ACTION AND ASPECT IN ENGLISH VERB EXPRESSIONS

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It is well known that some English verbs and expansions thereof name states rather than events or processes. It is also known that linked to the inherent durative aspect of stative verbs there is another, nonaspectual, feature: such verbs are not used with an active (agential) subject. However, we must not conclude from this that nonstative verbs necessarily name activities. It is easy to find examples of events and processes which are not activities. The co-occurrence restrictions which define aspectual categories such as event or process are quite distinct from those which lead to the activity-nonactivity categorization. The system must include both dimensions.

What is it about the verb "to read" that allows us to say "They're reading your message now"? And why can't we say "they're liking your message now"? Is it because "to like" is not an activity? That can't be it, since "receive your message" is not an activity either and yet we can say "they're receiving your message now."

The traditional idea that verbs express action or state of being is helpful in some ways. It is certainly true that you can go through a text and characterize some of the verbs as actions and others as states of being. But it soon becomes clear that this classification is unsatisfactory. It appears that two oppositions are required, activity versus nonactivity and stative versus nonstative. Evidence to support this view will be presented in this paper.[1]

The most striking difficulty in the traditional view comes up in sentences like "It will freeze solid," where the verb expression does not denote an action in the strict sense, an activity in which the subject participates as a voluntary agent. Nor does it denote a state of being: the expression "freeze solid" denotes an event, a happening, a change of state rather than a static condition. So neither "action" nor "state of being" is appropriate as a label for verb expressions of this kind, which we may call nonactivity events. (The "Verb Expression" of a sentence does not include

the auxiliary, but only the verb itself plus the objects and comple-
ments, if any, that go with it.)

When grammarians have occasion to talk about what is ex-
pressed by verbs they often settle for the term "action," some-
times noting that it is a short form for "action or state." But
we should not infer that this is a grammatical dichotomy of all
verb expressions. In the following examples, does the verb express
action, or state of being?

> 1. The chief received a cable.
> 2. The milk will turn sour.
> 3. A thought occurred to me.

Very broadly speaking we might call these actions in the sense
that the verb in each case represents something as happening and
does not describe a situation or a state of affairs. The danger is
that if we characterize such examples as actions it will obscure
the very useful distinction that must be made between activities
and nonactivities. All three examples contain nonactivity verb ex-
pressions; that is, they are not things the subjects do of their own
volition. As to temporal aspect, another matter entirely, they are
events rather than states.

Grammatically, the activity-nonactivity distinction is consider-
ably more blurred and has less stringent co-occurrence constraints
than the aspectual categories. The following collection will give an
idea of the range of possibilities.

EVENTS THAT ARE NOT ACTIVITIES

> 4. a) He was born in April.
>   b) The thing disintegrated.
>   c) My license expired.
>   d) He got sick.
>   e) He got a call from them.
>   f) I had that happen to me once.
>   g) We had a storm last night.
>   h) Somebody had an inspiration.
>   i) They heard something happen.
>   j) We heard it was so.
>   k) She inherited a castle.
>   l) She learned of it just now.
>   m) You'll recognize her immediately.
>   n) You'll recover soon.
>   o) We saw the manager leave.
>   p) It took place here.

There are also many verbs that can be used both ways, either as activities or not, and still retain their nonstative aspectual behavior: "Disappear" can be simply ingressive "become invisible," not entailing any volition or purpose; but with causative and reflexive features covertly added, it is "cause oneself to become invisible," which is an activity that can be done for a purpose and with moral responsibility.   Both are nonstative (punctual, to be more specific) in respect to their aspectual behavior.

Similarly "get old" and "get tired" are normally used the same as "become," but "get busy" and "get ready" can be causative and reflexive.

EVENT	EVENT + ACTIVITY
disappear	disappear
get old	get busy
get tired	get ready
get dry	get dry
get built	get married

Using "get lost" reflexively, as in a command, is figurative.

In the search for nonactivity verbs many borderline cases turn up.   In sentences like "She fainted," is the subject a voluntary agent?   Do such matters belong to syntax?   The difficulty of answering these questions should not overshadow the usefulness of the "activity" concept no matter how vague it is.   For a more precise term we could call it "voluntary activity" but of course the concept remains just as hazy.   Still, we have to have it in order to sort out such things as the uses and semantic variations of words like "may," "will," and "ought" as well as many other grammatical problems.   Selectional features of this sort, though not marked by suffixes or function words, are often more important than overt elements like possessive or progressive in the way they operate within the code.[2]

Knowing, for instance, that "receive" normally plays a nonactive role whereas "get" can be used either way about equally well, we can see why "You ought to receive it soon" is not taken personally.   The obligation, if we can call it that, is for something to happen, not for the person to do something.   Put an activity

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[2]As Whorf put it, the identity of a covert category is revealed "only in certain types of sentence and not in every sentence in which a word or element belonging to the category occurs. The class-membership of the word is not apparent until there is a question of using it or referring to it in one of these special types of sentence, and then we find that this word belongs to a class requiring some sort of distinctive treatment, which may even be the negative treatment of excluding that type of sentence. This distinctive treatment we may call the *reactance* of the category." (Whorf 1937:2)

verb like "fetch" in place of "receive" and the word "ought" will be understood as an obligation applying to "you" because in this configuration the subject means an agent voluntarily participating as performer of the activity.

A similar selectional feature helps to make tolerable within the language the semantic multiplicity of "may" and "will." To put it another way, the grammarian has to explain somehow, in lexical rules or syntactic rules or both, the fact that the meaning of "won't" in number 5 below is unambiguously future, whereas in 6A and 6B there are two distinct meanings expressed by one and the same grammatical form (at least the same phonological form).

> 5. They won't run out of fuel.   (Future.)
> 6A. They won't write to me.   (Future.)
> 6B. They won't write to me.   (Present.)

The ambiguity of "won't" when it appears with activity expressions like "write to me" contrasts with the single meaning of future which it has with nonactivities like "run out of fuel." That is, the same surface exponent "won't" corresponds, depending on context, either to the negation of the main verb in the future or to the negation of willingness in the present. But since the idea of willingness or refusal is incompatible with a nonvoluntary verb expression, only one of these interpretations is possible for "won't run out of fuel" in number 5.

So the general rule is that when the auxiliary "will" is used with a nonactivity it is almost certain to mean future rather than willingness. But with activity verb expressions both meanings are about equally possible, and a larger context has to be considered before we get a feeling that the balance is weighted in one direction or the other.

In all the examples so far, the verb expression has been deliberately chosen so as to be toward the punctual, or instantaneous, end of the punctual-durative axis, because it is important to keep these two kinds of opposition separated.[3] The behavior of a verb vis-a-vis adverbs like "how often" and "how long" is best treated apart from the question of voluntary or nonvoluntary. From the point of view of "temporal distribution or contour" (Hockett's terse description of aspect) the examples cited above are all events rather than states.

Still, it is true that many verbs exhibit a correlation between activity and event; that is, there are many verbs which, when they

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[3]Two works in which the separation *is* explicitly observed are Boyd 1965 and Fillmore 1968b.

denote an activity, are also punctual as to their temporal contour. A whole group of verbs denoting speech acts illustrate this kind of linkage of features in which activity and event are paired up so they both switch at once. One example is "admire," which in the meaning of "*express* admiration" is voluntative[4] and, as to aspect, punctual. "Admire" in the meaning of "be in the state or have the quality of admiring" is nonvoluntative and has only durative aspectual possibilities.

VOLUNTATIVE AND PUNCTUAL	NONVOLUNTATIVE AND DURATIVE
7a. Don't forget to admire the doctor's garden	7b. He is reported to admire the doctor's garden.
8a. I've already admired it.	8b. I admired it too, until today.

Other verbs in this group are:

agree	excuse	remind
blame	flatter	threaten
demand	promise	wish

"Wish" for instance appears as an activity in "She wished him a safe journey" (punctual) and as a nonactivity in "She wishes it were so," which is durative.

Aside from speech acts, there are many other verbs that illustrate this pairing of features. Common examples are:

annoy	surround
frighten	tickle
hide	touch

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[4]I.e., an activity. "Voluntative" applies to the feature a verb expression must have in order to participate in the agentive construction—an action performed with the deliberate intent and volition of the subject. It seems preferable to adopt this expedient instead of merely calling the verb "active" although the latter term has often been used in just this sense. Jespersen in this connection as elsewhere emphasizes the need to distinguish between syntactic and notional active, citing "A sees B" as an example of a syntactic active which is not notionally active. (1924:165) Compare also Ilyish, Chapter 12, where "active" is recommended as a term for all those verb uses in which the subject is represented as the originator of the action, whether there is a corresponding passive or not. (Many nonvoluntative verbs are intransitive, some are "mid," and some are transitive.) Gruber's term "agentive" or Boyd's "agential" could be used, but strictly these apply to the relation between the actor and the action rather than to either of the constituents of the relation. "Activity" which now seems to be the usual technical term, is not exactly appropriate because in ordinary use it includes events and processes which may go on without the will of the subject. Volition seems to be the essential idea of the category whose behavior we are considering. Obviously the important thing is not the problem of finding the right name but rather that of delimiting the relevant grammatical configurations.

In many of these, the subject can be animate even when its rela-
tion to the verb is not that of an agent: "You remind me of some-
body." Nevertheless, it very commonly happens that an animate
subject (that is, one having the feature of volition) is chosen to pair
up with an activity and an inanimate subject is chosen when the
same verb is used in a nonactivity sense. A typical example is:

9a. The children decided   9b. The idea is known
    to frighten him.   to frighten him.

The notion of an underlying optative, as in 9a, requiring the feature
of volition in the verb chosen, as opposed to the indicative modality
that underlies 9b, is developed in detail with many examples in
Boyd 1965. A useful theoretical framework for understanding the
agent relationship is provided by Fillmore in "The Case for Case"
(1968a).

In the case of verb expressions made up of BE plus an adjec-
tive or equivalent ("be frank, be a sport, be serious") we find
many examples illustrating the same general rule, namely that
when you switch from voluntative ("he decided *to be serious*") to
nonvoluntative ("the situation is felt *to be serious*") there is a
corresponding switch in the aspectual possibilities. Accordingly,
with the voluntative meaning, we can say "He isn't being serious
now but he has been serious several times today," where the ex-
pression "be serious" exhibits punctual behavior in both occur-
rences. The corresponding nonvoluntative use of the same form
exhibits typically durative aspectual behavior: "The situation may
already (or no longer) be serious."

Detailed analysis of the BE-plus-predicative construction func-
tioning as a voluntative verb can be found in Lakoff (1966). Typical
examples of adjectives that have this combination of syntactic po-
tentials are:

cooperative	gentle	quiet
fair	honest	serious
firm	kind	smart
frank	patient	

Granted, then, that there is a more than coincidental associa-
tion between activities and events, or more strikingly between non-
activities and states, nevertheless we have to deal with these two
dimensions separately. We cannot *explain* the aspectual behavior of
"remind" for instance, in a sentence like "You were reminding
me of my obligation," by saying that it is an activity; nor should

we set up the lexical entries in such a way as to predict this be-
havior from a feature such as "action" (If "action" is to be de-
fined, as I believe it should be, in terms of voluntary involvement
of some animate agent as originator of the process or event).

It does, however, seem to have some explanatory value if we
label "remind" in this meaning as *nonstative*. The reasoning is
as follows. There are certain verbs (and verb expressions con-
structed from them) such as "belong," "deserve," "know," which,
though not necessarily completely incompatible with the progres-
sive formative "be + -ing," do not need it in order to express
the idea of right-now immediate actual contemporaneousness which
this formative explicitly adds to ordinary (nonstative) verbs as in
"he got them" versus "was getting them." So verbs like "belong,"
etc., which exhibit the peculiar *stative* pattern of aspectual behavior
(of which the "no progressive" quality is only a part) are aptly
called statives.

Now, aside from their aspectual behavior, these verbs also
persistently reject all of the characteristics (such as manner, pur-
pose, imperative, etc.) which are summed up under the term "vol-
untative." Therefore it makes sense to say that "you were re-
minding me" is nonstative, because such a designation tells us
among other things that we are dealing with a verb expression
which observes the usual distinction between the simple form and
the progressive as we know it in verbs like "you went" and "you
were going."

In the case of "you were reminding me" it also happens to
be true that the verb is voluntative, i.e. an "activity," but this
does not *follow* from the fact that it is nonstative. There are many
nonstative verbs which are not activities (4a-p).

Some of the ways we recognize the aspectual patterns of "sta-
tive," "punctual," and so on, are sketched in the preceding paper
of this series and are treated in more detail by Ridjanović (1969).
The reactances for the other dimension, activity versus nonactiv-
ity, are summarized below.

ADVERBS OF MANNER. It is a useful rule that adverbs of
manner go only with activities, though the rule is greatly improved
if we take "activities" to include all events and processes whether
the subject is agent or not. Obviously, nonvoluntative things can go
on "silently, slowly, smoothly," and so forth; and these adverbs
must surely be considered adverbs of manner:

10a. The film disintegrated slowly and quietly.
10b. The story unfolded in a similar manner.

The alternative is to restrict the rule to activities in the narrow sense, that is, voluntative verb expressions, and also define "manner" more narrowly to include only those adverbs which describe both the agent and the action in a way that means the agent is consciously putting that quality into the performance. Examples of this type will therefore be incompatible with "be born, disintegrate, expire," and the others on our list of nonactivities.

ADVERBS OF MANNER ASSOCIATED WITH VOLUNTATIVE VERBS

angrily	intently
busily	laboriously
calmly	loudly
cautiously	merrily
clumsily	regretfully
contemptuously	skillfully
fiercely	stealthily
gently	wildly

One of the difficulties in connection with this rule about manner adverbs is that pseudo-active verbs, which are typically durative and nonvoluntative, seem almost to demand an adverb:

11a. It will install securely.
11b. These crates don't ship conveniently.

But those which are most used in such constructions, though they may suggest "manner," are quite distinct from the manner adverbs commonly used with voluntative verb expressions.

ADVERBS OF PRAISE AND BLAME. A voluntative verb expression, or the entire nexus containing it, can have applied to it adverbs or adjectives denoting moral judgments of the speaker, such as "brave," "foolish," "noble," and the like. This modification can be expressed by various syntactic arrangements, as discussed by Lees (1960b) and Bolinger (1961).

12. He destroyed the letter and that was foolish (of him).
13. To destroy the letter was foolish (of him).
14. He foolishly destroyed the letter.

15. It was foolish (of him) to destroy the letter.
16. He was foolish to destroy the letter.

17. His destroying the letter was foolish.
18. Destroying the letter was a foolish thing for him to do.
19. His destruction of the letter was foolish.

In all of these the underlying idea is that the qualifying term, appearing either as an adjective or an adverb, applies both to the agent and to the action. In this respect these modifiers are similar to manner expressions like "gentle" or "fierce" but most of the syntactic arrangements exemplified here are inappropriate for manner expressions. "Gentleness" is a manner the agent puts into the action, whereas "foolishness" is the speaker's comment about it.[5]

The degrees of ungrammaticality generated by the following lists can be explained only by postulating, first, some special selectional property for the adjectives and, second, another such property, say nonvoluntative, for the verb expressions.

He was brave	to
contemptible	be born in April
cruel	get sick
daring	get a call
foolish	have that happen to him
generous	have an inspiration
kind	hear something happen
naive	hear it was so
noble	inherit a castle
presumptuous	learn of it
rash	recognize her
selfish	recover
tactful	see the manager leave
thoughtless	
wicked	

Adjectives of the well-known "anxious" and "eager" group go with either activities or nonactivities:

He was anxious	to	escape, drive, serve, etc.,
eager		
proud		OR
reluctant		get a call, inherit a castle, recover from his illness.
willing		

Another distinction here is that adjectives of the "foolish" group do not combine with "become" or the other more specific link

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[5]Accordingly, it seems quite natural that the active adjective "contemptuous" belongs to the manner category whereas the corresponding passive "contemptible" belongs grammatically with "foolish" and "brave." (Jespersen 1924:169)

verbs as the "anxious" and "eager" group do:

He   was   anxious to escape.
     became
     looked
     sounded

He   was   foolish to escape.
     *became
     *looked
     *sounded

This restriction is in keeping with the logical structure of the sentence, which represents the nexus "escape" as the notional subject of the predicate "foolish." Also in keeping with this structure is the fact that such sentences as "he was foolish to escape" cannot be embedded as complements after "decide," "intend," "want," etc. "He wanted *to be foolish to do it." "We wanted him *to be foolish to do it."

PURPOSE EXPRESSIONS. The idea of intention and purpose seems as if it ought to be consistent only with voluntative verb expressions, but the most that can be said grammatically is that nonvoluntative verbs *resist* being modified by purpose expressions and also resist incorporation into purpose expressions.

20. They *ran out of fuel* so as to reduce the load.
21. We *inherited it* for the sake of family peace.
22. I *saw it happen* for some purpose or other.
23. She *gets inspirations* in order to improve herself.
24. We *had a storm last night* to cover our tracks.
25. They speeded up in order to *run out of gas.*
26. We flattered her to *inherit the jewels.*
27. He set out early so as to *learn there was a concert.*

No doubt some of these are flatly ungrammatical, but the only obvious conclusion is that almost any desired degree of grammatical deviance can be illustrated by combining purpose expressions with nonvoluntative verb expressions.

CAUSATIVE "HAVE." After "have" in the causative construction "have somebody do something" an activity verb expression is required. But there is another construction "to have somebody fall ill would be too bad" in which "have" accomplishes

the effect of a nominalization, and here of course the restriction does not apply. In the causative construction, furthermore, the "have" is itself an activity. In fact, the two dimensions, activity and aspect, constitute a useful framework for sorting out all the diverse meanings of the verb "have." Considering just those uses involving a past participle complement, we find the following.

DURATIVE (= Situation)

He has (= has got) his foot caught in the trap.   (Stative.)

PUNCTUAL (= Event)

Activity: He has the house painted every year.

Nonactivity: He had his horse shot from under him.

In these examples, the labels apply to the whole predicate "have" etc., not to the complement.

"FORGET TO" ETC. "Forget to" and similar verbs require a voluntative verb expression as complement:

28. He forgot to report that she was out.

29. *He forgot to discover that she was out.

A selected list will be sufficient to illustrate:

be afraid to
decide to
forget to
neglect to
promise to
remember to

Notice that "forget" and "remember" can also take a gerund complement, which does *not* have to be a voluntative verb expression:

30. He forgot receiving the other phone call.
31. He remembered discovering that she was out.

In this construction, 30 and 31, the underlying modality of the embedded sentence is indicative, whereas in the infinitive construction it is something nonfactual. Similarly, after "decide" in 9a "The children decided to frighten him," the embedded sentence has a modality that is optative or at least something other than indicative; that is, "to frighten him" here is in no sense an indirect assertion "that they *did* frighten him," but rather an indirect wish or command "that they *should* frighten him." With this underlying

modality, signalled by the selection of the verb "decide," it is natural that the choice of verb for the following infinitive should be restricted to those with the voluntative feature.

Consequently, when a verb like "frighten" (in this case the composite expression "frighten him") is put into this environment there is practically no ambiguity. In spite of the fact that "frighten" has by nature both potentials voluntative and nonvoluntative, it puts to use in this particular construction only the first of these intrinsic features. Again we see how the interplay of selectional features takes the place of overt signs that might be used in another language to distinguish the agentive and nonagentive uses of verbs like "frighten."

The notion of purpose or intent is strong enough in verbs of the "forget" and "decide" category to change a normally nonvoluntative verb into an activity:

32. Don't forget to sound friendly.
33. She decided to strike people as weird.
34. They were afraid to feel warm to the touch.

But as usual there are many different shades of acceptability. The main question is whether we can explain the pressures and twists within these combinations without some such notion as voluntary or conscious activity in our catalogue of grammatical categories.

CATENATIVES. "Appear to," "fail to," and "happen to" will combine with almost any kind of verb expression, but "mean to" and "hasten to" go only with activities:

35. We had rain last night though we didn't *mean to.
36a. He hastened to describe the problem.
36b. *He hastened to recognize the problem.

There is clearly a connection between "hasten to" and the usual verbs of motion, which all seem to have a special affinity for verbs of the voluntative type:

37. Get up and do it.
38. Go down and borrow it.
39. Run over and work on it.
40. Stand up and say it.
41. Turn around and watch it.

In fact the closest thing we have to an overt grammatical marker for the voluntative category is the otherwise meaningless "go" in "Don't go and break it." Similar expressions having this function are:

go ahead and
go to work and
take and
up and

In some areas where it is used, "be fixin' to" is also restricted to voluntative expressions, so that "He's fixin' to run out of gas" is taken to mean "on purpose" rather than merely an impending event.

COMMANDS. The best known test for an activity is whether it can be a true command or not; and along with this go all the constructions that have an underlying optative or imperative (in the sense of Boyd and Throne, 1969). Some of these have already been mentioned in connection with "will," "ought," and "decide." Some of the more direct forms of command are included below.

42. Will you please have your house ransacked?
43. *Now go and find out that it's raining, will you please?
44a. Why don't you receive any calls?   *O.K., I will.
44b. Why don't you have some beans?   —O.K., I will.
45. I smell whiskey. —Oh, you shouldn't do that. Don't smell whiskey.

Perhaps "request" would be a better term than "command."   At any rate "Why don't you" in 44a cannot be interpreted as a request for somebody to do something but only as a request for information, and this fits the nonvoluntative verb "receive"; such verbs resist the imperative idea latent in 44b.

The use of "will" in requests and responses to requests is a good example of the underlying imperative modality which it often expresses. The following examples show how this feature of "will" interacts with the voluntative feature in the verb expression that follows it. Because we know that "will" meaning future time is normally omitted in "if" clauses, we interpret the form "will" in 46 to mean volition ("if you will confess," etc.). And accordingly the domain of the zero substitute after "*will*" in "If you *will*, something good will happen" is that of voluntative verb expressions.

When volition is not involved, as in 47, then both kinds of verb expressions are treated the same. By forcing the form "will" into construction with a nonvoluntative expression in this environment (48) we create a decoding problem: the hearer might take it as an error of some sort or possibly an ellipsis for "if you will just

manage it so you miss the first act.'' In any case, the notion of nonvoluntative or at least some category other than aspect is required in order to explain what is going on in sentences of this sort.

46. If you will confess, hurry, pay, work, etc., something good will happen.

47. If you confess, hear it, see it, hurry, get better, recover, miss the first act, pay, etc., something good will happen.

48. If you will hear it, see it, get better, recover, miss the first act, run out of fuel, etc., something good will happen. (All somewhat odd.)

USES OF "MAY." The granting of permission, as expressed by "may," and the issuing of a command are very much alike in their modality and therefore in their configurations of grammatical features. The notorious ambiguity of the form "may" is most noticeable with punctual, voluntative verb expressions:

49. Your husband may leave early. ("It may be that he will" *or* "It may be that he does customarily.")

50. Your husband may leave early. ("He is permitted.")

If a *durative*, voluntative verb expression is chosen, the aspectual ambiguity is at least partly eliminated:

51. Your wife may study law. (Possible situation.)

52. Your wife may study law. (Permission.)

There is still doubt in 51 as to present or future *location* in time, but the aspectual question of single event versus custom is eliminated. If a punctual, nonvoluntative verb expression is chosen, as in the following examples, the "permission" interpretation is eliminated or at least its chances are greatly reduced, because permission entails volition. However, we again have the ambiguity of single event versus custom (to a degree depending on many other variables).

53. Jasper may receive the Wall Street Journal.

54. He may regain consciousness quickly.

55. Would you like to inherit a palace? O.K., *go ahead. *You may.

Ambiguity is eliminated in both dimensions if a stative verb is chosen. The only plausible interpretation for "may" in the following sentences is "It is perhaps the case."

56. He may crave freedom.

57. You may bruise easily. (Pseudo-active)

58. They may hail from Texas.

59. The paint spot may show.

SHALL I. The interrogative forms " shall I" and "shall we" express a future with verb expressions of all types.

60. Shall I encounter any difficulties?

61. Shall we arrive on time, do you think?

This is merely the regular interrogative conversion of the first person future "we shall arrive." Furthermore, but only with verb expressions of the activity type, the same forms "shall I" and "shall we" serve to express a request for the person addressed to make known his wishes:

62. Shall we leave early?

This use of "shall" (62) seems to be the interrogative form of "will" as used in giving permission to oneself (63), which naturally is restricted to voluntative verb expressions.

63. I guess I'll leave early.

64. I think I'll just *hear music for a while if you don't
    mind.

VERBAL COMPLEMENTS. "Verbal complement" names the function of the infinitive in "tell to do something." This function is only for voluntative expressions. Jespersen's examples (Essentials 32.5.2) are:

65. "He is told to be quiet." (Voluntative)

66. "He is said to be quiet." (Nonvoluntative)

Only the first of these is a verbal complement construction in this sense. (Boyd 1965: Ch. 5) Besides "tell," the verbs commonly used this way are:

advise	encourage	remind
beg	invite	urge
call upon	persuade	

In the *-ing* complement "find them escaping," and the like, the question of activity is not so crucial; and this fits in with the underlying factual modality of such complements. There are only minor variations if you put in the place of "find" another verb such as "catch," "see," "hear," etc. ("Imagine," however, yields a different construction.) The only great restriction is that stative verbs are barred from the *-ing* complement spot; though of course after "catch" because of its implication of blame, any nonvoluntative verb expression will sound odd as complement: "We caught him having an accident.

SUBSTITUTE VERB "DO." The domain of "do" as a substitute verb (not the auxiliary of "they don't but we do") is both more and less than the class of voluntative verb expressions, depending on the direction you go. It does not replace the voluntary BE + Predicative expressions "be quiet," etc.,

67. Why don't you be quiet? —O.K., I will. (That's all I ever *do.)

68. The one thing he decided not to do was *?be polite to Mrs. Simms.

69. Sam was being a good sport. —What was he *doing that for?

But it does replace things like "join" and "separate" even when they are used in a nonagentive construction:

70. This separates the cabin from the galley and that's all it does.

For service as a dummy activity verb, "do" is the best thing we have; but taken by itself, the substitution of "do" is not a sure test for activities. It is best to try several different reactance frames.

In summary: The semantic and syntactic features which identify aspectual categories like "events" or "states" are of quite a different type from those which distinguish activities from nonactivities. The latter contrast shows up in connection with adverbs of manner, purpose, etc., as well as with constructions involving imperative or optative modality. The aspectual contrasts show up when a verb combines with overt tense and aspect markers or with adverbials of time such as "already," "gradually," "since," etc.

EVENTS	PROCESSES	STATES
ACTIVITY	ACTIVITY	It belongs on the piano.
He acquired vs.	He studied vs.	He deserves a medal.
was acquiring	was studying	They differ slightly.
		They have long necks.
NONACTIVITY	NONACTIVITY	The size doesn't matter.
It expired vs.	It dried a while	All these weeds stink.
was expiring	vs. was drying	Now it weighs half a ton.

The accompanying chart gives a greatly simplified overview of how aspect and activity are distributed. As we try to devise a system of oppositions or properties to describe the lexical resources of the language, it seems advisable at least at the outset to deal separately with these two dimensions.

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