textsuperscript{30} One might say that the sequential element of mm. 2–6—anticipated, incidentally, by the slight piano introduction, which traverses C–F–B♭—would scarcely be apparent if not for its actualization by the variational second refrain. In other words, standing on its own, I–IV–vii–I, although featuring a descending-fifth root-progression across the first three chords, is likely to be construed simply as a functional T–PD–D–T progression over a tonic pedal (a typical opening gambit). It is not until the second refrain that we realize, in retrospect, the latent sequential, in contrast to functional, potential of this initial progression. The second refrain thus helps comprise the “theme’s” identity. The variation is not innocuous and purely coloristic but rather plays a decisive role in exposing what the theme in fact is by showing what it is able to become—that is, by showing what features it potentially possesses.

The next song in the set, “Mondenschein” (Ex. 1-3) forms a pair with “Sommerabend.”\textsuperscript{31} This is evident not just in the obvious repetition of the refrain material but in at least three

\textsuperscript{30} Notice that the first chord to extend the harmonic sequence—that is, the first chord to deviate from the harmonic model of the first refrain—is D minor in m. 28. This is perhaps not coincidental given that the middle section, as mentioned, was centered on D minor. Moreover, it is quite conventional for nineteenth-century ternary forms to effect some sort of synthesis, whereby the A\textsubscript{2} section incorporates elements from both A\textsubscript{1} and B. Put metaphorically, Brahms’s second refrain finds in the middle section its inspiration to make the most of its potential.

\textsuperscript{31} For an extended discussion of the relationships between these songs, see Stevens (2008, 178–200).
processes that span the two songs. First, Brahms, over the course of the repeated refrains, states the countermelody an octave higher each time, culminating, in “Mondenschein,” with the florid tune in the above-middle-C range, seen in the full light of day. Second, the upper-third relation in “Sommerabend” between the tonic (B♭) and the key of the middle section (d) is countered in “Mondenschein” with a lower-third relation between the tonic B♭ and G♭, a key touched on in mm. 4 (a G♭ chord also kicks off the descending-fifth sequence, mm. 21 ff.). Third, the second song provides greater tonal closure than the first does, due in part to the middle section standing on the dominant, such that the discharge upon the tonic (m. 20) has considerable impact. The tonal ambiguity of the first song is thus alleviated in the second.

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32 I owe the following three points to Kevin Korsyn (personal communication).

33 Given the emphasis on G♭ at the beginning and end, with B♭ being relegated largely to the middle, this song has a kind of inversive relationship to the previous one: there the primary key occupied the outer sections, the secondary key occupied the middle one; here the opposite holds. This inversion with respect to the formal placement of the primary and secondary keys perhaps reflects the inversive relationship of the keys themselves (B♭-D versus B♭-G♭).

34 The pedal point gives way, at least at the foreground, in the second half of m 16. However, the dominant continues to be composed out until the very end of m. 19, especially as the B♭ chord to which the F passes in m. 16 is a B♭⁷. Attaching the ⁷th here and continuing the chain of fifths undermines the potential tonic resolution (recall, Brahms twice uses the same device in the final section of Song 1).
Yet, if this last-mentioned passage enables the second song to surpass the first in terms of tonal closure, it also balks at the realization of the descending-fifth sequence. For here, in striking contrast to the sequence in Song 1, mm. 23 ff., it restores latency to the sequence by placing it above a pedal point, as did the very opening of Song 1. Hence, whereas this section in Song 2 shows a progressive tendency regarding the registral culmination of the countermelody, it shows a regressive one regarding the realization of the sequence.
If, however, this fifth-sequence is inhibited, another is freed: in Song 1, the auxiliary cadence with which the song begins is in fact part of a descending-fifth sequence but is likely not perceived as such, since the sequence in mm. 3 ff. is inhibited by the pedal point. Also, the abrupt change of texture in m. 3 dissociates those ideas—it makes it difficult to hear mm. 1–2 as belonging to the same progression as mm. 3 ff. (or, put differently, makes it difficult to hear the progression in mm. 3 ff. as a continuation of that begun in mm. 1–2). However, in mm. 23–24 (of Song 1), the two-measure introduction to A₂, that auxiliary progression is more fully assimilated to the sequence in that the sequence is now more fully apparent. Still, the change in texture—comparable to that of the opening—makes it difficult to hear those two chords as a bona fide part of the sequence. However, in Song 2, that two-bar module is extended to four (mm. 6–9) and houses a full-fledged descending-fifth sequence—so much, in fact, as to trump the subsequent sequence, now over a dominant-pedal. Hence, the initially latent sequential potential of the auxiliary progression in Song 1 is realized in Song 2. The end of the piece reaffirms the stability of that progression, now using it for cadential closure.

*   *   *

Like Brahms’s variational refrains, and like countless other similar examples in the nineteenth century, performances both manifest the notational properties of their “theme” (that is, the score) and actualize particular potentialities of that notation. As with variations, “deviations”—interpretive nuances not indicated by the score and that vary among performances—are neither necessarily incorrect nor merely decorative but frequently serve to illuminate otherwise latent features of the work. In short, as Joseph Dubiel suggests, an interpreter construes notation guided
by a conception “not of what the passage automatically is . . . but of what it can be. It is constrained, but not fully determined, by what is in the score” (1990, 331, his italics). Likewise, Lawrence Kramer affirms that “what is objectively ‘present’ in the work . . . is not a specific meaning but the availability or potentiality of meanings” (2002, 118). An interpretation has the illocutionary function of directing us to hear the work in a particular way, just as a variation directs us to hear the theme in a particular way.\(^{35}\)

This model thus holds performance and interpretation to be essential to the identity and constitution of the work. The performance is not a mere token of the work, for the work is not fully formed or defined prior to its performances—as new performances occur, the work continually evolves, latencies emerge of which we were previously unaware. Performances, then, are not of a work, since they are part of the work. If anything, performances are of a score, in the special sense I have indicated. I think we would want to preserve the notion, one to which most people intuitively subscribe, that a performance, in the Western art-music tradition at least, is of something else, an Other it engages, something that transcends any one performance and is a

\(^{35}\) This theme-and-variations model or metaphor for the musical work obviously requires greater substantiation in the form of a separate study. Nicholas Cook (1999b, 204–206) only briefly develops this idea. He argues that a theme is to its variations what Corelli’s score (of Op. 5) is to its ornamented versions—which, in turn, he likens to performance in general. What is varied in each case, he claims, is less the concrete entity (the theme/score) itself than its underlying properties. Both variations and elaborations (performances) implicitly reduce or analyze the music they vary, disassembling its structure in order to reconfigure it anew. Performances, then, like variations on a theme, are not supererogatory with respect to a work but extensions of it, serving to actualize its structural potentialities. (Paul Thom [2007] also considers the similarities as well as differences between interpretations and variations.)
common bond among its various performances. Our appreciation of interpretive nuances derives in part from the implicit conception or assumption of a work with certain invariant properties that an interpreter manifests in a particular way. Yet, this Other is merely one component of a work, the score, not the work entire. The score-theme is conceptually prior to the performance-variation in the sense that it defines certain key features that identify the piece as such. However, just as variations are as much as part of the piece as is the theme, so performances are as much a part of the work as is the score.

*   *   *

My ontological model holds certain elements in common with the phenomenological reader-response theory of Wolfgang Iser (1978). Iser frames the literary work as a repository of potentialities and consequently deems the reader—insofar as she actualizes various of these potentialities—a necessary rather than an ancillary component of the work. For Iser, the gap between text and reader is no impediment to, but rather a precondition of interpretation. The same goes for Gadamer, on whom I will also remark, regarding the gap between past and present. Finally, Adorno’s Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction—an incomplete work existing only in draft and note form—has some affinities with myself and Iser. In it I find a liberating model of the musical work, one in which interpretation is indispensable and granted ample freedom.

Curiously, Adorno’s treatise has received scant scholarly attention since its 2006 English translation. Hence, I provide here a lengthy précis in order not only to elaborate upon the view of the musical work and performance I have proposed but also to introduce many readers to this important philosopher’s provocative thoughts on musical interpretation. I summarize Iser at
length as well, since his theory of reading is perhaps the most apt non-musical model I have found for what I am trying to say about music.\textsuperscript{36}

\section*{II. AMELIORATIONS}

Her autobiography, if such a thing were imaginable, would be, if such a thing were ever to be written, an assemblage of dark voids and unbridgable gaps. . . . She understood that if she was going to hold on to her life at all, she would have to rescue it by a primary act of imagination, supplementing, summoning up the necessary connections . . .

–Carol Shields, \textit{The Stone Diaries}

\section*{3. Iser's Reader-Response Theory}

What actually happens when we read a work of fiction, what transpires in the reader’s mind? How is the text transformed during the reading process? How is the text designed to elicit, even necessitate, the reader’s active involvement? “Where is,” or what constitutes, the aesthetic object (as opposed to the book per se)? How does literature lead the reader to new experiences and worldviews that are no less coherent for being novel? These are some of the main, and rather enticing questions that Iser’s masterful \textit{The Act of Reading} attempts to answer.

His principal points are as follows. The literary work lies in the interstice between text and reader. The text is a network of potentialities; it falls to the reader to actualize these potentialities. Such actualization is subjective but not arbitrary: the reader draws upon her own experiences in grappling with the text, but the text itself conditions and delimits this subjective understanding to a high degree. The elements of a text are \textit{intersubjective instructions} for making meaning. Responses

\textsuperscript{36} I have not often seen Iser invoked in a musical context; Bonds (1991) is a notable exception.
to a text are elicited by the objectively present elements in a text but not reducible to them. “It is, then, an integral quality of literary texts that they produce something which they themselves are not” (1978, 27). Thus, the aesthetic object that is the literary work is neither text nor reader’s response but rather a felicitous marriage of the two.

As a reader, Iser argues, I do not merely identify with textual elements that already mirror my psyche. Rather, I seek out new perspectives; this quest is catalyzed by the dissonance between textual elements and my preexistent beliefs. These new beliefs are “prestructured” by the text but certainly not predetermined by it—the text merely allows for their possibility. The text impels me to construct meaning because it presents unfamiliar conditions, or frames otherwise familiar conventions within new contexts. In the process of forming new meanings and having new experiences, layers of my personality surface of which I had been previously unaware. Thus, when I read, I not only realize latencies in the text, I also realize them in myself; as I help constitute the literary work, I also constitute myself.

Although Iser is speaking of fiction, I think his ideas apply to reading generally, and, even more broadly, to aesthetic experience in any form. The following traces his main argument, or at least the points most relevant to my musical purposes. I will not spell out their musical relevance in this section but will draw upon them liberally in the sections and chapters that follow. Just as Iser divides his work into three main parts, enumerating traits of the reader, text, and intersection of the two (although all three components are ultimately inseparable), so will my précis.
The Text

Utterances in literary texts are performative. In J. L. Austin’s (1962) theory on which Iser draws, performative utterances can be either illocutionary, ones that inform, or perlocutionary, ones that induce a certain state of affairs. The signal trait of performative utterances generally is that they are not primarily denotative but rather pragmatic. If, to use my own example, I tell you, “It’s hot in here,” I say it not primarily to denote a factual state of affairs (the temperature), but rather to inform you that I am hot, and even more so, to get you to do something—that is, to open a window, or to come outside with me to get some fresh air. In other words, a performative utterance will harbor a subtext, one that often elicits a particular action or response.

Performative utterances in literature, Iser explains, are similar in structure though different in function from those in the real world. Literary statements do not produce what is meant, they do not result in the action they describe. Yet they are no less potent for that. For, in laying bare and reconfiguring traditional assumptions and standard conventions, they thus “enable us to see precisely what it is that guides us when we do act” (1978, 61). In this way, we are released from “the tyranny of unconscious concepts,” to borrow a felicitous phrase from Kevin Korsyn (1983, 2), and are freer to explore new ways of being in the world. Performative statements in literature, then, are not propositions regarding preexistent states of affairs, they are not mimetic. They invoke such states in order to bring them to the reader’s consciousness, and to incite her to form new beliefs about them, new attitudes toward them. Thus, as Daniel Purdy states, when Sophie Mereau “writes about female figures in her novels and her historical essays, she posits them as possible configurations of female identity rather than as mimetic representations of her own true
self. . . . [Her] literary figures . . . in their irrationality cast a critical gaze upon existing historical conditions” (quoted in Muxfeldt [2001, 32]).

To restate and offer a more extended example: literature does not so much depict reality—it is not primarily mimetic—as offer a conceptualization of reality, which it then stands on its head. That is, any episteme will foreground certain beliefs while pushing others to the background. The literary work points up the latter, that which the conceptual model has demoted. The work is thus able to dismantle that model—or rather, it compels the reader to do so. Any belief system contains the seed of its own undoing; the function of literature and reading is to bring this seed to fruition.³⁻⁷ For example, in The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy,³⁻⁸ Lawrence Sterne explicitly invokes Locke and fashions the novel in a Lockean vein, by which the characters thrive on freewheeling associations and sense impressions. This is especially true of Uncle Toby. Yet this character does not perform the meager service of confirming Lockean philosophy. Rather, in his desultory ramblings, he points up the problem lurking beneath Locke’s philosophy: namely, knowledge based on subjectivism and associationism is precarious knowledge indeed and can easily unravel. Sterne exposes and exploits the potential deficiency of Locke’s philosophy, in the process

³⁻⁷ Deleuze and Guattari express a very similar sentiment in their notion of territoriality/deterritoriality:

“But these territorialized functions and forces can suddenly take on an autonomy that makes them swing over into other assemblages, compose other deterritorialized assemblages” (1987, 325). Of course, this is a central conceit of deconstruction.

³⁻捌 This along with Tom Jones are the two works that Iser primarily draws upon. His emphasis on eighteenth-century literature is unsurprising, since it was in this period that authors were particularly cognizant of the reader and sought to engage her directly. This is especially true of Tristram Shandy, as I discuss presently.
compelling the reader to question that system and to redress its deficiency. In this—not in denotation, representation, or confirmation—lies the value of literature, according to Iser.

The literary work invokes not only preexistent conceptual models but also literary conventions and previous works. Intertextual allusions dig up old solutions to philosophical and artistic problems, and these solutions become problematized in turn. The familiar forms that are summoned “lose their validity when transplanted into the literary text. And it is precisely this loss of validity which leads to the communication of something new” (1978, 83, his italics). We deform convention to arrive at something novel and revelatory. At the same time, the old is not merely discarded, for the new is comprehensible only in its definable relation to the old. In short, the literary text is performative in that, far from codifying existing knowledge and conditions, it leads the reader to new insights and experiences.

**The Reader**

Writing has to implicate reading in order to yield the intentional object that is the artwork. A text implicates reading, in part, by referring to objects incompletely, thus placing the onus on the reader to fill in and synthesize these objects. Moreover, the text piques expectations on the part of the reader, the realizations of which instantaneously yield new expectations. The past event both informs and is transformed by subsequent events. Gaps in this implication-realization flow, however, are essential to the reading process. Otherwise, there would be few signals by which to indicate the *changes in perspective* the reader must synthesize or negotiate. (These various perspectives are those of the narrator, protagonist, secondary characters, plot, and “fictional reader”—the hypothetical reader situated within the text who casts attitudes toward the various
goings on and the cast of characters). These incongruities beg the reader’s attention and involvement; they incite her to form some sort of gestalt, to aim for consistency in her interpretation. Yet, the reader is constantly forming new gestalten as the text unravels: the latent gaps within one gestalt compel the reader to form another gestalt, which does not displace the old but rather modifies it. Our entanglement in the text is “never total, because the gestalten remain at least potentially under attack from those possibilities which they have excluded but dragged along in their wake. . . . The result is a dialectic . . . between illusion-forming and illusion-breaking” (1978, 127).

Since Iser apparently considers *Tristram Shandy* paradigmatic of reader-oriented literature, I offer more examples from that work, here and in the next subsection. Blocks to the narrative flow of implications and realizations, as mentioned above, would normally occur covertly; they would simply be part of the plot. Sterne, by contrast, renders these occlusions glaring. Tristram mischievously inserts so many digressions—for example, during the first few volumes in which he recounts the story of his conception—as to call into question the primacy of that story. In this, Sterne shows his work resistant to mimetic realism and draws attention instead to the very act of reading. In fact, Tristram frequently stops the story in order to address the reader directly. For example, in Chapter XX, in the middle of his birth story, he calls out to the reader:

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39 Charles Keil poses a musical counterpart to this idea, suggesting that people are led to musical participation—to movement, in particular—by a certain out-of-syncness in performance. Such “participatory discrepancies” can involve time, tone, or both: “music, to be personally involving and socially valuable, must be ‘out of time’ and ‘out of tune’” (Keil [1987, 275]).
—How could you, Madam, be so inattentive in reading the last chapter? I told you in it, *That my mother was not a papist.* —Papist! You told me no such thing, Sir. Madam, I beg leave to repeat it over again, *That I told you as plain, at least, as words, by direct inference, could tell you such a thing. Then, Sir, I must have miss’d a page.* -No, Madam,—you have not miss’d a word.—Then I was asleep, Sir.—My pride, Madam, cannot allow you that refuge.—Then, I declare, I know nothing at all about the matter.—That, Madam, is the very fault I lay to your charge; and as a punishment for it, I do insist upon it, that you immediately turn back, that is, as soon as you get to the next full stop, and read the whole chapter over again (51–52).

Sterne/Tristram here calls attention to the contingency of reading and to how reading is not an unimpeded linear process.

**Text-Reader Interaction**

The literary text is pockmarked. It is replete with gaps the reader must fill in with acts of imagination (hence the epigraph to this section). Again, such acts are not mere personal associations but flights of fantasy within the parameters established by the text. These gaps account for why the literary work is less a document to be decoded for hidden meanings than a vehicle for *communication*—the literary work is thoroughly heteronomous, implicating and beckoning the reader.40 “Whenever the reader bridges the gaps, communication begins. . . .

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40 Iser critiques Ingarden’s notion of “indeterminacy” on the basis that, for Ingarden, actualization is not communication. This is because Ingarden deems actualization dependent upon external criteria. Hence, he cannot accept that a work may be concretized in different, equally valid ways. Moreover, for many works of art, Iser states, their reception “would be simply blocked if they could only be concretized according to
Hence the structured blanks of the text stimulate the process of ideation to be performed by the reader on terms set by the text” (1978, 169).

In his concluding chapter, Iser enumerates two “structures of indeterminacy”—blanks and negations. For our purposes, it will suffice to outline the former. In contrast to Ingarden’s “places of indeterminacy,” which are gaps within a schema, Iser’s “blanks” are gaps between schemata. Blanks are junctures where meaning must be created. They continually allow for new ways of combining and negotiating the text’s various perspectives. Importantly, such combination contravenes the classic perceptual principle of good continuation: in the literary work, we seek not to fill out an existing image but to replace that image. Literature demands not the protracted perception of a single object; rather, it deliberately impedes the construction of a given image so as to juxtapose various objects. In literature we seek out various combinations, the “repeatable diversifications of innovative gestalten of meaning” (1978, 188). Iser emphasizes,

the vividness of the meaning will be proportional to the number of blanks that break up the good continuation and so stimulate a sequence of discarded images of the first degree and their replacement by those of the second degree. . . . We develop an impression of comparative poverty in the ‘continuously’ patterned text, as opposed to the vivid complexity of the ‘impeded’ text” (1978, 189).

In short, the reader is not supposed to merely internalize the various positions presented by the text but to juxtapose them so they will transform each other. As a result of this strategy, the aesthetic object begins to dawn.

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the norms of classical aesthetics” (Iser [1978, 178]). While Iser applauds Ingarden’s break with the mimetic conception of art, he ultimately deems Ingarden’s completions of indeterminacies “undynamic.”
Turning again to *Tristram Shandy*, its blanks, as with its inhibitions of gestalt-formation, are glaringly obvious, and in some cases, quite literal. For example, in volume 6, chapter 38, Tristram is about to describe a woman whom Uncle Toby fancies—Widow Wadman. He halts and states, “To conceive this right,—call for pen and ink—here’s paper ready to your hand.—Sit down, Sir, paint her to your own mind—as like your mistress as you can—as unlike your wife as your conscience will let you. . . .” (422). He then inserts a blank page (423), after which, “——Was ever any thing in Nature so sweet!—so exquisite!” (424). Tristram/Sterne reckons that the reader will create an image to suit his ideal of a beautiful woman. Likewise, in place of expletives Sterne supplies asterisks, leaving it to the reader to fill in the actual words—the onus of indecency is placed on the reader.

In summary, the act of filling in, of forming gestalten, of making meaning, which the reader does normatively, is in *Tristram Shandy* foregrounded, deliberate, and self-conscious.

**A Note on Gadamer**

Iser’s work resonates with that of both Gadamer and Bakhtin in more ways than I can enumerate here. It will suffice to cite a few salient connections.

If for Iser the gaps within the text, and that between text and reader, are no impediment to communication but actually a precondition of it, so for Gadamer the gap between past and present is no impediment to interpretation but a precondition of it.

Briefly, Gadamer (1960 and 1976) insists that we can—indeed, must—understand historical phenomena in terms of the present because those phenomena are not fixed in the past but continue into the present by means of traditions of reception, of which our present interpretive
stance is a part. To understand the past is not to project ourselves onto an uncorrupted historical moment; nor do we merely capitulate to our modern biases. Rather, we embrace both temporal realms, or more precisely, we dissolve the binarism of past/present altogether, realizing that the past bleeds into the present, conditioning our current modes of understanding. The document we seek to interpret is not ossified in historical stone such that we need to excavate it but is rather something alive that evolves over time. Gadamer, in short, posits the fusion of temporal horizons as a prerequisite for any act of true understanding.

If for Gadamer “horizon” is a temporal frame, for Iser it is more a conceptual one. Recall that, on Iser’s view, a text is composed of various perspectives that the reader slides in and out of. The reader cannot hold multiple perspectives simultaneously—at any given point, he will hold a single one, the “theme.” Yet this theme, Iser states explicitly invoking Gadamer, “always stands before the ‘horizon’ of the other [perspectives] in which [the reader] had previously been situated” (Iser [1978, 97]). If, for instance, the reader is currently concerned with the protagonist, his attitude toward her will be conditioned by the horizon of other characters, the plot, the narrator, and so forth.

In brief, I see Gadamer’s hermeneutics as essentially a diachronic counterpart to Iser’s synchronic theory. By this I do not mean to imply that Iser posits a static model of reading—on the contrary, he places great emphasis on the temporality of reading—but that Iser is not primarily concerned with historicity. That said, Iser does offer one particularly revealing comment concerning temporality that perhaps shows his Gadamerian colors most clearly: in reiterating that the discrepancies and negations of the text ensure the reader’s “entanglement” in it, he states that such entanglement “is what places us in the ‘presentness of the text’” (1978, 131, my italics). To the
extent that we strive to navigate the text’s manifold crevasses and chasms, the literary text is a contemporary, relevant document.

**A Note on Bakhtin**

To consider only Bakhtin’s “Discourse in the Novel,” I see three loci of intersection with Iser. First, both deplore the idea that novelistic notation is simply to be decoded, that nothing new is to be gained for the reader in the act of reading. “A passive understanding of linguistic meaning is no understanding at all. . . . [It] contributes nothing new to the word under consideration, only mirroring it, seeking . . . merely the full reproduction of that which is already given in the word” (Bakhtin [1938, 281]). For both scholars, the meaning of a literary utterance derives not from what it denotes, but from a web of contextual factors: for Iser, from the way a particular reader bridges gaps, negotiates the incongruity between her assumptions and those presented in the text; for Bakhtin, from the way a reader engages the various meanings a word has accrued, the various socio-ideological prisms through which it has been refracted. The common link between the two thinkers is that this meaning-endowing context is replete with incongruous and incommensurate elements—for Iser these are the various perspectives of a text, for Bakhtin the “contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgments” that stand between any given word and its ostensible denotation. Neither writer allows for facile, unmediated meaning.

Second, Bakhtin makes explicit the rhetorical impetus to Iser’s theory. Iser, as we have seen, maintains that literature is directed toward the reader and necessarily elicits his response and active involvement. Rhetoric, oratory, would seem to be paradigmatic of this notion, but Iser seldom acknowledges it. Perhaps this is no accident, for although oratory patently engages the
perceiver, it does not purport to be semantically ambiguous—on the contrary, the orator harbors a singular, clear, often propagandist message beneath his layers of tropical and topical flourish. Bakhtin, for his part, likewise recognizes the monologism of rhetoric per se. Yet he also recognizes that rhetoric informs every kind of discourse that is oriented toward a “responsive”—that is, active rather than passive—understanding. Literature is paradigmatic of such discourse—its language is dialogically charged. Even the single word “is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates” (1938, 280, his italics).

Finally, and most significantly, if for Iser a literary text is populated by a multitude of partially incongruous perspectives and schemata, for Bakhtin it is populated by a multitude of partially incongruous languages. Yet, in both cases, the reader forms a gestalt, a unity that for Iser is continually transforming over the course of reading, a unity that for Bakhtin is irreducibly “heteroglot.” A novel is replete with various languages and their concomitant socio-ideological registers. Yet for Bakhtin it is less the reader who carves out of these various registers a unique unity (as it is for Iser) than the author. She, knowing that the words she uses are always already shot through with alterity—with various possible meanings deriving from the plethora of contexts in which the words have been used (“Each word tastes of the . . . contexts in which it has lived its

\[\text{41 I am being somewhat reductive here. Within a more progressive, empiricist philosophy of language, as espoused by several eighteenth-century philosophers—Herder, Condillac, and Rousseau, among others—rhetorical tropes and poetic language generally do not serve to materialize a priori, abstract ideas but are rather the very stuff of which ideas are made. That is, language for these writers was initially poetic (and musical and gestural) and only subsequently more abstractly symbolic. This view of rhetoric, then, is arguably compatible with Iser’s theory.}\]
socially charged life” [1938, 293])—consciously expropriates words from these contexts and imbues them with her own intention. Crucially, however, these alien meanings can never be fully eradicated—they continue to infuse and color the writer’s linguistic use, just as, for Iser, the previous perspectival horizons continue to inform the reader’s current one, and just as the conceptual paradigm the novel critiques is not entirely jettisoned but rather remains an indispensable backdrop against which the new paradigm is all the more visible.

4. **Adorno’s Theory of “Musical Reproduction”**

Although Adorno’s titular “reproduction” would seem to betray a view of the musical work as inflexible and self-defining, Adorno’s stance is actually much more nuanced and complex than this term implies. Barbara Barry construes Adorno’s term as having two different senses: “one is objective reproduction of the work from its notation; the other is active reproduction as interpretation, with all its dangers of human fallibility and its potential for the miraculous” (2009, 93, her italics).

It is this second sense that I feel better captures Adorno’s overall attitude toward performance, and obviously the one with which my own stance has greater affinity.

According to Adorno, a score is not a set of performance directives, a mere script for the performer (as it is for Thom and Cook, for example), but is rather indicative of a complete, self-contained work, which, however, entails an image of sound. The work, although in a sense autonomous in relation to performance, possesses an element of indeterminacy as part of its autonomous structure that performance must rectify. Thus, the work by its very nature implicates performance.
The primary function of interpretation is to recover and revitalize the sounds and the expressive elements they embody that have been reified by notation. To elaborate, musical notation has both a “mensural,” or linguistic, denotative aspect and a “neumic,” or mimetic,\textsuperscript{42} gestural aspect. The performer’s job is to translate the former into the latter—to translate discrete, static symbols into a fluid image of human gesture. (Interestingly, he notes at one point that sometimes the mimetic is, in a sense, inscribed directly onto the mensural. The way notes are beamed, for example, can indicate something of their gestural quality. The composer’s actual handwriting, due to its distinctive character and fluid contours, can also intimate the gestural—more so than static printed symbols, which foster musical reification.\textsuperscript{43}) That is, the interpreter is concerned less with notation per se than with the sound and sentience it represents: “the task of interpretation is not, of course, fidelity to the text in itself, but rather the representation of ‘the work’, that is, the music for which the text stands” (2006, 67). Yet, performance does not merely reverse such reification, but, as the latter permeates the musical substance itself, the performer must somehow express this ineluctable tension between the idea and its notation. “This

\textsuperscript{42} At one point, Adorno indicates that the term “mimetic” should be replaced by another, but, regrettably, he does not specify which. However, from his remarks elsewhere on aesthetic meaning, one might infer that he does not mean this term to suggest that musical sounds have a primarily imitative relation to the world. Rather, Adorno generally believes that music relates to the world by virtue of structural homology, not by overt resemblance.

\textsuperscript{43} Relatedly, Schenker often testifies to the fact that great composers’ original notations often render musical relationships visible. For example, in reference to a passage in op. 101, fourth movement, Schenker remarks, “the Master’s notation, as my score shows, is again a paragon of visual presentation; what belongs together is united [with beams], and what comes as a consequence is separated” (1921, 171).
reification through notation . . . is not merely external to the composition . . . but rather seeps into it as an aspect in itself. . . . And interpreting therefore means not simply allowing the idea to crystallize, but rather making this force field visible” (2006, 140, his italics).

Also in a state of tension within musical works are the universal and particular, which the work attempts to reconcile; performance, Adorno says, should also attempt this reconciliation. “The idea . . . that the great music of tradition, in particular Beethoven, brings the general and the particular into a paradoxical state of unity, would be applied to the theory of reproduction. . . . interpretation is the imitation of that process which takes place in the composition itself” (2006, 70). Interpretation should expose the various problems and antagonisms inherent in the structure of the work, the points at which particulars resist subsumption by the whole. At one point, Adorno likens this process of structural exposure to taking an “x-ray” of the work, revealing its “subcutaneous” elements. Elsewhere, however, Adorno questions the use of this metaphor, since it falsely implies that the work can simply be decoded. Yet, he does maintain that all aspects of interpretation should be constrained by the structure of the composition. This seemingly contradictory stance that notation both is indeterminate and objectively prescribes its mode of interpretation equates, in my reading, with the view that the work entails a range of possible realizations—polysemy, paradoxically, is one of its immanent properties. Performance is thus no gratuitous sonic manifestation of a self-complete structure, but rather a means to recapitulate, work through, and perhaps resolve problematic aspects of that structure.
The Historicity of the Work

Because the work is not a fixed, monolithic entity, it is not susceptible to different performance “styles” or trends. Relativism, Adorno astutely suggests, is the complement to absolutism—to claim that the work can be interpreted in any number of equally valid ways is to presuppose that the work is a singular, self-defined entity to begin with. Rather, the work itself changes throughout history—its notational indeterminacy necessitates its historical evolution, its potential meanings are gradually revealed in historical stages. Indeed, a work is susceptible to modes of musical understanding that derive from subsequent compositional trends and aesthetic paradigms. In particular, the Classical-era paradigm of unity-in-diversity—in which the notion of unity is expanded to accommodate increasingly diverse and contrasting elements—can be retroactively and fruitfully applied to the music of the high Baroque (Bach and Händel), even though the implicit conception of unity in this music was oriented more toward uniformity than toward diversity (or so Adorno claims, presumably in reference to that music’s relative rhythmic homogeneity). The Classical model can illuminate Baroque music, highlighting unintended and otherwise unsuspected elements of contrast: “the multifarious formal structure of music since Haydn and Mozart unlocks a cognitive dimension in all music, whether earlier or later, that necessarily determines interpretation” (2006, 191–92). This is no dubious anachronism, for, again, the work is not absolute in the first place and is not fixed to the particular historical period in which it arose. Simply put, music of the past must be construed in terms of the present; “if themes are gestures, then these gestures . . . can only be imitated as present ones” (2006, 188). The affinities with Gadamer are quite apparent here.
Indeed, shifts in interpretive perspective are a necessary consequence of the work’s historical unfolding. Regarding the fast tempi prevalent in the early twentieth-century, for example, Adorno contends they resulted from the (re-)functionalization of music, by which meaning was divorced from the surface shape. The work was played faster because its parts were thought not to be imprinted with meaning but rather to convey separable meaning. (This trend is evident in composition itself, with the emphasis upon quicker note-values—whole notes have all but disappeared.) Yet, this is not necessarily a regrettable trend. Händel, for instance, was writing at a time when the “harmonic principle” came into being, and this in turn necessitated comparatively slower tempi in order to express this greater harmonic weight and harmonic awareness. Our modern harmonic sensibilities, in contrast, are more advanced and thus today we need not play Händel as slowly. These faster tempi may not evince the highest musical values, but they are an honest reflection of the historical state in which Händel’s music finds itself (Adorno [1930]).

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Regrettably, Adorno rarely substantiates his musical speculations with concrete analytical examples. It is left to us to do so. For this, I turn to Glenn Gould’s 1962 rendition of Bach’s C minor Prelude from the Well-Tempered Clavier, Book 1 (Ex. 1-4, Web Ex. 5).44 I choose this piece because it is quintessentially Baroque in its relentless rhythmic uniformity (at least on a foreground level), and, concomitantly, in its wholesale devotion to a single basic affect. Gould, however, arguably brings a Classical mentality to the piece, educing otherwise unsuspected elements of

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44 The following analysis of Gould’s performance is indebted to Barolsky and Martens (2012), but from their analysis I draw more or less my own conclusions.
To start, the softer dynamic, less forceful accentuation, and more varied, nuanced articulation he applies to the section beginning in mm. 5 ff. renders it, we might imagine, a more delicate, plaintive “secondary” theme (or perhaps “transitional” theme, since it modulates to the relative major), over against the “primary” theme of the first four measures, which he plays more aggressively. The relative autonomy and thematic identity of mm. 5–14, the latent Classicism, is supported by Barolsky and Martens’ perception that Gould fashions out of those otherwise Fortspinnung-oriented measures a quasi-period (antecedent, mm. 5–9; consequent, mm. 10–14) (2012, parag. 14). That is, Gould differentiates the two phrases by subjecting each to a different type of process: the antecedent alternates between two types of articulation, and concomitantly, between strong and weak bars, creating two-bar hypermeasures; the consequent, by contrast, charts a single course in its progressive shortening of soprano tones, a course that leads to a crucial harmonic arrival—the relative major (m. 14). Extrapolating from Barolksy and Martens, these two processes intimate an antecedent-consequent relationship not merely in being contrastive, but also in being complementary, just as the thematic content and cadences of an antecedent and consequent must be. That is, the oscillating dynamic of the “antecedent” is complemented by the linear dynamic of the “consequent.” Or, in Barolksy and Martens’ reading, “Gould’s oscillating articulations in measures 5–9 reinforce Bach’s harmonic sequence in its movement away from a stable key area. His gradual shortening of the soprano notes in measures 10–13 convey instead the sense of a single expansive teleological gesture leading into the more stable E♭ major in measure

45 M. 9 is a transitional bar in that Gould repeats the weak-bar articulation of the previous bar (see Ex. 1-4). Within the continuous linear-intervalic pattern, then, Gould inserts a conspicuous contrast; this moment thus particularly evinces a Classical disposition.
14” (2012, parag. 14). Hence, if this section is not literally thematic and periodic, Gould infuses the section with Classical qualities of thematicity and periodicity.

Example 1-4: Bach, Prelude in C minor, WTC Book I, mm. 1–15: Gould’s nuances (after Barolsky and Martens [2012])
If Gould evinces a penchant for Classical diversity, he also evinces a Romantic penchant for motivic processuality. In fact, Bazzana avers that Gould’s interpretations were influenced by the concept of developing variation, as practiced by Brahms and codified by Schoenberg (Bazzana [1997, 91–94], discussed in Barolksy and Martens [2012, parag. 23]). Barolksy and Martens note Gould’s slurring of the E♭–D–E♭ figure in m. 1, which protrudes because all other notes in that measure are played staccato. The authors then note that Gould demarcates an augmented variant of that figure in m. 15 (F–E♭–F of the bass)—indeed, it seems to me that Gould really goes out of his way to not emphasize the first E♭ in the bass of that measure, to play it staccato, precisely in order to foreground the neighbor figure.46 These instances are motivically significant in anticipating the lower-neighbor figure that initiates the fugal subject (C–B♭–C). I would add that Gould’s slurring in m. 1 seems haphazard in this context and is likely unintentional. No matter: one could easily chalk it up to a parapraxis, one showing unwitting sensitivity to motivic import.47

Gould thus draws out structural subtleties from Bach’s seemingly prosaic prelude by employing post-Baroque techniques and aesthetic sensibilities. I should clarify that, in pitting

46 The authors note another significant facet of this demarcation: it marks the moment where the gradual descent of the line departing from E♭ in the soprano of m. 5, is transferred to the bass, which continues onward to the G (the structural dominant) in m. 21–25. In this respect, incidentally, Gould marks off a midway point in the larger section comprising mm. 1–25, thus creating a kind of antecedent-consequent relation on the level of the entire section.

“Baroque” against “Classical” and “Romantic” in the above discussion, I do not mean to essentialize those styles in the manner I was criticizing above. Rather, I use those labels heuristically, as a means to support Adorno’s contention that the traits we associate with Classicism and Romanticism are in fact potentially present in Baroque music as well (and vice versa), and that these traits can be spotlighted by the savvy performer.

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A musical work, then, is not fixed to the historical period in which it was created. In fact, Adorno views the “historicity” of the artwork as not external but immanent—historicity is one of the intrinsic properties of the musical work and of its interpretation. He states, “the truth of interpretation does not lie within history as something that is alien to it . . . it is rather history that lies within the truth of interpretation as something that unfolds according to the latter’s laws” (2006, 166). Let us pause on this enigmatic notion, one on which Adorno does not really elaborate. He does suggest that one of the imperatives of interpretation, as alluded to above, is to grapple with the notational reification of musical ideas, which means not simply to negate such reification—to penetrate the putative content underlying notation—but rather to render the tension between the idea and its notation palpable in the interpretation itself. The historical dimension of this idea can be construed as follows: notation, due to its relative opacity, will not readily yield the gestural content for which it stands, but will by necessity require layers of interpretation, which unfold over a protracted period of time. Put a bit differently, notation has different possible meanings whose elucidation requires multiple and various aesthetic paradigms or schools of musical thought and interpretation (as distinct from more narrow fashionable
performance trends) and these, in turn, arise not simultaneously but in the course of history. In this sense, the musical work, by its very nature, encompasses its own historical unfolding. The different meanings it acquires throughout history are not superimposed onto it but rather derive from the content and nature of the composition itself. “This would mean that the changes undergone by works through interpretation are no mere matter of taste, but rather obey some objective law. . . . they are predetermined by the works themselves, not dependent on preference or even on the dominant manner among performers” (2006, 194).

Interpretation and historicity, then, no less than any other facet of the artwork, is immanent in the musical work itself. Consequently, Adorno is skeptical of appealing to historical conditions surrounding the work as a basis for interpretive validity. He deems such historicism specious: our sense of what constitutes the past reflects more our present biases and reified notions than historical truth. Anticipating Taruskin, he avers, “the connoisseurship nurtured educationally on the past in truth never gains access to those past works, but only to their false present, their conventionalized expression” (2006, 194, my italics). In alluding to a “false present,”

48 This is not to claim, however (at least I do not claim), that the successive interpretations of a work over the course of history progress ever closer to the “truth” of a work—I do not construe Adorno’s stance teleologically. Nietzsche, speaking more generally, claims, “the whole history of a thing . . . becomes a continuous chain of reinterpretations . . . which need not be causally connected among themselves. . . . The ‘evolution’ of a thing . . . is not its progressus toward a goal. . . . Rather, it is a sequence of more or less profound, more or less independent processes of appropriation” (1887, 210). (Forthwith, however, he proceeds to espouse precisely the opposite view, one favoring the “atrophy and degeneration . . . in short, death” of weaker beings precisely for the sake of “progressus,” for the good of the stronger and more powerful [ibid.].)
Adorno brings an added dimension to Taruskin’s critique of the authenticity movement. Taruskin (1995) accuses that movement of distorting the past in its vain attempt (“vain” in both senses) to uncover historical truth—an attempt that derives from a modernist ethos. Adorno takes a step further, implying that those who adopt a didactic (hermeneutic) approach to works of the past not only distort that past by filtering it through the prism of the present, but distort the present as well.

Mozart’s first compositional foray into Bach’s style can perhaps serve as an allegory of this idea. After encountering Bach’s music for the first time, in 1782, Mozart penned the Fugue in C major, K. 394, about which Edward Lowinsky quips, “What a paradox this fugue presents: it has all of Bach’s technique and none of his style!” (1956, 162). That is, it adroitly uses Bach’s fugal techniques yet, contrary to Bach’s fluid and asymmetrical phrase rhythm, exhibits phrase rhythm that is rather four-square. Yet, I would add, by 1783 Mozart had himself already achieved a remarkably fluid and plastic phrase-rhythmic style (the opening of the Menuetto from the Piano Sonata in A, K. 331, composed that year, is an apt example). Hence, in dutifully and earnestly attempting to recover Bach’s style, Mozart unwittingly falsified not only an element of that style but of his own as well.
Subjectivity in Interpretation

The above suggests that attempting to recover the work in its supposed historically pure state is a fool’s errand. Adorno affirms the necessity of appraising the score from a subjective standpoint. For, insofar as the interpreter’s task is to translate mensural symbols into mimetic gestures—to translate the reified into the sentient—she must tap into her own subjective impulses in order to relate empathetically to the living spirit behind the notation. Fidelity to the notation per se as a primary objective entails suppressing one’s subjective impulses and thus the ability to capture the subjective impulses of which the notation is a manifestation. In other words, a fundamental paradox of interpretation is that one is able to realize the (or better, an) objective meaning of the work only by relating to it subjectively, since the objective elements of the work are themselves reified subjective elements. “Where subjectivity [and] sense . . . are essential to the matter itself, yet at the same time congealed, ‘encoded’ within it, that aspect [sic] requires an equal, namely the subject, in order to be salvaged—precisely for the sake of factual content” (2006, 142). More succinctly, “in musical reproduction, objectivity of approach can come about only through the efforts of the subjective fantasy” (2006, 118). Nietzsche likewise holds that the “objective” is accessible not due to its polysemous character, can accommodate such fluctuating subjectivity. As Stephen Nachmanovitch states, “there is some largeness or manyness in the art that can resonate with the changing versions of myself” (1990, 172). In other words, the artwork is fluid enough to be able, potentially, to resonate not only with different historical perspectives, as discussed above, but also with the different perspectives of a single, evolving subject.

49 Of course, subjectivity is not a fixed thing—people and their identities constantly evolve. Yet, the work, due to its polysemous character, can accommodate such fluctuating subjectivity. As Stephen Nachmanovitch states, “there is some largeness or manyness in the art that can resonate with the changing versions of myself” (1990, 172). In other words, the artwork is fluid enough to be able, potentially, to resonate not only with different historical perspectives, as discussed above, but also with the different perspectives of a single, evolving subject.
through disinterested contemplation but only through “the most diverse perspectives and psychological interpretations” and that “the more emotions we allow to speak in a given matter, the more different eyes we can put on in order to view a given spectacle, the more complete will be our conception of it, the greater our ‘objectivity’” (1887, 255).

From this perspective, interpretation replicates an essential facet of “authentic” art itself, which, on Adorno’s view, captures universal truth by means of its unique, particular details. To elaborate, Adorno suggests that every particular must resonate with a universal in order to be a valid component of an artwork. Yet, paradoxically, one cannot apprehend the true character or nature of the particular unless one views it as autonomous in relation to universals—as irrespective of a subsuming concept (note the Kantian inflection). For it is precisely in the specificity and irreducibility of the particular that something universal is to be found. I, for one, routinely sense the truth of this assertion in listening to music. I sense how an exquisitely nuanced musical emotion seems to convey something universal precisely in its specificity. Conversely, when composers or other artists, in an attempt to convey something universal, employ generic or commonplace techniques or expressive tropes without significant qualification or reimagination, they fail to access such universality because such art is not grounded in real experience. Adorno implies that the deeper an artist delves into her own personal, subjective experience, the more universal it is—the more broadly it will resonate. As simply stated by Nachmanovitch, “Paradoxically, the more you are yourself, the more universal your message” (1990, 179). Adorno, in short, suggests that the path to the universal is through the particular: “no particular in the artwork is legitimate without also becoming universal through its particularization” (1997, 180, my italics).
Interpretation, then, requires highly subjective involvement in order to recover the objective elements of the work, just as art itself has to be grounded in very particular experience to enjoy universal resonance.

* * *

Adorno works very hard to corral all aspects of music into the work; even history and interpretation, on his view, count among its objective properties. I do not necessarily accept Adorno’s view of the work in this sense, for, as will become increasingly clear, I am reluctant to assign a work immanent properties beyond the most obvious, denotative ones. Yet, one might wonder precisely to what extent, or in what sense, Adorno regards these dimensions as objective, because with Adorno, one must take into account his penchant for dialectics and to remember that his language is often more performative than propositional. I think by “objective” interpretation he means something closer to Iser—that the text in its conspicuous chasms implicates the reader—than to the view Schenker, for one, sometimes adopted—that the text harbors a particular structural meaning that must be conveyed in performance. His rhetoric of immanence notwithstanding, he clearly embraces interpretive flexibility and variability, the imperative to bring a score to life. I now turn to more concrete interpretive consequences of these values.
III. **Interpretive Corollaries**

5. **Critique**

The common ontological assumption, discussed in the Introduction and earlier in this chapter, that the musical work is prior to and transcends performances, and is essentially inextricable from the score, entails, to some degree, the effacement of the performer. It relegates him to a mere pieceworker within a patronizing division of labor in which he who generates ideas stands above him who executes them. What are the interpretive ramifications of this pervasive view? I will consider this question first in the abstract, then more empirically.

Those holding this view will likely define (explicitly or not) interpretation more negatively than affirmatively—by what the performer avoids doing rather than by what she does. They assume musical sense to be “built into” the composer’s notations (both mensural and expressive), such that realizing those notations unobtrusively, not “interfering” with them, will guarantee musical sense. This stance confounds not only the work and score but also, more specifically, the notational symbol and its referent, thus encouraging performers to play “the notes as if they by themselves were [the] disclosed word,” in A. B. Marx’s biblical phrasing.\(^\text{50}\) That is, notation is solely denotative and thus fully determined rather than also connotative and thus underdetermined, requiring considerable interpretive input. Indeed, this approach exhibits a distinct strain of formalism in prioritizing the mensural over the mimetic; it conceives the work as self-referential. A corollary of this view is a formalistic approach to the tools of musicianship: technique takes priority over interpretation and even the latter is employed with scant regard for the meaning it potentially serves to convey—variances in dynamics, tempo, and articulation exist.

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\(^\text{50}\) Quoted in Schindler (1860, 396); I have been unable to locate the original source.
largely for their own sake. In short, within a score-centric model, the performer’s imperative is to execute rather than interpret, and to be fully transparent to the work, which is considered complete in its essential aspects prior to interpretation.

Such an ideology, like all ideologies, inevitably trickles down to, and also rises up from, the level of praxis. My Introduction has already documented the discernible trend toward relative interpretive homogeneity. Dynamics are relatively constrained, with *mezzo forte* the implicit default. Barely audible *pianissimos* are rarely employed, since the imperative is to “project”—to reach out to listeners rather than to draw them in (to relate to them, one might say, efferently rather than afferently). Modern performers are more likely to take risks on the louder side of the dynamic spectrum. Even *fortissimos*, however, are tempered by the ideal of a pervasively “beautiful tone.” This emphasis upon the material or sensuous qualities of sound—sound for sound’s sake (what Adorno derisively terms a “culinary” approach)—rather than upon sound as a vehicle for musical sense evinces a formalist mentality.

Tempo is thought to be the interpretive element most responsible for achieving unity, and is thought to achieve this through relative uniformity. Indeed, such uniformity is framed as the backdrop against which temporal relations as supposedly inherent in the notation emerge. Edward Cone typifies this stance: “Paradoxical though it sounds, absolute tempo governs our perception of the relative importance of each musical event, and thus our comprehension of form”

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51 Chapter 4 will sound other, more troubling ideological overtones of the seemingly unproblematic trope of musical beauty.
Edwin Stein likewise states, “The tempo is one of the performer’s most important means for holding the form together. . . . The same tempo, l’istesso tempo, should therefore be maintained. . . . If there are several themes of different characters, a tempo has to be found that is apt to all” (1962, 48–49). On this view, playing the two contrasting (primary and secondary) themes of a sonata at the same, “absolute” tempo illuminates rather than obfuscates their different characters—a curiously skewed logic. Rubato is an aberration of sorts, pejoratively framed in terms of the “stealing time” metaphor, in which taking time (ritarding) in one place requires giving it back (accelerating) in another. (Stein stipulates such compensation as requisite for employing tempo rubato.) In other words, tempo variances are valid only insofar as they result in overall evenness. Relatedly, legato is the default articulation and is applied on a broad scale in order to render “long lines,” out of an assumption, as with tempo, that uniformity will ensure unity and coherence.

A simple example demonstrates that, contrary to the above stance, tempo changes potentially illuminate rather than obscure changes of character, even when these changes are quite slight. Horowitz, in his live performance of Mozart, Sonata in C, K. 330, first movement (Ex. 1-5, Web Ex. 6), plays the first theme at a fast clip, approximately 76 to the quarter note. He ritards substantially at the bifocal close, into m. 18, but then appears to resume tempo for the more lyrical, appoggiatura-laden first secondary theme (ST1). However, he actually plays the theme approximately one metronome mark slower, as befits its vocal quality. Finally, he plays the march-

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52 Cone’s apparent assumption that unity equates with uniformity is also evident in his analysis of Chopin’s A major Prelude (1968, 40–42), which he ultimately reduces to a single “ball-throwing” gesture. (See Cook [2011, 293] for a discussion of Cone’s analysis.)
like second secondary theme (ST₂) one metronome mark slower still, as befits its sterner, lockstep quality. To be sure, he pushes and pulls within each of these sections and their corresponding tempi, but the overall tempo distinctions are clear even to the naked ear and reinforce the clear changes of topic, from ebullient Musette and Fanfare to Aria to March. By contrast, Glenn Gould (Web Ex. 7) maintains his initial slow, stately tempo through all three themes. This backdrop, pace Cone, does not, at least to my ears, somehow magically illuminate the very distinct topical profiles of Mozart’s thematic tapestry, but it does foreground Gould’s Bachian disposition: he evidently brings to the Mozart a sensibility oriented toward moto perpetuo, Fortspinnung, Affektenlehre, and the like to a
Example 1-5: Mozart, Piano Sonata in C, K. 330, first movement: Horowit’s tempi on primary and secondary themes

music whose stylistic trademark, in contradistinction to the Baroque, is thematic and topical diversity. I submit that Gould’s interpretation communicates his particular aesthetic predisposition and preference more than it does the thematic narrative of K. 330.
To be clear, I am not averse to employing an aesthetic arsenal that is historically removed from the piece at hand. If I had no problem in principle with Gould applying a Mozartian sensibility to Bach (as we saw earlier), nor should I with him applying a Bachian one to Mozart. If in some cases the Classical value of (unified) diversity might illuminate potentially differentiated elements in Baroque pieces, so in other cases might a Baroque sensibility illuminate Classical pieces. The question, really, is what does or does not work in any particular case, what “anachronistic” strategy best serves the potentials of any given score. Such interpretive open-mindedness, however, has no ally in the draconian stance apparently held by Cone and Stein, among many others, that “absolute” tempo uniformity is a prerequisite for illuminating thematic differences.

**Ideological Implications**

One might attribute the insistence upon dynamic moderation to psychological discomfort, on the part of the performer and audience alike, with conflictive or antagonistic elements (as often embodied by extreme loudness) or with feelings of intimacy or vulnerability (as often embodied by extreme softness). Taking a step further, one might view such dynamic-cum-emotional moderation as a means by which metaphorically to contain or control the musical experience so as to render it more susceptible to commodification. To elaborate, interpretive variances, as we have seen, serve to express gestural and emotive meanings, the mimetic aspect of notation. The more numerous,

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53 To clarify, I do not actually equate a Baroque sensibility with temporal uniformity, nor, for that matter, do I subscribe to a singular “Baroque sensibility” as regards performance. I am being somewhat reductive here for the sake of argument.
salient, and structurally strategic these variances, the greater their capacity to convey such meanings. Hence, to quell dynamic range is potentially to silence the meanings music can express, to diminish its capacity to reflect subjective and sentient experience. Furthermore, the less “human” the music, the more easily we can conceive it as an object, treat it as a mere commodity. As Adorno puts it, the “taboo” of dynamic extremes serves to “ward off expressions of pain and to attune music to a moderation that belongs to the sphere of cheerful and refreshing subjects, to the sphere of bourgeois vulgar materialism” (2006, 143). Interpretive containment, then, indicates and yields emotional containment, which in turn more readily yields a musical commodity.

This consumerist mentality is fostered not only by a lack of interpretive audacity, but also, and concomitantly, by a mechanistic, perfectionistic approach—by the desideratum of a seamless, glossy surface. Writing in 1938, Adorno bemoans the performance style emerging at that time:

All the cogwheels mesh so perfectly that not the slightest hole remains open for the meaning of the whole. Perfect, immaculate performance in the latest style preserves the work at the price of its definitive reification. It presents it as already complete from the very first note. The performance sounds like its own phonograph record. The dynamic is so predetermined that there are no longer any tensions at all. The contradictions of the musical material are so inexorably resolved in the moment of sound that it never arrives at the synthesis . . . which reveals the meaning of every Beethoven symphony (1938, 301).

Performing a work as a foregone conclusion, without foregrounding its inner tension or developing its unity from the bottom up—playing it, in other words, with neither conflict nor synthesis—is at once a cause and consequence of objectifying the musical work, the better for it to be expropriated by the consumer industry. Put another way, modern performers standardly avoid the arduous task of reconstructing the work’s structure—with all of its problems as well as
affirmations—opting instead to transmit attractive, palatable particulars. These can then, like the work as a whole, be easily reified and commodified. (The consumer in this scenario, Adorno’s “regressive listener,” clings to musical bits and pieces, tuneful fragments, appreciating them apart from the larger structural context from which they derive something more than mere material value.) Without such extemporaneous meaning-making—by which the musical structure is (re)built in unpredictable ways in a temporal present from which it cannot be extracted—music is especially vulnerable to commodification. “A Beethoven symphony as a whole, spontaneously experienced, can never be appropriated” (Adorno [1938, 298]). Whether the cardinal sin is commercialism or interpretive homogeneity each must decide for himself. But neither is the cause of the other; rather, they feed off each other in a vicious cycle.

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Interpretive confinement serves not only emotional containment and commodification, but also, and relatedly, conformity. Adorno is suspicious of any artwork that presents a “false totality,” that portrays particulars as being subsumed by universals too facilely and fully. Such art is ideological in fostering the false belief that the members of a society coexist with greater concordance and contentment than they really do. On the same basis, we might also question an interpretation that portrays a false totality—that fails to highlight and grapple with the incongruities and antagonisms of a work, which reproduce those of external reality.54 Indeed, the ideal of seamless execution (technical perfection, dynamic containment, uniform tempo, long line, and so forth) that typifies

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54 Schoenberg refers to encountering “problems” in studying a work that conductors who perform that work would “erase” by “playing whole movements in one stiff, inflexible tempo” (1975, 322).
this approach is not only aesthetically but also ethically dubious, insofar as it conduces to “false consciousness”—the impression than things are better than they really are—and thus, in a way, discourages dissent and promotes conformity. Stated more concretely, when one plays (or teaches another to play) in a way such that no detail dynamically protrudes from its surroundings, that rubato is not directly perceived but is instead subject to the requisite of overall uniformity, that articulation bridges together disparate ideas, and so forth—by all these, one upholds and encourages, if unwittingly, a model of conformity. To skirt this pitfall, one must foreground the tensions between part and whole, to maintain a sense of the counterforces and antinomies within the work.

Such a conformist agenda is even more blatant in the insistence that the performer need defer to the composer’s “intentions”—what Michael Klein facetiously derides as “an impulse to defer to the dead as a means of discovering univocal meaning” (2004, 29). This, in my view, is a patent model of political hegemony, a tool by which to engender unquestioning compliance. As Nicholas Cook puts it, “the idea that the performer’s role is to reproduce what the composer has created builds an authoritarian power structure into musical culture” (1998, 26). Indeed, the pecking order of composer first, interpreter second compulsively rehearse a hoary hierarchy-based ideology.

6. A Preferred Interpretive Model

In General: Ambiguity

So much for reactive critique; time to put forward the interpretive stance I embrace, and one all interpretations in this dissertation will betoken. This stance emanates from my beliefs that, first,
the musical work, properly construed, not only allows for but necessitates active interpretive involvement; and second, the performer, as emblematic of the societal subject—indeed, solo artists are widely taken to epitomize self-expression—ought to enjoy maximal expressive liberty. If the interpreter views the work as a broad, if finite, realm of structural and expressive potentialities that entails and implicates interpretation, at no point, or rarely, will she deem the score self-evident or self-explanatory. She will not assume its coherence to be guaranteed by a literal rendering of the composer’s indications. In fact, often the more apparently self-evident the music is, the more interpretive questions it raises. Consider that the opening theme of Mozart’s Piano Sonata in A major, K. 331, for example, is perhaps one of the most picked over passages in the music-theoretical literature. This is evidence of the fact that seemingly simple music typically conceals, and arises from, a host of structural questions and ambiguities.

Adorno correctly observes that sometimes ambiguity (or, more generally, obfuscation) is itself a structural property of the work to which the interpreter need adhere—in Jerrold Levinson’s words, “a duality that is internal to, and arguably intended in, the work” (1993, 39). For example, a composer might offer an ambiguity as a crux in the musical narrative and might subsequently disambiguate or resolve it as part of that narrative. Yet, I contend that such cases of narrative ambiguity are the exception rather than the rule. Normatively, structural ambiguity and expressive polysemy are less properties warranting direct expression than corollaries of indeterminate notation that therefore warrant resolution. In my view, the fundamental task of the interpreter,

55 Allanbrook (2008, 273–75) lists the myriad writings devoted to this theme.

56 I realize that an ambiguity is by definition an undecidable multivalency, so when I speak of a performer “resolving” an ambiguity, I do not mean to suggest he resolves it in any definitive sense, but rather that, for
in formulating a conception of a particular piece, is to choose from among its several inherent structural and expressive possibilities and present a single, definitive way to hear the piece in any given performance.\(^{57}\) It is the performer’s role to guide the listener through the work’s relations as she conceives them rather than to present a “neutral” version onto which the listener imposes his own interpretation—that would be more a conceptual exercise than a sensuous, aesthetic experience. As we have seen, to aspire toward neutrality or objectivity is necessarily to miss the mark, insofar as musical objectivity is, if anything, encoded subjectivity and thus requires a subjective response. The “neutral” performance—in which one attempts to allow the music to “speak for itself”\(^{58}\)—will ineluctably betray subjective biases at any rate, but, crucially, will not do so with the consistency and purposiveness needed for a compelling, cohesive interpretation.

the sake of clarity, he chooses and projects one out of its several possible (structural-cum-emotive) meanings in a particular performance. In other words, he implicitly asks his listeners to imagine that this meaning is the only possible one (more on such imaginings in the next chapter).

\(^{57}\) This selectivity and specificity, on Levinson’s view, is what distinguishes a performative interpretation from a scholarly (“critical”) one: the former, he states, is “typically selective, individualizing,” the latter “ideally synthetic, overarching” (1993, 39).

\(^{58}\) To this “authenticist” notion Taruskin sagely retorts: let us accumulate as much knowledge (including historical knowledge) as possible about a piece, but not “in a spirit of dutiful self-denial or with illusions that the more knowledge one garners, the fewer decisions one will have to make” (1995, 62). We cannot remove ourselves from the process of bringing a piece to life—music steadfastly refuses to “speak for itself”—and indeed “the suspension of personality in a modernist performance immediately stamps the performance as such, as is therefore paradoxically tantamount to an assertion of personality” (ibid).
I offer examples of each type of ambiguity: the normative case where a passage simply offers multiple possible meanings, and the special case, where the ambiguity is evidently a distinct element of the musical discourse since it is later resolved. Both cases, as I will demonstrate, call for the performer to assume an active rather than neutral role. We have already seen an example of the former in the Introduction (Ex. I-9): recall that Meyer (1973) detects in the subject of Bach’s D minor Fugue multiple implicative strands. Although he does not explicitly call the passage ambiguous, he clearly regards it as such, as structurally multivalent. Recall, he contends that the listener will perceive such multivalence provided the performer does not intervene, provided the performer merely execute the notes and not group or accentuate them in any particular way. I will repeat what I said before: such a neutral rendering, if even that were possible, will not convey anything in particular. The performer who wishes to concretize Meyer’s analysis on some level will choose one implicative strand and devise a strategy by which to convey or imply it. Of course, the performer may also choose to play different subject-entries in different ways, according to different implicative strands (as shown in Ex. 1-6), and thus convey a sense of ambiguity or polysemy on a large scale.

Example 1-6: Bach, D minor Fugue, WTC, Book 2, mm. 1–5: some performance strategies for conveying Meyer’s various implicative strands

An example of the second type is Mozart’s Symphony in G Minor, K. 550, whose opening theme is famously ambiguous from a metric standpoint. As shown in Ex. 1-7, the ambiguity derives from the fact that, on the one hand, the opening bar begins a pattern of octave-oscillations
in the bass, with the lower note intimating the stronger hyperbeat. On the other hand, the thematic content basically begins in m. 2, with the anacruses to that measure serving to reinforce its thematic and hypermetric stability (if, alternatively, the first measure were hypermetrically more stable, m. 2, along with its anacrusis, would serve as an extended anacrusis to m. 3). Mozart disambiguates this theme when it returns in the recapitulation: as shown in the example, the retransitory passage, which as a whole has a decidedly anacrusic quality, encompasses the opening measures of the theme, such that they are now clearly anacrusic as well—they are now unequivocally weak hypermetrically, preparatory to the structural downbeat that is m. 166.

Incidentally, this retransitory passage typifies the special blend of eloquence and contrapuntal artifice that Roman Ivanovitch (2011) ascribes to Mozart’s retransitions generally.

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59 Incidentally, this retransitory passage typifies the special blend of eloquence and contrapuntal artifice that Roman Ivanovitch (2011) ascribes to Mozart’s retransitions generally.
The question for the conductor, in light of this subsequent hypermetric clarification, is,
how should she interpret the opening measures? To somehow play it neutrally would not, I think,
ultimately convey the presence of conflicting meanings. Rather, by making a clear choice from the
start—by playing the second measure as hypermetrically strong, for example—the subsequent
reinterpretation in the recapitulation will make the astute listener realize, in retrospect, that in the theme always inhered the possibility of multiple metrical interpretations. In other words, the ambiguity emerges progressively, over the course of the piece; it is not something that need be, or even can be evident in one particular moment. That said, some cases might exist where structural ambiguity can be conveyed instantaneously, in an emotionally palpable way—by creating, for instance, a murky, hazy quality. Schoenberg offers a hypothetical example in which a pianist “blurs” motives rather than clearly delineates them in order to illuminate a piece’s multidimensionality and its representation of “life on several levels” (1975, 348).

Hence, whether the ambiguity arises simply from the normal, indeterminate condition of musical notation or whether it is evidently planted by the composer in order later to be resolved, the performer can and should treat the ambiguity decisively. It is naïve, I think, to assume that interpretive abstinence will somehow guarantee the expression of such a complex state as ambiguity. I suspect that some musicians covertly and perhaps unconsciously use ambiguity to justify the interpretive neutrality to which they are predisposed, to justify restricting a performer’s

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60 Tanner (2000), discussing Liszt’s Sonata in particular, notes that its formal ambiguities are not merely analytical problems to be solved; rather, they open up opportunities for particular kinds of expression. Also see Krebs (1999). In his chapter devoted to the performance of metric conflict and ambiguity in Schumann, he initially appears too heavily invested in the binary choice of bringing out such conflict or not. Eventually, however, he softens his stance, discussing the need to parse the meaning or explore the emotional intonations of such ambiguity: “It is not enough to convey the letter of metrical conflicts; you must also attempt to penetrate and to communicate their spirit, that is, their meaning” (spoken through his fictionalized Clara) (1999, 184).
freedom. Janet Levy (1995), for example, surveys several examples of “beginning-ending ambiguity” and considers the ways in which performers might respond to these. In every single case, she concludes that any tempo fluctuation will detract from the ambiguity, and therefore that the performer serves such cases only by being as unobtrusive as possible. Performance is, in her view, evidently more about what not to do than what to do.

In Particular: The Interpretive Parameters

Now I offer a basic approach to the fundamental interpretive elements of dynamics, tempo, and articulation. Most generally, the interpreter employs all three elements to manifest the structural and expressive meanings on which she has settled, to express musical sense and mimetic gesture. In other words, rarely does the interpreter call attention to these elements in and for themselves—for example, rubato for rubato’s sake. Adorno (2006) emphasizes in particular the need to express through these variances the formal function of an event, its temporal relation to previous and subsequent events. He claims that, in fact, there is no pure identity in music. Even two phrases consisting of the selfsame notes cannot be strictly identical, for they occur at different times and thus in different contexts and thus assume distinct formal functions that the performer need project.

To convey this range of emotional meaning and formal function, the performer requires the fullest possible range of dynamic color. Dynamic extremes, rather than mezzo forte, are themselves the norm, for only they are capable of “articulating and liberating the subcutaneous. Not varying a medium sound, but rather drawing strength from the characters [of the work] and
their proportions. The requirement of much greater dynamic differentiation: it must extend as far as the differentiation manifest in the composition” (Adorno [2006, 105]).

Tempo fluctuation (rubato) in this approach is an indispensable component of interpretation, a primary means of expressing musical sense. Insofar as every musical group is viewed as having the potential to create a semblance of human gesture, ubiquitous variances in tempo are needed to realize this mimetic potential, to allow notes to coalesce into physical images and emotional tapestries. On a higher formal level, different themes require different tempi in order to manifest their different characters (these differences might be slight, but still clearly perceptible). This approach eschews the notion of a single, uniform tempo since that would essentially nullify a primary element of interpretation, an essential means by which to convey meaning.

Parenthetically, Adorno’s remarks on tempo variance are frustratingly contradictory rather than genuinely dialectical (of course, one cannot know if he would have arrived at a more consistent stance had he completed his theory of performance). In one place, he claims that to interpret at all is necessarily to employ rubato. In another, he claims that tempo variance is a “more superficial means of articulation” than dynamic variance (2006, 99). He also claims that the tempo expresses the totality of the composition, dynamics the individual element (the two of which interact dialectically), and that a unified tempo is required in order to express the unity of the composition (2006, 102).

Yet, leaving aside the question of whether a uniform tempo can

61 To be precise, Adorno views such unity of tempo not as a material actuality—that is, as involving literally equidistant beats—but as an underlying, overall uniformity, an abstract idea: “no 2 [actual] beats will ever be chronometrically equal” (2006, 102).
create unity in any meaningful sense, there is no reason why tempo need be confined to this purportedly unifying role, reserving localized differentiation and characterization for dynamic variance. For tempo variances can be as subtle and minute as dynamic ones, and are as necessary for “humanizing” the music—for transforming the quantitative and mensural into the qualitative and neumic. Ultimately, I read Adorno’s overall ambivalence toward temporal manipulation as amounting to an allowance of moderate variance but also to a distaste for any rubato that appears superimposed onto the music, that results from the performer’s mannerisms rather than from structural necessity. This is evident in his statement that Chopin used rubato for a specific purpose, namely for “gliding over harsh modulations. . . . [It was thus] applied in a purely functional way, so unlike the abuse of it by many modern executants with whom it degenerates from slight variation into a disregard of time” (2006, 20–21).

In short, I believe, evidently in contrast to Adorno, that tempo variance is at least as important a tool for expressing musical structure (on all levels) as is dynamic variance. In fact, arguably any alteration in sound in bound to entail at least a slight alteration in time and vice versa. The fundamental point on which Adorno and I agree is that one should generally not employ rubato for its own sake, but mostly for the purpose of conveying musical sense. 62

Finally, this approach requires considerable differentiation in articulation, both globally and locally. Globally, the piece is be conceived as a series of discrete yet functionally related formal

62 Of course, minute gradations of sound and time are sometimes purely decorative or coloristic, devoid of any demonstrable meaning. Alternatively, one might hold that the most minute interpretive variances do in fact convey meaning, but meaning that is ineffable. For a probing investigation into the precise nature of musical ineffability, see Raffman (1993).
units and rhetorical moments, many of which require demarcation by means of separation. Locally, smaller-scale gestures likewise require such demarcation. The interpreter carefully considers how events should be grouped on various levels, not assuming such grouping to be self-evident—that is, he does not abstain from grouping events decisively (presenting a “neutral” version whose grouping would need to be imposed by the listener). Nor does he assume *legato* the default articulation, especially for music prior to Beethoven, where, in point of fact, *non legato* was the norm. Thus, the absence of articulation marks in the music of Bach, for example, is assumed to indicate neither the absence of distinctive grouping nor pervasively *legato* treatment but rather to warrant varied articulations whose function is to group the musical events in one of the several possible ways connotated by the notation.

In short, the greater the range of variance—with respect to dynamics, tempo, and articulation—the performer has at his disposal, potentially the more capable he is of conveying structural relationships and expressing gesture and emotional meaning. My stance valorizes extreme interpretation—not, per Said (1991), in order to dominate and dehumanize the audience but, on the contrary, to create a more human, more deeply felt experience for all involved. Such extremity, affirms Jonathan Culler, is “a quality to be cultivated rather than shunned. . . . Like most intellectual activities, interpretation is interesting only when it is extreme. Moderate interpretation, which articulates a consensus, though it may have value in some circumstances, is of little interest” (1992, 122). An interpretation, he admits, is not guaranteed to succeed on account of its extremity, but it will stand “a better chance . . . of bringing to light connections or

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63 To recall, Barth (1992) documents that Beethoven was the first composer to cultivate a pervasively *legato* touch.
implications not previously noticed . . . than if [it strives] to remain ‘sound’ or moderate” (ibid., 110).

7. CONCLUSION: THE AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETER

A corollary of the foregoing is that a performance/interpretation, though part of the work, is, or should be, an autonomous part of that work in some sense—just as, by analogy, some works comprise quasi-independent formal sections or fragments. Put more precisely, an interpretation is autonomous with respect to the score while still being part of the work. In fact, it is this very autonomy in relation to the score that allows the performance to be a bona fide part of the work as opposed to a mere instantiator of it. Like the romantic variation (of the “actualizing” variety I have described), the interpretation sets itself apart from the score but precisely in order to illuminate it more fully and in non-obvious ways—in order to seize upon its connotative possibilities.

On a heuristic level, the principle of interpretive autonomy means, somewhat obviously, that the more fully developed and versatile the performer’s technical and interpretive capacities in general—that is, apart from any concrete application—the greater her potential to illuminate particular works. Less obviously, it means that a particular piece is often best served by

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64 Rose Subotnik notes, for example, how certain pieces by Chopin are “internally fragmentary”:

And precisely because this is music in which style is of greater importance to intelligibility than is form, much of the same value can be obtained from the fragments . . . as from the whole. Thus the opening of the well-known Etude in E Major (Op. 10, No. 3) is not a statement of a harmonic premise that will unfold itself but a self-contained section that leads nowhere and could well stand, with just a few rhetorical changes, as an independent piece. . . . What we have here is a sensuous fragment. . . . It would not ravage the sense of the piece to end it here as it would to end at the corresponding point in a Mozart structure (1991, 153).
approaching it as a catalyst for the exploration of interpretive possibilities irrespective of what the piece seems to warrant.\textsuperscript{65} In this scenario, one employs the piece to generate interesting and imaginative dynamic colors to be appreciated for their own sake. Here, the piece initially serves interpretation rather than the reverse. Yet ultimately, this free exploration of sensuous nuance (hopefully) provides the performer with vivid and various interpretive particulars that she can gradually match up with the score and modify in accordance with the exigencies of a particular music-structural reading. Such freedom from the supposed stringencies of the score conduces to a leap of imagination by which the performer can intuit a felicitous interpretive choice or overall conception that he likely would not if approaching the score more deferentially. Conversely, a performer whose primary objective is to be “true” to the work unwittingly constricts the range of interpretive possibilities and variances by which meaningful dimensions of the musical structure can be revealed. The interpreter who is unduly concerned with adhering to the work’s objective elements, despite his best intentions, will often miss the true import of those elements. In a nutshell, a subjective, autonomous stance toward objective musical features paradoxically serves them, whereas an outright (supposed) allegiance to them does not. “Just as composition in fact increases its demands on interpretation the more it grows apart from it [that is, the more abstract or esoteric the music is], so also will the performer, the more perfect and differentiated his performance becomes, and the better he controls his natural material, become increasingly able to do justice to the composition” (Adorno [2006, 113]).

\textsuperscript{65} “A method that compels people to puzzle over . . . [elements] about which there might initially seem to be nothing to say has a better chance of producing discoveries . . . than one which seeks only to answer those questions that a text asks its model reader” (Culler [1992, 122]).
This paradoxical relation of interpretation to the score is analogous to that between the composer and the musical material she is obliged to employ in some fashion. Adorno states that, as such material accumulates generic meanings or associations over time, and as musical forms become more standardized, the composer starts to lose his freedom; it is less society that limits his creativity than the musical matter itself. For the modern composer in particular, the material presents challenges at every turn, and the composer has no choice but to grapple with “what his music objectively demands of him. But such obedience demands of the composer all possible disobedience, independence, and spontaneity.”\(^6\) The composer can be true to the objectivity of his material—which, to reiterate, congeals subjective and social impulses—only by utilizing such material freely and unconventionally. The score is to the interpreter what musical material is to the modern composer: both score and material are easily reified, such that to do them justice, to vivify them, performer and composer must resist their reification—they must be “disobedient” to them.

\(^6\) (1973, 37, my italics). In this work (Philosophy of Modern Music), Adorno expounds the thesis that Schoenberg’s more progressive, atonal and 12-tone language is truer to the (then) current state of music and society than Stravinsky’s regressive, neo-tonal language. The latter’s music is a falsity in supposing that tonality is still appropriate to then current social conditions. In fact, such ostensible allegiance to tonality actually does it a disservice: “[the] arbitrary preservation of tonality endangers that it wishes to maintain” (1973, 3). This stance toward musical style in general parallels that toward musical works in particular: presenting the latter as supposedly they once were reifies and distorts them and also fails to bring the work into concordance with current social and political realities. In this sense, Stravinsky’s neo-tonal style as well as authenticist performance trends belie the nature of both the past and the present.
I would extend this notion even to one’s own interpretive conception: to have such a basic conception is crucial, yet to “be true” to that conception by attempting to replicate it exactly each and every time is inevitably to desiccate and distort it. Here too, paradoxically, the performer must always go beyond his basic conception, must always be trying new things, precisely to invest that conception with the subtleties needed to keep it afloat—to render it compelling and to realize its embodied potential. The ideal of autonomy (in Adorno’s paradoxical sense), then, applies to the relation between the interpreter and the work, the composer and his material, and the interpreter and his own interpretive conception.

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The above recalls the authenticist notions the opening of this chapter put on trial. Was I a bit unfair? After all, it seems that all performers want more or less the same thing: to connect to the motions and emotions underlying notation in order to bring music to life for an audience. The question is, what attitude best serves that goal? Pious deference to the putative intentions of the composer, the letter of the score? Or rather, entering into the spirit of the score, by empathizing with the human qualities by which it is animated? Leopold Auer weighs in: “The musical spirit of Bach transcends all narrow limitations of period, and the artist of to-day who truly enters into this spirit will play Bach as he should be played, and will play Bach better because he will play him in the interpretive spirit of our own generation, not that of 1720.”67 As Dreyfus comments, it does not even occur to Auer that one could capture the spirit of the piece by unearthing how it might

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have been played centuries ago. On the contrary, “historical reconstruction may well
countermand the musician’s most important task, to move listeners in the here and now” (2007, 268). It is freedom and autonomy in relation to such veridical notions that enable the present-day
musician to reanimate the human qualities underlying a score. No two performers will express
these in quite the same way. Interpretive standardization and relative uniformity can only arise
when the letter of the score becomes the object of interpretation. If that object, rather, are feelings
to which we can relate or with which we can empathize, their expressions in tone and time will be
as varied and nuanced as, presumably, our experiences of those feelings are.
CHAPTER 2

PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS

Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing. Interpreters do not decode poems; they make them.

– Stanley Fish (1980, 327)

The analysis and interpretation of music are, for better or worse, also performances. . . . Performers inevitably hope that they have reached, moved, and inspired their listeners. Music analysts can only hope for the same.

– Janet Schmalfeldt (2011, 21)

My aim here is to argue for music analysis as a mode of interpretation rather than as a revelation of objectively present musical structures. Analysis is interpretive especially when used in a way as to implicate performance. In this chapter, I explore two ways analysis can do this. One, in an Iserian vein, is to pose—or, more precisely, educe from the score—questions, irregularities, and ambiguities with which the performer must grapple. Another is to elicit embodiment: as I will argue, many analytical constructs are metaphorical for physical and emotive states and thus eminently amenable to realization in performance. Put another way, when one chooses to view
analytical constructs as vehicles for sentience rather than as assertions of fact, one opens the door to using them performatively. I will emphasize the first performative feature in my analysis of Schumann’s "Von fremden Ländern und Menchen," the second in my analysis of Chopin’s Nocturne in C minor, op. 48, no. 1. The chapter divides into two parts, the first considering the performativity of music analysis generally, the second of Schenkerian analysis in particular.

I. Music Analysis in General

1. Analysis In The Work

Music theorists regularly evince the ontological bias I oppose, as a rule attributing features they derive analytically to an abstract work, rarely considering the possibility that they might belong to performance or perception.¹ This ontological stance was especially explicit in performance/analysis studies of the 1980s—I have already cited Narmour (1988) and Berry (1989) in this regard. Since these authors, among others, viewed structural features as immanent properties of works and viewed analysis as uniquely capable of unearthing such properties, they placed performance in the role of having to conform to and communicate an analysis (whatever “communicate an analysis” might mean, more on which below)—at least if the performance desired to be cogent. Again, Narmour, for one, unapologetically speaks of “correct” or “incorrect” performances based on their conformity, or lack thereof, to a correct analysis. In this way, analysis occupied an authoritative role vis-à-vis performance; the relationship between the two domains was

¹ Fred Maus (1999a) is an exception in arguing that the property of unity, in particular, should be attributed to one’s experience of the musical work rather than to the work itself.
asymmetrical and hegemonic.² I speak in the past tense because, as I discussed in the 
Introduction, this power structure is beginning to loosen. Still, more often than not, music theory 
speaks of works, not of performances—or more precisely, it speaks of works in a way that does not 
recognize performance as an indispensable component. The defining properties of a work are 
what they are, irrespective of performance.³

What role, in this scheme, does analysis play in relation to the musical work? It is instructive 
to consider and compare Schenker and Adorno in this regard. Adorno, while not terribly

² Parmer criticizes musicology for adopting a similarly hegemonic stance toward performance: “Although 
manufactured apart from . . . actual practice, [musicological] knowledge nevertheless exerts an authoritative 
force to which practice remains subservient: in this hierarchy, practice becomes professional, becomes 
authoritative and rigorous, only when it implements or applies such knowledge” (2007, 13). If, for Parmer, 
musicology derives its authority from other liberal-arts disciplines (recall my allusion to “derivative 
disciplinarity” in Chapter 1), performance derives its authority from musicology. The chain of command 
thus runs, from top to bottom: humanities/social sciences, etc.—musicology/theory—performance.

³ Lucy Green savors a paradox in this regard: the standard practice by which music theory frames the 
musical work (within the Western art music tradition) as an object of structural analysis—as an object 
whose meanings derive from its supposedly immanent properties—itself holds an extra-musical, ideological 
(in Green’s terminology, “delineated”) meaning. Namely, such music is of high value and thus worthy of 
such probing investigation (more so than, say, popular music, which putatively derives its value from social 
associations rather than from intrinsic content). The very act of analysis, which assumes the musical work 
to be an autonomous object replete with inherent meanings, conveys a decidedly non-immanent, 
ideological meaning, contrary to its objectivist pretensions—or, in different terms, a paramusical meaning, 
contrary to its formalist pretensions (see Green [1988, 53, passim]).
sympathetic to Schenker, agrees with him on two crucial points. First, analysis is part of the work in some sense. Second, following from the first, structural comprehension, in some form, is a requisite for successful performance. For Schenker, the mode of analysis integral to the work was, of course, his own: “The musical examples which accompany this volume are not merely practical aids; they have the same power and conviction as the visual aspect of the printed composition itself (the foreground). That is, the graphic representation is part of the actual composition, not merely an educational means” (1935, xxiii, my italics). Schenker does not explain the precise sense in which his graphic analyses are part of the musical work. One can speculate. In depicting structural levels in a dynamic, quasi-narrative manner, he clearly grants them a modicum of artistry in their own right. That is, in progressing through the levels, Schenker essentially tells a story (in his view, I think, the story) of how the piece came to be as it is—a story replete with conflict, tension, resolution, and transformation. In other words, while the structural levels are in actuality synchronic, Schenker depicts them in his running commentary as metaphorically diachronic, as if the background were the beginning, the middleground the middle, and the foreground (or the piece itself) the end of a narrative sequence of events. In this, he implicitly ascribes to them a tangible quality, he implicitly directs the reader-listener to imagine that the levels are themselves

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4 “For, in reducing music to its most generalized structures, what seems to him . . . merely casual and fortuitous is, in a certain sense, precisely that which is really the essence . . . of the music” (Adorno [1969, 174]).

5 His story is not an empirical description of the actual, chronological process of composing, but rather an account of the conceptual layers or logical stages that lead from an abstract universal—the Ursatz—to a concrete particular—the actual piece.
sensate phenomena, not merely an abstract structure underlying phenomena. Scott Burnham affirms,

Schenker describes the theoretical motion from background to foreground in terms usually reserved for the compositional motion from beginning to end (left to right). Such a conflation should not come as a surprise in a theory that holds that music is about itself—theoretical abstraction thus becomes another form of music composition and indeed, Schenker liked to consider his way of thinking to be more an art than a theory (1995, 90).

Yet, ultimately I construe Schenker to mean not that the higher structural levels are literally material and perceptible in themselves, but that they affect what is directly perceptible. That is, hearing the musical surface against the backdrop of higher levels yields qualities—of tension and deferral, for example—that would not otherwise arise. Put another way, a Schenkerian analysis is an attributive grid, a mode of explanation or interpretation that one invokes in order to make sense of a musical work on a given occasion (more on which later). Consequently, even if such a system, in the terms of Peter Rabinowitz (1992), is not properly in the work, it is nonetheless, in a sense, part of the work. I take Rabinowitz’s phraseology as a clever way of saying that one can construe the work in a narrow sense—as consisting mainly of authorial notations—or in a broader sense—as encompassing modes of interpretation that are revelatory of the work in some way. It is in this latter sense, I think, that Schenker touts his theory as being artistic in its own right.

For Adorno, analysis is a constituent particularly of those works that are patently esoteric—serial ones, for example. Such works unfold partially in the analytic medium. Put another way, works whose substance resides more in inner content—in a dense motivic argument, for
example—than in outer form depend upon some brand of analysis for their realization. (Yet, with characteristic dialectical slippage, Adorno goes on to claim that it is precisely such subcutaneous elements that are the most untranslatable—the most irreducibly particular to the piece at hand and therefore the least amenable to the general tools on which analysis relies. Insofar as analysis must make the unknowable knowable, it is a “squaring of the circle.”) Thus, for Adorno, the musical work, at least in particularly recondite cases, encompasses not only the composer’s notations but also the modes of interpretation that are indispensable for parsing those notations.

Adopting the stances of Schenker and Adorno, then, one might extend the purview of the musical work to include analysis. While I relish this prospect, I find with Schenker it comes at too high a cost, since he insists that one particular mode of analysis—namely, his—merits musical status (and is thus a prerequisite for compelling performance). For, on the one hand, I think there is some truth to Cone’s celebrated declaration (one also found in Adorno) that “the good composition will always reveal, on close study, the methods of analysis needed for its own comprehension” (1960, 54). A particular piece—by the nature of its particular form, genre, or style—may be more susceptible of one type of analysis than of another. For example, a piece that exploits and extends the possibilities of sonata form (such as many by Beethoven and Schubert) would warrant a formal analysis; a scherzo, whose effect depends largely upon rhythmic and (hyper)metric rhetoric and ambiguity, a rhythmic analysis; almost any work by Brahms, which thrives on the technique of developing variation, a motivic analysis, and so forth. On the other hand, even within a single piece, at one point one parameter might come to the fore, at another point some other. One might envision a scenario, for instance, in which now harmony is most prominent, now rhythm (with harmony receding), now form (with rhythm receding), and so on.
Indeed, Dahlhaus admonishes against assuming that all musical parameters will be equally emphasized for the duration of a piece, claiming “components which make up a musical structure can advance and retreat to different degrees during the formal process” (1975, 11). James Webster more forcefully asserts, “The belief that a complex work can be understood on the basis of a single musical parameter is reductive. . . . The more theoretically self-conscious the method, the greater its pretensions to global explanation, the more it actually excludes. The only sane course is to pursue . . . ‘multivalent’ analysis: to study each principal domain . . . without regard for ‘unity’” (1991, 4)—without regard, that is, for how the parameters might ultimately converge, which they often do not. Finally, there might be some merit to analyzing a piece against the grain—to analyzing an overtly rhythmic piece in terms of voice leading, a lyrical one in terms of rhythm, and so on—especially if the aim of interpretation, as Adorno holds, is to uncover potentially incongruous, conflictive dimensions. In summary, (1) different types of pieces conduce to different modes of analysis—Schenkerian analysis should not be the analytical “default”; (2) different parts of a single piece may conduce to different modes of analysis—voice leading often takes a back seat to other parameters; and (3) pace Cone, one should not necessarily restrict one’s analytical approach to the method the piece is most obviously amenable to—even patently linear pieces might be better read by methods that go against the Schenkerian grain (as we will see in Chapter 4).

My more substantive concern, however, with Schenker’s conception of analysis as belonging to the work is that he apparently takes his analytical method to be a truth-seeking enterprise. I prefer to see analysis as an indispensable component of the work not because it disinters the truth of the work but, on the contrary, because it disinters multiple structural potentials. The Ursatz—or, more generally, long-range connection and progression—is apparently
for Schenker (at least as evidenced by some of his remarks, documented below) precisely such a singular truth. Now, this does not mean Schenker’s theory must be viewed in this way—we need no more defer to authorial intentions with music theories than we need do so with musical works. In fact, Part II of this chapter will pose an alternate Schenkerian perspective, drawing on the rich philosophical tradition in which Schenker’s ideas are embedded. But it does appear that Schenker viewed his own theory in apodictic, hermeneutic terms. This is most evident in how he upheld the Ursatz as a guarantor of musical profundity and value. As much as within any given analysis Schenker reveals the Ursatz to be tightly wed to the lower-level diminutions and motivic details it generates, it is nonetheless for him a separable, metaphysical ideal, one that transcends particular compositions.

2. Performance as Truth-Telling

In Chapter 1, I argued that hermeneutic musical knowledge is ersatz knowledge, or that, at the very least, we need to be cautious about reducing pieces to generalizations, which are useful, if at all, only as points of departure. I just pointed to Schenker’s affinity for such knowledge, for viewing deep structures in a reified way. They need not be, and I will pose alternatives below. For

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6 Here I speak of hermeneutics neither in Gadamer’s sense nor in the sense of programmatic, narrative interpretations of the Kretzschmar variety. (Incidentally, Schenker, his formalist reputation notwithstanding, was not immune to such interpretations. For example, he reads Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 110 as indicative of an enervated persona striving for greater vitality. See Snarrenberg’s discussion of this reading [1997, 108–20]. My own reading of Chopin’s C Minor Nocturne will rest upon a similar narrative premise.) Rather, I am speaking of hermeneutics in the sense I used in Chapter 1, relating to hidden meanings (here, primarily ones of a structural nature).
now, however, I want to suggest that we ought to be equally reluctant to assign performance the
task of communicating putative music-analytic fact.

Maus (1999b) has offered perhaps the most compelling argument along these lines, and so I
summarize and gloss his article at length. He defines the “standard conception” of analysis-
performance relations thus: analysis uncovers a truth or the truth about the piece and performance
can and should reveal it somehow. For Schenker, for instance, “something is true of the work,”
Maus states, “and the performer’s task is to find a means of communicating it” (1999b, 133). For
Cone, to take another instance, the performer’s duty is to reveal the “rhythmic life” of a
composition, as derived from analysis. The problem with the standard conception, Maus cleverly
deduces, is that if the listener already knows the analytical precept, she does not need the
performer to project it (however he might do that); if, on the other hand, the listener is not privy
to the precept, nothing the performer does will unequivocally communicate that precept.
Performance under the standard conception is either superfluous or hopelessly ineffectual.

Maus elaborates on each pole. Regarding superfluity, he notes that in most
performance/analysis discourse, one proceeds from analysis to performance: one first formulates
an analysis of a piece and then takes the compliant performance to be a self-evident token of that
analysis (failing to consider what the listener not privy to that analysis would hear). We tend to
forget, or blissfully ignore, the constructed nature of the enterprise. Maus thus implies that such
studies typically exercise circular reasoning—the performance merely confirms the meaning that
we have decided in advance it would hold. On the other hand, performance obviously cannot
unequivocally communicate an analytical precept because it is semantically indeterminate. A
particular interpretive tactic might be understood in light of different, even diametrically opposed
analyses. To offer my own hypothetical: dynamic emphasis might express either structural weight or, conversely, extra-structural significance—either phenomenon could easily inspire dynamic intensity. The converse, I would add, is equally true: a particular analytical determination might be conveyed by opposing interpretive tactics. A cadential arrival, for instance, can be delineated equally well by both a dynamic increase and a decrease.

Maus concludes, “I do not think that theorists know very much about the extent to which performance details can actually communicate analytical information” (1999b, 141). Better to think of an analysis-influenced performance as responding to that analysis rather than somehow instantiating it. To expand on this key point, when a performer follows an analytical interpretation, either his own or someone else’s, the performance outcomes do not—indeed, by nature of the musical language, cannot—discursively communicate that prior interpretation. Rather, the interpretation contains fluctuations of phrasing, dynamic, articulation, tempo, pedaling, vibrato, portamento, and so on, that—in some, not all cases—arise in response to that analysis, but which subsequently take on a life of their own; they become autonomous in relation to the analytical information by which they were incited. These performance outcomes may well possess structural qualities such as cohesiveness and differentiated unity in part as a result of following an analytical reading. But, crucially, these qualities become wedded to the sounding experience and do not convey the analytical data by which they may have been catalyzed. The analysis eventuates in sounding music, not the other way around.

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7 Put another way, performance can help us understand structural elements not in the sense of calling our attention to those elements per se, but in helping us hear the music as coherent. This distinction relies upon a more basic philosophical one, as explained by Jane O’Dey, between understanding what sentence s
Another problem with the standard conception, Maus contends, is that it falsely presupposes a work outside or prior to interpretive discourse, a work on which the performer then comments. Maus conjectures, however, that most listeners do not hold a work- or score-based view and thus do not perceive a distinct boundary separating a piece from its performance. “In an actual performance the composer’s decisions blend with those of the performer, and often there is no way to tell, from listening, where the composer’s creativity leaves off and that of the performer begins” (1999b, 148). In other words, the typical listener does not hear the performance as communicating something about something else—she does not hear the performance as pointing to or commenting on an abstract work and its invariant properties, and certainly not pointing to an analytical conception of that work.

Maus then takes a step further and concludes that performance is indeed part of a composition, not a commentary on it. A composition, meanwhile, is itself performative. He contends, along with Small, that “one might regard composition as an activity that has as its goal the production of performances” (199b, 149). Both assertions grant performance “the centrality, in our theorizing, that it already holds in our musical practices, our musical pleasures” (1999b, 150).

The performance is part of the work; the work is part of the performance. I agree, but I

is and understanding s. The former requires that we possess the vocabulary to parse the grammatical structure of s, the latter merely that we intuitively grasp the sense of s. The latter, “understanding simpliciter,” is the more common way of understanding music. “Like language, music has an ‘understanding simpliciter’ that is linked neither to explicit explanation nor to the ability to read musical notation and that operates independently of both” (O’Dey [2000, 9]).
also wonder: where does this leave analysis? In my view, it can also be performative. It is concerned, to invoke a Goethean precept, not with truth but rather with meaning. The next section develops this premise.

3. Analysis as Performative

Making Meaning

To review, fiction for Iser is not opposed to reality but is somewhat opaque to it precisely in order to expose something rarified about it. Since literature is not content to present a mimetically transparent, uncontested view of the extra-literary world, it is only logical that it should deliberately elicit the reader’s involvement. For, the reader, drawing on his store of experience, will inevitably bring something new to the text, will construct a more intricate and uncommon meaning than the text alone could do. Literature, on Iser’s view, is less about what it means and more about what it does to the reader (and what the reader does to it). Indeed, Iser is forthrightly opposed to the idea, often assumed, that artworks stow hidden meanings. If anything, artworks educe new realizations and insights from the reader’s own depths. “The significance of the work, then, does not lie in the meaning sealed within the text, but in the fact that that meaning brings out what had previously been sealed within us” (1978, 157, my italics). However, I do not take Iser to mean that the reader, like the notional Freudian analysand, harbors an unconscious truth about himself that simply

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8 Novalis lent this idea pretty, poetic form in his “Monolog” of 1798: words, he said, “create a world unto themselves—they play with themselves, express nothing more than their wondrous nature, and for just that reason are they so expressive—for just that reason do they mirror the strange play of relations among things” (quoted in Rumph [2005, 135]).
awaits discovery. Rather, the literary work along with its participatory reader create new meanings that retrospectively expose, if anything, only latent potentialities—those of both the reader and the text.

Turning to music, I offer an analogy between literature and extra-literary meaning on the one hand, music analysis and music-structural meaning on the other. Just as literature generates new ideas about the world rather than merely reflects preexistent ideas, so might it be more fruitful to conceive of music analysis as constructing rather than reflecting the attributes it ascribes to a piece. Nicholas Cook has been the chief ambassador for this idea (especially in 1989a/b and 2002). An analysis, he postulates, is an implicit plea to hear a piece in a particular way. He cites Schoenberg in this regard: though subscribing to a natural foundation for music theory, Schoenberg contends that such a foundation has yet to be fully discovered. Until then, we must view theory as a mode of “good comparison.” In this model, analysis makes metaphors, ones whose efficacy derives less from illuminating “the ultimate nature of the things presented” (Schoenberg [1911, 10]) than from their own heuristic and music-pedagogical utility. Schenker’s theory too, despite its essentializing tendencies, is arguably more a recommendation for how we could hear—more an impetus for revised perception—than a reflection of how we actually do hear.\footnote{Marion Guck (1998) seconds this view, arguing that analysts write not about structural truths but about their own particular mode of engagement with the work. The latter, as well as analysts’ more general assumptions regarding the nature of the work and the role of the perceiver, can be gleaned from their linguistic style and diction.} Whether or not a theory purports to be factual, we can employ it in a pragmatic, performative way.
How does performance fit into this model? To the extent that analysis recommends particular perceptions, it recommends particular interpretive tactics that will enable those perceptions. From Cook’s vantage, in fact, structural analysis is not external to performance—it is no abstract dimension—but is rather a way of conceiving and formulating the expressive possibilities of performance. More broadly, the very notion of a musical work might be understood “as a means of representing or conceptualizing performances” (1999a, 244). The result (to reiterate this key quote) is an “emphasis on the mutuality of the analyst/performer, as against the hegemonic relationship assumed by Berry and Narmour” (ibid., 245). Within Cook’s model, analysis is itself performative, infused with a performance-like sensibility. Analysis is not antecedent to performance as concepts in general have often been deemed antecedent to experience, because analysis on this view is not factual but rather experiential through and through. The possibility of performance and perception conditions the very process of structural attribution, and such attributes, while perhaps posing as abstractions, are implicitly conceived as eventuating in sensuous sound.10

10 Tim Howell (1992) adopts a similar stance regarding the role of analysis in relation to performance.
Musical Imaginings

Kendall Walton’s theory of artistic representation (1990) is a useful supplement to Cook’s ideas. Walton proposes that when we participate in a representational work, we implicitly agree to follow certain “rules of the game”—both the ones established by the medium generally as well as those established by the artwork in particular. In viewing a painting, for example, the most general tacit rule is: view this two-dimensional matrix as if it were three-dimensional. In viewing a play: pretend that these actors are the characters they portray—that the person onstage is really experiencing the feelings he portrays and that the events his character undergoes are really happening. A literary work is replete with “fictional truths”—propositions that are true within the fictional world created by the work. Each mimetic genre has its own rules to which we must adhere if we are to experience the object as an artwork, with neither undue formalism—say, seeing the painting as mere splotches of color on a canvas—nor undue realism—say, in viewing the play, thinking the murder being depicted is a real one.11

11 Suzanne Langer (1953 and 1957) would frame such imaginings as “illusions” or “apparitions.” Her thesis is that each artform poses its own central image (imagining), one peculiar to it, and without which it would not be perceived as art. This image transcends the particular materials used to create that it—it is an emergent property. For instance, music creates an illusion of “audible time” that transcends the harmony, melody, form, and rhythm forming the basis of that illusion. In other words, the property of temporal unfolding is an emergent one, one supervenient upon various music-structural parameters. This effect is integral to perceiving music qua music. Thus, the moment we perceive harmonic progression instead of the illusion of temporal progression that harmonic progression helps engender, we no longer listen to music as such. Likewise, the moment we perceive paint and brush strokes instead of virtual space, we no longer view a painting, merely marks on a canvas. While each kind of art creates its own particular illusion, all such
Walton’s theory is apropos of our discussion in that, while he does not assign the percipient as great a role as Iser does in constituting the meaning of a work, he does render the percipient an integral part of the mimetic act. The percipient does not just passively take in a depiction, merely suspending disbelief, but actively participates in creating it, triggering fictional beliefs, implicitly agreeing to imagine particular things. (To be precise, Walton claims that fictional truths exist whether or not they are actually imagined as true, but they are nonetheless designed to be imagined as true, just as the work of fiction, in Iser’s account, is designed to elicit the reader’s response.)

Walton (1994) applies this model to music with an aim to explain musical expression. Music, he claims, prescribes that we imagine certain behaviors. Building upon Guck’s (1993) analysis of the opening piano solo from the Adagio of Mozart’s Piano Concerto in A, K. 488, Walton adduces a provisional plot centered around the qualities of lateness and fortuitousness that pervade this passage. He eventually dismisses the specifics of the plot as “silly,” a mere crutch by which better to connect the various instances of lateness and render them more tangible. Nonetheless, that the music does not entail this, or any one particular plot does not mean it fails to prescribe imaginings. The music, Walton maintains, does in fact create a fictional world, albeit an incomplete one: this world is replete with qualities and attributions, but unlike literature, it lacks agents and narrative continuity. The denizens of this world are so many “jumbled” fictional truths (1994, 67).

illusions basically serve to express human feelings—not the feelings of the artist, nor those evoked from the audience, but those of the “lifeworld,” feelings in general.
Indeed, Walton draws a clear line between musical and literary/pictorial fictionality. For one, in viewing a painting, I imagine myself viewing its object from a certain perspective. In music I have no such perspective, for the spaces of the music and of the listener are entirely separate (or possibly, I would counter, entirely merged, but in neither case would the listener occupy a distinct position in virtual space in relation to the music). For another, in viewing a painting, I imagine seeing what is represented. In music—excepting music depicting birdcalls, thunderstorms, flowing water, and the like—I do not imagine hearing what is represented: “a rising melody portraying the ascension of a saint into heaven doesn’t portray the sound of the ascension; I have no idea what a saint’s ascent to heaven sounds like. Music probably does not portray sounds when it portrays nonvocal behavioral expressions of emotion” (1997, 70–71). Both cases suggest that one has less perceptual access to the fictional world in music than one does to the fictional world in painting. Yet, Walton says, this is counterintuitive, for “my impression is the opposite of being distanced from the world of the music. . . . I feel intimate with the music—more intimate, even, than I feel with the world of a painting” (1997, 71). Indeed, the feelings music represents are feelings we imagine ourselves as having, and we imagine of a particular auditory occasion that it is an experience of that feeling. “Music that induces me actually to feel exuberant thereby induces me to imagine feeling thus, and music might induce me merely to imagine feeling anguish when I don’t really” (1997, 75); and I imagine not just that I feel exuberant, but also that my experience of the sounds is an experience of exuberance. From this Walton concludes that, at least with respect to emotional expression, music offers no “work world”—at least not in the same sense as those of literature and painting—only a “game world,” the world of the perceiver. “The only fictional truths there are may be ones generated by the listener’s experience with the music, ones that
belong only to the game world” (1997, 81). In short, “It is the auditory experiences, not the music itself, that generate fictional truths” (1997, 82).

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Walton’s theory holds fascinating implications for the aesthetics of musical representation and expression. But my main concern at present are the performative dimensions of his theory, and how we might relate it to music analysis. Judging from his account, music is perhaps even more performative and perceiver-oriented than are the mimetic arts because the experiences the work mandates us to imagine are solely our own, not those of characters. Though precipitated by structural features of the work, these experiences belong to our world, not that of the work. Yet, we need not even go this far to argue for the performativity of Walton’s theory. In fact, I see no reason why a sad piece cannot engender a fictional world, a work world, in which a persona is sad, even if it is also the case that the perceiver and/or performer are (imaginatively) sad. Such a music-fictional world would still be incomplete and indeterminate enough to serve performative aims, to elicit the listener’s participation in organizing the world in one of several possible ways that would make sense (Walton’s narrative about K. 488 is one of the ways those otherwise “jumbled” ascriptions of lateness could cohere).

But let us set aside specific emotions for the moment, as the musical work, Walton accedes, prescribes imaginings about more general sensations as well: lateness or delay (as in K. 488), tension-resolution, suspense, surprise, fulfillment, and so on. And these in turn, I would add, derive from structural elements. For example, from a form-functional standpoint, we imagine that 12 measures standing on the dominant augur a tonal-thematic return, an imagining that triggers a
sense of tension or expectancy; from a rhythmic/structural standpoint, we imagine that this return is a “structural downbeat,” thus an emphatic, even triumphant arrival; from a Schenkerian standpoint, we imagine that a \( \hat{5} \) melodically embellished is consequently omnipresent in some sense, and that in relation to it the embellishing tones are circuitous, desultory, tense, or whatever. In each case, a material trace, a music-notational fact (such as several bars reiterating a dominant chord), filtered through some structural/stylistic model (form theory/sonata convention), induces both a music-structural imagining (the V augurs a thematic/tonal return) and a correlative experiential or quasi-emotive imagining (tension, suspense). The imaginings are not randomly imposed onto the music—they have a material basis—and yet they definitely transcend this basis, congealing in the listener’s mind, thus forming an intentional object. In Nattiez’s (1990) semiological terms, the neutral level, subjected to music-analytical imaginings, ascends to the esthetic level.

This material trace is thus in itself merely a potentiality as regards both its structural and emotive meaning. One might say it is rhematic in Peirce’s [1955] sense. In Peirce’s system (helpfully schematized by Turino [1999, 226]), a rheme is a sign that represents its object as a possibility. The word “dog,” for example, is a rheme because it points to the possibility of a dog without necessarily signifying an actual dog. A painting of a fictional person is also a rheme. (A rheme corresponds to the levels of icon and qualisign within Peirce’s other trichotomies.) As Turino summarizes, “As signs interpreted as representing possible . . . objects, rhemes are crucial to the semiotic functions of art because they allow for the play of imagination and creativity. Rhemes can denote and represent what does not exist . . . but they are crucial to bringing new possibilities
into existence by *imagining* and representing the possibility materially in art objects or performances” (ibid., 238, my italics).

The rheme is a sign in its nascent, inchoate stage, one at which we can only imagine the various phenomena it might ultimately signify. Importantly, rhemes are not restricted to words and pictures; in fact, Turino relates them to “certain ineffable sonic qualities of performance” (ibid). I would add that score-traces—harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, and simple formal configurations (basically, musical phenomena not rising above the purely “descriptive” level of analysis)—can also be rhematic, insofar as they, in conjunction with a music-analytical impetus, can elicit musical imaginings regarding the structural and expressive relationships among tones.

Here we begin to see the role of music analysis in “as-if” performativity. Analysis consolidates the score’s performative inclinations: if material traces allow for multiple potential relationships, particular music-analytical models circumscribe this set, indicating what in particular the performer-listener is to imagine. Different analytical modalities apply to music different sets of metaphors in terms of which we imagine hearing the music, different attributive hats that we listeners try on.¹² The listener also imagines the aesthetic and emotive qualities that invariably

¹² If my stance seems a bit ironic, I believe it is—not flippantly so, but in the Romantic sense. As René Rusch declares (in the context of discussing irony in Schubert), “With regard to a musical work, it seems plausible that multiple contextual frames can bring meaning to a single musical statement” (2011, 78). If this is so, I propose that the analyst is justified in adopting a degree of ironic distance from the music she analyzes and methods she uses, realizing that music is by nature susceptible of various modes of explanation, such that using any one is bound to entail an act of imagination, a suspension of disbelief. One imagines, for instance, that a voice-leading analysis, in a particular case, is indispensable for illuminating the music. Braunschweig adopts a similar stance, claiming that “when one encounters a
accompany such structural metaphors. Music-analytical imaginings are thus by nature double imaginings.

The entire package—the material potentiality as exposed and actualized by analysis and (in some situations) responded to by a performer—is then delivered to the listener for his delectation. The listener’s experience, the final link in the interpretive chain, is perhaps the least amenable to codification. Suffice to say, although the performer, as we discussed, typically projects the expressive connotations of analysis by tactics that have preestablished expressive functions, thus ensuring some degree of intersubjective consistency among listeners, the listener will ineluctably filter the interpretive product through her own realm of experience, thus introducing additional variables. For that matter, the performer, as we have seen, cannot be expected to manifest the meaning actualized by analysis but only respond to it, to filter it through the exigencies of her instrument. (Sadness, for example, is typically conveyed one way on the violin, another on the piano, another in the voice, and so on.) Hence, meaning is not simply passed along a conveyor belt from the neutral to esthesic levels—it is fundamentally altered in each stage of the process. The chain from material trace to analytical interpretation to performance interpretation to perception is by no means a closed loop.\footnote{Nor is the chain unidirectional, insofar as the performer is obviously a perceiver as well. As such, she will continually alter her previous sound-conception or sound-image based on what she hears coming from the}
In brief, analysis is integral to the music work in illuminating not its immanent properties but its potentialities—ones only intimated by rhematic musical notation—thus drawing the performer/perceiver directly into the meaning-making process. Analysis is, or at least can be, a portal through which the performer/perceiver finds a way into the work, a way to make the work what it is in a particular instance. Analysis, then, induces new meanings and experiences rather than codifies what is already present in the score, simply waiting to be sonically manifested. But, as Walton sagely remarks, even if analysis were simply the process of making conscious what we already hear, it would still lead to new perceptions:

The objective of analysis is not always or only to explicate how listeners in fact hear pieces, however. Many analyses are designed to explain and encourage new ways of hearing. The obvious way of doing this is by specifying the intensional content of the new hearing. . . . But the distinction between explicating a current way of hearing and pointing to a new one is not clearcut. Even an analysis consisting entirely in specifications of what a listener already hears in a piece is likely to change the way she hears it. . . . So an analysis . . . by specifying what I hear in a piece . . . changes my experience at the same time that it enhances my understanding of it (1992, 42–43).

The Need for Analysis

instrument (alter, that is, in real-time performance and/or from one performance to another). The component of perception, therefore, is not merely an “output” with respect to performance, but also an “input,” resulting in a kind of feedback loop. On these points, see Parmer (2007, 30–37).
Do I go too far in including analysis as a component of the work? I don’t think so. Music by itself has a limited capacity to direct its readers to imagine—simply because its harmonic and melodic configurations do not, like sentences in a novel, denote particular assertions the truth of which we are then implicitly directed to imagine. Music analysis thus serves as a crucial interlocutor between the score and the performer/perceiver, drawing out potential structural relations, narratives, and anomalies, rendering them more explicit, guiding the willing analyst-listener to imagine their certainty, their reality, and their concomitant emotional qualities.

Let me restate the situation in Iser’s terms. For Iser, a signal difference between reading and social interaction is that “the partners in dyadic interaction can ask each other questions in order to ascertain how far their views have controlled contingency, or their images have bridged the gap of inexperienceability of one another’s experiences. The reader, however, can never learn from the text how accurate or inaccurate are his views of it” (1978, 166). Moreover, dialogic partners presumably converse within some sort of pragmatic context, which serves as a tertium comparationis that regulates their interpretations. The reader-text dyad lacks this as well. Thus the reader, Iser concludes, must infer the codes that regulate interaction from the text in which they are dispersed or implied. The music-auditor also lacks a dialogic partner. A regulative context, on the other hand, inheres, I would argue, in musical form and genre (perhaps more so than in literary genres). The experienced listener intuitively grasps the principles and practices underlying these forms and genres and reflexively grapples with the discrepancies that invariably arise between generic norms and particular pieces. A music-analytic context will serve both to highlight and reinforce these normative procedures and also posit additional regulative principles in relation to which we perceive the piece. Sonata-form theory, for example (that of Caplin, Hepokoski/Darcy, Rosen,
Schmalfeldt, and others) both codifies well-established sonata-form practices and offers a theoretical surplus—additional codes or imaginative prisms through which we view particular pieces. In short, most music—and not just, pace Adorno, abstruse twentieth-century music—is complex and indeterminate enough as to require, or at least benefit greatly from, an explicit interpretive matrix.

Some will no doubt be skeptical of my radically constructivist stance toward musical structure and analysis. In particular, some might wonder how I distinguish between an analytical method or analytical application that poses questions relevant to the piece at hand and one that imposes its own preoccupations onto a piece willy-nilly. In response, I would say, first, that models that are themselves musical (or rather, meta-musical)—that utilize musical notation and are homologous in some sense with the music being analyzed—are more likely to seize upon musical relevancies. This is arguably one of the signal advantages of Schenkerian theory\(^\text{14}\) (though, again, it should not grant that theory precedence over all others nor preclude us from extending and amalgamating it with others, if fruitful for understanding a particular piece). Second, like any other mode of interpretation, music analysis, to be compelling, must convince the reader that it responds to something objectively present in the score, even while creating something new from that neutral trace.\(^\text{15}\) That said, both analysis-based and performance-based interpretation inevitably

\(^{14}\) Also see in this regard Keiler (1981).

\(^{15}\) Paul Ricoeur (1978) posits a similar point in an important article on metaphor. He essentially claims that metaphor posits a deviance that results in a new congruence on the level of an entire sentence (rather than on that of the individual word), such that we see similarity in the difference. Yet the similarity is not arbitrary or associational but one entirely appropriate to the new juxtaposition. He asserts, moreover, that it is precisely in this interstice between difference and an emerging novel congruence where imagination
walk a fine line between immanence and contingency. Such a precarious balancing act is, in my view, precisely what renders the interpretative act so tantalizing and potentially powerful.

4. Summary

This chapter thus far has provided the crux of my theory of music-analytical interpretation. Hence, it will be useful to reiterate its main principles before proceeding to an extended analysis.

1. Both Adorno and Schenker consider analysis part of the work in certain circumstances: with Adorno in the case of abstruse repertoire, with Schenker in the case of his own theory. The problem with Schenker’s model, in my view, is that, even though he views his own theory as artistic, he at the same time evidently views it as apodictic and thus as indispensable for successful performance.

2. I take inspiration from Adorno and Schenker in posing a model of the musical work by which it encompasses music analysis in its various forms, alongside performance, as an integral mode of interpretation and explanation, as part of what makes the music what it is on a given occasion. But, unlike Schenker, I deem analysis integral not because it unearths objective properties but rather because it crystallizes various potentialities.

3. As a consequence, analysis, in whatever form, is not something to which performance must adhere. Analysis and performance run parallel, not perpendicular, as it were—they are coequal interpretive enterprises. A performance that takes inspiration from an analysis responds to it—engages in a dialogue with it—rather than somehow exemplifies it.

and feeling play a key role. In its emphasis on imagination as part of metaphor, Ricoeur’s theory resonates with Walton’s; in its emphasis on imagination as creating new meaning, it resonates with Iser’s.
Regardless of whether analysis can expose objective properties, sounding music, due to its semantically indefinite nature, is not able to make assertions about such properties—performance is not a propositional medium. Performance that is reduced to such a fact-conveying role is either superfluous or ineffective.

4. In responding to an analysis, a performance exemplifies not analytic propositions but rather the more general qualities, both structural and emotional, that underlie such propositions (I expand on this idea later in this chapter). An analytically-informed rendering may consequently exude a structural quality such as differentiated unity without communicating the particulars of the analysis that in part gave rise to that quality. Such qualities, in other words, are emergent, supervenient upon analytical phenomena—dependent upon them materially but ultimately autonomous with respect to them. The perceptual corollary of this notion is that the listener knows differentiated unity when he hears it—she knows it intuitively, unconsciously, non-verbally—but does not necessarily know about it. Her understanding is “simpliciter.”

5. Two scholars who have significantly contributed to our understanding of how music theory is performative are Cook and Walton. Cook amplifies Schoenberg’s notion that music theory is a mode of “good comparison.” That is, unable to get at “ultimate nature” of music—unable to recover the noumena behind the phenomena—it must be content to make metaphors by which we can grasp various aspects of music in a partial, perspectival way. The efficacy of such metaphors is thus heuristic rather than factual. Moreover, analysis, and indeed, the work itself, Cook insists, is simply a way of crystallizing the expressive capacities of performance. Music theory, in short, is artistic both in being
metaphorical and in being performative—performative in that those metaphors both arise and evoke responses from performers and perceivers.

6. Walton’s theory of fictional imagining is suggestive for performative analysis. Although he claims that the musical work world is virtually non-existent—that the listener’s musical imaginings involve herself rather than a virtual musical persona doing something—I contend musical work-worlds do exist and do contain fictional personae, various attributions, actions, and so forth, yet are nonetheless incomplete and thus need to be filled in by the interpreter. I also extend Walton’s theory to structural imaginings, since even the most basic structural attributions we might take for granted—such as a thematic return being a structural arrival or a prolonged scale degree persisting through its embellishments—are in fact acts of imagination, even if automatic or unconscious, elicited by particular theoretical models. Almost any structural imagining will also be an emotive imagining, since the very ways theoretical propositions are framed betray assumptions of sentient qualities and effects.

7. The incompleteness of the work world is a corollary of the rhematic aspect of notation. That is, musical notations, while objective material traces, harbor inchoate, nascent structural meanings, whose realization requires the interpreter’s imagination (as conditioned by particular theoretical predispositions).

8. The interpretive chain in one sense goes from score to performer/analyst to listener, but two crucial caveats apply: first, there is no unproblematic continuity from one link in the chain to the next. The performer, analyst, and listener are all constrained by the particular tools of their respective media and also by their particular experiences. Second, the flow of
meaning can go “backward” as well as “forward,” given that, for example, perception is not merely the output of but also an input to performance, just as performance, in turn, can be an input to composition.

9. Iser says that literary interpretation lacks explicit means of verification other than the codes that one must infer from the text itself. These codes in music, I submit, are stronger than in literature, since music places greater weight on form and genre as vehicles of meaning. On the other hand, music does not enjoy the semantic definition literature does. Hence, analytical contexts can help pose particular imaginings that music is unable to on its own. They can render explicit imaginings that are otherwise obscurely present in particular forms and genres, and also pose new imaginings.

10. Music-analytical interpretation presumes neither musical immanence nor subjective contingency and relativism. Rather, it mediates between these two extremes. Its degree of interpretive efficacy, as with metaphor, depends on the degree to which it is able to say something new that is still ultimately congruent (if unexpectedly so) with exigencies of the form/genre and the particularities of the piece at hand.

5. Schumann, “Von fremden Ländern und Menschen”

I should proceed no further without offering a concrete example of a self-consciously performative analysis. For this purpose, I will look at Schumann’s “Von fremden Ländern und Menschen” (“Of Foreign Lands and People”) from Kinderszenen (Scenes from Childhood), op. 15 (Example 2-1). In its simplicity, the piece will provide an amicable vehicle by which to put forth a rather complex mode of analysis. It will also illustrate that even such seemingly simple music, conjoined with analysis,
can offer numerous structural-expressive issues and ambiguities that performance can address, and that is all the more interesting for taking up that task.
Example 2-1: Schumann, “Von fremden Ländern und Menschen”: analysis

inactive third?

approximate inversion of soprano
implies over-the-bar connection
more precise inversion of soprano

step altered to third activates third 6th-motive

bass has melody (partially quasi-inverted) returns to tritone

complete fill of sixth gap

B reached prematurely

sixth compressed to fourth

last sixth set apart by preceding tie (cf. m. 8)
Analysis

Even at first glance, several questions arise regarding the form. On the highest level, the piece clearly has three main sections (A₁, mm. 1–8; B, mm. 9–14; A₂, mm. 15–22). But, first, how are we to understand the relation between the B section and the A sections by which it is framed? That is, to what degree is the former independent of the latter? One factor suggesting that B is relatively independent is that it is tonally closed, concluding on I in the home key. If it had cadenced on V, as middle sections often do, one would be more likely to group it with A₂. On the other hand, B possesses neither its own tonality (it never really leaves the home key) nor its own theme—its melody (initially in the bass) is a variant of the opening theme. Hence, the overall form is somewhat ambiguous: the middle section is autonomous with respect to the outer sections by virtue of its tonal enclosure (suggesting ternary form), parasitic upon them by virtue of developing the main theme (suggesting rounded binary form, which, of course, is also implied by the repeat signs). Second, how are we to understand the relation of A₂ to A₁? For, on the one hand, the two sections are nearly note-identical; on the other, A₂, occurring after B, is therefore perceived in a different context than A₁ and surely has a different function or expressive connotation, if subtle. The notation itself, which contains but slight variants at the very beginning and end of the section, offers scant clues as to what this difference might be.

On a lower level, the phrase that is the A section comprises three subphrases grouped as 2+2+4 measures, suggesting a sentence. However, it deviates from a prototypical sentence (as defined by Caplin [1998, 35–48]) in that the third subphrase does not possess the characteristic features of a continuation—harmonic acceleration and fragmentation (at least not to a significant degree). Another issue concerns subphrasal connections: the discreteness of the two subphrases
within the presentation phrase, and of the presentation and continuation phrases as a whole, is problematized, though not necessarily obliterated, by the bass motion of leading tone to tonic (mm. 2–3 and 4–5), which seems to transcend these formal boundaries. (Indeed, in the A section, every measure is approached by a semitone motion in the bass until the penultimate measure.) While the bass motion implies a connection between mm. 2–3, the slurs and thematic parallelism in the right hand imply a lack of connection—a new beginning in m. 3. Hence, the juncture between mm. 2 and 3, and analogous measures, is ambiguous. A consequence of the parallelism just mentioned is that the right-hand pitches, D⁵-B⁴, mm. 2–3, have no direct syntactical or perceptual connection (in Riemann’s terminology, the interval formed between them is “dead,” inactive). As for the B section, it also has a sentential character, but where we would expect a 4-bar continuation phrase, we receive merely another two-bar phrase, such that the B section seems somewhat truncated. In short, both the A and B sections seem to aspire to a more fully formed internal, sentential structure, yet neither is able fully to manifest it: in each case the continuation phrase is in some sense problematized. Even a cursory formal analysis of this piece, then, reveals some problematics and ambiguities regarding the overall form, the form of individual sections, and the degree of connectivity between subphrases—all fodder for the canny interpreter.

Turning to a motivic overview of the right hand, the theme in mm. 1–2 consists of an ascending sixth followed by descending steps (demonstrating the melodic convention by which a leap in one direction is countered by steps in the opposite direction). The thematic statement in

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16 One might characterize such a dead interval as an Iserian blank, not merely a separation but also “a tacit invitation to find the missing link” (Iser [1978, 196]). Adorno, incidentally, is unsympathetic to this Riemannian notion: “it is unlikely that there would be any dead intervals in true interpretation” (2006, 72).
mm. 5–6 is modified in following the ascending sixth with a descending skip (G⁵–E⁵) rather than with a step as before. The section concludes (mm. 7–8) with a sequential variant of mm. 5–6 (beginning a step lower, on A), in which the ascending sixth motive is compressed to a fourth but the third—now D⁵–B⁴—is preserved. This continuation group, mm. 5–8, has significant motivic and formal implications: due to the long slur, there is now a direct, syntactical connection between the notes (C⁵–A⁴) at the formal juncture between mm. 6 and 7 (a juncture comparable to those between mm. 2–3 and 4–5). In other words, this juncture can be seen to activate the previously inactive interval of a third.¹⁷ This event is prepared by the motivic deviation in mm. 5–6, in which the third G²–E² is perceptually marked by occurring where one expects a step. It is also reinforced by the final two melodic notes of this section, which restate the original pitches of the third—the D⁵–B⁴ of mm. 2–3—and posing a clear connection between them, given the slur and the parallelism with the previous, C–A figure. The question for interpretation, then, in light of the continuation group, is: do we still view the thirds D⁵–B⁴ in mm. 2–3 and 4–5 as inactive, or do we regard the activation of the third in the continuation group as suggesting they were active to begin with, as retroactively clarifying their true relation? This question is of formal, not just motivic, consequence, for if the performer decides that, in retrospect, D⁵ and B⁴ were always related and thus chooses to connect them in some fashion, they will transcend the ostensible subphrase boundary, mm. 2–3. In this scenario, because both bass line and melody travel over the bar, the

¹⁷ For a similar case, see Leonard Meyer’s analysis of the theme of Mozart’s Sonata in A major, K. 331, whose interval of a fourth between mm. 1 and 2 is in his view inactive—or, as he says, “unrealized”—due to the rhythmic factors he discusses, but is then subsequently realized in variation 1 (1973, 37–38).
juncture is no longer ambiguous. If, on the other hand, the performer disunifies them—in spite, or perhaps because, of their eventual activation—he will uphold the ambiguity.

When the soprano regains the melody in m. 13, it traverses a line: is it a fifth, $E^4-B^4$, on account of the fermata over $B^4$; a sixth, $E^4-C^5$, on account of the formal division ($A_2$ arrives on the next note); or a seventh, $E^4-D^5$, since the stepwise line continues unbroken to that point? Each scenario has its own interesting implication. The first seems to reflect and reinforce the predominance of the bass in the B section, whose melodic variant replaces the sixth motive with a fifth (more on which in a moment). The second hints at the original motive, filling in the initial open sixth more completely than the A section was able—the $D^5-B^4$ gap in mm. 2–3 precludes the open sixth of m. 1 from being filled in entirely. Both of these scenarios maintain a clear juncture between the B and $A_2$ sections, and thus indicate ternary form (or at least reinforce its sectional boundaries). By contrast, the third scenario entails a complete connection between the B and $A_2$ sections in implying a connection between $C^5-D^4$, mm. 14–15, and hence subsuming the first note of the $A_2$ section by a line initiated in the B section. This scenario is thus more indicative of rounded binary form, by which B and $A_2$ form a larger group. As we can see, motivic interpretation here, as in the A section, bears directly upon formal grouping.

Regardless of which line the analyst/performer deems motivically significant (a fifth, sixth, or seventh), the fermata over the $B^4$ points up the fact that the B section has reached that note prematurely, as it were—prior to the thematic restatement at the beginning of $A_2$. As a consequence, that restatement begins on D instead of B, and thus the sixth motive is transmuted to a fourth (recalling m. 7); this moment is thus characterized by intervalic compression or
inhibition. The question is, to what extent, if any, does this slight alteration infiltrate the reprise as a whole—to what extent does it distinguish $A_2$ from $A_1$?

The bass voice follows an interesting path: it begins as an approximate inversion of the melody; where the melody ascends a minor sixth in m. 1, the bass descends a diminished fifth; where the melody descends a third in m. 2 (linearly), the bass ascends a third (as an open interval). The bass more closely approximates the soprano in m. 5, where its G–B precisely inverts the $B^4–G^5$ of the melody (the resultant voice exchange, as indicated in Ex. 2-1, reinforces this complementarity). After a brief thematic hiatus in mm. 7–8, where the motivic content of the bass is liquidated so that the bass may serve the conventional role of articulating the cadential $\hat{5}–\hat{1}$, the bass states a variation of the theme in mm. 9–10. True to its quasi-inversional character, it begins with a descending perfect fifth rather than an ascending sixth (and rather than a diminished fifth as in m. 1). Thus far, the bass has traversed a linear path: it began as an approximate inversion of the melody, then stated a more precise inversion of the melody, and then became the melody, albeit in varied form. In this last instance, however, the thematicism of the bass is less than certain, given that its use of a descending fifth in place of a sixth recalls its previous inversional and accompanimental function, and also delineates a descending fifth sequence, whose generic and homogeneous quality attenuates the bass’s thematic distinctiveness. Consequently, it is not surprising that the bass quickly reverts back to its mirroring role (mm. 13–14), in preparation for the thematic return upon the arrival of $A_2$. In short, the bass spins a motivic tale, in which it aspires to be thematic but is ultimately unable to fully realize this aspiration.  

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18 Similarly, notice how the inner part comes to the fore for a brief instant in m. 8, recalling the B–G ascending sixth of the theme (thus bringing $A_1$ full circle). At the end of $A_2$, the final motivic recurrence in
Finally, a window into the voice-leading structure is the 3 and resultant imperfect authentic cadence on which the piece ends. Indeed, the entire piece prolongs 3—there is no linear descent to 1\(^9\) (such lack of melodic resolution is not surprising given that the piece is, after all, merely the first in a cycle of interconnected pieces\(^{20}\)). Although the piece is inherently inconclusive, the question remains as to just how inconclusively the ending should be rendered. This might depend, in part, upon whether “Von fremden” is played as a free-standing piece or as part of the larger set; the former case would probably merit slightly greater conclusiveness than the latter. Also, as the graph in Ex. 2-2 reveals, the melody is of a polyphonic nature, which perhaps suggests that the pianist should somehow differentiate the two melodic strata. Incidentally, notice how the G–F\# in the upper tier of this compound melody is countered by its inversion, F\#–G, in the bass, at once revealing another dimension of the inversive relation of the bass to the soprano and lending further support to the possibility of a connection between mm. 2 and 3 and analogous locations.

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the inner voice is incrementally more exposed than it was at the end of A\(_1\) since it is offset by the preceding tie. The inner voice thus seems to intimate its own, albeit minute, thematic quest.

\(^{19}\) John Ellis has a different interpretation: he reads the final 3 as a cover tone concealing the 1 of a 3–2–1 descent (2003, 313).

\(^{20}\) Reti (1951) analyzes Kinderszenen as a veritable variation set, with “Von fremden” serving as the theme.
In summary, this brief analysis has exposed numerous structural occurrences and their narrative implications to which the performer might respond, ambiguities and questions he might resolve or decline to resolve—potentialities he might actualize—and a motivic narrative that is highly suggestive for non-musical meanings, which in turn hold implications for interpretation. I now consider how the performer might grapple interpretively with these aspects of structure.

**Interpretation**

In my reading, the tonal-structural dimensions of the piece are rather restricted: recall that it prolongs a single scale degree and thus does not substantively progress melodically; neither does it significantly digress from the home key. A dynamic interpretation following this reading would likewise be relatively constricted. That is, the piece would have an intimate quality, with all variances relative to a *piano* context (although this range would perhaps be slightly greater if the piece were played in isolation). On a lower level, Schumann marks each of the main formal sections *piano*, yet clearly not all *pianos* will be equivalent given the distinct function of each section. The B section, which is more dynamic—more harmonically (sequentially) active—than the A sections, would probably warrant a slightly stronger dynamic, a wider dynamic range (even in
the music prior to the notated crescendo in mm. 13–14). A₂ would perhaps be more piano overall than both A₁ and B, given the more confined, reticent way in which it begins—with a fourth instead of a sixth—and the irresolute way in which it ends the entire piece.

On a lower level still, in m. 5, the motion from G to B in the bass can be distinguished from the previous G–C# motions in order to highlight the transformation from dissonant tritone to consonant minor sixth (the latter as both a melodic interval within the bass and a harmonic interval between the bass and soprano) and the fact that the bass has begun to realize its thematic potential. The skip into m. 6, since it deviates from the previous two statements of the theme, warrants dynamic inflection. Most likely, since it is a decisive event, anticipating and perhaps motivating the conversion of the inactive third into an active one, it will warrant a strong dynamic. It is indeed the most likely candidate for the climax of the phrase, its point of arrival; the other candidate is the A on the downbeat of m. 7, since that is the precise moment at which the third is activated. The remainder of that section is no doubt a dynamic denouement, not only due to the notated decrescendo, but to the motivic liquidation and rhythmic relaxation to which that dynamic responds. That decrescendo, and possibly an accompanying ritardando, would thus be infused with the qualities of smoothing out and winding down. In the B section, one might respond dynamically to the sequential repetition in mm. 9–12, although it is not to be assumed that because the sequence descends one must diminuendo. The notated crescendo in m. 14 can be seen as responding to the gap-filling progression in the right hand, but precisely what quality this progression and crescendo have awaits a narrative interpretation. Whether one would continue the crescendo through C² (the last note of m. 14) or subtly taper it depends upon whether one views the progression as essentially terminating at the fermata B or reaching beyond it. Finally, one should
listen to the innervoice pitches B–G\(^1\) in the last measure of each A section for their thematic character, although to demarcate them deliberately would surely result in overstatement. In particular, the very last time they are played, at the end of the repeat of A\(_2\), one would want to ensure that they do not overshadow the B of the soprano, upon which the irresolute quality of the ending depends.

Next, consider the temporal implications and questions that arise from the above analysis. Most generally, the tempo range and degree of rubato would certainly be relatively constrained, given the structural constraints mentioned above.\(^{21}\) The tempo of the B section might be slightly slower than the outer sections given the thematic import of the bass and the deliberate right-hand progression starting in m. 13, both of which connote weightiness. On the other hand, its harmonically active quality relative to A might warrant a quicker tempo. More locally, most dynamic variances will imply corresponding temporal ones. In particular, the B in the bass in m. 5 will require an agogic accent for its import to be realized. An interesting choice here would be to roll the left hand on the second beat, so that the sixth the bass forms with the tenor (B–G) will sound melodically as well as harmonically (assuming B is caught in the pedal), thus highlighting the melodic and motivic import of those pitches and foreshadowing the fuller thematic emergence of the bass in the B section. As mentioned, a slight ritardando at the end of A\(_1\) will serve the denouement. The quality and precise pacing of the ritardando in mm. 13–14 will derive from the

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\(^{21}\) Ellis (2003, 307–8) suggests that a relative lack of rubato in this piece will intimate “child-like innocence” while one with rubato will intimate “the adult, nostalgic aspect of this cycle.” He cites Horowitz’s performance as an instance of the former approach, Alfred Cortot’s of the latter.
narrative meaning one ascribes to this progression. A final question concerning tempo is whether the effect of irresolution at the end would be better served with or without a slight ritardando.

In terms of articulation, one might place a slight break between mm. 2 and 3 in order to avoid the implication of a direct, syntactical connection between D$^2$ and B$^1$, for the reason already mentioned. On the other hand, since the connection between F$^\#$ and G in the bass is so strong, tonally and motivically, one would probably “connect” them, if not literally, then by the subtle use of dynamics and tempo. By not connecting the right-hand pitches but connecting in some fashion the left-hand ones—that is, by having each hand suggest a different formal grouping—one would preserve the formal ambiguity at this point. Indeed, I think this is a case where it is important to preserve the ambiguity since a resolution is suggested within the notational domain itself (in the continuation phrase); to eliminate the ambiguity would be to eclipse a compelling musical process.

Another crucial question is whether to connect C$^5$–D$^5$ into the A$_2$ section; this depends upon what progression one posits here, and to what degree one wishes to highlight the point of thematic return. The latter would require a distinct slur break or caesura since A$_2$ begins on D rather than B and so without a cue from the performer, one may not realize A$_2$ had begun.

**Expression**

The analysis exposed particular events that merit particular interpretive attention, and in working through the principal interpretive parameters of dynamics, tempo, and articulation, we cited variances that seem to be the clear choice given my particular structural reading. However, we have also encountered further questions, where, of the choices that apply, we do not yet seem to have a concrete basis on which to choose one over the other. For this we require a concrete
expressive scenario. The motivic analysis of the piece—which emphasized a dormant interval progressing toward an active one, and a bass line progressing toward greater thematicity—was highly suggestive of a narrative thread, which we might now consolidate with a more explicit hermeneutic (in the sense of programmatic) reading. Schumann’s descriptive title, as with all such titles, is of course only a clue to, or perhaps an example of, the generalized experiential processes encoded within the piece—merely a point of departure for a more thoroughgoing construal of musical meaning.\(^{22}\) My own reading that follows is itself but a single—albeit more elaborate and explicit—indication or example of those processes, and of course many other fictional scenarios might capture the expressive potential of the musical structure equally well.

On the largest level, the most basic emotional quality implied by my analysis is longing. One instance of longing is fulfilled—namely, the initially latent third that is later actualized. Most instances, however, are ultimately unfulfilled: the sentential aspirations of each section, the quest of the bass (and to some extent the inner voices) for greater thematicity, the gap of a sixth that is never completely bridged (in the descending direction at least), and, more broadly, the structural gap between the melodic scale degree on which we end (\(\hat{3}\)) and the more stable one on which pieces normally resolve (1). Experiencing such longing is arguably a single character or persona, who I infer from the development of a single theme—and also, more specifically, from the overarching thematic process of the bass. Schumann’s protagonist is a mature adult reflecting upon the lost innocence of childhood, as suggested by the title of the cycle, wistfully recalling youthful fantasies of exotic places and people, as suggested by the title of the piece.

\(^{22}\) Edward Lippman (1999) discusses Schumann’s ambivalence with respect to the use and meaning of the titles that he applied to his compositions.
On the next narrative level, the opening ascending sixth is the motive of longing, perhaps for exposure to things foreign, for some experiential confirmation that distant lands and people are as ideal as the inner child conceives them to be. The child has clearly not yet explored these remote regions—she is self-enclosed. The latter is connoted by the voice exchange in m. 2; also witness the repetitive harmonic cycles and also how the remoteness of the C# diminished-seventh chord and its consequent tonicization of V in m. 2 and analogous places are immediately curbed by a return to the tonic. Both of these seem to express a quality of confinement. The A₁ section, in short, might be read as a naïve idealization of Otherness which is tinged with sadness because it appears inaccessible.

The B section, by contrast, might express disillusionment—the adult persona overtaking the child persona—considering the earthbound emphasis upon the bass, which converts the ascending sixth of naïve longing to the descending fifth of sober realization. The adult, unlike his inner child, his younger self, has been to these foreign regions and knows enough not to idealize them. The melodic transformation in mm. 13–14 is the most decisive proclamation against misguided hope, concretizing the vague, ethereal sixth of longing with the practical steps of wisdom and experience. In this process, the adult co-opts the crucial B (under the fermata) in order to preclude the child from restating the longing motive of the sixth at the beginning of A₂. Indeed, the child is now compelled to begin on D instead of B, to state a fourth instead of a sixth, and hence to proceed more reticently, soberly, within a more constrained imaginative space. The child is not quite the same as he was before—he has assimilated the adult perspective, at least to some degree. In this sense, this piece is a microcosm of the entire set, which traverses a journey
from childhood to adulthood, the latter most strongly represented by the final piece, “Der Dichter Spricht.”

Hence, this piece, while expressing the agency of a single persona, nonetheless represents two sides of that persona: one the credulous child, the other the disenchanted adult, as represented by the A and B sections respectively.23 Alternatively, we might infer the child and adult personae from the right and left hands, respectively. The C# bass, in forming a tritone with the G soprano, forces the latter to resolve to F#—the adult curbs the child’s flights of fancy, bringing him down to earth (even more so in the B section). This interpretation warrants a speaking style of playing, in which the two hands—in particular, the G–F# motive and its inversion—partake of a dialogue. In this scenario, the right hand progression in mm. 13–14 signifies the child voluntarily taking the adult’s cue rather than the adult forcing his point. These two readings are not necessarily incompatible. Indeed, within an amalgam of the two, the A section foregrounds the child persona, with the bass serving to frame that persona by the perspective of the adult narrator, while the B section foregrounds the adult perspective, which had been subtly present in A1. In other words, in this scenario, the gradual thematic emergence of the bass is a musical analogue for the gradual emergence of adult consciousness.

23 These sections and perspectives are associated with different temporal modes: A is arguably in lyric time (arrested time, comparable to Marx’s Satz), B in narrative time (passing time, comparable to Marx’s Gang). That is, the A sections evoke the past, but as stored in memory, and thus rendered static; the B section evokes the present, where states are shifting, feelings evolving. Michael Klein (2004) demonstrates the interaction of these two modes in Chopin’s First and Fourth Ballades and argues that such interaction lends plausibility to the notion of musical narrative generally.
What does this expressive scenario suggest for the interpretive questions posed above? First, I presented evidence in support of both a slower and a faster B section: slower on account of its weighty bass-orientation, faster on account of its increased harmonic activity. Which does my narrative entail? In it, the A section belongs primarily to the child persona, which, situated within the context of an adult perspective, implies the past—or rather, the past as stored in the adult’s memory, and thus statically present. The B section, by contrast, belongs primarily to the adult persona and is thus actively present. Hence, in pragmatic terms, A is generally slower and softer, B quicker and louder. Second, regarding the dynamic treatment of the bass’s B in m. 5, it would most likely have a strong, earthly quality, since here the adult’s perspective begins to be actualized. Third, where does the narrative place the point of arrival within the A section? This is still not entirely certain, but I would suggest that E in m. 6 would be the likeliest candidate, since it marks the point at which the child breaks free of his repetitive, hermetically-sealed imaginings and asserts something less fanciful—perhaps in direct response to the emergence of the adult’s voice in the B of the bass, one beat before. Fourth, how do we dynamically render the sequence in mm. 11–12? It would probably be weaker, in that the strength of the perfect fifth of the previous two measures yields to the instability of the tritone, which might be seen as initiating the bass’s regression to its initial subsidiary role as a mere accompaniment; in other words, at this point, the adult begins to lose his voice, albeit slightly. Fifth, if one played the right-hand progression, mm. 13–14, as a fifth progression, arriving decisively on the B, it would indicate that the child has resolutely adopted the adult’s perspective. Finally, the entire A₂ might realize the emotive implication of the initial
ascending fourth, that the child has been irreversibly affected by the adult perspective. It would thus be rendered more soberly than $A_1$—with even less rubato and dynamic fluctuation.$^{24}$

Ex. 2-3 summarizes the interpretive choices for this piece given my particular structural and expressive reading, and Web Ex. 8 features my performance of it.

**Concluding Thoughts**

Performative analysis reveals elements that only infrequently necessitate a particular interpretation. Much more often, it admits of a range of possible interpretations, in particular ambiguities that the

$^{24}$ Very commonly in late Classical and Romantic ternary forms, $A_2$ in some sense synthesizes $A_1$ and $B$, typically amalgamating the theme of $A_1$ and a rhythmic or textural element of $B$. In this piece, $A_2$ does not overtly synthesize the two sections. But if the performer manifests the emotive suggestion of that opening fourth—that is, imaginative constraint and earthly realism—rendering the initial section from the perspective derived from $B$, $A_2$ would indeed be a synthesis, an emotive one, of the previous two sections. This example reveals the capacity of the interpreter to create form, or, more precisely, to actualize extremely subtle formal implications or potentialities.
Example 2-3: Schumann, “Von fremden”: Interpretive Implications

Legend

- structural dynamic/tempo for section
- voice/demarcate
- connect (not necessarily via legato)
- point of arrival
- accel.
- rit.
performer will resolve or, less commonly, preserve—that is, when, as in the Schumann, the ambiguity is resolved in the course of the music-structural process. Alternately, it suggests particular structural-affective states, but which can be realized in any number of ways. The structural and affective are thoroughly intertwined. Indeed, the very way in which an analyst frames his observations regarding structural occurrences betrays his assumptions regarding the anthropomorphic dimensions of such occurrences. In this way, an analysis will often provide a foundation onto which the performer may project a more explicit narrative conception.

Extrapolating from the above scenario, how in general does the performer grapple with the various possible meanings exposed to her by analysis? She experiments with the range of interpretive options that seem appropriate for a particular musical event, whether a local detail or significant structural occurrence. Where no one choice within this range intuitively strikes her as the most convincing, she must defer to a more concrete expressive scenario, which will hopefully motivate a particular interpretive choice. In other words, while multiple choices may be valid in relation to a structural reading, the performer must ultimately choose one; yet, this choice must not be random but rather compelled by an emotional connection to the piece.

Two caveats warrant reiteration. First, the analysis, although fruitful and in some cases even necessary for interpretation, will not necessarily precede interpretation. The latter can induce intuitive realizations regarding musical structure and its narrative implications as much as the reverse. In other words, I conceive of the two modes as partaking of a bidirectional, dialogic exchange, where in one case analysis might lead to interpretation, in another case the reverse. But again, even when analysis precedes performance, it will not dictate to it assuming it is framed more in terms of questions than putatively factual answers. Second, when a structural or emotive
realization does happen to come first, the performer need not necessarily devise an interpretive application deliberately. Very often, such a realization will affect him naturally, unconsciously, and physically, infusing his playing with interpretive nuances that he would not necessarily arrive at through conscious deliberation, and which are often so subtle as to be impervious to conscious control.

**PART II. SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS**

6. SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS AS TRUTH-FINDING

To begin, let me restate the basic issue with which we have grappling in the terms of Susanne Langer. She identifies two basic kinds of symbols. Discursive, or linguistic, symbols capture the rational order of experience due to their linear syntax and denotative capacity. Presentational symbols such as artworks, on the other hand, can capture extremely subtle and complex mental and emotional states that language cannot; this is due to their multidimensionality and ability to present simultaneities (Langer [1957, 53–78]). Music, in her view, is a presentational symbol. In

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25 Some of the material in this part is drawn from my College Music Symposium article (Swinkin [2008]) but has been substantially revised. In what follows, I will not be considering Schenker’s own personal views on analysis and performance, save for a few scattered quotations. The reason is that this topic is quite large and complex and requires separate space (for a condensed but invaluable discussion, see Rothstein [1984]). For, there are not only his own explicit theoretical statements on the topic to consider (as gathered in 1911 [pub. 2000]) but also assumptions to be gleaned from his editorial activities, especially his fingerings (on which, see Swinkin [2007] and also Terrigno [2009]). Moreover, one could also parse his critical commentary on performers of his own day, the first extended study of which is only now being written (by Kumaran Arul, working under Nicholas Cook at Cambridge).
its rhythmic motion, patterns of tension and release, hierarchical complexity, and so forth, music is a logical analogy for feelings and other inner states (Langer [1953, 104–48]). In other words, music and other art forms do not refer to dimensions of internal experience but present or embody them (hence “presentational” symbol).

Is Schenkerian theory more discursive or presentational—or, roughly rephrased, more science or art? This very question leads us astray, for the “is” suggests an essentializing tendency I do not subscribe to. Better, then, to ask how the theory has been or can be used in particular circumstances. Since my main concern is performance/analysis, I will reframe the question thus: which of the various applications of Schenkerian theory to performance betray implicit but clear biases regarding the discursive versus presentational character of Schenkerian theory? Or, more broadly: when Schenkerian theory is situated within the context of performance, what epistemological assumptions about it come to light?

Rather than attempt a comprehensive survey of the literature, I will offer a representative example of a Schenkerian performance/analysis study that, to my mind at least, clearly evinces a discursive bias. Cynthia Folio (1992) aims to offer a practical account of how analysis can be

26 The most rigorous defense of Schenkerian theory as a scientific system, as meeting the strict standards of scientific validity, has been mounted by Matthew Brown (2005). A key component of his argument (building on an earlier article he co-authored with Dempster and Headlam [1997]) is that Schenkerian theory conforms to “The Hypothetico-Deductive Method,” wherein, as stipulated by Popper, an explanation, to be valid, must be falsifiable (Brown affirms that for Popper, “even our best knowledge is fallible or conjectural” [2005, 16]). On Brown’s view, the fact that some Schenkerian principles can be logically refuted protects Schenkerian theory from the charges of circularity that have been leveled against it (most famously by Narmour [1977]).
applied to performance, using the first movement of Bach’s Sonata in E Major for flute and harpsichord as her central example. Some of the pervasive features of this piece she uncovers using Schenkerian techniques are parallel tenths governing relatively long stretches of music, embedded double-neighbor motives, and motivic connections between flute and harpsichord. Her main advice to performers is to emphasize or “bring out,” dynamically or agogically, the notes comprising these underlying lines and motives, and to highlight long-range structural and registral connections by dynamically “matching” the notes that comprise such connections (see her Figures 4 and 5, 142–43). In this account, the analysis itself, while not overtly reductive, ultimately betrays such an orientation by using performance to cut through foreground phenomena in order to project structural lines. This reductive methodology, in turn, equates with a discursive, or propositional one; it is tantamount to stating a supposed fact—that a structural entity exists. Folio thus employs the conjunction of analysis and performance discursively: the foreground, via performance, is reduced to (supposed) structural fact.

The “bringing out” technique is hardly unique to Folio; it is widely endorsed. Another widely endorsed discursive or literalist application of Schenkerian principles to performance involves rendering “long lines,” as supposedly implied by the Urlinie (and perhaps by middleground linear progressions as well). The Urlinie and Züge relate mostly non-contiguous pitches, exposing a musical logic operative over long time-spans. Yet, proponents of this approach misconstrue this metaphorical notion of aural or conceptual connection as implying or entailing literal, physical connection—that is, as a mandate to create a “long line.”

A rigidly discursive

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27 Needless to say, the long line phenomenon does not at root derive from a literalist construal of Schenkerian theory, as is evident by its ubiquity among performers and studio teachers, few of whom are
approach to Schenkerian theory and performance, then, will view high-level structures as factual in two senses: first, they exist, and the analyst/performer must excavate and emphasize them; second, the connection among these structural tones is real, hence the performer must actually connect long strands of tones, employing overarching *legato* as the default articulation.

Certainly, it is sometimes appropriate and desirable to project structural tones or create long, *legato* lines. Yet, the fundamental shortcoming of this literalist approach is twofold. For one, it may adhere to the letter of Schenkerian thought but does not adhere to its spirit. That is, it does not conduce to the organic coherence that Schenkerian constructs were designed to expose or elicit. Simply demarcating or connecting structural pitches by itself does nothing to ensure or
directly influenced by Schenkerian analysis. If anything, the converse holds: performers-turned-theorists come to Schenkerian analysis with a predilection for playing with a long line and construe the implications of the *Urlinie* in such a way as to validate that stance (Murray Perahia is perhaps the most notable case in point). This predilection, in turn, stems from modernist ideology. As Nicholas Cook points out, current Schenkerian performance-pedagogy interprets principles derived from Schenker’s writings in terms of the performance style of post-1945 modernism, a style that remains broadly current today [as I discussed in the Introduction]. And here there is another and sharper paradox, for this style is utterly unlike that of . . . 1890s Vienna, where Schenker seems to have formed the basic musical sensibilities that he retained through his life (2011, 294).

Furthermore, in his closing paragraph, Cook writes, “Schenker’s theory has . . . been invoked to support a style of performance quite different from, even opposed to, the ‘rhetorical’ style to which Schenker subscribed” (ibid., 307). Schenker made himself vulnerable to such distortion and modernization, Cook submits, because he did not closely connect his theoretical views with those on performance.
create meaningful relationships among these pitches.\textsuperscript{28} In other words, the musical \textit{unity} that Schenkerian constructs potentially foster is often misconstrued by performers as implying \textit{uniformity} of articulation (and frequently of tempo as well).\textsuperscript{29} Such unity—or more precisely, unity-in-variety—can only be achieved through the strategic and varied use of articulation, dynamics, and tempo, the performer’s essential resources. Second, and more crucially, the particular pitches that comprise the \textit{Urlinie} and \textit{Züge} are hardly the point. Rather, their significance derives from their interaction with the surface, from their function as a backdrop in relation to which foreground particulars achieve expressive salience.\textsuperscript{30} In brief, the discursive/literalist approach

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{28} Schenker himself admonished the performer not to follow “the \textit{Urlinie} slavishly and pluck it out of the diminution, just to communicate it to the listener” (1927, 109).

\textsuperscript{29} See Schenker’s diatribe against the substitution of uniformity for true unity in Schenker (1925a). In this essay, as Schachter aptly summarizes, “he was urging performers . . . to discard the featureless continuous legato suggested by ‘phrasing slurs’ of corrupt editions in favour of the varied and lively articulation shown in the composers’ autograph” (1991, 620). Indeed, Schenkerian performance-pedagogy can truly benefit from taking into account Schenker’s early and middle works, not just the \textit{Ursatz}-oriented late work. Even though the latter, charitably construed, fosters particularity in its own way, as I will discuss presently, the concern for particularity is more evident in the earlier work.

\textsuperscript{30} Gregory Proctor goes so far as to assert that “structural levels [are] ideas of reasonable musical processes . . . not . . . some of the notes in a piece”; quoted in Smith (1996, 278–79), which goes on to claim that the structural pitch itself is not nearly as important as “the formal-contrapuntal-harmonic process in which that pitch participates.” Likewise, Schachter states, “identifying structural elements should never become a goal in itself; the goal is to discover how those elements participate in what Schenker called ‘das Drama des \textit{Ursatizes}’—the drama of the fundamental structure” (2001, 168).
\end{footnotesize}
simply does not go far enough. By focusing on the supposed fact of structural progressions, it
limits the creative uses to which such progressions can be put.

I will offer a performative alternative to this strategy below. First, however, I would like to
lay some philosophical groundwork for this project. In the next section, I sketch three German-
philosophical models to which Schenker’s theory has an affinity in some sense.

7. SCHENKER AND THE PHILOSOPHERS

. . . Schenker was no philosopher . . .

-Victor Zuckerkandl (1973, 206)

Perhaps not. Indeed, Schenker was impatient with those who placed music-philosophical concepts
before music-theoretical ones. Yet, as Kevin Korsyn affirms, “Schenker’s rejection of the musical
opinions of philosophers was by no means a rejection of philosophy. . . . He simply believed that
an understanding of musical language is a precondition for any aesthetic generalizations about it”
(1988, 3). The culture of fin-de-siècle Vienna in which Schenker lived was a heady one indeed, and
there is little doubt that Schenker was steeped in German intellectual history, as Korsyn affirms:
“Schenker was a typical Viennese intellectual in terms of the breadth of his knowledge” (1988, 5).
We know he read Schopenhauer and Goethe, both of whom he quotes, and Kant’s name and his
various terms, such as “synthesis,” are peppered throughout his œuvre; though he does not refer to
Freud explicitly, scholars have long suspected a connection between the Ursatz and the
unconscious and new research tells us that Schenker did in fact read Freud.31

31 The first extended study of Schenker’s relation to Freudian ideas is hot off the press (Fleshner, 2012).
Granted, given Schenker’s concerns about putting the philosophical cart before the musical horse, we should not expect to see in his work overt use of these philosophers’ concepts. Rather, as Korsyn suggests, we are more likely to encounter displacements (in the Freudian sense) of these concepts. Our task here is to detect resonances between Schenker’s analytical edifice—the Schichten of background–middleground–foreground—and certain strands of German thought. So as not to lose the main thrust of my argument, I offer rather condensed remarks on Schenker’s intellectual affinity with Goethe, Kant, and Freud—three philosophical snapshots.

**Goethe**

Goethe’s *Urphänomen* strives, through the process of *Steigerung*, toward ever higher levels of organization, continually generating new forms. Yet all such forms are holistically related: the centrifugal tendency of development is held in check by the centripetal, unifying power of the organic whole.

William Pastille (1990, 34) reminds us that Schenker, in the second volume of *Der Tonwille*, quotes Goethe’s poem “Typus,” the incipit of which reads: “Es ist nichts in der Haut, /Was nicht im Knochen ist.” [“There is nothing on the skin, /that is not in the bones.”] Though the poem describes organic life, Schenker’s invocation suggests it can extend metaphorically to the artwork. In both, an inner model governs external characteristics.32

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32 Schenker’s appropriation of Goethian thought is, of the three philosophers being considered here, by far the most discussed. See Kassler (1983), Neff (2006), Pastille (1990), and Solie (1980). Incidentally, for a brief yet informative account of Goethe’s own involvement with music, see Heller (1949).
Schenker’s inner model is strict counterpoint, which, in his view, underlies and ensures the coherence of the various phenomena of free composition. More specifically, Schenker’s counterpart to Goethe’s Urphänomen is of course the Ursatz—a contrapuntal-harmonic formula that eventuates in a plethora of foregrounds. Hence Schenker’s motto: “Always the same, but not in the same way.” Far from being static and architectonic, the Schichten evince a teleology, or entelechy: just as Goethe’s plant strives to realize the potential of its inner form in outer appearance, so Schenker’s Ursatz strives to realize its potential in the foreground, where it remains in order to ensure the interconnection of all phenomena, no matter how diverse. Musical form, in his words, is “an energy transformation—a transformation of the forces which flow from the background to the foreground” (1935, 162).33 Music, on Schenker’s view, thus evinces a teleological impulse by which it actively strives to manifest its latencies, its aesthetic DNA as encoded in the Ursatz.

To offer a more specific parallel, which I find especially interesting: Goethe’s “proliferous rose” (Durchgewachsene Rose) is “a partially defined flower, as it were, with a stem growing again from its center, and new leaves developing on this stem” (1790, 94). That is, it is an entire plant in microcosm, as it were, in the place where one would expect reproductive organs (see Figure 2-1).34 We witness an almost exact musical parallel in Schenker’s technique of the “transference of the Ursatz.”35 Here, the fundamental structure that governs the whole is replicated in its entirety at a

33 For a further discussion of this passage, see Rothfarb (2002, 939).

34 In the section immediately following, Goethe proceeds to describe the “proliferous carnation,” which he deems “still more remarkable” (1790, 93).

lower structural level (Schenker discusses abbreviated or “incomplete” forms of the transferred structure as well). For example, in Schenker’s analysis of Beethoven’s “Freude” theme from the Finale of the Ninth Symphony (reproduced in my Example 2.4), he posits a $\hat{3} - \hat{2} - \hat{1}$ Ursatz, which

Figure 2-1: A Proliferous Rose
is replicated verbatim at the foreground (see the circled notes in the example). Moreover, the interrupted form of this structure, occurring at the deep middleground (bottom system), is replicated at the shallow middleground (middle system), rendering the first half of the piece a precise microcosm of the whole.  

For both Goethe and Schenker, the whole is ever present in an ideal sense. For Schenker, to hear music organically is to hear each event as uniquely colored by its position within the whole. But with the proliferous rose and transferred Ursatz, the whole is present in a quite real sense as well: the whole is literally one of the parts. It is not difficult to see, then, why these two entities would have held special meaning for their respective authors: both illustrate organicism in the  

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36 Zuckerkandl’s analysis of this passage (1973, 174) demonstrates its recursivity even more rigorously than Schenker’s.
most vivid possible way. In Goethe’s words, “the proliferous rose . . . offers a very clear example of everything we sought earlier through our power of imagination and understanding” (1790, 93). 

**Kant**

For Kant, the synthesis of diverse phenomena must come from the apprehending subject. Synthetic unity would seem a contradictory concept: how can a manifold be unified? It can because diverse phenomena are united as my thoughts—as belonging to “transcendental apperception.” Likewise, Korsyn (1988) notes, the Ursatz, far from being a formula to which a piece is reduced, is a vehicle for transcendental apperception. It is the “I” of the piece, the metaphorical subject who renders the various foreground events coherent.

Crucially, it is through time that the transcendental subject binds phenomena; “time-determination,” Paul Guyer asserts, is “the real basis of Kant’s epistemology” (cited by Korsyn [1988, 28]). For Schenker, the Ursatz (along with other high-level linear progressions) is precisely such a vehicle of time-consciousness—it binds a series of disparate tones unfolding in time. Time-consciousness is the mental tension by which we carry over the initial tone of a linear progression to the end: Schenker states, “the conceptual unity of a linear progression signifies a conceptual tension between the beginning and the end of the progression: the primary note is to be retained

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37 A notable distinction between the two formations, however, is that whereas the transferred Ursatz is a relatively standard technique, the proliferous rose is an anomaly, an anatomical aberration. In this respect, one might note a connection between Goethe’s rose and Freud’s neurotic symptom: in both, a pathology serves as a precious window into a much more significant phenomenon—in the former the organic life-force, in the latter the substance of a repression, the etiology of mental illness.
until the point at which the concluding note appears. The tension alone engenders musical coherence” (1926, 1, my italics). What ensures unity in multiplicity is holding onto a single entity over a period of time—a single tone that passes through the others or through which the others pass. This tension ensures that a string of events comprise not a mere succession but a grammatically coherent statement. So, contrary to the common criticism that Schenker ignores musical time, we see that the Ursatz represents first and foremost a temporal faculty.

To summarize, “the organic composition, then, is a correlate of Kant’s cognitive subject; the Ursatz is the transcendental consciousness of the piece, its ‘I think’” (Korsyn [1988, 35]). This model, Korsyn muses, explains why an encounter with a piece often feels like an encounter with another person, or even with a version of our own deeper self: music sensuously embodies a crucial element of how we think.38

38 Cook (2006), I think, gets at this same basic Kantian idea but in non-Kantian terms. He argues that the composer-oriented values that originated with Beethoven’s heroic style “ran underground, so to speak, in the twentieth-century analytical commentaries that eliminated the composer but retained the traces of creative intentionality” (2006, 18). He cites Schenker in this regard, claiming his is a theory not of music generally but of masterpieces in particular, and of how they are created in a “lightning flash” (Cook’s phrase). Schenker’s move was to retain composer-like intentionality while taking the actual composer and the feelings ascribed to him out of the equation. Indeed, music theories are often pseudo-theories of creativity in a formalistic guise. The values of coherence and unity are seeming formalisms that bear vestiges of creativity and intentionality. Hence, to return to Schenker’s Kantian predilection, compositional unity and organicism implicitly symbolize and valorize the transcendental mind that gave rise to them and that governs musical unfolding from behind the curtain, as it were. In this sense, everything in a piece, from a Schenkerian perspective, is thoroughly personified.
Freud

Both Freud’s and Schenker’s theories seek to expose the motivations underlying complex and often apparently disintegrated phenomena. Freud and Schenker did not inhabit the same social circles, but they were almost exact contemporaries; both lived in Vienna and in fact attended the University of Vienna only ten or so years apart; both were Jewish but not very religious; and both were born of Galician parents. Nicholas Cook (2007) stresses the affinity between these figures, claiming that their respective theories were not just theories in the modern sense but “programmes for action,” movements with political and religious overtones. Cook notes that both theories have a strong mystical component, perhaps a trace of Talmudic philosophy: in both, the truth is concealed, not readily apparent to the eye or ear, and requires analytical intervention to be exposed. The truth for Freud lies in the unconscious, for Schenker in the Ursatz. “Whether in religion, psychoanalysis, or musical analysis, then, truth takes the form of revelation, being accessible . . . only to the adept” (Cook [2007, 213]).

Rather than attempt to consider Freud’s theory of mind generally, I will focus on his dream theory in particular, since here the affinities to Schenker, in my view, are most tangible.

The Dreamwork

To briefly rehearse Freud’s dream theory (1900): events on the day preceding the dream trigger unconscious associations, thoughts of past experiences, and a wish, which the dream fulfills in one way or another. The dream distorts these “dream thoughts” by transposing psychical intensity onto otherwise indifferent dream-day material; the dreamwork appropriates that material to
express repressed memories and desires. Such distortion satisfies the agency of censorship. This agency is very strong in waking life, which is why unconscious thoughts often reach quasi-consciousness only in dreams, where that agency is less strong. To slip by the censor, dream-thoughts disguise themselves; in particular, several are often condensed into a single image, which is thereby “overdetermined.” Sleeping dreams differ from daydreams in having a strong hallucinatory component, for which Freud offers an ingenious explanation: normally, we first receive sense perceptions, which then leave traces in memory; in dreams, this normal path is reversed. Due to censorship and to the absence of fresh stimuli, the process runs backward, from mnemonic traces back to sensory perceptions. The dreamwork is in this sense “regressive” (1900, 581–82).

The psychoanalyst and analysand recover the latent thoughts underlying the dream content; they disentangle from a single image the various thoughts that catalyzed it. The patient forgetting part of the dream or doubting her memory of it is no impediment to analysis, for these are but a continuation of the dreamwork and its censorship. The point is not to reconstitute the dream perfectly but to disinter the unconscious thoughts it manifests.

Schenkerian Structure

Schenker’s Schichten can be readily described in Freudian terms. If ultimately all dreams, as Freud insists, fulfill a wish, ultimately all music, on Schenker’s view, expresses the Naturklang, the “chord of nature”—the major or minor triad as derived from the first five partials of the overtone series. The background, the first presentation of the Naturklang in linear form, is the unconscious of the piece. The middleground (of which there might be several) is the pre-conscious agency of
censorship, guarding the gates to the conscious, the foreground. It provides the initial set of transformations by which the background will enter the foreground in distorted or disguised form. Finally, the foreground is both the conscious mind and the sensory faculty—it is where we hear the piece. It is a dream of tones that variously conceals and exposes the latencies from which it arose.

Both models, therefore, adduce purposive thoughts underlying often apparently random or incoherent phenomena. The key difference, however, is that whereas in Freud the latent dream is much more intricate than the manifest dream, in Schenker, conversely, the background is much simpler than the foreground.39

Examples

I offer two examples, framing the Freudian one in Schenkerian terms, the Schenkerian one in Freudian terms. The former (Figure 2-2) graphs a rather intricate dream and its analysis (Freud [1900, 232–34]) along four Schenkerian strata. The arrows indicate a derivational relationship—they trace the various components of the manifest dream back to recent events (both inside and outside therapy) and those in turn back to the latent dream thoughts. Turning to Appendix A, the background posits an octave Urlinie,40 which is divided into a fourth and a fifth (the two progressions overlap on ḳ 5) based on the fact that, as the bass line shows, D5–A4 compose-out a i

39 I thank Professor Frederick Amrine for pointing this out to me.

40 Octave Urlinien are quite rare. As David Beach (1988) points out, a full-octave descent is often merely apparent, as in cases where the initial three tones are harmonically unsupported and thus actually embellish the true Kopfton ḳ 5.
chord while $A^4-D^4$ unfold over a cadential progression. The first middleground begins the process of transformation: most notably, it changes the melodic tone $C^5$ of the background from a dissonance into a consonance; also, it changes the melodic tone $G^4$ of the background from a perfect into an imperfect consonance. We might regard this process of inverting consonance and dissonance as analogous to inverting psychical intensities, as occurs in dreams. Then, the penultimate bass note is shifted back to coincide with the $F$; entities that were separate become conjoined or condensed, as in the dreamwork. The second middleground continues the transformational process, mutating $B_\flat$ into a different object altogether: $B_4$. Thus, the middlegrounds perform the operations of inverting psychical intensities, condensation, and displacement.
The foreground introduces its own motive, that of a fourth, which takes on its own internal logic, one irrespective of the foreground’s relationship to higher levels. Such motives and their repetitions, at least for later Schenker, are ontologically obscure, secondary to higher level
motives, which recur from one structural level to another. By analogy, Freud submits that apparent logical relations within a dream are part of the manifest rather than latent dream—the connections among events within the dream itself are in a sense illusory in that they represent separate, latent content.

There are dreams in which the most complicated intellectual operations [seem to] take place, statements are contradicted or confirmed . . . just as they are in waking thought. But here again appearances are deceitful. If we go into the interpretation of dreams such as these, we find that . . . what is reproduced by the ostensible thinking in the dream is the subject-matter of the dream-thoughts and not the mutual relations between them (1900, 348, his italics).42

41 Cohn (1992) argues for the emancipation of foreground motives from this rigidly hierarchical scheme and locates the seed of such emancipation in Schenker’s work itself.

42 Generally speaking, musical applications of Freudian theory have scarcely been explored. I have suggested elsewhere (Swinkin [2012]) that variation form, especially of the nineteenth-century type to which I alluded in Chapter 1, can be usefully viewed from a Freudian perspective: the theme bears material traces with “repressed” (that is, latent or potential) meanings which come to light only as a consequence of musical “memories” (that is, variations). Maynard Solomon expresses this analogy in similar terms, likening the theme to a manifest dream, “a simple, condensed sequence of images masking an infinity of latent dream thoughts” (1977, 303) and variations to analyses of the dream, which educe certain of those latent thoughts. William Echard states, more generally, that “Musical personas do not follow the same rules as do actors in the mundane world. They are dream-like, and just as with dreams, their distinctiveness comes into focus when we notice that they include figures which are the same as those in waking awareness, yet not the same” (2006, 86)
Assessment

To summarize, the Ursatz can be likened to Goethe’s Urphänomen, Kant’s synthetic apperception, and Freud’s latent dream, and by extension, the unconscious. This is not to say, of course, that the Ursatz is identical with any of these, but that, though Schenker may not have been a philosopher in his own right, he was clearly engaging, if unconsciously, several important strands of German philosophical thought.

At root, all four models valorize depth, forces operating beneath the sensuous surface. We should recognize a key distinction, however. Freud, on one pole, seems primarily interested in “foreground” phenomena—symptoms, parapraxes, and so on—for the window they open onto unconscious forces. Kant’s innate apperceptive faculty, on the other pole, is about organizing and unifying external phenomena in all their diversity. Is Schenker’s Ursatz closer to the Freudian or the Kantian paradigm? Is it more a deep truth to be recovered from phenomena or rather a faculty that penetrates phenomena? Judging from Schenker’s own words, the former: he often adopts a kind of zealous rhetoric by which the Ursatz, like Freud’s unconscious, is the truth; “the fundamental structure amounts to a sort of secret . . . which, incidentally, provides music with a kind of natural preservation from destruction by the masses” (1935, 9). Likewise for motivic parallelisms, of the sort we witnessed in the “Freude” theme. Here Schenker speaks of “the mysterious concealment of such repetitions [as] an almost biological means of protection: repetitions thrive better in secret than in the full light of consciousness” (1935, 18). Schenker invokes organicism here not to revel in the resplendence of deeper structures at the foreground but to posit a kind of protective layer against disintegrated hearing—against what he views as musical mediocrity.
Such devaluing of sensuous appearances might be seen as retreating from organicism in the truest sense, by which the whole infuses the parts and deep structure is apparent in surface phenomena (as with Goethe’s proliferous rose), and as advancing toward a geological or archaeological paradigm, by which deep structure is buried and in need of excavation. Cook affirms that, “like Freud’s use of the [archaeological metaphor], Schenker’s entails digging through the surface to recover what lies beneath, removing the layers of accretion or misrepresentation that have built up over the years” (2007, 213). Indeed, Schenker’s stance evidences what Holly Watkins (2004) contends is a broader trend during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by which artists and writers gradually relinquish organicist metaphors and increasingly embrace geological ones. If at the beginning of the eighteenth century, depth was thought visible in the surface, later it was thought hidden and needing to be exhumed. I, for one, find this trend dubious—better, in Schenker’s case, to regard the lower levels of middleground and foreground as transparent layers through which the background is visible rather than as opaque, sedimented rock under which the Ursatz is buried.

* * *

Fortunately, Schenker lends some support to this stance, for his archaeological protestations are belied by the generative methodology he generally practices. As we have discussed, his typical analytical narrative takes us on a journey leading from background to foreground. That is, he presents a particular level as an elaborated and, in some respects, transformed version of the previous, more abstract level rather than a more normative version of the next, more concrete
level.\textsuperscript{43} But Schenker does not quite put his mouth where his money is; or at least, his remarks on his own methodology are somewhat equivocal and muddled:

The question of why my representation of voice-leading strata moves in all cases from the background . . . to foreground, and not . . . vice versa may be answered as follows: actually, it makes no difference. Nevertheless, the opposite direction of presentation [from foreground to background] . . . would give more consideration to the needs of teacher and student, but would not so accurately represent the true process (1925c, 107).\textsuperscript{44}

In one breath he states both that it does matter which direction one takes and that the “true process” is top-down. I will try to disambiguate his stance with three propositions: (1) the compositional process is essentially top-down. Again, this “process” is conceptual rather than temporal: the composer may conceive of all levels simultaneously, with different structural levels perhaps occupying different levels of consciousness; (2) once the levels are generated, the analyst can

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Of course, that he presents the background first does not mean he produced it \textit{ex nihilo}, for, in analyzing a piece, he must have already parsed the lower levels to some degree in order to arrive at a plausible \textit{Ursatz} for that piece. Thus even an ostensibly generative approach must entail a heuristic by which one examines salient details of the actual piece that are suggestive of an \textit{Ursatz}, which one then turns back on the composition as an explanatory mechanism. This process thus traverses the so-called hermeneutic circle, in which both the meaning of the whole is derived from the parts and that of the parts from the whole. Cook affirms, “the process of Schenkerian analysis is . . . one of oscillating between the notated surface and the emerging underlying structure, between a bottom-up approach and a top-down one” (2002, 94).
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Felix Salzer holds that, even if the top-down approach is not the “true process,” it is nonetheless the more revealing of the “meaning and impact of the prolongations which create the color, interest, and tension of the music” (1952, 207.) Also see Keiler (1983–84).
\end{itemize}
proceed in either direction, or shuttle back and forth between the two. That is, music-structural relations are symmetrical—generation and reduction are two sides of the same coin; (3) the difference in direction is procedural rather than logical: analytically, it is more efficacious to proceed from the top down, pedagogically from the bottom up.

Schenker’s verbal ambiguity aside, his generative methodology would suggest that the Ursatz is merely the point of departure from which the lower levels and musical composition arise. That the Ursatz is meant to generate and unify musical content does not mean that the content is reducible to its structural or conceptual origins. In fact, the Ursatz can be viewed as a universal backdrop against which the particularities of a piece are all the more apparent, “the general as a foil for the sensed particular,” in Pieter Van Den Toorn’s pithy formulation (1995, 55). For example, as we have seen, the Ursatz establishes tonal and melodic goals that the foreground resists or delays. It is often precisely the details that exceed or evade the structural plan that possess the greatest expressivity and urgency—qualities that would not arise, or would not be as salient, if not for the backdrop of the Ursatz. Indeed, the point is not to hear through foreground phenomena to the background, but rather to hear them in relation to the background. In short, that Schenker departs from the background does not mean that he prioritizes it. Quite the opposite: the point of the Ursatz is to eventuate in the foreground and illuminate its particularities. In Schenker’s theory, the Ursatz serves the actual music, not the other way around.

Thus, Schenker’s rhetoric notwithstanding, I think it is completely justifiable to view the Ursatz not as buried treasure but rather as indicative of synthetic apperception, of an organizing mode of consciousness and perception. From this Kantian perspective, the Ursatz is not merely readily visible through the surface but is actually a constituent of the surface, in the sense of being
crucial to how foreground events are perceived. A remaining question, however, is whether the Ursatz (and other high-level entities) is merely symbolic of this faculty or is an empirical apparatus by which actually to exercise this faculty. In other words, does the Ursatz merely signify a transcendental subject or do we actually hear in terms of it? Does the Ursatz symbolize the notional “I” that is the piece’s central persona or does it indicate the empirical “I”—I the listener and how I actually make sense of the piece?

**A Phenomenological View of the Ursatz**

Recall Schenker’s assertion, cited above, that what unifies a sequence of tones is the mental retention of the primary tone (“the primary tone of the progression is to be carried forward until the goal tone appears”). This statement is Husserlian in spirit, and can be seen as but the tip of the phenomenological iceberg. This is no place to assay a full-blown theory of Schenkerian perception, but I will take a few steps in that direction.

Markand Thakar (2011) offers a lucid account of music phenomenology, although not from a Schenkerian perspective (that will be my contribution).\(^4^5\) I reproduce and gloss one of his key diagrams in my Figure 2-3. Basically, he argues that aesthetic objects or experiences are indivisible, such that every “now-point” is infused with both the past and future: elements of the past are retained, those of the future protended. In this sense, even though music flows in time, it is a simultaneity nonetheless. Of course, we don’t literally hear everything at each now-point, but each now-point sounds as it does and makes the sense that it does by virtue of its relation to the

\(^{45}\) A better-known but less recent account is Lewin (1986).
remembered past and anticipated future. “In any experience of an indivisible . . . temporally extended object, our focused consciousness at any now-point includes the corresponding now-phrase, the retention of ‘just having been’ now-point experiences, and the protention of ‘as-yet-to-come’ now-point experiences” (Thakar [2011, 134, his italics]). In this model, even where

Figure 2-3: Thakar’s music-phenomenological model

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the whole is not literally replicated as one of its parts, as in the transferred Ursatz, the whole is still in some sense refracted through each and every part.

Thakar does not musically concretize the dual processes of retention and protention; invoking Schenker is one way to do so (of course, other, non-Schenkerian modes of
phenomenological perception are possible). Using a very brief example—the incipit of the “Freude” theme—my Fig. 2-4 appropriates Thakar’s model from a Schenkerian perspective. Schenkerian hearing, under this model, is truly the phenomenological counterpart to organic structure: the entire structure folds in on itself, so to speak, such that every now-point exudes a sense of the whole.

Figure 2-4: A Schenkerian appropriation of Thakar’s music-phenomenological model

46 I view Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s *A Generative Theory of Tonal Music* (1983) as essentially a music-cognitive/perceptual, though not strictly phenomenological, appropriation of Schenkerian thought. I refer primarily to the parts dealing with tonal cognition, although their rhythmic and metric models are rigorously hierarchical as well. (Note, however, that not all actually consider Schenkerian structure hierarchical in the strictest sense; see, for example, Rifkin [2000, chapter 1].)
Yet, Thakar’s phenomenological model is, of course, highly idealized, as is my Schenkerian version. It presupposes absolute, unerring immersion in each moment of the music’s unfolding. Such immersion, for Thakar, is in fact synonymous with musical beauty and transcendence. To experience musical beauty, he submits, is to be completely “open” to each and every musical sound. The listener does so, he argues, by withholding judgment, not hearing the sounds “as” anything. “A loss-of-self experience can happen only when the act of consciousness does not involve judgment” (Thakar [2011, 141]). The notion that disinterested contemplation is integral to aesthetic experience, to a judgment of beauty, is of course a Kantian one (curiously, Thakar does not openly acknowledge his debt to Kant). Yet, if suspending conceptual attribution, as Kant claims we must in apprehending beauty, is necessary for organic hearing, it is certainly not sufficient. In other words, merely coming to music unencumbered by concrete thoughts (a near impossibility in itself) does not itself ensure one will retain and pretend musical events. One could perhaps make a case that retention is somewhat natural, that to hear a tonal melodic and/or harmonic progression coherently, we necessarily condense (reduce) previous elements, “chunking” them, in order to secure a context in relation to which subsequent sounds make sense. But the notion of protention is much more problematic and enigmatic. Do we have a natural predisposition to hear $\hat{3}$ as implicating $\hat{3} - \hat{2} - 1$, for example? I would claim we owe such expectations not to immanent properties but to a deliberately Schenkerian way of hearing—a kind of hearing we need (or most of us need) to learn and to consciously adopt (or not) in each
instance.\footnote{Which is not to say that, once learned, one cannot listen in a Schenkerian mode spontaneously and unconsciously. It is only to say that Schenkerian hearing (if one can even postulate so reductive a concept) is not inborn.} It is arguably only within an acknowledged Schenkerian framework that I hear emphasis on \textasciitilde{3} in the beginning of a composition as implicating a \textasciitilde{5}-line \textit{Urlinie} (or, more locally, a third progression), that I hear in some sense a future promised by \textasciitilde{5}. This way of hearing, I believe, is largely theory-dependent.

To summarize: (1) The \textit{Ursatz}, at least in the context of perception/performance (as opposed to abstract analysis), is optimally viewed not as a structural gem to unearth but rather as a vehicle for perceiving foreground events as coherent. (2) This perceptual model can be viewed phenomenologically, as involving both retention (reduction) and protention (anticipation). (3) But this way of hearing is not natural; rather, it is constructed, learned, and theory-dependent.

To reiterate the question, then, that I posed at the outset: is the \textit{Ursatz} more symbolic of ideal (transcendental) perception or indicative of how one might actually perceive music? I would say the former. I do not believe Schenkerian hearing is inborn (even to the most gifted musicians) but I do think one could learn to hear that way. Put another way, just as literature and music do not merely reproduce epistemes and experiences but modify them and create new ones, neither does Schenkerian theory reflect the way we hear. Rather, it is a system of metaphors in terms of which we could hear, hear in a new way. It is to this metaphorical aspect of Schenkerian theory that I now turn.
8. A Performative Approach to Schenkerian Analysis

The last section hopefully established a compelling philosophical basis for using Schenkerian theory performatively. Toward this goal, it took the first and most crucial step, which was to argue that Schenkerian theory need not be viewed as factual, nor does it represent the way we actually or naturally hear—it is rather a construct that guides hearing. Schenkerian theory represents neither immanent properties (only immanent possibilities) nor an inborn perceptual faculty. Yet, acknowledging Schenkerian theory’s metaphorical nature does not lessen its interpretive potency in the least. To the contrary, it enhances such potency, just as the performer, as I argued in Chapter 1, is much freer to illuminate the score once liberated from the duty to find truth in the work. My task in this section is to establish a more precise sense in which Schenkerian theory is metaphorical and performative, and to delve into metaphors within the system that have distinct implications for performance.

On the most general level, we might regard Schenkerian theory as a directive to imagine that a particular composition arose organically or intuitively, and, concomitantly, that it unfolds organically (the latter can be seen to symbolize the former—music on Schenker’s view is apparently symbolic of mind). Viewing organicism as metaphorical is arguably consistent with Schenkerian thought taken as a whole—that is, considering the early, not just late work. In an early essay, “Der Geist der musikalischen Technik” (1895), Schenker asserts, “the material of musical content never arises completely organically, but rather, the composer’s teleological intent is to bring it about that the arrangement of proportions and the order of moods . . . should be judged from the perspective of the organic” (in Cook [2007, 329, my italics]). Kevin Karnes weighs in, stating that these moods
“must be heard and evaluated, in other words, as if they were the products of an unimpeded outpouring of spontaneous invention” (2005, 160, my italics). He adds, “Schenker considered it of the utmost importance that [the] element of deliberate craftsmanship be employed with discretion, so that the finished work sounds to the listener as if . . . it were a product of nature rather than compositional artifice” (2005, 161, his italics).48 If for later Schenker organicism was a metaphysical truth, for early Schenker it was a contingent metaphor, an illusion created for the listener.

More specifically, Cook (1989a) argues that Schenkerian analysis offers a metaphor of Fuxian counterpoint in terms of which we are asked to perceive the music. In other words, through a Schenkerian filter, we listen to a piece as if it were a prolongation of the prototypes of species counterpoint. Of course, this is not as arbitrary as it sounds, for there is a reasonably good fit between the domains of species counterpoint and free composition; the Schenkerian metaphor thus seizes upon what is objectively present in music even as it extends it metaphorically. (Clearly, not every metaphorical model will fit music equally well.) The point, then, is not to state an objective fact about the piece—“it elaborates this contrapuntal configuration”—but rather to ask, “what would it be like to hear the piece as an elaboration of this contrapuntal configuration—what particular details come to light at a result?” Put more baldly, Schenkerian theory is a Waltonesque directive, a rule of the game (the “game” here being a particular hearing or particular performance): “hear these configurations as embellishing or prolonging tonal prototypes.”49

48 For more on Schenker’s anti-organicist tendencies, see Korsyn (1993) and Pastille (1984).

49 Cook (1987), a well-known empirical study, concludes that the longer the piece, the less likely university music students are to notice the piece was altered to end in a different key from the one in which it
But, to reiterate, unlike a typical directive, one implicit in a mimetic art form and that we adopt more or less intuitively (“pretend the actors on the stage are real people with real thoughts and feelings”), a Schenkerian directive is more consciously adopted. It directs imaginings that are not “built into” a musical genre or style, such as, in sonata form, “hear the second theme in the recapitulation as succumbing to the first theme,” or something along these lines. Schenkerian theory, in short, is “an action disguised as fact” (Cook [1999a, 252]), a catalyst for imaginative perception.

* * *

Recall, however, that most musical imaginings are dual imaginings: most structural imaginings have salient somatic and expressive connotations. I will address each in turn. The notion of structural levels employs a spatial metaphor, whereby mostly non-contiguous pitches are collected into various spaces—conceptual categories and physical spaces on the page—indicating their structural significance.\(^5\) The concept of voice leading is at once spatial and somatic, involving the

\(^5\)In the more explicit terms of Lawrence Zbikowski (2003) and others, the “source domain” of space is mapped onto the “target domain” of time, serving to render it more tangible. Zbikowski’s work and mine in the following relies heavily upon Johnson (1987).
motion of an entity through tonal space toward a goal. On a lower level, Schenkerian theory is replete with more particular metaphors that are perhaps even more saliently somatic in orientation: these include unfolding, register transfer, reaching over, and motivic processes such as expansion and compression (motivic parallelisms). All of these rely upon the metaphor of musical space and of an agent physically engaging such space in various ways.

Generally speaking, the spatial/somatic and emotive are fundamentally intertwined, such that one can often start in either domain and easily be led to the other. We witness this connection in Schenkerian analysis no less than in other realms. For example, the spatial/somatic notion of descent, as in the descending *Urlinie*, connotes other spatial/somatic notions such as closure and stability, which in turn have positive and reassuring associations. Ascent, by contrast, often has less comforting connotations of striving, struggle, and tension. These emotive associations derive from our experience of the physical world, in which succumbing to gravity and conforming to natural laws affords one a reassuring sense of resolution and comfort (as when an airplane lands), while resisting gravity can be unsettling (as when one takes off). Of course, in other contexts, the roles are reversed, but the point remains: physical motions have emotive correlates or consequences.

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51 Schenker (1935, 14) associates the *Urlinie* with the notion of tone-space. This voice-leading metaphor is also anthropomorphic in nature. Most music-somatic metaphors will be, since the physicality ascribed to a musical process is more easily envisioned as enacted by a musical persona rather than as motion in general. Saslaw (1997–98) expounds the somatic-metaphorical dimension of Schenker’s (and Schoenberg’s) theory in much greater detail.
Tension is perhaps the most crucial physical/affective metaphor in Schenkerian theory (affective in a general sense—it is an experiential dynamic that underlies many, more specific emotions). As we have seen, the central notion of prolongation pivots on it, insofar as, according to Schenker, one must mentally retain the primary tone of a linear progression in order to bind the others into a manifold unity; this produces “conceptual tension.” In Schenkerian theory, such tension derives from imposing higher levels upon lower ones, which renders salient the way “motion toward the goal encounters obstacles, reversals, disappointments, and involves great distances, detours, expansions, interpolations, and, in short, retardations of all kinds” (1935, 5).

Schenkerian theory is a meta-musical matrix that, applied to a piece, seizes upon the potential tension that any tonal piece will harbor; it furnishes a clear framework in which tension is all the more apparent. The framework may itself be fictional or imaginative, but is no less heuristically effective for that.

A final consideration: how do Schenkerian metaphors compare to standard tonal metaphors, the ones common to virtually any tonal theory? For example, any theory would consider a root-position tonic triad stable in some sense. Does the ubiquity of this metaphor render it “dead”? That is, has “stability,” albeit of non-musical origin, become for all intents and purposes literalized in music theory, a “metaphor” in only a nominal sense? Cumming takes up this question, suggesting that a root-position tonic chord in Schenkerian theory might “carry further suggestions, whose connotative dimension is more marked. A background of ‘stability,’ contextualizing features deemed ‘disruptive’ at a more local level, is not merely a technical feature of a tonal style, but impinges on the potential mood of a phrase or section in which it is exemplified” (2000, 85). For Cumming as well as for myself, metaphors in Schenkerian theory are
particularly “live” or salient, expressively marked in relation to the unmarkedness of comparable metaphors in other music theories, and expressively suggestive for the pieces to which they apply. Such markedness perhaps accounts for the widespread appeal and longevity of Schenkerian theory.

In closing, if Schenkerian analysis implicitly frames musical processes in terms of our physical engagement with the world, it also frames them in terms of our emotional reactions to such engagement. After arriving at such isolated physical/emotive states, the interpreter’s next task is to bridge the gaps among them, to integrate these states into some sort of narrative framework. Such a narrative approach will render these isolated physical and emotive states more specific; it will engender a more multidimensional, complex human condition that the performer can more readily identify with, physically embody, and musically project through sound, touch, and time. I hope to show this in my reading of Chopin’s great C-minor Nocturne.

9. CHOPIN, NOCTURNE IN C MINOR, OP. 48, NO. 1

I have argued that viewing Schenkerian theory as a performative and metaphorical, rather than explanatory, apparatus adjoined to the music (“hear the music as if . . .”) ensures a continual engagement with the musical surface, with the particular ways in which the foreground manifests, embellishes, and deviates from contrapuntal prototypes and structural progressions. I contend that the most fruitful ramifications of Schenkerian structure for performance involve precisely these particular interactions between foreground and deeper levels. For it is these interactions, rather than structural entities per se, that are laden with the physical and expressive connotations

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52 As Snarrenberg (1997, 120) points out, Schenker himself posits an inextricable link between musical motion and emotion in the movement of Żüge.
that can be readily actualized in performance. In other words, what is most applicable to performance are not the tones of the Urlinie or linear progressions in themselves, but the somatic and emotive details that arise from understanding or hearing the musical surface in relation to these structural progressions.

In the following analysis of Chopin’s Nocturne, op. 48, no. 1 (Ex. 2-5, voice-leading sketch in Appendix B, my performance Web Ex. 9), I shall demonstrate that one can readily apply analytical insights to performance by actualizing, in sound and time, the spatial/somatic metaphors that underlie and are connoted by Schenkerian constructs. For the first section, I will proceed phrase by phrase, working in close detail. For the subsequent sections, I will proceed a bit more quickly, taking more global issues into account, and will focus more on motive and topic than on tonal structure per se. My procedure of starting with analysis and moving to performance might smack of the hegemonic stance I have scorned, but, as I have said, this chronology itself is not the problem; the problem is the epistemological priority granted to analysis. In my model, however, analysis is not primarily a series of abstract claims that must somehow be manifested in performance, but is itself sensuous and emotive. As such, performance is no longer expected to assimilate something foreign to it—namely, abstract concepts—but merely to draw from a well of experience common to analysis and performance alike. Analysis in this model is not prescriptive, but rather gives the performer something to respond to (following Maus). When an analysis is devised in this way, proceeding from analysis to interpretation is no longer problematic.

Moreover, I believe the performer can reap advantages from following an independent analysis, especially if he undertakes it himself. Attaining insights into non-obvious structural relationships is often difficult to achieve at the instrument and often requires separate analytical
activity. Schenkerian theory, employed in the manner I have been describing, can make available to the performer interpretive subtleties and options of which he might not otherwise be aware. In this sense, proceeding from analysis to performance is not only unproblematic (because analysis in this model is predisposed toward performance, not alien to it) but decidedly
advantageous, since it renders the performer more amenable to fresh, even radically new insights, less susceptible to the status quo.

**First phrase, mm. 1–4: Analysis**

Mm. 1–2 establish an upper neighbor (Nb.) motive consisting of G–A♭–G (♯5–♭6–♯5), which is mirrored by a lower neighbor motive in the bass (C–B♭–C). The Nb. motive embellishes the G Kopfton, which is then unfolded by a ♯5–♭5–♯1 arpeggiation (mm. 1–3) (see Appendix B). The potential tonic support of the C♯5 that ends this arpeggiation is undermined by the A♭ in the bass. In addition, C♯5 is overshadowed by the emphasis on the Kopfton (and Nb. motive) at the beginning and end of the phrase and by the coupling of the Kopfton over the entire phrase. Hence, the tonic pitch on m. 3½ is weakened both locally due to its harmonization and more globally due to its subsumption by the octave transfer of ♯5. The quality of weakness established by this suggestive detail is exemplified in a different way at the end of the phrase: in m. 4, C♯4 is now harmonized by i, but such potential strength and resolution is undermined by C’s own transience, resulting from the accelerated and abruptly terminated rhythm. The C, a mere sixteenth note placed off the beat, evaporates into the silence from which the phrase emerged (remarkably, silence in this piece is a veritable motive unto itself). Moreover, neither tonic pitch in the melody is approached via a linear descent; the Kopfton G is composed out by arpeggiations rather than by linear progressions.

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53 I partially owe the following strategy of discerning relationships—congruence as well as disparity—between voice-leading structure and foreground *topoi* to Agawu (1991).
Thus, both ♯1s in this phrase fail to achieve a sense of stability or closure. As we shall see, the quest for these qualities will provide a narrative arch throughout this piece.

The quality of weakness as implied by the voice leading is amply exemplified by foreground elements. The 6–5 motive found in mm. 1–2 is a quintessentially Romantic motif of longing and anxiety. As presented here, with its curious rhythmic setting dominated by strong-beat rests, it establishes, along with the minor key, a reticent, anxious, and ambivalent mood at the outset (hence contradicting the qualities of stability and clarity conventionally associated with a beginning). This motive shifts to the bass in mm. 3–4. As a larger-scale entity, it has the capacity to permeate more of the phrase with its sullen mood. Being in the bass also allows the motive to affect other, namely melodic, elements—specifically, it is responsible for the weak harmonization of C in m. 3. It is as if this anxious emotion is initially conscious (the melody, mm. 1–2) and subsequently descends to a deeper, more unconscious level (the bass, mm. 3–4), creating a more unsettling feeling. Another foreground element is the melody’s descending fifth (G–C) into m. 3, which can be construed as a sigh motive, and thus anticipates the more decisive shift toward weakness that occurs on the downbeat of m. 3. What follows is a funeral-march topic, which marks the zenith of pathos within the phrase. Both the sigh and funereal motives exemplify the structural qualities of weakness and instability. The end of the phrase, as mentioned, is a rhythmic thrust that contributes to the lack of closure (the strettò indicated in some editions serves to exemplify the inbuilt acceleration and consequent tonal irresolution). In short, the features of mode, motive, topos, and rhythm all have affective associations that support and are supported by those of the tonal structure.

54 This gesture can be seen as an intervalic expansion of the G⁵–D⁵ in m. 2.
First Phrase: Performance

The structure and surface signify a constellation of related affects one may variously describe as weakness, tentativeness, anxiety, tension, pessimism, and so on. On a general level, these qualities can be expressed through slightly unsteady timing (a limping gait) and a weak sound. More specifically, the absence of a linear dynamic trajectory—that is, a steady crescendo leading to a distinct point of arrival—will express the absence of voice-leading linearity and tonal resolution. Moreover, the pianist might also gently accelerate in m. 2, in order to exemplify the acceleration from a quarter-note to an eighth-note to a sixteenth-note pulse, and then pull back decisively in m. 3 in order to consolidate the new, morose feeling (which results in part from the progressive animation being curtailed). Finally, since the silences are motivic and pregnant with suspended

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55 These words do not all mean the same thing of course, and by bunching them together I mean to convey not that the feeling of the passage is unclear, but that words can only approximately describe rather than precisely denote a musical affect.

56 To offer a crucial clarification, however, one to bear in mind throughout this analysis: to “express” in this case is not to denote, not to communicate a proposition. The non-linear dynamic scheme does not somehow say: “we lack voice-leading linearity here.” Rather, it culls from that structural assertion, or structural imagining, a more general quality—irresolution—one that permeates or can permeate the dynamic scheme. Once it does so, that sense of irresolution stands on its own. It acquires significance in relation to other abstract qualities—or in relation to an emerging narrative scenario—but not in relation to the original structural imagining by which it was incited.
emotion, the pianist might slightly extend them. The best way to do this, as I was taught, is simply
to listen for them—to try to hear silence.

Second phrase, mm. 5–8: Analysis

The previous gap between G and E♭ (as part of the arpeggiation, mm. 1–3) is now filled by F (m.
6), which establishes a line that continues to D in m. 7. This 5–4–3–2 progression thus supplies
the linearity that was conspicuously absent from the first phrase, and seems to promise a resolution
to and proper harmonic support of 1, especially when the tonality turns abruptly from the relative
major back to the home key in m. 6. This promise, however, is quickly broken: no sooner does 2
arrive than we shift toward the key of g (v), and hence are not in a tonal position from which to
resolve to C. Instead, D ascends to E♭, which reinforces the denial of closure in two ways. First, it
is part of an implied 6–5 motive (within the key of v), whose tension here seems to arise from and
comment upon the voice-leading predicament. Second, the E♭ (m. 7) is conspicuously isolated in
terms of register and does not resolve directly to the expected D. Hence, the promise of even local
linearity is foiled.

Harmonically, this phrase begins in III, which, in conjunction with the increased linearity,
connotes amelioration and optimism. By contrast, v (m. 7) coincides with the loss of linearity, and
consequently of hope. Yet, on a deeper level, III can be understood as a long-range neighbor to
the v/v (thus paralleling the neighbor motion in the bass of the opening phrase and, at pitch, the
E♭–D Nb. motive of the second phrase [see motivic analysis]). III is thus subsumed on a deeper
level by v. Analogously, the hope it signifies is subverted by the anxiety signified by the minor
mode. For that matter, the initial three Stufen of i–III–v taken together can be seen to compose
out the tonic triad, suggesting perhaps that the essentially pessimistic mood of the minor tonic underlies the entire section, rendering any change of mood suggested by III illusory.

As for foreground features, the tied A♭ in mm. 5–6 precludes a recurrence of the rest that had occurred in m. 2, and thus directly exemplifies the broader qualities of connectedness and directionality associated with the voice-leading linearity. That is, the more abstract process by which a melodic gap is subsequently filled is concretized by a rest being filled with sound. Second, the loss of linearity and hope in m. 7 is immediately presaged by the rhythmically conspicuous B–C motive in the bass of m. 6, which recalls the initial phrase and its predicament and also allows us to pivot back to a minor key (v). The motive can be seen as representing a psychological shift, an intrusion of memory, which recalls an undesirable state and reverts to it. Finally, following that unpropitious motive, all hope of linearity is quashed with the octave drop at the beginning of m. 7. The resultant disillusionment is then topically reinforced by a sigh figure (E♭⁵–F♯⁴)—all the more potent for occurring on the expressively charged ̅6.

Second Phrase: Performance

Unlike the initial phrase that expresses basically a single emotional state, this phrase expresses two: attainment then loss of hope (of achieving stability and fulfillment). A performer following this reading would thus bifurcate this phrase, playing the first half with a distinct sense of security and linearity, the second in a more disoriented, erratic manner. The emotional shift as represented by B–C in the bass of m. 6 can be played abruptly and intrusively. Transcending this break, however, is the ̅5–4–3–2 line that arrives on m. 7. The performer can express this ephemeral linearity by exaggerating the sense of line, both by playing molto legato—perhaps even elongating the G in
m. 5 to anticipate the imminent over-the-bar connection—and by applying directional dynamics, arriving decisively upon D⁵ m. 7. It is crucial, I think, to differentiate dynamically between the arrival on that note and the one on E₅ (m. 7), as the former connotes affirmation, the latter anxious deviation. The E₅ is the longest note in the phrase and undoubtedly the climax of the piece thus far. It fully consolidates the initial state and is all the more indignant for having seen a glimpse of a solution. This one note, therefore, played with sufficient intensity, can encapsulate a complex mental state. A subito piano on F♯ (last note, m. 7) will have a threefold purpose: to express the sigh figure, to dynamically isolate the E₅—that is, to express its registral isolation and consequent loss of linearity—and to induce a soft dynamic for the end of the phrase, which will foreground the lack of closure.⁵⁷

The ambiguity of III presents a considerable challenge to the performer: how might she handle its multiple connotations? On a surface level, as we have seen, it expresses optimism and resolution, while on a deeper level, it is subsumed by pathos and instability. Of course, one could simply express the latter on account of the former being in some sense illusory—perhaps by resisting the temptation to brighten the color on m. 5 but instead retaining the general sound of the previous phrase, exemplifying the subsumption of III by i. Alternatively, one could fully indulge in the glimmer of hope and not express in any way its subsumption by i nor anticipate its motion to v. Yet a third option, which I think preferable, would be somehow to capture the

⁵⁷ This interpretation is reinforced by the fingering Chopin recommended to his student Dubois of 4 on E₅ and 3 on F♯, suggesting that the two notes would be detached and isolated from each other, and that the second note would be played with a weaker dynamic, since whatever intensity had accumulated by the climax on E₅ would be dissipated by the detachment. Eigeldinger (1986, 264).
polysemous quality of the moment, perhaps by furnishing a bright color, but at the same time, resisting too firm a grounding in that key, instead projecting its inherent instability and mobility as an upper neighbor within v. In this rendition, the performer will not feel or allow the listener to feel metrically grounded in the section, but will infuse the passage with a sense of imminent slippage or unease. In short, this moment involving III is a small but revealing example of the potential correlation between structural and emotional complexity: to expose structural levels is to expose the various affective levels to be conveyed.  

**Third phrase, mm. 9–16: Analysis**

Up to this point, the analysis has yielded qualities that inextricably link the physical and emotive. The lack of linear resolution in the first phrase intimated both physical and emotional weakness, while the initial presence of linearity in the second phrase intimated both physical and emotional security. The third phrase, however, seems to foreground purely physical qualities—as perhaps befits its somewhat developmental function—boasting no fewer than four distinct somatic/spatial techniques, some of which have multiple instances.

1) *Motivic Enlargement:* The \( \hat{6} - \hat{5} \) (A\( \flat \)–G) motive is enlarged over the span of four measures (mm. 9–12). Mm. 1–12 thus constitute an enlargement of the complete Nb. motive of mm. 1–2 (G–A\( \flat \)–G) (see deep middleground in Appendix B).

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I develop this view of musical emotion in Swinkin (forthcoming A).
2) **Octave Displacement and Alternation**: Each pitch of the Nb. motive (A♭ and G, mm. 9–12) is octave-transferred. This event frames the more extensive registral play of m. 10, where a descending third motion of A♭–G♭–F is played out in two registers. Chopin apparently wanted this registral dialogue to be audible, given his downward stems.

3) **Reaching Over**: The A♭ of the Nb. motive receives its own neighbor (B♭) in m. 9, which is a reaching over. This maneuver creates the space for additional motivic content and recaptures the obligatory register. Likewise, C on the last eighth of m. 11 reaches over the upper voice containing A♭.

4) **Motivic Compression**: There are at least four instances of motivic compression. First, the octave alternation in m. 10 referred to above can be seen as a compression of the broader octave alternation of the tones of the Nb. motive by which it is surrounded. Second, the motion of A♭–G into m. 12 is a slight parallelism and compression of the Nb. motive, an audible instance of the larger Nb. motive that governs the four-bar phrase. Third, the right hand of m. 13 constitutes a parallelism of the bass line of the previous two measures (see motivic analysis). However, notice that this figure can also be understood as an augmentation of the ascending fourth cell of the theme (m. 24). This figure is thus a diminution and an augmentation simultaneously (Ex. 2-6), creating a sense of ambiguity. Finally, the melismatic

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59 The figure in m. 9 can be viewed as an augmentation and intervalic expansion of that in m. 7 (beginning on the second note). The second and third phrases are thus related by Knüpfechnik.
ornamentation of m. 15 (leading into beat 4) encapsulates the melodic configuration of the last half of m. 2 and m. 6; this subtly prepares for the thematic return of m. 17.

Example 2-6: Chopin, mm. 11–13: a rhythmic double entendre

*Third Phrase: Performance*

Generally, this section is marked by expansiveness, in terms of both the exploration of vertical, registral space and the linear expansion of the Nb. motive. The performer can express this quality, in general, by employing a broader spectrum of dynamic and tempo fluctuations than he has employed to this point in the piece, and by expressing a sense of strain and of resisting gravity (with subtle ritardandi) on the octave transfers and reachings over. (M. 10, by contrast, involves considerable compression, and thus might be played with a hurried quality.) For a more specific recommendation, one can highlight the bass line in mm. 11–12 due to its motivic significance, and so the listener can perceive its subsequent imitation by the right hand in m. 13—bearing in
mind that to “highlight” the bass is not merely to bring out the individual pitches, but to shape them as a coherent line. That imitation, in turn, because of its rhythmic ambiguity as explained above, can perhaps be played with a sense of push and pull, as if not knowing whether to be fast or slow.

*Fourth phrase, mm. 17–24: Analysis*

The opening is quite fluid harmonically; it employs a descending fifth sequence that touches upon both initial Stufen (i and III).60 It also recalls the elements of disconnection and connection associated with those respective Stufen. Namely, the downbeat rest of the second measure is reinstated, recalling the first phrase associated with i. On the other hand, the G–Es gap is filled by F, recalling the second phrase associated with III. In this way, this phrase compresses events or elements that previously belonged to separate phrases into a single phrase. Our narrative is reaching a climax. The conflicting elements of linearity and non-linearity are coming to a head within an intensified harmonic motion that seems to signal a more fervent desire and active search for a resolution to the predicament. At long last we arrive upon 1 via a linear descent (m. 20), but it still does not receive definitive, tonic support, as it once again sits atop the upper-neighbor As.

As in m. 7, the lack of closure is immediately reinforced by a registral gap, this time an audacious melodic leap of an ascending eleventh (m. 21). A probing musical soliloquy (mm. 21–23) then

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60 To be precise, the i here is replaced by V/IV, which, however, serves as a tonic substitute. An alternate harmonic reading might assert that, since the previous phrase cadenced on what is arguably a V/III (m. 16), and since we return to III in m. 18, the C7 chord here is subsumed by a prolongation of III (mm. 16–18)—its tonicity thus denied. I will not pursue the narrative or performative implications of this reading.
explores the space opened by that leap, as if searching for something to cling to within this chasm. Such intrinsic logic and linearity is actually to be found concealed within the intricate folds of this melisma. As the graph reveals (also see Ex. 2-5), this passage embeds a fragment of the initial melody (G–A♭–G–F–E♭), bringing the fundamental line down to E♭. In its searching, circuitous contour, within which is nested a comprehensible melodic line, this passage can thus be read as a peroration on the search for closure and the problematics and obstacles involved in such a search. It intensely encapsulates the dialectic of resolution and tension, connection and alienation, played out since the beginning. The protagonist finally achieves some semblance of closure, although we must imagine the structural 2, as it is an implied tone (see Appendix B). The closure is also provisional in that 1 is not in the obligatory register. That this closure is provisional and does not (yet) equate with satisfaction and stability is borne out by the tragic triplets with which the section ends.\footnote{Such triplets, in a major-key piece, might convey optimistic heroism. In a minor-key piece, however, they tend to be foreboding, as is the case with the opening of Mahler’s Fifth Symphony, to take another example.}

Fourth Phrase: Performance

The beginning of this phrase, I feel, strongly calls for a sense of forward motion, to indicate both the compression of events and the intensified search and yearning for closure. The figuration in mm. 21–23 is the most difficult interpretively, but an awareness of its underlying thematic contour should afford the performer some basis on which to shape it. But again, it is not primarily a matter of bringing out the embedded thematic notes but of responding to the emotive and
narrative significance of their embedding: that is, the fervent desire for a sense of a linear orientation and rationality in the midst of a seemingly insoluble predicament. The dialectic of underlying motive and foreground figuration, because of the emotional complexity it embodies, will yield far more substantive and numerous interpretive possibilities than the underlying motive itself (and the imperative to “project it”). Overall, this phrase, in its juxtaposition of elements, effusive figuration, and equivocal resolution (note that the structural \( \hat{2} \) is implied), encodes the most complex mental state in the piece thus far. Moreover, the more multidimensional the state is, the more a sheer recognition of it through structural analysis will naturally affect a performer and the less one can prescribe how it will.

**B Section**

\( E\flat \)\(^5\) was registrally stranded at the end of the A\(_1\) section (m. 23). Since, as a consequence, that tone lingers in the listener’s mind, the modal inflection (\( E\natural \)) that begins the B section is especially salient. This \( E\flat \) serves as the local Kopfton, the primary tone of the B section.\(^62\) Obviously, the switch from minor to the parallel major connotes a more positive mood.

This emotional shift also occurs on a topical level. The hymn or chorale topic around which this section revolves, generally speaking, has an affirmative, reassuring quality. This quality, however, is modified and specified both by the particular, somewhat unusual way Chopin deploys

\(^{62}\) The connection I posit between \( E\flat \) and \( E\natural \) is consistent with Schenker’s view of modal mixture as form-generating: that is, in most of his examples where ternary form derives from mixture, \( \hat{3} \) in the initial section is altered to \( \hat{\hat{5}} \hat{3} \) in the contrasting middle section or vice versa. See Schenker (1935, 40–41 and 70–71).
the chorale topic and by its relation to the topical content surrounding the chorale.\textsuperscript{63} On the one
hand, these chords are big, covering a wide ambitus, which, at least for most pianists, would entail
some stretch and strain, even though they are rolled. For, several rolls require changing hand
position and are thus not easy to navigate. This embodied tension is, to be sure, very subtle, kept
under wraps by the \textit{sotto voce}. Nonetheless, it might be seen as a latent form of the more overt and
dramatic tension that erupts starting in m. 39 (more on which in a moment).\textsuperscript{64} On the other
hand, the chorale signifies a release from the tension of the \(A_1\) section. More specifically, \(A_1\), with
its expressive melodic and rhythmic contours set against a more neutral accompaniment, sketches
a highly individuated subject—one, moreover, who is quietly desperate, melancholy, full of
longing, and who gradually finds his or her voice, culminating with the melismatic peroration.
The opening of the B section, by contrast, soothes the subject, or perhaps even transcends
subjectivity altogether. In depicting both a spiritual, transcendent state and a communal,
reconciliatory realm, it serves as a reprieve from individualistic desire.

However, this peaceful realm is subsequently shattered by the double-octave passages. I
construe them as symbolic of physical strength, of the protagonist desiring and trying to overcome
her physical weakness as expressed in the \(A_1\) section, and to flout the chorale that aims to assuage
or nullify such desire. These passages, in my hearing, represent the reemergence of the desiring

\textsuperscript{63} Stephen Rumph (2005) notes that any one topic may harbor several possible meanings. Which one(s) it
holds in any given context depends in large part upon the contrasting topic with which it is juxtaposed.

\textsuperscript{64} Alternatively, these chords could be rendered as harp-like and ethereal, in which case they obviously
would not exude tension. One performance that creates this effect marvelously (largely through “over”-
pedaling) is Martha Argerich (1978–79).
subject, whose brute physicality and materiality intrude upon, compete with, and ultimately overthrow the nuanced reassurances of the ecclesiastical voice. The quality of intrusiveness derives not just from bravura content per se but from the way it interrupts, is interpolated into, the phrases of the chorale, ultimately overtaking it in m. 47 where the chorale chords must be content to coincide with the thunderous, more dominant bass.

Chopin thus juxtaposes and sets in conflict two antithetical topoi. But underlying this (seeming) antithesis is a subtle source of synthesis, since, as I previously stated, the chorale chords are dispensed in a way that creates understated tension and, moreover, the virtuosity of the octave passages emerges gradually—it takes time for the protagonist to recover her voice and strength. The challenge I would pose to the pianist, therefore, is not so much to amplify the topical contrast but to convey the bourgeoning anxiety of the chorale (perhaps deploying Chopin’s crescendi for that effect) and to depict with the initial octave passages the waxing and waning of energy, the progressive emergence of the heroic subject. Just as Chopin semantically extends the traditional connotations of the chorale topic, both in its textural treatment and topical juxtaposition, so the pianist, in turn, has an opportunity to semantically extend the traditional connotations of such a juxtaposition—that is, not merely to employ it for blunt contrast but to seek out a subtle synthesis.

Another way to frame this unifying effect is in terms of extension. This quality is evident in the interpolations, which stretch out the phrases of the previous chorale (or at least give that impression). This extension may be seen as a corollary of the purely physical extension required by the rolled chords. In other words, the extension that embodies psychical stress is at first quite

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65 Chopin’s E major Etude, op. 10, no. 3 also features lyrical, Nocturne-like content that is broken up by an unexpected bout of almost violent virtuosity within the middle section.
literal—the hand is stressed and stretched—then metaphorical, transferred to the domain of phraseology.

* * *

The somewhat general moods or qualities I have attributed to the B section will be specified, and rendered more amenable to interpretive treatment, by examining motivic content (Ex. 2-7). In this section, a new (or seemingly new) motive comes to light: its first instance is in mm. 283–291, the chromatic passing motion D–D♯–E, what I will designate the chromatic slide motive (“CS” for short). The E♭ of the home key is now enharmonized as D♯ and consequently directed upward.
This enharmonic and contoural reversal signals an emotional reversal in relation to the $A_1$ section. In the next instance of CS, G–G♯–A in the inner voice of m. 31, the tendency tone (now G♯) is given consonant support (by E). In other words, the E major chord (a chord of secondary
mixture), arises, in my estimation, from the need to consonate the G♯ that, by virtue of its correspondence with the D♯ of m. 28, is essentially an augmented 5th above C (see example). If the D♯ of the initial instance of CS arguably enharmonicizes E♭ of the home key, the G♯ of this instance arguably enharmonicizes A♭ of the home key, especially since it comes from G, just as A♭ in m. 1 does. In this light, we might derive CS from the Nb. motive of the opening. In other words, CS converts the semitonal upper neighbor of Nb. to a chromatic passing tone, thus extending the Nb. motive’s one semitone to two. This process of extension continues into the next two, sequentially related instances of CS, in the bass of mm. 33–34 and 35–36. In addition, the contour is inverted. The combination of chromatic extension and inversion yields a descending chromatic bass line, whose affective connotation of dejection is well supported by virtue of both contour and convention. It is also supported contextually: it recalls the descending G–G♭–F of mm. 9–10, which introduced us to the darker realm of the Phrygian key. Hence, the emotional reversal of A♯ signified by the enharmonic and contoural reversal of its defining Nb. motive is now itself reversed. CS is restored to the emotional condition to which it was a reaction.

Interestingly, the motivic and emotional reversal is cemented by the soprano’s G♯–G♭ in m. 36, which inverts the G–G♯ of m. 31, thus returning CS to its Nb. origins. It does so, moreover, in the same register as mm. 1–2, thus rendering this motivic connection more audible. The audibility is also enhanced by the analogous mode of continuation, as shown in Ex. 2–7. This

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66 The importance of this chromatic bass line for the middle section was foreshadowed by the otherwise prosaic transition in m. 24, whose tenor voice traces G–F♯–F♯–E, exactly the same pitches as in the bass of mm. 35–36.
connection is rendered even more evident in m. 39, where G♯–G is restored to A♭–G and placed within an explicit neighbor-oriented context, one distinctly reminiscent of the opening of the piece, with its 6–5 motive.

The pervasive spatial/somatic quality of extension and tension, then, which we have seen to operate, in different ways, in both the chorale chords and double octaves, also derives from extending the previous Nb. motive to include three and then four notes (two then three semitones). More specific emotions, or at least emotional dynamics—reversal in particular—derive from these motivic permutations. The emotional reversal in m. 33 ff. supports my previous observation that the chorale harbors stress and strain beneath its reconciliatory surface. The pianist following this motivic-emotive narrative will likely infuse mm. 28–29 with energy and buoyancy, given the connotation of D–D♯–E; exhibit composure on the E chord in m. 31, in light of the support it lends to G♯; and ratchet up tension in mm. 33 ff., perhaps emphasizing then tapering the bass, since it laments.

A₂ Section

The accompaniment part in A₂ synthesizes the central opposition of the B section: the homophonic texture of the chorale and the rushing triplets of the octave passages. A₂ is also, more obviously, a synthesis of the A₁ and B sections, since its accompanimental texture is derived from B, its melodic and harmonic content from A₁. A₂ also acts as a kind of emotional synthesis. It appears to take from B both its (partial) communal equanimity, symbolized by the chorale, and its subjective yearning, symbolized by the octaves. The equanimity comes across in how the melody, which in A₁ was given a fairly sparse accompaniment and thus suggested an isolated and alienated
protagonist, now finds a home, so to speak, as it is ensconced in a plush harmonic fabric. Also, whereas previously the rests by which the melody was perforated were readily audible due to the sparse accompaniment, in A they are infused with harmonic resonance. The protagonist, then, is no longer alone but is embraced by a community. Still, the agitato, rushing triplets, and 3-versus-4 rhythmic dissonance convey residual unease. If the synthesis shows the protagonist that her individuality might be compatible with the intersubjective, communal sphere, she is still somewhat skeptical of this idea, anxious about being too thoroughly subsumed (though not nearly as anxious as she was in the defiant octave passages).

This section is thus emotionally ambiguous, and not merely in the unmarked sense—by which music is always in some sense emotionally ambiguous, overdetermined, multivalent, and so on—but in the marked sense, by which it is irreducibly ambiguous—indicative not simply of an array of competing possibilities but of an actual mental state (one that might be better termed ambivalence) that can on some level be conveyed. In other words, marked musical ambiguity/ambivalence is a palpable element of the musical narrative. I believe one can express ambivalence here, on the one hand, by exuding anxiety through impulsively timed triplet chords, rushing and retreating; on the other hand, by conveying some degree of comfort and resolution by relishing the harmonic fullness, by rendering the melody more subservient to the harmonic accompaniment (read: community) than the reverse. This is not to say the melody will be buried; on the contrary, the pianist might reinforce the melody by the notes by which it is now doubled (in mm. 49, 49, 51, and so on). Also, the pianist might play the melody with more dynamic direction than he did at the beginning (there, to recall, its conspicuous gaps, in terms of both rests and voice leading, led us to eschew dynamic linearity). For, again, the melody/protagonist is no
longer isolated and alienated. This increased directionality is to some extent implied by the slight
variations in melodic contour: in mm. 69–71, the soprano, now weighed down by thick
homophony, is not as unfettered as in mm. 21–23, and hence not as registrally erratic. The
smaller melodic intervals and more linear contour in the soprano intimate that we might achieve a
less anxious resolution to Ĥ than in A, and so the oration appears less dismal. (It is as if the
spiritual intervention of the B section—whose continued presence is indicated by the homophonic
texture—has had a positive effect on the protagonist’s state of mind.)

However, the resolution turns out to be far from untroubled: for the expected perfect
authentic cadence in m. 72 is subverted or evaded by a brazen 4 chord (Ex. 2-8). This chord arises
from the descending chromatic motive in the bass, as occurred in mm. 84–9. Of limited
consequence in the A, section, this descending chromatic bass motion, as I have shown, gained in
motivic importance throughout B (mm. 33–34 and 35–36) and now rears its head, signaling
defiant irresolution. This motive is reinterpreted in m. 73, however, where it is relegated to
decorative figuration in the right hand and is thus much less able to steer the course of harmonic
events (Ex. 2-9). Also, the Gb is respelled as F#, which shows it no longer has a tendency to
tonicize the Phrygian (and the tendency of F# to tonicize the dominant is instantly quashed by the
F#). In other words, the pernicious tendency of Gb has been neutralized, which renders closure
possible. As an affirmation of successful closure, the Eb–C gap into m. 74, which in the first
phrase of the piece had posed a state of irresolution (C was an overhang note, subordinate to Eb
that, in turn, was subordinate to G), is now decisively resolute, with the C appearing on the
downbeat and elongated—thus both metrically and agogically accented.\(^67\) That E\(_b\), however, returns in the soprano voice of the final chords, posing something of a question mark. The protagonist, despite having overcome social solitude and physical weakness by dint of the spiritual embrace of his community, and despite having found some direction, purpose, and resolution, is in the end apparently still somewhat dubious about these ameliorations.

Example 2-8: Chopin, mm. 72–73

Example 2-9: Chopin, mm. 73–74

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\(^67\) I thank Kevin Korsyn for this observation.
The Nocturne, then, as perceived through the filter of my Schenkerian and semiotic reading, is a veritable character study. It portrays a persona who in his essence is feeble and uncertain, perhaps afraid, but who more locally undergoes a range of feelings and corresponding physical stances. The pianist following this reading would, like an actor, simultaneously embody and convey the most deep-seated as well as the more transient emotive states. Importantly, the narrative premise of weakness and striving for stability, perhaps no more than a potentiality within the piece—at times strong, at others somewhat faint—is consolidated by the application of the Urlinie, Zug, and other Schenkerian constructs. Without a Schenkerian reading, such a potentiality might easily remain latent. Indeed, I believe a Schenkerian reading of any piece is at root a mandate to imagine precisely such a search for closure, and the many obstacles and deviations encountered along the way. Schenkerian analysis is ideally suited to elicit this particular mode of engagement with a work, and thus uniquely suited to tease out the story that is Chopin’s C-minor Nocturne.

10. CONCLUSION

I hope to have shown that performance and Schenkerian analysis are, or can be, deeply compatible. We actualize this potential compatibility when we attend to the physical and emotive features of Schenkerian analysis, features in which performance is also patently grounded. Somatic and affective states condition the formulation of Schenkerian concepts and constructs,

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68 On a pedagogical approach to embodying expressive states that derive from Schenkerian analysis, see Pierce (1994); see Pierce (1993) for a broader overview of her approach to performance and movement.
and these states can be recovered and manifested in performance. To be unabashedly
metaphorical, it is as if Schenker’s metaphors freeze real experience and thaw upon contact with
the warmth of the performed music to which they are applied, becoming actual again.
Schenkerian theory and music can in this way partake of a mutually beneficial relationship, by
which Schenkerian theory actualizes potentialities of the piece, the piece potentialities of
Schenkerian theory.

The more anthropomorphic our analytical reading of a piece, the more naturally that
analysis can be applied to performance. Empathizing with the somatic and affective substratum of
analysis is key, for this allows the performer, in a somewhat intuitive way, to project the sense of
sound and movement that typifies such states. Indeed, a Schenkerian analysis, employed in a
metaphorical spirit, exposes states that are so fundamentally human and that elicit such empathy
from the performer that little deliberate “application” from analysis to performance need be done.
In other words, the ideal use of analysis, in my view, is to arrive at an exegesis of a piece that is
itself so experiential, so suggestive of a physical and expressive stance, as largely (if not entirely) to
obviate the need for conscious or rational translation.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Schenker himself seems to have advocated this unselfconscious approach to the relation between analysis
and performance. Rothstein (1984), for example, suggests that Schenker conveyed many of his
recommendations for performance based upon analytical insights—regarding dynamics, articulation,
phrasing, and so on—in the form of fingerings as opposed to more explicit indications. In this way, the
pianist relate to these insights on a kinesthetic level, executing them naturally, without cognitive mediation
or exaggeration. Bamberger (1976) likewise claims that Beethoven conveyed abstract ideas in the form of
fingerings. In this respect, Schenker’s approach to fingering in his edition of the Beethoven Sonatas
arguably followed the lead of Beethoven himself.
Yet, as I have also suggested, such an approach, as rooted as it is in mutual consonances between analysis and performance, paradoxically foregrounds the ineluctable tensions between them. For the metaphorical qualities that arise from my methodology are general, and thus will inevitably receive very different realizations from different performers. Moreover, a human-oriented approach to analysis will allow for the subjective inclinations of the performer, for the possibility that he will realize a structural quality in an unexpected way, adding nuances that modify established meanings and even lead to new ones. Simply put, while a broad correlation exists between Schenkerian analysis and performance in that both thrive on physical and expressive qualities, no exact, predictable, and measurable correlation does. In this lies an inexhaustible source of interpretive richness that one would not want, despite its messiness, to wish away.

70 Nolan (1993–94) makes this point nicely.
CHAPTER 3

BEETHOVEN, STRING QUARTET IN C MINOR, OP. 18, NO. 4, FIRST MOVEMENT

The following scenario, whose setting is a D.M.A. seminar/practicum in performance/analysis, is not intended realistically to depict the typical responses of seminarians, nor, for that matter, to serve as a pedagogical model or ideal. I merely employ this quasi-Socratic medium (taking inspiration from Korsyn [2003], Krebs [1999], Le Guin [2006], Pierce [1983], Schmalfeldt [1985], and Thakar [2011]) in order to transmit my performative analysis of this piece in a manner that is itself somewhat performative. Since I am not a string player, my avatar in this dialogue, the teacher/chamber-music coach, will dispense advice on performance that is for the most part general rather than string-idiomatic.

SESSION 1: EXPOSITION, FIRST THEME

Teacher (T): Welcome to Week 3 of our Performance/Analysis seminar! Over the next several sessions, I will be coaching you string-quartet players on the first movement of Beethoven’s magnificent\(^1\) C-minor String Quartet, op. 18, no. 4. I have asked you to learn the notes but to

\(^1\) Not everyone agrees: Joseph Kerman, for one, is positively scathing in his appraisal: “and the Quartet in C minor is the exceptional work in the Op. 18 series; exceptional, by its weakness, in the entire corpus of the Beethoven quartets” (1966, 71). While my aim here is not primarily to defend the aesthetic integrity of the work, I do hope my analysis will reveal many interesting features that might at least give some critics pause.
hold off settling on particular interpretive nuances, since our goal, remember, is to explore how music analysis can awaken us to new possibilities. We don’t want our physical habits, in which status-quo ways of playing are often ingrained, to determine or unduly constrain our interpretation. We are therefore going to adopt a proactive stance, for each section discussing analytical points first, which will hopefully generate interesting and even radical interpretive ideas, which we will then put into practice. But first, to orientate our work on this piece, perhaps it would be advisable to review some of the general principles regarding analysis and performance that we have been discussing over the last two weeks.² Who can get us started?

Silence.

T: Why is it crucial to aim for a performance rich in individuated moments, drawing on a wide palette of dynamics, articulations, and tempi?

First Violinist (V1): Because, as Adorno pointed out, smoothing over a piece’s contrasts and complications is sort of like oppressing individuals. It’s really an ethical issue, not just a musical one.

T: Yes, not to mention that playing in a highly individualized way affirms the freedom of the performing individual himself or herself. It affirms his or her relative autonomy with respect to the supposed strictures of the score and intentions of the composer, to academic expectations,

² This initial discussion draws upon the previous two chapters. Please consult those for fuller explanations and citations.
and to the limitations imposed by recording-industry values. We are thus talking about freedom not just in a symbolic sense, but in a quite real one as well.³ Anything else?

Violist (Vla): One might need to use particular dynamics, tempo changes, or whatever in order to realize certain potentials of the score.

T: Indeed. Can you fill out that idea a bit?

Cellist (C) (interjecting): Well, a score includes pitches, rhythms, and all kinds of expressive markings. But we all know that music is about so much more than quarter notes and crescendi! These symbols may indicate what to play and something about how to play it, but they also imply certain things about musical structure. Isn’t that right? And to get across ideas about musical structure, we need to use lots of variance.

T: Nicely said. But I’m concerned about that last sentence: by “get across ideas,” do you mean we try to communicate abstract ideas in a performance? Is that even possible?

C: Sorry, I didn’t put that quite right: realizing something about musical structure can motivate the musician to play in a certain way. When a piece varies a motive, evades a cadence, shifts the hypermeter, or what have you, it suggests a physical or emotional state—at least to the imaginative interpreter. When the performer adopts this state or empathizes with it in some way, it can affect how she plays.

³ Put in more formal, Peircean terms, freedom is signified not just iconically but also indexically. Thomas Turino makes a related point: “When music makers and dancers are in sync, such signs move beyond felt resemblances [the iconic level] to [the] experienced fact of social connections and unity [the indexical level]” (1999, 241, his italics).
T (interrupting): Right, and the variations in dynamic, tempo, and articulation that result will yield sonic contours that are analogous to how certain feelings and thought processes feel, or to how people comport themselves, gesticulate, and vocalize when feeling particular things. Listeners intuitively pick up on these analogies, they readily infer an emotional state from the performer’s interpretive behaviors.

VI: So you’re saying that we don’t communicate ideas when we play. Rather, when we read structural processes imaginatively, we are led to interpretive nuances that help create the semblance of human states to which we can all relate.

T: Yes. Being in a particular emotional state (or, as Kendall Walton might prefer, imagining ourselves in such a state) will often naturally lead to a physical gesture that directly affects how we play.

C (demurring): But, it isn’t always that straightforward: singing or playing an instrument presents its own very particular demands, so we often need to adjust or modify those natural physical responses simply to execute notes on our instruments.

Vla: Yeah, but instrumental technique does not entirely lose touch with the non-musical gestures to which they are inevitably related.

T: Couldn’t have said that better myself. Now, one more thing: we’ve been saying that sometimes an analytical tool or concept will point out a sentient element potentially present in the music that the performer can then physically realize or embody. But won’t an analysis sometimes hit a stumbling block? Or, put in more positive terms, sometimes an analysis will seize not a definite state but rather on an ambiguity lurking in the score. So, we should not always look to
analysis to give us answers, but sometimes to pose stimulating questions. Can anyone think of a common example?

C: When we apply the *Urlinie* metaphor to a piece, doesn’t that often bring out a conflict or ambiguity between possible head-tones—♯ versus ♭?

T (jumping in): Yes. Now, as we’ve discussed, a musical ambiguity might be “unmarked”—just part and parcel of musical notation and how it necessarily harbors multiple possible meanings. Alternatively, the ambiguity can be “marked,” a palpable part of the musical narrative. Now, how do we handle ambiguity of the unmarked variety?

Vla: We make a choice! We play in a distinctive way, not assuming the music will “speak for itself”!

T: Naturally. And how do we handle ambiguity of the marked variety?

V2: It depends, doesn’t it? We can try to create a visceral sense of ambiguity by playing in a murky way, as Schoenberg suggested, right? Or we can approach it more intellectually, say, by playing the ambiguous passage, if it is repeated, in two different ways. That way, we allow the ambiguity to unfold gradually, retrospectively.

C: Or, when the music and analysis subsequently clarify the initial ambiguity, we might play that passage in light of how we know it will eventually be resolved.

T (jumping in): Musical ambiguity, and how it can be treated in performance, is a very complex matter, one best handled on a case-by-case basis. And the Beethoven Quartet will certainly give us ample opportunity to think more about this issue. Okay, that was a productive review. Let’s take a quick break and then dive in.
T: I trust you all understand the basic dimensions and procedures of sonata form, which this movement is in. And you are familiar enough with the piece that we can start analyzing it in detail, yes?

Quartet members nod.

T: Excellent. So, we will proceed more or less chronologically but jump around where appropriate. We will focus on form, motive, tonal structure, rhythm, and melodic expectation/realization. We will consider how these various parameters interact to yield sentient states as well as conflicts and ambiguities. Sound good?

Players nod.

T: To begin, does this piece remind you of any other by Beethoven in the same key, written at around the same time?

VI: The “Pathétique” Sonata?

T: Precisely, op. 13. Both were composed around 1800. Moreover, their opening tunes are remarkably similar, don’t you think? [See Ex. 3-1.] Both begin with a firm tonic, outline a 3rd, and then enunciate an accented dissonance resolving down by step. Both then sequence their respective opening ideas. Hey, as long as the opening of the “Pathétique” is basically in a four-part

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4 Op. 13 dates from 1798–99. The Quartet’s chronology is a bit more complicated—see Kerman (1966, 54–55) and Marliave (1925, 3). In what follows, I draw together several C-minor works, a key to which Beethoven was particularly drawn; see Tusa (1993). I also liberally draw upon Caplin’s (1998) theory of Classical form.
texture, why don’t you play it as if it were a string quartet? Read off the photocopies I made for you.

They do so.

T: Good, now play the opening of the C-minor Quartet in the same slow, grandiose, tragic style.

Example 3-1a: Beethoven, String Quartet in C minor, op. 18, no. 4, first movement: opening

They do so.

T: Does that do anything for you?
Vla: I think that’s a good exercise. Even though the Quartet is marked “Allegro ma non tanto” and so is faster than the Sonata’s opening, we might want to err on the side of the “ma non tanto” in order to bring out its relation to the “Pathétique.”

T: Interesting thought. But more important than the slow tempo in itself, and more important than conveying this possible intertextual connection,⁵ is imbuing the Quartet with weight, depth, and darkness (which you can do even within a relatively fast tempo) in order to underscore its potentially tragic element. Practicing the piece as if it were a slow movement, like the opening of the “Pathétique,” is merely one way to inculcate these qualities.

VI: By the way, isn’t there another, earlier C-minor piano sonata by Beethoven?

T: Yes, op. 10, no. 1.

T plays Ex. 3-2a.

T: How would you compare the form of the respective openings of these two C-minor piano sonatas?

Quartet contemplates.

Vla: Well, both are sentences, in that both have a basic idea, a sequence⁶ of that idea, and then a longer phrase. But the basic idea of op. 10, no. 1 is much more involved than that of op. 13. The former is comprised of two smaller, somewhat independent ideas, right?

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⁵ Stefano Mengozzi (unpublished) posits even more striking intertextual connections between the “Pathétique” and the previous piano sonata, op. 10, no. 3.

⁶ The sequences here are melodic, not harmonic. In op. 10, no. 1, the bass line weaves a stepwise ascending line, C–D–Es, through the basic idea and sequence. In op. 13, the bass is sequential—in the first measure
T: Yes, what Caplin calls a “compound basic idea.” And how would you compare the longer phrases, what he calls “continuation phrases”?

VI: They are similar in that both present a kind of microcosmic sentence. That is, each presents a module, a repetition of that module, and then a longer continuation. But these continuation phrases are also quite different.

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it outlines C–G, in the second A♭–E♭—but the harmonic progression itself is not. Both passages compose out the tonic, leading from I to I♭.
T: How so?

VI: The one in op. 10 is followed by a separate cadential phrase, starting in m. 17. The one in op. 13 is not.

T: What else?
C: The continuation in op. 10 almost has a new thematic idea, one much more lyrical than the basic idea.

Vla (jumping in): But they do share that two-note sigh figure.

C: True. The continuation provides more of a “home” for that Seufzer motive, ensconcing it in a longer stepwise line.

T: So, let me rephrase the similarities and differences between these two continuations. Both continuations are sentences in microcosm, which is very common. Continuations also always fragment their basic ideas, which both of these do: op. 10 shortens the 4-bar module of the basic idea to 2 bars; op. 13 shortens the basic module by about a beat, by repeating the jagged-rhythm motive prematurely. But we see a key difference as well: since the continuation in op. 10 presents a (partially) new idea, its fragmentation is mainly temporal, while in op. 13 the fragmentation is more obviously of the motivic variety.

V2: My roommate, Shaun, who is a pianist, is working on Beethoven’s C-minor Piano Concerto, whose opening is structured in a very similar way.

T: Indeed. The theme of the first movement, just like that of op. 10, no. 1, features a compound basic idea whose first module is an arpeggiation. And in each, the basic idea is

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7 The first theme of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 2, no. 1 is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this technique (and of sentences in general). However, as Janet Schmalfeldt pointed out to me (in a personal communication), sentential continuations are perhaps more common among 16-bar sentences.
followed by a more expansive, lyrical continuation that reduces the thematic module from 4 to 2 bars. (Casually) I know Shaun, by the way. What else is he playing these days?

V2: Let’s see, I think a Brahms Rhapsody, some etude by Liszt, and . . . oh yeah!—Beethoven’s op. 7 piano sonata.

T: Ah, I love that sonata. In fact, its opening (Ex. 3-3) is relevant to our discussion. Here Beethoven brilliantly foils our expectations: he sets up what seems like a clear-cut sentence, and then, come time for the continuation, he uses entirely different melodic material. Granted, like a continuation, it does create a sense of fragmentation and acceleration, increasing the harmonic rhythm considerably. Still, its melody is so unlike the opening that it is hard to hear it as part of the same sentence. So, it is very similar to op. 10 in its heroic, arpeggiated basic idea followed by more passive, lyrical material for the continuation. But in op. 10, as we saw, the seemingly new idea in the continuation was really linked to the opening by means of that sigh figure. In Op. 7, by contrast, I think we would be hard pressed to find any motivic connection to the opening.9

8 Mozart’s C minor Piano Sonata, K. 457, opens with a theme redolent of both Beethoven’s Op. 10, no. 1 and C-minor Piano Concerto. However one might describe the mood that C minor evoked in Classical composers, that mood clearly compelled them to devise similar sounding themes and to structure them in similar ways. Again, see Tusa (1993).

9 If the passage beginning in m. 5 is indeed a new sentence, what we had initially thought to be the presentation phrase (mm. 1–4) turns out to be, becomes, a kind of introductory fanfare. Following Schmalfeldt (2011), I use a block arrow (as shown in the example) to indicate the relationship of becoming, of one formal function transforming into another on the basis of what follows. I should clarify that, although the “Beethoven-Hegelian dialectic,” as Schmalfeldt calls it, is most closely associated with middle-period Beethoven (its paradigmatic instance is the first movement of the “Tempest” Sonata), it is by no
C: So, I’m seeing a kind of continuum regarding sentences with sentential continuations: we lead from the “Pathétique,” whose continuation phrase is motivically consistent with the presentation phrase; to op. 10, no. 1, whose continuation is motivically (only vaguely) similar to the presentation; to op. 7, whose continuation is entirely distinct from the presentation and thus possibly indicative of a new sentence [see Table 3-1]. So, where does our Quartet fall along this continuum [see Ex. 3-4]?

T: That’s exactly what I want to know.

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means foreign to early-period Beethoven (even, as Everett [2012] suggests, to Beethoven’s earliest experiments in sonata form, from his Bonn period), nor, for that matter, to Mozart and Haydn, as Schmalfeldt (2011) affirms.
C: Well, the continuation in m. 5 is clearly linked motivically to the basic idea, right? In fact, much like op. 10, no. 1, the continuation seizes on a short sigh motive from the basic idea.

V2: But the idea seems fairly new, what with that distinctive F–D gesture.

T: So perhaps we might say that the continuation is more novel than that of the “Pathétique” but not as novel as that of op. 7. I would say it is comparable to op. 10. And it is comparable not just in terms of formal design, but, as you point out, in terms of motivic content as well; in fact, both continuations emphasize a D–C sigh figure that harkens back to the opening material.

V1: Cool!

T (addressing C): So, the continuum you expertly devised makes the formal ambiguity of this passage very concrete—we can see that it falls precisely midway between motivically repetitious and motivically novel sentential continuations. You’ve rendered this ambiguity almost calculable—the passage is basically “equidistant” from either extreme.
C: This is all very interesting, but what exactly does it have to do with performance?

T: Well, I think our comparative analysisprovokes us to consider the degree to which we want to play up the novel elements of this phrase. How might we do that?

V1: Maybe sink into those distinctive downbeat figures of mm. 5 and 6?
T: Or, to be less literal about it, one might instill the continuation with a more general quality of novelty, playing it with a much different color.¹⁰

**Group tries it.**

T: And how, by contrast, would we bring out the motivic connection to the basic idea?

V2: Downplay the downbeat and instead go for the offbeat syncopation, give it a *sf* so we hear it as basically the same sigh figure as in mm. 2 and 4.

**Group tries it.**

T: So, of the two basic choices, which do you prefer?

V2: I like it the first way.

V1: Hmmm. I prefer it the second way.

T: Fair enough. We don’t need to agree this minute. What’s important is to use analysis to open up cogent options; equally important is to keep those options open. As we solidify other interpretive elements of this opening, and as we decide how we want to play what comes later, we will have more of a context by which to answer questions like these. If we decide now, lacking that context, our choice would be rather arbitrary, don’t you think?

Violinists nod. **C is flipping back and forth between the Quartet and opus 7.**

T (to C): Do you notice something else?

C: Yes: in each piece, there is an expansion in the continuation phrase.

¹⁰ The Cleveland Quartet (2011), of several ensembles I listened to, does this the most saliently and effectively, pulling back on m. 5 and playing that phrase more softly than the previous one.
T: Right, a common technique. In the Quartet the expansion is twofold: not only is the continuation repeated in modified form, but the repetition is itself elongated due to augmenting the Eb–D–C–B♭–C of mm. 7–8 over two full measures and a beat (mm. 11–13).

C: So, shall we try to make this gradual, multi-layered expansion tangible?

Group plays mm. 11–13, with not just a crescendo but also an allargando.

T: What do you think?

V1: Well, if nothing else, this analysis helps me to understand the impetus behind Beethoven’s crescendo of measures 11–13. It isn’t just about getting louder for the sake of getting louder, but about creating a sense of emergence and expansiveness.

T: Yes. While crescendi and similar markings entail a wide range of possible executions, that range shrinks considerably when one surmises the structural motivation for a marking, or the structural effect that marking can create. And I would add that the expansiveness here serves to create a sense of arrival on C⁵ and the I chord in m. 13. That arrival has a lot to do with completing a ⁵th-progression, as we can see from our voice-leading analysis [Appendix C]. We’ll have more to say about that sense of resolution in a moment, but first let us reflect on our analysis thus far, which has led both to a question and to an opportunity for embodiment. The question is whether the continuation starting in m. 5 should be played more as a new thematic idea or a modification of a previous one; the embodiment has to do with the increasing expansiveness as the phrase comes to a close. Neither entails one fixed way of playing: the former yields a basic binary choice, with each choice allowing for various realizations; the latter yields a singular image that, however, can likewise be realized in a multitude of ways.
T: Where we left off, the cadence of the first tonal/thematic area arrived with a fifth-progression into $\hat{1}$. As our voice-leading graph [Appendix C] shows, that progression serves to compose-out the Kopfton $\hat{5}$ (G). The latter is reached via an initial ascent (Anstieg). The long period of time and wide range we traverse en route to that Kopfton opens up a considerable space in which to establish crucial motives, as outlined in Ex. 3-4. Heck, even the anacrusis-to-downbeat figure is significant in being the first in a chain of increasingly wide leaps: a P4, M6, d7, and finally a PO in m. 10. The only deviation from this progression is the d5 in m. 6. Whereas this leap was modest enough to be completely filled, the octave leap in m. 10 is too large to be completely filled within this section (even though the section is accommodating enough to stretch an extra bar). Because the F6 is not resolved to its lower octave, it is open-ended and must lead to something else; and indeed, it is picked up by the G6 in m. 17.11

C: I wonder if there is some correlation between the increasing size of the leap motive and the acceleration in my part.

T: What do you mean?

V1: Well, where the figure expands to a sixth in m. 5, I have low Cs at the beginning of two consecutive bars, whereas before I had them every other bar.

T: Right, which served to establish a two-bar hypermeter, with a rhythmic accent on the second hyperbeat, due to the sforzando on each second bar.

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11 To be clear, the two pitches partake not of a strict voice-leading connection but of an implicative one based on registral conspicuity.
VI: And starting in m. 5, maybe the cello no longer has that hyperaccent because the syncopation is taken over by the upper strings [Ex. 3-5].

![Example 3-5: Beethoven, mm. 1-6: rhythmic analysis](image)

T: Yes! In fact, that syncopated D leading to C, as we said before, is reminiscent of m. 2. So it is as if m. 5 compresses the entirety of bars 1–2, which adds to the sense of acceleration, or intensification. Hence, at that one crucial moment, bars 5–6, we get intervalic expansion, accelerated bass motion, and both metric and modular compression.

C: Maybe I will accelerate slightly in m. 5 to exemplify the acceleration made clear by our analysis.

VI: And maybe, at the same time, I will backphrase\(^\text{12}\) into the D to express the expanded interval. Also, maybe I will crescendo into the D but pull back on the diminished fifth in m. 6.

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\(^{12}\)“Backphrasing” is a term commonly used by theater singers to denote pulling back the tempo on their melodic line while the accompaniment maintains a steady tempo. It is roughly equivalent to what Sandra Rosenblum (1988, 362–92) calls “contrametric rubato,” a form of rubato that (as I explained in the
since that is a more constrained interval that is immediately filled in. Then I’ll ratchet up the
tension on the ultra-dissonant diminished 7th in m. 9 and climax on the octave, pulling back on
the downbeat of m. 11 in order to have room to crescendo into the arrival point.

V2: And by exclaiming the octave, pulling back, and then crescendoing, you embody the
sense, or create an image, of opening a space that you proceed to fill.

T: Good thinking, all. I have just one more question about this opening. What do you
make of the somewhat unusual chromaticisms [Ex. 3-4]? I am referring both to the chromatic
voice exchanges (cross relations) in m. 7 between the second violin and cello and also to the
diminished fourth (E♭–B♭) linearly outlined by the first violin in m. 7 and then condensed by the
cello in the next measure.

C: I don’t know what the larger significance of the E♭–B is, but at least for the moment I
can try to hear and play my figure in m. 8 as a quasi-imitation of the first violin’s in m. 7.

V1 (to C): And that cello figure also engages with the part I play over it, as they form a voice
exchange.

T: Which is key, since the “transfer” of the cello’s E♭ up to your third beat is what keeps
the phrase open tonally—it creates sort of an imperfect authentic cadence. This precipitates a
modified repetition of the phrase that will lead to a perfect authentic cadence. And what of the
crunchy chromatic voice exchanges between cello and second violin in m. 7?

V2: Maybe they too keep the phrase open, since those voice exchanges defer the cadential
F♯–G, supporting a predominant and dominant, until the last moment. Compare that to m. 12:

Introduction) both Mozart and later Chopin advocated for solo piano music, wherein the right hand is
temporally free while the left hand keeps strict tempo, resulting in the hands being out of sync.
there the F♯ occurs right on the downbeat such that the cadential dominant can now occur on a relatively strong beat (beat 3).

T: Good. Now, I don’t think we need to be overly fussy about prescribing dynamic shadings for all these figures we’ve been discussing. I know that if you are listening for them, you will hear their interplay, their structural functions, their characters. In fact, I would say that goes for almost everything we have discussed and will discuss. The aim is less to map out the precise dynamic and temporal shadings in advance than simply to think through the musical relationships as you play. Then those variances will more or less happen of their own accord.

Vla: Doesn’t that go against what you have been saying, about using analysis for a visceral rather than an intellectual experience?

T: No, because thinking about these theoretical items ultimately serves to create sensuous shadings, and will hopefully do so in a more integrated, natural way than if you were going for the shadings directly. Take this analogy with acting. The famous acting teacher Stanislavski advised his students not to aim directly for the particular emotional state they want to achieve, because doing so will make the emotions seem forced and caricatured. Rather, he admonished his charges simply to stay attuned to the thought processes of the character, and to his situation and environment, because if the actor is immersed enough in those tangibles, the emotional result will produce itself.¹³ Just so, if our goal is to play with a wealth of dynamic and temporal color (which will in turn paint emotional pictures), we should focus on the tangibles of our analytic thought process, such that those variances will arise in an unforced way. Does that make sense?

Quartet nods tentatively.

¹³ Stanislavski (1935).
T: Okay, play through the passage in slow motion so that you have time to think about and hear everything that is going on. And just respond to those thoughts and perceptions in whatever way seems natural.

Quartet plays, sounding something like Ex. 3-6.

T: Promising start. Okay, I think we’ve done enough for today. See you next time.
SESSION 2: EXPOSITION, TRANSITION

T: What strikes you about the beginning of this transition section?

Quartet contemplates.

Vla: It seems unusually insistent regarding the tonic. After all, don’t many expositions prefer to leave the first TT area harmonically open, saving the big cadence for the second key area?

T: For the moment of “essential expositional closure,” yes. This moment shows Beethoven’s tendency, one many scholars have observed, to “overemphasize” the tonic and dominant chords—Tovey called this the “tonic and dominant swing.” But Beethoven tends to do this in codas. To do so in the transition is a bit unusual for him. I mean, it is one thing to end the first tonal area with a perfect authentic cadence, as he does in op. 10, no. 1, for instance; it is another to harp on a cadential progression, as he does here. So, what do you make of this?

V2: Well, I’ve noticed that when composers do something formally or stylistically anomalous, it is often to make that moment stand out.

T: Stand out how? For what purpose?

V2: To express or represent something particular.

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14 Rather than choose between “tonal area” and “thematic area”—between essentially an eighteenth-century sonata-form paradigm and a nineteenth-century one—I adopt both; hence “tonal-thematic” (or “TT”) area. I do so because I think the two primary expositional modules are typically distinguished both tonally and thematically. Put programmatically, the sense of conflicting personae in a sonata derives from both tonal and thematic contrast.


16 Tovey (1945, 111).
T: I concur. So, what might this moment be expressing? Can you weave a narrative thread leading to this point?

V2 is at a loss.

C: How about this: the opening theme is about angst, what with the minor mode, the motoric drive, the $\hat{6} - \hat{5}$ motives accented with sforzandi, the angular syncopations, the diminished intervals, and the increasing intensity deriving from intervalic and corresponding phrasal expansion.

T: Very Sturm und Drang.

C: Right. So, maybe this cadence is sort of emotional overcompensation—a drastic attempt to reign in the emotional overflow of the previous section.

T: I think “overflow” is an apt metaphor, given the expansions you mentioned—the first thematic section is positively busting at the seams. So, your point is that the cadential figures are emotionally suppressed by comparison?

C: I think so. But then, look!—that octave idea returns in m. 17, reaching up to the $G^6$ that you said picks up the $F^6$ of the previous section [Ex. 3-7].
VI (interjecting): And that previous passage (mm. 9–13) is now intensified in mm. 17 ff., not only by the higher apex but also by the string of 4–3 suspensions. And they spill into or overlap with the cadential dominant in m. 19, just as the previous passage overlapped with the cadential tonic in m. 13.

T: Right, but the key difference is that now the octave is completely filled in, which is maybe our golden ticket—it allows us to advance in the formal scheme. We can now pass beyond the tonic area and proceed to the preparatory dominant and medial caesura\(^\text{17}\) (more on which next session).

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\(^{17}\) Hepokoski/Darcy (2006, 23–50).
V1: Question: given that mm. 10–13, and mm. 17–20, are so similar, and that G⁶ picks up F⁶’s thread, maybe what we thought to be an unusually decisive cadential gesture (mm. 13 ff.) is actually more an interpolation. Maybe the cadential emphasis is nothing but posturing!

T: Interesting point. And I might note yet a third possibility: given that this section turns out to be sentential (basic idea, mm. 13–14; sequence, mm. 15–16; continuation, mm. 17–20), perhaps this is a transitional theme. Let’s step back and consider our three formal possibilities, which create a rich ambiguity. The ostensibly new section starting in m. 13 initially appears to be the cadential phrase of the previous sentence. Yet, upon the sequential repetition of mm. 13–14 in the following two measures, we retrospectively realize this to be a sentence, and thus possibly a new theme—a transitional one, perhaps. But then Beethoven pulls a stunt with the continuation phrase, as he is wont to do: the continuation is a reprise of the previous section. As Schmalfeldt might have it, the passage beginning in m. 13 is a cadential phrase to the previous sentence becoming (upon the sequence in m. 15) a new sentential transitional theme becoming (upon the repetition of previous material in m. 17) an interpolation within a transition section that retrospectively begins at m. 9 [Ex. 3-8].

V2: So, this is one of those narrative ambiguities, right? The ambiguity, in Adorno’s terms, is not mensural but mimetic.

T: Well put. So, we want to play up this ambiguity somehow, and not assume, as Janet Levy and Leonard Meyer seem to, that doing “nothing” will somehow convey the ambiguity, or the coming-into-being of multiple formal functions. Any idea of how we might do that?

C: Play mm. 13–14 as a resolute cadential gesture, with broad bow strokes. Then, when the sequence arrives, come back dynamically. Since themes tend to be internally differentiated,
playing mm. 13–16 with dynamic differentiation will imbue this section with a thematic quality.\(^{18}\) (Also the softer dynamic will exemplify the sequence, the repetition of the module on the dominant, which in turn will exemplify the sentential and thus thematic nature of mm. 13–16). That will give us the opportunity to reenergize that ff in m. 16, which will convey the sense of picking up where we left off in m. 13. Playing m. 17 ff. with a burst of vitality greater than that of mm. 13–14 will make mm. 13–16, in retrospect, seem like an interpolation.\(^{19}\)

*Group tries it (Ex. 3-8).*

\(^{18}\) To expand upon the cellist’s point: It is commonly assumed that main themes are in general rhythmically stable and texturally homogenous whereas transitions are rhythmically unstable and texturally heterogeneous. Yet, as Caplin reminds us, precisely the opposite often obtains: “a good number of main themes feature discontinuities in durational patterning [and] marked contrasts in textural disposition,” while “transitions tend to feature continuity of durational patterning [and] uniformity of textural combinations” (2010, sec. 9). Taking Caplin’s clarification to heart, I might proffer a performative analogy: to play with greater-than-usual differentiation is in some sense to play “thematically”—is to imbue whatever passage we play (whether, properly speaking, it is thematic or not) with a modicum of thematicity. Conversely, to play with minimal differentiation is to imbue a passage with a transitional quality. Our players appear to grasp this principle intuitively.

\(^{19}\) Schmalfeldt (2011) devotes a brief but illuminating chapter (Chapter 5) to the performance of formal becoming.
T: That’s good. In your rendition, the ff in m. 17 has a distinct meaning from the ff in m. 13: it helps us resume the action, advance the plot, move forward. Now the ff into m. 17 is not redundant; it has a different quality from the previous ff. We see here how not all ffs (or ps, pps, or whatever) are created equal, and Beethoven is implying as much by writing two of them in consecutive passages, with no intervening dynamic. This notational anomaly puts you interpreters on the hot seat, demanding that you grapple with its possible meanings and, presumably, that you find a way to differentiate them.
C: So, how does this part of the story end?

T: Well, what do you take the reiteration and compression in mm. 20–24 of the G-octave coupling to express?

Vla: Perhaps quiet reassurance?

V1: Until, that is, the second beat of m. 24, where I play a rather angsty figure, what with the impatient offbeat accents and those diminished 7ths.

T: Positively. And, incidentally, your syncopation (the D) adds yet another rhythmic stratum to our series of syncopations, bringing that series to a head [Ex. 3-9]. The structural dynamic mm. 20–25 is rather multilayered. For on the one hand, we are just sort of playing out what is arguably the climactic event of the entire piece thus far: the G–G fill (mm. 17–20)—we’re just spinning our wheels. On the other, the entire section comes full circle, with the repeated cello notes—not to mention, the addition of the appoggiatura A to the first violin’s G scale.
strategically recalls the accented dissonances of the opening: A–G of m. 22 recalls D–C of m. 2 [Ex. 3-10]. So, try playing the passage as a mere echo of what just occurred, such that m. 24 is a sudden, unexpected burst of energy; then try playing this passage as a more substantive, reassuring return, leading into m. 24.

Quartet does so; the second way yields a more directed line on the descending scale, a bit of a crescendo into m. 24.

T: You don’t sound convinced yet either way. Okay, let’s put a pin in that. By the way (speaking to C), why do you think you now play octave-shifts in four consecutive measures, whereas before you only got to do it in two, mm. 5–6?
C (after some thought): Maybe because it summarizes and reiterates that G–G octave coupling of the first violin.

T: Nice. And that insight might compel you to play those notes somewhat melodically, with a touch of *legato* perhaps?

C: Perhaps.

V1: In which case the G–G at my entrance might actually sound like an imitation of the cello’s [Ex. 3-10]!
T: Which suggests that, in retrospect, the octave shifts of the cello, from the very opening bar, were always potentially thematic, an impetus to the octave-leap idea that gradually emerges in the first violin! Okay, put this section together and I’ll return in a few minutes.

* * *

T: May I ask you to identify the main second theme of this movement?

Vla and C speak simultaneously.

Vla: M. 26.

C: M. 34 (pickup).

T: Okay, each state your case.

Vla: The principal secondary theme (ST¹) begins in m. 26; a subsidiary secondary theme (ST²) begins pickup to m. 34. I base this on the pregnant pause in m. 25, which by convention delineates the end of the first TT area and the onset of the second [see Ex. 3-11].

T: I can see that. And that the preparatory dominant is of C rather than of the relative major poses no problem. The G major dominant connects to Eb by 3rd. Beethoven began to experiment with 3rd-relationships in sonata form, a trait Schubert and Brahms enthusiastically adopted. In the Piano Sonata in F, op. 10, no. 2, to take another instance, his preparatory dominant is of A minor (!)—that is, it is an E major chord, which then connects to the secondary key of C by 3rd. (We don’t get that promised A minor until the beginning of the development, and even there it is stated rather equivocally.) An alternate perspective is that the dominant in both cases is backrelating—that it has no syntactical connection to the next chord. Such back-relation enhances the effect of a medial caesura—it creates a greater sense of separation between the first
and second TT areas, a greater sense of formal fragmentation within the exposition (fragmentation being another Romantic feature, along with 3rd-relatedness, to which Beethoven was one of the first to give voice). Now (speaking to C), state your case.

C: Well, you’ve been saying that starting in m. 26 we get the relative major, but is that really true? It seems to me that Beethoven uses the initial Es chord as a springboard for As—the local tonic is really a V/(IV (just as at the beginnings of the First Symphony and the “Pastoral” Sonata). And then the passage is sequenced, further undermining the supposed Es tonic. Not to mention, the theme itself is rather insubstantial and fragmentary—not what I would associate with a traditional second theme. However, in m. 34 Beethoven commits to both a stable key area, the relative major, and a stable theme, with a tight-knit, sentential construction.

T: Beethoven is generally fond of creating ambiguity at the second thematic zone. He does so here, as you have observed, by supplying a medial caesura but also a theme and key area that are both unstable in some sense. So the crucial question, for our purposes, is, how would you play

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20 Beethoven follows an almost identical procedure in op. 10, no. 1, first movement: a medial caesura articulates the onset of a theme that is very fragmentary and sequential and whose key center is unstable—as in the Quartet, he no sooner touches on the relative major than converts it into a V of IV. Clearly, in ops. 10, no. 1 and 18, no. 4, written in close proximity and in the same key, Beethoven was experimenting with similar techniques. His interest in playing with the rhetorical possibilities of medial caesurae, however, can be traced back to his earliest work, dating from the Bonn period, as Everett (2012) has shown.

21 On the distinction between tight-knit and loose-knit formal constructions, see Caplin (1998, 17).

22 Elsewhere, he tends to favor the latter, tonal procedure. Two examples are the first movements of the Piano Sonata in C, op. 2, no. 3 and of the Eighth Symphony. In the sonata, the first second theme is thematically substantial and characteristically lyrical but is in G minor rather than G major (cf. op. 13, first
the passage starting in m. 26 as if it were the “primary” secondary theme? The same question goes for m. 34.\footnote{23}

Quartet experiments, playing the earlier passage with more tone, more line, and less staccato when treating it as the primary second theme.\footnote{24} In this rendering, the players become aware of tiny motivic cells passed off between cello and first violin, as shown in Ex. 3-11.

T: Now, another factor to consider in cases of musical ambiguity is, does the score itself have anything to say about the ambiguity? To find out, we might look ahead to the recapitulation. What do you notice?

Vla: I don’t see the “first” second theme at all. We go straight from the cadential passage to the “second” second theme.

\footnote{23} It is possible that the passage at m. 26 is retrospectively (upon the arrival of m. 34) the second part of a two-part transition, but given the impact of the medial caesura, I think it is more suggestive for performance to imagine the ambiguity pivoting on whether this passage represents a “false” versus “real” second theme.

\footnote{24} Extending the length of the medial caesura, as the Fry String Quartet (2011) does considerably, enhances the thematic effect of this passage—it makes it sound more like a bona fide second theme.
C: Does that mean the theme at m. 26 was in a sense illusory to begin with? Or does that mean it begins as “real” and is subsequently exposed as illusory? In the first case, we would play it insubstantially; in the second case, substantially.

T: That is the sixty-thousand-dollar question in cases like these. Broadly stated, does the subsequent resolution of an initial ambiguity indicate to the performer that the ambiguity is itself

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Example 3-11: mm. 24–38: double voice exchanges

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*= 3rd-mot.

= double-voice-exchange tones
illusory—that she should apply her retrospective awareness to it and render it in light of what she
knows to come later? Or does the subsequent clarification form an essential part of the narrative
structure of the composition? In which case, the performer would approach the ambiguity as a
“first-time” listener rather than a “second-time” listener.  

V2: Is there necessarily a right answer to this question? Or does it depend on context?

T: Oh, I think the latter, for sure. So, what do you think here?

V2: Well, to me, the initial secondary theme is so obviously loose and un-thematic to begin
with that I think it would be convincing to telegraph its insubstantial nature from the start, rather
than wait for the recapitulation to tell us.

T: We can put a pin in that as well. What’s important for now is that you are asking all the
right questions. Now, go rest.

Session 3: Exposition, Second Theme

T: So far, we’ve encountered two significant formal ambiguities, am I right? They regard
the formal status of the passages starting at mm. 13 and 26. Beethoven’s formal inventiveness and
innovation has drawn us in as listener-performers, implicating us, begging our involvement. And
the analytical tools we’ve used—primarily our arsenal of formal prototypes—have focused a
spotlight on these implicative features. As we learned from Rosen (see Chapter 1), such prototypes
are fictions, false generalizations. But unlike Rosen—who, I suspect, is concerned more with
“truth” than with interpretation—we don’t necessarily view these fictions as deleterious. Quite the
contrary: like the Ursatz, they are backdrops against which the peculiarities and ambiguities of

25 See Cone’s (1977) typology of the three kinds of listener.
particular pieces stand out, and that, again, compel us interpreters to grapple with various interpretive dilemmas, in the process weaving us into the very fabric of the musical work.

V2: So, for example, there isn’t necessarily one “true” second theme. But applying the template in which there is can elicit fuller engagement, can open our minds to different interpretive options.

T: Exactly. The score presents a possible scenario by which there is a competitive encounter between two second themes—it contains the seed of this imagining, or the material trace onto which this scenario can be reasonably imposed. The formal template is a kind of additional fictive layer, a fictional world in which it is true that a sonata form has only one “proper” second theme (that is, only two primary, diametrically opposed themes). The analytical fiction that there is only one real second theme brings out the fiction implied in the score that two secondary themes are competing for primacy. The theoretical fiction enhances the fictionality of the work, it concretizes this potential. Am I making myself clear? Perhaps someone else can restate this crucial point, so I know you understand it?

V1: I volunteer. We imagine it to be true that there is only one real second theme, and imagining this necessitates more rigorous interpretive involvement than if we just took Beethoven’s music at face value, devoid of theoretical reflection—it we took the piece to have two second themes that are equally secure ontologically.

T: Well put.

C: It’s interesting, by the way, that both ambiguities seem related thematically, conceptually.

T: How so?
C: Both have to do with Beethoven setting up the expectation of a sentence and then problematizing it somehow.

VI: Yes, in the passage beginning m. 13, what we expect to be the continuation phrase of the sentence becomes a reprise of what occurred just prior to the sentence. In the passage beginning m. 26, what we expect to be the continuation phrase (starting pickup to m. 33) turns out to be a new sentence, a completely new thematic idea [Ex. 3-12].
T: Excellent. Such a “thematic” connection among these instances of ambiguity is, in fact, a kind of musical theme in its own right. But instead of an idea in music, it is an idea about music, one arising from the collision of musical potentiality and theoretical reflection. I have dubbed
such meta-musical motives “conceptual motives,” akin to Schoenberg’s “Idea.” Now, does Beethoven problematize this sentence, mm. 34–41?

V2: I don’t think so—seems pretty straightforward.

T: Very. In fact, it is the most stable, most tight-knit entity thus far. Moreover, this sentence and its varied restatement comprise the antecedent and consequent phrases of a larger period, the consequent being extended . . .

C: By standing on the dominant of the relative major . . .

V1: Which is significant because this is the first real dominant preparation of the second tonal area, for mm. 19–25 stood on the dominant of the home key, not that of the relative major.

T: Right. Which lends the closing theme starting in m. 53 a quality of arrival and stability, yes? So, after the tumult, anxiety, and confusion of our opening 33 or so bars, we are gradually coming into the clear: first with a main second theme that is structurally stable, then with a closing theme that is tonally stable (because of the preparatory dominant, which the main second theme lacked). So, this marks a (temporary) respite from ambiguity. So, does that leave us nothing to do as interpreters?

C: Certainly not! We somehow have to embody the sense of arrival, respite, resolution, stability, whatever. The only agitation will come with the harmonic extension, mm. 49–52, but that quickly gives way to, and makes possible, the tonally stable closing theme.

Quartet plays.

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26 For more on conceptual motives generally, and on the similarities and differences between this notion and Schoenberg’s Idea in particular, see Swinkin (2012).
T: Good, that analysis at least covers the overall tone and mood. It is fruitful to establish a context, as we have done, in order to delimit a dynamic and temporal range, one to which the smaller details will be relative. Now let’s get into more detail. Is this theme at m. 34 entirely new?

V1: I see what you’re getting at. It derives from that ascending 6th-figure in m. 5 [Ex. 3-13].

C: Or more precisely, from that figure in its intervalically expanded and rhythmically extended form, mm. 10 ff., since the figure in the second theme continues down by two steps, not just one as in m. 5.

T: Although, even in mm. 5–6, one could say two downward steps were “waiting to happen”—D–C–B♭. There, Beethoven avoided or downplayed the syntactical connection between the C and B♭ by means of a motive-repetition and slur break. Now, in the second theme, he actualizes that foiled implication, and does so by taking the lead of mm. 10–11. In other words, the second theme is a kind of synthesis of two previous forms of the 6th-motive. And this connection is made crystal clear in the continuation phrase (mm. 38–41), which replicates the syncope chain of mm. 17 ff. (I can’t help but wonder, by the way, whether the violin’s D–C–B♭ in m. 12 foreshadows this integrative act; what would it be like to play it that way?) An interesting byproduct of this synthesis is that the tune spells out the 3rd-motive, which also connects it to the beginning of the opening theme, a connection Beethoven makes audible by placing an accented dissonance in the second bar. Hence, not only does Beethoven synthesize two different variants of the leap motive but also two different components of the opening theme. Put another way, he reveals the underlying similarity between those two parts (between mm. 1–4 and 5–8).

V2: So, would you say Beethoven is practicing the technique of developing variation here?
T: Absolutely. This, I think, is one of his crucial innovations in sonata procedure. As Dahlhaus has talked about, earlier classicists like Mozart were more inclined to build large, symmetrical structures in their sonatas, which meant they often had to rely on stock material, especially at cadences, to fill out a phrase, to create symmetrical proportions. Beethoven, by contrast, relied less on this “architectonic” conception and more on a thematic one—he typically generates a sonata movement by means of a particular thematic argument, such that, in fact, otherwise external conventions come across as byproducts of motivic processes unique to that
piece. He builds his sonatas from the *inside out*, as it were. As a result, very little material is conventional.

C: I see what you mean about how Beethoven managed to render otherwise generic material specific to the piece at hand. Take the cadential swing at m. 13, for example. It has a thematic quality because it comes out of the B♭–C of the previous bar—this is motivic linkage, right? [See Ex. 3-7.] And this thematic quality is affirmed when that passage gradually becomes a sentence (the sentence being a form themes commonly assume). And because this lick is written in a quasi-thematic way, Beethoven sets up the opportunity to render big cadences, as in mm. 73–74 and two bars later, thematically specific, not just generic!

T: Very perspicacious. Put another way, the piece—as seen through the lens of developing-variation theory—directs us to imagine that the cadences are not generic but particular to this piece.28

Vla (slightly annoyed): This has been a stimulating digression, but I’m losing track of how all this relates to how we should play the second theme.

T: Fair enough. I’m not sure we’ve added anything new in that respect. I think our knowledge of the synthesizing function of the theme simply lends more support for that reassuring, resolving mood on which we had already settled. Then again, maybe every difference

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28 On Beethoven’s propensity to individualize conventions, such that they seem to arise from the exigencies of a particular piece, see Burnham (1995, 29–65). Also, as Kerman memorably put it, Beethoven “was eminently capable of dignifying cliché into aesthetic bullion” (1966, 67)—although he grouses that in the C minor Quartet, Beethoven did not!
makes a difference—every new bit of information, every new structural motivation, will lead to a slightly different interpretive result. How it does, I cannot necessarily codify. All I can do is don my Stanislavski hat and say, “think as hard as you can. As for the result, it will produce itself.”

As he would tell his students, think about what the action is. This second theme—within the fictional world lying at the intersection of the piece and our theoretical systems—explicates, clarifies, resolves, synthesizes. The piece here has really found a home, albeit temporarily. Don’t try to express any these items directly, merely think of them as you play and see what happens.

* Quartet tries.

T: Okay, in time, you will have more opportunity to synthesize all these insights. Let’s take a break and then get into subtler aspects of this warm theme.

* * *

V1: Earlier, someone mentioned that my C–B in m. 12 provides a link into the section beginning m. 13. By the same token, I wonder if the viola lick in m. 33 is the impetus for my counter-figures in mm. 35, 37, and 41.

T: Good question. But rather than frame the issue as a factual one (“is the viola’s figure the impetus for mine?”), I would trust that the very impulse to ask that question betokens a potentiality. So ask, “how might I play my figures so as to actualize that potentiality?”

V1: Yes, how would I? Maybe I would shape each with a comparable degree of crescendo to how the viola plays it.

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29 Stanislavski (1935, 43).
Vla: Or maybe shape each figure more than the one before, since, to my ears at least, they show increasing affinity with my lead-in figure. (Thinks silently: “I will help out my colleague by slightly accenting my initial A♯ in m. 33 so that the rhythmic relation of her figure to mine will be really clear.”)

T: Notice, by the way, that m. 37 has the turn-motive from m. 1, inverted and augmented [Ex. 3-14].

V2: And that connection is made crystal clear by following right on the heels of my turn.

V1: Since mine is augmented, perhaps I can exemplify that by stretching it out a bit, backphrasing.

C: Wow, this second theme really doesn’t let a single morsel of the first theme go to waste, does it? It uses the motives of the 3rd, 6th, and turn.

V2 thinks: “In fact, my part is like a microcosm of the first theme all in itself, but it reverses the sequence of real events, almost as in a dream—within the first two bars, first comes the 6th-motive, then the turn-motive; the 3rd-motive falls into place gradually. I can abstract from that idea an image schema of reversal or regression, which I could perhaps embody with a decrescendo, mm. 34–35. I never hear it played that way, so I’m almost afraid to suggest it out loud. One would usually be urged to treat E♯, the focal dissonance of the basic idea, as the point of arrival; here, I would taper it instead. Also, one is usually urged to bring out the melody when it is in an inner voice, and with the decrescendi I am considering, the theme might not come out enough for some people’s taste. But having the courage to defy conventional
wisdom might just result in exposing a new sentient dimension of this passage, one distilled from structural awareness. I’ll try it next time we play it. Also, it will help keep my dynamic down so that I can then really come out starting in m. 38, which is where a significant portion of my theme’s origin is revealed. It will also enable me to delineate, crescendo on, the successive G–A♭–B♭, mm. 34, 36, and 38 [Ex. 3-14]. Hey . . .”

V2 (rejoining conversation): “Hey, I just noticed that my descending third, G–F–E♭, which is a slower version of the initial 3rd-motive in the first two measures, is itself shadowed by a slower, ascending third, G–A♭–B♭, over the course of the phrase.

C thinks: “Wait, my Eb–D♭–C in m. 26 [Ex. 3-11] is this same 3rd-motive. This idea is supported by the fact that those notes replicate, in chromatically altered form (due to the tonicization of A♭), the pitches of the original 3rd-motive. So, I should play that figure somewhat melodically not just because the first violinist
imitates it, but because it is motivically significant in the grand scheme. And it does not just recall the opening but it also prepares for the descending third of the second theme (which—oh I see now—is even more immediately presaged by the first violinist’s F–E♭–D, mm. 32–33. And what’s more, there is a pattern to all these third motives!—a slower ascending third of E♭–F–G [Ex. 3-15], which supports the idea that the “real” second theme arrives in m. 34. The connection between this rising third and the second theme is clinched by the fact that the rising third E♭–F–G leading into the second theme is reiterated in that theme itself—the theme retrogrades it, at pitch, in its first two bars (34–35).

Example 3-15: ascending 3rd leading into second theme

T: What might this suggest for performance?

V2: Well, this phrase is all about slowness, expansiveness—in relation to the first phrase of the piece (it augments its 3rd-motion) and even in the relation among parts within this theme (the rising 3rd, mm. 34–38, augments the initial descending 3rd, mm. 34–35). So, might we actually choose a slightly slower tempo for this theme to exemplify that? Would that be okay with everybody?
Quartet tries it.

C: The question is, where would we resume the original tempo? I can’t help but feel it should happen when I reenter the picture in m. 39. Between the slower tempo and my absence, it will be as if the theme to the point at which I enter is a kind of interpolation, an alternate realm, and my job is to help restore reality. And that makes sense, because in the consequent phrase, the top three strings resound the theme in a quasi-chorale texture, which connotes an intersubjective, communal realm, over against the solipsistic individualism of the previous phrase. (This texture, by the way, no doubt recalls that of mm. 5 ff., and that helps elucidate the derivation of the second theme from the latter part of the first.)

T: Does playing the antecedent phrase “solipsistically” fly in the face of treating the theme as a more solid, affirmative arrival? Or can we have it both ways?

Vla: Sure, why not? An actor might feel several emotions simultaneously, on different levels of consciousness, with maybe one emotion being more at the fore. Perhaps the primary sense here is arrival and affirmation, but the secondary one is ethereality? What would it be like to play it with these apparently contradictory qualities in mind? Can we try it?

T: You can. But one thing I know: the more complex and multilayered the sentient state you desire to musically embody, the less you can “try” to do it, the less you can plan it. The more you just need to let it marinate, seep into your psyche, and then, when you come back to it, the complex, ambivalent state might just happen naturally, if you’re lucky.

SESSION 4: END OF EXPOSITION

VI: I think I know why the theme starting in m. 53 has a kind of summational quality!
T: Tell me.

VI: My initial two pitches, G–B₃, compactly summarize the second theme, which traces G–A♭–B₃. And that line is made more explicit when my gap is filled in, mm. 53–54, with B₃–A♭–G [Ex. 3-16].

Example 3-16: derivation and features of closing theme

(a) second theme

(b) closing theme (starts m. 53)

T: Yes, and many other features from both main themes return in disguised form as well.

Namely?
V2: The syncopation-motive?

T: Yes.

Vla: The $\hat{6} - \hat{5}$ ($A_\flat - G$) neighbor motive, I think. True, $A_\flat - G$, mm. 54-55, is possibly encompassed by the larger third motion, $B_\flat - A_\flat - G$. Then again, the $A_\flat$ and $G$ are rhythmically grouped together. Also, we get into that theme by way of a large $A_\flat - G$ neighbor motion; the high, accented $A_\flat^3$ really makes that clear [Ex. 3-16].

T: Well, at the very least you point up an interesting ambiguity between the 3rd- and neighbor-motives—one I don’t think we’ve encountered before in this piece. Which perhaps lends this section an air of novelty.

C: Notice, by the way, that I play the $B_\flat - A_\flat - G$ figure in chromaticized form in m. 59. Once again, however, there is ambiguity, for the rhythmic grouping, the proximity of $A_\flat$ and $G$, might easily delineate a neighbor-motive within the 3rd-motive, especially if I lean a bit on the $A_\flat$.

T: And we can hear the cello figure as augmenting the chromaticized 3rd-motive leading into the theme, m. 53 [see bracket in Ex. 3-16]. Holding back on the cello figure a bit, backphrasing, might help exemplify that augmentation. And bringing it out above the other parts can signal a narrative crux—that you are undermining at this moment the rustic joviality of the theme. (This theme is “rustically jovial,” I think, due both to the texture—the most homophonic and homorhythmic of the piece thus far—and to the diatonic simplicity.) Robert Hatten calls this
undermining trope “undercutting,” and it is generally created by precisely such a chromatic slide in the bass at a cadence.

C: And the sense of the rug being pulled out from under us is made even more tangible by the crescendo leading to a subito piano, mm. 59–601.

V2: And isn’t that tension even anticipated in the previous bar (m. 58)?

T: Why?

V2: Well, it starts to inject chromaticism into the otherwise purely diatonic theme—in my part, in fact.

V1 thinks: “That E♯–F motive is echoed in mine” [Ex. 3-16].

V2: We also get a “premature” sf bar. Something is definitely brewing here.

T: Also, mm. 57–58 seem to initiate a “5–6” sequence that is then curbed by the cello’s (and second violin’s) chromatic slide. (T plays Ex. 3-17b; notice the relation of this sequence to the more prototypical 5–6 Root sequence, shown in Ex. 3-17a). Also, notice how the sequential harmonies are unevenly distributed, the last two really squeezed in there. This adds to the sense of acceleration. So, let’s try mm. 49–60 a few times and see what we have so far.

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30 Hatten discerns instances of this trope in Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 101, first movement (1994, 99–100).
As the Quartet does so, details begin to take shape, as shown in Ex. 3-18.

T: I heard some effective things. In particular, the different quality of *sfôrzandi* in mm. 52 and 53 nicely distinguished between the anxiousness of the ♮– ♮ motive and the relative contentment of the new theme. Coming way back on mm. 54 and 56—playing those bars murkily, maybe a bit unsteadily—is a nice result of the motivic ambiguity we discussed. In other words, the initial *crescendo* and rhythmic stability nicely parallel the motivic clarity and confidence of the G–B♭ summary, whereas the *decrescendo* and rhythmic instability nicely parallel the
confusion as to whether we have a 3rd-motive or a neighbor-motive here. (Thinks: “most ensembles would probably hairpin this passage intuitively, simply on the basis of its contour—up then down. But our ensemble’s hairpin is colored and timed just a bit differently—a bit more uniquely—because they are not just doing it for its own sake, not just because it is a generically ‘musical’ thing to do, but in response to the emotional connotations of the analysis. The difference between such an execution and a more generic one may be minute, and I may not be able to put my finger on it or notate it precisely, but I know it is there.”) Also, I like how you ratchet up the tension in m. 58. Just a tiny detail, second violin: if you sock your syncopated Eb in m. 58, you will anticipate the syncopation in the cello, and thus in turn the syncopation of that entire bar in relation to the hypermetric scheme [see Ex. 3-16b].

Example 3-18: interpretive ideas for mm. 52–59

T: Now, that hyper-syncopation begins to throw off our sense of hypermeter a bit, doesn’t it? In fact, after that, the hypermeter goes askew.

C: How so?
T: Well, see for yourselves. Just say your respective rhythms on “ta” and stomp your feet when you hear a larger, hypermetric accent.

The Quartet does so, as in Ex. 3-19.

T: Right, the hypermeter shifted not once but twice, didn’t it?

Vla: Does that mean we should place an accent on the downbeat of m. 63 to indicate the new “1”?

T: No, I don’t think so, because the sf here is actually being delayed relative to its location in mm. 60–62 . . .

V2 thinks: “Hey, my miniature syncopation on my E♭ in m. 58, in addition to immediately anticipating the larger syncopation in the cello, might also anticipate the syncopations mm. 60–62, all of which occur on the “and” of 1. All the more reason to ‘sock it!’”
T: Hence, if anything, this bar should begin very quietly. But doing so, beginning pp, will be striking enough to convey a new hypermetric unit. Know what I mean? The metric emphasis derives not from a literal accent but from a quality of newness. Again, we want to avoid the trap of pursuing the most obvious or literal implications of an analysis. Moreover, that hypermetric shift is not the main event: it occurs within a broader deformation of what is in essence a single 4/4 hypermeasure, which could have gone like this [Ex. 3-20]:

Example 3-20: Possible Underlying 4-bar Model for mm. 60–65

V2: So, more important than any one detail is to infuse the whole passage with a sense of gradually distortion, gradual expansion, right?

T: Exactly. Especially in mm. 64–65, where the phrase really goes off kilter. And especially in the cello, where you outline a tritone as in the first violin but on a broader scale. Okay, let’s play mm. 53–70.

Quartet does so, with V1 rendering mm. 66 with much rubato.

T: Why are you bending the time so much in m. 66?
VI: Because this is the first and only time in the exposition the rest of the ensemble falls away, implying that my part is a quasi-cadenza.

T: Nice thought, and I agree, this passage does have that topical connotation. The question, however, is whether it is more crucial to realize that connotation or to reestablish the 4/4 hypermeter.

VI: Is there perhaps a way to do both, to strike a balance between the two—maybe initially reestablishing the tempo and taking bits of time within it?

T: Possibly, continue to experiment. Now, let’s also consider the tonal and motivic elements at work. What do you make of the rising line G–A♭–B♭ in the cello (shadowed in parallel tenths in the first violin), mm. 60–62 [Ex. 3-19]?

C: It fills in that G–B♭ gap with which this theme began (in m. 53)?

T: Yes, and at the same time retraces the lineaments of the main second theme, do you see [Ex. 3-21]?

C: And in a rhythmically stilted fashion at that!

T: Which perhaps intimates a quality of . . .

C: Being pedantic—a heavy-handed “explanation” or summation of what previously happened in a more fluid, natural-seeming manner?

T: Sure. Now, all that leads to our C♭ on the downbeat of m. 63. We described that bar as shifting the hypermeter but in a weightless or suspended rather than emphatic way. Does our voice-leading analysis bear this out [Appendix C]?

Vla: Sure, C is an arrival only locally. Globally, it is a neighbor to B♭.
T: So that measure is emphatic in a non-emphatic way, in terms both of hypermeter and of voice leading. Now, let's talk about that B♭. What overall significance might it have?

V2: I guess it's the local *Kopfton*, the head-tone of the second TT area. Is that correct?

T: I don't know about “correct”—on what basis would we judge such a thing? True, there is a lot of emphasis on B♭ in this entire second area, but from a strict Schenkerian view, that is no guarantee of structural significance—sometimes, in fact, structural tones are inconspicuous or even implied while tones of secondary structural significance are emphasized. More the question, I think, is: does making B♭ our “protagonist” tell a good story, a convincing story, one that would
seem to illuminate or be illuminated by various other musical details? What story can we tell about a B♭ head-tone?

C: It kind of resists that role.

T: What do you mean?

C: Well, it takes a while to work up to it—we approach it via the G–A♭–B♭ motive . . .

T: An initial ascent . . .

C: Right, which in itself underscores the importance of B♭, it makes that tone a point of arrival. But it seems whenever we attempt to descend from it, in the manner of a local 5–4–3–2–1, we spill over the 1, as in mm. 38–41 and the corresponding passage in the next phrase. Then, in the closing theme, it is only able to descend as far as 3. And after both unsuccessful attempts at resolution, the line goes up from B♭ (starting in mm. 49 and 60) as if to say “descent is not possible, we’ll have to find another way.” And in the end, the first violin makes a big to-do of that B♭—playing it all over the place registrally (mm. 68–69), kind of summarizing the entire ambitus thus far, and then leaping from B♭ down to E♭ (into m. 70), as if to say, “nope, no linear resolution here.”

T: And this at the primary cadence within the second area, at the point of essential expositional closure. And even if we regard the B♭ as progressing down to the second violin’s A♭ (m. 69) due to the second violin reaching above the first and encroaching on its register [Ex. 3-23], it still would only progress at far as G, as in mm. 53 ff. In other words, in the end, this 3rd-motive outweighs structural necessity; the tendency to progress down by a linear fifth is precluded by motivic constraints.

Vla: So, pretty good story about that B♭ head-tone.
T: I think so. As in the Chopin C-minor Nocturne we looked at, the Kopfton is less a guarantee of structural closure than an agent to be reckoned with, a protagonist to follow along his or her search for such closure. And imagining such a search—as we are directed to do by the piece’s potential as provisionally realized by our analysis—happens to enliven the details along the way. The notational domain seems amenable to our imagining the head-tone’s search for closure.

V2: But, how do we apply that to performance?

T: I’m not sure we do. But thinking about this story will inevitably affect how we play this section. So, for example, try your descent from B♭ in mm. 38 ff., thinking about the line “spilling beyond” the presumptive arrival-tone E♭.

V2 tries it a couple of different ways.

V2: The first time I was compelled to crescendo, the second to decrescendo. Spilling past that E♭ could take two opposing forms. So, there really isn’t any way unequivocally to convey that idea to the audience!
T: Nor are we trying to. Remember, our job as performers is not to convey propositions. It is rather to convey the sensuous elements that underlie propositions. So, what is important is that our analytical story compelled you to experiment with various nuances—of vibrato, dynamics, articulation, phrasing, rubato, and so on—which in turn convey shades of sentience to the listener. The listener hears sounds as having meaningful relationships to one another, in the small and the large, even if he doesn’t or can’t articulate exactly what those relationships are.

V1: What of that mysterious, quirky codetta, then?

T: Maybe we should skip it for now, precisely in order to leave it a mystery.

V2 thinks: “Hey, these tones might be derived from my G♭–E♭–F–G–As in m. 58 [Ex. 3-23].

That connection doesn’t necessarily mean I should play the codetta passage any particular way. If anything, it
might give me some motivation to *project* my part in m. 58—not just the syncopated E♭ that is so important for the reasons we discussed, but the following notes as well!

**Example 3-23:** an unsuspected thematic connection

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**SESSION 5: DEVELOPMENT**

C: I have to confess, I’m feeling a bit frustrated.

T: Why?

C: We’re moving so slowly! Is this really a feasible way to learn a piece? I mean, it’s fine while we’re students, I guess, but say our quartet goes professional after graduation—we would have lots of concerts to prepare for and would have to learn pieces much more efficiently.

T: You have a valid concern. And in part this method is more feasible for students than for professionals who are under pressure to concertize. My hope is that, as a student ensemble,
you will go through this step-by-step process often enough that eventually you will be able to
generate analytical imaginings, along with their expressive and performative implications, more
intuitively, without having to tread every single step. This is why I have been encouraging you all
along to allow analytic-expressive insights to manifest themselves naturally wherever possible—to
develop a sense of when discussion is unnecessary and could even interfere.

C nods in acknowledgment.

T: That said, I urge you to keep in mind our larger goal: soloists, chamber ensembles, and
orchestras who can learn music quickly, play competently, and concertize regularly are a dime a
dozen. What we are going for is something else: we are seeking to engage pieces in a richer, fuller
way—to recognize many more of their potentialities and to realize those potentialities in an
embodied, emotionally powerful way. This takes time, and yes, sometimes more time than a high-
profile career would allow. Hence, it is possible that, at some point, you might need to choose
which road you want to take.

Quartet squirms uncomfortably.

T (clearing his throat): Think of it this way: a piece is like a person, and you have to choose
what kind of relationship you want to have with this person.

Quartet looks confused.

T: Every person—I mean, every person—is incredibly complex, don’t you think? Everyone
has an intricate family history, a rich emotional life, thoughts both conscious and unconscious.
Also, everyone harbors so many potentials, traits that might emerge as the result of particular
interactions with his or her environment. Finally, everyone experiences particular problems and
challenges—and also often presents problems and challenges to others. Now, we aren’t able to,
and probably wouldn’t care to, engage everyone we meet on all of these levels—many relationships are somewhat casual and superficial, and that is fine. But for the people with whom we want to build deeper, more fulfilling, longer-lasting relationships, whether platonic or romantic, we would want and need to engage more of their dimensions over a period of time. We would want and need to grapple with their various sides, leaving no stone, or very few stones, unturned—don’t you agree?

Quartet nods in increasing understanding.

T: The same goes for pieces. For each and every one you come across, you need to ask: what kind of relationship do I want to have with this piece? As with people, some pieces may seem less worthy of investment than others. But, as for Beethoven’s opus 18, no. 4, I’m sure we all want to know it intimately, to tackle its many sides and challenges, to form an enduring relationship with it. And, if you reflect on the process by which you came to know your best friend, your sibling, your romantic partner, whomever—you will admit that this takes time, there are no shortcuts. It is, in fact, a never-ending process.

C (coming around): And that is time well-spent.

T (smiling): No doubt. All that said, we will in fact proceed a bit more quickly through the remainder of the piece.

Quartet seems more reassured and relaxed.

T: So, would anyone care to offer a thematic synopsis of the development?
V2: Aren’t we just recycling through the events of the exposition?\textsuperscript{31} I mean, we begin with the primary theme—now in the minor dominant—and develop that for a while starting in m. 90; we proceed to something resembling the transition in m. 108; then the second theme arrives in m. 112 and is developed starting in m. 120. After that we sit on the dominant, starting in m. 128, to prepare for the recapitulation.

T: Nice and succinct. Can anyone offer an equally succinct tonal synopsis of the development?

V1 (drawing Ex. 3-24 on the board): Basically, we have a cycle-of-fifths progression, G–C–F, with F serving to prepare the dominant, G. So, at least on some level, the entire development composes out the V—it brings us full circle from a minor V back to a major V, from a local tonic back to the preparatory dominant.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{example324.png}
\caption{Tonal synopsis of development}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{31} Kerman calls this type of development “run-through” (1966, 68). Also see Hepokoski (2002), who argues that sonata form is often governed more by the principle of thematic cyclicity than by the “sonata principle.”
T: So perhaps it would be more accurate to say “full spiral” rather than “full circle”—we return to the dominant but in a transformed guise. I also want to point out that the keys along the circle are not all of equal weight: G minor and F major are the main keys since they house the first and second themes, respectively; C is a dominant preparation for F. Hence, the development recaptures the sense of tonal contrast evident in the exposition, one necessary to differentiate the protagonist and antagonist. Now, can we get into a bit more detail regarding the formal and thematic processes?

Vla: I seem to remember Caplin partitioning developments into pre-core, core, and retransition sections, which I would place at m. 78, 90, and 128, respectively.

T: Naturally. What are the main differences in thematic presentation between the pre-core and the exposition?

C: I notice that whereas in the exposition I was stationed on a tonic pedal for the first six measures, here I unexpectedly move in the third measure (m. 80). I definitely want to bring that out.

T: Sure, but let’s go two steps further. First, simply “bringing out,” sitting on, every note in this bar might miss the connotation of the variation, which is to move rather than sit still. You will be much more likely to convey movement if you shape your part, as in (plays cello line of Ex. 3-25 on the piano). Second, if that bar looks back to the exposition from which it deviates, it also looks ahead to a later passage: notice that the sequential restatement of the theme in the core (m. 98) is in C minor, but now over a dominant pedal point (within that key). See the irony here? Where the theme is “supposed” to be over a pedal point, it enjoys a mobile, vivacious bass. Where the
theme is “supposed” to be liberated—where it boasts its own, sequence-motivated key—it is
reigned in by a pedal point, which results from inverting the first violin and cello.

C (facetiously): So, I’m supposed to express irony now, am I?

T: Sure, why not? Which is merely to say, have some fun with that “walking bass” in m.

80—we’re not after sterile emphasis or even some generic musical shaping, but a kind of vocal or
gestural . . .

C tries it, laughs.

T: Exactly, a laugh is what we need. But do it with your bow rather than with your voice.

Some spiccato perhaps?

C does so.

Example 3-25: shaping the unexpectedly mobile cello line

T: Sure. Enjoy the irony that C minor is, in a sense, a more full-fledged key here, during its
brief anticipation, than it is within the core. Now, lest we get carried away, notice that the key is
quickly foiled by a deceptive motion to A♭, which you can imbue with pathos—a subito change of
dynamic and bow stroke in that measure [Ex. 3-25].

V1 raises her hand.

T: Yes?

V1: I have this really weird G–A♯ leap, with the A displaced many octaves (mm. 87–88). Maybe that enormous leap overcompensates in a sense for the lack of an octave leap in m. 87, which, in accordance with the model of m. 10, “should have” happened.

V2: Yeah, and that bigger leap intensifies the mystery of those open-octave Fs that you had in m. 10. I believe we said that that octave, which was only partially filled, unlocked new territory that was the transition. Here, this much bigger, more dissonant leap perhaps unlocks the rest of the development—it is, metaphorically, the chasm or space the development fills, or in which it unfurls.

T: So, the two most significant moments in the pre-core go to the cello and first violin. That emphasis anticipates or prepares for the core, in which you two share a duet. Here, as we said, you exchange parts, resulting in a kind of suppressed or stifled C minor (mm. 98 ff.).

C: So, maybe we should play that sequential restatement with less intensity?

T: Maybe. Also, what do you make of the sequential interval within the model: the statement on G sequences up a step, contrary to its usual restatement up a fourth (which is being saved for the larger sequential restatement).

Vla: We seem to be retracing that G–A♭–B♭ motive yet again [see Ex. 3-21], but now with A♭ altered to A♯ in accordance with the key of G minor [Ex. 3-26].
T: Right on! As for the affective dimension, perhaps we are entering into some sort of explanatory mode here: instead of the come-what-may leap of a fourth—an interval that, in the opening, incited ever wider leaps, ever bolder forays into the unknown—we proceed more carefully and systematically by step. And this “carefulness” is borne out by the imitative-counterpoint topic that follows in mm. 94–96, which is associated with a cerebral quality, especially when compared with the blunt force of the rapid-fire eighth notes and thick homophony that began the section.

Vla: So, how does one play in an “explanatory mode”?!
T: You don’t try to. You just keep that idea in mind as you play and see what comes out.

*Quartet plays, starting in m. 90.*

T: The statement beginning on A (m. 92) had less power than when you sequenced up a fourth. And the whole passage was very clearly *articulated*, just as you might articulate (as in “enunciate”) clearly if you were trying to ensure that someone understood what you were saying. Does anyone detect anything else a bit removed, distanced, cerebral about this passage starting in m. 90?

V2: Well, the main theme is presented as a more tight-knit sentence than we had at the opening. The looseness of the opening sentence came from both the relative melodic novelty in the continuation as well as from the modified repetition of the continuation. In the core, by contrast, the continuation phrase sticks much more closely to the basic idea, fragmenting its basic idea.  

T: Good. Put another way, the theme is now much more like the opening of the “Patétique” than that of op. 7.

V2: Right. So, the formal concision and motivic economy make this passage seem like a more clear-cut, streamlined version of the opening theme, almost an explanation of it. That, along with the learned counterpoint, might compel us to play this in a slightly “cerebral” way.

T: Precisely. In a similar vein, the coda of the first movement of the “Eroica” Symphony presents a more symmetrical, more tight-knit version of the primary theme than found in the

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32 The continuation is a bit loose-knit only in lacking a full-fledged cadence in m. 96, which simply has to do with the core’s need for propulsive continuity. A passage will often modify the formal prototype it exemplifies in order better to serve a particular formal function.
exposition. In both cases, such formal clarification and stabilization can be seen to generate a somewhat distanced, explanatory quality. The test of whether that quality “works” is if it feels convincing to play it that way.

Quartet tries.

VI (skeptical): Well, couldn’t we construe the streamlining process as yielding a more muscular, powerful version of the theme, so that it is more visceral than intellectual? And isn’t the former more suitable to the dynamic of a development section anyhow?

T: Fair question, but keep in mind, it isn’t a matter of either/or. For example, we might whale on mm. 90–93 and then reign in the more cerebral counterpoint of mm. 94–96.

Vla: But that aggression returns with a vengeance in m. 108.

VI: Partly because, as we can see by comparing this passage to the model [Ex. 3-27], we cut to the chase here—right to the three-quarter-note motto.
Vla: Yes, we actually invert the sequence of events.

VI: So a slightly receding tempo and dynamic perhaps? This will also serve to prepare the second theme?

*Quartet tries.*

T: Yes, and the force of that passage also has to do with the added two bars just prior [Ex. 3-27]—the phrase extension generates energy that discharges upon the transition passage. This energy catapults us beyond the relatively composed notation and directly into the . OK, take five.

* * *
V2: The first time I heard this piece, my mind wandered a bit around the middle of the core and when I regained my attention, for some reason I thought we had somehow gotten to the recapitulation, second theme (mm. 112 ff.).

VI: Yeah, even now that I know the piece well, my mind still plays tricks on me sometimes, and I think we are at the second theme of the recap. Maybe because the theme is so clearly presented, so stable, which is kind of rare for a development, isn’t it? And it would not be unheard of to proceed from the development directly to the second theme of the recap, bypassing the first theme, right?

T: Right. Still, the theme here is presented a bit “off color,” what with the melody in the cello’s stratosphere. (To C) What does it feel like to play it?

C: Because it is so high, it feels somewhat taut, tense.

T: And such tension, albeit soft tension, goes along with the character of the development. So, even though the theme is given an expository statement, its instrumentation and the way it feels to play it telegraphs a developmental function, if subtly. Now, where does Beethoven more clearly disabuse us of the impression of being in the recap?

Vla: Starting in m. 120, where the theme is restated in minor.

T: Correct. And what is it about the minorized version that says “development”?

Vla: Developments are associated with darkness, angst, and tension, and hence with an abundant use of minor.

T: Correct—and this is no less true of minor-mode sonatas, since even here expositions will typically spend most of their time in major. So, Beethoven first toys with our conventional expectations, by providing very tight-knit versions of both themes that counter, to some extent, the
visceral forward-thrust by which developments—cores in particular—are characterized. But then, in m. 120, he adheres to those conventions once again.

Vla: Yet, there is a disparity here, right? Because on the one hand, the music, in again conforming to expectations and conventions, has a positive connotation, it promotes “cognitive consonance.” Yet, the nature of that conformity, the reversion to angsty minor (with plenty of emphasis on the $b\hat{5} - \hat{5}$) promotes a kind of a cognitive dissonance. See what I mean?

T: Interesting paradox. And here’s another: mm. 124–128 give us the longest syncope chain yet [Ex. 3-28]. In this sense, the passage, although highly transitory, is a point of arrival in that very intensified transitoriness—it is the culmination of an overarching process.
C: So we have two dualities somehow to embody here: mm. 120 ff. are at once reaffirming and disturbing, mm. 124 ff. are at once overflowing and stable.

T: Well put. Experiment for a while.

Quartet does so.

T: What did you notice?

VI: We imbued mm. 120–124 with a quiet tension—one to some extent guaranteed by Beethoven’s conjunction of piano and minor, but enhanced and qualified, in maybe incalculable ways, by our awareness of the phrase’s duality. Tense because minor, but contained tension because reverting to a formal norm. As for my part, I was inclined to play it matter-of-factly, as if resigned to the return of anxiety, resigned to the return of a formal norm. And Beethoven clued me into that mood by omitting the characteristic suspension-figure.

T: Yes, I inferred the matter-of-factness or curtness from the way you clipped the final note of each subphrase. I also noticed that you all played mm. 124 with a relative sense of arrival, with a big sound right away, yet not so big that you couldn’t still crescendo thereafter. This I think stemmed from your realization that this phrase constitutes the apotheosis of the syncope idea. And Beethoven facilitates this sense of arrival by having the upper three strings revel in imitative counterpoint right away, then gradually weeding out that figure.\(^3\) He thus intimates that, despite the crescendo, the real arrival is at m. 124. You really made the most of this, and I have to say, I found it more interesting than the more generic move of backing away at the start of a crescendo (a

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\(^3\) That is, there are three ♫ ♫ ♫ figures in m. 124, two in mm. 125 and 126, then none in m. 127.
technique we are all taught to do) and simply crescendoing in a routine manner. Your choice was more specific, more part of a narrative sequence of events.

C: Nobody mentioned my part in this passage, but it also helps vary the syncope idea: whereas in previous syncope passages I simply shadowed the first violin at the tenth below, here I alternate between 10th's and diminished 5th's, which gives the bass more weight [Ex. 3-29].

T: Indeed it does. In both cases you help create a descending-third sequence, but here you create first-inversion rather than second-inversion chords. The descending thirds-chain, (Ab)-F-Db-Bb-G, ends on the home-key dominant which, in turn, initiates the retransition. Looking ahead, do you see any further indication of that 3rd's-chain?

V1: Yes, in my part, starting pickup to m. 129! [Ex. 3-30]

C: Big deal—thirds are ubiquitous in tonal music.

T: True. But the first violin’s correspondence with your part is substantiated by near pitch-identity (allowing for chromatic alteration).

C: Oh, I see. The violin reverses or inverts the 3rd's-scheme, and within a much shorter time-span.

T: Which might inspire you, first fiddle, to accelerate, which will also create a sense of expectancy befitting a retransition.
VI: Now I see why my G major arpeggio has an added seventh, an F (decorated by F♯). On the face of it, I seem to be merely imitating the cello of m. 128, but that F♯/♭ is telling: it relates my part more to that 3rd-chain of the cello in mm. 124–127 than it does to the cello of m. 128. Or at least, it amalgamates the two passages.

C: Yet, it is interesting that the F♯ threatens to overshadow the F, the 7th of a V⁷, necessary for the tail of the retransition. In fact, in m. 131 we get the F♯ without the F (the latter doesn’t fit into a C minor chord). It is not until the passage starting in m. 132 that we weed out that F♯, that we get F without its chromatic counterpart.
T: Right, we quash the chromaticism in order to pave the way for the recapitulation. And right after that decisive moment, m. 133, Beethoven shifts the hypermeter to begin on a new 1 [Ex. 3-30], which is established by the first violin starting its continuous stream of eighth notes at that point; Beethoven also marks that moment with a crescendo. The confluence of factors at this bar makes it cry, “Clear for take-off!”

*Quartet plays from m. 128.*
**T:** It’s amazing how Beethoven can dramatize and specify such an otherwise *pro forma* thing as attaching a 7th to a V at the retransition, isn’t it? This is what Beethoven does generally—he dramatizes the most basic facets of the high-classical language, brings them to the forefront of awareness; he renders them specific to the piece at hand, integrating them into its musical drama. And you, in turn, shadow that process by dramatizing and specifying the otherwise generic crescendo by imbuing it with a particular purpose. In our reading, it makes perfect sense to energize mm. 133 ff. right away, just as we did the passage starting in m. 125. From both passages, we can appreciate how developing a structural scenario and a concomitant narrative can provide specific *motivations* for dynamics and other expressive indications. And how, armed with such a motivation, one is likely to render such indications in a fresh, novel way, one deriving expressive force both from its vocal or gestural quality and its relation to other expressive choices within the narrative.

**SESSION 6: Recapitulation and Coda**

**T:** Last coaching—let’s make it count!

**V2 (eager):** Shall we focus on the ways in which the recap deviates from the exposition?

**T:** Absolutely. The development, as we saw, basically recycled the events of the exposition, but of course with significant variations. We might even say that this development as a whole is a kind of *variation* of the exposition, the latter serving as a kind a “theme.” (Beethoven, arguably taking Mozart’s lead, was fond of injecting elements of variation form into sonata form; Schubert
pursued this idea even more rigorously.\textsuperscript{34} This recapitulation is likewise sort of a variation of the exposition.

\textit{C (skeptical):} Aren’t all recapitulations?

\textit{T:} Well, sure, to some extent. But Beethoven here has established a particularly cyclical dynamic due to the slavishness with which the development retraces the exposition. Hence, in this context—that is, coming after this development—this recapitulation, I would argue, appears to be even more of a variation of the exposition than it otherwise would. The development is like variation 1, the recap variation 2.

\textit{V2 (proudly):} I think my part is the first to signal the recap as a variation of the exposition. I almost overshadow the first violin with a new countermelody that crosses over her register.

\textit{T:} Good, but is this countermelody completely new?

\textit{V2 (considering):} I guess not. The rhythm comes from the accelerated-syncopation motive that I initiated in m. 58, and which shortly thereafter came to the fore in all parts in m. 60 [Ex. 3-31].

\textit{T:} And what about the pitch element?

\textit{V2:} Wow, I just noticed this: many of the pitches are the same as well! The first countermelody (mm. 137–38) broaches the $E_b$–$E_b$–$F$ I played when introducing that accelerated-syncopation motive. And the sequence of that countermelody (mm. 139–40) has all of those pitches except the initial $E_b$ [Ex. 3-31].

\textsuperscript{34} On Mozart’s use of variation procedure within sonata form, see Ivanovitch (2008) and (2010); on Schubert’s, see Dahlhaus (1986). It is also possible to incorporate sonata-like elements into variation form, on which see Rosen (1997, 434–40).
T: Keen insight. And you might notice that the dyad that is invariant between those two figures is none other than E♭–F, which is a motive in its own right. Do you remember what the first chromatic pitch in the piece is (excluding ♩ 7)?

V2 (flipping back a page): Oh, E♭, which I play!

T: Exactly. Beethoven nicely individuates your part by giving it most of the key instances of that motive. Speaking metaphorically, within this community of four, the E♭–F and the syncopated motive symbolize a predisposition more or less unique to you, a characteristic that preserves your autonomy within a larger group.
V2: So, this means I should bring out all the figures containing E₂–F?

T: I’m not comfortable with such a narrow prescription. I would say, more broadly, that each of you should take stock of what renders your part a unique component of a larger whole, to seize upon clues to your individuality. See, Beethoven, perhaps more than any other composer preceding him, sought to greatly expand the notion of musical unity so that it would encompass increasingly diverse and seemingly incommensurate elements. In his late works, for example, he often juxtaposes themes that differ in almost every conceivable respect—key, mood, topic, texture, rhythm and meter, register—and would then find ways gradually to reconcile them over the course of the piece, such that one theme progressively assimilates characteristics of its antipode. The variation movements of the String Quartet, op. 132 (the “Heiliger Dankgesang”) and of the Ninth Symphony, as well as the final movement of the Piano Sonata, op. 110 are cases in point.³⁵ But these late works only amplify a tendency Beethoven evinced from his earliest works—a tendency to test the limits of musical unity, to see how far it could stretch to accommodate the most variegated material. And he was showing us that such unity, arising from the bottom up, built on the backs of heterogeneous elements, creates a fundamentally different experience from unity taken as a given, as a precondition for a piece—as in many Baroque works, for example. From an Adornian standpoint, moreover, we would say that such differentiated unity is not solely an aesthetic value, but an ethical one as well.

³⁵ Korsyn discusses all three works in (1983) and (1993a). Incidentally, that the reconciliation of antinomies is a central concern of op. 132 as a whole is supported by the first movement, which, like the “Heiliger Dankgesang,” posits salient musical oppositions at the opening and proceeds to unify them on a subthematic level. See Chua (1995, 54–106).
C: Ethical?

T: Yes, in the sense that such music models a society whose cohesiveness does not come at the expense of the freedom, autonomy, and individuality of its members.

C: I’m losing track of what all this has to do with performance.

T: Sorry, I digress too much. My point is this: the Beethovenian ideal by which unity arises not in spite of differences but precisely as a result of them—this ideal also informs the way in which he would individuate parts within an instrumental texture. You as an ensemble are a community, sure, but one arising from the utter differentiation of your parts in relation to each other. The motivic cohesion of the second violin is merely a window into this broader phenomenon, which can affect how you play generally.

C: How so?

T: Well, just as an experiment, choose a lengthy passage from anywhere in the piece and each play your part as if it were a solo part, a melody completely unto itself, without regard for anything else around it.

*Quartet tries the first 25 bars.*

36 A pointed example of such textural unity-in-difference is Beethoven’s so-called *Durchbrochene Arbeit* technique, in which a principal melodic line is dispersed among various voices or instruments. The thematic idea susceptible to such treatment cannot plausibly be conceived as unified prior to its fragmented presentation, but rather is inconceivable without such a presentation. Dahlhaus states—citing the variation theme of the C#-minor String Quartet, op. 131 as paradigmatic—“the inner unity is not given a priori, but arises out of motivic dialectics. The particles must be performed by separate voices or instruments, paradoxically, in order for their cohesion to be discernible” (1991, 155). In this technique, then, “separation and connection are thus shown to be two facets of the same process” (ibid).
T: Hear how full-bodied that was, with each part shaped individually? And it was not to
the detriment of a larger unity. In fact, I glimpsed a special kind of unity, the kind that arises from
multifarious elements. Sure, you weren’t always together, but I don’t think that is necessarily a bad
thing; to be strategically out of sync on occasion is to enhance the polyphonic richness of the
texture.® Now, I’m not saying you wouldn’t need to tone down or modify some things in order to
clarify relationships among parts, for example. But use the autonomy of each part as your starting
point and then tweak things for the sake of the larger ensemble. The less desirable alternative is to
start from the assumption that you are a monolithic entity and then find little moments to stand
out or bring stuff out. (To V2) See what I mean now about having to expand your horizons
beyond bringing out a fragment here, another there?

V2 nods tentatively.

T: So I leave you to play that way for a while, and I trust you will enjoy doing it.

* * *

V2: So, can I try to summarize your points from before to make sure I understand them?

T: Be my guest.

57 One might relate this style of playing to Keil’s (1995) concept of “participatory discrepencies.” Here, the
players of an ensemble dissonate with each other—they are either temporally or tonally out-of-sync. For
Keil, it is precisely such out-of-syncness that creates interest for listeners and draws them in as participants—
as ones who are compelled to move to the groove created by rhythmic disjunction, for instance, or as ones
(like Iser’s reader) who are compelled to make sense of certain disparities.
V2: Concerning the secondary figures that clearly come to fore, as in m. 137 ff.—I should not merely seek to bring these out (though I might in some cases) but rather, more broadly, view them as a window through which to appreciate the individuality of my part generally. And I should play with individuality throughout, like a soloist. And when we all do, the performance will probably not degenerate into cacophonous chaos but rather will allow at least the possibility of a thoroughly heterogeneous unity.

T: I couldn’t have said it better myself. Now, where we left off in your part, the A₅ᵒ in m. 140, that pitch was left hanging, wasn’t it? What does a registrally stranded note lead one to expect?

V2: That that register will be picked up at some point down the road.

T: Right, that register, or even that particular note or the note to which we expect it to resolve. To what note should the A₅{o} resolve?

V2: To G₅.

T: Does it ever?

V2 (searching): Perhaps m. 157, but 159 would make a better candidate.

T: Why?

V2: There the long-range connection is made audible, since, just as in m. 140—and not since then—I perch on top of the first violin [Ex. 3-32].

T: So, perhaps here, starting in m. 159, would be an especially good opportunity to display your autonomy, to play with soloistic shape.

V2: Really? But wouldn’t I drown out the first violin, which has the melody?
T: Not necessarily—you could shape your part subtly. But even if the first violin *did* play “second fiddle” to you here, that wouldn’t necessarily be a bad thing. After all, we had a full-fledged presentation of the second theme in the development, as you know, so maybe now is the time for the variational element to come to the fore—we’ve heard the theme enough! (By the same token, your variation of the first theme can come to the fore, since we also heard that theme quite clearly in the development). In other words, we are less concerned with
music-pedagogical “fact”—as in, “never drown out the primary melody with a subsidiary melody.” We are more enamored with music-analytical fiction—as in, “hear this sonata form as if it were a theme-and-variations form”—a “fiction,” again, that is not imposed willy-nilly onto the music but that seems a convincing metaphorical match, one suitably compatible with various musical details and the potentials they suggest. And within this fictional scenario, it makes perfect sense that the variant elements would take precedence over the invariant elements, just as they often do in the variations of a variation set.

*Quartet tries.*

*T:* Good, we’ll return to that important juncture in a moment. But first, speaking of variation procedure generally, we might distinguish between two broad categories: between variations that decorate the theme somewhat superficially and those that alter it more substantively or structurally. In sonata form, the themes are often restated in the recap with decorative variation, as is the case here, given the alteration in texture caused by the second violin (although even these counter-figures, as we discussed, are not entirely “superficial”—they have larger significance in bringing the E♭-F motive to the fore). Now, taking the recapitulation as a whole, where might we expect a more structural alteration to occur, generally speaking?

*Vla:* In the restatement of the second theme in the tonic?

*T:* Yes, and before that even?

*C:* The transition.

*T:* Exactly. Keep in mind, some textbooks have the transition in the recap ceasing to modulate or modulating differently than it did in the exposition in order to stay close or lead to the tonic key. But composers such as Beethoven often display some rather bold harmonic
maneuvers in this section not to skew close to tonic, but quite the opposite—to create some pointed tonal interest and variety precisely because we soon need to restate the second theme in the tonic. And more than just variety is at stake: such tonal divergence in the transition makes the return to the tonic in the second area precisely that—a return, an arrival, as befits the structural significance of that moment in the overall form. So what does he do here?

Vla: Some kind of sequence.

T: Let’s analyze it on the board [Ex. 3-33].

C: Wow, I see what you mean about the harmonic audacity. The sequence leads to Eb minor, quite remote from where we need to end up, in C major—double mixture, right? If Beethoven were merely concerned to keep us in C, he sure could have taken a simpler route!

Example 3-33: Rhythmic reduction of mm. 150–157: realization of \( \frac{5}{4} \)Root sequence

\[
\begin{array}{c}
V \bowtie \\
V \bowtie \\
V \bowtie \\
iii \ vii \ ii \ I t \ V
\end{array}
\]

T: Right. Does this sequence bring another similar one to mind from earlier in the piece?

Quartet flips through score.
T: Remember the sequence that was presented only tenuously in mm. 57–59? Tenuously, in that it was very brief, and in that its rhythmic presentation was quite uneven and erratic. Now, in the transition, we get that same sequence but in a clear-cut, decisive, rhythmically stable guise.

C: So, I assume you would recommend we play it decisively—metrically, marcato, perhaps long bow strokes?

T: Sure, generally. But where precisely does that energy kick in?

C: Right at m. 148.

VI: I disagree. Because at that point, nothing about the original passage has been altered. It is exactly at m. 150 where this passage deviates from the model, where we jettison the first figure and harp on the second [Ex. 3-34].

T: And does that alteration come out of nowhere?

C: Actually, no. We had the same thing in mm. 108–109.

T: Spot on. The rhythmic idea that we merely touched on in the development is now being exploited. Again, this is typical for variation procedure: our “second variation,” the recap, retains and amplifies an element from the “first variation,” the development. So, our transition phrase is not only audacious but triumphant in actualizing not one but two potentialities: that of the ascending 5–6 sequence and the idea.

Vla (skeptical): Audacious versus triumphant. What’s the difference in terms of interpretation?

T: Well, try it first in a blindly aggressive way, with muscular bow strokes—hammer away!

Quartet does so.

T: Now, think this as you play: “we are bringing nascent ideas to their glorious realization.”
Quartet tries.

T: Good, that was virile but not violent. Moreover, there is an additional subtlety here, perhaps even an ambiguity. Look again at that passage in the exposition. Even though we seem to be shifting indiscriminately between tonic and dominant, the larger progression here is I–V, with each harmony being composed out by the other. Now, when this passage returns, the elision of

Example 3-34: Transition in recap compared to trans. in exposition

![Example 3-34: Transition in recap compared to trans. in exposition](image-url)

hyper-meter:
what was m. 15 shifts the harmonic balance, so that we are in fact returning to I, no longer prolonging V. See? The rhythmic shift creates a new harmonic emphasis, one sticking closer to I, perhaps all the better to depart from it in the audacious way we described. But, things are a bit more complicated when we take the hypermeter into consideration, as we can see here [Ex. 3-34].

C: Wait, why does m. 150 get the “1” when it is the same rhythm as the previous bar? Why doesn’t m. 149 get the hyperaccent?

T: Because, as we noted, it is exactly in m. 150 where we deviate from the model, drawing emphasis to it. So, even though we thought we are sticking close to tonic here, the hypermeter would suggest that the tonic harmony in m. 151 is still subsidiary to V of m. 150, a secondary chord in the ascending sequence [Ex. 3-33/34].

C: I see. So, the layers of tonal/rhythmic ambiguity of this passage, when seen in relation to the model, should give us pause—we should think twice about hammering away.

T: Yes, on a general level. More specifically, we might shape it dynamically very carefully so as to clarify the tricky metric-harmonic syntax [see hypermetric analysis in Exs. 3-33 and 3-34].

VI: So, once again, a close structural reading discloses affective subtlety that we can embody with interpretive variances. The latter convey a novel effect and affect that goes beneath or beyond the most obvious and relatively coarse emotion of the musical surface.

T: Exactly. The analysis mobilizes our imagination, it helps us to generate a more nuanced intentional object, one that influences our interpretive choices. Now, after break, we will revisit the second theme, and taking a cue from Beethoven, I will propose a somewhat novel reading of this section.
Vla: You said you had a “novel reading” of the second theme in the recap?

T: I think so. The conventional sonata-form narrative goes like this: the first and second themes/tonalities are contrasting to the point of being antagonistic. This scenario typifies nineteenth-century accounts in particular, such as that of A. B. Marx, for whom the first theme is more aggressive or “masculine,” the second more passive or “feminine.” The conflict is intensified in the development, then resolved in the recapitulation. “Resolved” not in the sense of a real rapprochement between the personae but in the sense of the second theme capitulating to, or being dominated by, the first, as symbolized by the former adopting the key of the latter. My reservation about this Procrustean scheme is that we sometimes forget that music-formal dynamics are by nature broader and more general than any one particular hermeneutic reading. The tonic-transposition of the second theme indicates an abstract dynamic into which we can fit any number of more specific actions, ones that are related but by no means identical: synthesis, integration, assimilation, domination, and so on.39 Different sonatas, while all employing the “sonata

38 Marx was apparently the first to cast the first theme/second theme binarism in gendered terms (in his 1845 treatise, Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition). This idea, in turn, may have stemmed from Hegel, who, in Philosophy of Nature, held the male to be active, the female passive. See Beauvoir (1949, chapter 1).

39 This is where McClary (1990) errs, in my view; she seems to take the paradigm of domination as a given. Even if, moreover, one were to assume this paradigm, instrumental music is not nearly semantically determinate enough such that one could see or hear in it an unequivocally gendered type of dominance. Dominance is a broad dynamic that could potentially encompass any number of hegemonic relationships; it is not necessarily reducible to misogynist ideology.
principle,” might well suggest different actions. Which one a particular sonata uses is, of course, a matter of interpretation, something for which one can argue based on a close and imaginative reading of the structural and topical fabric of the piece. Moreover, even within the “domination” model, we tend to take it as a given that the first theme ultimately dominates the second. But couldn’t we read the requisite transposition as indicating that the second theme assimilates the tonic key, rather than is assimilated by it? In other words, over against the default scenario in which the second theme capitulates to the first on the basis of being assimilated to the tonic, we might claim that the first theme capitulates to the second on the basis of the tonic key being assimilated to the second theme. In the former scenario, the second theme is taken over by the tonic key; in the latter, the first key is taken over by the second theme. It could work either way, depending on the context, see what I mean?

Quartet nods tentatively.

T: So, which fictional scenario would seem to apply here? Does Beethoven offer any clues?

Group is tacit; T looks at V2.

V2: Does my part have anything to do with it?

T: I think so. Can you say more about that?

V2: We discussed how, in the second theme of the recap, and to some extent in the first theme as well, my secondary part comes to the fore.

T: Good. Let’s retrace our steps: where do you first supersede the first violin?

V2: M. 69, right?

T: Yes, with that As⁵ left hanging, as also happens later. But here, the first violin picks up that thread right at the beginning of the development, which at once makes the opening of the
development follow logically from the end of the exposition, and also gives it a kind of freshness, since we had not heard that register for several bars. Then you take over again . . .

V2: At the beginning of the recap, leading again to that hanging As . . .

T: Which, this time, you yourself regain at the start of the second theme, m. 159. In other words, now you are able to tie up your own loose ends—the first violin doesn’t have to do it for you. Any other instances?

V2: How about in m. 183, which is simply a transposition of the end of the exposition?

T: Right, although here, since the apex of the entire piece, C7, occurs directly before in the first violin, I can’t help but think the voice crossing doesn’t pack quite the same punch it did before. Here I think violin 1 regains its supremacy. But, the second theme—well, that’s another matter.

V2: OK, so I predominate in the recap, second theme. And that predominance is affirmed when I play the melody starting in m. 156, with violin 1 singing a descant. And the chorale texture housing my melody is a kind of affirmation, it celebrates my predominance.

T: Something like that.

V2: So, what does this have to do with the sonata narrative you were talking about?

T waits.

V2: Oh, I think I see where you’re going with this! The countermelody I have—which, as played by the first violin in the exposition (m. 35) was secondary—now comes to the fore, and not just in isolation, but as part of the culmination of a larger thematic process, involving a rivalry between the two violins. And that is maybe a metaphor for the rivalry between the two theme/key areas!
T: Yes, in other words, this variation—the second violin sitting atop the first violin, the countermelody (possibly) superseding the primary melody—might be a cue for us to imagine that the second theme in the recap predominates. That is, the dominance of the countermelody is a metaphor (or more precisely, a synecdoche) for the dominance of the second theme. So Beethoven’s sonata, like the novel according to Iser, overturns a more conventional paradigm, both musical and ideological, bringing a less standard one to the fore. Or more precisely, an idiosyncratic process in the piece—the second violin’s plight to outshine the first—draws us in as interpreters, inciting us to imagine another, less obvious fictional truth.\(^40\)

V2: Okay, I think I get it. But does all this esoteric explanation merely affirm what we had already decided, for me to bring out my part in mm. 159 ff.?

T: By no means. This reading will affect the entire ensemble. How do you speak, how do you move, when you arrive at a main point, at the crux of an argument, when you have finally persuaded someone to accept your view? Can any of you gesture it?

V1 quasi-conducts, slowly, grandiosely.

T: Right, but due to Beethoven’s piano dynamic, the music does not boldly declare “I told you so” but rather quietly yet confidently affirms this unexpected predominance.

Quartet plays it that way.

T: Yes, I think that a slightly slower tempo will render this second theme a very special moment indeed. Your appropriation of piano here—quiet, yet warm and full-toned—will preclude

\(^40\) Citron (1992, 120–64) provides an even clearer instance of such role reversal within Marx’s scheme—Chaminade’s Piano Sonata in C minor, op. 21.
the second theme from coming across as cowed. Rather, it will convey the sense that the theme is humbly, graciously rejoicing in the realization of its own power, its own potential.

* * *

T: Where, exactly, does the coda begin?

Vla: M. 184?

T (to the group): Agree? Disagree?

C: Actually, technically speaking, the coda begins right at m. 192.

T: Why do you say that?

C: Well, the passage in mm. 184–191 is really a transposed repetition of the exposition’s codetta. It is not until m. 192 that something really new happens, which, I remember Caplin saying, is where the coda would officially begin [Ex. 3-35].
T: But don’t we get a change at m. 188? It is more subtle than the one at m. 192, but striking nonetheless.

V1: Oh, I see. We restate the codetta theme in minor, whereas in the exposition it stayed in major.
T: Right. So if we follow Caplin’s principle strictly, the coda would begin right there.  
But more important than the “fact” of where the coda begins is what happens narratively at that point.

Vla (after some thought): Well, in the exposition’s codetta, major and minor were mixed: the Eb major theme contained a hint of Eb minor, with that telltale 5 - 5; but then the music returned to major as if nothing had happened. In the recapitulation, however, following that 5 - 5 (now in the tonic key), the music actually responds to that cue—it is altered to minor as if to accommodate those scale degrees.

T: Yes, I think “accommodation” is an apt metaphor. Can you please play that passage in an accommodating manner?

Quartet does so.

T: Yes, very different from the hackneyed way of playing a major-to-minor switch—you know, from louder to softer. Here, the minor is not some sort of echo or a weakened version of the major but, quite the contrary—this is home, this is where we live. This moment is a return to the tonic minor that we had abandoned for some 40 bars. Now, if this were a Finale movement, perhaps Beethoven would have stayed in the tonic major. At least in his middle-period works, he favors a multi-movement narrative revolving around the idea of overcoming adversity, symbolized in minor-key works by ending with major-mode Finale—the Fifth Symphony, in C minor with a

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41 “The ‘start’ of the coda is best located at that moment when the music of the recapitulation no longer corresponds to that of the exposition, even if that moment is not perceived as a structural beginning” (Caplin [1998, 181]). This last clause implies that one might register the onset of the coda only retrospectively.
Finale in C major, and the Ninth Symphony in D minor with a Finale in D major, are two well-known examples. And in the Finale of our Quartet, he does gesture in that direction, but does so rather tentatively, as we see here [Ex. 3-36]. Notice, by the way, that this figure, with its equivocating between $E\flat$ and $E\natural$, between minor and major, distinctly alludes to the coda of the first movement [Ex. 3-36b], which is none other than the violin 2 motive. So, all this is to say, if you were to perform this entire Quartet at some point, you would want to look at the big picture and settle on a narrative for the entire multi-movement structure, perhaps looking to these codas of the outer movements as “hermeneutic windows.”

Vla: Hermeneutic windows?

T: Yes, particularly telling moments, often idiosyncratic ones, that open a vista onto meanings that pervade the piece. And in fact, getting back to the first movement, we have another such window in m. 192, with that prominent Neapolitan in second inversion. This moment is so striking that, remember, it led at least one of you to identify it as starting the coda. So, why does that chord pack such a punch?

V2: Because it’s the Neapolitan, in an unusual inversion, and played fortissimo!
T: Yes, but not just that. It is the first Neapolitan we have had in this movement—fairly uncommon for a piece in minor.

VI: What about the D♭ chord in m. 153?

T: That isn’t a functional Neapolitan, since it is right in the middle of a sequence.
VI: Isn’t the Neapolitan in the coda part of a sequence as well?

T: Yes, but it begins the sequence and the phrase, and is thus a point of tonal articulation. Also, it is much more emphasized, much more differentiated from the surrounding chords, than the D♭ chord was in m. 153. At any rate, Beethoven uses the chord very sparingly in this piece, a trait more associated with Mozart, in whose footsteps Beethoven followed in his early works.\(^\text{42}\) (In fact, compare this Quartet to a C-minor piece by Mozart, the first movement of the Sonata, K. 457, where he uses the Neapolitan in only a single passage, to startling effect.\(^\text{43}\)) Used sparingly and strategically, it can really enhance the pathos and tragedy of a minor-mode piece. To appreciate how much more readily Beethoven relied on the Neapolitan in his later works, think, for example, of the “Appassionata” Sonata in F minor: at the opening, he no sooner states the theme in the tonic than he restates it up a semitone, in the key of the Neapolitan (or Phrygian).

C: Okay, just so I don’t lose the thread of our discussion: C minor in m. 188 is not a generic echo but, if anything, is more forceful, because it turns back to the tragic, minor key after a hiatus in major. And we take an even more tragic turn at the Neapolitan, which Beethoven saves for this key moment. And by the way, I think this emotional reversal is also signaled, on a very detailed level, by the inversion of the $\hat{6}-\hat{5}$ figure [Ex. 3-35, see brackets].

T: Good. Now, I think there is one more significant aspect of this Neapolitan chord, and it has to do with the pitch-class D♭ in particular. Looking back to the piece’s opening, a “tonal

\(^\text{42}\) “It was as the incarnate spirit of Mozart, moulded by Haydn’s virile talent, that Beethoven was to appear to the musical world when the six quartets of Op. 18 . . . were published” (Marliave [1925, 1]).

\(^\text{43}\) Mm. 121–24 (the Neapolitan is tonicized here). I owe this observation to Kevin Korsyn (personal communication).
problem,” as Schoenberg would have called it, arises straight away: I am referring to the clash in m. 2 between the B diminished-7th chord with the C pedal point, and in particular, the D “appoggiatura.” This agogic dissonance is partly what lends such tension and pathos to the theme. And we saw how it enters into the semi-new idea in m. 5 as well, which is also infused with anxiety. Much of the piece can be seen, I think, as an attempt to expunge this tension-ridden element. For example, we saw that the “false” second theme subtly altered the pitches of that opening third motive [Ex. 3-11]: Eb–D–C becomes Eb–Db–C. Moreover, the Db there was rendered metrically inconspicuous (at least until m. 29, where, in its identical rhythmic treatment to m. 2, we are reminded of where this pitch comes from). We might see the Db as a vehicle by which to whitewash the problematic D♯, even though the attempt is not entirely successful early on (nor would we expect it to be). Now, as the piece proceeds, while the D dissonance is not always present, the angsty dissonance it initially defined is omnipresent and keeps that tonal problem alive. In the turn to the tonic minor in mm. 120 ff., Db plays a conspicuous role and finds a home as ♯ 6 in F minor. In the recapitulation, first theme, the angst of that D is somewhat countered by the unexpected prominence of the second violin, as we discussed: the latter’s syncopated, accented B pulls our attention away from that problematic dissonance in the first violin, as does, in a more proactive vein, the A♭ in m. 140, where that lingering note might well overshadow the D in the first violin.

VI: I see where you’re heading: the Db in m. 192, in its definitive presentation—as part of a tonicized Neapolitan, and metrically and agogically accented—definitively wipes out that problematic D!
T: I think so. But, of course, we don’t fully appreciate that until the very end of the piece, where we get the 3rd-motive multiple times, now without the D appoggiatura [Ex. 3-37]! The piece can conclude because the problematic element has been completely expunged. And in case we miss the point, Beethoven now places *sforzandi* on all the Es, whereas previously he had placed them on the Ds.

V2: But wouldn’t the Db, being somewhat foreign to C minor—dissonant in relation to it—itself cause a “problem” that would need to be neutralized before we can end?

T: Good point. And where, if at all, do you see that happening?

V2: Perhaps in the chromatic scale, the sequence, starting in m. 194 [Ex. 3-35]. Here the Db becomes just another sequential tone, on a par with every other tone—it forfeits its potency.

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Example 3-37: end of first movement: D as accented dissonance expunged

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T: Sure. Let me offer an analogy. Imagine that you have a problem with a friend, that something is eating away at your relationship, and neither of you seem to be able to talk about it.
Then, one day, you decide enough is enough and it’s time to deal with the problem openly. To do so, you have to be somewhat forceful or insistent: you confront your friend and demand that you both discuss it candidly, bring this festering problem out into the open, even though doing so might be initially awkward or unpleasant. You are somewhat aggressive about dealing with this because you know that is the only way anything is going to change. So, you and your friend are now talking openly about the systemic problem, and have finally come to some deeper understanding of its nature. Is this sufficient for regaining a sense of equipoise in the relationship, for things to move forward in a positive way?

V2: No, because it is not enough to hash things out. The dust has to settle.

T: Right, eventually you have to let down your defenses, let go of the adamance that was necessary to treat the problem, because you don’t want those qualities to form a part of your ongoing relationship. You can’t continue to play offense or defense if you want the relationship to be healthy. Just so, getting back to the music, the problem is D, the tool by which we countered it head on is D♭, but even that needs to be purged, put away, because things aren’t really resolved if you’re still holding onto something.

Vla: And that seems to happen for sure by m. 198.

T: I agree. But why?

Vla: Because our “false” second theme comes back, with its innocent gaiety [Ex. 3-36b]! And its predominant diatonicism, coming after a densely dissonant and chromatic passage (mm. 192–196), brings a sigh of relief.

T: And more than that, the theme fills a gap: it had been omitted in the recap, and so alluding to it—albeit fleetingly, as befits its “illusory” quality—provides an added sense of
resolution. A loose end has been tied up. So, the theme creates a sense of resolution or reassurance not just because of its easy-going demeanor but, maybe more crucially, because of the formal dynamic in which it participates.

V1: But I still have a loose end, don’t I? I’m referring to my A♭ in m. 197, which, being unresolved (until m. 203, that is), would seem to cast a shadow over this otherwise problem-free passage.

C: Can we try to put all this analysis into practice?

T: Sure, just play as you allow the narrative to pass through your mind and see what happens.

Quartet plays from m. 184.

T: I particularly liked the attention and slight emphasis you gave to the “false” second theme. Most ensembles I have heard pass it by, because at this point it is easy to be swept up by the forward momentum driving to the end. But, though innocuous in itself, this theme, placed at this crux in our narrative, plays a not insignificant role in affirming that “things are okay . . . at least for now.” And yet, you also conveyed the sense of unease created by that unresolved A♭ by playing it with slight rhythmic unevenness. I think you were able to get across the emotional complexity and duality in a very tangible way, with specific, suggestive nuances of timing and dynamics. The weight you gave to the section, the full rather than anemic piano, conveyed some sense of resolution, while the unsteady rhythmic gait conveyed, if subliminally, a lingering concern.

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On this and other functions of Beethoven’s codas, see Hopkins (1988).
Teacher and Quartet exit the classroom and chat in the hallway.

T: I am so pleased with how thoughtfully and intelligently you have been working on this piece. Again, you don’t need to make any final decisions as to interpretation now. Even after performing the movement for our end-of-seminar concert, you might decide to change things if you perform it again in the future. The important thing for now is that you are grappling with the structural, somatic, and emotional factors that motivate interpretive decisions, rather than regarding such decisions as merely the icing on the cake of an self-complete piece. And I believe that ultimately whatever scheme of variances you adopt will be all the more compelling for having been motivated by a close structural reading of the piece.

Vla: But we don’t always have to practice the way we’ve been practicing in seminar, right?

T: Of course not. Remember the very first thing I said to the class: music theory is far broader than the parts of it that have relevance for performance; and performance is far broader than the parts of it that are amenable to music analysis. So much of what will be interesting and inspired, affective and effective about your eventual performance will come from working on the piece in ways that have nothing to do with deliberate analysis.

C: So, what’s our next project in this class?

T: We are going to work with Sandra, the singer in our class, on Schumann’s “Du Ring an meinem Finger.” While vocal performance obviously poses some concerns that are unique to it and far removed from those of a Beethoven string quartet, I think you will detect some overlapping issues. In particular, in working on the Beethoven, we have encountered several situations where a passage, filtered through our analytical prisms, evinced multiple sentient states, some of which were even mutually contradictory. In those cases, we did not necessarily choose one
and discard the other but rather attempted to embody both, even if one emotion was more
dominant than the other. In vocal music, this kind of psychological complexity can be even more
defined, due to the presence of a text, and more clearly conveyed, due to the ability of the singer to
act, to dramatize the music and text, in a more overt way than we can in instrumental music.

Vla: Sounds fascinating!
CHAPTER 4

MUSICAL STRUCTURE(S) AS SUBTEXT: RESISTING SCHUMANN’S “RING”:

Classical vocalists typically sing with more musical than dramatic nuance. Operatic singers tend to effuse only rather obvious emotions—perhaps because more subtle ones do not “read” in the huge halls in which operas are usually performed. Also, the musical subtleties by which emotional ones are conveyed are difficult to project over a large orchestra. Lied singers do not face these same obstacles and hence tend to display greater emotional nuance. Still, they often prioritize the classic traits of beautiful singing—long lines, phrase arcs, vibrato—over acting the song. Muscular theater vocalists, by contrast, are usually actors first, singers second (if not initially trained to be so, they are subsequently nudged in that direction). What distinguishes classical and theater singers is that the latter are routinely encouraged to treat a song’s text as primarily a dramatic utterance, as the outpouring of a multidimensional character with an elaborate backstory. They manifest this backstory in the form of an inner monologue—an explicit formulation of the song’s subtext, as the

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1 Previous versions of this chapter were delivered at the Theory Colloquium Series, University of Michigan (October, 2012) and The Society For Music Theory National Conference in New Orleans (November, 2012). The paper benefitted substantially from the participants in both sessions.

2 The British tenor Ian Bostridge is apparently a notable exception. I have not seen him perform, but he is reputed to deliver Lied cycles with compelling theatricality.
performer construes it.\textsuperscript{3} When the song is performed outside the show from which it is drawn, as in a cabaret or recital, the subtext can still derive from the character and plot of said show. But more often, the performer imagines for the song a very different scenario, one perhaps more personally significant to him, one deriving from his own experiences. The result is often a subtext only partially congruent or even sharply at odds with the written text. Arguably, the richest, most compelling performances arise from such incongruity.

I think the classical singer could benefit from adopting, to a greater degree, the acting approach of her musical-theater counterpart. Such an approach is eminently feasible for the art-song stylist, in that she has the music-structural complexity and richness of a Schubert, Schumann, or Brahms on which to draw. Such structure, interpreted imaginatively and metaphorically—as analogous to emotional and psychological states and processes—can provide fodder for an inner monologue, the rendering of which produces certain demonstrable music-interpretive variances.\textsuperscript{4}

Can a close analysis be fodder for an inner monologue that is dissonant with the text, that resists it in some way? I found myself wondering this in looking at Schumann’s Frauenliebe und leben, op. 42 (1840). Given its evident misogyny, I feel the performer has some responsibility to resist the cycle’s ideology.\textsuperscript{5} This might initially seem a strange notion, because it is usually assumed that to perform a work is on some level to tacitly endorse it. Jane O’Dea, for example, says, “more

\textsuperscript{3} Such a monologue can implicate an addressee and thus be dialogic to some extent, a point to which I return momentarily.

\textsuperscript{4} Lewin (1994) draws connections between music-structural assertions and subtext in operatic music.

\textsuperscript{5} This ideology has already been widely discussed in the musicological literature. See in particular Cusick (1994) and Solie (1992). For a defense of the cycle, see Muxfeldt (2001).
than mere transmitters, more even than explicators, performers may be described as advocates for compositions. Their task is to commend such works to listeners” (2000, 19). My contention is that it is not always ethically laudable to do so.

This chapter will develop critical, resisting interpretations of “Du Ring an meinem Finger,” the fourth song of Frauenliebe. My process, following some initial exposition, will be to read the musical structure as consisting of parametric crosscurrents—counterpoising, in particular, hierarchical (Schenkerian) and horizontal (melodic and motivic) domains that cannot be fully integrated, thus educing a potential source of unease and resistance. Generating subtexts incited by such methodological tensions, I will offer four versions of the song, performed by soprano Jennifer Goltz and myself, that increasingly spurn Schumann’s musicalized enclosure. I conclude by reflecting upon and amplifying the feminist-critical dimensions of my interpretive escapade.

The overall aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to continue the project of the preceding three chapters, which is to demonstrate how musical structure can be employed in the service of musical meaning as expressible in performance; (2) to carry this project one step further, demonstrating how approaching art song with greater dramaturgical integrity can yield not only a more engaging performance, both theatrically and musically, but also a critical, political statement. My primary concern, therefore, is less with vocal pedagogy than with social justice.

I begin with some general background on the idea of subtext, then proceed to develop a context for my performances of “Du Ring.”
I. Subtext/Context

1. Subtext

The inner monologue is the text the actor (or his character) “speaks” behind the spoken words. It is a repository of thoughts, feelings, desires, motivations, and intentions that informs what the character actually says—or, more precisely, that variously buttresses, lends additional complexity or ambivalence to, or even contradicts what he says. When performing a monologue—a soliloquy or song, for instance—the character, by definition, speaks to no one directly, but she may nonetheless be addressing someone implicitly. This someone may be a character who is not onstage at the moment or a person from the actor’s actual life. The character often wants something from this implied addressee, and the monologue often implicitly goads the addressee into fulfilling that desire. To this extent, the monologue is performative, a speech act.

Virtually all books on stage singing advocate this subtext-oriented approach—it is essentially a *sine qua non* of advanced musical-theater training.⁶ Typically, they advise the student-singer to look for subtextual clues in particularly descriptive or unusual words, in the music itself—its accompanimental texture or rhythmic patterns, for instance—and in the relationship between text and music. The student is then asked to write out the inner monologue more or less word for word—reading between the lines, proverbially, eventuates in *writing* between the lines, literally. Tracey Moore, for one, instructs, “write out what your thoughts are for each line. Your thoughts might be what you would like to say, but can’t. Or it might be what you would like to

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⁶ See, to cite only two of the more popular texts, Craig (1990) and Moore (2008, 41–206).
do. Or it might be a different thought (perhaps the opposite) about what is being expressed in the lyrics. Try to write it as yourself, the way you would speak and think."  

This approach derives from that developed by the venerable Russian acting pedagogue and theorist Constantin Stanislavski (1863–1938). This approach—now universally known as “method acting” or simply, “the Method”—was initially disseminated to American students by Stanislavski’s protégé Lee Strasberg, along with the latter’s colleagues, Stella Adler and Sanford Meisner, among others. I briefly alluded to Stanislavski’s thought in the previous chapter, but I will expand upon it here. In his classic volume, An Actor Prepares (1936), Stanislavski submits that although one cannot always generate genuine emotion deliberately, one can prepare the “fertile soil” from which it is likely to arise. He counsels the student-actor to focus intensely on the particular details of his external environment, to execute some action, and to deliberately develop or carefully attend to a train of thought in response to these perceptions and actions. All these, he maintains, are likely to activate unconscious processes and thus elicit an authentic emotional response. By contrast, attempting to achieve an emotional state directly leads only to physical tension, self-consciousness, and caricature. In other words, focusing on one’s perceptions, actions, and thoughts with minimal preconceptions as to what emotional state these might yield creates a realistic situation in which genuine emotions are likely to occur. For this reason, Stanislavski admonishes, “when you are choosing some bit of action leave feeling and spiritual content alone. Never seek to be jealous . . . or to suffer, for its own sake. All such feelings are the result of something that has gone before. Of the thing that goes before you should think as hard as you can. As for the result, it will produce itself” (1936, 43, his italics).

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7 Moore (2008, 135). She provides a good example of a subtext (for “Some People” from Gypsy) on p. 159.
I would like briefly to consider the ways in which Stanislavski’s thought overlaps with Schenker’s, his almost exact contemporary (not that, to my knowledge, they knew each other’s work). This intersection is relevant to our discussion insofar as below I align the subtextual approach that derives from the Method with a Schenkerian one—or, more precisely, I derive various subtexts from the way melodic implications and motivic strands interact with Schenkerian structure. To start, both Stanislavski and Schenker obviously valorize depth over surface. Both were responding to what they perceived to be superficial trends in the practices of their respective arts—Stanislavski to acting as mere appearance, to emoting in an affected, artificial manner; Schenker to the attribution of musical coherence to surface-level forms rather than to deeper-level linear spans. In this respect, the two figures can be triangulated with another contemporary, Freud, to whose thinking Schenker’s has also been compared (see Chapter 2). As for the affinities between Stanislavski and Freud, consult Sullivan (1964).

For Schenker, linear progressions transcend what he considers the artificial divisions of form theory (Formenlehre). For example, the exposition and development of sonata form, which from a formal perspective are distinct entities, are from a Schenkerian perspective a single entity (at least on a relatively deep structural level); that is, the interruption of the Urlinie occurs at some point in the development (see Schenker [1926]). Linear progressions, on Schenker’s view, unify even forms typically regarded as highly sectionalized, such as rondo and variation, or as highly determined by formal operations, such as fugue. One might say—to employ a patently organicist, and thus fitting metaphor—Schenker viewed pieces more in terms of physiological processes than anatomical structure. Schenker, in short, was the “great antihero of
these respective endeavors, each relied upon organicist metaphors: Schenker’s I discussed in Chapter 2; as for Stanislavski, recall, for example, his mention of “fertile soil.”

Yet, both also espoused what may appear the flip side of organicist ideology, in emphasizing the need to employ tangible tools and reason in order to attain otherwise intangible or spiritual states. This is evident in Stanislavski’s insistence that an emotional state may be accessed only by means of lucid perceptions and thoughts. He provides a methodological equivalent to the broader aesthetic notion that high artistic achievement is not divined or inspired but takes work. Schenker, despite his metaphysical leanings and frequent invocations of natural “genius,” also apparently subscribed to this principle at certain points along his intellectual path.

Strictly speaking, this is not antithetical to organicist aesthetics as originally conceived. Proto-organicist thinkers such as Goethe retained the venerable model by which the artist is inspired by an external, immaterial source—the proverbial poetic muse, or some agent of divine intervention. Yet, at the same time, these thinkers transposed the source of inspiration from some external realm to the mind of the artist. By this maneuver, organicist philosophers secured for the artist her rightful place in the process of artistic creation. Hence, whereas some eighteenth-century philosophers held that the artist completely succumbs to his unconscious, Goethe and other romantic theorists held that the artist consciously triggers these impulses—sets them in motion—from which point they undertake their own, natural course. Others held an even stronger view: the artist steadily applies to these impulses the force of his training, knowledge, and intentions, hence continually refining, modifying, and shaping them. For a detailed historical consideration of these issues, see Abrahms (1953, 156–225)
Kevin Karnes (2005) provides a useful overview of this path. Prior to studying with Brahms (1894–96), Schenker held the view that creativity was mainly instinctual. Working with Brahms made him realize the extent to which sheer workmanship entered into the compositional process. In this, Schenker parted with commonplace early-nineteenth-century theories of creative genius and aligned more with the empiricism that dominated late-nineteenth-century German thought. He claimed that one cannot really know the music-creative process through abstract, metaphysical speculation, only through the statements of active composers, such as his mentor Brahms. However, when, around 1900, he stopped working with Brahms and then gave up his own compositional aspirations, he returned to emphasizing the intuitive element. In Harmony of 1906, for example, he claimed that even those purporting to compose in modes were instinctively led to write in keys—their unconscious prevailed. And in his late, mature work, of course, Schenker wholeheartedly embraced the notion of metaphysical genius.

To zoom in on this middle, Brahms-influenced phase: in an early essay, “Routine in der Musik” (1896), as Karnes recounts, Schenker argues that, even though Beethoven followed several different artistic paths during his life, he nonetheless displayed a consistent attitude (“routine”)

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11 See in particular pp. 60–83, in which he considers the Heiliger Dankgesang movement from the String Quartet, op. 132, which Beethoven designates as being in the Lydian mode. Schenker asserts that this piece is actually in F major with a perpetually tonicized dominant—hence the B♭s; behind Beethoven’s back “there stood that higher force of Nature [that] led his pen, forcing his composition into F major while he himself was sure he was composing in the Lydian mode” (60–61). In other words, Schenker concedes that Beethoven was creating a Lydian effect, but maintains he did so by purely tonal means—by continually tonicizing V. Brown (2005, 151–58) contextualizes Schenker’s tonal interpretation of the Heiliger.
toward his creative process. Namely, as Karnes paraphrases, “he always strove to master the possibilities and respect the inherent limitations of the full palette of expressive means endowed to him by his predecessors” (2005, 168). Beethoven—and also Brahms, according to Schenker—found his voice by distilling the lessons of his predecessors and minting new ideas by means of them. Beethoven relies upon and modernizes the past because, Schenker asserts, natural talent and even inborn genius are insufficient for attaining supreme artistry; for this, one must also carefully hone mechanical skills. Correspondingly, on the level of particular compositional endeavors, spontaneous invention and conscious craftsmanship must interact. Unconscious impulses must submit to rational reflection and be modified accordingly. Hence, as Karnes summarizes, “the truly great composers . . . are not those predestined to achieve their greatness along a path predetermined by their innate creative talents. Rather, the truly great artists . . . like Beethoven, never tire of exploring, in a carefully deliberating manner, the expressive potential of all artistic means at their disposal” (2005, 164). Beethoven had the wisdom to filter his considerable instincts and talents through the models of others.

I have taken somewhat of an excursion, but the main point for our purposes is that the “Method” art-song stylist will diligently fashion a tangible subtext by which she is more likely to feel genuine musical emotions. Moreover, this process, in its balance and tension between rational and more intuitive elements, arguably parallels that by which art songs, and great music generally, are composed, and more broadly still, by which great composers develop their talent.
2. The “Resisting” Performance

As I mentioned, a subtext may support, problematize, or even (seemingly) contradict the text’s most obvious level of meaning. Perhaps the classic example of the last is Barbara Streisand’s version of “Happy Days are Here Again” (originally composed by Milton Ager and lyrics written by Jack Yellen for the eponymous film of 1936). Streisand contravenes the text not only with her famously slow arrangement but also with her acting choices and lugubrious singing (see her performance on the Dinah Shore Show—Streisand [1963]). One might assume that the slow tempo would create a persistently sad take on the otherwise happy song, but Streisand’s performance actually traverses a wide range of emotions (none of which, however, are outright happy). She begins more wistful than sad, the bridge is defiant, the last verse is grandiose, and the coda is angry. These last three choices suggest that, if one is indeed to glimpse happiness, one must actively recover it, claim it, rather than just expect it or take it for granted. In this way, her interpretive approach, which might otherwise seem merely to contradict the text and thus be nonsensical, consonates with the text in an unexpected way.

Streisand’s subtext, then, though incongruous with the text, ultimately does not resist it. Her interpretation, though bemoaning a lack of happiness, still subscribes to its possibility. For Frauenliebe, given the ethical concerns it presents, I would like to explore the possibility of generating a more critical, more resistant subtext than Streisand perhaps felt compelled to generate.

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12 I thank Brent Wagner for bringing this example to my attention.
for “Happy Days”—the political stakes in the Schumann are simply higher. Before I do, however, I would like to consider the notion of a critical subtext more generally and offer a couple of precedents. A resisting subtext can arise from (a) the context in which one situates a song—assuming, of course, that one preestablishes that context for the audience in some way; (b) the blow-by-blow interpretive choices—the combination of musical and visual cues by which the performer telegraphs unease or disagreement with the words she sings (this includes the particulars of the arrangement in the case of pop songs); (c) a combination of these. Ultimately, I will utilize option (c), but for now, I offer separate examples of (a) and (b). The resistance of the first example, from an opera-cum-musical, depends almost entirely on context, is to economic and racial oppression, and is comparatively subtle and light-hearted. The resistance of the second example, a pop-song cover, depends almost entirely on performance-content, is to gender oppression and abuse, and is brazen. The first example is “I Got Plenty of Nothing” from Gershwin’s Porgy and Bess, as performed in the recent Broadway revival; the second is “Johnny Get Angry,” as performed by k. d. lang.

13 In at least one instance, however, “Happy Days” did in fact assume political overtones: on the Garry Moore show, Streisand performed the song within a skit revolving around the Great Crash of 1929, singing it ironically as a millionaire who had just lost all of her money.

14 I shall keep my discussion here very limited, discussing neither the broader controversy over the opera’s putative racism, nor the more limited one over the current production’s putative lack of authenticity (as alleged by Stephen Sondheim in a now infamous 2011 letter to The New York Times).

15 In this chapter, I am focusing on resisting performances in the vocal rather than instrumental medium, since in the former the semantic content and context on which political resistance relies is clearer. But resisting performances in the instrumental realm are also possible. In this regard, Korsyn (2009) recounts
In a videotaped interview, the playwright Suzan-Lori Parks, the self-described “book adapter” for the recent Broadway incarnation of *Porgy and Bess*, explains that the *raison d’être* of this production was to convert what was conceived as an opera into more an audience-friendly musical—one, moreover, that resonates with contemporary mores and is “more truthful to the *current* African-American experience” (Parks [2012]). Speaking in particular of Porgy’s second-act anthem, “I Got Plenty of Nothing,”¹⁶ she says the song has long been hard to swallow for many people, because traditionally, it’s been understood to be a song of the happy ninety-nine percent, if you will. ‘Our pockets are empty but boy we’re happy!’ And I was like, you know, there’s gotta be more to that. So I started to think about the word ‘nothing’ . . . . In the African-American tradition, the word ‘nothing’ is often used to mean ‘everything,’ or when you mean ‘nothing’ you mean ‘something.’ So what I did is I added some dialogue right before the song, in which Porgy comes out of the house—he’s been living with Bess for about a month . . . . and says ‘good mornin’ everybody’ and they say ‘good mornin,’ and they say ‘wow Porgy, you’re lookin’ better than good. What you been

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¹⁶ The Gershwins originally spelled “nothing” as “nuttin’”; the current production changed the spelling presumably in order to avoid a perceived racial or cultural stereotype, just as they changed “Dat” (in “There’s a Boat Dat’s Leavin’ Soon For New York”) to “that.”
up to? ’ And he says [with a smirk], ‘nothin.’ Now, all the men [on stage] laugh, and the audience
laughs too, because ‘nothing’ means ‘something,’ it means he’s getting some love in his life, finally.

. . . . . Then he sings ‘I Got Plenty of Nothing,’ which, now in our production, means, ‘I’ve got
plenty of love.’

So in Parks’s version, the song conveys not “I’m happy to have nothing” but “I’m happy to have
something,” namely sexual love. Instead of complying with and even celebrating his own economic
oppression (just as, in the United States at least, those of lower economic status are often
persuaded to vote against their own best interests), Porgy celebrates his autonomy. Granted, this
autonomy is more carnal than fiscal, but the two are not unrelated: the concreteness of bodily
experience is some countermeasure against the abstract exchange value of capitalism, much in the
way Adorno says music itself, if deceptively, “assures man that within the monotony of universal
comparability there is still something particular” (1962, 48).

In this example, the resistance derives almost entirely from Parks’ added bit. The
performance itself, as far as I can tell from the little I was able to see on YouTube (Parks [2012]), is
fairly neutral—it does not wear ideology on its sleeve.¹⁷ We fully appreciate the irony only if privy
to Parks’s interpolation—and to the fact that, in African-American slang, “nothing” is
“something.” By contrast, k. d. lang’s audacious 1985 cover of Joanie Summer’s 1962 hit, “Johnny
Get Angry,” does not lie within any particular context that would infuse the performance with a
particular subtext (she does not verbally introduce her performance, as far as I can tell from the

¹⁷ Lydia Hamessley offers another example of a performance whose resistance derives almost entirely from
the explicit context surrounding the song. The singer Lily May Ledford put a political spin on her
performance of the Appalachian Murder Ballad “Pretty Polly” (to be discussed later) by means of an
anecdote she told prior to playing the song live in concert. See Hamessley (2005, 22).
video clip).\(^{18}\) Lang conveys the subtext so powerfully, vividly, and physically, “subtext” here is almost a misnomer—she inscribes new meaning over rather than under the words of the song.

In the song’s text, the female protagonist expresses disappointment with her partner’s (presumably husband’s) apathy toward her threatening to leave him and her dancing with another man. Using the euphemism of “lecture,” she welcomes verbal, even possibly physical abuse, as implied by “cave man”:

Johnny get angry, Johnny get mad,
Give me the biggest lecture I ever had,
I want a brave man, I want a cave man,
Johnny show me that you care, really care for me.

The song celebrates and lends credence to the false belief often held by victims of abuse that the abuser expresses caring through his or her actions. Incidentally, an even more blatant invitation to physical abuse occurs in Act I of Mozart’s Don Giovanni—in Zerlina’s aria “Batti, Batti” (“Beat me, Beat me”), which she addresses to her fiancé Masetto, ostensibly to assuage his anger about the Don’s advances toward her. Some performers counter the titular exhortation by delivering the song as an ironic or even sexual provocation—as if to suggest, contrary to Zerlina’s otherwise cherubic demeanor, that she is soliciting sadomasochistic sex that would be a display of her own autonomy, a celebration of her own carnal prowess and power. Very often, however, performers—especially when singing the aria in studio class or recital—regrettably fall prey to Mozart’s melodious lyricism and thus collude with him in belying the horrifying message of the text.

\(^{18}\) Of course, knowing that lang is a self-proclaimed feminist is itself a context, albeit a very general one.
Lang, on the other hand, refuses to accept the misogyny of her chosen text. She resists it by explicitly acting out the violent consequences of the authority the protagonist grants the man, leaving no doubt that the verbal abuse she invites is in fact physical abuse thinly veiled. Lang basically asks, “is there a fundamental difference between male authority and abuse?” (Burns [1997, 97]). She conveys resistance in part by acting out variously the male and female characters in the song’s scenario. In this, she not only renders the violence more explicit, but, more subtly, she opens up the otherwise monologic enclosure of the text, challenging authorial authority, which has traditionally been granted to men. She also provokes her audience—who indeed responds to her performance in a gleefully “unruly” way—into a dialogic confrontation with her, thus undermining her own monologic authority as a performer. At one point she does so by means of an “uncomfortably long pause,” as Burns describes it (ibid., 98). Relatedly, her pervasive contrametric rubato could be seen as resisting the authority of meter (the “tyranny of the downbeat,” as Kevin Korsyn is fond of saying in seminar, most often in reference to Beethoven’s evasion of it).

Equally significant is the manner in which lang’s arrangement intensifies the binarism of the authentic/plagal harmonic systems (on which Harrison [1994] provides a definitive exposition). This, I would suggest, arguably aligns with the binarism of masculine/feminine, insofar as authentic progressions (prototypically V–I) are structurally authoritative and more suggestive of abstract musical reason, plagal progressions (prototypically IV–I) are more

19 One might view this pause as the performance equivalent to the conspicuous textual gaps described by Iser (1978), which likewise dissolve the monologic self-enclosure of the text—or better, expose it as illusory.

20 On the markedness or otherness of the plagal system in relation to the authentic, see Notley (2005).
supplemental, deviant, and embellishment—at least prior to late-Romantic harmony, where they become more normative. As Burns explains, “Lang exaggerates the inherent features of the original song and carries them to their logical conclusion. By playing on the ‘weaker’ versus the ‘stronger’ features in the original song’s musical discourse, she exposes the imbalance of power ascribed to women and men in patriarchal society” (ibid., 110).

In summary, Lang, in her physicality, music-interpretive choices, and arrangement, resists the song less by furnishing an alternate meaning, as in the example from *Porgy and Bess*, than by vastly intensifying the song’s original meaning, exposing it for the misogynist propaganda it is.

* * *

I want to expound on Lang’s approach by recourse to a seemingly incompatible bedfellow—Beethoven. Adorno postulates a fundamental distinction between Beethoven’s middle and late styles, in order to set them in dialectical orbit. This distinction is based upon music-technical and -aesthetic factors and the sociological ones they intimate. His basic contention, to state it simply, is that the middle style is characterized by organic wholeness, the late style by fragmentation and dissociation. Concomitantly, the former posits a subject who is compatible with the objective sphere, the latter one who is not. The former subject is thus free—free, that is, in a way consonant with nature. This is no purely formal, Kantian freedom, by which, as glossed by Charles Taylor, “I declare my independence . . . from all natural considerations and motives and from the natural causality which rules them. . . . I am free in a radical sense, self-determining not as a natural being but as a pure, moral will” (1975, 31). Rather, Beethoven’s freedom is more Hegelian, whereby

21 The following is adapted from Swinkin (forthcoming B).
one, in achieving ultimate autonomy, perfectly accords with nature. Man, on Hegel’s view, is a vehicle of spirit without having to abdicate his moral autonomy.²²

To elaborate, in many middle-style works, the theme is de-particularized from the outset, such that the subject can be thoroughly immersed in the whole—or, more precisely, can create a whole that is but a projection of his own course, his own destiny.²³ Burdened by no presuppositions, no a priori, he can be self-generating, self-defining, an agent who “shapes and seizes history as [his] own narrative of progress and power in the name of liberty” (Chua [2005, 18]). If these narratives of self-generation are engendered by the elemental beginnings, so are they by the nothingness in which such beginnings eventuate. Beethovenian form is a dialectical process whereby particulars cancel each other out, resulting in a zero-sum game of “self-consuming adequations,” a whole that is but “the sum of all the individual negations” (ibid., 21). Put more concretely, middle-style Beethoven is ideally suited to expressing freedom, for, unencumbered by demonstrable reference to external reality, it is music first and foremost about itself. Yet, in that very absoluteness and abstractness lies an image of pure being, of unfettered freedom—“absolute nothing is the programmatic element of these works”²⁴ A piece about nothing is thereby paradoxically a piece about something—namely, the unqualified freedom to forge one’s own

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²² See Taylor’s magisterial discussion of these issues in 1975 (3–50).

²³ I do not use the masculine pronoun here casually: the Beethovenian subject is indeed arguably primarily masculine, as discussed in Pederson (2000) (more on this in conclusion).

²⁴ Chua (2005, 19). This paradox of German Romantic music generally forms the central theme of Hoeckner (2002).
identity, to move uninhibitedly through historical time and social space. As Adorno declares, “in Beethoven everything can become anything . . . because it ‘is’ nothing” (1988, 22 and 26).

Yet, Adorno insists, insofar as this dynamic purports to reflect that of social reality, the middle style harbors an ideological dimension, for, in the real world, the subject is generally dominated by, rather than consonant with, the objective sphere, or the ruling stratum. In fact, the middle style subtextually contains strains of coercion, tiny tears in its supposedly seamless organic fabric. This is evident in, among other things, the overexerted “tonic and dominant swings” (Tovey [1945, 111]) of the codas and in “the exaggerated assertiveness of the development and recapitulation procedures, in which Adorno discerns . . . the incipient transformation of freedom into force” (Subotnik [1991, 22, my italics]).

Adorno appraises the late style with comparable dialectical ambivalence. On the one hand, Beethoven frames the particular as no longer an integral part of an inviolable whole but rather as an autonomous fragment: “the emancipated phrase, released from the dynamic flow, speaks for itself” (Adorno [1988, 125]). Just as the societal subject no longer possesses the power to generate objective reality on its own terms, neither can the musical subject generate external forms and procedures: “the conventions [are] no longer imbued and mastered by subjectivity, but left standing” (ibid.) Accordingly, overt thematic development and connections between formal sections are frequently absent, such that formal conventions are laid bare, and now assume an

25 It appears, in fact, that the only style, according to Adorno, whose rapprochement of subject and object is consonant with social reality is that of Bach, who integrates archaic contrapuntal devices and subjective “reflection on the motivic work”—rational control over the myriad motivic permutations. Contrapuntal formulae are not merely exhibited but thoroughly worked over and assimilated. See Adorno (1955).
arbitrary rather than intrinsic relation to the content. Absent a dynamic thematic trajectory, the subject is no longer embedded in musical processes but is relegated to the exterior of the composition—the subject must now enter in surreptitiously, in the cracks and fissures of the musical fabric. The pregnant silences—as throughout the scherzo of the Ninth Symphony or in the second movement of op. 109, just prior to the recapitulation—bespeak a musical persona who veers into his musical creation from without rather than vitally inhabiting it from within.

Implicitly invoking Hegel (1820–29, 76–97), Adorno claims that the music’s spirit is no longer integrated with material substance, in the manner of a classical symbol, but is segregated from it, in the manner of an allegory. The music is about the subject (read: Beethoven?) rather than infused by the subject. Beethoven is present in his late music by being conspicuously absent: “of the works [the subject] leaves only fragments behind, communicating itself, as if in ciphers, only through the spaces it has violently vacated” (Adorno [1988, 125]). In short, “as [a] critical and stylistic term, late style [for Adorno] implies the paradox of an authorial signature present in its withdrawal” (Rosenthal [2007, 121]).

Hence it would seem that Adorno denies late Beethoven the possibility of freedom in Hegel’s sense; the subject is no longer reconciled with nature but is hopelessly alienated from it. In fact, music itself, once a symbol for nature, has devolved into ossified conventions—there is no nature with which the subject can seek reconciliation. Yet—and here is the point to which I have been leading—such inorganicism can be seen, paradoxically, as possessing life-affirming potential. For, in casting off the appearance of art, of organic seamlessness, it crystallizes the alienation and disenfranchisement of the individual, which was menacingly latent in the middle style. Late Beethoven’s “moments of transcendence . . . cut through the aesthetic appearance of unity and
expose it as false” (Hoeckner [2002, 22]). In exposing this condition of alienation, the late music implicitly critiques it, pointing toward a more ideal state, if only by (to invoke Nelson Goodman’s term) “contrastively exemplifying” such a state. The late style catalyzes freedom insofar as the latter assumes the form, in Fredric Jameson’s estimation, of “a sudden perception of an intolerable present which is at the same time, but implicitly and however dimly articulated, the glimpse of another state. . . . The intolerable present of a terrorized world . . . gives us a glimpse of a state of freedom where there is no fear.”

Or as Elaine Showalter says of recent woman’s literature, “although the reclamation of suffering is the beginning, its purpose is to discover the new world” (1985, 134). And finally, for Adorno himself, “in the abandonment of the illusion of harmony, there is an expression of hope” (1988, 126).

Late Beethoven, then, on Adorno’s view, catalyzes freedom precisely by crystallizing the reality of unfreedom, just as k. d. lang does in her revelatory performance. And lang does so in a manner that could be traced back to late Beethoven, or readily described in terms of a late-Beethovenian aesthetic: she paralyzes the music with devastating caesurae, exposing organic musical continuity or unity as false or illusory; she polarizes the authentic and plagal systems, just as late Beethoven does various other musical parameters; and she separates out the authorial

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26 Jameson (1971, 85); quoted by Pederson (2000, 2). On the notion that freedom exists only counterfactually, within some alterior realm, see Chua (2004).

27 In particular, late Beethoven separates polyphony out from both monody and homophony, all of which had been tenuously integrated in earlier classicism. As Michael Spitzer says, “a texture which is left loosely hybrid in the music of Haydn, Mozart, and early Beethoven is radicalized . . . into a clean-cut opposition between extremes—unmediated juxtapositions of polyphony and monody” (2006, 141).
persona—in her case, her own performing self—from the musical discourse, serving as a puppet master who unabashedly manipulates performance conventions from without, just as Beethoven does compositional conventions. In all these ways, though apparently worlds apart, the two musics share the same strain of critical potency.

* * *

Yet, an ambiguity lurks behind Adorno’s theory of Beethoven that he does not sufficiently address: is it ethically more beneficent to reflect the reality of oppressive social conditions or, conversely, to postulate a less hegemonic, even utopian social dynamic? Is it preferable to show how things are or rather the way they could (should) be? Put differently, is Beethoven’s heroism on its face a pernicious obfuscation of the social conditions of his era or rather an impetus to individual freedom? Adorno’s own ambivalence toward this matter has not gone undetected. Stephen Hinton, for one, states, “the question remains whether music’s glory is philosophically ‘acceptable’ or ‘false’—whether it is allied with truth or with ideological deception” (1996, 143). Subotnik, for another, muses, “how does one decide when art is doing its best to prefigure a utopian totality in the face of despair and when it is trying to conceal inhumanity? Adorno offers no general guide” (1991, 38).

Put in terms of performance, is it politically more strategic to interpret an ideologically dubious song in a way as to expose its dubiousness or in a way to point to a more desirable state? Can one do both for the same song, perhaps in different interpretive versions? It depends on the song. I do not think it is possible to convey anything beneficial through such a toxic vessel as “Johnny” other than by taking it apart at the seams, as lang does. “Du Ring” is another, more
complex matter. In it, I believe, one can both expose the baleful practice of female containment within Schumann’s era and also advocate for alternative states. One can variously display displeasure and hope. I will demonstrate this below, but first I must lay the groundwork for our interpretive experiment by taking an overview of the cycle and reviewing some of the literature devoted to it.

3. Context

_Frauenliebe und leben_ purports to trace the love and life of the titular protagonist but in actuality reduces her life solely to the events deemed significant within the scheme of nineteenth-century bourgeois domesticity: basically, falling in love with a man, marrying him, and bearing his children. The other events and relationships that would render a life meaningful are replaced, Solie (1992) points out, by narrative gaps. This is due in part to Schumann having omitted from Chamisso’s cycle both a strophe from the sixth poem in which the heroine confides her pregnancy to her mother, who proceeds to offer her comfort, and, more significantly, the final poem in its entirety, in which “the protagonist looks back on her life . . . and passes on her accumulated wisdom to her granddaughter” (ibid., 228). That her life is lived through the man to whom she genuflects is borne out by the end of the cycle where he dies—or perhaps, metaphorically, leaves her—and she pronounces herself dead as well (“ich bin nicht lebend mehr”). Hence, the cycle is a portrait less of a woman’s real, multidimensional life than of her life as refracted through a masculinist prism.

The heroine’s potentially rich subjectivity is diminished not just by having to mirror the man, but also, and relatedly, by being confined to patriarchal space. Such containment is arguably
enacted both textually and tonally, as can be gleaned from Ex. 4-1, an overview of the entire set. Songs 6 and 7, the rare moments where the woman is not fixating upon the man—who she focuses on her child—return forthwith, in Song 8, to a preoccupation with the man, whose death/abandonment quashes the woman’s deeply felt joy. Moreover, these songs are set in the only remote, chromatic keys of the cycle. This renders them other and thus in need of diatonic restoration, which the home-key postlude subsequently provides. On a smaller scale, Song 3, in which the man initially reciprocates her affections, is of course morally dubious in itself in its sentiment of (to paraphrase) “I can’t believe he actually loves me.” But it is also dubious in its
tonal enclosure: its C minor is enveloped by the E♭ key of Songs 2 and 4, as if to suggest that the woman’s incredulity is indeed warranted, and that the man’s apparent affection for her is in fact illusory ("ein Traum").

Schumann’s heroine, in short, “retains only a generic, ritualized, mythic existence” (Solie [1992, 228]). She is devoid of particularity and serves mainly to mirror her husband’s desires. Schumann’s cycle is oppressive not only in adopting Chamisso’s cycle but in exacerbating its misogynist tendencies in its textual and musical choices.28

* * *

So a resisting performance, I think, must, above all, particularize the woman, flesh her out, give her her own voice.29 In covering a pop song, the arrangement can do this. Hamessley offers the

28 I say the cycle is misogynist rather than Schumann himself because I do not presume to ascribe particular attitudes to him. He could very well have been making these choices without any conscious misogynist intent; and even if he consciously held these attitudes, they might be less symptomatic of personal malice than of established cultural mores. It is the value system of Schumann’s culture, not of Schumann per se, and the way that system is musically encoded on which I prefer to focus. Hence, subsequent references to “misogynist ideology” and the like can be situated within this culturally mediated stance. Not to mention that, if one were to attribute baleful attitudes to Schumann, it would only be fair also to attribute to him the unease and resistance to the text in the various musical moments throughout the cycle on which I seize below.

29 Koskoff’s (1995) documenting of the musical and cultural practices of the Lubavitschers—a sect of Hasidic Jews most of whose members reside in Crown Heights, Brooklyn—vividly reveals the extent to which the oppression of women can take the form of silencing them, quite literally.
example of “Pretty Polly,” an Appalachian Murder Ballad. Traditionally performed, this genre recounts the killing of a woman in a dispassionate way, amounting to “a heartless acceptance of the ballad’s violent scenario” (2005, 20). The cover by the New Coon Creek Girls, however, strategically uses a fiddle to represent the woman’s sentience: “by closely aligning the fiddle melodies with Polly’s experiences, the performers draw attention to Polly’s feelings of suspicion, dread, and terror” (ibid., 31). Granted, the words would seem to give Polly a voice: “Oh Willie, please spare my life,” she pleads, just as, on a broader level, Frauenliebe is ostensibly spoken entirely by the woman. But Polly’s words are uttered by the male narrator; in Frauenliebe, a male evidently speaks through the woman, expressing his own vision of how her life should be. So Polly’s violin is a much needed, non-verbal venue in which the woman can convey her experience.

Short of arranging Frauenliebe, can something along these lines be found in the score as is? Kristina Muxfeldt (2001) finds it in Schumann’s postlude (Ex. 4-2).
Chamisso’s final poem would have exposed the previous ones as recollections, creating narrative distance between the woman and her life, and between us and the woman. Schumann’s postlude, by contrast, intimately depicts her sentience. It recalls the opening song sans some melody, giving us a real sense of the woman’s muted memory. The initially blinding image of him is now softened: “the very inaccuracy of the repetition, its muted passion, imitates the perceptual mechanisms of a memory that has no hope of being revitalized” (Muxfeldt [2001, 47]). Moreover, the missing melody directly elicits the listener’s imagination—we must exercise our own memory, and in doing so we experience the heroine’s mental process and thus empathize with her. So, for Solie, Schumann, by omitting the last poem, fails to portray the heroine in a multidimensional
way. For Muxfeldt, conversely, Schumann, precisely by replacing the poem with a postlude, succeeds in portraying her in a multidimensional way.

On this basis of empathy, Muxfeldt defends the cycle more generally, claiming that both Chamisso's poetry and Schumann’s setting give the woman a voice at a time where it was rare to do so in literature. Yet, I am ultimately unpersuaded by Muxfeldt’s advocacy, for it does no good to give the woman a voice only to speak the words put in her mouth by a man. An adequate defense of this piece, in my view, must devolve upon the music rather than upon the text. For it is music, in its basic ineffability, in exuding general states of being on which no one discourse has a monopoly, that furnishes the site where the feminine can assert itself in a way not guaranteed to reproduce male desire. But this is not to say that the postlude is the only place where the woman can speak. I believe she does so, potentially, in myriad musical details throughout the cycle, in latencies that connote resistance. Because these details are very subtle, more potential than actual, we require significant analytical intervention to tease them out.

* * *

My method here will be to use Schenkerian structure as a kind of foil, pitting against it motivic strands and melodic and harmonic implications that resist its tonal hierarchy and
enclosure (see Fig. 4-1). In other words, over against tonal structure, I juxtapose “phantom”
tonalities (a term I will explain), melodic implications, and motivic modules that appear to
challenge the enclosure of a Schenkerian hierarchy, that seem to exhibit a predilection for
autonomy or emancipation. Take this as a metaphor for the female seeking to emancipate herself
from the enclosure of the proverbial ring.

The stage for this methodological conflict, needless to say, has already been set. Eugene
Narmour (1977), as is well known, challenges “Schenkerism” on many bases, one of which is that
it subordinates the parameters of melody and rhythm to an all-subsuming Ursatz. Yet, Narmour
claims, melody and rhythm often generate implications that cannot be explained or resolved by the
Ursatz. He exclaims, “voice leading and melody are not the same. . . . Melody . . . though influenced by
harmony, nevertheless remains independent of it” (1977, 80, his italics). He prefers an
implication-realization model, since it acknowledges the individuation of distinct parameters by
focusing on implications irrespective of their contribution to a preconceived totality. Narmour, then, is concerned with melodic lines that assert an irreducible horizontality, that refuse to be subsumed by the putatively all-governing Naturklang.

Richard Cohn (1992), meanwhile, has championed the autonomy of motives with respect to Schenkerian structure (although he ultimately does not view the two domains as irreconcilable). As he recounts, Schenker’s concept of motivic unity shifted from recognizing real-time, linear correspondences to prioritizing hierarchical derivation. In the latter, a motive assumes the status of an entity by “its derivability from the Ursatz via voice-leading transformations, rather than its treatment elsewhere in the piece” (1992, 153). Consequently, “many surface contiguities which were recognized by traditional theorists, including the early Schenker, are [in later Schenker] considered false entities” (ibid., 154). According to this later view, a motive’s description must include its voice-leading derivation or origin; if two apparent motives do not share a structural description, the hypothesized relation is dismissed. Yet, Cohn proceeds to note, Schenker himself deviates from this standard. For example, in his analysis of Mozart’s late G minor symphony, Schenker dissolves a single third span into two stepwise motives and grants them a motivic correspondence even though the entities assume divergent voice-leading functions.

For the present, I am interested in such polemics not for the sake of unpacking or arbitrating them, but rather of using them to harness antagonism between the performers and the ideology of Schumann’s cycle. Schenkerian theory itself is not the problem, and indeed, as Cohn suggests, such productive parametric conflict can arise even within Schenker’s œuvre (or indeed, even within a single Schenkerian reading), provided one takes his diachronic development into account. I am staging a confrontation among different methods mainly in order to render more
vivid the tensions that reside within any one, well-formulated theory. Moreover, I impute no misogynist agenda to Schenkerian theory, but rather use it merely as a metaphor for the enclosure Schumann depicts, and as a heuristic by which to catalyze conflict among parameters. This parametric conflict will function on two semiotic levels. In terms of Peircean semiotics, iconically it will symbolize the conflict between the heroine and the man. Indexically, the conflict, in the subtexts it yields, will precipitate actual tension between the performers and the piece’s ideology.

My working method was to analyze the music; to construe the results metaphorically, as symbolic of emotional states; then to concretize those states in the form of an inner monologue. The latter, in performance, then reanimated those emotions in Jennifer and myself, which led to musical and physical choices that hopefully convey those emotions on some level. Fig. 4-2 schematizes this process. I want to emphasize that, though we rely on subtext, ours is still basically a non-discursive strategy: the subtext produces signs of resistance that come through in non-verbal, musical and physical forms.30

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30 To elaborate on our working procedure, I presented subtextual cues to Jennifer after having completed my analysis, and she developed her interpretation in response to them. In some cases she suggested modifications to my subtextual thoughts or entirely new thoughts, for which I am grateful. The subtexts on which we eventually settled are basically reproduced in Ex. 4-5 and subsequent examples. The placement of these thoughts in the score (indicated by wedges) is not meant to suggest that Jennifer necessarily thought them at those precise moments; they might have entered her mind a little before or after. Nor, presumably, did Jennifer think these exact words. They are merely a template for a subtext, one needing to be infused with Jennifer’s personal experience.
Suzanne Cusick offers a possible precedent for a resisting performance of Frauenliebe. Citing Jesse Norman’s rendition of the second song (“Du, der Herrlichste von allen,” Web Ex. 10), Cusick opines that Norman sings with uncharacteristic unmusicality (by conventional standards), most notably in her “amateurish execution of the vocal turns” (1994, 105). Cusick also detects her wavering between a throaty voice and a more normative feminine head voice—a tactic, I would add, that opens up the same sort of dialogic space as we saw with k. d. lang, although with Norman less blatantly. Most generally, Norman exposes rather than conceals the mechanics of vocal production. She seems “ill at ease with her own voice” (ibid., 106), thus subliminally conveying discomfort with the text and, perhaps more importantly, with the Heldenmusik Schumann asks her to sing. As Cusick contends, “Norman invites us to hear the Frau’s voice struggling with the enforced discipline of enunciating someone else’s seemingly uncongenial words; a voice struggling
to perform in the phrase-ending turns the Frau’s coming social role as ornament to her future husband’s life” (ibid., 107).

Cusick, then, does not indict Norman on the basis of these apparent vocal anomalies but rather diagnoses them as parapraxes of sorts, ones by which Norman unconsciously resists the cycle’s oppressive ideology. Jennifer and I, on the other hand, approach this endeavor quite consciously and deliberately. If Norman resists Frauenliebe, it is likely unintentional and rather subtle. But many would agree that such a “hateful” cycle, as Cusick puts it, demands a more proactive and outspoken performance critique, which Jennifer and I shall provide. My contribution also lies in demonstrating how close analysis can benefit this critical enterprise. Admittedly, Frauenliebe generally may be a somewhat facile target for critique, “Du Ring” in particular, due to its oozing sentimentality. But, my goal is less feminist revelation than to demonstrate how, once the need for resistance is firmly in place, one can co-opt music analysis to facilitate a close, quasi-deconstructive reading that in turn facilitates a resisting performance.

* * *

Table 4-1 provides an overview of our interpretive experiment. The first interpretation has all the classically pretty singing one has come to expect in this song. This performance—not a resisting one but rather a foil for the resisting ones that follow—expresses a somewhat utopian state, one that, crucially, belies the violence and brutality on which such a state is built.31 The remaining

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31 Leppert (1993) frequently makes this point with respect to the musical iconography he surveys. To take just one of his many examples: Johan Zoffany, *The Morse and Cator Families* (ca. 1784) depicts two women—a harpsichordist and her page-turner—flanked by two men, one playing the cello, one standing. These men
three performances will expose the dehumanization of the female within the nineteenth-century, male-centered, bourgeois economy. The first resisting performance (Version 2) will express somewhat subtle ambivalence by seizing upon subtle tensions at the musical foreground. The second (Version 3) will express glimmers of hope, of more ideal states that transcend existing conditions. It will do so by exposing tonal and melodic implications and realizations, which will be read metaphorically to imply alternate, heartening scenarios. The last (Version 4), by looking more closely at motivic content, will express outright anger and defiance, which, in this context, is a positive thing, for the woman has been emotionally liberated and is no longer ensconced in an aura of domestic tranquility. Hence, our resisting performances utilize three different emotional states as derived from three different analytical methodologies (with some overlapping, of course).

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were real-life Britishmen living in India in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Leppert notes the portrait was composed in India but India is not at all represented—the geographical reality is suppressed. The picture transposes the “social reality of British colonialism . . . into a visual language eminently attractive, seamless, and unprovocative” (95); and the conventional curtain behind the subjects prevents us from seeing “the foundation of exploitation and suffering on which this cultured scene depends” (105).
II. Resisting “Du Ring”

First Analysis/Performance

“Du Ring” (Ex. 4-3) delineates a ternary, A₁–B–A₂ form, A₁ nesting a smaller-scale a₁–b–a₂ (A₂, as is typical of ternary forms, is a condensed variant of A₁, eliding its b section). Note the affinity between the small and large B sections: the latter has a somewhat developmental function in condensing and fragmenting the main melodic idea of the former (Ex. 4-4). B also plays extensively with b’s fourth motive—which b actualizes in relation to the a section, as shown in the example—first enlarging then diminishing it, as we will later discuss. The coda alludes to the B section, as is typical in all manner of ternary-type forms. This coda negotiates between the two versions of the B-section melodic idea, between the one found in the small B and the large B, as shown in Ex. 4-4. That is, it is true to the linear contour of the former but still breaks it off, fragments it, as in the latter.
Example 4-3: Schumann, “Du Ring an meinem Finger” from Frauenliebe und -leben, op. 42: translation and formal sections

You ring on my finger, my golden little ring.

I press you gently to my lips, to my heart.

I had outdreamt the peaceful, beautiful dream of childhood.

I found myself alone, lost in open, infinite space.

(because) you had first taught me, to open my eyes to the infinite, deep value of life.
I will serve him, live for him, belong to him entirely, give myself to him and find myself transfigured in his glory.
Given the thematic relations among the small B, large B, and B-oriented coda, the song can be seen basically to alternate between A and B modules throughout. This generates some ambiguity about precisely what section frames what: is perhaps the final A refrain, for instance, framed by the B material by which it is flanked? Such interlaced structure, characteristic of Schumann in particular and of the Romantics generally, is redolent of the arabesque, a figure transferred from architecture to poetry and music, the last most explicitly in Schumann’s eponymous piece of 1838. As Nonnenmann (2001) recounts, Schlegel equated the humoresque of Jean Paul with the
arabesque. Both are fantasies about nothing—the frame (narrative in one case, visual in the other) is brought front and center, valorized as primary. “The accessory ceases to be an external component and advances to the precondition of the work’s possibility” (Nonnenmann [2001, 245]).

Precisely how Schumann’s Arabeske instantiates this romantic trope largely exceeds the scope of our current discussion. Briefly, it is manifested on several levels. On the smallest, in the opening figure, anacrases lead to yet more anacrases—an ornament decorates yet another ornament, and that in turn decorates another, and so on. On the next level, the interlaced structure yields an ambiguity as to what section frames what—as the piece proceeds, we lose confidence that the A section is central, and begin to hear it as subordinate to the interior sections. Finally, on the level of the entire form, the piece is ostensibly a rondo, yet the rondo is devoid of real identity—the piece, technically speaking, may have the form of a rondo but not really the character of one. Similarly, the piece could be considered a variation set if not for lacking a solid thematic kernel. Schumann himself memorably referred to the piece as a set of “variations but on no theme” [“Variationen, aber über kein Thema”]. In Nonnemann’s gloss, “the

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32 “Das Beiwerk hört auf, externe Zutat zu sein, and avanciert zur Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Werkes selbst” (Nonnenmann [2001, 245]). This and the following translations of this article are my own. Here he is actually quoting Winfried Menninghaus, *Lob des Unsinns. Über Kant, Tieck und Blaubart* (Frankfurt a. M., 1995), 112.
entire course of the piece as an unfolding of a micro-structural “nothing” [the opening figure] turns out to be a macro-structure equally devoid of a center.”

The significance of this trope for the present discussion is that the ornamental has traditionally been aligned with the feminine, that which is ornamented with the masculine. Insofar as the arabesque pushes the ornamental to the fore, it can be seen to pose a challenge to male hegemony. Moreover, this ornamental center, as Nonnenmann argues, is not vacuous, not purely formalistic, as the arabesque has often been thought to be. On the contrary, according to Schlegel and other Romantics, it possesses transcendental content and value. Schumann’s piece, for one, “indicates precisely with its thematic—or, in the Kantian sense—conceptual emptiness an infinite bounty of formal possibilities.”

As Nonnenmann notes, Schumann employed this trope not just in Arabeske but throughout his oeuvre—it formed a core part of his aesthetic sensibility. Indeed, I would suggest that the arabesque obtains in “Du Ring”—on primarily a formal rather than thematic level—even


34 Extracted from “Auf Schumanns kleines Stückchen angewendet bedeutet das, dass es gerade mit seiner thematischen bzw.—kantisch gesprochen—begrifflichen Leere eine unendliche Fülle an Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten signalisiert” ([Nonnenmann [2001, 254]). Transcendence, autonomy, absoluteness, and so on, though here attributed to the feminine arabesque, are nonetheless, traditionally speaking, masculine values. This fact points up the insufficiency of feminist critique along these lines. More on this point below.

35 Also see Daverio (1987).
if in less pronounced fashion than in the *Arabeske*. That is, the subsidiary B sections threaten to frame the A sections to which they are ostensibly subservient. Herein lies the seed for feminist resistance to this song; the song arguably harbors the potential for its own undoing. Moreover, on the level of the entire cycle, we might say that C minor, which before I claimed matter of factly to be subsumed by the flanking E₃'s, harbors the potential to chart its own independent identity, in the process subsuming and challenging the home-key tonic. I will explore this possibility later on.

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Example 4-5. Schumann, “Du Ring an Meinem Finger”: voice-leading and motivic analysis
As for the Schenkerian analysis (Ex. 4–5), I posit an interruption at the end of both the small and large B sections, the latter interruption obviously residing at the deeper middleground. The structural interruption is a perceptibly signal event: F♭⁵ (2, m. 28) is approached by a broad 5th progression and subsequently coupled with F⁴ (m. 32); all this occurs within an unfolding of V⁷.

Within the opening period, I do not read an interruption at the end of the antecedent phrase, but
rather prioritize the neighbor motion A\#–G, mm. 4–5, connecting the antecedent and consequent. I do so because this A\# is by far the longest note to that point and also connects seamlessly to G.

Finally, I somewhat hesitantly posit at the end an implied structural \( \hat{2} \), enabling a 3-line Urlinie. I think this reading is more justified if the song is sung in isolation, as a self-complete piece. As part of the larger cycle, however, it might make more sense to exploit the B\#, downbeat of m. 40, that is left hanging, to highlight its connection to the subsequent song (Ex. 4-6). This tack befits the narrative continuity: the engagement, as alluded to in “Du Ring,” logically leads into preparation for the wedding, as described in “Helft mir.” In any case, for our present purposes, it poses no problem to assert a linear resolution to \( \hat{1} \).

I align the Schenkerian analysis with our first, conventionally attractive interpretation (Web Ex. 11). The former’s long lines and seamless integration of particulars within a larger whole symbolize and conduce to musical beauty, to a pretty performance. It is precisely this analytic unity and concomitant musicality—both of which disguise the oppressive structure enabling ostensibly peaceable domesticity—that our subsequent three interpretations resist.
SECOND ANALYSIS/PERFORMANCE

Our second performance (Web Ex. 12/Ex. 4-7), whose basic emotion or mental state is ambivalence, begins to detect moments of tension that belie the docility of the surface, however subtly. The first such moment is perhaps the pickup to m. 3, where soprano and bass, voice and piano, pull apart in contrary motion, a conventional musical signifier of tension. Moreover, the E♭–D–C in the bass inverts, metaphorically “corrects,” the soprano’s C–D–E♭ of the previous bar (see Ex. 4-9). We concretize this textural and motivic tension with a scenario in which the man had earlier antagonized the woman by correcting her in public, thus degrading her. Following a sinking chromatic gesture in the voice, mm. 3–4, indicating in this context the woman’s dejected response to that incident, the piano carries the chromaticism further, creating an omnibus-like,
Example 4-7: subtext for second performance; basic emotion: ambivalence

He antagonized me the other day, corrected me in front of someone. [tension between pno./voice]

Now I’m confused— I don’t know what I want. [omnibus prg.]

That incident yesterday makes me cringe. [pianist’s strain and diss.]

No, I’m no waif: before this mess I was more myself; given enough time, I may have found what I really wanted. [contrary contours in voice/bass; filling in of open 6th]

Now I’m not so sure . . . No, I’d better take his lead; it’ll be okay. [minor] [imitation] [enharmonic revision]

being alone presents opportunities [asc. 6th]

thinks about that incident again, but it is more vague, less painful [musical repetition]
harmonically disorienting effect, which here serves to wipe the woman’s memory clean of that painful incident. As a consequence, she is once again able to accept her present condition. Yet that memory soon returns: the pianist, last beat of m. 7, is forced to reach a rather awkward and
dissonant trichord in the right hand. This embodied tension wincingly recalls the painful incident just mentioned.

In the b section, the incipits of the two phrases (mm. 9 and 13) comprise descending and ascending 6\textsuperscript{th}s, respectively. I read both as relatively affirmative, in that both gaps are subsequently filled in; the second 6\textsuperscript{th} is even more affirmative in its bold, ascending leap. This motivates Jennifer to read the “allein” against the textual grain: though she pays lips service to the idea that she was lost and alone and thus needed the man to guide her, subtextually she conveys the sense that being alone was for her really an opportunity for self-realization, for paving her own way. However, this phrase takes a disconcerting detour into E\textsubscript{♭} minor, whose pathos is enhanced by touching on a full-diminished-7\textsuperscript{th} chord—the woman loses her confidence. This precipitates a return to the status quo at the pickup to m. 17, where the voice dutifully follows the piano’s figures, unquestioningly complying with its imitative scheme. In fact, the F\textsharp enharmonically revises the G\textsubscript{♭} of the disturbing excursion in m. 15 and thus signifies an emotional reversal. The latter is clinched with the more frolicking uneven rhythm of m. 17, over against the sterner, straighter rhythm of m. 1; the rhythmic variant indicates that the woman accepts her fate somewhat gleefully. Then, the heroine seems to lose her composure in the B section, with its “Nach und nach rascher” signaling unease at the prospect of “belonging to him entirely.” Finally, in A\textsubscript{₂}, the striking reharmonization, mm. 37 ff., of the opening tune is emotionally ambiguous: it is warm yet also potentially overwhelms the voice with its deep, octave-doubled bass. In our performance, the woman loses her verve gradually. By the postlude, with its allusion to the b section and its sentiment, at least on the surface, of naïveté, Jennifer is exuding exquisite vulnerability, as if feeling painfully uncertain about her current state. Then, when in the
penultimate bar the motivic fragmentation is alleviated and the complete 4th-motive is restored, Jennifer regains a sense of comfort—for now the heroine reconciles herself to her domestic confinement.

**Third Analysis/Performance**

Our next interpretation (Web Ex. 13/Ex. 4-8) pivots on a deeper reading of musical structures in order to tease out alternatives to the domestic entrapment the song ostensibly celebrates. Whether this alternative is a more co-equal relationship with this man, a relationship with another man (or woman), or no relationship at all, the music-cum-structural analysis of course cannot specify. All we can ask of the music/analysis here is to intimate alterior states and to tinge those states with particular emotional shades. That said, examining “Du Ring” in relation to other songs in the cycle, as I will do here, will perhaps yield greater semantic specificity than would examining the song in isolation.

The triadic outlining of C minor (Ex. 4-9) resonates with that of E♭ in Song 2, the *Heldenmusik.* This resonance is perhaps strengthened by the fact that both songs (2 and 4) are in the same key. Does this resonance empower the heroine? This is a complex question, for there are two levels of ambiguity with which to grapple. First, though the allusion to Song 2 is fairly clear, Song 4 does, after all, lyricize the fanfare, both with its “innig” and by filling in the third, C-

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36 Rumph detects a remarkably similar tonal ambiguity, involving the same precise keys no less, in the opening of Mozart’s E♭ Piano Concerto, K. 449, which, though opening in the tonic, arpeggiates an apparent C minor triad in the outer parts. Here, as in the Schumann, the initial tonal ambiguity has far-reaching consequences, as Rumph discusses (2005, 167–71).
E₃, in m. 2, rendering it more melodic. In this way, “Du Ring” perhaps presents the fanfare more weakly and thus reinforces a gender stereotype. On the other hand, the intimation of empowerment is bolstered by the possibility that the C minor fanfare de-interiorizes the C minor of Song 3. Although in the key of E₃, Song 4 subtly fights against it and holds

Example 4-8: Subtext for third performance; basic emotion: optimistic about alternative possibilities

I'm powerful, I can turn the tables. [appropriation of Heldemusik] I can have some other life entirely; I just got a glimpse of that. [implication of G]

Maybe I'll pay lip service for now, but I have the freedom to imagine another life. [quasi-tonicization of C.]

(mocking him) [quasi-bass line in sop.]

Forget the forlorn, lost thing; I define what my gaps are, and how best to fill them in [asc. 6th rather than desc. 6th and filling in] This is not supplicating — this is doing what I want to do [tonal implications of anacruses]
What might have knocked me for a loop before is now a source of inner strength; I think I know who I am and what I want! [F3 actualizes 3rd-implication]

Yes, this new way of being is so much better, but this is the trigger, the thing that always makes me regress [reharmonization] [bass line from C takes over what was triumphant vocal line]

But now, let go; you don’t need to fight him or convince him; you don’t actualize yourself on his terms [G tonicized]

I'm unsure I can hold on to this sense of new possibility... No, I can.
on, if precariously, to the C minor of the previous song, thus mitigating its containment. To elaborate, first C minor is presented melodically (mm. 1–2), then as a harmony (m. 3), then as a slightly tonicized harmony (m. 7), and then as more fully tonicized in m. 38 as a result of—or perhaps as an impetus to—the aforementioned reharmonization. This song’s emphasis on C minor, then, problematizes the enclosure of Song 3: C minor spills into the frame, it is no longer
just an object of the male gaze. In this way, the man’s affection for the heroine is not so
patronizingly unimaginable, as she declares in that song.

The first ambiguity, in short, is that Song 4’s C minor fanfare, though lyricized in relation
to Song 2 and thus potentially eviscerated, potentially symbolizes empowerment due to the
increasing importance of C within Song 4 and the way it consequently liberates the tonality of
Song 3. The second ambiguity is this: even if the heroine is empowered, she is so, after all, by
appropriating her male counterpart’s voice. One might see this as a dead-end enterprise, for the
power is still being defined in masculine terms. Put another way, that the woman speaks through
the man’s voice—within his discursive space—can mean one of two things: that she claims
authority or, on the contrary, that she is claimed by it (much as, in the previous chapter, I
suggested that in a sonata recapitulation, the second theme “speaking” in the tonal terms of the
first theme can mean that the second theme either appropriates the first or is appropriated by it).
The two, perhaps irresolvable questions we face, then, are: (1) Does the reference to Song 2
symbolize empowerment? (2) Even if it does, to whom should we ascribe the power—the man or
the woman?

As should be clear by now, I do not view such ambiguities as invitations to discover the
“truth” of the matter (which ambiguity, by definition, precludes in any case). Rather, I view them
as invitations to imagination. We arbitrate an ambiguity, if at all, only by what seems to be the
more convincing interpretation given the context and our own subjective predilections. In this
case, where I have charged our interpretation with critiquing male hegemony, I think the relation
of Song 4 to 2 and 3 (Song 4 derives its power from 2, by means of which it “liberates” 3) makes
for a compelling subtext by which the heroine at the opening of Song 4 gains the upper hand, at
least momentarily (see Ex. 4-8). This reading places much stock in C minor’s potential emancipation from Es. In fact, Jennifer and I agreed she would imagine her opening to be in C minor, that she would arrive on the C in m. 2 as if it were a tonic. And as C minor acquires increasing prominence in the manner just described, the protagonist is increasingly emboldened. The apotheosis of C minor, as mentioned, occurs in m. 38. Contrary to the previous interpretation, then, in which this passage, based solely on textural considerations, threatened to subdue the protagonist further, in this interpretation, the passage realizes a previously latent harmonic possibility, one that assumes considerable semantic specificity in light of the cycle as a whole. This moment comprises a locus of female empowerment.37

Another key that comes increasingly to the fore throughout “Du Ring” is G minor. In nineteenth-century music—late nineteenth-century music in particular, such as Wagner’s—key centers are often inferred from subordinate progressions within those keys, without the tonic of that key necessarily being explicit. Following Lawrence Kramer, we might term such tonality “horizontal,” but I prefer the “phantom-tonic complex” (my term).38 G minor, I contend, is one

37 Things take an unfortunate turn, however, immediately following this C, as I will discuss later.

38 Kramer’s (1981) “tonal horizon” is basically tonal space, which in classical music, more often than not, is evident in the tonal fabric of a piece. Increasingly in romantic music, conversely, tonal material is set in opposition to the piece’s tonal horizon—the material, or “presentational relations,” in Kramer’s terminology, assumes relative autonomy with respect to the tonal horizon. This phenomenon is related to the “double-tonic complex” insofar as in both cases the ontological certainty of one or more keys is in doubt. This complex is common in, but not exclusive to, Schubert’s Lieder. “Erster Verlust,” to take just one example, pairs the keys of Es and C minor. For other examples, see Krebs (1996) and Samson (1996).
such phantom tonality in this song. Recall that, in the scheme of the entire cycle, G (albeit G major) is, like C minor, a key that is framed by or embellishes the tonic and thus, in our interpretive scenario, longs for de-containment (see Ex. 4-1). On a melodic level, G’s ornamental subservience to the tonic was telegraphed from the very opening of the cycle, where it served as an upper neighbor to F, a chord-tone of the B₅ triad (Ex. 4-10). “Du Ring” emancipates G just as it does C. For example, G, to my ears, is strongly implied in m. 3 by the ♯ chord over the D bass (Ex. 4-11): a ♯ over an elongated or accented bass standardly signifies a cadential dominant, in whatever key (of course, in other contexts the ♯ chord has a passing or arpeggiating function). This allusion to G opens up a kind of hypothetical realm, which, as with C minor, is supported by reference to an earlier song: in Song 2, that same chromatic descent happens within an established G context (Ex. 4-12). There the effacement is clear: she is essentially saying to the man, “go about your business; I merely want to worship you from afar, for your star is too bright for me to approach it.” Evoking that song here testifies to the ring effacing the woman. At the same time, though, G minor is withheld here, setting up the possibility that things might turn out differently. G—or rather, its absence—comes to symbolize an alternate life. In other words, by alluding to the grim condition of Song 2 sans its explicit G minor tonic, “Du Ring” at once evokes its effacement and

This complex, in turn, is related to “directional tonality,” in which the two tonics are not paired synchronically but rather diachronically, as it were—a piece beginning in one key ends in another, thus posing a challenge to traditional monotony. Chopin’s Second Ballade, which begins in F major and ends in A minor, is just one example (although these two keys are also paired throughout the piece). On this topic, see Korsyn (1996). The duality between competing tonics in paired and directional tonality evokes Doppelgänger, the uncanny, and other related tropes of musical and literary German Romanticism.
mitigates it. Jennifer and I attempt to convey this positive potential by grandly arriving on m. 3 as if it were a cadential ♭, embracing the idea, as stated in Ex. 4-8, that other, more fulfilling situations are possible.

Hence, this version presents the opportunity to appropriate the key of G in a more affirmative way. Since the beginning alludes to it only obliquely, we may proceed to approach it along an axis of self-realization. Indeed, G becomes more of a real possibility as the piece proceeds, starting with the pickups to m. 17, which hint at the tonicization of G. These anacruses, which in the previous interpretation were mere tokens of conformity, pieceworkers within an imitative-contrapuntal apparatus, here carry more empowering tonal implications. Hence our subtext: if the woman temporarily returns to the man’s frame of reference, as indicated by the resumption of the refrain and of the tonic—well, she does so, as much as is possible, on her own terms. This meaning is bolstered by tracing the motive back to its origins—to that remarkable deceptive cadence in m. 15 of the opening song (Ex. 4-10).
Example 4-10: opening of *Frauensliede*

Example 4-11: G tonic potentiated

could have been

(piano reduction)

(something like ...)
There, the protagonist extols the image of her beloved (“heller, heller”—similar imagery to that of Song 2). This ostensible glorification is more than subtly undermined or questioned by the ominous cadence, which, with its dark, minor harmony rendered pp, blatantly counter-depicts the bright image of which she speaks. Also, the arabesque-like configuration placed at the cadence—the harmonic evasion is itself evaded, or ornamented—suggests the woman is able to push against the constraints that have been imposed upon her. This indicates a life outside the man—a life of which the heroine in Song 1 has only a faint sense. But when those selfsame pitches return as
anacruses to m. 17 of “Du Ring,” they trade more forcefully on that same possibility, especially since G has since been affirmed as a potential tonality in Song 2 and earlier in Song 4. Hence, in this reading, the woman, though ostensibly following in the contrapuntal footsteps of the male in m. 16, seizes upon this motive and its glimmer of hope. The woman’s role as dutiful imitator or puppet is overshadowed by this broader symbol of independence.

However, it is not until m. 31 that G appears as a full-fledged tonicized chord (Ex. 4-12). And though the G itself is ephemeral, the sense of self-realization here is palpable because the reference to Song 4, merely hinted at in mm. 3–4, is now glaring, as the example shows (see dotted boxes). Jennifer thus effuses the warmth and confidence that derive from a sense of self-worth and self-actualization (more on our particular subtextual assertion in a moment).

I note one further, though admittedly tenuous, harmonic implication (Ex. 4-13): the soprano’s A♭–B♭–E♭ in m. 12 smacks of A♭–B♭–E♭ within the key of E♭—it walks and talks like a bass line. Granted, here we are tonicizing A♭, and so one might claim that the impression of E♭ major is strictly visual. However, I think this implication derives support from the fact that B♭–E♭ occurred just seconds before, in the bass of m. 10 (see example). That in turn derives support from the fact that the voice part is evidently transferred to the bass. In this context, the voice seems almost to be imitating—or better, taking over—the piano’s bass. This reading entails an obvious irony: to the extent that E♭ major is intimated by these vocal pitches, it is enfeebled—it is presented in a part and a harmonic environment that render it impotent. Jennifer conveys this irony by singing those pitches somewhat tongue-in-cheek, not as a graceful melodic dip (with portamento, say) but as a somewhat disjointed instrumental line, as if slightly mocking it.

39 Note, incidentally, the role of this F–F♯–G figure in Song 3, where it is treated in retrograde.
For that matter, the vocal line in this song often seems to wax instrumental, not least in the fanfare with which it opens (even though, as we discussed, it is subsequently linearized and lyricized). This disjunct texture has the effect of emphasizing the lower line traversing G–E♭–C, which in turn establishes a 3rd-cycle (Ex. 4-14), the implication of a continuing sequence of 3rds, of which A♭ in m. 4, the longest melodic note thus far, is arguably the temporary terminus. This reading may seem dubious since that A♭⁴ is not in the “obligatory register” of that chain—it is an octave too high. Yet, this is retroactively justified when the note to which that A♭⁴ would pass on, F⁴, is reached in an even higher register (F⁵) in m. 28. In other words, as the chain unfolds, a new, registral implication arises: that each link in the chain—or better, rung on the ladder—

Example 4-13: “Du Ring,” mm. 9–12: a subtle exchange of parts?

will be higher than the one before. The F⁵ in m. 28 is thus both an intervalic and registral realization. It is also climactic because it is the apex, receives agogic emphasis, and is led to via a
stepwise progression that is emphasized by serving as the upper line of a polyphonic melody. As such, it is the singular climax of the song (see Ex. 4-14).

The chromatic motive, F–F♯–G, here appears in the guise of E♭–E♮–F (mm. 27–28), which was the first variant of this motive in Song 1 (m. 15; see Ex. 4-10). This clinches the self-realization of that moment, not only because of the textual association, but also because of the way in which E♭–E♮–F is transformed: whereas the F–F♯–G figure is metrically accented in Song 1 and unaccented in Song 4, the E♭–E♮–F variant, conversely, is unaccented in Song 1 and accented in Song 4—in the latter it begins on the downbeat and is dressed in elongated, grandiose rhythms. Hence, at this climax the heroine is not only asserting what is becoming to her a real alternative (as regards the F realizing long-established implications) but is doing so in an aggressive manner (as regards appropriating the chromatic motive leading into the F in such a bold, demarcated fashion). The heroine is really staking her claim to independence here.

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40 This stepwise ascent is a 5\( ^{\text{th}} \)-progression from a voice-leading standpoint, a 4\( ^{\text{th}} \)-motion from a motivic standpoint—insofar as the 4\( ^{\text{th}} \) has by now in the song been established as a bona fide motive (more on which later) and as C\(^5\) in m. 25 initiates a distinctly new rhythmic grouping. See Ex. 4-5.

41 Although E–E♭–F occurs prior to F–F♯–G in the bass, the latter is planted in the alto as far back as mm. 6–7, in the form of G–G♭–F.

42 Also notice the B♭–B♮–C in the tenor voice of m. 7: it adamantly restores the recte version of the F–F♯–G motive that had been inverted on “Ringelein” in order to reinforce the idea of an alternative being foiled (along with the key of G). (This motivic correspondence and correction, incidentally, is bolstered by the inverted motive departing from B♭ and descending by semitone, the correction departing from B♭ and ascending by semitone.) The sonority housing the B (last beat, m. 7), in particular, is downright hostile
Hence, F⁵, the point at which the heroine claims to “belong to him entirely” is also, scandalously, the moment where she claims a very different identity, one whose thread has been toward the tonal closure within V; and because of the time most hands would require to reach it, it threatens to break off from tonal discourse and speak a foreign, virtually atonal language (an [0148]!). I therefore construe this motive as subversive.
surreptitiously spun throughout the song. This moment, I would argue, is the apotheosis of the heroine’s self-realization. The one that happens soon thereafter, in the harmonic realm—the tonicization of G in m. 31—is more inner and authentic, more “innig.” This juxtaposition of more external and defiant versus more internal and heartfelt actualizations is crucial, in that it negotiates the philosophical conundrum to which I have alluded: if self-actualization is charted along pre-defined masculinist paths, is the heroine truly liberated? Here the heroine has her cake and eats it too—she variously adopts both types of authority, one trading on external masculine aggression (which, after all, is not unjustified), the other on internal feminine self-acknowledgment. In the latter case, she no longer feels the need to convince the man, to argue within his discursive space, within the terms he has already preestablished and thus usurped. The realization, if less demonstrative, is also more authentic. Hence our subtextual choice as stated in Ex. 4-8. Moreover, trying on these different discursive systems, one articulate one tacit, with no one assuming precedence, is itself a feminist tack—it refuses the singularity and absolutism of the masculine economy.

A final point: the means by which the F⁵ is achieved is the bifurcation of the vocal line into higher and lower strata. Such a compound melody, while not unmusical or unidiomatic for the voice, is arguably more instrumental in orientation, and thus, by convention, masculine. This accounts for the aggressive—and thus, from a feminist standpoint, ultimately unsatisfactory—nature of the self-realization. What is more, that upper line, C–D–Eb–E–F, is subsequently appropriated by an instrument—the piano, mm. 38–39 (see Ex. 4-15). One might view this as symbolic of the male reclaiming authority after so many gestures in that direction by the woman—the F⁵, the C minor chord, and the G minor chord. This recalls our first interpretation, where the
bass gradually overwhelms the singer. The piano’s bass, then, shifts personae midstream—up to m. 38, where C is actualized, it affirms the female perspective, after which it affirms the male one. A seemingly indissoluble bass line is wedged apart, rendered dialogic. I express this by rendering the bass line from C rather obtrusively, Jennifer does by retreating from her hard-won confidence.

In our scenario, the man’s (seeming) warmth that the reharmonization exudes menacingly transforms into dominance; the momentary comfort that the protagonist takes in such warmth devolves into fear. This reflects the reality that abusive relationships often have the semblance of caring but can turn destructive on a dime.

In closing, the emphasis on potentiality in this version, which came from processes going against the Schenkerian grain, can be seen as a feminist strategy: Elaine Showalter reminds us that
reacting to male injustices is only half the battle; the other half is more proactive. Her so-called
gynocritics foregoes “the linear absolutes of male literary history” and focuses instead on “the
newly visible world of female culture” (1985, 131). In other words, gynocritics does not resist
oppressive constraints, an endeavor that, ironically, is bound to keep women in some sense
constrained. Rather, it imagines other possibilities, ones grounded in authentic female experience
and consciousness. These musical potentials I located can be metaphors for these alterior states,
given their desire to break free from the reigning Schenkerian discourse.

FOURTH ANALYSIS/PERFORMANCE

If the previous interpretation offered glimmers of hope based on salient implications/realizations,
this one (Web Ex. 14/Ex. 4-16) offers only anger and defiance in response to an unhappy and
unhealthy situation. Jennifer and I conceived of this version as being more about doing than
thinking: she sings to provoke and antagonize the man, to openly flout his expectations. That is to
say, she sings performatively. Consequently, the subtext in Ex. 4-16 consists not so much of tacit
assertions but more a series of intentions and actions. Our most general physical idea, as evident
in the video, is that Jennifer continually touches the ring as if threatening to take it off; her
character apparently no longer considers it indissolubly wed to her hand. Our most general
musical idea is to use musical configurations as weapons in order to mar the ostensible idealism of
the text and beauty of the music—to treat motives as jagged shards to tear at the masculinist fabric
in which the heroine is ensconced.

Three main, more particular interpretive strategies follow from this musical approach:
Example 4-16: subtext for fourth performance; basic emotion: angry and defiant.

Counts/challenges [3rd-motive vs. 4th]

Counts/challenges [4th-mot. in ungainly place]

what was source of vulnerability (minor) is now catalyst for strength

Counts/challenges [3rd-motive vs. 4th]

Counts/challenges [4th-mot. in ungainly place]

what was source of vulnerability (minor) is now catalyst for strength
1. We delineate motives, especially 4th-motives, that work at cross-purposes with voice-leading structure. Thus delineated, they sit awkwardly within the phrase, impeding its lyrical flow.
2. We phrase in opposition to the obvious phrase boundaries, sometimes creating exceedingly long lines, not to create beauty but to symbolize evading masculine boundaries, both discursive and physical. Secondarily, doing so pushes the limits of Jennifer’s breath, such that she embodies her character’s psychical discomfort.

3. Jennifer mixes chest voice and head voice (just as Jesse Norman alternates between two vocal placements in Song 2) in order to eschew a pretty sound—indeed, to embrace the dictum, as recently stated by the violinist Christian Tetzlaff, that “beauty is the enemy of expression!” (Eichler [2012]).

I derive this interpretation from 4th-motives that contravene voice-leading structure (see Ex. 4-5). I also derive the interpretation from the conflict between the 4th- and 3rd-motives, which is established from the start: the B♭–C–D–E♭ that would weave the piano (read: man) and singer (read: woman) into a false unity (see top of Ex. 4-4, also Ex. 4-17) is countered by an angular emphasis on C–D–E♭. The latter figure is cordoned off by its intervalic content—all steps, over against the skips that precede it. This reading is bolstered by the bourgeoning tonality of C minor, as previously discussed. These three notes thus enjoy a modicum of independence based on both melodic contour and implied tonality.

The 3rd-motive has the capacity to conflict not only with Schenkerian boundaries, but also with phrase boundaries (Ex. 4-17): “Ringelein” (diatonically) describes B♭–A♭, the latter wanting to push onto G, which it does only at the beginning of the next phrase. The motivic identity of B♭–
A₆–G is affirmed by its precedent in the piano’s inner voice, mm. 1–2; the voice realizes this latent figure but does so in a deliciously subversive way, transcending a phrase boundary.

The 4ᵗʰ-motives also conflict among themselves. This motive comes to the fore in the b section (Ex. 4-18), where it invades both the piano and voice and becomes the subject of an altercation of sorts: the descending 4ᵗʰ in the bass is antagonized by the ascending 4ᵗʰ-motive in the voice—“antagonized” because the voice (a) retrogrades its model, “correcting” it; (b) corrects it quickly, impatiently, not waiting for the bass to finish its expansive statement; and (c) sets it more blatantly at odds with voice-leading structure: whereas in the bass the fourth transparently decorates the 3ʳᵈ (G–E₆), in the voice the terminus of the motive, A₆, is the focal dissonance of the gesture and needs to resolve. Here the incongruity between motivic and tonal function is palpable.

In mm. 11–12, the bass aborts its 4ᵗʰ-descent, as if taking its cue from the voice’s “correction” in mm. 9–10—it leads up to A₆ via F and G just as the voice did in those measures, and now makes of A₆ a provisional tonic; the voice, meanwhile, takes over the bass’s B₆–E₆, as we discussed. Thus, the roles of voice and piano, woman and man, are reversed, with the woman claiming the authority of the bass line for herself. Even as the
heroine speaks of having been lost after childhood and needing male guidance, the music in this reading tells a different story, one in which the woman takes charge of her own destiny. In fact, in an unplanned but, in retrospect, felicitous interpretive move, Jennifer jumps the gun a bit on the G♭ in m. 15, as if to usurp it, to preclude it from fomenting the self-doubt it had in earlier versions.
The end of the song (Ex. 4-19) plays with the 4\textsuperscript{th} in suggestive ways. In the previous interpretation, the bass in mm. 38–39 symbolized the man overpowering the woman in taking over her C–D–Es–E♭–F from the B section (see Ex. 4-15). That bass line is also authoritative in affirming tonal structure, since it leads to a decisive point of tonal articulation—the structural predominant, V/V. Yet, the voice bumps up against this imposing line with a descending 4\textsuperscript{th}-motive (Es–D–C–Bs, the retrograde of the initial, latent 4\textsuperscript{th}-motive), which, like the one in m. 9, is impatient and alights on a dissonant note. It refuses to conform to tonal structure. The motive is also at odds with the text and the vocal phrase: its initial note, Es\textsuperscript{5}, occurs at the end of a word and also at the point where a singer would be inclined to breathe. For this reason, the motive disintegrates—it is perforated with a breath. In retrospect, this may have been one reason why, in previous interpretations, Jennifer’s heroine lost confidence at this point, along with being overwhelmed by the bombastic bass. The potential weapon that is that 4\textsuperscript{th}-motive was neutralized and dissolved. In this version, we refuse to let that happen: Jennifer, against musical “common sense,” declines to breathe there and makes a beeline for the cadence. In this way, the notes of the motive are emphasized, since not only are they connected, but due to the long phrase, Jennifer starts to run out of breath on the last two notes of m. 40, which are registrally deemphasized in any case. The potency of that fourth in this version is restored.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{43} I should acknowledge that breaking up the motive in previous versions could also be seen to have resisting potential, insofar as that figure, as fragmented, refuses to fall in line with the piano’s (man’s) imitative scheme (see boxes in Ex. 4-19). Recall that in Version 3, we similarly tried to challenge the imitative scheme in m. 16 by placing greater weight on in the vocal anacruses into m. 17.
A related point: the Es$^5$ of m. 29 is led down the octave to Es$^4$ in m. 32 (Ex. 4-20). At first glance, the latter would appear to affirm tonicity, due both to the octave coupling—at least on a motivic level—and to taking part in a tonic arpeggiation (see beamed notes). Yet, it is dissonant against the bass—its linear-motivic function is sharply at odds with its tonal function. We can
read this as implying that the protagonist slyly undermines E\textsubscript{b}'s tonicity, or that she appropriates it on her own terms. Again, we emphasize this by withholding a breath until after “Ring.” It is fruitful to note in this regard Schumann’s varied use of the anacrusis figures leading into the refrain phrases: no two are quite the same, as Ex. 4-21 synopsizes. We have noted the resisting potential in particular of the anacruses leading into m. 17 and m. 33. Indeed—to return to the point with which I began, regarding the arabesque’s potential for sexual resistance—these variants are anything but superficially decorative: they prove a pivotal means of self-expression, one that exists outside of masculine sphere.
POSTLUDE: THE PIANO’S PERSONAE

It should be clear from the above analyses that in Versions 2 and 3 the piano did not adopt a single persona—neither solely that of the man nor of the woman. I decided to use the piano flexibly and pragmatically, to embody now one persona, now another, depending on the effect I thought most necessary to achieve in any one moment. For example, in Version 3, I adopted and reinforced the heroine’s persona leading to the point of self-realization in m. 28, to ensure that
crucial moment came across. Then, however, I switched roles in mm. 38–39, playing the
overbearing man to Jennifer’s daunted heroine. In the fourth version, however, I generally
adopted the petulant tone of the woman. Even in m. 12, where the man is eviscerated, where the
bass is cowed by the woman’s own bass-like enunciation, I nonetheless side with the woman,
demarcating the F–G–A₄ figure.

Two questions arise regarding Versions 2 and 3. First, would it possibly have been more
effective for the piano strictly to have played the male persona? Would that have foregrounded
and illuminated Jennifer’s character and emotions by giving her something consistently
oppositional to play against? In other words, would adopting a starker male/female—piano/vocal
opposition have rendered our performances more critically potent? Only further experimentation
would tell, but, again, my hunch is that it was more efficacious, interpretively and critically, for the
pianist to don different hats throughout the song. Another option, incidentally, would be to play
more “neutrally,” to adopt Edward Cone’s “composer’s persona”—the implicit musical persona,
not necessarily indicative of the actual composer’s thoughts and feelings—rather than specific
“vocal personae” (1974, 20–40). To simplify, the former is a general arbiter of all that occurs in
the composition as a whole, the latter is a particular character within that whole. I avoided this
strategy since, as I established in the first chapter, I am dubious that neutral playing is even
possible. To the extent, then, that I vacillate between different vocal personae, the second
question that arises is: to what degree, if at all, is the listener able to detect the shift from one
persona to another—to discern these dramatic “beats”—given the semantic indeterminacy of the
instrumental medium? I do not have a ready answer to this question, and so remain vulnerable to
the possibility that the piano, in failing to adopt a single persona, compromised its critical power.
While my intuition tells me this is not the case, I would have difficulty proving otherwise, and must leave it to the individual listener to determine the degree to which the piano’s various personae are discernible.

III. Reflecting Upon Resistance

What do Jennifer’s and my performances resist? (1) Primarily and most obviously, the misogyny of Schumann’s cycle—of both its text and musical setting. More precisely, the performances seize upon potentially resisting elements in Schumann’s music—they mobilize the music’s own capacity for resisting the text. (2) Conventional or conservative musicality. The performances refuse to be complicit in masculinist ideology, as would happen if they had passively “instantiated” the score, and especially if in a beautiful way. To sing this song beautifully is to work against one’s own self-interest. (3) The potentially oppressive dimensions of music theory, of hierarchical hegemony in particular. (4) Most importantly in the scheme of my entire dissertation, the twin notions of the transcendent work and the subservience of interpretation to it (Werktreue).

What these foci of resistance hold in common is the metaphor of containment: in the first case of the female and female desire; in the second of the aberrant or pathological by which (according to Brett [1994]) musicality is implicitly framed, as explained below; in the third of (quasi-) autonomous, contra-hierarchical musical parameters; and in the last free, corporeal, even carnal interpretation—the impulse to be unfaithful or adulterous, as it were, to the work.

Whereas only the first of these items is connected to feminism in any obvious way, the others relate to it by extension, in ways I will amplify in this concluding section. Yet, I will also point out the limitations of the kind of traditional feminist stance I adopted above (in musicalized form),
drawing in particular on Judith Butler; I will also acknowledge the limitations of my own particular interpretive experiment and its execution. I should say, I have neither the expertise nor space to survey nearly all the literature applicable to these issues, nor to follow these ideas to their ultimate conclusions. What I offer instead is a fairly selective discussion of particular feminist-musicological concerns that pertain to the above interpretive project.

1. The Musical Oppression of the Female

Here I consider the first of the four factors mentioned above: the musicalized oppression of women. Schumann composed his cycle during an era in which music was played predominately by amateur musicians in the home, which were mainly women. It is ironic that, although instrumental music in a sense superseded vocal music in the nineteenth century and waxed rigorous, assertive, argumentative, and thus “masculine,” it was mainly women who played that most instrumental of instruments—the piano. Yet, far from being a gesture of empowerment, this practice was apparently rife with voyeuristic overtones, as Leppert (1993) argues in his magisterial survey of musical iconography from this period (and earlier). He reveals that paintings of women and pianos, and paintings on keyboard instruments themselves, were commonly affiliated with misogyny and death. Without getting into the details of particular paintings, I enumerate four themes of his discussion: (1) These paintings allow music to be appropriated visually. They subject keyboard music—and the women who play it—to the male gaze. (2) These paintings aestheticize

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44 “Is singing’s full embodiedness related to the longterm trend in European art music that has deprivileged vocal music in favor of instrumental? Does that long-term trend . . . tell us something important about our culture’s responses to the feminine?” Cusick (1998, 50).
violence. The images suggest that “for music to flourish, political pacification must be pursued militarily. In this extraordinary visual conceit, force and imputed violence become the agents of art” (ibid., 127–28). (3) Women at the piano are often depicted as dead and passive, hence more amenable to male appropriation. (4) Visual appropriations of musical phenomena serve to control the elusiveness and perceived femininity of sound.

Indeed, music, considered generally, has traditionally been aligned with the feminine, in which respect the masculinization of instrumental music can be seen to resist or repress this association. Such masculinization can arguably be traced back to Beethoven. In an astute cultural analysis, Sanna Pederson posits that Beethoven has long been regarded as quintessentially masculine due to (1) his universalist, asensuous aura; (2) his involvement in the political sphere; and (3) the heroic character of his middle-period works. The last, in their assertiveness or virility, can be seen to repress traces of the feminine conventionally associated with the music profession. By extension, as Brett notes, these qualities perhaps serve to ward off insecurities about homosexuality. “The appropriation of the feminine and privatization of ‘the muse’ in the figure of the male composer, who therefore seems in a special way to reflect the trope of the woman’s soul trapped in a man’s body . . . often seems to demand a compensating amount of energy spent in holding up the façade of masculinity. This lethal combination in turn helps to augment the legendary misogyny of the profession” (1994, 22).

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Pederson notes that his masculinity thrives on the contradiction, evident in the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, that all people are naturally equal, born so, and yet women are prevented from enjoying equal rights because of their socially constructed gender. The latter principle, which could have been used to advocate for equality, was instead used to rationalize inequality (see Pederson [2000, 315]).
Yet, as Leppert argues, such a tack, evident not just in Beethoven but in much nineteenth-century music—think of Tchaikovsky’s explosive orchestrations, Brahms’s vigorous thematic arguments, and Wagner, given the sheer exertion he demands of singers, players, and listeners alike—is patently self-contradictory. For on the one hand, it “constitutes an impassioned outburst by male artists entreating for the centrality of their artistic exercise not only as a protest over their own marginalization but also as the sonoric denial of the effeminization the culture attached to them as artists” (Leppert [1993,187]). On the other, “these expressions of sonic protest serve to reenact and thereby sanction the ideology of male hegemony on which artists’ own marginalization depends” (ibid.). Concomitantly, the freedom for which heroic Beethoven ostensibly pleads is partially undermined by the very bellicosity with which it does so—recall the above discussion, in particular Subotnik’s comment regarding the fine line in this music between freedom and force, between equality or solidarity and coercion. Pederson quotes Maynard Solomon in this regard: “Liberty and fraternity—but not equality. It is on the issue of equality that Beethoven parts company with the slogans of the French Revolution and the eighteenth-century utopian philosophes” (Solomon [1988a, 203]). She proceeds to explain that Beethoven was avowedly more interested in power than in equality, and that he “did not subscribe to the idea that ‘all men are created equal,’ even when only men were indicated,” as in the “Alle Menschen werden Brüder” of the Ninth (Pederson [2000, 322]). The contradiction here, clearly, is that to valorize individual liberty but not equality inevitably results in a situation in which some enjoy liberty and others not. And without an equitable system in place, the tables can easily turn, such that those who enjoy freedom today may well not tomorrow. Liberty without equality is thus arguably no liberty at all.
As self-contradictory, then, as the above enterprise may be, composers who did not undertake it often suffered the consequence of being dubbed feminine or effete, and of being paired with, and devalued in relation to, a more “manly” counterpart. The classic example of this is probably Liszt and Chopin, a juxtaposition that evokes a constellation of binarisms such as masculine/feminine, strong/feeble, forte/piano, arm technique/wrist and finger technique, public/private, piano as imitative of the orchestra/of singing, and so on. In all these, the second term, associated with Chopin, is implicitly marked or aberrant. The composers who do not suppress the assumed feminine association of their craft are restored to that condition; the unmarked female gendering of music returns as a marked and dubious characteristic.

In summary, I have outlined two forms the musical suppression of the feminine assumes: one is the voyeuristic containment of the female musician in various pictures and images (as surveyed by Leppert), the other is the repression of the composer’s culturally-ascribed femininity. The former can be seen as an externalization and projection of the latter. Schumann’s cycle is the sonoric equivalent to those images; it is a tone-picture of domesticized containment that conceals the violence on which such containment trades. And to whatever extent Schumann himself is complicit, if unwittingly, in such ideology—though please recall my previous caveat in this regard—he too can be seen as distancing himself in Frauenliebe from the femininity, or rather homosexuality, about which he evidently fantasized.


47 On which see Ostwald (1985, especially 42–43).
Counter-Critique

To the extent that my interpretive experiment constitutes an implicit plea for female liberation, it is subject to concerns raised by Judith Butler. From her broad and penetrating critique, I will cull only the two points most relevant to our discussion. First, defending, or purporting to defend, the rights of women (even ones of a bygone age) can easily fall prey to an essentialist economy, by which women are viewed as a homogeneous, monolithic group. Obviously, women do not comprise a uniform category; to any one person several and overlapping cultural indices apply, of which gender is only one. Coalition politics often assumes unity and also desires it as the outcome, which is questionable if the goal is political action and reform. “Does ‘unity’ set up an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identity that rules out the possibility of a set of actions which disrupt the very borders of identity concepts . . . ?” (1990, 21). In other words, one cannot begin with a fixed assumption of identity and unity if such identity is precisely what one seeks to change. Nor do the alleged male antagonists comprise a single category; to view men as such itself smacks of masculinist ideology. “Feminist critique ought to explore the totalizing claims of a masculinist signifying economy, but also remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing gestures of feminism. The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms” (1990, 18). Feminists are not immune to the “the colonizing gesture.” The second point is that aspiring toward subjective autonomy or emancipation—as Jennifer and I did in our performances overall—is problematic from the start since that very ideal is a masculinist one, one that assumes a natural, pre-discursive individual who may then be culturally stamped. Not to mention, the ideal of complete autonomy is a ruse: no one can be so free so as to elude all cultural constraints and
contexts. In short, the ideals of (female) solidarity and subjective autonomy—in a sense, two sides of the same coin—both rest upon masculinist, which is to say foundationalist and hegemonic paradigms, and thus undermine the feminist project from the start.

How do I square these legitimate concerns with both my advocacy of interpretive freedom in general (in the first chapter) and of female freedom via interpretive resistance (in this chapter)?

As to the former, I would clarify that the interpretive liberation for which I argued neither assumes nor aspires to a pre-cultural, pre-discursive individual who can (or should) do anything she wants to a score. Rather, I invoked and affirmed Bowen’s (1993) stance that interpretation necessarily takes place within a community of interpreters and an established history of interpretations. Any interpreter is inevitably influenced by and on some level must grapple with, or respond to, at least some of these interpretations. Even more crucially, I argued that the interpreter ideally exercises his freedom in relation to, within the context of, the exigencies and intimations of a score. Hers is a freedom to make choices within particular constraints, within a broad yet finite realm of cogent possibilities. The performer must dip into her well of natural and nurtured proclivities in order to close the gap between herself and the text, in order to fill the score with sentience. Such constrained freedom is arguably the only true freedom, as I have discussed above with respect to composition. We saw how even Beethoven, widely held to epitomize the autonomous and self-directed artist, manifested his creative freedom by deeply internalizing and also strategically dramatizing, problematizing, and occasionally ironizing the well-established conventions of his predecessors, particularly Bach, Haydn, and Mozart.

As to the plea for female liberation, it may well be vulnerable to Butler-esque charges of essentialism, coalitional unity, and replicating masculinist ideology. The last was most evident in
the fourth performance, in which the heroine sought recourse to the very masculine aggressiveness by which she, by implication, is oppressed in the cycle. In this regard, the third performance was more successful, and not only by adopting a more hopeful stance. More subtly, it traded heavily on potentiality, on moments where the music implied an alternate experience. This tactic, in turn, pivots, to a limited extent, on the non-representationality of women with the masculinist discursive system. I elaborate this point by counterpoising, as Butler does, the views of Beauvoir (1973) and Irigaray (1985). Beauvoir claims that within the terms of masculine signification, the female, in her corporeality and particularity, is a marked term; the male, in his incorporeality and universality, is an unmarked term. Irigaray, by contrast, deems women utterly unrepresentable within masculine discourse. As Butler summarizes, “For Beauvoir, women are the negative of men, the lack against which masculine identity differentiates itself; for Irigaray, that particular dialectic constitutes a system that excludes an entirely different economy of signification” (1990, 13). Feminine multiplicity and polysemy—the “sex which is not one”—resists the binaristic discourse described by Beauvoir; it rejects the assumption of a singular somatic substance upon which masculine discourse can act. In Butler’s gloss,

Irigaray would maintain . . . that the feminine ‘sex’ is a point of linguistic absence, the impossibility of a grammatically denoted substance, and hence, the point of view that exposes that substance is an abiding and foundational illusion of a masculinist discourse . . . . The female sex eludes the very requirements of representation, for she is neither ‘Other’ nor the ‘lack,” those categories remaining relative to the Sartrian subject, immanent to the phallogocentric scheme” (ibid., 14, her italics).

My emphasis on non-material presence, on potentiality, then, served, I hope, to mitigate the danger of asserting a female trace that a masculinist system can easily appropriate as Other. But mitigate only to a point, of course: for such potentials or implications, in my reading, were
eventually realized, at which point—recall the arrival of F⁵—the female succumbs to the masculinity dynamic of striving, or becomes the Other, asserting a presence but within the terms defined by masculinity. As I implied above, late Beethoven teaches us that the only true freedom is potential rather than actual, for once actual, it can easily prove coercive and thus self-effacing. In the third interpretation, once the unrepresented state of feminine solace becomes a reality, it too easily succumbs to, or threatens to replicate, male hegemony.

To this extent, the only solution that would probably satisfy someone like Irigaray—the only way for the performer to elude Schumann’s/Chamisso’s grasp—is simply to avoid singing the cycle altogether. And indeed, one might reasonably ask, why sing the cycle at all if it is ideologically pernicious? To say, “because it has intrinsic musical value” is to play right into masculine essentialism; to say “because it is beautiful” is to accede to the woman/performer serving as an innocuous ornament. Even to have a man sing it, which is not out of the question,⁴⁸ is not necessarily to elude charges of misogyny, insofar as sex and gender are not synonymous; men can be as easily oppressed by misogynist ideology as can women. My stance is that there is something to be said for challenging the system from within it—as citizens do within a democracy, for instance—to push against its constraints rather than pretending it away. Taking on the debate, in my view, is preferable to passivity. It is true, however, that one must be careful not to be hemmed in unwittingly by the terms imposed by the dominant system; often an entirely different set of terms is needed. I would also suggest that resisting the cycle’s misogyny from within the

⁴⁸ No more so than women singing Winterreise, which they seem to be doing ever more frequently. Christa Ludwig, Brigitte Fassbaender, Natalie Stutzmann, and Christine Schäfer have all recorded the cycle.
confines of that cycle may not be the optimal or ultimate solution, but it might be seen as at least a step along the path to more authentic female identity.

A related objection is, does Frauenliebe require a resisting performance? Because, from our modern standpoint, it wears its misogyny on its sleeve. Moreover, if late Beethoven is any model, boldly exposing a social imbalance is itself a form of critique. From this perspective, performing the cycle sincerely would suffice to point up its shortcomings. Muxfeldt, citing Cusick’s diagnosis of Norman’s performance, quips, “if there are aspects of these songs which no longer speak to us, do we really need a singer’s stiffness to bring this home? I should think a truly fabulous performance would suffice” (2001, 30, fn. 9). And, of course, as I mentioned, Muxfeldt does not actually see the cycle as oppressive to begin with, but rather, in its historical context, as empathetic. So, paradoxically, whether the cycle is blatantly misogynist or not at all, arguably it requires no resistance.

In response, I would say that it is unduly optimistic to assume that most audiences, even today, would see Frauenliebe as transparently misogynist. Anecdotally, I can report that the several female singers with whom I have discussed this cycle (Jennifer Goltz excepted), and who are obviously more privy than the average listener to the inner workings of the poetry and music, tend to express knee-jerk enthusiasm for the cycle. I attribute this, again, to a predilection to view vocal music as a species of instrumental or absolute music, and thus as supposedly apolitical. The ethos of musical absolutism, in my view, tends to cancel out the ethos of gender equality that (supposedly) characterizes the current political left, on which most artists reside. Hence, it is not surprising that to hear the cycle performed today is typically to hear it performed “beautifully”; and devoid of an explicitly critical context, it is doubtful that anyone would hear through the pretty
sounds to the pernicious sentiments underlying them. It is to this notion of “beautiful singing” that I now turn.

2. Singing “Musically”

In common parlance, to call someone “musical” is implicitly to say that he plays or sings with a beautiful tone; spins long phrases; arches most phrases, dynamically and temporally; delineates obvious phrasal and formal boundaries; and, most generally, employs a variety of dynamics, tempi, and articulations but also confines them to a relatively modest range, so as not to “detract” from the abstract ideas assumed to be embedded in the score and to define an abstract work.

Institutionalized musicality, as I discussed in Chapter 1, is a safeguard against the subjective inclinations that threaten to spiral out of control, to problematize the work in some fashion, or to become detached from the perceived purview of the work altogether.

This is a troublingly hegemonic dynamic generally, but particularly so when the work in question is ideologically dubious in some way. In the cases of “Du Ring” and “Batti, Batti,” for instance, their melodious beauty serves to conceal the infrastructure of oppression and violence on which they depend. Culturally sanctioned musicality, in turn, ensures that those performing these songs preserve their (ostensible) beauty and thus that the performers comply, if unwittingly, with their ideology. Performing the Schumann with a self-indulgently beautiful sound would in effect portray the protagonist acceding to her condition (this tactic, granted, could be critical if over-the-top saccharine). Moreover, on an indexical rather than iconic level, it would entail subverting the female performer herself and rendering her submissive. To sing this cycle with conventional musicality is to sing against oneself.
If conventional musicality can serve to curb the performer’s subjective impulses perceived to be recalcitrant toward composerly reason, or the feminine impulses recalcitrant toward masculine reason, it can also serve to control, contain, and alteriorize the psychological pathology with which musicality has long been associated. As Brett (1994) argues, homosexuality is to sexuality what musicality is to music. As ideological cognates, homosexuality and musicality draw a line in the sand separating normal from abnormal, sanctioned from deviant.\footnote{Brett points out that variants of the epithet “musical” have in fact been used as euphemisms for “gay.”} Of course, “musical” is not used in a pejorative sense as “homosexual” is, but both are associated with pathology:

Though it is not proscribed in the same way as homosexuality, music has often been considered a dangerous substance, an agent of moral ambiguity always in danger of bestowing deviant status upon its practitioners. Both Plato and Aristotle saw it in these terms. Theirs was a legacy of moral doubt that infected much of the writing about music in the West, from St. Augustine’s anguish about being moved more by the voice than by the words to the attacks of the Calvinists. . . . Lurking beneath the objections against music, the ethical question surrounding it, is the long tradition of feeling that it is different, irrational, unaccountable (Brett [1994, 11]).

Brett’s assertion might help account for the extremity and voyeurism that Said (1991) associates with classical performance. Said was talking about artists of high technical achievement and refinement. Even more extreme are cases where the artists are not only highly skilled but also idiosyncratic or even mentally ill in some sense. This would explain the continual fascination

\footnote{On musicality as supposed sexual deviancy, also see Cusick (1994, 79). On the association of musical “talent” with Otherness generally, see Kingsbury (1988, 12–13).}
with—indeed, fetishization of—Glenn Gould, to whom essays, books, and films are continually being devoted. Another case is David Helfgott, the pianist suffering from schizophrenia who, after the biopic *Shine* was released, enjoyed his fifteen minutes of fame on a concert circuit that was treated somewhat like a circus. The exploitation of such artists, by both scholars and the public and sometimes even by the artists themselves, is merely a pronounced instance of the more general phenomenon by which, on Brett’s view, we attempt to contain the gendered pathology that we associate with musical skill generally. In music we more often fetishize than denigrate it, but the effect of containment is the same.

The foregoing suggests that being “unmusical” is not necessarily a bad thing, especially in the case of propagandist art. An illuminating statement by Adorno surfaces in this connection, and deserves to be quoted at length:

> Lively music-making, by children, amateurs, entertainers and such like, supplies the theory with the most important exemplary material. Firstly, because here the music appears with all its cracks and holes, so to speak, deconstructed into the elements of every dimension of which it is constituted, and through it one can observe, as with broken toys, how it “works.” The tears are so many windows onto the problems of interpretation that proficient execution normally conceals, but then one can see in the approaches of those subjects all those things that also inspire bad official music making, but which are covered up there by good manners, by the “good musician”; the normal musical education is nothing other than the history of such concealment (2006, 127, his italics).51

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50 Besides Bazzana (1997) and Said (2006), whom I have already cited, also see Hafner (2009) and Ostwald (1998).

51 Adorno’s motto might have been, as expressed by psychologist Scott Miller, “The enemy of excellence is proficiency.” Quoted in Greenberg [2010, 30]). It also brings to mind an aphorism from Zen Mind,
This quote leads us back to the idea that we err in supposing music, whether in its composition or performance, to be organic, natural, and inevitable. Such a view conceals the very real labor of both composer and performer, it undervalues the performing body, with its stresses and strains as well as pleasures (more on which below). And, more central to our purposes, it would make messages as evident in Frauenliebe seem inevitable and objectively true. To expose the fissures in the compositional fabric, whether unwittingly (as, presumably, with Jesse Norman in Song 2) or much more deliberately and self-consciously (as with Jennifer and myself in Song 4) is to telegraph the contingency and bias of such messages.

How would I assess our performances in light of these comments? In all candor, I feel that we could have gone further—there is certainly room for performances even more resisting, more problematic, more strategically “unmusical.” This is not to criticize my colleague or myself; it is merely to speak to the difficulty of extricating oneself from conservatory-style training, which, certainly in my case, centered around time-honored notions of competent musicianship. My performances, despite concerted efforts to the contrary, bore the stamp of the institutionally sanctioned musicality from which I, like countless other musicians, derive a sense of validity and acceptance, and which one disavows at his own peril.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{52}\) On the interconnection between “musicality” and power relations in the conservatory system, see Kingsbury (1988).
3. A CRITIQUE OF MUSIC THEORY?

The parametric incongruities and conflicts I discerned in Schumann’s score are at once iconic and indexical. That is, on the one hand, these parametric conflicts, within the feminist context I explicitly invoked, symbolize, are homologous with, conflict more generally. On the other hand, within the methodology I established, they do not merely represent such conflict but induce it on the part of the performers (and are induced by it)—they draw the performers into an antagonistic relationship with Schumann’s piece. My analysis in no way purports to be objective or factual but rather aims to be unabashedly performative and provocative, to tease out the strains of resistance latent in Schumann’s notations and to serve them up to the performers, who may then realize such latencies and challenge the cycle’s ideology in a public forum.

I used analysis, then, in the service of critique. The question here is, in that process did I critique analysis itself? In particular, in placing melodic/motivic threads and hierarchical tonal structure in mutual opposition, did I implicitly frame the latter as a hegemonic vehicle? Are Schenkerian analysis and music analysis more generally susceptible to critique on feminist grounds?

This is a complex, much-debated issue that I cannot and need not extensively rehearse. A few main points will suffice. Certainly, New Musicologists have been known to subject music analysis to feminist and other post-structuralist modes of critique. Leppert, for one, implies that theorizing music, especially in a way as to reduce it to immutable mathematical laws, is a means by which to contain it: “only when it remains on paper, so to speak, can it be dealt with in pure form—ideally in numbers—and thus totally contained in a logical system otherwise divorced from
the world” (1993, 99, my italics). Ascribing rational perfection to music—which goes back to the “harmony of the spheres”—is arguably motivated by a desire to quash or at least curb music’s potentially unpredictable, disruptive force. On this view, music theory is not unlike the work-concept itself, and may be seen as an extension or projection of it. Both extract music from the sensuous and erratic experience of producing it.53

This strike against theory is rather broad (and of course applies with much less force to non-mathematical music theories). It does not pertain to music theory any more than it does to rationalistic discourse generally. It stems from the general skepticism that the realm of ideas and of language, in the process of abstracting from empirical experience, sterilizes or desiccates experience. This skepticism, while particularly pronounced in the case of music/theory, is by no means unique to it. My question, however, is not: does music theory essentialize music?, but rather: do we use music theory in an essentializing way? My concern has been not to do so. To say theory is restrictive, or is x—or even, for that matter, to use “theory” in the singular, given the multifariousness of the discipline—is precisely to reproduce the epistemology to which many feminists and other post-structuralist factions would object. My overriding assumption, by contrast, has been that the theory of an art can be an art, and can be what we need it to be to realize the connotations of musical notations and to enrich the fictionality of musical works. The real masculinist mistake, then, is not the use of theory tout court, but rather using it under the

53 “Nor could music theory as I have known it help me tell the story I thought I heard, because it is a discipline that identifies nearly totally with the composer as mind, and which identifies music as mind” Cusick (1998, 45, her italics).
assumption that it possesses and points to immanent properties—using it, that is, in a way as to attenuate its potential interpretive and critical potency.

As for Schenkerian analysis in particular, one can easily fall into the trap of essentializing it as well, taking Schenker’s late, Ursatz-driven work as representative of his entire output. Yet, his thought evolved, as we have seen, from avowed anti-organicist assumptions. But, to take the mature thought on its own terms, does tonal hierarchy harbor an unmistakable misogynist component? Does Schenkerian analysis stand to be critiqued on feminist grounds?

I think not, as I have said before. But to consider one such argument, McClary (1985) begins with the general claim that music theory and history have paradoxically imposed silence upon the sonic artform that is music by foisting on it rigid paradigms and taxonomic formalisms. Schenker, in particular, who attempted to revitalize motion—it having been, in his view, deprivileged by Rameau—ultimately foiled that enterprise by adducing metaphysical truths. Even worse, Schenker’s American appropriators expunged his explicit political polemics, thus treating silence with yet more silence. For McClary, Schenkerian theory, and music theory generally, displaces the experiencing subject with a more distant, and silent, abstract reflection. It displaces unique and unrepeatable features of a musical work with universalist paradigms.

Van Den Toorn (1995, 11–43) retorts that the abstract paradigms of music theory, far from prioritizing reflection over immediacy, actually serve as a foil by which to illuminate the unique features of a musical surface (a key point from my Chapter 2). Meanwhile, McClary’s effort, while intending to uphold the immediacy of musical perception by eschewing music-theoretical paradigms, instead posits alternate essentializing paradigms, ones that detract from the musical surface. In fact, McClary and others use music in support of a larger, and otherwise non-musical,
feminist critique, rather than use feminist theory to explicate music. For Van Den Toorn, then, the apparatus of critical feminism is much more of an encumbrance to real-time perception than is the Schenkerian apparatus.

I think Van Den Toorn’s counter-critique warrants careful consideration, but for now, I offer a slightly different one. Feminist musicology, in my view, sometimes fails to acknowledge the ineluctable semantic indeterminacy of instrumental music. To clarify, by “semantic indeterminacy,” I do not mean that instrumental works have no meaning. On the contrary, I mean they have multiple meanings—that they are irreducibly polysemous. To reiterate my example from the previous chapter, the tonic-transposition of the second theme in sonata form indicates a very abstract dynamic into which one can fit any number of more specific actions: synthesis, integration, assimilation, domination, and so on. And even domination can mean either that the second theme is dominated by the first, or, conversely, that it dominates the first (one might argue one or the other based on context). To regard the “domination narrative”—in which the first theme ultimately overtakes the second—as a default is to displace a contingency with a necessity, a particular with a universal. It is thus to succumb to the kind of essentialism feminist musicologists hope to evade. We should be equally wary of the conventional first theme/second theme binarism: that the first is often in some sense stronger or more assertive, the second in some sense weaker or more lyrical, does not equate with the first theme exhibiting a masculine character, the second theme a feminine one. Feminists who rely upon A. B. Marx’s metaphor as the basis for critiquing sonata form play right into essentializing hands, taking a particular mode of description out of its historical context and conflating it with immanent properties of sonata form.
Likewise, Schenkerian hierarchy, if it does have hegemonic overtones, which is possible—and, of course, Schenker himself projected a rather authoritarian persona in his prose, to say nothing of his oppressive political views, which I will not get into—such hierarchical hegemony by no means specifies masculinist hegemony. Above, I endowed Schenkerian theory with this meaning only in a deliberate, self-consciously metaphorical way. I was able to do so because of the text and context. The metaphorical transference was facilitated by masculine/feminine hierarchy and tonal hierarchy sharing a common term, an experiential substratum. Likewise with the Schenkerian dynamic of tonal closure/enclosure (which is obviously related to that of hierarchical subsumption): I had it represent or parallel physical enclosure, that of the proverbial ring, but I did so self-consciously and performatively, not because I truly equate tonal enclosure with feminine enclosure. I think Schenkerian theory parallels the absolute music to which it is primarily devoted and from which it emerged: both arguably present general schemata that can be particularized given textual affiliations or a deliberately posited context. Feminist musicology often errs in reducing such schemata to the particulars by which they can but need not be exemplified.

In short, I have used Schenkerian analysis for the purpose of critique, not to critique it. (Not that it is not susceptible to critique, even to some form of feminist critique, but just not, in my view, on the above grounds.) My strategy was to extend it metaphorically to facilitate a feminist reading, to which end I think it proved a useful heuristic. In attempting to domesticate ultimately incorrigible parameters, Schenkerian structure distilled and crystallized the oppression intimated by the text/context and hence helped critique it.
4. THE FEMININE PERFORMER, THE MASCLLINE WORK

To what extent can the plight of the performer, as I have framed it, be considered a feminist plight? When the performer is contained, effaced, compelled to disappear, does this represent the suppression of the female generally? Conversely, when, as in my model, the performer is upheld as essential rather than decorative, as more free than constrained, to what extent does this represent female liberation?

One could arguably make such a connection in the context of Frauenliebe and similar pieces. For on the one hand, to deliver the cycle in a traditional, prettified way, to defer to the work, is on some level to administer one’s own oppression. On the other hand, to deliver the cycle against the grain, as I have proposed, is on some level to celebrate one’s own (potential) liberation. But what of less propagandist music, and of music hard to pin down semantically, such as instrumental music? In such cases are we justified in aligning the performer and female on the one hand, the work (in its traditional formulation) and male on the other?

One should proceed cautiously here. For, female oppression is not antecedent to all other forms of oppression and is thus not necessarily represented by them—to say it is would be to essentialize feminist oppression and thus undercut the very enterprise of liberation. Indeed, as Butler affirms, no one type of oppression, no one oppressed group, holds such a privileged position:

oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of “originality” and “derivation”. . . . Indeed, the field of power . . . exceeds and encompasses the axis of sexual difference, offering a mapping of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily hierarchized
either within the terms of phallogocentrism or any other candidate for the position of “primary condition of oppression” (1990, 19).

Female oppression is but an example or instance of a more general schema. So, for that matter, is the suppression of the performer. As such, female-suppression and performer-suppression coexist within a social field, one that contains many other modes of disenfranchisement as well. That is, they are analogous because they exemplify a common schema, but they are not directly or causally related. (Granted, they might be so related within the context of bourgeois domesticity to which I have been alluding, but we would not want to assess the politics of performance generally in light of that one historical moment.) To say they are analogous is to say they partake of a symmetrical relation: in the proper context, female oppression could symbolize performer oppression as easily as the reverse. Either can serve as the “target domain” to which the other is metaphorically extended. And to the degree that gender is performative—as many, most notably Butler, have argued—gender can emanate artistic overtones as easily as musical performance can gendered overtones. Hence, the two domains co-exemplify a more general schema of oppression, are analogous and symmetrical, and neither enjoys precedence. This caveat is not to neutralize the political implications of my overall argument—I still feel that to advocate for the performer’s liberty is on some level also to advocate, more generally, for the societal subject’s. But I do not align that subject with one or the other gender.

* * *

With that crucial caveat in place, we can proceed to consider the resonances between the two types of oppression. Both trade on the binarism of reason/sensuality, or mind/body: the work is
associated with abstract ideas, the performer with sensuality, and that, in turn, traditionally with the female. Both performance and the female have been simultaneously celebrated and denigrated on the basis of their presumed constitutive sensuality.

To frame the matter broadly, as Sabina Lovibond explains, the Enlightenment yielded the notion of “unity of reason,” under which reason is held to be pure and abstract, impervious to the contingencies of time and culture. Moreover, the Enlightenment principle seeks consensus among factions of a community, so that varying perspectives may ultimately be arbitrated by a single, overarching truth. Postmodernism reacts against such notions of abstract reason and consensus, emphasizing instead the particularity of various “language-games,” and refusing to concede that “the replacement of one 'game' by another can be evaluated according to any absolute standard” (Lovibond [1990, 156]). Feminists, along with postmodernists generally, uphold provisional, contextual truths, holding the Enlightenment ideal of transcendence to harbor distinctly misogynist connotations. Indeed, transcendence has often been used as a metaphor for man escaping nature—in turn associated with the feminine—in order to emerge into the pure light of reason.

By analogy, the musical work, as traditionally formulated, is a locus of musical reason and consensus: its raison d'être is to define the essential, invariant components of a composition to which all executants must adhere. It seeks to escape the vicissitudes of physical execution, suppressing that reality even as it is an absolute necessity for music to be music—for music to be heard. As Dillon Parmer puts it, “it is . . . to rein back the multiplicity generated through performing, that musicology [posits] a fixed and stable construct, a point of origin it identifies as the ‘work’. . . . Because performance events differ from and exceed the identity of such a
construct, suppressing both their difference and excess is necessary to maintain the stability of that object for . . . knowledge production” (2007, 38). Indeed, as this last clause reminds us, the work is rationalistic not only in asserting musical ideas that supposedly transcend and reduce away the ineluctable plurality of performance, but also in generating ideas about a piece. Simply put, we could not collect knowledge (at least of an academically-sanctioned sort) about Mozart’s Piano Sonata in D, K. 311 if we considered it nothing other than a motley collection of performances. It is only by hypostatizing it as a work—one largely coextensive with the score—that we can generate knowledge about it, and thus secure a place for ourselves within the power structure that is music academia.

To the extent, then, that pure reason is associated with the masculine, and sensuous, somatic experience such reason transcends with the feminine, the work can be aligned with the masculine, performance with the feminine.

The project of pure reason relies heavily on printed language, just as its musical counterpart relies on the printed score, without which the notion of the musical work would likely not have arisen. This logocentric bias is coupled with a phonocentric one that, as Derrida has shown, grants the false impression of metaphysical certitude to written language. By analogy, our worship of the musical score is coupled with an implicit belief that the notations “are themselves the spoken word,” to recall A. B. Marx’s phrase from a previous chapter—that the notations delimit the boundaries of sonic realization. The fetishization of the visual in music is evident not

\[54\] Such an implicit belief undergirds Brahms’s (in)famous sneer that, to paraphrase, he had no need to go to the opera when he could hear a better performance staying at home reading the score; and also
just in the printed score but also in musical iconography. To invoke Leppert one last time, just as
the pictures he surveys prettify the messiness underlying apparent domestic order and neuter the
sensuality of their female subjects, so the score along with the work it supposedly represents
prettify the ineluctable messiness of learning and making music. They exclude the performing
body, with its real pleasures and pains that some would soon forget. (Which, again, is why we
should heed Adorno’s reminder as to the values of amateur music-making and the dangers of
music-professionalization.) Cusick reinforces this link between textuality and sexuality: “a focus on
texts tends to trick us into staying in a power-over paradigm that is mighty close to the regime of
compulsory heterosexuality” (1994a, 80). In short, logocentrism, phonocentrism, and
phallocentrism all seem to be mutually reinforcing—though, again, by no means necessarily or
causally connected.

In summary, though one should be wary of framing the performer’s plight as in essence a
feminist one, there are undeniable parallels arising from long-standing cultural associations. One
might view the subservience of the performer to the work/musicological knowledge and female
 subservience as two instances of a more general schema of domination. To this extent, to resist
the performer’s oppression by the work and Werktreue concepts is on some level to resist other
more distressing forms of oppression. This, in my view, is partly why interpretive freedom is so
 crucial. And especially so, of course, when the work itself is ideologically dubious. Thus, put
 negatively, for the performer to erase herself in deference to Frauenliebe is to enforce both work
hegemony in general and Frauenliebe’s gender hegemony in particular. Put positively, to resist

Schoenberg’s that performances are only for those hapless individuals who lack the musical intelligence to
audiate sounds directly from the score.
Frauenliebe is to do the aesthetic work of framing the performer as integral rather than decorative; it is also to do the cultural work of countering the decorative function Frauenliebe assigns to women.

* * *

How, then, can the performer assert his presence, his physicality in particular? Most obviously, by foregrounding, or at least not concealing, the physical act and exertion of playing. In song performance, the singer-as-actor can move around the stage (rather than being glued to the piano, which is the norm). Even (semi-) staging song cycles would not be out of the question. (It is telling that it is commonplace to render staged works in concert form but not the reverse. This practice reveals our penchant for the abstract.) Foregrounding the body in instrumental music is admittedly more challenging, where the size of the instrument and difficulty of producing sound on it often force the performer to be relatively stationary.

Perhaps this is an area in which Jennifer and I could have gone further. Generally speaking, it is easy to pay lip service to physicality while playing right into traditional categories. For example, Cusick (1994 and 1998) has bemoaned the “mind-mind game” of music, by which music is conceived as being carried from the composer’s mind to the listener’s by a neutral performance vessel. In this conception, the performing body is all but passed over. Yet, as Maus (2009) points out, Cusick valorizes only the physicality necessitated by the score, not one left freely to the performer. Alexandra Pierce (1994) and Roger Graybill (1990) likewise focus on the embodiment of the physical states implied by music. Granted, these movements are interpretive rather than prescribed by the composer’s literal notations. Still, Maus contends, they are
concerned mainly with conventional “musicality” and, moreover, assume a universal, fully abled body. Similarly, Keil (2000) notes that Small (1998) resorts to essentializing in his later chapters: in his early ones, Small argues (in Keil’s words) “that the gesture language of musicking is always open in the moment of performance, meanings flexible or indeed playfully reversible depending upon context and listener,” but in the closing chapters, music “the object and text is coded, a semiotic built up for centuries is fixed in the score” (162). And finally, even the pop music performance, in which the body has traditionally been celebrated as a tool of sexual resistance, still often genuflects to the dominant ideology. Auslander cites in this connection the “glam” rock of the 1970s, which was male-dominated and “took the performance of masculinity as its terrain” and was thus “entirely in line with the conventions of rock as a traditionally male-dominated cultural form” (2004, 10).

A liberating piece in this regard is John Corigliano’s *Pied Piper Fantasy*, which involves various movement, such as players entering and exiting the stage.\(^{55}\) That Corigliano penned the

\(^{55}\) In a program note, he states:

A technical problem—the fact that two groups of performers each playing music extremely divergent in tempo ideally requires two conductors—thus provoked a theatrical solution: the separation and exit of one of the groups. The children and the exit became an integral part of the score. While originally conceived for musical reasons, these elements started a chain of theatrical additions to the performance that followed the world premiere in Los Angeles. In London (Galway with the London Symphony) stage and house lights were slowly dimmed as follow-spots tracked the departure of the Piper and the children. In Puerto Rico the young soloist began the introduction to the opening Piper’s Song onstage and entered wearing a cloak. In Israel the performance began in darkness, the lights coming up and growing in brilliance with the orchestral sunrise. The
concerto specifically for James Galway, and claims to have wanted to play to his (avuncular? flamboyant?) persona raises another means by which performers generally can be recalcitrant to effacement: they play not only, or even primarily, the work, but also play themselves, including their sexuality. This is a paradigm classical performers can usefully borrow from film actors and rock stars, where such self-performance is commonplace (where performances, as Adorno might have said, serve as their own advertisements). It is evident in cases where actors seem to be “just themselves” when playing roles, which we infer from the fact that they always seem to be the same in every role. Of course, we often criticize performers on this basis—we think that one who always just plays himself must not be a very good actor—and yet, for better or worse, the idea of a movie star is predicated precisely on the idea that people can count on some degree of consistency. We pay to see a Tom Cruise film not because we think he is going to disappear into the role that

56 “Galway as the Piper seemed the most natural thing in the world” (ibid.).

57 Auslander (2004, 6), however, insists that pop musicians are never simply themselves on stage. Invoking Simon Frith, Auslander outlines three types of persona that are simultaneously present in pop musicians’ performances: the real person, the performance persona, and the character. The first draws upon his own true experiences; the second merely conforms to an image, one consciously manufactured by the performer and/or his producers and managers; the third derives from the content of the song. Auslander adds, “that these three signified presences admittedly are often difficult to distinguish from one another does not diminish their heuristic value” (ibid).
he plays, but because we know we are going to see Tom Cruise. This is, of course, a shameless brand-name mentality, one that objectifies and dehumanizes the performer even as it supposedly celebrates him. Moreover, we classical artists have a complex array of notes and an even more complex array of structural and emotive connotations with which to contend. Ours is not a medium in which it is even possible to play only ourselves. However, adopting some variant or degree of this mentality, I think, can at the very least ward off the danger of being annihilated, of being sucked into the vortex of abstraction that is the musical work.

But most generally, such presence is maintained simply by not losing one’s interpretive voice, not allowing it to be silenced by the score/work and institutions that secure its authority. Of course, the mechanisms of this resistance, and the way in which music analysis can be used in its service, have been explored throughout this dissertation. But to add a point, building upon the remarks about acting with which I began this chapter: the paradigm of the script can, I think, be quite useful for the classical-music performer generally. The idea of a script often has a kind of pejorative connotation, one of prescription—when we say something is “scripted,” we usually mean its essentials have been artificially planned out in advance. Indeed, this is one reason why in Chapter 1 I objected to viewing the score as a script. But actors commonly approach a script as a completely malleable, flexible tool. They take for granted that its words are so many empty shells that simply must be filled with the performer’s sentience and personal experience to come to life—indeed, to have any impact at all. As Kevin Bazzana aptly states, referring to Glenn Gould’s theatricality, “In the theatre . . . creative interpretation is simply how interpretation is done” (1997, 41). The neutrality or effacement classical performers are often encouraged to embrace, explicitly
or not, would, in the theater world, simply equate with bad performance, or even non-performance.

Another way to put this is that an outstanding performance will stand out as a performance; a compelling interpretation will, in my view, be an “overinterpretation.” As Jonathan Culler declares (to reuse a quote from Chapter 1), “interpretation is interesting only when it is extreme” (1992, 110). But, as he goes on to say, we should be extreme not for its own sake, but because doing so gives us much more room in which to bring out potentialities in the work we might not otherwise. And that includes, as we saw in the Schumann, the potential of a work to transcend its own ideological limitations and put forward a more life-affirming vision.
Appendix A: Bach, Little Prelude in D minor, BMV 940: voice-leading graph, after Schenker (1925b)
Appendix B: Chopin, Nocturne in C minor, op. 48, no. 1: voice-leading and motivic analysis
Appendix C. Beethoven, op. 18, no. 4, first movt.: voice-leading and motivic analysis of exposition
**Discography and Videography**


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