

**TRANSFORMATIONS IN LABOR, LAND AND COMMUNITY:
MINING AND SOCIETY IN PASCO, PERU, 20TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT**

by

Federico M. Helfgott

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Doctoral Committee:

**Professor Emeritus Fernando Coronil, Chair (Deceased)
Associate Professor Stuart Kirsch, Co-Chair
Professor Bruce Mannheim, Co-Chair
Associate Professor Sueann Caulfield
Lecturer Julie Skurski, City University of New York**

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For my parents, Michel and Edith

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a historical ethnography of a mining region in central Peru, as well as an attempt to reflect on how social formations and antagonisms within capitalism shift over time. The starting point for this investigation is the decline in class-based politics that took place in parts of the world at the end of the 20th century, and the simultaneous rise of new social movements. In the Peruvian mining industry, the 1980s and 90s saw a shift from the predominance of labor conflicts to that of mine-community struggles over land, environmental and distribution issues. Through research in an area where both the labor and the land relation involve many of the same populations, I interrogate these late-20th century transformations and place them in the context of longer-term dynamics, in particular the century-long transition from labor shortage to labor surplus. I also re-examine the social history of the mining camps, focusing especially on topics such as everyday life, the household and the environment. This world ended in the 1980s and early 90s, during a period of decline precipitated by the global crisis of capitalist accumulation, and in a context of political violence. Yet as a new mining boom has taken hold since the mid-1990s and especially since 2003 (prompted by the industrialization of China), capital has encountered new challenges. Open-pit mines, which require little labor, have encountered widespread opposition, due to their invasive encroachment on local space as well as the sense of exclusion they foster. Underground mines, such as those in my region of focus, continue to require significant amounts of labor, even if a labor surplus is also present here. As the voice and power of labor have declined, however, the land/local community relation has taken over many of its functions, becoming socially “thick” as a repository for people’s expectations of progress and for the defense of local agency against powerful outside entities such as mining companies. I thus conclude by arguing that there is a surplus of the social that overflows the forms set by struggles over value, and that then expresses itself through other relations.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a historical ethnography of a traditional mining region in Peru. At a broader level, however, it is concerned with social transformations under capitalism, particularly with how social groups cohere and shift over time, and how categories and identities rise and fall. In particular, my research began with an interest in the global decline in class-based politics that took place towards the end of the 20th century, and the simultaneous rise of new identities and social movements. These interrelated processes took place both at the level of social reality (most markedly with the collapse of “really existing socialism” and the decline of labor unions in much of the world) and of academic analysis. On the latter plane, an important shift in the perspective of the intellectual Left was articulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in 1985, when they wrote that “from the point of view of the determining of the fundamental antagonisms, the basic obstacle, as we have seen, has been *classism*: that is to say, the idea that the working class represents the privileged agent in which the fundamental impulse of social change resides” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 177; emphasis in original). It would be incorrect to assume that intellectual Marxism had previously been solely focused on the working class; nevertheless, statements like this served to articulate and acknowledge a greater willingness to decenter categories that had previously been central and to open up analysis towards other social and political relations and identities.

At the level of social and political change, these late 20th-century shifts have been highly uneven, with great variation depending on the region and sector involved. In the particular case of the global mining industry, many mining worker communities were displaced during these decades, and their formerly strong unions weakened (with important exceptions such as South Africa). At the same time, as Ballard and Banks (2003) have written, an important new category arose in the 1980s: “local communities,” which “swiftly assumed a pivotal position in the

politics and analyses of the wider global mining community” (288). This shift was reflected in the contrast between Godoy’s earlier (1985) review of the anthropology of mining, which devoted significant attention to mining workers, and Ballard and Banks’ own greater focus on the “resource wars” involving local communities, transnational advocates, corporations and the state.

In Peru, this transition has been even sharper than in other mining countries. Although mining workers there were never quite as central to national politics as their Bolivian counterparts (Damonte 2005, 63), they were nevertheless an important actor within the broader Peruvian labor movement up until the late 1980s. Moreover, for the national mining industry labor issues were certainly the biggest source of social conflict in the 1970s and 80s, the decades of greatest strike activity. By contrast, since the 1990s, and most of all in the last decade, the renewed expansion of mining activity has generated widespread social conflict, but this time between companies and local communities. In the last few years, some of these conflicts have become significant enough to affect national politics, even leading to the resignation of an entire government cabinet in late 2011 (as a result of the protests over the Conga gold mining project). Although the mining labor movement has recovered slightly from its nadir in the mid-to-late 1990s, labor conflicts today are on the whole much less politically visible than the company-local community disputes.

This change has been accompanied by a corresponding shift in the academic scholarship on mining in Peru. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, a group of sociologists, historians and anthropologists conducted research on the formation of a working class in the mines, and the social dynamics, political struggles and cultural formations that this entailed (Bonilla 1974, Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, Laite 1981, DeWind 1987, Flores Galindo 1993 [1974], and Salazar-Soler 2002 and 2006). By contrast, in recent years the attention of scholars and analysts has turned to mining again, but this time to the relationships and conflicts that have emerged between corporations and local communities (Barrantes et al. 2005, Bebbington et al. 2007, Scurrah et al. 2008, Salas 2008, Damonte 2009, Gil 2009, De Echave et al. 2009). This new scholarship has yielded many important insights into contemporary mine-community conflicts in Peru. However, for the most part, it has not directly examined the change in the

nature of social conflicts around mining, from labor to the “local community” (with the important exception of an essay by Anahí Durand (2011) which discusses the transition “from miners to indigenous people” (*de mineros a indígenas*) in the region of Angaraes, Huancavelica, as well as the reflections in Chapter 2 of Damonte 2009). Moreover, the earlier literature left off around the year 1980, and could not have predicted either the demise of the old mining camp model nor the decline of the mining unions. This process has thus been left largely unexamined as a historical event. Although this neglect is certainly understandable from the perspective of the contemporary literature, given its aims and purposes, it does mean that the “decline of labor” is assumed rather than examined, and that potential continuities and transformations are missed in the face of what seems like a total, radical break.¹

This shift or break in the literature on mining in Peru is a particularly sharp instance of the broader change in intellectual analysis in much of the world that was theorized by Laclau and Mouffe: the move away from the emphasis on class and towards a focus on the “plurality of democratic struggles which are decided in good part outside the class itself” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 177). While I certainly believe this has been a productive intellectual shift, there is a risk of ignoring the potential for articulation and connection between the old class-based analysis and politics (and the social formations on which it focused), on the one hand, and the intellectual and political currents and identities that are most prominent today, on the other. As Greg Grandin writes,

Over the last decade, scholars have heralded such ‘new social movements’ for mobilizing around culture, community, sexual, and gender identities and interests and for moving away from class analysis and an obsessive focus on the state and economic development. Yet notwithstanding its reputation, in many countries the old, class-based left was, on the ground, more varied and vibrant than its rhetoric often suggested. Despite their inability to incorporate culture and race into their analyses and visions of progress, left political parties and labor organizations in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Peru, for some examples, drew significant support from rural, often indigenous communities.... Just as recent work in U.S. history has revealed important bridges between the activism of the 1930s and subsequent civil, gay, and women’s rights movements, there often exists

¹ Again, the shift in the mining literature is sharper in the scholarship on Peru than on that concerning other mining countries. For example, Ferry (2005) and Rajak (2011) do examine issues of mining labor ethnographically, for Mexico and South Africa, respectively. Similarly, Finn (1998) and Klubock (1998) have published works on the history of mining workers in Chile (and the United States in the case of Finn).

in Latin America a direct link between the older left and new social movements (Grandin 2004, 192-193).

In the specific case of conflicts around mining, the links between the “old” and the “new” at the level of politics have certainly been disrupted by structural transformations and restructuring in the global mining industry, and the corresponding changes in local social formations, as will be examined in this dissertation. Yet if nothing else, in a country like Peru – where, unlike in the U.S., the highland indigenous population has historically comprised the main labor force for the mines – there is a significant continuity at the level of the people involved in the old labor struggles and the new company-community conflicts. This is especially true in the Central Highlands, Peru’s traditional mining region.

Thus, on one level my dissertation seeks to inquire into the historical transition that leads up into the present day – i.e. the “decline of labor” and the “rise of the local community.” To what degree is this only a surface appearance and to what degree does it represent an underlying reality? Has labor disappeared from the social landscape of mining regions the way it has vanished from academic analysis (in Peru) and from the concerns of most NGOs? If still present, what transformations has it undergone? What are the consequences and implications of these changes? Are there any continuities or commonalities between what we could call the old “communities of labor” and the new “local communities”? Although the mining industry certainly has its own economic, technological and social dynamics, these are questions that I believe resonate more broadly with issues of social articulation and transformation in global capitalism. I thus set out to examine these questions empirically, through a concrete study in one particular mining area of Peru – a country situated not at the center but rather on the periphery of global capitalism, where the “formation of the working class” had always been a more tenuous process to begin with.

However, as I began, I realized that I could not adequately grasp these late-20th century shifts without a proper understanding of the longer trajectory of the labor-centered paradigm in the Peruvian mining industry since the early 1900s, and of local society more broadly. While on paper historical transformations may appear swift, sudden and all-encompassing, in the actual social world they often turn out to mask longer-term continuities and gradual, slowly evolving changes. While the restructuring of the 1980s and 90s had formed my initial object of inquiry, I

soon realized that the years leading up to that moment had not been one long, homogenous period of stable mining camp life, as I had assumed at first, but rather had been punctuated by several shifts that were almost as significant as what occurred at the end of the century. In general, I found I could not adequately analyze the transition of the 1980s and 90s without understanding what had come before.

Thus, the project became not only an inquiry into the late-20th century shift but also a reexamination of the social history of mining in the Central Highlands of Peru since the early 1900s. In this aim I was greatly helped by the historical, sociological and anthropological studies cited earlier. However, it has not been my purpose to simply summarize their findings or use them as background to my own work. Rather, I have conducted my own primary research into these earlier decades, as part of my overall investigation. While the earlier works contained many useful insights and analyses, scholarly perspectives have also changed since the 1970s and early 80s, and my aim has been also to incorporate some of these analytical shifts. For example, I have tried to pay more attention to issues of everyday life and practice, as well as environmental history, and also to rethink the narratives of “proletarianization” and “working-class formation” that – understandably – were present in many of the earlier works. These narratives inevitably look different now after the dislocation and “flexibilization” of labor at the end of the 20th century. In this sense, my work seeks to make a modest contribution to the new social history of 20th-Peru, along the lines of recent works such as Drinot (2011), Parker (1998), Drinot and Garofalo (2005), and, from the perspective of historical ethnography, De la Cadena (2000) and Mayer (2009). One particular feature of my research as social history is the fact that it focuses on the crossroads between the world of industrial labor and capitalism – usually associated more with urban spaces – and the rural world, i.e. between labor history and agrarian history.

This “crossroads” aspect has to do with the fact that my research examines the world of mines and mining camps in highland Peru. Specifically, I focus on the Central Highlands, and on Pasco Department, where I conducted most of my research, in particular. While the new mining investments since the 1990s have been located all across northern, central and southern Peru, for much of the 20th century it was the mining centers of the central and south-central highlands, especially in the departments of Junín, Pasco and Huancavelica, as well as the highlands of

Lima, that were the most important. In particular, Pasco Department contains the historic mine of Cerro de Pasco – the most important silver mining center in the Andes after Potosí during the late-colonial and 19th-century periods, and an important polymetallic producer still today - as well as several important medium-scale Peruvian mines, such as Brocal (Colquijirca), Milpo, Atacocha and Huarón. While many of the workers at these mines have historically come from valley agricultural regions such as the Mantaro Valley (Junín Department) and Huánuco, there is also a rural population in Pasco itself, and the *comunidades* there played an important role during the land recuperation movement of the early 1960s, accelerating the decline of the haciendas (large estates) across Peru. Thus, it seemed like an appropriate place to study the intersections between issues of labor, land and “local community” in relation to mining.

Specifically, I focused primarily on two mining centers: Cerro de Pasco itself, which is a small city, and one of the medium-scale mines in the department, Huarón (and its more recently developed neighbor, the Animón/Chungar mine), situated next to the small town and *comunidad campesina* (peasant community) of Huayllay. I conducted ethnographic and oral history research in Cerro de Pasco, in the adjacent *comunidad* of Rancas, and in the *comunidad* of Huayllay, spending several months in each of these three locations. Since they are all reasonably close to one another, my dissertation is thus in a sense a historical ethnography of a region rather than of discrete villages or communities – although the focus shifts over the course of the chapters, with the social history component centered more squarely on Huayllay and the Huarón mine, and only secondarily on Cerro de Pasco. Altogether, I spent around 16 months in this area, and have continued to visit periodically since. I also conducted significant archival research, as well as a few interviews, in Lima, to complement the archival material I also gathered in Pasco itself. Some of the archives I have used for this research are those of the state mining company Centromín, the National Federation of Mining, Metal and Steel Workers of Peru (housed at the National Library), the Denis Sulmont Labor Archive at the Catholic University of Peru, the collection of engineers’ theses at the National Engineering University (UNI), and local archives such as the one I examine in Chapter 3. I also visited the city of Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley twice in order to interview former mining workers and company employees living there.

The choice of area focus within Peru thus leads to certain particular features in my research, which I discuss at greater length in the body of the dissertation. First of all, due to the altitude, at around 4,300 meters above sea level, this is a livestock-raising (sheep, alpacas and to a lesser degree bovine cattle) rather than agricultural area. Nevertheless, the region's historical association with mining and with capitalist development in the 20th century has meant that population density is higher than would otherwise be expected given the altitude. Second, it is today a primarily Spanish-speaking region, although a variety of Central Peruvian Quechua is spoken by many elderly residents and is generally considered to be part of recent history and local identity. Third, as is clear from the subject matter of this dissertation, this is an area that saw a significant influx of foreign and also national capital during the course of the 20th century. It thus underwent certain processes of capitalist development and modernization to a greater degree than many other parts of Peru; this development furthermore took place in particular ways given that it had to do with mining rather than, say, industry or commercial agriculture. That said, it is not an area that is considered to be at the forefront of modernization in Peru anymore; rather, it tends to be associated with old-style, rather than what is today labeled "modern" (i.e. post-1990s) mining, as well as with environmental pollution. While certainly not an isolated region, it is regarded as distant from the perspective of the national capital, Lima, due to the difference in altitude, and is entirely outside the tourist circuits being avidly promoted in Peru today.

Lastly, although this dissertation traces the decline of labor conflicts and the rise of company-community conflicts, in Pasco the latter generally do not take the form that they have at times had in recent years at certain large mining projects in Peru, such as Tambogrande, Majaz (Río Blanco), Tía María, Conga and Cañariaco –where local populations have protested to stop mines from being developed in the first place. In Pasco this has only occurred, to some degree, in one case – the Brocal Company's San Gregorio zinc open-pit project, which has been indefinitely stalled by the community of Vicco, as discussed briefly in Chapter 6. Other mine-community conflicts in the region have instead involved disputes over the terms and conditions of mining operations, not the questioning of the mines' existence itself. This has to do with several issues: the predominance of livestock raising rather than agriculture, the area's higher proportion of underground mining, which employs more people and destroys less land, (the two

open-pit mines of Cerro de Pasco and Brocal notwithstanding), and finally the local population's historic dependence on mining work and mining-related economic activity.

The overall argument of the dissertation can be summarized as follows. Both long-run and late-20th century factors have shaped the transition from the predominance of labor conflicts to that of mine-community disputes. Among the long-term factors is the shift, traced in Chapter 1, from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. The more recent, late-20th century factors include the “neoliberal” solution to the crisis of the 1970s and 80s – particularly the change in the labor laws. More importantly, both the long-term and the more recent factors involve a subtle shift in the location of “the social” and the “social burden” - these concepts defined both as the site of company interventions into society, and as the locus of people's demands for economic and educational progress in the face of inequality and partial exclusion. This shift becomes particularly evident in the case of Huayllay, where the old workers' camp and the local *comunidad* have essentially fused together. The types of demands and concerns that used to be channeled through the world of the mining camp, the union and the workers' collective bargaining agreements with the company are today channeled through company-*comunidad* negotiations in which land, rather than labor, is the explicit object of contention. Capital has mostly overcome, for now, the obstacles posed by the organization of labor, but it has not overcome the power of organized, and in this case landowning communities, a power which may be modest in the global scheme of things but which in the case of Peru has increased rather than decreased in recent decades.² Thus, while in the past capital was concerned with maintaining “labor peace” in order to be able to proceed with mining operations, today it is most concerned with the attainment and preservation of “social peace,” or, to use a more common industry term, “social license.” Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs are one way to facilitate this, and in this sense they can be seen as an integral and necessary component of the

² One way that we could think of this in somewhat Marxian terms would be to speculate that while in the late twentieth century labor was defeated in its challenge to capital in the realm of value (i.e. the *distribution* of power and of the fruits of society's collective efforts), the realm of *use-value* (i.e. the multiple needs, uses, goods and forms of wealth in society) has its own separate trajectory, and may continue to grow and change over time, generating a surplus that overflows the social forms set by the struggles over value. That surplus will then express itself through other social antagonisms that it finds available.

system of production, not unlike similar elements in older times (i.e. worker housing, social work, etc.).

I do not pretend that this argument accurately describes the changes in the conflicts that have taken place in all Peruvian mining sites, let alone in mines around the world. For example, there is little doubt in my mind that the recent and ongoing conflict over the Conga mining project in Cajamarca (northern Peru) has involved the emergence of what Martínez-Alier (2003) has called “the environmentalism of the poor” – a concept I do not employ much in this dissertation. Some versions of this phenomenon have emerged in the Central Highlands and Pasco at certain times in the past, as I discuss in the last chapter of the dissertation, but it is not as visible today – at least it does not have the same centrality as in the Conga conflict. Thus, to understand the latter conflict we would require different analytical tools and approaches, in addition to the ones discussed here. Certainly, the argument summarized in the previous paragraph is most relevant to a context like that of Huayllay, which combines a history of industrial mining employment, late-20th century restructuring of labor, and strong local institutions based around the hold over land. In the case of the city of Cerro de Pasco nearby, the first two of these factors are present, but the “local community” is a fragmented urban population rather than a landowning *comunidad* that negotiates with the company. The result is a lower corporate preoccupation with “the social” and a decreased ability on the part of the local population to bargain collectively with the mining company. Clearly, each site has its own particularities, and generalizations are difficult to make.

Nevertheless, I feel that the approach developed here has a relevance that goes beyond the specific case of Huayllay or Pasco Department. Although some features of my research site are specific and different from other places, others are more widely shared across mining sites in Peru and beyond. In particular, the shift from labor shortage to labor surplus is connected to a broader structural feature in capitalism – what Marx called the “relative surplus population” or “reserve army of labor” – even if it has taken a particular form in mining contexts and in countries like Peru. Moreover, not only is the late-twentieth-century restructuring of labor a phenomenon shared across much of the world, but it also necessarily implies shifts in the definition and location of “the social” and “the social burden.” And just like a landowning

community becomes a way to articulate demands and negotiate conditions and benefits in a region like Pasco, around the world new identities and forms of social and political articulation are emerging even as older ones decline. Thus, I believe that the arguments developed here serve to highlight certain dimensions of mining conflicts whose relevance goes beyond the specific case of the mining industry and of Peru, and which can help to understand broader issues of shifts and mutations in social forms and antagonisms in contemporary capitalism.

These arguments are developed gradually over the course of an examination of concrete historical and ethnographic material. The first three chapters comprise the social history component of the dissertation, and focus primarily on the Huarón mine and the local society in Huayllay District, with a secondary focus on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC). The reason for this is that the previous works on mining workers in Peru tended to focus primarily on the CPC (with the exception of Salazar-Soler 2002 and 2006), leaving aside more rural, medium-scale mines of which Huarón is just one example. In Chapter 1, after a brief introduction on the development of mining in Peru, I trace the historical background of the Huayllay area. I then proceed to elaborate the main argument of the chapter – i.e. the transition from labor shortage to labor surplus in Huayllay, Pasco and by extension other mining regions in Peru. I find this to be a more useful framework from today’s perspective than the narrative of “proletarianization” and “working-class formation” (or “peasants into miners”) that was posited by many of the earlier studies, and which was critiqued, for the case of Zambia, by Ferguson (1999). The transition from labor shortage to labor surplus involves not only the mechanization of mining, but, more crucially, the incorporation of rural populations at least partially into the capitalist sphere, with its new social dynamics, expectations and needs. In this sense, the discussion of traditional exchange systems in the background section of the chapter is relevant to the argument about the transition, for it describes some of the older world that was replaced by wage labor and market exchange.

Chapter 2 continues the examination of the social history of mining in this area, but with a focus on work, in part through life histories of mining workers and other people involved with the mining workforce. The chapter furthermore focuses not just on the sphere of mining work itself but also on that of “reproductive work,” in the sense of the reproduction of labor-power. A

bridge between these two spheres is formed by a theoretical discussion of the status of reproductive and household work within Marx's labor theory of value. This is a question that provoked significant scholarly and political debate in the 1970s. My own inclination is on the side of the theorists (such as Smith 1978 and Molyneux 1979) who argue that while reproductive and household work may be crucial to capitalist production and deserve close attention, they cannot be understood as directly producing value in capitalism. Using concepts from Ollman (2003), I propose that "production" is one moment of reification (of "labor" into "capital") in an ongoing process that also includes unpaid domestic labor as well as other activities and relations. These are part of a chain of causality, but are marginalized from the moment of "production" itself. This supports the view that domestic labor requires different analytical tools in addition to those used to understand the exploitation of labor within capitalist production. This discussion is relevant to the social history of labor, particularly in places like the mines of highland Peru where the reproduction of the labor force for capitalist production has often taken place within a non-capitalist sphere.

Chapter 3 then switches from a discussion of labor issues to one of everyday life in the mining camps of Central Peru, taking Huarón as a specific case and moving into the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (Centromín) at the very end. A large section at the beginning of the chapter is taken up with an analysis of household and marital relations in Huarón in the early 1940s. In this I follow the new tendency in Latin American social history to use judicial and other quotidian archives to examine the everyday social relations and cultural constructs of ordinary people - an approach which is exemplified in the case of Peru by works such as Hunefeldt (2000) and Christiansen (2004). Although the focus of this section may seem distant from issues of labor, community or land, I believe that a social history must pay attention to issues involving the household and marital and kinship relations, which in a sense underlie and to some degree determine much of the other relations established in society. However, in the second part of the chapter I also shift to a focus on housing and conflicts over space. This follows an established tradition in cultural anthropology of examining the space of the house as key to many other social relations. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the practice of social work in the state-owned mining company Centromín (the former Cerro de Pasco Corporation). This discussion not only helps to illuminate everyday life issues further, but is also important to the

overall argument of the dissertation in that it helps us to understand how “the social” was defined towards the end of the mining camp era, only a decade or two before it began to shift towards the sphere of Community Relations.

Chapter 4 transitions from the mode of social history, with its attention to long-term local and regional dynamics, towards a focus on the conjuncture of the 1980s and early 1990s, when large numbers of workers departed the mining camps of the Central Highlands during a period of social, economic and political crisis, setting the stage for the restructuring of the industry and the workforce. However, in order to understand this moment of crisis the chapter also moves outwards towards a discussion of the broader global crisis of the 1970s and 80s, in terms of mineral prices, long-run tendencies in capitalist production and also national dynamics of crisis and violence specific to Peru. I then return to an examination of the “unmaking of the working class,” in Salazar-Soler’s (2006) term, using union meeting minutes as well as my own interviews about this time.

Chapters 5 and 6 then shift to a more ethnographic mode, focusing on the two *comunidades* of Huayllay and Rancas today. Chapter 5 sets the stage, describing the basic functioning of the two communities, especially as regards land use. It makes the argument that the concept of the “peasant-miner” used by earlier scholars still has relevance today (but without so much of a need for the “into” of DeWind’s (1987) title), while at the same time the nature of both “peasants” and “miners” has changed over time. I provide a description of the basic dynamics of mining work today, as it occurs in both communities. I then conclude through an ethnographic vignette of a ritual and gathering at one of the rural estancias, as a way to illustrate some of the themes of the chapter and of the dissertation more broadly. Chapter 6 then tackles some of the central themes of the dissertation, especially how the mine-community relationship based around land has acquired preeminence, and how the location of the “social burden” has shifted. First I focus on the community of Rancas and its negotiations with the Volcan company in Cerro de Pasco over the renewal and expansion of a tailings pit on its land. I then switch to Huayllay, discussing how there has been a shift from “labor peace” to “social peace.” In order to do this more fully, however, I first need to describe the broader national and global context that surrounds the rise of the “local community” as a central actor in the mining world. I then return

to the concrete examination of Huayllay, using my interviews and observations to describe how many of the demands that used to be channeled through the union and the labor-capital relation are now channeled through the negotiations between the company and the *comunidad*. I examine how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is seen as compensation for the use of the land, and how it becomes a basic factor of production in mining operations.

Finally, in the last chapter I examine more closely an aspect that is closely tied to the land and that, although it was always there, has also acquired increased visibility in recent years alongside the mine-community relation. Namely, I focus on the emergence of “the environment” as a category of politics around mining today. I do this in three distinct sections. First, I attempt an environmental history of mining in the Central Highlands, to give an idea of the historical background to environmental issues today. Second, I focus on the politics of lead contamination in the city of Cerro de Pasco today, and discuss how lead has become notorious over and above other metals. I also examine how the mining company reacts to accusations of environmental irresponsibility, and how health hazards come to be closely associated with issues of monetary compensation. Lastly, in the third section of the chapter I switch back to environmental history, but this time with the purpose of understanding the emergence of the problematic of drinking water in the city today. This brings the dissertation to issues not just of environment but also of privatization, the shift away from the old system of “dependence” on the company, and the nature of mineral wealth, as well as the uncertain and unstable modernity that tends to be associated with mining.

CHAPTER I

FROM LABOR SHORTAGE TO LABOR SURPLUS: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF MINE LABOR AND MIGRATION

Introduction

The first three chapters of this dissertation undertake a reexamination of the social history of mining labor in the Central Highlands of Peru during the 20th century. They also form part of this dissertation's inquiry into the shift from labor-capital towards capital-local community relations as the most visible site of social articulation and politics in Peruvian mining at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. In the latter chapters of the dissertation I examine topics such as the "unmaking of the working class" in the late 1980s and 90s, the intersection between labor and community today, and the emergence of environmental issues as a central area of concern. However, it is first necessary to ground this discussion in the longer history of mining in the area, particularly in the age of modern, industrial mining in the 20th century. Without this background, it is not possible to grasp the changes that have occurred in the last twenty years, or to understand that significant continuities remain. Yet the purpose of these early chapters is not merely to provide background, but rather to re-open the question of the social history of mining in Peru from a more contemporary historical perspective. While the earlier works on mining workers in Peru, based on research carried out from the late 1960s through the early 1980s, all provide very crucial and often still valid insights, the history of labor inevitably looks different after the crisis of labor of the last few decades. In particular, most of the earlier works (especially Flores Galindo 1993 [1974], DeWind (1987) and Salazar-Soler 2002) were framed in the context of what they saw as increasing proletarianization and a gradual but steady movement from the countryside to the mines, before the disruptions of the late 1980s and early 90s.

The main argument of this first chapter is that we can understand the broad arch of the history of mining labor in 20th-century Peru as involving a change from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. I find this framing to be more useful today than the narrative of gradual proletarianization, which lends itself to more rigid expectations of what a working class should look like. The “shift from labor shortage to labor surplus” framework has the advantage that it can at the same time not only relate to similar phenomena around the capitalist world (including what Marx called the emergence of the “relative surplus population”) but is also empirically verifiable at the national and local levels in Peru, and is less subject to rigid interpretations and expectations derived from the “classic” experience of British and Western European industrialization. The argument is not only that labor needs decreased, relative to capital invested, over the course of the 20th century, but also that people became more willing to seek wage employment in the mines, as the focal point of local life moved away from previous regional systems of exchange and production (some of which are traced, for specific case of the Huayllay area, in the early parts of the chapter).

Beyond this argument, however, this chapter also seeks to lay the basis for the analysis in the rest of the dissertation by presenting a sketch of a specific region and by mapping out the basic patterns of migration and workforce formation at a medium-scale mine in central Peru. It also attempts to delve into certain issues that I feel are especially important to understanding the social history of mining workers, such as the rural context of the mines, in the sense both of the regions that workers migrated from as well as the surroundings of the mining center itself. Most of the earlier scholarship, with the exception of Salazar-Soler (2002 and 2006), was focused on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation – the largest mining company in Peru for much of the 20th century. While this focus makes sense in many respects, it tends to overlook the rest of Peru’s highly fragmented and diverse mining sector, with its numerous camps stretched across the high Andes, constituting partly stable and partly transient communities that straddled the rural and industrial worlds. For that reason, in these chapters I focus on one of those more rural medium-scale mines, Huarón, located in the district of Huayllay where I did field, oral history and archival research in 2009 and 2010. Huarón is an old *mediana minería* mine that was worked on an industrial scale beginning in the 1910s. For much of the 20th century, it was owned and administered by a succession of French companies, who ran the mine until 1987. The mine

continues to operate today, and, together with the neighboring Animón/Chungar mine, forms the heart of a mining district that was undergoing a new boom period while I was there. I also use evidence from Cerro de Pasco (about an hour away), since part of my research also took place there. Additionally, when appropriate, I compare the specific characteristics of this particular region with those of other areas in Peru.

The reason for focusing on the twentieth century is that it constitutes the temporal framework for modern industrial mining in Peru, which is usually considered to have begun with the arrival of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation in 1903. Yet it cannot be ignored that mining has existed in Peru since much earlier than that, and that the pre-1900 context inevitably influenced what came later. This is particularly the case when it comes to the organization of labor, which, unlike technology or capital, could not be imported wholesale from abroad. Foreign mining capital had to adapt to existing regimes of labor recruitment; transformations did take place but only gradually and over several decades. For that reason, it is necessary to look briefly at the historical development of labor recruitment for Peru's mines as it developed up to 1900.

Mining and labor in the Central Andes

As is widely known, silver was the main product that connected the Spanish Empire in the Americas to the world economy during colonial times. Within Spanish America, the largest producers by far were the Central Andes and Mexico. Most important in the early years was Potosí (then part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but present-day Bolivia), which peaked in the late 16th and early 17th centuries and then began a long decline punctuated by a modest recovery in the late 18th century. The mines of Zacatecas and Guanajuato in New Spain (Mexico) were also important, and that region would eventually surpass the Andes in silver production.

Nevertheless, the Central Andes³ continued producing silver, and in the late 18th century Cerro

³ In this dissertation, I follow the usage according to which "Central Andes" means roughly the space occupied by the modern republics of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. "Andean," on the other hand, should rightfully also include countries like Chile, Argentina, Colombia and even Venezuela. The distinction between the two serves to highlight the important cultural and linguistic continuities that exist among the three Central Andean countries, with their significant indigenous heritage, but it should not be taken as denying the fact that there are also links and continuities with the rest of the Andean nations as with all of Latin America. "Central Andes" is thus also different from the "Central Highlands of Peru" – the latter is meant to denote a geographic region within the nation, distinct from the Southern Highlands and Northern Highlands of Peru.

de Pasco emerged as the second most important Andean silver producer, after Potosí, actually surpassing the latter's production for one year - 1804 (Fisher 1977, 112). Since Potosí and the rest of Upper Peru (Bolivia) had in any case been turned over to the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (present-day Argentina) in 1776, Cerro de Pasco became the most important mining center in what remained of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the independent nation that emerged out of it in 1824. It maintained this position throughout the 19th century, surpassing smaller but important mining regions like Hualgayoc (Cajamarca Department) and Huarochirí (Lima Highlands). In Peruvian and Central Andean mining, the period spanning from the late 16th to the late 19th centuries can be seen as one long age of silver, in which the basic technologies, like mercury amalgamation (patio method), changed little.

Labor systems, on the other hand, did show some variation. Spanish colonial mining in the Andes is infamous for the *mita*, the coerced labor system that, starting in 1574, required adult men in indigenous villages over a wide area to take turns working at Potosí and in the mercury mines of Huancavelica (which supplied the necessary raw material for amalgamation). Colonial administrators considered the system to be a necessary remedy for the labor shortage that they believed threatened to undermine the silver industry and by extension the Spanish Empire itself, after the exhaustion of the richer surface ores at Potosí had made mining more difficult and less appealing to indigenous workers (Bakewell 1984). Modern historians have emphasized that a large "free" labor sector existed alongside the *mita* throughout the colonial period (Assadourian 1979; Bakewell 1984; Cole 1985; Tandeter 1992); these workers were more skilled, better paid and engaged in different tasks from those of the *mitayos*. Indigenous community members subject to the *mita* requirement would try to pay for these free workers to take their place at the higher market rates, thus avoiding going to the mines themselves. In this way, the communities' wealth drained away to subsidize the mines; colonial mining actually depended in large part on these subsidies as well as on other state protections for the industry.

Other mining regions, like Cerro de Pasco and Hualgayoc, flourished later in the colonial period, by which time the state was less willing to cede to the mining sector's petitions for a forced labor draft (Contreras 1995, 71). Thus, they had to rely on other mechanisms, such as the *repartimiento de mercancías* and the Indian tribute, both of which created a need for cash on the

part of the indigenous population and thus led them to seek out employment in the mines (Contreras 1988 and 1995, Deustua 1986). As these institutions were abolished over time (in 1789 and in the 1850s, respectively), other mechanisms for attracting labor remained. For example, the right to a portion of the metal extracted (which in Cerro de Pasco was known as the *huachaca*, according to Contreras and Deustua) made mining work more attractive during periods in which high-grade ore was found. Most importantly, the mining sector adapted to the seasonal nature of agricultural work, which meant that peasants migrated to the mines and then returned for the harvest and for planting. The relationship of complementarity between the two sectors meant that a large part of the costs of reproduction of the labor force were borne by the rural communities, while the cash earned in the mines was used for tribute, for the sponsorship of village feasts, or for the purchase of specific goods that required money (Contreras 1988, 130-138). In this way, the subsidy from the rural world towards the mines continued, as it arguably would during the early part of the 20th century.

Yet this system did not mean that a perfect balance between labor supply and demand was always maintained. Although the willingness of more rural areas to supply workers for the mines may have been increasing, this did not always keep pace with the growing labor demands of the mining industry during periods of increased production and investment; at those times an acute labor shortage could be felt. One such period was the 1840s – the decade of the most important mining boom in 19th-century Cerro de Pasco and Peru (Deustua 1986 and 2000, Contreras 1988). Another was the turn of the century, when large-scale industrial copper mining began in Peru. In order to understand how this affected the dynamics of mining labor, we must first look at what is meant by industrial mining. In the next section, I briefly discuss two mining companies – the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation, which dominated the Central Highlands, and the smaller, nearby Huarón mine, where much of my evidence comes from and which I use as the focal point for this chapter and the next.

Industrial mining in Peru: Cerro de Pasco and Huarón

In the late 19th century, the new electrical technologies associated with the Second Industrial Revolution brought about a sharp rise in the world demand for copper. Metropolitan mining companies built giant copper mines in the United States and also traveled the world

searching for more copper deposits and building smelters in which to process the metal. In Chile, this eventually led to the development of some of the world's largest copper mines, like El Teniente and Chuquicamata, both under U.S. ownership (Klubock 1998, 26-27). In Peru in the 1890s, local mine owners attempted to respond to the rise in copper prices by switching from silver to copper extraction, just as prices for the former product were falling sharply. Their effort failed due to a lack of capital at the local level (DeWind 1987, 16-17), but a decade later the needed capital arrived from abroad. In 1903, U.S. mining baron James B. Haggin founded the Cerro de Pasco Investment Company (later Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation);⁴ in addition to his own capital, he obtained the financial backing of several leading industrialists and financiers such as J.P. Morgan, Henry Clay Frick, the Vanderbilts and the estate of George Hearst.⁵ The new company quickly monopolized mineral production in the immediate vicinity of Cerro de Pasco, and gradually moved on to purchase the most important mining centers in central Peru, such as Casapalca and Morococha. It eventually developed a vast productive network that included railroads, hydroelectric plants, smelting and refining centers (first at Tinyahuarco and later La Oroya) as well as mines. From its early focus on copper, in the 1930s it shifted its production to lead and zinc, becoming one of the largest producers of these metals in South America and the world.⁶

For much of the century, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC) was the largest mining company in Peru; it also became the largest landowner in the country, purchasing a vast array of haciendas in the Central Highlands (its *Ganadera* Division). Yet it was by no means alone; Peru's mining sector in the twentieth century did not depend on one sole company or one single metal. Beginning in 1912, there was the Huarón company, to be discussed shortly. Additionally, during the first half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1930s and 40s, there was an important gold-producing sector, led by Peruvian-owned medium-scale and small scale

⁴ The company went through several variations in its name during its early history. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this dissertation I refer to it as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation.

⁵ This information on early shareholders comes from DeWind (1987) and is also mentioned in several other sources. It is also found in the Cerro Corporation Archives housed at the University of Wyoming's American Heritage Center.

⁶ In 1952, the company claimed to be the largest producer of refined lead in all of South America (Cerro Corporation Archive, "General Information," January 7, 1952).

companies, in addition to artisanal and placer gold mining. Although most of these gold companies closed around 1950, another vibrant medium-scale sector had emerged by then, with (mostly) Peruvian-owned companies like Atacocha (1936), Milpo (1942) and Buenaventura (1952) producing silver, lead and zinc. This *mediana minería* complemented the *gran minería* that included the CPC as well as, beginning in the 1950s, the U.S.-owned companies Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) and Marcona Mining Company. By 1974, when it was nationalized by the government of Juan Velasco Alvarado, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation no longer represented the cutting edge of the Peruvian mining industry in terms either of productivity, profitability or technology, having lost that status to the SPCC. Since the 1990s, with the numerous new large-scale gold and/or copper mining projects coming into production, like Yanacocha, Antamina and Pierina, the aging mines that formerly belonged to the CPC have receded even more in relative terms, even if they are still very important producers of lead, zinc and silver.

Given the pivotal place of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the history of modern industrial mining in Peru, it is no surprise that most social science and historical studies of mining in the country before the 1990s tended to focus on this company (Flores Galindo 1974, Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, Laite 1981, DeWind 1987). In this chapter, although I often mention labor dynamics at the CPC, given its importance to the Central Highlands and to Peru as a whole, most of my local evidence comes from the Huarón mine, located in the district of Huayllay, about one hour by car from Cerro de Pasco.

As noted above, while for much of the twentieth century Peru's large-scale mining sector (*gran minería*) was dominated by foreign, primarily U.S. capital, the country's medium-sized mines (*mediana minería*) were mostly controlled by the domestic mining bourgeoisie. Huarón, however, constituted an exception to this rule. Although belonging to the *mediana minería*, it was nevertheless controlled by foreign, namely French, capital. Also, it began relatively early, in the 1910s, long before other important medium-scale Peruvian mining companies like Milpo, Atacocha and Buenaventura. Thus, during several decades of the first half of the century, it was the second-largest mining company in Peru, after the CPC. Although less important in relative terms today, for much of the century Huarón was well-known among Peruvian mining engineers

as it was a frequent site for internships, trainings and job opportunities. Before using evidence from Huarón to discuss the social history of labor in the mines of central Peru in the 20th century, I must give some brief background on the formation of the company.

The Compagnie des Mines de Huaron (CMH) was formed in 1912 to exploit a mineralized zone then known as the mineral district of Huancavelica (not to be confused with the department and mercury mine of the same name in south-central Peru). One of the mines in the area was called Huarón (after a local lake known as Huaroncocha), and over time this name came to be used more frequently than the earlier name Huancavelica. These mineral deposits, located in the district of Huayllay and containing silver, copper, zinc and lead, had been worked on a small scale since at least the early 19th century (and probably much earlier).⁷ The CMH would remain under French control for over 70 years, from 1912 until the late 1980s. An array of interlocking French financial and mining interests controlled the company during this long period. Most important in the first few decades was the banking house Mirabaud, which also had investments in mines in Spain, Mexico, Algeria and the Balkans. Although Mirabaud would maintain its influence through the 1950s, already by 1927 other French banking and mining groups had bought shares in the CMH, which needed their capital for new expansion projects at the mine; among these were businesses like Peñarroya, Société Minerais et Métaux, Neufelize, Harth and the Banque de l'Union Parisienne (Chancelier 2001, 228). These companies supplied many of CMH's directors and administrators over the next few decades. In 1953, Mirabaud et Cie. merged fully with the Banque de l'Union Parisienne,⁸ which became the dominant shareholder and administrator of the CMH during the decade of the 1950s.⁹ By the 1970s and

⁷ It should be mentioned that there is also a community called Huayllay in the department of Huancavelica, which only adds to the confusion.

⁸ Founded in 1904, the Banque de l'Union Parisienne was one of the largest *banques d'affaires* (investment banks) in France. In the 1970s it fused with Crédit du Nord and both came under the control of Paribas, which in turn sold Crédit du Nord to the Société Générale in 1997.

⁹ Although Huarón was not itself a uranium mine, in the 1960s the CMH also had close financial links to companies involved in the post-war drive to invest in uranium mining for France's nuclear program; one such company, the Compagnie Française de Mokta, bought 20% of Huarón's stock in 1959 (Troly 2008, 31; Blanc 2009). Huarón's Annual Reports from those years list CMH itself as owning a share of two uranium mining companies: the Compagnie Française des Minerais d'Uranium (CFMU) and the Compagnie des Mines d'Uranium de Franceville (COMUF). Mokta was acquired by Peñarroya in 1971; this purchase brought Huarón into direct administrative control by Peñarroya. In 1986 Mokta was sold to the Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA), which in 2000 became part of the French nuclear conglomerate Areva. These corporate connections were likely

80s, the mining conglomerate Peñarroya, long dominated by the French branch of the Rothschild family, had become the main owner of the CMH, and administered it as part of its vast mineral empire, Groupe Imetal.¹⁰ In reality, however, all these companies overlapped a great deal, forming a tight-knit network of French mining investment around the world that shared not only capital but also expertise and professional experience. The French era at Huarón came to an end in 1987,¹¹ when a crisis-ridden Peñarroya sold most of its mining assets.¹² The Huarón mine was bought by the Adminco company, of the Hochschild group, founded by former Bolivian tin baron Mauricio Hochschild. Finally, in 2000 Adminco sold the mine to the Canadian company Pan American Silver,¹³ which continues to operate it to this day.

In terms of its on-the-ground operations, Huarón was not a completely isolated mine. Not only was the Cerro de Pasco mine located only 40 km. away (about one hour by car today), but also, in the immediate surroundings of Huayllay District, other small and medium-scale mining centers emerged and declined over time. The U.S.-owned vanadium mine at Mina Ragra, located high up on isolated Lake Punrun at the northern edge of the district, operated during the first half of the 20th century.¹⁴ The Río Pallanga, Santander and Chungar companies, on the other hand, emerged later in the century.¹⁵ In particular, Chungar is in a sense Huarón's twin. Its original

known to workers in the Huarón mine; one of my interviewees, a former worker, asserted the belief that there was an important uranium deposit at Huarón (which is not the case as far as I know).

¹⁰ Peñarroya was founded in 1881 as a joint enterprise by the Mirabauds and the Rothschilds, though the latter group eventually became dominant. Originally created to exploit the rich lead deposits of southern Spain, by the 1920s and 30s it had begun a global expansion through North Africa, southern Europe and the Americas (López-Morrell 2003). In the 1970s the Groupe Imetal, chaired by Guy de Rothschild, brought together Peñarroya, Mokta and the Société Le Nickel; these were separated again in the 1980s.

¹¹ It should be mentioned that since 1978 the CMH had shifted its legal residence from Paris to Lima and became the Compañía Minera Huarón. However, until 1987 Peñarroya still owned around 65% of the stock, with the rest controlled by various Peruvian companies.

¹² That year Peñarroya fused with the German group Preussag AG Metall to become Metaleurop S.A.

¹³ Incorporated in Vancouver, and formerly known as Pan American Energy Corporation and later Pan American Minerals Corporation, the company was re-founded as Pan American Silver in 1994. Today it claims to be the second-largest primary silver mining company in the world, with mines in Peru, Mexico, Bolivia and Argentina. In Peru it owns Huarón as well as a mine in the Morococha District and, until recently, the Quiruvilca mine in the northern part of the country.

¹⁴ Although not a large mine by today's standards, the Vanadium Corporation of America's mine at Minaragra at one time produced 90% of the world's stock of this rare metal used for industrial and military purposes.

¹⁵ Río Pallanga, which closed in 1983, was owned by Peruvian entrepreneur Roberto Letts Colmenares (who would later buy the Volcan Mining Company and the Cerro de Pasco mine). The Santander mine, according to Purser (1971, 124) was at one time owned by the U.S. company St. Joseph Lead. It was no longer operational by the time of my research, though there were plans to bring it back into production.

owners also owned Huarón; when they sold the latter to the French in 1912, they kept some mining concessions which they later developed. After the original Chungar mining camp was destroyed in an avalanche in 1971, the company moved its operations to the Animón mine, immediately adjacent to Huarón. However, it is only in recent years that Chungar/Animón (now owned by Volcan, which also owns Cerro de Pasco) has grown to rival or even surpass Huarón in production; together, Huarón and Animón form an important nucleus of *mediana minería* in Huayllay District.

Huarón itself has also undergone significant changes in the nature of its productive operations over the years. In the first few years the Compagnie continued previous practices like hand-picking the metal and sending it by packs of llamas towards the smelter in Casapalca to the south. At the same time, however, it was working on deepening the mine and building its offices, workers' housing and a railroad to connect to the railway line that ran between Cerro de Pasco and Lima. Early on, the company's engineers also harnessed the water in the local lakes (Llacsacocha, Naticocha and Huaroncocha) to generate hydroelectric power for their operations. A nearby coal mine was also acquired to supply the railroad as well as other uses. The company furthermore built its own smelter, which produced copper bars from 1918 through the late 1920s when it was abandoned. In the late 1920s, as the mine began to focus on lead and zinc in addition to copper, a Differential Flotation Plant was built to process the metal; the modern concentrator plant went into operations in 1957. The company interrupted its operations in 1925 due to flooding and again in 1930 due to the Depression; other than that, it operated continuously until 1998 when lake Naticocha collapsed, flooding both the Animón and Huarón mines and interrupting production for a couple of years.¹⁶

In terms of the number of workers, although it fluctuated widely with the ebbs and flows of production in the company's first couple of decades, by the middle of the century the Huarón workers' camps were the demographic center of Huayllay District. According to the 1940

¹⁶ This technical information on the operations of the Huarón mine during the 20th century comes from: the company's Annual Reports (1912-1920, 1926, 1946, 1960, 1967-1968, 1980-1987) as well as the theses written by several Peruvian mining engineers who interned and worked at Huarón, such as Sotomarino (1949), Freyre (1960), Curisinche (1974), Calderón (1979) and Peña (1992). These theses, which are housed at Peru's National Engineering University (UNI), are to a large degree reports on the engineers' work and on the mine's past and present operations. Additional sources are the *Boletín del Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Minas del Perú* (1919) and Godet (1918). Information gathered during my visit inside the mine in 2009 will also be included later in the chapter.

census, the combined population of the three Huarón camps clustered around Huayllay was 3,005, or 43% of the district's entire population of 6,932. This vastly outnumbered what were then the small villages of Huayllay and Huaychao, with populations of 593 and 99, respectively; another 1900 or so people were found in the *estancias* – the shepherds' houses, spaced far apart, in the open grasslands. If we add the workers' camps of the vanadium mine at Mina Ragra (which totaled 1308 people)¹⁷, some 62% of the district's population was found living in mining camps in the 1940 census. Of course, this kind of data provides a very simplistic picture; in reality people frequently moved back and forth between the *estancias* and the central villages, and between these and the mining centers. Moreover, it is only a snapshot in time; the number of workers at Huarón increased over the next few years, and more of them began bringing their families to the mine. Thus, by 1953 company's workforce stood at around 2,000; with their families, this represented a camp population of 7,000 (Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times, June 1953). The size of the workforce declined somewhat over the next 30 years, as the company sought to mechanize its operations. By the mid-1980s, the population of the camps was around 5,000 (Sulmont and Valcárcel 1993, 222). This spatial organization of the district, centered around the mining camps, came to an end in the 1990s, when most of the camps were dismantled, as they were in mines throughout Peru.

Like at other mines at the time, the operations of the Huarón company were accompanied by the formation of a mining workforce. Later in this chapter, I will discuss the ways in which this process took shape, with a specific focus on Huarón but drawing out patterns that were common to other mines in the Central Highlands and Peru more broadly. First, however, it is important to provide some historical, social and cultural background on the local area of Huayllay District, where much of this chapter and the next take place. I conducted fieldwork, oral history and archival research there between 2009 and 2010; I also use other sources of information when they are useful.

¹⁷ These two camps were found to have 874 and 434 people, respectively.

The local setting

Huayllay, where the Huarón mine is located, is one of 13 districts that compose Pasco Province, which in turn is one of the three provinces in Pasco Department.¹⁸ The district gets its name from the town of Huayllay, which is not only the district seat but is also the center of the *comunidad campesina* (peasant community) of Huayllay, which owns a large area of pasturing land. A smaller town, Huaychao, is also the center of a *comunidad campesina*; a third, smaller and more distant *comunidad* is Los Andes de Pucará, which emerged from a former hacienda. These larger groupings also include a few small villages as well as the many *estancias* that dot the area. As stated above, two important medium-scale mines currently operate in the district: Huarón, currently owned by Pan American Silver, and the adjacent Chungar/Animón, currently owned by Volcan Mining Company.

In terms of political jurisdictions, Huayllay District borders the Department of Junín to the south and the Department of Lima to the west. In geographical terms, it is situated at the southwest edge of the highland plateau that straddles Pasco and the northern part of Junín Department – although sometimes referred to as the Bombón Plateau, in the remainder of this chapter, I will refer to this as the Pasco/Junín plateau.¹⁹ This is a large, high-altitude grassland (*puna*) area located at a more or less uniform height between about 4,100 and 4,500 meters above sea level, and situated between the steep Western Cordillera and the eastern *quebradas* (intramontane valleys) that gradually lead into the Amazon lowlands to the east. It is the second

¹⁸ There are few studies of the Huayllay area. Amaro (2003) has published a book, *Huayllay: Riqueza Cultural de un Pueblo Andino*, which discusses issues of education and tourism as well as general facts about the community, including some folktales and customs. Aranguren (1971) wrote an anthropology thesis for the University of San Marcos about the community of Huaychao. Additionally, several groups of anthropology students from the Catholic University of Peru have gone to Huayllay over the last 15 years to do short fieldwork practices; their reports are catalogued in the university library. Chang (1970) wrote a study of the community of Huayllay for the Ministry of Agriculture during the Agrarian Reform; it is discussed later in this chapter. Ramírez (2002, 117-126) reproduces certain colonial land documents from Huayllay but does not discuss the community beyond that.

¹⁹ The name Bombón Plateau (*Meseta de Bombón*) is somewhat confusing as it is sometimes used to refer only to the flattest part of the plateau, i.e. the area around Lake Junín. For me, the more relevant geographical category includes the entire high-altitude grassland region, including areas like Cerro de Pasco, Rancas and Huayllay, that do not identify as much with the name Bombón (which seems to be derived from the old ethnonym Pumpush, once applied to people living around the present-day town of Junín).

most important highland plateau or *altiplano* in the Andes – the other being the much larger (though slightly lower) *altiplano* of the Collao, which straddles the Peru/Bolivia border and is home to Lake Titicaca as well as to cities such as La Paz and Puno. Although Huayllay is certainly part of the Pasco/Junín plateau altitude-wise, it is not located in the flattest, central portion of the plateau. Rather, its territory consists of many rolling hills and includes a particularly rugged geological formation known as the Stone Forest (*Bosque de Piedras*), which in recent years has become central to local identity as well as an object of tourism promotion efforts. The Huayllay area is really situated at the edge of the plateau, close to where it encounters the Western Cordillera and the Lima highlands of the upper Chancay Valley - an area with which it has historically had strong links.

Like most of the plateau, this is a livestock-raising area, with little or no agriculture; the raising of sheep is most important, followed by llamas and alpacas. Although all of the grasslands in Huayllay are certainly in use, today herding is secondary to mining as an economic activity. Both Spanish and Quechua were spoken in Huayllay for much of the 20th century, but with Spanish eventually becoming the dominant language.²⁰ Today, the area is primarily Spanish-speaking, even if many of the older people still know how to speak at least some Quechua. Additionally, some migrants come from regions such as the *quebradas* of Huánuco and Chaupiwara that have higher predominance of Quechua speakers – both according to popular view and to Chirinos' (2001) *Atlas Lingüístico del Perú*, as well as other studies.

At present, one can reach Huayllay from the departmental capital of Cerro de Pasco in about one hour by car. The town has grown significantly in recent years. The crisis of the 1980s and 90s (culminating in the flooding of the two mines in 1998) had drained the district of

²⁰ The variety of Quechua from this area has not been studied in-depth. *Yaro* is an ethnonym traditionally used to describe several of the groups that inhabited present-day Pasco and Daniel Carrión provinces at the time of the Spanish Conquest. It is also the name given by Torero (1974) and Mannheim (1991, 11) to describe the varieties of Quechua spoken in Pasco, Junín, Tarma and Chaupiwara, as a sub-branch of Central Peruvian Quechua (Torero's Quechua I and Parker's Quechua B). On the other hand, Chirinos (2001) calls these varieties "Yaru-Huánuco," thus grouping them with at least certain parts of Huánuco Department. In the 1980s and 90s, regional health and educational authorities, together with the Summer Linguistics Institute, published some materials on what they classified as the Quechua of Ambo (Huánuco) and Pasco provinces. Black (1990) has similarly published some material on what she calls "southeast Pasco and northern Junín Quechua," in which she includes Huayllay. It should also be mentioned that, although all of these varieties belong to Quechua I/Quechua B (Central Peruvian Quechua), Huayllay was geographically close to a variety of Quechua II/Quechua A spoken until recently in Pacaraos in the upper Chancay Valley, which was studied by Adelaar (1987).

population, but the new mining boom that began around 2002 has brought many people back. Most of them have made their base in the town of Huayllay itself, since the mining camps were largely demolished (and not replaced) in the 1990s. In 2007, according to the national Census of that year, the town had a population of 6,736, or 63% of the total district population of 10,617. By comparison, the next largest town in the district, Huaychao, had only 404 people. For much of the 20th century, however, the demographic center of the district was composed of the mining camps, rather than the villages. I will now briefly describe some aspects of the origins and historical development of local society.




Figure 1 – Old-style *champa* dwellings in a Huayllay estancia, ca.1915-1917.
Source: Godet 1918, 150.



Figure 2 – Town of Huayllay, 1940s
(Photo courtesy of Juan Porras Benavides)

The formation of local society

For the entirety of its colonial history, Huayllay was under the jurisdiction of the western Andean slopes – namely Canta as well as the upper Chancay Valley - rather than Pasco. The whole area was subject to the *reducción* program of the 1570s – the massive scheme aimed at resettling and regrouping the native population for the purposes of taxation, labor tribute and conversion. According to Degregori and Golte (1973, 3), San Juan de Huayllay was one of several *reducciones* made up of *llacuaces* (a term used in certain documents to refer to highland

pastoralists in opposition to valley agriculturalists)²¹ – others being the nearby towns of Huaychao and Pari, also in the highland plateau. These high-altitude *reducciones* were grouped together with the *ayllus* of the Hanan Pirca in the upper Chancay Valley - who had themselves been “reduced” into eight *reducciones* centered around Pacaraos – and placed under the authority of the *corregimiento* (later province) of Canta. This political organization continued into the late colonial period, as described by the Spanish botanist Hipólito Ruiz, who traveled the region in the 1770s and 80s.²² Already at this time, there was small-scale mining activity in Huayllay, as in several places around Canta Province as well as Pasco. Huayllay was also situated right on the path taken by mule and llama trains on the way from the mines of Cerro de Pasco towards the town of Canta and from there to Lima.²³ After independence in 1824, and throughout the 19th century, the jurisdictional status of Huayllay seems to have been unclear – sometimes it is included under Canta, other times under Pasco and Junín; gradually, it shifted towards the latter.

In terms of land ownership, the modern *comunidades campesinas* of Huayllay and Huaychao both possess documents that are used to trace the possession of land by the *común*, the *pueblo* or simply the “Indians” (*indios*) of their respective communities back to at least the 17th and 18th centuries (Aranguren 1971, Ramírez 2002, 117-126). Over time several *haciendas* formed in the area as well, the most important of which were El Diezmo, Huasca/Chuquiquirpay, Cónoc, Racracancha, and Quisque. Smaller properties also developed as certain individual families claimed particular tracts of land and either passed them on to their children or sold them to others. A large part of the communal land documents discuss conflicts between these claims upon landed property and the *común* or the *pueblo*.²⁴ People today remember certain specific

²¹ See Duviols (1973).

²² Ruiz described the ecclesiastical divisions of the province of Canta: it was made up of 9 *curatos*, one of which was the *curato* of Pari. The latter in turn included 12 *anexas*, among which were Huayllay, Huaychao, Vichaycocha, Pacaraos and other towns (Ruiz 2007, 181).

²³ As Ruiz wrote about Canta Province at the time of his visit in the late 18th century: “The greatest number of natives of this province are engaged in *arriería* (muleteering or transport by llama), principally for the minerals of Cerro, carrying the ore from the mines towards the mills (*ingenios*). Others are occupied in digging mines and for this purpose they keep many mules. The women work the fields and care for the family while their husbands are away in the mines: They also spin and weave cloth from wool and cotton for their own use.” (Ibid., 182; my translation).

²⁴ Although I have examined many documents from the Huayllay area, I have not looked at copies of the land title documents held in Huayllay and Huaychao. Parts of them are reproduced in Aranguren (1971) and Ramírez (2002,

families, in particular the Verásteguis and the Anduezas, as having been the most prominent – though not the only – landowners in the immediate area around the town of Huayllay, while others owned the larger haciendas situated slightly further away.²⁵ Indeed, two members of the Verástegui and Andueza families were buried inside the Huayllay church – a sign of their status – in the 1870s.²⁶ An Andueza owned a property known as San José, adjacent to the town of Huayllay, which he later sold to the French mining company in 1915 as one of the sites on which to begin their operations.²⁷ One of the Verásteguis is widely remembered as having directed mining operations on a small scale in the mid-19th century, in the area that would later be the Huarón mine. A man named Eugenio Verástegui – who may be the same person – also appears as *gobernador* of the district of Huayllay in a document from 1840 (Carrasco 1840, 143). Similarly, it may also have been Verástegui whom British naturalist A. Cruckshanks stayed with towards the end of the 1820s, when he passed through Huayllay, which he describes as “a small Indian town and the center of a mining district.”

One of our party, a Spaniard, conducted us to the house of the Governor, who was his countryman. He had been a soldier in the Spanish army, but having married an Indian woman of Huayllay, he settled in the town, where his intelligence and activity procured him the office of Governor; to which he added the profession of a miner, and the trade of a shopkeeper. Our apartment was in keeping with the mixed pursuits of the master of the house; the table was covered with papers relative to the number of recruits, and the tribute to be furnished by the Indians under his jurisdiction; a heap of silver ore occupied a corner of the mud floor, and candles, sugar, jars of spirits, and similar merchandise were spread around (Cruckshanks 1831, 194).

Around the turn of the century, many people from Huayllay were *huacchilleros* on the nearby haciendas and private holdings, which meant they could keep their own herds on

117-126). It should be kept in mind that the land titles both of communities and of haciendas are often complex, multilayered texts; both parties to a dispute often accused each other of using forged documents.

²⁵ Other self-proclaimed “notables” (*personas notables*) of the district appear in an 1853 letter to the President of Peru – in which they join other districts of the province of Canta in expressing their support for a particular military leader - and include names such as Paz, Estrada, Guerreros, Artica and Madrid. I do not know whether this was a previous generation of local elites to that remembered by people today, or whether it simply constituted a different, perhaps less powerful sector.

²⁶ Several of the old churches in Pasco contain the remains of former *hacendados* or otherwise locally powerful families. That is also the case for the church in Huaychao, as well as in Rancas.

²⁷ This property consisted of 1,331 hectares of land. This is where the Huarón company built its first smelter as well as housing for its administrative staff; the latter is in use to this day.

hacienda lands in exchange for taking care of the owner's flock. The latter was often composed of herds of llamas – a profitable business for hacienda owners at a time (before the introduction of railroad and automobile transport) when these animals were rented out for transport of mineral to smelters such as the one in Casapalca. The tight interlinking between the mining and cattle-raising economies is furthermore shown by the fact that several of the mine owners were also *hacendados* – not just the Verásteguis, but also the Galjuf family, immigrants from the Austro-Hungarian Empire who had originally settled in Cerro de Pasco. They bought the Huasca/Chuquiquirpay hacienda from the De la Torre *hacendados* and in 1901 formed the first formal mining company in Huayllay, the Sociedad Minera Concordia, employing between 25 and 70 workers at any one time according to Velarde (1906, 31). In 1912, they transferred most of their mining claims (*pertenencias*) to the French Compagnie Francaise d'Études et Entreprises Coloniales, resulting in the formation of the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron; the latter began operations on a much larger scale than before in 1918. The portion of the Galjuf claims that were not transferred to the French eventually became the Chungar company, today owned by Volcan.

The development of industrial mining brought with it important social transformations to the Huayllay area. Other changes, however, were more connected to developments in national politics – namely, the new constitution of 1920, approved under the Leguía government. For the first time since national independence a century earlier, the constitution recognized the existence of indigenous communities (under the name *comunidades de indígenas*). Moreover, the government created a national Department for Indigenous Affairs (the *Sección*, later *Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas*), which functioned unevenly over the next few years but which provided communities with an avenue to apply for official recognition, which later allowed them to assert their rights to property in land. These moves were motivated both by the ongoing land conflicts in parts of the country (especially the South) and by the *indigenista* movement among urban intellectuals. They were also part of the early opening by the Leguía administration (1919-1930) towards indigenous and popular demands – a brief opening that ended when Leguía shifted toward a more conservative stance. Over the next few decades, the new Indigenous Affairs Department was shifted among various ministries - first the Ministry of *Fomento* (Public Works/Development), later the Ministry of Public Health, Labor and Social Provision, then the

Ministry of Justice and Labor, and finally, in 1949, the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs, which lasted until 1965 (Abanto 2011, 3). During this period, a number of communities – at first, those with relatively more resources and links to urban society – began applying for recognition; the *comunidad de indígenas* of Huayllay gained legal status through an official government resolution in 1929. According to documents from the Indigenous Affairs Department, that entity approved the map of the community's lands two years later, in 1931.²⁸ Other *comunidades de indígenas* in the area were also officially recognized around the same years: Rancas in 1926, Huaychao in 1933, Villa de Pasco in 1934, and Vicco in 1940.

The gaining of official status on the part of the *comunidad* included a process by which families that owned or held land privately – described today as *propietarios* or *parceleros* – and that in some cases reportedly held individual land titles, gave these up in favor of the community's single title, as the law indicated. In the contemporary terms used by *huayllinos*, they became *comuneros* and *usufructuarios*. In other words, each individual household was to have private usufruct of grazing lands (known by terms such as *canchas*, *pastos*, *estancias*, etc.), but they could not sell it, for legal ownership was in the hands of the community. The latter, at least in theory, had the power to reassign or redistribute land among different families (as when someone left permanently). That is largely the present order in Huayllay today (as in Rancas): communal ownership (under the name *comunidad campesina* or peasant community), and private household usufruct. While some *propietarios* and *parceleros* consented to become part of the *comunidad*, others did not, and either sold their lands or otherwise left. Certainly, the large *haciendas*, such as El Diezmo, Racracancha or Huasca/Chuquiquirpay, remained in the hands of their owners. Thus, by the 1930s the *comunidad* of Huayllay existed in something resembling its present form, although smaller in territory, ringed as it was by the *haciendas*.

I have synthesized this account from the descriptions of my informants, focusing on the points where they coincide with each other and when possible collating them with written documentation. However, many questions remain. What was the exact nature of the connection or continuity between the old *común* or *pueblo* of Huayllay that appears in the 18th-century documents (Ramírez 2002, 117-126) and the *comunidad* that was recognized in 1929? What

²⁸ Archivo General de la Nación – Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas, Legajo 3.13.2.17.

processes of “communal hegemony” - i.e. political struggles over power and meaning at the communal level, to use Mallon’s (1995) formulation – were involved in the formation of the *comunidad*? What relations of power might have existed in the new *comunidad* between those described as the former *propietarios/parceleros* and the former *huacchilleros*, and were they really entirely different groups? What role did kinship and local/outsider divisions play in determining who became part of the *comunidad* and who did not? A few of the last names that people identify as having belonged to the powerful families of the old days are still to be found among some *huayllinos* today, while others are not. Some of my informants emphasize the process by which property owners and *parceleros* gave up their titles to join the *comunidad*, whereas others place greater emphasis on the departure of the former landowning families and their replacement by the *comuneros*. One of them drew an explicit contrast between one former landowning family whose members all left the area, and another one which did stay and join the *comunidad*. It was likely a combination of these different patterns.

Again, as mentioned above, the larger haciendas in the district remained unaffected by the formation of the *comunidad* at this time. Nor did all the shepherds and *huacchilleros* in the district join the *comunidad*, particularly if they were employed by the haciendas and had come from outside the immediate area. It should also be kept in mind that people who did not join the *comunidad* did not necessarily have to leave at this time - the development of industrial-scale mining at Huarón after 1912 generated employment opportunities and meant that people could live in the village of Huayllay or in the mining camp and not depend on herding activity or its products for their livelihood.

Meanwhile, some of the *haciendas* in the district were purchased by larger *hacendados* – El Diezmo by Lercari Hermanos (also owners of the Pacoyán hacienda near Cerro de Pasco), and the *haciendas* Cónoc, Racracancha and Quisque by the powerful cattle and mining entrepreneur Eulogio Fernandini. The latter was the owner of the Brocal mining company as well as of numerous *haciendas*; together with the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, he was one of the largest *hacendados* in the Central Highlands, his properties covering a large part of Pasco province. In the 1950s, the Fernandini haciendas (under the name Algolán S.A.), like those of the CPC, intensified their efforts to modernize along capitalist lines, attempting to convert *huacchilleros*

into salaried workers and enforcing their property rights by building fences and expelling *huacchilla* animals. This process was cut short in the early 1960s when the *comunidades* of Pasco waged a campaign to occupy the haciendas; as part of that, in 1962, Huayllay and Huaychao occupied the Fernandini lands. The land takeovers across the country pushed the Peruvian state to institute a first Land Reform under Fernando Belaúnde in 1964 and a second, more radical reform under General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1969 (which also changed the name of *comunidades indígenas* to *comunidades campesinas* or peasant communities).²⁹ As a result, the haciendas largely disappeared from the Peruvian highlands, and in Pasco province the change was particularly thorough. Some of the land of the former haciendas in Huayllay district was split among the communities of Huayllay and Huaychao as well as neighboring *comunidades* like San Pedro de Pari. Other parts were temporarily turned into CAPS (cooperatives that involved the participation of different communities); in the 1980s, these were also divided among the *comunidades*.

The mine-comunidad relation

In the 1920s and 30s, the recognition of *comunidades de indígenas* as legal owners of land had an effect on the mining companies that operated on their territory. When companies arrived in areas occupied by haciendas or other individual owners, they could simply buy up the land – this of course worked only if the owner was willing to sell, but at least the purchase of the land was a possibility. This was not the case with the newly recognized communal lands, especially after a new Constitution in 1933 added to the protections found in its 1920 predecessor, by stating that communal lands were “inalienable” (*inenajenable*) as well as “unseizable” (*inembargable*), which meant they could not be sold. Granted, communal land could be expropriated “for reasons of public utility” (a concept equivalent to eminent domain); the National Mining Code of 1901 also allowed expropriations of land for mining purposes. Still, mining companies recognized the difference inherent in dealing with *comunidades* as opposed to individual owners.³⁰ When needing to use communal lands, the companies, rather than

²⁹ There had also been an earlier, limited Land Reform under the military junta that governed from 1962 to 1963, but it had been directed solely at the province of La Convención in Cusco, one of the sites of peasant political agitation.

³⁰ For example, Cerro de Pasco Corporation official B.T. Colley writes that during the Oroya Smoke Affair, company superintendent Harold Kingsmill “was negotiating the purchase of many privately owned properties

conducting a simple purchase, would have to establish long-term agreements with the *comunidades*, specifying a rent to be paid as well as other forms of compensation.

Indeed, four years after its official recognition, the *comunidad* of Huayllay signed its first agreement with the mining company. This was in 1933, around the time the company was restarting operations after a temporary closure that was due to the Depression. The agreement was in turn revised in 1936 and 1941. Although I do not have the exact wording of the 1933 agreement, the later revisions discuss its provisions, as well as the complaints that the community had brought forward, namely that the company, since beginning operations, “had not properly compensated the communal properties” and had occupied 48 hectares of the community’s land (González et al. 2002).³¹ This was the land on which the company had built its narrow gauge railroad, its “vast housing camps” and its hydroelectric facilities. The complaints also made reference to “the damage that the smoke from the San José smelter had produced,” and “the harm that the Francois Concentrator Plant was producing through its corresponding tailings (*lamas*) deposit, and the contamination of the waters of the Huayllay river by chemical substances” (Ibid.). In return for the community agreeing to renounce all claims in relation to these complaints, the company agreed to provide the community with electricity from its hydroelectric plant – specifically, it would supply enough electricity to light fifty 40w lightbulbs.

The discussion of “environmental” issues in the 1933 agreement should not be surprising, not only because the company did pollute the area in different ways, but also because contamination had already become a source of conflict in the mining areas of the Central Highlands at this time. A decade earlier, smoke from the Cerro de Pasco Corporation’s smelter at La Oroya had decimated communal as well as hacienda lands and prompted conflict at the local level as well as the appointment of an official government commission to investigate the matter. As a CPC official who was involved in the affair was to write decades later, “the smoke question

claiming damages, and arranging with the Government for the payment of annuities for damages to properties which legally could not be purchased, such as communities” (Colley 1958, 18). It is not clear whether he is referring to a period before or after the 1933 Constitution.

³¹ Here I have benefitted from the fact that González, Koc-Menard and León’s (2000) essay reproduces the text of the 1936 and 1941 agreements as an appendix. This text is consistent with the discussion in Gerardo Bedoya’s 1939 Indigenous Affairs report, which I analyze below.

broke and it entirely engulfed the Corporation for the time being, finally greatly changing its history and completely altering its operations and its various products” (Colley 1958, 16).

Although the operations at Huarón were on a smaller scale, the leaders of the Huayllay *comunidad* had to have seen some of their effects (smoke from the San José smelter, tailings, etc.) and connected them to what they had heard about La Oroya.³² Nor is the use of electricity as a form of compensation particularly surprising. Mining companies had a near-monopoly on electricity in rural areas of central Peru at this time, and were likely the only way for a community like Huayllay to gain access to this coveted element of modernity. It’s also possible that *huayllinos* might have heard about the communal project undertaken by the community of Muquiyauyo (which was starting to send migrants to Huarón around this time), in the Mantaro valley. In the early 1920s, the *muquiyauyinos* had used their savings from mine work as well as technical expertise and contacts gained in the mines to build a small hydroelectric plant, with which they soon began selling electricity to the city of Jauja (Adams 1959, Dionisio 1993). While a smaller, less prosperous community like Huayllay was not in a position to do something similar (and could not in any case have competed with the mine’s hydroelectric plant next door), the idea of small towns and *comunidades indígenas* gaining access to electricity must have circulated through the mining regions of the Central Highlands at this time.

In 1936, the agreement between the mining company and the *comunidad* had to be revised, because of, as the document put it, “the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron having increased [through] its activity the amount of land owned by Huayllay that is occupied by said Compagnie, having increased especially the tailings deposit... all of which makes a new agreement necessary” (González et al. 2002).³³ The company promised to increase the amount of electricity provided to Huayllay from 50 to 100 light bulbs of 40w; other forms of compensation are also mentioned. The mine agreed to give the *comunidad* a one-time payment of 500 soles as

³² As an executive from the company that currently owns the Huarón mine told me, when they arrived in the early 2000s they found that “there had been a mining catastrophe there.” He was referring to the uncovered tailings ponds (one of them immediately adjacent to the town) that had grown over the course of the 20th century and that had been left abandoned by the previous company in the 1990s.

³³ This time the representative of the *comunidad* is explicitly mentioned: Demetrio Herrera, who is listed as having received a *poder* (legal authorization) from his community since 1929; representing the company was its General Manager Marcel Cabandous.

“definitive compensation” for the loss of land due to the rise in the water level of the lakes (Huaroncocha, Naticocha and Lacsacocha) that the company used to supply the canals and dams that generated its hydroelectric power. A regular rent payment for the use of land was also agreed upon – the company would pay an annual sum of 250 soles for the communal lands it used. Furthermore, the mine agreed to cede to the *comunidad* a large part of the San José estate, which it had originally bought from the Andueza family in 1915; however, the *comunidad* was also required to “recognize the validity” of the 1915 purchase (thus implying that it had been questioned).³⁴

The forms of compensation listed above were in return for the community accepting the company’s use of 137 additional hectares of land in addition to the previous 48 (for a total 185 ha.).³⁵ Also, as before, the community gave up all claims regarding any damage caused by the company, including from “the eventual tailings deposits that could appear in the properties of the *comunidad* of Huayllay, besides the areas listed in the previous article” (Ibid.). Finally, the 1936 agreement specified that in case the mining company needed to expand its operations, “for whatever reason and on whatever part of the territory of the *comunidad* of Huayllay,” they would pay the *comunidad* the annual sum of one sol and fifty cents for each new hectare occupied.

These agreements not only serve to highlight relations between the local community and the mining company; they also provide a window into the relationship of these two agents with representatives of the Peruvian state. In 1939, an official from the Indigenous Affairs Department, Gerardo Bedoya, wrote a report to his superiors about the agreements between the community of Huayllay and the Huarón company, based on a visit to the site as well as his analysis of the documents.³⁶ The Department had had some involvement in the negotiations from the beginning (the original 1933 agreement had been signed by the parties in the Ministry of

³⁴ The company also promised to contribute a one-time payment of 200 soles to help in the construction of a canal that the *comunidad* was planning to build.

³⁵ Specifically, 30 ha. for a new processing plant, 67 ha. for new tailings areas, 15 ha. for new housing camps, and 25 ha. for surface area surrounding the mines themselves, in addition to the 48 ha. already discussed in the previous agreement.

³⁶ Bedoya’s report is reproduced in Pinto’s (1978) compilation of documents from the Indigenous Affairs Department, *Comunidades Indígenas: Documentos*.

Fomento, which housed Indigenous Affairs at the time). Moreover, as Bedoya noted, the 1936 agreement stipulated that it had to be submitted for approval and ratification by Indigenous Affairs. Bedoya's remarks should be read with caution; the political orientation of the Indigenous Affairs office tended to vary over time, but in 1939 Peru was under the conservative government of General Oscar R. Benavides. Moreover, when government officials visited mining regions it was common practice for them to be hosted by the mining companies themselves, which often made them partial to the latter (if they weren't so to begin with). In his report Bedoya argued that the agreement was "broadly beneficial" to the *comunidad*. The community was allowing the company to use 185 ha. of its land, but on the other hand the company had given them a part of the San José estate that it had bought from Andueza in 1915; although the agreement had not mentioned the size of this tract of land, Bedoya claimed it was 838 hectares. Thus, the community was gaining more land than it was losing.³⁷ He did not consider the possibility that the *comuneros* of Huayllay might have considered the land of the San José estate – immediately adjacent to the village of Huayllay - rightfully theirs to begin with. In monetary terms, Bedoya's analysis of the agreement also told him that the community was benefitting more than was apparent. It would receive not just the yearly 250 soles in rent payments from the mining company, but also what it could charge people both for the use of the 100 light bulbs and of the pasture lands in the recovered San José land (the latter according to standard rates charged by *haciendas*). Taking that into account, he argued, the annual revenue received by the *comunidad* would be 2,707 soles, not 250. What Bedoya does not seem to recognize is the fact that most of the consumers of the electricity and pasture lands would likely be *comunidad* members themselves, and thus, even if the fees for the service were actually collected, the money would flow into the communal institution from within, rather than from without.

However, Bedoya did object that one element in the agreement was too favorable to the company at the expense of the *comunidad* – its stipulation that the former could expand its operations to any part of the community's lands by simply paying 1.50 soles for each new hectare occupied. He argued that "it is not possible to allow such a broad authorization, by means

³⁷ Also, Bedoya claimed, out of the 185 hectares that the company had acquired for usufruct, only 110 ha. were really in use at the time of his visit – 50 ha. for company installations, 60 ha. for tailings deposits. On the other 75 ha. of land, the community's animals were still grazing, even if the land was technically in use by the company.

of which a certain company could occupy... the totality of the lands that make up the patrimony of a community” (Pinto 1978, 164). He thus recommended that the company be required to request permission from the Indigenous Affairs department each time it needed to use more land. His recommendation was indeed taken up in a 1941 revision of the agreement, albeit in slightly modified form: the company could acquire up to 150 additional hectares of land without permission; beyond that, it needed authorization from Indigenous Affairs and from the *comunidad*. Furthermore, the annual rent for each additional hectare of land to be paid to the *comunidad* was raised from 1.50 to 2.50 soles.

Representations by outsiders

These agreements show that the legal provisions regarding *comunidades de indígenas* in the 1920s and 30s made a difference in the relationship between the mining company and the local population in Huayllay. The leaders of the community were able to negotiate an agreement that provided some minimal compensation for the use of land. The Indigenous Affairs office in theory provided some assistance to the *comunidad*, but in this case it was rather sympathetic to the company. This is clear from Bedoya’s report, where he describes the company in the glowing terms proper to the national discourse that has traditionally associated mining companies with modernity and progress (Salas 2008):

The aforementioned company has been an efficient collaborator in the economic and cultural improvement of the whole zone, and very especially of the Indians (*indígenas*) of the community of Huayllay, whose services it employs preferentially, currently paying them an average [daily] salary of 2.65 soles for the work undertaken in the interior of the mines, and of 2.00 soles for the work conducted on the surface (Pinto 1978, 158).

Bedoya did add some nuance to his account by recognizing that the interactions between the company and the local population had not always been positive, though he attributes the change to the attitudes of company management rather than to the formation of the *comunidad* and the legal context surrounding it: “The relations between the mining company and the community of Huayllay has also had many changes and variations, and it is only from the date Mr. Gustavo D’Auriol assumed the management, that they begin to be cordial, with positive benefit, certainly, for both parts” (Pinto 1978, 159-160). On the whole, however, Bedoya emphasized the benefits that the community derived from the presence of the mine: the company school, hospital and

general store. He also portrays the company as a civilizing force, and in the process reproduces the idea, common among Peruvian elites and professionals at the time, that coca use was a public health problem: “The unquestionable necessity of combating the development of alcoholism and cocaineism (*cocainismo*) among our native (*autóctono*) element, is also the object of an intense and feasible (*plausible*) campaign on the part of the upper-level staff of the company” (Ibid., 159).

The affirmation of cultural hierarchies evident in Bedoya’s statements is indicative of the broader ways in which outsiders tended to approach a space like Huayllay at the time. Gunter Holzmann, a German chemist who worked at the company’s laboratory in the 1940s, discussed the experience in his memoirs. Although more sympathetic to the local population of mining workers, his account is by no means free of exoticism, as in this passage:

Not only did they offer excellent salary and conditions, but also the opportunity to have an independent directing position, where I could put my knowledge and skills to the test. In spite of the tempting conditions, few were willing to exile themselves to a camp at 4800 meters, far away from all civilization and surrounded by 2,000 Indian workers feared for their frequent strikes and violent rebellions (Holzmann 2000, 101).

Holzmann’s account is rather vague and seems to be based more on common ideas about Central Highlands miners in general – those “feared for their frequent strikes and violent rebellions” – than on specific observations. On the other hand, Harry Tschopik, a U.S. anthropologist who visited the area in 1947, gives us a different impression. Tschopik arrived in Huayllay as part of a research project (“Highland Communities of Central Peru”) organized by the Smithsonian’s Institute of Social Anthropology, in collaboration with Peru’s Ministry of Education. As he himself acknowledged, his observations were by no means in-depth – he spent only a few days in Huayllay, and two months in his entire survey of 14 communities in the central and south-central highlands. Still, as an anthropologist, Tschopik was naturally more interested in social and cultural dynamics than were other visitors. Unlike the other accounts discussed here, Tschopik devotes almost equal attention to both of the communities in Huayllay District – Huayllay and Huaychao. According to him, Huayllay village had around 100 houses, ranging from huts made of *champa* (similar to the *estancias* of the rural surroundings) to rectangular adobe, thatch-roofed

dwellings and a few two-story, galvanized-iron-roofed houses in the center of town.³⁸ He estimated the population at around 400, though many of the men were away at the Huarón mine up the road. Huaychao, on the other hand, was a much smaller village, with only some 20 houses but then gradually diffusing outwards into the *estancias* that dotted the plain. Although it was as close or closer to the mine, it had fewer people working in mining.

However, Tschopik was most interested in the degree of social and ethnic differentiation in the two communities, and in the way in which this related to the socioeconomic changes that were taking place. He sought to distinguish between Indians and Mestizos, and looked for comparison to other parts of the country he had visited. In this sense he described Huayllay and Huaychao in contrasting terms. The latter was more rural, less oriented to mining, and had a more fragmented population:

The inhabitants of Huaychao annex, which pertains to the District of Huayllay, are in great part Indian shepherds, most of whom live in the scattered *estancias*.... The organization of Huaychao appears to be not unlike that of the more primitive and conservative villages of Huancavelica and Ayacucho Departments. Although the Mestizo inhabitants of the village proper represent but a small percentage of the total population of the annex, they occupy the important political offices (Tschopik 1947, 53-54).

Huayllay, on the other hand, seemed to him to be homogeneous. Tschopik did acknowledge that the “general social-cultural uniformity” which he observed “may be more apparent than real,” and could be disproven by more in-depth observation. Overall, however, he made an argument about the effect that mining had had on social structure in Huayllay:

Steady or temporary employment in the surrounding mines has tended to upset the established social equilibrium. Opportunities for economic advancement are available to all, and Indians and Mestizos alike are in demand as laborers and employees; the fine distinctions of class are largely ignored in the labor markets of modern industry. Hence, while it seems likely that the class structure of Huayllay a generation ago would have resembled more closely that of present-day Huaychao... the present trend appears to be toward a leveling of class distinctions (Ibid., 51-52).

³⁸ Two of Tschopik’s observations regarding the physical aspects of Huayllay village are of interest here. He confirms the continuity of the company’s provision of electricity as a form of compensation for the use of land. Additionally, he discusses the polluting effects of the mine’s activity on the local river: “Flowing from the northwest past the town is a small river, highly colored by mineral salts, which carries away the waste and refuse from the miens of Huarón. For this reason Huayllay must depend for its drinking water on that piped from several nearby springs” (Tschopik 1947, 50).

On this basis, he concluded that “in striving for consistency within the present paper we should probably – on cultural grounds – consider the bulk of the inhabitants of Huayllay to be Mestizos” (Ibid.). The terms “Indian” and “Mestizo” were common in social science discourse at the time, and they were also used as categories in the Census (unlike today). The 1940 Census used the categories “Indian” and “White or Mestizo;” for Huayllay district (including the camps of the Huarón mine), it listed 51% of the population as “Indian” and 49% as “White or Mestizo.”

Of course, as many scholars of the Andes have pointed out, in practice the categories “Indian” and “Mestizo” were relational rather than fixed; nor are those necessarily the terms used at the local level, i.e. racial hierarchies can be expressed in other terms such as culture and education (De la Cadena 2004). Tschopik based his classification both on the degree of differentiation he observed in each community as well as on specific markers, namely language, dress and occupation. For information on language use he relied on the opinions of local informants. In Huayllay, he concluded that, although the overwhelming majority of the population was bilingual, “there appears to be a marked preference for Spanish over Quechua and, with the exception of some of the old people, few speak the native language only” (52). In Huaychao, on the other hand, the local schoolteacher had told Tschopik that between 30 and 40 percent of the population spoke only Quechua, while the rest were bilingual. In terms of dress, he identifies “mestizo” clothing with either Western-style clothing or miners’ overalls for men and *de centro* (a style originating in the Mantaro Valley) dress for women. “Indian” clothing, on the other hand, consisted largely of homespun cloth, “native-woven textiles” and hand-made felt hats. Finally, as far as occupation was concerned, Tschopik associated the work of shepherds with “Indians,” whereas mining work, for him, was one of the driving factors behind Huayllay having become more mestizo.

Many of Tschopik’s observations were likely accurate – particularly those regarding observable aspects such as clothing – while others oversimplify what was no doubt a more complex reality, as he was aware. In terms of his discussion of race and ethnicity, it seems to be influenced both by the ways in which his informants might have talked about social distinctions – in particular, the relationship between shepherds and those whose animals they cared for - as well as by the semantic and ideological framework through which race was understood in

Peruvian intellectual and political discourse. As De la Cadena (2004) has argued, for much of the 20th century, the Peruvian state did not promote an official ideology of *mestizaje*, as in some other Latin American countries; nevertheless, the mestizo was seen as an “acculturated” Indian, and *mestizaje* as a process of culture loss and assimilation into national culture. Race was defined not in biological but primarily in cultural and educational terms. According to De la Cadena, a popular ideology emerged over time to counter this dominant view. This popular perspective allows for the possibility of leaving behind “Indian” status and its association with educational and economic backwardness, without necessarily abandoning one’s culture; the result is the phenomenon De la Cadena calls “indigenous mestizos.”

In certain areas of the Central Highlands such as the Mantaro Valley, the social and cultural changes already underway by the first half of the 20th century already pointed to the inadequacy of the acculturation model. In the Mantaro Valley, the decline of extreme social inequalities, the gradual adoption of Spanish and the greater integration into national society did not preclude the cultivation of a strong regional *huanca* identity or the maintenance of many distinctive cultural traits. This phenomenon was already noted by early observers such as Arguedas (1975). Furthermore, the mining industry also played a distinctive role within this imaginary. On the one hand, professional and elite Peruvian observers in the first half of the 20th century saw highland Indians as naturally suited for mining work, due to their large numbers, low wages, and adaptation to high altitude. On the other hand, the modernity and progress that the industry was supposed to bring were seen as incompatible with indigeneity (as Drinot 2011 has argued for Peruvian industrial development in general). Therefore, while Tschopik was probably right that the demand for mining workers had helped to level social distinctions in Huayllay – as Alberti and Sánchez (1974) argue for the Mantaro Valley – his observations, and the way they would be read by Peruvian intellectuals, could not help but be influenced by the dominant acculturation model as well as by the particular ways that both race and the mining industry were understood in Peru at the time.

A contrasting account of the Huayllay area comes from the context of the Agrarian Reform some two decades later. In 1970, the Department of Peasant Communities of the Ministry of Agriculture assembled a team of researchers to conduct a series of studies on the

comunidades of Pasco that had received land allocations through the Agrarian Reform. Their reports are shaped by a different intellectual and political climate from that which influenced both Bedoya and Tschopik. By this time, the use of the terms “Indian” and “indigenous” had largely been abandoned by Peruvian social scientists as well as by the state; as a reflection of that, in 1969 the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado had officially changed the name of the *comunidades indígenas* to *comunidades campesinas*. The 1970 Ministry of Agriculture reports are focused on comparing among the different *comunidades* in Pasco province and assessing the degree to which each one might be amenable to the new regulatory framework (*estatuto*) for peasant communities as well as to the formation of cooperatives. In this context, the concepts of tradition and modernity are preserved, but tradition actually receives a more positive valence than modernity, as it is taken to imply a greater adaptability to and willingness to comply with the objectives of the Agrarian Reform. Thus, the community of Vicco, known for its members’ prosperity and success as truck drivers, is described by Chang and Núñez del Prado (1970) as “individualistic,” “inhospitable” and in other unfavorable terms; furthermore, the authors argue, “the village of Vicco has ceased to be a peasant community and has become a town of Westernized mestizos” (67). Based on that logic, they argue for the dissolution of the *comunidad* of Vicco (which never occurred).

By contrast, in his report on Huayllay (which does not include Huaychao), Chang (1970) describes the *huayllinos* in more favorable terms, as cordial, prone to cooperation and as dedicated to the betterment of their community. Although he emphasizes the processes of “transculturation” underway, as well as the division between *comuneros* and *particulares* (the latter being those who worked at the mining company and were not members of the *comunidad*), he argues that Huayllay “can still be considered to be a true peasant community” (132). This was due to its organizational cohesion and the continuing importance of herding activity to its economic and cultural life. For that reason, Chang expected that the application of the new regulations pertaining to peasant communities would meet with success here, as would the formation of a communal cooperative. The intellectual and political climate of the moment (i.e. anti-imperialism) is also reflected in Chang’s account of the mine-community relationship: he argues that Huayllay is “dominated by” and “dependent on” the mining companies. His description of the relationship is much more negative than that of Bedoya or Tschopik:

Currently, the *comuneros* manifest a strong rejection, almost a hatred, of mining activity. They feel frustrated that their children, some of whom have university studies,³⁹ are obliged to work as salaried workers within a system of exploitation, where they very seldom can have the hope of progressing towards a better life. In the same way, they cite the scant assistance that the mining companies provide, and the frequent conflicts that they maintain with the community (Chang 1970, 139).

Exchange systems and regional articulation

So far we have focused most on two aspects of the local history of the Huayllay area: the formation of the *comunidad* and the relationship with the mining company. These are important but not sufficient to get a sense of social dynamics in Huayllay during the time that industrial mining has existed there. Just as crucial, if not more, have been the traditional patterns of subsistence and activity through which people have made their everyday lives. Foremost among these, certainly, has been the raising of animals, primarily sheep, alpacas and llamas, since this is a high-altitude *puna* region. Although secondary to mining as an economic activity today, herding continues to be practiced, largely through family usufruct on community-owned lands (often, though not always, involving hired shepherds). However, another, closely related sphere was historically just as important for the local population: the barter exchange of local products, including crafts, for those of valley agriculturalists. When I began research in Huayllay I was surprised to find that this was one of the things that people – especially older men – liked to talk about the most. Here I will briefly describe this system as it existed well into the 20th century, both in terms of local production and of the links it established with other areas of the Central Highlands to the west, north and east.

Barter systems have been described for many Andean communities, most notably by Enrique Mayer (2002) for the community of Tangor in the Chaupiwara region. As Mayer himself notes, while barter and other forms of exchange have been an important component of economic life for many valley agricultural communities, for *puna* pastoralists it was often “an absolute necessity:”

³⁹ In the 1950s and 60s there was a campaign to create more regional universities in the Central Highlands, as in other parts of the country. In 1960 this resulted in the creation of a Cerro de Pasco branch of the Universidad Nacional del Centro (based in Huancayo). In 1965 this branch became the University of Cerro de Pasco – the Universidad Nacional Daniel Alcides Carrión. The workers at both Cerro de Pasco, Huarón, and other regional mines contributed to the founding of the university through deductions from their payroll.

Every year, the same pastoralists came to Tangor with their llamas, donkeys, and horses bringing wool, *chuña*, mutton, and cheeses. They stayed with friends, plied their trade, and returned with their animals loaded down with grains (Mayer 2002, 159).

In the case of *huayllinos*, they, like many other highland herders, would also go to the *quebradas* (narrow intramontane valley) areas at harvest time, to exchange their own products for the corn, potatoes, *oca*, *olluco* and other products of the agriculturalists. Many of the highland products that they took with them were typical *puna* items, similar to those carried by other herding communities: meat (especially mutton), wool, animal hides, and fish (*challwas*). However, *huayllinos* had also specialized in the production of a very specific kind of item, for which they were regionally known: clay pottery, made by hand and with local materials. This was an activity that involved both men and women, although generally in different capacities. Together with their other products, the exchange of clay pots tied *huayllinos* to many communities in the northern Lima highlands to the west, in the Chaupiwara region and Huánuco to the north and northeast, and in other *quebradas* to the east. On the other hand, there does not seem to have been significant exchange with regions to the south such as the Mantaro Valley.

Since pottery is a craft that has drastically declined in Huayllay, I was not able to observe it firsthand. There are still a few older people who practice some elements of the craft, and there are some incipient efforts to preserve and perform it as part of local tourism promotion efforts and as a part of *huayllino* identity.⁴⁰ Moreover, there are many people still around who, as children, took part in and/or observed both the making of pottery and the process of its exchange in the *quebradas*. I will briefly discuss the process of production of the clay pots based on the accounts given to me by my informants.⁴¹ Two types of clay were used – one red, the other

⁴⁰ At one point during my research, a “Festival of the Clay Pot” was held in one of the *caseríos* (hamlets) of the community, but I was not able to attend. This should be understood in the broader context of the discourse of tourist promotion, which is widespread in Huayllay today – even if the number of tourists that come through the community is actually very modest. However, the recent efforts at tourist promotion, though they help to explain something like the formal holding of a “clay pot festival,” are not sufficient as an explanation for the centrality of the pottery craft to *huayllino* identity, which has its roots in the actual role that *huayllinos* fulfilled within the regional *puna-quebrada* barter system.

⁴¹ I should mention that, although the actual shaping of the pots was done generally by women, my accounts of the process all come from men. I did interview a number of women in Huayllay, and conversed with them more generally as part of my fieldwork, but the topic did not come up, and at the time I had not realized its importance.

described alternatively as white, gray or blue - and both were extracted from specific hills or promontories around Huayllay. Each family brought these clays to their *estancia* – the rural shepherds’ dwellings, spaced far apart, where the making of the pots took place. The two clays were mixed together, water was added, and a third element was thrown in – a sand-like material, also extracted from places within Huayllay’s general territory. People then stepped on the mix until it was well-blended; this is the one stage of the production process that people most remember having participated in as children. At some point, the mixture was left to rest for a period of time, so the whole process could be drawn out over several weeks.

The next two stages were more divided by gender: the shaping of the pots was generally associated with women, and the firing with men. One of my informants, Desiderio Roque, described to me how his grandmother would shape the clay with her hands, using only a small cylinder and a few other implements, and using the back of a sheep hide as a base. She would give the pot its initial round shape and then let it air out while she started on others, until there were one or two rows of them. She then picked up the pots again and continued to work on the shape, then let them air out again, and finally finished by polishing any rough edges. Although people today refer to the products of the craft generically as “clay pots,” they were actually different shapes and sizes – large and small *porongos* for *chicha*, pots for cooking, kettles, tiny decorative pots, etc.

Once the pots had dried in the sun, the men would lay them out in rows and cover them with *champa*⁴² as well as llama or sheep dung (*takia*), both of which are good fuels. They would then light the *champa* and proceed to let it burn. During the whole firing process, the man would smoke, chew coca and drink cane alcohol - the same as on any ritual occasion – while using a stick to turn over the *champa* to keep the fire going. No one was supposed to make any noise during the firing; for this reason, the children were taken somewhere else.⁴³ After a while, the man would take a small piece of dried *takia* and throw it against the side of one of the pots; judging by the sound, he could determine if it was ready.

⁴² *Champa* is a species of highland grass that is cut and dug out together with part of the underlying soil, and that serves as a fuel for cooking and other purposes; it burns well and is more economical than buying gas. It is dug from the ground shortly before the start of the annual rains, when the ground is driest.

⁴³ According to another one of my informants, women were supposed to stay away from the firing as well.

Incidentally, the craft of pottery in Huayllay is described in a 1918 document by Ernest Godet, a hydraulic engineer who spent a few months in the area, hired by the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron to build dams and canals for the mine's operations. Godet had a family connection to the University of Neuchatel's Ethnographic Museum, and wrote a long article about the Huayllay region for the university's Geographical Bulletin. His references to the pottery craft are surprising because they are among the few sections of his article that actually contain detailed descriptions as opposed to shallow generalizations and commonplace prejudices. In general, his description matches the information that people in Huayllay gave me, which makes it seem like it might have been based on actual observation.⁴⁴

For some reason that escapes us, this work appears to be reserved for the women of the region. The man, it is true, piles up the raw pottery in order to fire it, and monitors the process, but, with the exception of one particular case, we have never seen men get their hands into the clay (Godet 1918, 164)

Godet describes arriving at an estancia where women were engaged in pottery work, and being treated to a demonstration of "the most marvelous handwork precision work that one can imagine."⁴⁵

These women crouch in front of a large flat stone; the others stay in front of a short tree trunk; the stone and the trunk constitute their work space. They then grab a handful of clay and, without tools, without any means other than their fingers and their thumb, they knead and dig into the mass, rounding the edges bit by bit; in some twenty minutes they have completed a container of exact circumference and whose harmonious profile offers the most perfect symmetry (Ibid., 166).

Although the two main stages of pottery production – the shaping of the clay and the firing – were associated with different genders, there was some flexibility to this. It does seem like the firing was almost always done by men, but the shaping of the clay, though generally associated with women, could sometimes be done by men; to this day, there are a few men who make clay pots themselves.

⁴⁴ I did not find out about Godet's 1918 article until long after I had concluded my research. The overall lackluster quality of the piece (other than the section on pottery) is my reason for not using it as a source in other parts of this chapter. It could of course be used as a text through which to analyze the perceptions and worldview of a European engineer of his time.

⁴⁵ He erroneously uses the term *hacienda* to refer to *estancias*. It's possible such a usage could have been in place at the time, but it seems doubtful.



Figure 3 – Memorial plaque for a *huayllina* woman, Huayllay Cemetery. This is part of a new trend, in the region’s cemeteries, of decorating graves with pictorial and/or sculptural representations of activities with which individuals were associated in their lifetimes. Photograph by Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, 2010.

The making of pottery in Huayllay was timed to coincide with the harvests in the *quebradas*; in fact, people refer to the old exchange trips as “doing the harvest” (*hacer la cosecha*). Clay pots were the most distinctive items by which *huayllinos* were regionally known, but it was not the only one they carried on the trips; they also wove woolen blankets for exchange as well as for their own use, in addition to carrying animal hides, mutton, wool and fish (*challwas*). It was usually the men who went on the trips, packing their goods on llamas and following by foot; those who were better off rode on horses. The familiarity of *huayllino* men with traveling and with pack animals – derived also from their role as transporters of minerals

from the mines to the Casapalca smelter and other locations before the introduction of the railroads – led to Huayllay being described as a town of *arrieros* (transporters or muleteers) in the early 20th century, for example in Velarde (1906, 11) and Godet (1917, 138). There were two main times of the year for the exchange trips: the potato harvest in May, and the maize harvest, to which people traveled beginning in July and more fully in August and September or even later.⁴⁶ Although these were the two main crops and they in a sense defined the exchange, other crops were obtained as a secondary element in the exchange, depending on the location and altitude: Andean tubers like oca (*oxalis tuberosa*) and olluco (*Ullucus tuberosus*), habas (fava beans), barley, wheat, or fruits.

The llama caravans went in two principal directions from Huayllay: west and northwest, on the one hand, and northeast, on the other. The westerly direction was more associated with the maize harvest, whereas the northeasterly direction was more characteristic of the potato harvest, although both harbored some of each crop, depending on the altitude and the specific location. Some of the northeasterly destinations that people mentioned to me were the Chaupiwara Valley and the immediately adjacent area of southwestern Huánuco Department (for example Yanahuanca, Ambo, Caynas and neighboring Huariaca, Pallanchacra and Yarusyacán), as well as the *quebradas* of eastern Pasco Province such as Paucartambo and Huancabamba, and sometimes as far east as Oxapampa. To the west, the *huayllinos* went to communities on the upper Chancay Valley, such as Carac, Coto, Lampián, Huayopampa, La Perla, Sumbilca and Huascoy, or, slightly further south, to villages in Canta Province such as Quipán, Marco and San José. They also traveled to communities on the upper Huaura Valley, such as Puñun, Tongos, Maray and Paccho.⁴⁷ By and large, the westerly direction brought *huayllinos* into contact with

⁴⁶ Certain varieties of maize were harvested in July or even earlier, while others were harvested in August. Even for the early-harvest varieties, some people preferred to wait till the corn was dry.

⁴⁷ In her thesis on the community of Huaychao (Huayllay's immediate neighbor), Aranguren (1971) lists more locations as destinations for *huaychinos* (who had similar exchange practices as *huayllinos*) on their "harvest" trips. To the northeast and east, they went to several locations in the Chaupiwara Valley, namely Yanahuanca, Chinche, Pomayarus, Huarautambo, Vilcabamba, Rocco, Santa Ana de Tusi and Tángor (the latter the community where Enrique Mayer [1974, 1977, 2002] did his research). They also traveled to Huácar (Ambo), Huachón, Yarusyacán, Paucartambo, and Ulcumayo. To the west, the *huaychinos* went to Picoy, Parquín, Santa Leonor, Paccho, Ayaranga, Churín, Huancahuasi, San Cristóbal de Rapaz and Oyón, as well as many communities on the upper Chancay Valley, such as Vichaycocha, Pacaraos, Santa Cruz de Andamarca, Santa Catalina de los Baños, Ñaupay, Ihuarí, Huachinga, Chauca, Lampián, Cárac and Huascoy,

communities that were adopting Spanish more rapidly, due to their proximity to the coast, whereas the northeasterly route took them to *quebradas* (Chaupiwara, Huánuco, Huariaca, etc.) where varieties of Central Peruvian Quechua were more heavily spoken during much of the 20th century (though also, increasingly, alongside Spanish).⁴⁸

The items were exchanged according to established ratios. For example, Vicente Morales, one of my informants, mentioned a specific type of metal container (*lata*) that was used as a measurement. A small blanket (*manta*) was exchanged for 2 *latas* of corn, while a large blanket (*frazada*) was exchanged for 6 *latas* of corn.⁴⁹ According to him, the llama itself was also used as a measurement, since the clay pots were always packed onto the llamas in the same way: the pots carried by one llama were exchanged for the amount of potatoes that that same llama could carry. Maize, on the other hand, was worth twice as much as potatoes. Aranguren (1971) gives some more traditional exchange ratios from the community of Huaychao (47). Similarly, Mayer notes the existence of a method of exchange known as *unay precio* (old price), whereby items were priced in terms of coinage that was no longer in circulation, resulting in “prices” that bore no resemblance to the actual market prices at the time (Mayer 2002, 154, 159).

The trips could sometimes be lengthy. For example, Armando López remembers having traveled once with his father to the district of Cayna near Ambo in Huánuco Department; the trip took five days, although they stopped along the way. They had horses which they rode, while other people had to travel on foot with their llamas. Máximo Roque (born 1934) remembered having gone several times with his relatives, accompanying their llamas on foot over the course of several days as they traveled to the *quebradas* to the northeast such as Yanahuanca, Pallanchacra and Huariaca. Vicente Morales remembers having done four trips, mostly to the maize-growing communities to the west. He described the route to the community of Puñun (Huaura Province) to obtain maize: the first day they arrived in the town of Yanamá, then the second day to a village called Huamanripa, and finally the third day the party came to a placed

⁴⁸ I am making this linguistic generalization about language based on ethnographies and other studies of the region. It was also made by one of my informants – Armando López.

⁴⁹ As Mayer writes when discussing the different systems of measurement in barter exchanges in the Chaupiwara region: “A fourth option was the *lata*, a rectangular tin container that manufacturers used to pack and ship commercially manufactured lard” (153).

called Churincocha; there they had to decide among four different places to go to: Puñun, Tungus, Maray or Paccho. When they finally arrived in a community where an exchange was going to take place, the people from that town met them in the outskirts and competed with each other to grab the pots. The local people then hosted the visitors overnight in their homes; the next day, the *huayllinos* went around town looking for the persons who had taken their pots or other items, so that the exchange could be completed (this kind of delayed exchange was also described to me by Armando López). Vicente Morales remembers that the people in the maize-growing community would send them back with foods for the road such as *cancha* (toasted corn), toasted fava beans (*habas*), and *chicharrón* (fried pork rinds). On the other hand, another of my informants, Desiderio Roque, never went on one of these trips, but he remembers seeing his father leaving for the journey and returning a couple of weeks later. Not everyone in Huayllay possessed llamas, certainly; they sometimes had to rent them in order to be able to travel to the *quebradas*.

In his study of the *comunidad* of Huascoy in the upper Chancay Valley, Salvador (1983) provides a description of *huayllino* exchange from the perspective of one of the communities that bartered with them. According to Salvador, people in Huascoy preferentially exchanged their maize for pots, blankets and cloth from Huayllay specifically; the relationship between the two communities had reportedly been in place for so long that Salvador wondered if it wasn't indicative of some common origin in the past (Salvador 1983, 180-181). Although by the time of his study the custom had "drastically declined," for much of the 20th century the *huayllinos* had come to Huascoy each year around October, in four or more caravans, each caravan consisting of around 50 llamas. As was the case in the Chaupiwara community of Tángor, described by Mayer (1974, 63), in Huascoy it was usually women who received and exchanged products with the men from the high regions. They referred to the *huayllinos* by terms such as *paisanos*, *paishacos*, *llacuacos* (apparently derived from the old term *llacuaz*), or *amigos*; they also sometimes established *compadrazgo* relations with them (Ibid., 178-179). Salvador's description matches what people in Huayllay told me – the pots, textiles and other *huayllino* items passed hands first, and then, after a certain time lapse, the *huayllinos* went to people's homes to get the corn. Similarly, some of the exchange ratios he lists as being in operation between 1920 and 1960 are exactly the same as those which people in Huayllay reported to me: two *latas* of corn

(about 22 kilograms, according to Salvador) for a small *manta* (blanket), six *latas* of corn for a large *frazada* (Ibid., 180).

In his discussion of barter from the perspective of the Chaupiwara region, Mayer (2002) emphasizes the fact that barter is not a precursor to market exchange, as economists have often assumed, but rather that it co-exists with the cash nexus, filling gaps that are due to an (either systemic or temporary) shortage of cash and also, importantly, protecting people from the vicissitudes and exploitative aspects of market exchange. Barter, a “collective and institutionalized creation of the peasant sector,” provided a context of greater equality and more control over transactions than the often abusive world of Andean markets (Mayer 2002, 165). Peasants’ hard-earned cash (often obtained through labor outside the community) was saved for those items, like factory-made products, that could only be found on the market; products such as corn, potatoes and meat could be obtained without a cash outlay and therefore were. At the same time, Mayer acknowledges that things could look different from the perspective of highlanders as opposed to *quebrada* agriculturalists. On the one hand, for highlanders it was more of an absolute necessity to leave their ecological zone in order to find products necessary for their subsistence. On the other hand, by the time of Mayer’s research (1969-70), corn producers in Chaupiwara apparently benefitted more than highlanders from barter and therefore were “keener defenders” of the system. Highlanders, “despite their apparent isolation, were much better integrated into the national market system through the sale of wool and meat, but nonetheless also reserved some of their production for the barter sphere” (Ibid., 165).

In the case of a community like Huayllay, there was the added factor of mining work and the increased availability of cash it brought about. Several of the *huayllinos* I spoke to drew an explicit connection between the presence of the mine and the decline of the barter system as well as the pottery craft, even if both did co-exist with mining work well into the 20th century. One of my informants emphasized that the “pride” (i.e. arrogance) of mining workers and their wives caused them to look down on traditional activities such as making clay pots. People also remark that the pottery craft in particular suffered from the introduction of cheap factory-made aluminum pots in the second half of the 20th century. The production of blankets for exchange, as well as the barter of sheep hides and meat, continued for a longer time, though by then trips were

made by motorized vehicle or horses rather than with packs of llamas.⁵⁰ In Huascoy, according to Salvador, the barter relationship with Huayllay began to decline rapidly after the construction of the road through the upper Chancay Valley. By the time of his writing (early 1980s), people in Huascoy had switched much of their maize lands to peach monoculture for the market, and so had less corn to barter; besides, by then the *comuneros* of Huascoy preferred factory-made blankets and pots (Salvador 1983, 179-181).

Today a few individuals still practice both the pottery and textile crafts on a small scale. In connection to the latter, the Huarón mining company today sponsors weaving workshops as part of its social responsibility programs, but these are aimed at creating high-end products such as alpaca sweaters and scarves to be sold by exporters in Lima, and are completely disconnected from the old barter networks. As mentioned earlier, there are some attempts to revive pottery as an element of Huayllay's identity, in connection with tourism-promotion efforts, but for the most part the old exchange of clay pots has disappeared. Desiderio Roque told me of how he had recently been in Yanahuanca (in the Chaupiwara Valley), and many people still remembered his grandfather. One of them told him, rhetorically of course, that if he were to bring them some of the old clay pots, they would give him the finest items that they had. As Roque told me, "in every little town I have visited people always ask about Huayllay: 'Do they still make [the pots] or don't they?'"

The social dynamics of mining labor and migration

In the introductory section of this chapter I provided some background on mining and labor systems in Peru in general, and more specifically on modern industrial mining, which in the early 20th century was pioneered by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and secondarily by the Compagnie des Mines de Huarón. The second section sketched a profile of the local society of Huayllay District and surroundings, as it has changed over time. In this section I return to a specific focus on mining, namely on the migration of mining workers and their families from

⁵⁰ That was the case also in the last few decades of the pottery craft. As Desiderio Roque put it, "they no longer went on foot with their llamas, rather they went on horse, by car, but they carried their pots. They were not the authentic travelers anymore" (*ya no eran los auténticos viajeros*).

other regions. I start by briefly examining the following question: Given that the company recruited many of its workers from areas outside the immediate locality, which regions were these?




Figure 4 – Departments of Peru

I have not been able to gain access to personnel records from the Huarón company that would allow me to determine directly where its workers came from. However, there is another kind of archival material that allows us to do this indirectly; the result is less exact but useful nonetheless. The information in question comes not from company records but from a local

judicial institution, the *Juzgado de Paz* (Justice of the Peace) of the district of Huayllay. Over the course of the 20th century, thousands of local disputes were aired here, over issues ranging from injured reputations to conflicts between common-law spouses to accusations of cattle-rustling (see Chapter 3). Either the *Juez de Paz* or an aide took notes of each dispute; in most cases – though not all – they also recorded the place of origin of the litigants. In a mining district like Huayllay, one would expect to find individuals not just from the immediate locality but also from other regions, and this is indeed what we find.

As records of migration to the Huarón mine, the *Juzgado de Paz* documents are of significant but limited utility, since they pertain not only to the mining camp but rather to the district as a whole. However, as described earlier, the mining camps of the Huarón company constituted by far the largest population center in the district, and contained 47% of the district population of 6,932 according to the 1940 census. Also, they were located close to the village of Huayllay where the *Juzgado de Paz* sat; this meant that the *Juzgado* was easily accessible from the camps. This is in marked contrast with the other, smaller mining company that operated within the district's boundaries in the first half of the century, the U.S.-owned Vanadium Corporation of America (practically the only global producer of this rare metal at the time). Vanadium's camps at Minaragra and Jumasha, on Lake Punrún, were distant from the district seat of Huayllay. Although the residents of Vanadium's camps constituted 19% of the district's population in the 1940 census, in the 1940-42 *Juzgado* documents only one case explicitly mentions people from those camps coming to the *Juez*. Individuals living in the Huarón company's camps, in contrast, fill the pages of the *Juzgado* documents.

I do not at present have *Juzgado de Paz* cases from the first two decades of the Huarón company's operations – the period from 1918 to 1940 when short-term migration and the debt-labor system known as *enganche* (see below) would have been most prevalent. Rather, I have analyzed place-of-origin information from the Huayllay *Juzgado* for three moments in time: 1940-42, 1969, and 1975-76. Since the 1969 and 1975-76 data are close to one another in time, what we really have are two moments in time, allowing us to observe differences between the early 1940s, on the one hand, and the late 1960s to mid-1970s, on the other. For the 1940-42 and the 1975-76 periods, the data allows us to distinguish between the general population of people

who aired their disputes before the Huayllay Juzgado, on the one hand, and the more specific subset of parties to disputes who stated a direct connection to the Huarón mine, either through occupation or through residence in the company camps, on the other. For 1940-42 this subset was 57.8% of the total, while for 1975-76 it was 52.7% of the total. I list the results of the analyses in Appendix A, where I also discuss their limitations as well as other possible interpretations of the data. Here I will simply summarize the main long-term trends that emerge.

The areas of origin for people appearing before the *Juzgado* can be classified into the following categories: Huayllay District itself, other parts of the Pasco/Junín plateau (i.e. the high-altitude, livestock-raising region of which Huayllay is part), the Mantaro Valley to the south, the Lima Highlands to the west, the Chaupiwara Valley and other *quebradas* (intramontane valleys) in Pasco department, and finally the *quebradas* of Huánuco further north, which in a sense form a continuous *quebrada* region with Chaupiwara. The immediate local area of Huayllay District appears as the place of origin for close to 50% of the parties to disputes in both the early and later periods; if we limit the analysis to individuals who stated an explicit connection to the mine, the percentage of locals goes down to around 28% (which makes sense since more migrants were found among the mining families as opposed to those in the rural estancias). These proportions are consistent across time. Similarly stable are the percentages of people who come from the nearby plateau communities, areas that were roughly similar to Huayllay in terms of culture, ecology and an economic focus on livestock rather than agriculture; they account for around a third of migrants (i.e. not including the native *huayllinos*) or slightly more. What changes is the origin of more distant migrants. Whereas in 1940-42 the Mantaro Valley to the south accounts for a significant portion of migrants (around a third), this goes down to almost 10% by the late 1960s and mid-70s. Similarly, whereas the *quebradas* of Huánuco to the north are barely represented in the 1940-42 data, they account for a significant percentage of migrants in the later data (25% in 1969 and 41% in 1975-76, to be precise). If we combine Huánuco with Chaupiwara and the other *quebradas* of northern and eastern Pasco Province (which share a lot of cultural similarities with Huánuco, even if they are on the other side of the departmental divide), this combined region accounts for over half of the migrants in the 1975-76 cases.




Figure 5 – Central Highlands of Peru, with locations mentioned in text

The historical literature on mining in Peru provides evidence, from other mining centers in the Central Highlands, for both of the trends discussed here: the relative importance (though not uniqueness) of the Mantaro Valley as a source of workers in the early 1900s, as well as the gradual emergence of other, more peripheral areas as sources of migrants during the course of

the century. Similarly, the reasons for migration and the social dynamics that emerged around it were similar at many of the mines. For this reason, the Huarón mine cannot be discussed in a vacuum. In this section I will discuss some of the social patterns involved in the formation of the mining working class in the 20th century; Huarón will be the focal point for analysis but in the context of broader dynamics and patterns, as documented both in the secondary literature and in my own primary sources. Because of the importance of the Mantaro Valley region as a source of migrants to Huarón and other mines in the Central Highlands from colonial times through the first half of the 20th century, I will begin by briefly describing the main characteristics of this region as well as its relationship to the mines. I will then discuss the problem of labor shortage as well as the *enganche* system in late-19th and early-20th century Peru. Following that, the next three sub-sections focus on changing patterns of migration to the Huarón mine specifically. Finally, and most extensively, I discuss the change from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus, both through documents and through the perceptions of people in Huayllay today.

Mining and the Mantaro Valley

The significance of the Mantaro Valley region as a source of mine workers did not begin in the early 20th century, but rather has roots much earlier in time. In fact, as Contreras (1988) argues for the Cerro de Pasco mines, migration from this region, as a proportion of the total, was if anything greater in the first three quarters of the 19th century, before the decline in silver production that began around 1870. He analyses death and marriage records in Cerro de Pasco, which contain information on individuals' locations of origin. During the period 1845-1900, the city's population had a strong migrant component – around 50% of individuals registered as deceased had been born outside the city. Certainly, the Mantaro Valley was not alone in sending workers to Cerro. A significant number of migrants came from the areas corresponding to the contemporary department of Pasco – namely, the northern half of the Pasco-Junín plateau plus the Chaupihuaranga and other narrow valleys (*quebradas*) surrounding Cerro de Pasco. References to recruitment of workers in the nearby *quebradas* are also present in the evidence presented by Contreras and by Deustúa (1984) as well as in other primary sources. Other regions, such as Huánuco, Huancavelica, Lima Highlands and even Ancash Department, were also present, although in smaller numbers. Yet over the long run, more migrants to Cerro de Pasco

came from Junín department, where the Mantaro Valley is located, than even from Pasco Department itself. Namely, Junín Department provided 43.4% of the migrants in the 1845-1900 period, versus 25.2% for Pasco Department (Contreras 1988, 116).⁵¹

Most of the migration from Junín Department came from the provinces that roughly correspond to the Mantaro Valley: Jauja, Huancayo and Concepción. During the period 1845-1870, these provinces together accounted for around 40% of migrants to Cerro, which decreased to around 23% in the 1875-1900 period (Ibid., 121).⁵² This decrease had to do partly with the decline in silver production at Cerro, which meant that labor needs were lower and could be more easily satisfied at closer range, without having to recruit workers from more distant areas like the Mantaro Valley or Huancavelica.⁵³ As the production of copper began to replace that of silver in the 1890s, and especially after the arrival of U.S. capital in the following decade, labor demand once more outstripped supply. Labor recruiters once again looked to the Mantaro Valley as a reliable source of workers, ensuring that that region would continue to be of central importance to the mining industry through at least the first half of the 20th century. The prevalence of workers from the Mantaro Valley at many of the mines of the Central Highlands is documented not only in Contreras' demographic data, but also in many narrative accounts by mining engineers and others from the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The Mantaro Valley is one of the most important and best-known regions of the Central Highlands of Peru. Although the Mantaro River as a whole runs all the way from the Pasco-Junín plateau to the Amazon rainforest, the term "Mantaro Valley" usually refers to the present-day provinces of Jauja, Concepción, Huancayo and Chupaca (Junín Department) only. This is where the river valley broadens out to form one of the largest and most fertile agricultural regions in Peru – a rarity in a country known for its challenging, difficult geography. This area has always supported a relatively dense population and produced a large agricultural surplus that was traded with other regions – primarily the regional mining economy centered in Cerro de Pasco in the 19th century, and the large urban market of the national capital, Lima, in the 20th century.

⁵¹ If we instead look at marriage records (which were analyzed for the period 1820-1900), the proportion is 29.1% for Pasco Department and 40.3% for Junín Department (Contreras 1988 116).

⁵² If we include Tarma as part of the Mantaro Valley, the percentages for the two periods increase to 46.2% and 28.4%, respectively.

⁵³ Migration from Huancavelica decreased from 8.6% to 1.3% between the two periods (Ibid. 121).

The Valley has also been known to historians and social scientists for its particular characteristics in terms of land tenure and social organization during the 20th century. These include the dispersion rather than concentration of land holdings, the relative absence of extreme forms of social and ethnic inequality, and the accelerated processes of cultural change that took place over the course of the century. Some scholars have emphasized special conditions during the Conquest and the colonial period that led to the descendants of the *huanca* polities retaining most of their land, so that haciendas formed in the upper reaches of the valley and surrounding highlands but not in the fertile valley floor (Arguedas 1975, Espinoza 1973). Without denying the importance of these long-term factors, other scholars have instead emphasized the significant processes of change that took place during the late 19th and 20th centuries (Alberti and Sánchez 1974, Long and Roberts 1984).

In particular, Alberti and Sánchez argue that although it is true that large estates did not form in the lower Mantaro Valley, and landholdings remained unusually dispersed even in the 19th century, this does not mean that at that time the region already possessed the relative social and ethnic homogeneity we associate with it today. The population was differentiated between a white and mestizo elite, which resided either in the city of Jauja or in one of several district capitals, and an Indian peasant majority. The elites maintained power not through direct control of land but rather through their monopoly over political offices, education and access to markets. This order collapsed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a result of several factors, including the emergence of new political jurisdictions to which non-elites had access, the growth in commerce and transportation, the entry of peasants into wage work at the mines in the early 1900s, and the arrival of new ideologies from the national capital and beyond. Such changes took place in the Mantaro Valley earlier than in many other parts of highland Peru. Similarly, scholars have focused on the rise of a “bourgeoisie of peasant origins,” which spearheaded a “peasant model” of capitalist development in contrast to the “Junker model” of other regions in Peru such as Cajamarca (Mallon 1983, 340-341). Others have examined the ways in which Indian/*mestizo* distinctions broke down in Valley communities such as Muquiyauyo in the early 20th centuries (Adams 1959). Already in the 1950s, Peruvian writer and anthropologist José María Arguedas described the characteristics of the Mantaro Valley that set it apart from the regions of southern Peru with which he was familiar and in which feudal-like relations still

prevailed at the time. Like Arguedas, more recent writers like Romero (2004) see the Valley as having undergone a profound process of *mestizaje* – but *mestizaje* understood not as something opposed to indigenous culture or implying its complete dissolution and absorption by the dominant society, but rather as “the gradual appropriation of modernity by indigenous Andean peasants” (Romero 2004, 45). People selectively adopted aspects of Western culture (most notably the Spanish language) and vigorously pursued integration into national society, but at the same time maintained at least some local cultural elements, such as music, art and rituals, while at the same time constructing a strong regional *huanca* identity. Beyond academic analyses, the Mantaro Valley is well-known in Peru for its music, dances and festivals, as well as for the commercial vibrancy of its main city, Huancayo.

Since the Mantaro Valley is the best-studied area of the Central Highlands, there exists the tendency to conflate the two,⁵⁴ thus confusing part with whole and obscuring the different characteristics of other regions such as Huánuco, Pasco or the highlands of Lima. Similarly, it is important to guard against the tendency to paint a homogeneous image of the Valley; the characteristics sketched in the previous paragraph are true only as a first and broad approximation to the area. If we examine the literature more closely, it becomes clear that during the course of the 20th century, the decline of social and ethnic inequalities was accompanied by a hardening of economic class differences, both within and between communities (Laite 1981, Mallon 1983). For a sample of the diversity of communities in the Mantaro Valley and surroundings, one need only compare a large, prosperous community on the valley floor, like Muquiyauyo (Adams 1959), with a relatively isolated, poorer community on the upper slopes like Huasicancha, which had to battle for centuries to recover lands from the neighboring haciendas that grew at the southwestern edge of the Valley (Smith 1991).

We have seen that the Mantaro Valley long provided a significant share of workers to the mines of Pasco and other areas of the Central Highlands. The reasons for this are multiple. The more obvious factor involves altitude, geography and population density. Most of the mines were located at high altitude, near grassland areas where pasturing rather than agriculture was the predominant activity. In these regions, population density was relatively low, with the exception

⁵⁴ See, for example, Flores Galindo (1974: 26-29).

of a mining town like Cerro de Pasco where a population had already formed that lived not from animal herding but rather from mining and commerce. Mining companies thus had to look for laborers in lower-altitude valley regions, where agriculture permitted more dense settlements and thus generated a larger population from which to recruit workers. Although many of the *quebradas* (narrow valleys) fit this criterion, it makes sense that the Mantaro Valley, as the most productive and most densely populated agricultural region in the Central Highlands, became an important source of labor to the mines.

However, there were other factors that also determined a particularly close relationship between the mines and the Mantaro Valley. As Alberti and Sánchez (1974) and Mallon (1983) have pointed out, around the turn of the century the Valley had already begun an incipient process of capitalist development and dislocation of traditional structures. This made peasants more eager to seek out opportunities to earn cash, such as through work in the mines; as Alberti and Sanchez emphasize, people migrated to the mines either to earn cash to invest in agricultural production back home (in the case of prosperous peasants) or because their landholdings were too small to support a family (in the case of poor peasants). A region in flux, undergoing multiple social and economic transformations, like the Mantaro Valley, would be more likely to yield a surplus population for wage work elsewhere.

However, there is a further reason why the region became an important source of labor during the early years of industrial mining, in the early 1900s. As Contreras (1987) points out, the Mantaro Valley communities had become specialized in seasonal mining work already by the late 18th and 19th centuries, developing a reputation for being efficient workers. In fact, he traces this specialization to the late 16th century, when groups of *xauxas* and *taramas* from the region were included in the *mita* (forced labor draft) for the mercury mines of Huancavelica to the south. As Huancavelica declined and then closed in the late 18th century, the pole of migration – no longer under the *mita* – shifted from the south to the north, i.e. towards Cerro de Pasco. At least some of the Mantaro Valley communities thus developed skills and experience in mining work that were eagerly sought out by the mines (Contreras 1988: 116-120). Although in the mid-20th century many communities in the Valley would turn away from mining work towards other

alternatives, such as migration to Lima, in the early 1900s the effects of this long-term, deep-rooted connection to the mining industry were still felt.

This does not mean, however, that the rural population of the Mantaro Valley and the rest of the Central Highlands was completely amenable to the labor needs of industrial mining during these early years. As mentioned earlier, the sudden increase in labor demand brought on by the arrival of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in 1903 created a situation in which a shortage of workers was palpable – similar to what had occurred during previous short-term mining booms in 19th-century Cerro de Pasco, but this time on a larger scale. Moreover, the new mining entrepreneurs were less able than their 19th-century counterparts to adapt their production rhythms to the seasonal nature of the labor supply. This situation of shortage was stated explicitly by mining engineer C.E. Velarde in his 1908 survey of the Peruvian mining industry. While he wrote that “in general, in the entire highlands the workers needed by the operations have been found, among the indigenous population,” he also remarked, specifically for the Cerro de Pasco region, that,

Since some time ago, there is in this whole area a shortage of hands, due to the great momentum gained by the operations of the mines; and because of the intermittent manner in which the *enganchados* provide their services, alternating them with their agrarian labors (Velarde 1908, xxxiii-xxxiv).

In a similar way, in 1903 one official of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation wrote to another complaining of the labor shortage and highlighting the seasonal nature of the problem:

Not only ourselves but Fernandini, Patrons, Azalia and Nations [other mine owners in the region] and many others with whom I have talked recently are complaining of the difficulty to get sufficient labor among the Cholos.⁵⁵ The only place in which we are not short is here in Cerro in the shafts. For the past month the Cholos have been going into the low country to harvest the potato crop; hundreds, yes, thousands, migrating for this purpose. Some of them have returned and others are returning, and I expect within the next 2 or 3 weeks that labor will be more plentiful (Cerro Corporation Archive, American Heritage Center. “Employees” - Letter from A.A. Abbott to F. Klepetko, July 16, 1903).

⁵⁵ In Peru, *cholo* is an originally derogatory ethnic term that has varied in meaning over time, referring either to Indians in general, to urban Indians only, or to mestizos, as well as other shades of meaning. Today, it functions either as a derogatory term or as one of endearment and sometimes an affirmation of cultural pride. In early 20th-century mining company documents such as this one, *cholo* is used to refer to Indians, in particular in their condition as workers.

Labor shortage and enganche in Peru

The situation described by Velarde and by A.A. Abbott was but one instance of a much broader phenomenon that characterized not just the mining sector but large-scale agriculture as well, and that was not limited to Peru but rather common to many parts of Latin America since the mid-to-late 19th century. Elites complained of the labor shortages that they believed stemmed from both the thinness of the population as well as the unwillingness of rural people to work in sugar plantations, road construction and mines. Different types of labor shortages had existed before, for example in Potosí in the 16th century, when the problem was addressed through the institution of the *mita*. But novel developments beginning in second half of the 19th century upset the precarious balances between labor supply and demand achieved over the course of the colonial period. New export booms were reconnecting Latin America to the world economy and solidifying its position as a producer of raw materials; this was reinforced by the rise of liberal ideology, which promoted free markets and production for export. This development led to sudden – if localized - increases in the demand for labor, at the same time that colonial-era mechanisms designed to extract labor from the population were being phased out.

In Peru, for example, the Indian tribute was abolished in 1854, removing what had been an important incentive for highland indigenous peasants to look for cash-earning opportunities in the mines and elsewhere (Contreras 1988, 57). That same year, President Ramón Castilla decreed the abolition of slavery, freeing the 26,000 or so Afro-Peruvian slaves, most of who lived in Peru's coast. Coastal cotton and sugar planters found themselves without their traditional slave labor pool, and they sought a substitute in the importation of Chinese indentured servants, often under slave-like conditions. These laborers also became the workforce for the guano boom of the 1850s and 60s – a period which saw labor recruitment practices as extreme as the kidnapping of over 3,000 Polynesian islanders to work on the Peruvian coast in 1862-63 (Maude 1981). Around 100,000 Chinese workers came during these decades, but in 1874 international pressure brought the so-called “coolie trade” to a halt in Peru. Guano was already in decline by that time, but the sugar plantations of the northern coast were growing. As they saw their Chinese labor force gradually age or move to the towns without being replaced, sugar planters experimented with Japanese immigrants as well as coastal residents, but both sources were found to be inadequate in

numbers. Gradually, the northern coastal planters turned towards the highland peasantry, especially the neighboring highland department of Cajamarca.

At the same time as in the sugar industry, in the rest of highland Peru rural people were in demand as laborers for the construction of roads and railroads and, as always, for the mines. It was among all these sectors that, as in several other Latin American countries, the well-known system of *enganche* (“hooking”) developed, as a way of increasing control over the labor supply by linking work to legally enforceable debt. As Flores Galindo writes, quoting Pedro Muñiz, “*enganche* was in those years a ‘national institution’” (Flores Galindo 1993, 41); similarly, Blanchard (1982) writes that “the system quickly emerged as the principal means of obtaining workers for rural jobs in Peru” (67). In the historical literature on Peru, *enganche* is generally understood as a form of labor recruitment in which agents (known as *enganchadores*) advanced cash loans to peasants, which they then had to repay by working in the mines, plantations or other sites. The system was based on people’s need for cash (which could also be encouraged by the *enganchadores*) and on their inability to repay in any form other than their labor; a crucial element was also the cooperation of local authorities in enforcing *enganche* contracts. It thus had features akin to many other labor systems around the world, such as debt peonage or indentured servitude, and can be seen in a historical and geographical continuum with such systems. Although historians of Peru have focused on the heyday of *enganche* as lasting from the second half of the 19th century through the 1920s, its origins lie further back in time; Contreras speculates that *enganche* in the Cerro de Pasco mines began in the late 18th century (Contreras 1988, 63). Similarly, Klarén sees *enganche* as having its roots in “the post-Conquest Spanish perversion of the Inca mita system” (Klarén 1978, 242) as well as in the institutions of slavery and indentured servitude. Moreover, the term *enganche* was used more widely in the sense of recruitment – in the 19th century, it often referred to military conscription. Rather than a single, unique entity, thus, what historians have called “the Latin American *enganche* system” (Brass 1990) can be understood as the particular set of forms that labor recruitment took during the mid-to-late 19th century export booms in Peru and much of Latin America – a period of widespread labor shortages in a context marked by various forms of coercion and hierarchical power relations at the local level.

In Peru at the time, *enganche* was widely criticized as coercive and oppressive. In her 1913 denunciation of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, *indigenista* activist Dora Mayer criticized the company for using *enganche*, which she called “a system of debt slavery, well-known to the people in countries like England who are interested in the lot of the oppressed races” (Mayer 1913, 20). Other attacks on *enganche* appeared around the same time, and in 1914 this campaign led to the passage of certain legal provisions discouraging the practice (Flores Galindo 1974, 42; Dewind 1987, 162-163). In more recent years, historians have taken a more nuanced view of *enganche*. In his 1974 study of the CPC’s mining workforce, Flores Galindo criticized the common view of *enganche* as the sole mechanism of labor recruitment in the early years of the mines and as based primarily on the *enganchadores*’ ability to deceive rural people, who were portrayed as naive. He emphasized the “push” factors in the countryside which made people willing to work in the mines for short periods of time, rather than susceptibility to outright deception. Similarly, in Latin Americanist historiography more generally there has emerged a “revisionist” literature on *enganche* (Blanchard 1979, Bauer 1979) that has sought to characterize it as non-coercive and as an arrangement that rural people could manipulate in their favor. This literature has in turn been critiqued by scholars who continue to emphasize the aspects of *enganche* that most resemble debt bondage (Loveman 1979, Brass 1990). In any case, this debate has influenced historians working on specific countries and led them to question an uncritical reliance on earlier activist sources (like Dora Mayer, cited above) and to examine the various modalities of *enganche* in specific context on the basis of primary sources.

In the mines of central Peru, the early period of industrial mining was characterized by short-term migration and seasonal labor shortages, as well as by the widespread use both of *enganche* and of subcontracting (*contratas*). Foreign companies like the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron built their labor recruitment strategies on the existing practices of Peruvian mine owners and entrepreneurs. As the literature indicates, over time a transition took place, as production was gradually mechanized, the workforce stabilized and *enganche* was abandoned in favor of direct hiring. Yet this transition did not take place at the same rate or in the same way everywhere - smaller, less mechanized mines tended to stabilize their workforce more slowly if at all; labor recruitment practices akin to *enganche* continued to be practiced in small-scale gold mining into at least the 1980s (Castro de León

1985). Even for industrial mining, scholars differ on issues of periodization. Flores Galindo (1974), who studied only the period from 1900 to 1930, saw the 1920s as a moment of change from what he called a “mixed proletariat” – composed of peasants who worked a few months in the mines and a few months in their lands – to a “transient proletariat,” in which most workers labored at least a few years in the mines. On the other hand, DeWind (1987) saw the whole first half of the twentieth century as a long, more or less unbroken period characterized by low-skilled workers with very high labor turnover. According to him, the change would have occurred only in the 1950s, when the Cerro de Pasco Corporation began to stabilize its existing workforce rather than seek out new workers, at the same time that it was mechanizing production. The two authors also differ on the ways they interpret the seasonal nature of labor and the persistence of labor shortages in the early part of the century. Influenced by E.P. Thompson, Flores Galindo emphasized the ways in which these features constituted forms of “resistance to proletarianization.” DeWind, on the other hand, argued that seasonal, short-term labor was not so much resistance to proletarianization on the part of peasants as it was functional to the needs of the mining company, since it kept wages low. Most likely, both factors were at work.

Labor at Huarón in the early 20th century

Like Cerro de Pasco, the early years at the Huarón mine were also characterized by seasonal work with frequent interruptions. This was described to me by Máximo Roque, a native of Huayllay who worked at the company from the 1950s through the 1980s. In the following quote he refers to an earlier period during which his father and other members of his family alternated work at the mine with their participation in the regional barter system:

My father, some of my relatives, they just worked for a few months at a time. In other words, Huarón was like a mother... A mother. They went in, they left, people left the mine, people went in to work some two, three months. They said, I’m going to do a *cachuelito* [odd job or job on the side]. In the winter months.⁵⁶ I’m going to do a *cachuelito*, they said. So then they went [to the mine] for two or three months. December, January, February. Even March for some of them. In April they were already leaving because they had to prepare to go do a barter (*trueque*) with the valleys... In May they had to leave for the potato harvest, taking [their] pots on their llamas.

⁵⁶ People refer to the rainy season as the “winter” (*invierno*), even though nighttime temperatures are actually slightly higher at that time.

In a fashion similar to workers from agricultural zones, Roque's description shows people from Huayllay working in the mine during the rainy season, and then leaving again when it was time for the harvest. Although in Huayllay there was no agriculture, *huayllinos* were still tied to the agricultural calendar because of their exchange relations with areas like the northern highlands of Lima and the *quebradas* of Pasco department. Although local *huayllino* workers were thus in some ways similar to those from more distant areas, the quote above also shows a particularly close relationship with the mine – labor was seasonal, but it was likely to be repeated year after year.

Roque's narrative about his father's time may refer to the early years of industrial mining, that is, after either 1912 (when the French first arrived) or 1918 (when the mine finally went into full production). Or it may refer to the period before that, when the mines in Huayllay were worked on a small scale, under a series of mine owners based in the area. As mentioned earlier, at the time the mines of Huayllay were commonly known by the name Huancavelica (not to be confused with the department of Huancavelica in south-central Peru). During the first decade of the 20th century, according to Velarde, the number of workers in the mines of Huayllay/Huancavelica fluctuated around 45, though it could go as low as 25 or as high as 70 (Ibid., 31). Yet already at this time, mining entrepreneurs and engineers like Velarde were envisioning a much higher level of capital investment, likely coming from outside, and similar to that which had arrived in Cerro de Pasco in 1903 and which would arrive in Huayllay with the *Compagnie des Mines de Huaron* in 1912.⁵⁷ Such an increase in capital investment and in operations was fully justified by the richness of the mineral deposits, but it entailed the need for a much larger labor force, which raised the specter of a labor shortage. Velarde acknowledged that there was already a labor force in the immediate vicinity of the mines: "In Huayllay and its surroundings you can easily get good mining workers, who work under conditions more advantageous for the owner than those of Cerro de Pasco and Yauli⁵⁸" (Ibid. 31). "Advantageous

⁵⁷ In fact, it is likely that Velarde's 1906 report (part of a series of reports prepared over many years by the government's National Mining Engineering Corps), which described the potential of the Huayllay mines in positive terms and highlighted the need for more capital, played a role in attracting the interest of the French investors who later formed the *Compagnie des Mines de Huaron*.

⁵⁸ At the time, references to the mining district of "Yauli" usually referred to the Morococha and Casapalca mines, among the most important in Peru in those days, as well as smaller mines nearby.

conditions” seems to have referred to the fact that labor here was cheaper, probably because it was a more rural area, people were less dependent on mining income, and the demand for labor in the mine had till then been lower. Nevertheless, this was a high-altitude herding area, rather than an agricultural region, so the local population density would not be enough to meet the high labor demands of a larger-scale operation:

Labor in Huancavelica [Huayllay] is very cheap. The peons from the neighboring areas work for fifty cents up to one sol for a workday of 10 hours, with small breaks, and right now it is easy to get people; but for larger-scale operations needing 300 or more peons, it would be necessary to resort to more distant locations; in this case the greatest difficulty would be generating the current [of migrants], since the day’s pay would not increase in any noticeable way. In Cerro de Pasco, hundreds of expert workers are brought from the faraway province of Jauja, through the system of *enganche*, and the average cost of operations has decreased rather than increase, due to the steadiness of the work as well as to the higher output of the workers from Jauja. (Ibid., 39, my translation).

From Velarde’s description it is clear that keeping wages low was an important priority in Peruvian mining at the time (as sources from other mines also indicate). The labor shortage could have the effect of raising wages to a level that was unacceptable to mining entrepreneurs; for this reason, it was necessary to promote active labor recruitment over a wide area, rather than letting the market forces of supply and demand operate in the strictly local labor market. Velarde directed anyone interested in larger-scale operations in the Huayllay mines to look to the example of Cerro de Pasco nearby, where *enganche* was being used.⁵⁹ He also made it clear that the Jauja/Mantaro Valley was the primary area where the mining industry sought out large number of workers for *enganche*. Besides being numerous, already at the time they were seen as being more skilled than people from high-altitude areas like Huayllay; this greater ability could make up for the costs involving in recruiting people over long distances.

After the arrival of the French in 1912, laborers were in demand for the expansion of mine shafts and tunnels and for the construction of the smelter, which went into production in 1918. Thus, industrial-scale operations had only recently started when the decade of the 1920s began. As noted earlier, Flores Galindo saw this decade as having witnessed a shift in the Cerro mines from strictly seasonal migration to migration for a few years at a time. In her discussion of

⁵⁹ Thus, the reason for *enganche* was not just resistance to proletarianization, as several scholars have emphasized, but also the mining industry’s need for cheap labor, as DeWind (1987) has argued.

migration from the villages around Jauja (in the Yanamarca Valley, part of the Mantaro area), Mallon (1983) also sees the 1920s as a point of transition: “If one were to choose a decade in which significant progress was made toward proletarianization it would have to be the 1920s” (254). This is because, although migrants still maintained connections and access to land in their rural villages, many of them were now staying away for years at a time, and some were taking their families with them.

Yet if the 1920s were a period of gradual change in migration patterns to the mines, according to Flores Galindo and Mallon, this process was cut short abruptly by the Depression and the consequent drop in metal prices. In the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, some of the operating units were closed and overall two-thirds of the workforce was laid off between 1929 and 1932 – in response both to the economic crisis and to the first systematic attempt at organizing unions in the mines. At Huarón, the mine had already been closed for 3 years starting in 1925, due to flooding; it reopened in 1928, but only a couple of years later it closed again due to the Depression. In his study of migration from the Mantaro Valley communities of Ataura and Matahuasi, Laite (1981) recounts what happened when the mine closed:

The French-owned Huaron mine closed and its workers also returned to their villages seeking sustenance. Many of them were *enganchados* unable to afford transport, and a long column of workers and their families filed through the Andes on their way back to the Mantaro valley. It was a four-day walk, but many took longer, having to work in the fields by the wayside to earn sustenance for the next day’s march (68).⁶⁰

A similar image of reverse migration from all the mines during the Depression is evoked by Augusto Mateu Cueva, a writer, mineworker and Communist activist from the Mantaro Valley. In a 1940 book of prose poetry, he described the events of 10 years earlier:

Caravans of workers with their wives and children migrate everywhere, carrying their odds and ends on their backs, and followed by their dogs. Yesterday, it was from the countryside to the mine; now it is from the mine to the countryside (40).

⁶⁰ It is not clear what is Laite’s source for this passage. It occurs in the historical background section of his study, but there is no mention to workers from Huarón in the other studies on the history of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation that Laite might have used as sources, such as Flores Galindo (1974), Bonilla (1974) and DeWind (1977). This reference to Huarón probably came from his interviews with former workers in the communities of Ataura and Matahuasi. The date he gives for the closure of the mine is 1933, but this is contradicted by the data provided by Sotomarino (1947), which states that the mine closed in 1930. This makes more sense as it coincides more precisely with the onset of the Depression.

For some communities, the Depression was not only an interruption but also a turning-point. Laite describes the contrasting cases of Ataura and Matahuasi; while the former renewed migration to the mines at the same rate as before once the economy recovered, in Matahuasi mining never recovered the importance it had had before the Depression, as more and more people migrated to Lima rather than to the mines. Thus, already in the 1930s, some Mantaro Valley communities like Matahuasi were beginning to transition away from mining work towards migration to the coast as well as transportation and commerce in the region itself.

Migration from Muquiyauyo to Huarón

However, the Valley as a whole still sent large numbers of workers to the mines in the 1930s and 40s, as the data we presented for Huarón in 1940-42 shows. One particular case deserves special mention: that of migration from the community of Muquiyauyo to the Huarón mine beginning in 1934. This was studied by anthropologist Richard N. Adams as part of his 1949-50 fieldwork in Muquiyauyo, published in his 1959 book *A Community in the Andes: Problems and Progress in Muquiyauyo*. According to Adams, before the Depression the *muquiyauyinos* had worked primarily at the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation – not just in Cerro itself but also in the company's other units such as Morococha and Oroya. But in 1934, between 70 and 90 workers from Muquiyauyo left the CPC mines and switched to Huarón. This case serves to illustrate some of the links between migration, proletarianization, race and class.

Located at the northern end of the Mantaro Valley, near the city of Jauja, Muquiyauyo was well-known in *indigenista* and intellectual circles, where it was regularly described as one of the most developed, progressive and best-organized communities in the Mantaro Valley if not in all of Peru (Castro Pozo 1924, 67; Mariátegui 1952 (1928), 86-87; Tschopik 1947, 46-48; Pulgar-Vidal 1947, 22). Hildebrando Castro Pozo, a socialist, *indigenista* and, for a brief time in the 1920s, the head of the nascent Indian Affairs bureaucracy, was the person who first brought the peculiar features of Muquiyauyo to the public eye. Among these was its complex communal institution – which would obtain official recognition as a *comunidad indígena* but which also fulfilled the functions of a cooperative and an industrial development association. More striking was the fact that in the late 1910s the community had built a small hydroelectric plant, the first in

the Valley, and had begun selling electric power to the city of Jauja, in a reversal of usual urban-rural power relations. The construction of the plant, which occupies an important place in the official memory of the community (Dionisio 1993), was in part financed through the remittances from *muquiyauyinos* working in the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation; certainly the idea for the plant had come from the experience in the mines. The community apparently also had a reputation for left-wing politics,⁶¹ though Adams believed that this was limited to a few young people who had migrated to Lima and were active in José Carlos Mariátegui's political circle (Adams 98-99).

Adams traveled to Huarón and interviewed the *muquiyauyino* workers there, including some who had made the original switch from the CPC mines. When asked why the shift had occurred and why Muquiyauyo had begun sending migrants to the French-owned mine, they gave several reasons. According to them, Huarón had higher pay and better working conditions and vacations; the company sponsored more and better fiestas following customs from the region; there were more opportunities to rise in the company hierarchy than in the CPC mines; also, the first few individuals who made the switch were *muquiyauyinos* with good reputations so the rest followed them. However, Adams suspected there was another reason, related to the others, that was important but was not voiced explicitly (Adams 90-91). Namely, the Huarón company had started by hiring two individuals from Muquiyauyo who were from families that had been socially classed as Indian, rather than mestizo; they were part of a process of upward mobility by which several young people from the former "Indian caste" had acquired professional education in the previous few years (in this case as an accountant and as an engineer). Furthermore, the company hired them not as *obreros* but rather as skilled technicians.

To understand what this meant, we must refer to the historical development of social distinctions in Muquiyauyo as described by Adams.⁶² Muquiyauyo had originated as a settlement that brought together *Huanca* ayllus from the Mantaro Valley with *Yauyos* groups from the

⁶¹ Apparently, President Luis Sánchez Cerro (1931-33) believed Muquiyauyo to be a focus of Communist activity (Adams 99).

⁶² Adams' ethnographic and historical account is fairly rigorous and useful, I believe, for understanding the social changes that took place in one community in the first half of the 20th century. At the same time, one must be critical of the influence of modernization theory evident in his work, as well as of the fact that he mostly ignores the national context, in particular the changes that took place in the 1920s in the legal and bureaucratic framework affecting communities.

highlands of Lima, who had been transported to the area by the Inca. Yet already in the late colonial period a few white/mestizo families had settled in the area and claimed properties. In the 19th century, the town was divided between these two “castes,” with the majority Indians maintaining separate communal authorities and mestizos controlling access to the formal political system, as in much of Peru at the time. This division began to break down in the late 19th century, when a local conflict led to the abolition of the distinctive institutional markers that separated the Indians from the mestizos – the Indian communal lands and the Indian authorities, such as the *alcalde de campo* – at the same time that a few Indians began entering district political offices that had previously been monopolized by the mestizo families. In the early 1900s, a new communal structure began to coalesce among the Indian population, but it eventually came to include the mestizos as well. This became the *comunidad de indígenas* in the 1920s, but was also explicitly conceived as an “industrial community,” due to its role in implementing communal projects such as the hydroelectric plant. Some Indians gained access to more educational opportunities as well as to work in the mines, and differences of dress and language between the two groups began to disappear.

A double movement thus took place – the community gradually became more “mestizo” in the eyes of outsiders, as educational and economic changes took place; after 1943, all births in the parish began to be recorded as mestizo. At the same time, both the former “Indians” and the former “mestizos” were now part of the “indigenous community” (*comunidad de indígenas*) as recognized by the state bureaucracy. A process of social convergence had taken place; yet it was not complete, for class distinctions were emerging between rich and poor community members. Although many individuals of Indian descent had achieved significant social and economic mobility, to some degree the new class distinctions mapped onto the former “caste” division, with mestizos more likely to be at the top. Furthermore, as Adams describes, even in 1949-50 he still noticed that some social distinctions between Indians and mestizos were maintained at occasions like village feasts and work parties.

Thus, in this context, it is easier to see why it might have made a difference that when the Huarón company hired the first two people from Muquiyauyo in 1934, they were professionals from families that had formerly been socially classified as Indian. Many *muquiyauyinos* of

Indian origin had worked in mines before, but they had done so as *obreros*, or manual workers. When a person from Muquiyauyo had risen to a higher position in the mines, it had always been a mestizo. The company's hiring decision in 1934 was almost certainly fortuitous – foreign companies generally did not recognize highland social distinctions unless a very clear phenotypical difference was present. Nevertheless, Adams believed this decision made a big impact on workers from Muquiyauyo, namely those of Indian origin, who consequently saw greater opportunities for upward mobility at Huarón rather than at the CPC. Adams' hypothesis is consistent with Alberti and Sánchez's (1974, 44, 200) argument about the role played by migration to the mines in the alteration of traditional social structures in the Mantaro Valley.

Differences between migratory streams

Adams' study also gives a temporal sense of how by the middle of the 20th century migration to Huarón was abandoning its seasonal nature and becoming more long-term. Of the 25 *muquiyauyinos* he interviewed there, all but one had been working between one and fourteen years, and the majority had been working at the mine between 3 and 8 years. Furthermore, 21 of the 25 had worked at other mines previously (Adams 97). Thus, at least among these workers the gradual development of a more stable working class was clearly underway by 1949. However, this conclusion must be nuanced. Workers from Muquiyauyo and the rest of the Mantaro Valley were obviously not the only workers at Huarón, even at mid-century, as we saw from the archival documents analyzed earlier. The workers from different regions occupied different locations in the workforce hierarchy, and their profile differed as to length of stay and skill level. This is described by Guillermo Flores Pinedo, a Peruvian mining engineer who worked in Huarón for a time and wrote his engineering thesis about the functioning of the mine in 1948. He explains how workers from the Jauja Valley (another name for the Mantaro Valley) tended to be more skilled and work for longer periods:

The majority of *obreros*, especially the *maestros* (master drillers and timbermen) and foremen, are people from the Jauja Valley, very good miners, long-suffering and tough for mining work, whatever may be said against them. This personnel is stable at the Company, remaining there for years and getting trained at the different tasks in the mines, rising from shovel men (*lamperos*) to assistants and later to *maestros* and foremen (Flores 1948, 109).

However, there was another part of the workforce that differed from the other as to length of stay and the kinds of tasks they performed at the mine:

Another [segment of the] workforce is that formed by men from the lower *quebradas* of the department of Pasco, such as Chacayán, Tápuc, Vico, etc., who stay in the job for only a few months, then leave in order to harvest their crops, and then return again, and so they never manage to get ahead, never reaching beyond the level of an assistant (Ibid.).⁶³

Flores' description is geographically consistent insofar as the three communities he names are all in Pasco department. On the other hand, only Chacayán and Tápuc are in the *quebrada* (narrow intramontane valley) zone, while Vicco is actually in the plateau region. His account might not be based on careful ethnographic observation, but at the very least it would have expressed a common perception among the mining engineers at Huarón. He describes a two-tiered workforce – on the one hand, a group of stable workers performing the more skilled jobs, such as master driller or foreman; on the other hand, less stable workers performing the less skilled tasks. In itself, this distinction was not new – it built on a similar division in 19th-century and colonial mining between those who cut into the rock at the mine face and the *apiris* who carried the ore to the surface; only now the variety of tasks and jobs at the mine was of course greater. But attached to this difference in skill levels and tasks performed is a geographical distinction: workers from the Mantaro Valley are at a higher, more skilled tier in the hierarchy, while those from the *quebradas* are at a lower level.

One cannot but detect a tone of judgment in the engineer's description of the second group of workers, unlike the first who are described admiringly as possessing more of an industrial work ethic. The first two communities he names, Chacayán and Tápuc, are part of the *quebrada* of Chaupihuaranga. It could be that his inclusion of the plateau community of Vicco is an error, or it might be that he saw the plateau migrants as being in the same category with the *quebrada* workers rather than with those from the Mantaro Valley. It is likely, furthermore, that the workers from the region of Huánuco – who made up an increasing portion of migrants to Huayllay District by the 1960s and 70s – would have been categorized as being similar to those from Chaupihuaranga communities like Chacayán and Tápuc. As we mentioned earlier, the

⁶³ That is, they remained assistant drillers or assistant timbermen, but never made it to master driller or master timberman.

quebradas of Chaupihuaranga and of southwestern Huánuco share many similar characteristics and in a sense comprise one single agricultural region that straddles departmental borders between Pasco and Huánuco.⁶⁴ This whole area has sent migrants to the mines of Pasco since the 19th century if not before, even if such migration increased greatly in the 20th century. Today, migrants from the *quebradas* (around the Chaupihuaranga and Tingo Rivers as well as Huánuco) comprise a significant portion of the population of the city of Cerro de Pasco. Some of them also work as shepherds for the plateau communities surrounding Cerro. In a reversal of the pattern found in other regions of Peru, here modernity is linked to high altitude, while the lack thereof is associated with the lower-altitude *quebradas*. The Mantaro Valley, on the other hand, is not commonly referred to as a *quebrada*, and is in any case less important as a source of migrants to Pasco today.

Thus, it is not surprising that workers from Huánuco were also seen by at least some as being more closely tied to agriculture and thus lower in the dominant cultural hierarchy. One of my interviewees, the wife of a Huarón worker for several decades, specifically referred to workers from places in southwest Huánuco Department in a derogatory manner. The company had put cables outside the workers' housing, for people to hang their clothes to dry, but someone had stolen the cables during the night. She argued that "those kinds of things" were done by "people from Llata, from Jesús, Dos de Mayo,⁶⁵ those people who have *chacras* (plots of land), who have animals, cattle..." While in a different context this kind of statement about someone possessing land or animals could be construed positively, as an indication of prosperity, in this case she mentioned it while discussing company inspections of workers' housing – a context in which proximity to the agrarian world was usually construed in a negative way, as implying a lack of education and of urban customs. That cultural and educational hierarchies existed among the workers at Huarón – not just between *obreros* and *empleados*, but within the *obrero* category – was stated explicitly by another of my interviewees, even if he did not connect it to geographical origin. Ernesto Blanco, the son of a mining worker who grew up in the Huarón camps in the 1960s and 70s, described it thus:

⁶⁴ For historical interconnections between communities on both sides, see Fonseca (1966).

⁶⁵ I.e. Llata Province, Dos de Mayo Province, and Jesús District within Lauricocha Province, Huánuco Department.

I remember very well, that the Huarón company had classified its workers. There were, for example, workers who were illiterate, who had a low academic level, they were made to live in the Huancavelica camp. Those who were a bit better were made to live in Shiusha. And the *empleados*, who had better preparation, were made to live in Quinientos. Or in San José. So, the people were classified.⁶⁶

From labor shortage to labor surplus

Just as there were changes over time in terms of the areas that workers came from, and the locations that each group of migrants occupied in the mine hierarchy, there were also transformations in the nature of labor recruitment. As we saw earlier, the early 20th century was a period in which labor shortages periodically plagued the mining industry; in general, the dominant industry and state discourse was of a country with a small population and a lack of available workers. This created the need for proactive labor recruitment practices that implied venturing into the villages to obtain workers – in particular through the modality of *enganche*, which in its classic version meant creating a situation of indebtedness as a way of compelling people to work. As DeWind argues, *enganche* was in large part designed to counter the seasonal labor shortages that arose during harvest time (DeWind 1987, 156). The literature on the history of mining in Peru has argued that a decline in the use of *enganche* took place over the course of the first half of the 20th century, paralleling a transition from short-term towards more stable labor. DeWind argues that by the 1920s, anti-*enganche* regulations led to a partial reduction in the practice, or to the use of contractors who themselves probably used *enganche*; yet the system continued to be used for some time. Tracing the precise evolution of the use of *enganche* is complicated by the fact that the disrepute of the system led the mining companies to avoid discussing it or to claim that it was already in the process of being phased out. For example, in his 1917 defense of the mining industry and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, journalist Marcial Helguero y Paz Soldán quoted the general superintendent of the company as simultaneously acknowledging and disowning *enganche*, while announcing its gradual decline.

People have talked a lot about the ‘enganche’ system... There has been the attempt to slander us because we have employed this modality of work with the Indians. But, is it our fault? We did not bring that custom with us. It existed in Peru since time immemorial. We did nothing more than simply put it to good use - at first. Not anymore today, because

⁶⁶ Interview with Ernesto Blanco

it has given us bad results. The company lost over twelve thousand pounds in one year, because the *enganchados* did not fulfill their obligations and left, taking with them the money that they had already received as an advance (Helguero y Paz Soldán 1917, 16).

Helguero y Paz Soldán himself attempted to de-emphasize the prevalence of *enganche*; he countered an early 1920s account by a traveler from the U.S., Edward Ross, who in his book *South of Panama* (quoted in DeWind 1987, 166) stated that around 4,000 out of 7,840 CPC workers were *enganchados*. Helguero presented *enganche* as the exception rather than the rule:

All the work is currently done by ‘maquepueros’ (free workers), and it is only during periods of great labor shortage that workers in Jauja and the nearby districts are sought out, and given an advance for the train trip... The need to employ people from the outside is gradually decreasing, and, as I said earlier, a race of miners is being formed, little by little, one that does not need to be begged to serve this Company...” (Ibid. 17).

Helguero’s account may be seen as propaganda for the company, and its basis in reality questioned, or it may also in part reflect the particular characteristics of the city of Cerro de Pasco (on which it is focused), where ‘a race of miners’ had indeed been forming for much longer than at other mining centers, i.e. since at least the 19th century. At other mines the process took longer, and *enganche* persisted for many years. Bonilla (1974) quotes a report by an *enganchador* (labor recruiter) travelling through the Mantaro Valley in 1946, recruiting for the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. He reports having heard that “‘in all these towns and others of the province there are many individuals in charge of recruiting to work at Pachacayo, Huarón, Castrovirreina, Río Pallanga and mines of the south” (Bonilla 45).

On the one hand, at Huarón, U.S. anthropologist Harry Tschopik wrote that in Huayllay District, which he visited briefly in 1947, “all go to the mines voluntarily, since the system of *enganche* is said not to exist in this area” (Tschopik 1947, 52). On the other hand, in his 1948 thesis about Huarón, cited earlier, engineer Guillermo Flores Pinedo wrote:

To obtain the labor, especially for the shovel men (*lamperos*), the system of recruitment through *enganche* is used, in which an individual – someone who knows the region – recruits the workers for the Company, receiving a commission for that service. (Flores 1948, 109)

Another engineer, Celso Sotomarino, who like Flores worked at Huarón for a time and wrote his thesis about it in 1949, used the term *enganchar* while discussing the problem of labor shortages:

In the Huarón company there are many work sections paralyzed for this reason [labor shortage], even though the company pays employees in the most populated and proximate locations, such as Cerro de Pasco, Huánuco, Canta, Junín and Huancayo, who have as their mission to *enganchar* workers (Sotomarino 1949, 77).

However, the use of the term *enganche* does not necessarily imply that the system continued in its classic form. *Enganche* had never referred to just one standard form of labor contracting, but rather could mean recruiting in general – as we mentioned earlier, in the mid-19th century it often referred to military recruiting. Although there are many accounts that show that *enganche* often functioned through debt in the early 20th-century mines and sugar plantations, by the 1940s in popular usage it may simply have come to refer to any time that agents went around looking for workers. This is how it seems to be used in Flores Pinedo’s brief definition quoted above. The “hook” of debt may still have played a role, but in general the aspects of the system that had most resembled debt peonage in the late 19th century were probably very limited by the middle of the 20th. A definitive study of *enganche* in the mines – which would imply working with archival sources produced by the contractors themselves, as well as certain local archives – has not yet been conducted.

In any case, what is shown by the two engineers’ accounts, as well as the one quoted by Bonilla, is that labor shortages continued to be enough of a problem that proactive recruiting was still necessary. Indeed, this is explicitly acknowledged in Sotomarino’s account, which sounds very similar to earlier views about labor shortage, even if it also mixes in his own critique of the low salaries:

CMH [Compagnie des Mines de Huaron] is no exception to the well-known phenomenon of labor shortage that currently afflicts all the mining companies. And this circumstance is made worse by the fact that it has as its neighbors other companies that constitute competition in this crisis [of labor shortage], and besides the fact that the salaries are not in accordance with the intensity of the effort that the mining worker must exert. The problem of labor shortage evidently has to do with two main factors: the shortage of population from which Peru as a whole suffers, and [the fact] that since agriculture is the basis of the life of the inhabitant of our highlands, it draws many hands [*brazos*, “arms”] away from mining, especially during the time of the potato harvest (Sotomarino 1949, 76).

This late-19th/early-20th century discourse about labor shortage was thus still common among mining engineers (and other professionals) as late as the 1940s. It was not limited to engineers

working in Huarón or in the Central Highlands for that matter. For example, in 1949 engineer Eloy Yépez wrote very similarly about the situation at his workplace, the Ccochasayhuas mine, a small-to-medium gold mine owned by the Banco Wiese (a Peruvian banking house) and located in Apurímac Department in southern Peru. Unlike Huarón, Ccochasayhuas was not part of a larger mining region, and did not have to compete for workers with other mines, yet in Yépez's view it still suffered from the same problem of labor shortage:

The problem of manpower, common to the country as a whole, especially in the mining industry, does not spare Ccochasayhuas. During the times of planting and harvesting, absenteeism is very accentuated, leading to a critical situation in the work inside the mine, and creating distressing conditions for sustaining the production of the mineral (Yépez 1949, 52).

Furthermore, he added that “the exploration of new areas has had to be limited due to the lack of workers, or else it has been paralyzed entirely whenever the scarcity of people was most acute” (Ibid., 30).

However, the relationship between labor supply and demand, whether in actual reality or in engineers' perceptions, was about to change. Although numerous scholars have described the increasing person/land ratio in the highlands in the first half of the 20th century, and although, as Contreras writes, the “demographic explosion” in 20th century Peru has its roots in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,” these trends did not become widely evident to observers until the 1940s (Contreras 2004, 213). The massive migration from the highlands to the coast, in particular to Lima, in the 1940s, 50s and 60s – similar to rural-urban migration in many Third World countries at the time – impressed upon elites the notion that the country was changing dramatically. Laments about a “lack of hands” were replaced by cultural anxieties about the decline of the old order and its hierarchies, and about the “invasion” of the coast by highlanders (whereas before the question had been how to attract them to work in modern coastal agriculture). Not only was population growing, but the decline of traditional economies and the stagnation of prices for agricultural food products as a result of import policies (Long and Roberts 2001 [1984], 104-108) meant that, in the highlands as a whole, more people in rural areas were willing to seek work in highland mines or coastal plantations. References to labor shortages as such disappeared from the record, at least as far as modern sectors like industrial mining or coastal agriculture were concerned. Over the course of the second half of the 20th century, under

the influence not only of evidence of domestic population growth but also of transnational population control discourses, it would become commonplace in Peru to describe the country as being overpopulated rather than lacking in people as had been the case until mid-century.⁶⁷

In the mines, at least in the more modern ones, the mid-century was a point of inflexion not only in terms of the supply, but also of the demand for labor. For the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, DeWind sees this moment as beginning the era of “the mechanization of production” (1987, 64). After pressuring the Peruvian government into issuing an investment-friendly mining code in 1950, the company began a program designed to reverse the declining trend in its rate of profit by increasing worker productivity through capital-intensive projects. These included the introduction of open-pit mining – first in Toquepala (a joint venture between CPC and ASARCO) and, beginning in the late 1950s, in the company’s original mining site at Cerro de Pasco. At the CPC’s underground mines, where the nature of the deposits was not amenable to open-pit mining, a series of new technologies were introduced that tripled worker productivity between 1954 and 1969, even if it continued to lag far behind that of the open pits (DeWind 1987, 96). This process of underground mechanization intensified after 1967 when trackless mining was introduced at the CPC’s new underground mine, Cobriza. Over the next few years, the new technology would find its way into most medium-scale mines of the Central Highlands. All this increased the capital/labor ratio, required more skill from workers and limited the demand for labor. As DeWind writes for the CPC,

As the technology required more specialized skills, the company imposed more impersonal and restrictive criteria to determine who would be hired. Prior to the 1950s, the company’s recruitment of laborers had been almost entirely unselective. (194)

Similarly, based on his interviews with Cerro de Pasco Corporation executives in 1960, Bourricaud (1961) describes the company’s new attitude towards its workforce: “The labor policy is commanded by three rules: Do not fire, do not hire, train as much as possible the labor already employed” (37). “Do not fire” was more of a necessity imposed on the company both by the increase in union demands after 1956 – with labor stability gaining importance among

⁶⁷ This discourse – common to many third-world countries - was one of several factors that helped to create the conditions for aggressive birth control programs such as the forced sterilizations of the 1990s (at a time when birth rates were actually already declining).

workers' foremost concerns – and by new government policies that did not look well upon the dismissal of workers. These pressures in turn made it more imperative to limit the hiring of new workers and instead focus on improving the productivity and qualifications of existing workers. Although mining companies frequently exaggerated the constraints imposed on them by unions and by government policies, it cannot be denied that this was a factor, alongside technological change and the mechanization of production.

This multilayered process cannot be assumed to have been uniform at all the mines in Peru. Even among the different mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation there were significant differences in the level of mechanization and productivity, and the CPC as a whole lagged behind the new Southern Peru Copper Corporation (of which CPC owned a part) (DeWind 1987, 115-116). Huarón also lagged behind the CPC in terms of technological change; to this day, workers who have experience in the different mines in the area do not consider Huarón to be one of the most advanced (in comparison, for example, to the Milpo mine). However, Huarón also saw technical changes and efforts at improving productivity and the quality of the workforce rather than expanding the quantity of laborers. A 1954 thesis by an engineer working in the mine shows that these ideas were already circulating at this time. Whereas only 5 years earlier his colleague Celso Sotomarino had lamented the prevalence of labor shortages, now engineer Juan Hoyos Castillo focused on the negative impact of unstable labor on the workers' level of skill; one of his suggestions for the Huarón company was aimed in this direction:

Stability of labor, at the present time there is little in the way of specialized personnel, because of their short duration on the job; this problem could be solved by improving the conditions of life, principally as far as housing is concerned, and giving more facilities to the workers (Hoyos 1954, 170).⁶⁸

But at Huarón these changes took place at a slower pace than at the CPC. Bourricaud, who visited both companies in 1960, emphasized the differences and similarities between the two:

⁶⁸ The narrative portions of these theses by engineers working at Huarón should not be interpreted as being exact representations either of company policy or of the reality of the workforce (unlike when they provide technical data, which was usually copied from company documents). Rather, they simply show us what ideas and discourses were circulating among engineers at the time.

Since many years ago, the ‘Cerro de Pasco’ [Corporation] was trying to make its workforce sedentary, whereas Huarón, for example, did not worry over a very elevated turnover. But as the need for more qualified workers begins to be felt, the company that pays the cost of their training seeks to preserve them for itself and to have them at hand (Bourricaud 1967, 92).

Like the CPC, Huarón took advantage of the drop in world metal prices in the late 1950s to begin to limit the size of its workforce. As Bourricaud noted in 1961, in 10 years the company had doubled its production, yet the number of *obreros* had been reduced from around 2000 in 1954 to slightly under 1800 in 1959 (Bourricaud 1961, 348). At the same time, however, the number of *empleados*⁶⁹ had risen from 228 to 313, indicating the beginnings of an effort to shift resources from the less skilled towards the more skilled end of the workforce. The size of the labor force did not increase again after this; rather, it continued to gradually decrease, so that by 1979 there were 1003 *obreros*, 257 *empleados* and 57 upper level *staff*, making for a total direct workforce of 1317 (Calderón 1979, 22). This downward trend continued in the 1980s, so that by 1987 the company’s report to shareholders stated a total workforce of 1,125, of whom only 844 were *obreros*. By this time, the causes of the workforce reduction were not only mechanization but also the crisis of the Peruvian mining industry in the 1980s, which kept the company from hiring new workers.⁷⁰ Also, the figures given here are for direct, payroll workers only, and do not include those employed by subcontracting firms. Subcontracting had been common in the early part of the 20th century, but it returned to prominence in the last few decades of the century, so that by the 1970s and 80s union leaders saw it as a growing problem. At the same time that those employed directly by the company had developed into a stable, unionized workforce, a parallel subcontracted sector had emerged as a form of competition. After the mass departures of stable workers in the early 1990s, as in other mines, subcontracting increased dramatically, as did the use of temporary contracts even among direct workers; by 2009, only 30% of the workforce consisted of stable, payroll workers.

⁶⁹ Again, *obreros* and *empleados* were the two “castes” in Peruvian labor (to use D.S. Parker’s term), with separate legal regimes governing labor relations, health insurance and pension plans. The two categories corresponded in part, though not completely, to the U.S. terms “blue collar” (*obreros*) and “white collar” (*empleados*).

⁷⁰ Finally, the early 1990s saw hundreds of workers leave Huarón, under pressure from the company at a time when many other companies were actually closing altogether.

Thus, the late 1950s were a point of inflection, when a reduction occurred in the total workforce, after which no return to previous levels would occur at the Huarón company, like at many other mines. If subcontracting could theoretically leave the total labor demand unaffected, that was not true for mechanization, which replaced some workers with machines and required the others to stay more years on the job so as to learn to be able to handle the new technologies. This occurred at the same time that the labor supply was on the increase. In this way, the era of labor shortages and of active recruitment ended at Huarón, as in most other mines of the Central Highlands.⁷¹

The memory of the previous period of labor shortage, and its contrast with the situation today, emerged spontaneously in several of my conversations and interviews in Huayllay, showing that there is local awareness of this historical transition. Blanca Chávez,⁷² a native of Huaychao – the other village in Huayllay District – told me about her father’s experience working in the mine. Before becoming part of the stable, unionized workforce (from which he retired in 1980) her father had worked seasonally. At that time, she said, people would leave and then they would be much sought after - the company would seek them out to return to work (*a veces volvían hasta rogaditos a trabajar*). They would “return, then leave, then return.” In its emphasis on the seasonal nature of work and the constant turn-over characteristic of times past, Blanca’s comment is similar to Máximo Roque’s account quoted earlier. However, she also highlights the fact that the company had to ask people to return to the mine; in colloquial usage, the term *rogadito* (from *rogar*, to beg or implore) implies being sought out, being in demand.

Another of my interviewees, Vicente Morales, used the same term when describing the way working in the mine used to be in the old days. Now in his sixties, he worked for sixteen years in the nearby Río Pallanga mine, before returning to Huayllay, his hometown, and settling down as a baker. Before that, his father had worked at Huarón. I had asked Mr. Morales a

⁷¹ For the sugar industry of the northern coast, which had relied on *enganche* of workers from the highland department of Cajamarca, this transition occurred around the same time or a bit later. In her study of Cajamarca, Deere (1990) writes of “the generation of surplus labor in the highlands in relation to job opportunities” and “the generation of surplus labor in relation to the opportunities for employment in the coast” as having occurred by the 1970s (266-267). Similarly, Scott (1976) writes of “the secular decline in demand for highland labor on the part of the sugar plantations” (338-339) and argues that “the system of *enganche* finally disappeared for the recruitment of cane cutters in the Departments of La Libertad and Lambayeque in the early 1960s” (336).

⁷² Pseudonym

question about the clay pots that *huayllinos* used to make and exchange for agricultural products from the valleys. He explained that this was “for the livelihood of each community member;”⁷³ it was an important part of the household economy – “we lived from that.”⁷⁴ When the mining company arrived, “all that was abandoned; because now there was [an activity] from which to eat.”⁷⁵ In other words, in his narration, mining appears as the activity that replaces the pottery craft as the source of supplementary income for the household. In fact, it was such an ample source of employment that the company actually needed more people:

The company even went looking for people. There weren't a lot of people. For example if I was absent [from work] today, already the next day they were coming [for me], “why don't you work,” like that. It was *rogadito*.

When I asked him to explain more what he meant, Mr. Morales emphasized that he was talking mainly about the earlier period, when his father was working at Huarón:

I know that from when I was a child. When my father, my father always, sometimes, when there was some important occasion [*compromiso*], he would not go [to work]. The next day the foreman was already arriving [makes sound of knocking on door]: “Why hadn't you come to work, let's go. From the moment you start to work you will earn your *tarea* [payment for task completed],” he said. He would go in at 9 or 10 in the morning. He would work until 4 or 5 in the afternoon, and done, he had earned his *tarea*.

This passage mentions something that other people also told me was a common phenomenon in the old days: the *huayllinos*, who were close to their village (unlike the workers who had migrated from farther away), would attend special events like weddings or community feasts, and then not return to work when they were supposed to. Here the company is portrayed as tolerant of this fact because it was so much in need of people. Mr. Morales furthermore contrasts this with the present:

And now to enter the company, there are a lot of things required, exams, everything. Of the lungs, of the heart, sight, everything. Now it's a lot of medical exams (*chequeo*) to go in to work. But not back then. People skipped work, they kept working, they skipped work, they kept working. Now when someone skips work they kick them out right away.

⁷³ “*Para sostenimiento de cada comunero*”

⁷⁴ “*Con eso vivíamos pues.*”

⁷⁵ “*Ya allí todo eso se ha dejado. Porque ya había pues de donde comer*”

Here he emphasizes the barriers to employment that exist today, in particular the medical exams that young people looking for work in the mine must go through. Also, the company can now afford to be much stricter with people who miss work. The increase in work discipline over time is something that is widely known and discussed in mining areas like Huayllay. While sometimes it is explained as due to changes in ownership of a particular mine (for example, in Cerro de Pasco, from state back to private ownership in the 1990s), in Mr. Morales' account the reduced tolerance for absenteeism is directly tied to changes in the balance between labor supply and demand.

A similar comparison between past and present was drawn by Octavio, a man who had moved from Tarma, where he had worked in a cement plant before studying in the university in Cerro de Pasco and then moving to Huayllay, where he was my neighbor for a time. He told me how “in the time of the French” the mine owners and managers had to go looking for workers. They would go through the countryside, and when they saw a shepherd, they would tell him to come work, and they would give him food and supplies (*viveres*) as an advance, in that way the shepherd would be motivated to work. But now, Octavio said, that has changed, now people have to go looking for the engineers and practically beg them for a job. Also, before people were afraid of the mine, it was terrifying to them. Now they are used to it, “it’s like their house.” Octavio directly mentioned the advance payment in the form of goods that was one classic feature of *enganche*. He also included as part of his account the change in people’s attitudes towards the mine – an increased desire to work there and a heightened disposition to mining work, even when now it is more difficult to find a job. In his case, however, he preferred not to work in the mine – there you could perhaps earn a good salary, he said, but you stayed at the same level and did not advance. Instead, he was trying to start his own *contrata* (contracting firm) to provide transportation to the mining company.

Lastly, Edgar Urbina,⁷⁶ a young man who like Blanca Chávez was a *comunero* of Huaychao, and who was occupying a position of authority in the village municipality (*centro poblado menor*⁷⁷) at the time I met him, also spoke explicitly about the change that had occurred

⁷⁶ Pseudonym

from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. This was in response to my question about whether there were older people in Huaychao who had worked in the mine in times past:

Before, our elders told us that they used to seek them out to get them to work. But not any more. Now they have to have two years of experience. Yes, in all [the companies], that's at the national level. And if you don't manage to do that, if you don't have two years' experience, how are we going to enter into the mine? It's very hard.

I asked him to explain in more detail what he meant about people being "sought after" for work:

Yes, because in the mine there were few people that wanted to work. In other words, there was greater quantity, or more of a chance to work back then. Also demographically we were few, so there was more of a chance. I have heard that from our old people... Now one has to look for [a job]. If you go for a job, there will be, for one single position, 10 or 15 people applying.

Like Vicente Morales, Edgar Urbina emphasizes the barriers that have arisen to keep young people from the locality from obtaining employment at the mine easily. In his case, he focuses not on health and physical exams but rather on the two years' experience requirement commonly found in the mines today, as well as on the competition for each position.

Thus, the transition from labor shortage to labor surplus not only appears in the documents, rather it is also something of which many local people are explicitly aware. This historical transformation was the product of several factors: mechanization, population growth, and the decline of other local and regional economic activities such as cattle-raising and crafts (in Huayllay district itself) and agriculture (in many of the regions that sent workers to the mine). The increase in labor supply and the decrease in labor demand does not mean that mining wages are now lower than they were in the early 20th century. Although the supply-and-demand mechanism is no doubt a real force in the determination of prices (including the price of labor power), it is only one of several factors. Another factor that is equally and probably more important is the social determination of the needs of workers and their families, which shape the value of labor-power and which, as Marx pointed out, contain a "historical and moral element" having to do with "habits and expectations" (Marx 1976, 275). A closely related factor is the degree to which people become directly dependent on the capitalist economy for their livelihood

⁷⁷ Since the 1990s, certain villages which are not important enough to be the district seat are nevertheless elevated to the category of *centro poblado menor*, which means they have their own mayor – previously, the term "mayor" (*alcalde*) was only used for the district or provincial authority. The mayor of a *centro poblado menor* usually has much less in the way of funds and political authority than a district or provincial mayor.

and social/cultural reproduction, rather than having it merely as a complement to a non-capitalist sphere.

Although a nationwide phenomenon, the transition highlighted here takes different forms in different places. The mining workforce at the Huarón mine was progressively reduced during the second half of the 20th century and then drastically cut in the 1990s, culminating in the temporary closure of the mine as a result of the 1998 flood that inundated both Huarón and Animón and killed 6 workers. In Huayllay, the 1990s were a time of crisis and unemployment, when many people left the district looking for work elsewhere. Since 2002, the rise in metal prices - which has aided the reopening of Huarón under a new administration, as well as the expansion of operations at the formerly small Animón mine (which is now comparable in scope to Huarón) - has to some degree masked the long-term trend discussed here. In 2009, there were around 1500 individuals employed at the Huarón mine, of whom around 30% were stable, payroll workers, another 30% were on the company payroll but on temporary contracts, and 40% were subcontracted. At the immediately adjacent Animón mine, according to one company official with whom I spoke in 2010, there were between 1700 and 1800 people working at any one time, of whom around 400 were on the company payroll and the rest worked for one of 67 contractors. Nevertheless, the condition of labor surplus is widely noted in Huayllay, even during a mining boom such as the one that has taken place over the last decade. Even if more people are working in mining in the district than ever before, the population is also much greater. Mechanization creates the need for a highly diversified workforce, segmented according to levels of skill and training. In such a context, among many local people there is a deeply felt sense of being excluded not just from work in general but in particular from the more skilled jobs. If in the 1950s and 60s the company attempted to keep workers longer in order to train them, today Huarón and Animón, like other mining companies in the region, expect to be able to hire workers who are already trained, without having to bear the cost of such training – thus the two years' experience requirement. This is true also for mining contractors, who perform much of the work at the two mines in Huayllay District – and who, unlike the main companies, are under much less pressure to hire local people (since they are less subject to land-for-jobs pressure from the community).

Thus, although the area was undergoing a “boom period” at the time of my research, and although many local people did work at the two mines, there was a widespread sense that gaining access to a good job at the companies was difficult. The mining companies no longer sent labor recruiters out to the field; rather, they or their contractors hired skilled operators from different locations (Huayllay itself, Cerro de Pasco, Huancayo, Lima) who applied on their own. At most, when they needed a particular type of operator on short notice, the contractors might put a flyer on a light post or on one of the outdoor bulletin boards where people in Cerro go looking for jobs. Rather than the company trying to convince people in Huayllay itself to come work at the mine, the community had to pressure the mine to sign *convenios* or agreements in which the company agreed to take on a certain number of community members (*comuneros*) as workers.

On the other hand, the effects of mechanization on labor demand at underground mines like Huarón are less dramatic than in open-pit mines. The most important technological change in underground mines was the introduction of trackless mining, which in Huarón took place beginning in the 1970s. This and other changes at that time reduced the demand for labor, certainly, but in the years since there have not been transformations in the productive process that were as significant. In underground mines, the 1990s saw the collapse of labor unions, the changes in labor laws and the consolidation of the subcontracting system, but not a new technological revolution. The difference in labor requirements between underground and open-pit mines, on the other hand, is dramatic. The technological leap of the “new mining” that emerged in Peru after the 1990s has consisted precisely of the proliferation of new open-pit mining projects, so that they comprise a higher proportion of total capital invested in mining than before. In open-pit mining areas the labor requirements are much lower and the sense of labor surplus is therefore greater. The ability of companies to diffuse local conflicts by offering jobs at the mine is thus lower in comparison to underground mines like Huarón, even if it is also limited in the latter. Also, although in Huayllay district there is a sense of exclusion from the more skilled jobs, it’s less intense than in areas where people have little or no previous mining experience and thus find it harder to convince a new company to give them jobs.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ In this paragraph I am comparing Huayllay to places like Espinar (Tintaya mine) and Cotabambas/Grau (Las Bambas mine), where I have done a small amount of fieldwork. In both places, a large open-pit project entered into

Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided an overview of the main structural aspects of the formation of the mining workforce in the Central Highlands of Peru in the 20th century. I have done so through a specific focus on the Huarón mine but with a secondary focus on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and, to some degree, the rest of the Peruvian mining industry. The reasons for focusing on labor are several. First, as stated in the introduction, issues of labor have largely been left aside in recent studies of mining in Peru, both in their historical and contemporary aspects. Second, the twentieth century was a time in which, in Peru as in many other countries, labor constituted a central site of intervention by governments as well as political activists. The “labor state” described by Drinot (2011) for early-20th century Peru was one manifestation of this. Third, in the specific local setting analyzed in this chapter – Huayllay - the mining camps constituted the demographic center of the district during much of the century. Thus, it was partly around the labor link with the company that much of the “local community” constituted itself at the time – which does not mean that there weren’t other, parallel communities such as the *comunidad campesina*, which I have also examined.

In the first section of the chapter, I discussed some of the long-term aspects of labor recruitment in mining in the Central Andes, and discussed what is meant by modern industrial mining in Peru. I then introduced the local setting of the district of Huayllay, where the Huarón mine is located, and which provides much of the evidence for this dissertation. In the third section of this chapter I examined the long-term trends and dynamics of migration and the formation of the workforce in the mines of central Peru. I tried to maintain a balance between a specific local focus on Huarón, a wider regional lens on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, and a broader national perspective.

As stated in the introduction and in the fourth section, one of the main arguments of this chapter is that there was a transition from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus in Peruvian mining in the 20th century. To some degree, this was the case in other modern, capital-intensive sectors of the Peruvian economy as well, namely export-oriented agriculture. This

an area with very limited previous experience in mining; thus, the number of local people who had previous training in mining jobs was much less than in Huayllay.

transition is also illustrative of broader, interrelated tendencies present in capitalism worldwide, such as the development of the reserve army of labor and the switch from absolute to relative surplus-value (through technological change). However, these trends take particular forms in different parts of the world. In Peru, as in the mining regions of southern Africa, the shortage of labor in the early 20th century had to do with the persistence of traditional economies and the resulting relative weakness of push factors from the countryside (at least when compared to the classic case of English industrialization). Also, it is important to point out that the phenomenon described by the sources was a shortage of the kind of labor the companies wanted – abundant, low-wage and, importantly, year-round labor. Similarly, the labor surplus found today is not unlike that found in most capitalist economies, but it has particular characteristics in Peru and in the mining areas described in this chapter. Compared to the industrialized countries, in rent-dependent mineral-exporting nations like Peru there are obviously fewer industry jobs overall in the economy; in that sense there is the potential for a greater labor surplus. However, on the other hand, due to the somewhat lesser advance of capitalist relations of production, there are more opportunities in petty commodity production, commerce and what’s commonly called the “informal sector.” And, in the particular area described in this chapter – Huayllay District and the rest of the Pasco/Junín plateau – there is some access to land, for many people though not for everyone, through the institution of the *comunidad campesina*. There are also differences, as described, between the kind of labor surplus found in an underground mining area like Huayllay and an open-pit mining project. Thus, there are historical and regional specificities that go beyond the overall tendencies of capitalist production.

Chapter II

MINING AND WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In the previous chapter I examined the main long-term trends and dynamics in the formation of the workforce in the mines of Peru in the 20th century, with a particular focus on the Huarón mine and the Central Highlands more broadly. In this chapter I switch from the long-term dynamics of migration towards the topic of work itself. In this first section I provide a brief overview of the nature of mining work during the 20th century, with a focus on work methods and dynamics as well as mine accidents. I then switch to a more narrative mode as I discuss the life histories of four mining workers at the Huarón mine as well as one individual who did not work at the mine but was closely involved with the mine workforce. Since these accounts are based on my conversations with living individuals, they naturally shift the discussion towards the latter decades of the 20th century (thus providing in a sense a preview of some of the issues discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6).

In the third section of this chapter, I switch to a theoretical examination of an issue that is particularly important to the social history of migrant labor and extractive industries in agricultural and rural societies, but also to the study of labor in advanced capitalism as well: the nature of work involved in the reproduction of labor-power, in particular household labor, and its relationship to value production in capitalism. Finally, in the last section of this chapter I return to a concrete and historical mode, as I examine issues related to the reproduction of labor-power in the mines of the Central Highlands of Peru in the 20th century. First I review the relationship between mining and rural production, and how the latter performed much of the work necessary for the reproduction of labor-power in mining, as was emphasized by DeWind (1987). I then examine the gender division of labor and household work in the mines of the Central Highlands and in the Huarón mine in particular.

Technology and production

As mentioned earlier, during the first few years after its founding in 1912, the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron built a hydroelectric power system, a narrow-gauge railway (which replaced llama transport) and installations such as offices and workers' housing. A smelter was also completed in 1918, but it was always said to have never worked up to full expectations, and it was abandoned in the late 1920s. In the 1930s the Huaron company (like the CPC) expanded its focus from copper to lead and zinc; a Differential Flotation Plant was built in that decade, and the modern concentrator plant took over in 1957. In terms of the actual extraction of ore from the ground, the first few years were devoted to expanding and deepening the tunnels and galleries used by the previous owners (the small Concordia and Venus companies, formed by mineowners from Cerro de Pasco) as well as earlier miners. The first few reports to stockholders testify to the challenges posed by flooding as shafts were dug deeper than ever before, and to the role that the generation and use of electric power played in solving this and other problems, as well as in allowing mechanical perforation.⁷⁹ As DeWind (1987) describes for the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, the four most important types of machinery in those early years were compressed air drills, slushers, hoisting winches and pumps, all of them powered by electricity (DeWind 1987, 44):

On the basis of the new technology, mining became an integrated and continuous activity. The processes of extraction, concentration, smelting and refining were maintained 24 hours a day as each stage fed into the next... The major source of energy driving the entire system was electricity (Ibid., 40-41).

Like the larger CPC, the Huaron company harnessed the water resources in its immediate vicinity in order to generate electricity. Some power was also generated through the use of coal,

⁷⁹ In the words of the 1914 report (on the 1912-1913 period), three years before electric power became available, "our horizontal labors have continued without difficulty, but our work downwards has been hampered, then slowed, then halted at 16 meters below the old workings, by a rise in the water level beyond the abilities of the necessarily rudimentary means of drainage that we have at present" (CMH, Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 27 Mars 1914, p.4; my translation). In its 1917 report, the company noted that "the absence of power during the previous year has not allowed us to push forward very actively" inside the mine. However, the hydroelectric plant had finally been completed at the end of 1917; its purpose was to "provide the power necessary for mechanic perforation, for ventilation and drainage of the mine, for the lighting of the houses in our mining camp, etc.... Since the closure of this year [1916] and the completion of the hydroelectric plant at Francois, which has allowed us to make use of mechanical perforation, the development of the mine has been pursued vigorously" (CMH, Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 11 Mai 1917, p.4; my translation).

especially for use by the smelter. Although there were many similarities between the two companies, Huarón's operations were necessarily on a smaller scale and developed at a slower pace. That was even truer of the other, smaller Peruvian-owned mines of the early 20th-century.

As is well-known, industrial mining tends to have one of the most male-dominated workforces of any sector of the economy. This is not necessarily the case for artisanal, informal or small-scale mining, particularly of gold; there, women play a significant role to this day, working alongside men. However, historically, when mining work has come to involve going underground, cutting into the rock and carrying heavy ores, the association of mining with masculinity has come to be taken for granted. In the early years of industrial mining at Huarón and similar mines in central Peru, women did play certain roles directly in the productive process. In particular, before concentrator plants became common, the separation of high-grade from low-grade ore was done by hand. This step in production, known as *pallaqueo* in Peru, took place on the surface outside the mine entrance. It served to prevent the low-grade ore from being included in the shipments to the processing mills, which would have been uneconomical – whether such shipments were carried by animals, as in the early days, or, later, over railroads. This work was traditionally done by women, old men and children. Contreras writes of how in 19th-century Cerro de Pasco women had been in high demand to work as *pallaquies* (Contreras 1988, 108). Similarly, Cerro de Pasco Corporation official B.T. Colley wrote of how a large plant for handpicking ores existed in Cerro de Pasco in the early 1920s. The company had constructed a concentrator plant, but there was opposition to this as the hand-picking method was preferred, so that first concentrator was closed down (Colley 24). As late as 1930, when Communist Party organizer Jorge del Prado arrived in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's Morococha mine, the first job he got was in *pallaqueo*, at the picking plant.⁸⁰

At Huarón, there are reports that handpicking was used in the early days, as was common at the time. This old practice continued even after the construction of the company's copper smelter in 1918, since the latter could function with high-grade ores only. However, already by the 1930s many or most of the people engaged in *pallaqueo* or hand-picking would have been

⁸⁰ Del Prado actually worked alongside old men in *pallaqueo*, but he still attributes the term to the Quechua word for old woman, *palla*.

displaced by the construction of the first flotation plant for concentrating ore; it is likely that many of them were women, although I do not have direct evidence on that fact for Huarón. Such displacement of hand-pickers did not take place in all mines at once; it depended on the scale of operations and their degree of technological advancement. For example, in 1949 the Ccochasyhuas gold mine in southern Peru still employed around 50 *pallaqueras* (gendered feminine and thus, almost certainly, mostly women) who worked 8 hours daily in a yard (*cancha*) located in the bottom of a dewatered lake; they picked out gold ore from old mineral wastes that had been discarded by miners since colonial times but which had become recoverable under modern processing techniques (Yépez 1949, 52-53). Similarly, Nash (1979) reports that in the San José mine in Oruro, Bolivia, over 250 women were fired when the concentration plant was installed in 1967; they were replaced by 17 male operators (Nash 197). Nor was handpicking the only possible job that could be done by women in 20th-century industrial mining; Thede (1982) reports that in the early days of the Milpo mine in Pasco Department (in the mid-century) women were employed in sewing sacks for carrying the ore, but this was later discontinued (Thede 5-6).

Beyond the sphere of direct production, women were certainly employed as office workers, teachers and, beginning in the 1950s, social workers. However, from at least the 1930s onwards, when discussing the workforce engaged directly in production at a medium-sized industrial mine like Huarón, we are talking primarily about male workers. I have not found references to women employed in production at the mine, as *pallaquires* or in another capacity, in either the local archives of the *Juzgado de Paz* (which often, though not always, list individuals' occupations) or in the engineers' reports and company annual reports that I have examined.

The most common method used in underground mining in 20th-century Peru has been overhand cut-and-fill (*corte y relleno ascendiente*). As DeWind shows, it was already used in the CPC mines in the early 1900s (Ibid., 46-48). In spite of the many changes that have taken place in terms of machinery, overhand cut-and-fill is still by far the dominant method used in Huarón, as I saw during my visit to the underground mine in 2009 (although sub-level caving methods

were expected to become more important there in the future).⁸¹ The overhand cut-and-fill method means working upwards from one level to the one above, knocking out or blasting the ore and letting it fall to the lower level, from where it is removed; most of the empty space (stope) is then filled in with waste rock so that work can continue above. For much of the 20th century (unlike in the present), this method involved the work not just of drill operators but also of shovel men and timbermen. Furthermore, whereas today scoop loaders and dump trucks are used to carry the ore from the stope to the concentrator plant, until the 1970s this was done via small railway cars that went all around the mine. In his 1949 mining engineering thesis based on his experience working at the Huarón mine, Sotomarino (1949) writes that overhand cut-and-fill was used in most of the mine at the time, but the alternative method of square-set stoping (*cuadros de stope*) was used in the Travieso section, due to the specific characteristics of that copper-rich area. Sotomarino also describes what he saw as the typical sequence followed by an imaginary *obrero* who went to Huarón looking for work in the 1940s, without previous mining experience:

When he comes looking for work, he will come before the Chief Foreman, who, on realizing that our man does not yet know anything, will assign him to be an shovel man on the surface [*lampero de superficie*]. Tempted by the slight improvement in salary that it implies, he will soon become an underground shovel man [*lampero de mina*], in which position he will have the opportunity to observe the others' work; a preference for one activity or another will arise in him, and intermittently he will need to perform the duties of an assistant and later of a master driller or timberman.

Sotomarino's description is an idealized depiction of upward mobility in the mine; obviously not all workers completed this process successfully. As we saw earlier, another engineer at the time, Guillermo Flores Pinedo (1947), emphasized how workers from the Mantaro Valley tended to stay longer on the job and make the full progression to master driller or timberman, whereas workers from the *quebradas* of Pasco Department never stayed long enough to make it past the assistant position. Sotomarino's description is interesting, however, not so much for its applicability to all workers as for the idea it gives us of the different steps in the mine hierarchy:

As time passes, the Chief Foreman will occasionally need someone who can act temporarily as a Foreman, so the *obrero* will need to summon all his dedication and

⁸¹ This visit was conducted jointly with Jessica Smith.

enthusiasm so as to not disappoint, and then it is only a matter of time before his ascent to [the position of] Foreman on a permanent basis. In this capacity he will come into contact with the Engineer, a man bent on ensuring that his knowledge results in an increase in the output of the workforce, in the extraction of the best possible tonnage, as well as in the achievement of the best possible safety conditions for the workforce; if our man performs up to those standards, he will subsequently become a Chief Foreman, which is the highest level in the mine hierarchy to which he can aspire.

Work Accidents

Before continuing the discussion of work at the mine it is necessary to include an important aspect of mining anywhere: accidents and work hazards. Around the world, underground mining work has historically been a dangerous occupation; that has been the case in the Andes as well. In representations of Spanish colonialism in the Americas, the Potosí silver mine has become synonymous with dangerous working conditions as well as coerced labor (the mita system). The arrival of modern industrial mining in early 20th-century Peru would have a contradictory effect on mining-related hazards. On the one hand, the closure of the long era of amalgamation of silver, in the last few decades of the 19th century, meant the end of the use of mercury (the key ingredient in amalgamation), whose negative health effects had been documented for mining sites such as Cerro de Pasco in the 1820s (see Rivero y Ustariz's 1828 report) as well as earlier.⁸² Additionally, certain occupations that had formerly been among the most onerous - like the *apiris* who carried the ore on their backs - were eliminated in mines like Cerro de Pasco and Huarón in which narrow-gauge mine railways and electric-powered hoisting winches took over their functions. Furthermore, modern industrial mining would eventually develop safety standards and mechanisms that would be introduced, to varying degrees and at varying speeds, around the world.

On the other hand, the expansion of mine galleries and shafts to unprecedented lengths and depths, under the requirements of industrial, electric-powered production, as well as the extensive use of explosives, initially increased the risk of accidents from rock falls, explosions and gas poisoning. In January and August 1910, two major explosions at the Cerro de Pasco

⁸² For an analysis of the process by which amalgamation was abandoned as the primary method for processing silver in late-19th century Peru, see Contreras (2004, 114-146).

Corporation's Goyllarisquizga coal mine killed twenty-nine and seventy workers, respectively, according to press accounts at the time (Blanchard 1982, 39). As Blanchard argues, the impact of the second accident also contributed to speeding up the passage of Peru's Law of Professional Risk/Work Accident Law, which directed companies to pay indemnifications for workers killed or injured on the job. The explosion also prompted an official investigation by the Ministry of Public Works/Development (*Fomento*) and the National Mining Engineers' Corps, which found many deficiencies and hazards in the company's work methods (Mayer 1913, 42-55). The Mining Engineers' Corps published statistics on mining accidents in the Pasco and Yauli mineral districts (i.e. Pasco Department plus the Morococha and Casapalca mining areas in Yauli) during the early years of the century. According to them, between 1908 and 1920 mining accidents in these two areas caused 527 deaths (Flores Galindo 1974, 63). To take a particular year for which we have more specific Corps statistics available, in 1918 there were 52 fatalities listed for the Pasco and Yauli regions, at a time when the total combined number of mining workers and employees recorded for those two areas was 10,260. Two of those deaths took place at the Huarón mine (both attributed to rock falls) while 26 fatalities occurred at the CPC's mines and subsidiaries.⁸³ These statistics should be taken with a grain of salt, however, since they seem likely to miss fatalities at smaller, more isolated mines. Additionally, they give a figure of only 25 fatalities in 1910, even though just the Goyllarisquizga accidents (also located in Pasco) caused a larger number of deaths that year, if we believe the press accounts cited by Blanchard (1982, 39).

On December 5 1928, a cave-in and flood at the CPC's Morococha mine killed at least 28 workers; the accident had been caused by workings that got too close to the bottom of Lake Morococha. This tragedy caught the attention of José Carlos Mariátegui, the founder of Peruvian Marxism, who published accounts of the accident in his biweekly paper *Labor* and initiated the first contacts with the mining workers of the Central Highlands – contacts that would lead to the first systematic attempt at unionization in 1930. It was shortly after the Morococha accident that the CPC organized its first Safety Department and set about implementing policies that, by its

⁸³ Here I include accidents at the CPC-owned Morococha Mining Company, but not the Sociedad Backus y Johnston, which was acquired by the CPC only that year (1918).

own account, helped to significantly reduce the rate of fatal accidents over the next decade and a half (Kohl 1945, 567).

At Huarón, there were also numerous accidents during the early years. Alejandro Freyre, also an engineer who worked at the mine, wrote in his 1960 thesis about a collapse that had taken place in the Travieso section, reportedly in 1924. Whether or not the year is accurate, he provides a description based on what had by then apparently become company lore, as well as on his own excavations and measurements:

It was in reality a huge interior collapse due to bad working conditions. According to versions from individuals who worked during that time, it occurred in 1924 in the Block 1 Francois of the 600 level. This area was worked by the cut-and-fill method, filling in the stope with the residue from the blasts, after picking out the richest mineral. [The collapse] occurred in circumstances in which a 5-meter block of great potential had been found; given this great richness, they opted to extract all of the mineral that had been blasted out, thus leaving the stope without the necessary support. Additionally, it seems that the ceiling was raised higher than permitted by safety rules, without covering it with timber, so that [the stope] was 7 meters high and 30 meters long... At that time, the drilling was done on top of scaffolds or ladders, and even, according to witnesses, on wheelbarrows stacked up on top of each other. Suddenly the ceiling caved in, and the rock collapse extended as far as 60 meters above; and it is believed that all the *obreros* working in that area were killed (Freyre 1960, 105-106).

Freyre mentions a gallery and a chimney that were excavated (apparently under his watch) in order to explore the area of this collapse; these tests left “no doubts that it effectively took place and moved a great volume [of rock] of Travieso” (Ibid.).

A series of cases in the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* minutes from 1938 provide us a partial window into accidents and compensation at the Huarón mine at this time. On January 7 of that year, the *Juez de Paz* was witness to four transactions between the company representative Fausto Orihuela Carrión, and accident victims or their relatives. It is not clear why these four cases were settled on the same date, whether they had to do with the same accident, or when exactly the accident(s) had taken place. In the first case, 38-year old Petrona Huacachin, a native of Ulcumayo near Tarma, received a one-time compensation of 540 soles, “according to the law,” for the death of her son, Pedro Arroyo Huacachin, who had died “as a consequence of the collapse of a block of mineral.” According to the transcript, the money came through the *Compañía Internacional de Seguros del Perú* (an insurance company), where the company

apparently had a policy, and was “for six years of service that [the deceased] had provided” the company. In return, Petrona Huacachin agreed to the formulaic statement whereby she “received the aforementioned sum to her complete satisfaction, renouncing definitively any claim she might make, [the issue] being settled for the first and last time.” In the next case, 60-year old Catalina Lozano, a native of Muquiyauyo near Jauja in the Mantaro Valley, received a one-time payment of 362 soles for the death of her son Lorenzo Bautista Lozano, who had died in the Huarón mine. The same provisions and legal formulas as in the previous case applied.

Similarly, 50-year old Rosa Pizarro from Muquiyauyo received compensation of 332 soles “for the first and last time” for the death of her husband Vicente Flores as a result of a rock collapse in the Sésamo section of the mine. On the other hand, Julián Lazo from Apata (also near Jauja) received a compensation payment of 532 soles for his own injury at the mine, namely a fractured femur resulting from a fall. Similarly, on January 24, 36-year old Dámaso Collazo received 160 soles for an accident in which he had broken his right leg. Two months later, on March 14, the Company representative gave 23-year old Seferino Campos, a native of Cerro de Pasco, 552 soles as compensation for an accident in which he had lost three fingers. Surprisingly, the records for that year also register two cases in which compensation was given for accidents which supposedly had taken place at a much earlier date. On January 8, 1938, the Company gave 60-year old Anselmo Luján Millán, from Huamalí in the Mantaro Valley, a compensation payment of 600 soles, for a work accident that had occurred in September 1922; the minutes remark that this transaction was “the last and definitive one.” Similarly, the same day, a payment of 400 soles was given to Asunción Dionisio, also from Huamalí, “for the last and definitive time,” as compensation for an accident suffered by her son Juan Rivera in the Huaron company’s railroad in December 1922.

In Peru, compensation payments such as these were first mandated by Law 1378, the *Ley de Accidentes de Trabajo* (Work Accident Law). Signed on January 20, 1911, after several years of public debate, it was the first such law in Latin America and the second in the Western Hemisphere (Blanchard 1982, 39). Before that, workers or their families could in theory sue employers for damages under the Civil Code, but that rarely ever happened. Law 1378 mandated an indemnity in the form of a percentage of the worker’s salary during convalescence,

or permanently in the case of incapacitation; this pension was given to the worker's family in case of a fatal accident. The law was one of as many as twenty major labor regulations introduced between 1900 and 1920, and it was part of what Drinot (2011, 28) has called "the labor state" – the process by which the Peruvian state created itself by acting upon labor to police, protect and "improve" it. That process was similar to that taking place in fully industrializing countries, yet in Peru it had particular features due to the fact that labor was seen as a vehicle for the civilizing of the nation. As Drinot writes, "the law constituted the state as a paternal figure overlooking the safety of his worker-sons and worker-daughters" (Ibid. 30). Yet as Drinot, Blanchard and other authors make clear, the Work Accident Law faced huge obstacles in terms of implementation:

The most common shortcoming was the refusal of companies to pay compensation if they believed the worker responsible for the accident. This could be rectified by judicial intervention, but in some areas no judge was available and there was confusion where the worker could go for legal redress. Companies also ignored judicial decisions (Blanchard 1982, 106-107).

Certainly, many aspects of the cases from Huarón from 1938 seem strange or overly vague. What was the rationale for the different amounts of compensation, and why did some workers receive more for a broken leg or hand than was given in other cases for a worker's death? On the one hand, the fact that the transcripts mention an insurance policy in all the cases (except the two that were apparently carryovers from sixteen years earlier) makes it seem like strict rules and calculations may have been followed in determining the amounts. On the other hand, it is also likely that, although law 1378 no doubt contributed to affirming workers' right to some type of compensation, its specific provisions did not actually dictate what occurred on the ground. Although the law supposedly mandated an indemnity in the form of a small pension (a fraction of the wage) paid to a deceased worker's family, all of the cases mentioned above involve a lump-sum, one-time payment. This may have been the preference of the workers or their families, or it may have been preferred by the company. As Blanchard writes,

Companies also paid voluntarily so that no legal action was necessary. Some avoided paying long-term indemnities by settling on a lump sum... Much was still left for the employers themselves to decide, and they invariably protected their own interests first (Ibid., 40).

Similarly, in a 1938 report about the conditions of indigenous workers in Peru, Chilean labor lawyer and International Labor Organization official Moisés Poblete Troncoso wrote about the way that accident compensation payments actually functioned in many mining areas:

As far as the payment of compensation for work accidents, because of the ignorance of the Indians, especially in those centers in which there is no authority to make sure that the appraisal [*valorización*] of the injuries is done correctly, the author was able to ascertain that it is done solely based on the opinion [*apreciación*] of the bosses (Poblete 1938, 149).

Other questions also remain – Why are almost all of the workers involved in these compensation cases from the Mantaro Valley (a region that, admittedly, was the source of many workers, but not all) rather than also from, say, Huayllay itself? Were their cases linked to each other in some way?

Huarón, like the CPC, did implement certain safety measures over the course of the 20th century. In 1954, Engineer Juan Hoyos Castillo wrote that the Department of Safety, Industrial Hygiene and Welfare had recently been formed (Hoyos 1954, 154). A few years before, another of the engineers, Celso Sotomarino, gave a description of what safety was supposed to look like at the mine in the late 1940s:

In the upper-level staff of the Company there is an Engineer who is in charge of work safety. This is also a task given to the Chief Foremen, in its partial and local aspects, and they must consult with [the Engineer] whenever necessary. They must make sure that the protection and safety equipment is always in a perfectly maintained and working state, and periodically check the winches, shaft cages... Check the galleries and stopes being worked, to make sure that there are no toxic gases, and if there are, to ventilate them intensely so as to cause them to dilute (Sotomarino 1949, 79).

Nevertheless, although these and other measures no doubt contributed to reducing the accident and fatality rates at the mine, fatal accidents have continued to occur to this day, as in other mines. A safety official at the Huarón mine whom Jessica Smith and I interviewed in 2009 told us that in the five years he had been working there (2004-2009), 9 workers had died. Indeed, if we examine the official accident statistics from Peru's Mining and Energy Inspection Office (OSINERGMIN), we see that in the four years from 2007 to 2010 (inclusive), there were 215 fatalities in accidents in Peruvian mines. Of these, 7 took place at Huarón (two in 2007, two in 2008, 1 in 2009 and two in 2010), while 6 occurred at its neighboring mine Animón. If we look

at the entire 11 years from 2000 to 2010, 654 workers have died in accidents in Peruvian mines according to OSINERGMIN.⁸⁴ Today, at mines like Huarón and Animón, accident fatalities usually occur one at a time, as a steady, yearly trickle (usually two per year) and thus do not garner as much press attention as the larger-scale, multiple accidents that used to occur with greater frequency. There are of course exceptions, as when Lake Naticocha, which overlays parts of both the Huarón and Animón mines, collapsed in April 1998, completely flooding both mines and rendering them unworkable for a couple of years; six Animón workers died on that occasion.

The most catastrophic accident to have occurred in the Huayllay region, however, was not a workplace accident, although it did involve the mining population. On March 18, 1971, an avalanche destroyed the camp of the Chungar mining company, killing hundreds of people. As mentioned earlier, the Galjuf family had sold much of its mining possessions to the French Huarón company in 1912, but it kept some, and later in the century, together with other investors, it formed the Chungar company. By the 1960s, their main mine was located next to Lakes Chungar and Yanahuin, some 15 km. from that company's present site at Animón and some 17 km. from Huarón. This is situated towards the southwest, on the border between Huayllay District (Pasco Department) and the Department of Lima, almost at the Continental Divide. The disaster occurred shortly after 8:00am, when an avalanche with an estimated volume of 100,000 m³ fell from a 400-meter high rocky outcrop situated near Lake Yanahuin (Plafker and Eyzaguirre 1979, 275). The rocks fell into the lake, and the resulting water displacement generated a wave that reached a maximum height of 30 m. and hit the mining camp, destroying almost everything in its path. Since most of the men had just entered the mine for the day shift, the wave killed mostly the women and children at the camp. Some of the water also entered the mine shaft, killing several workers, though most of them survived and managed to get out.

Occurring less than a year after the 1970 earthquake and landslide in Ancash to the north, the Chungar disaster attracted some international attention and national relief efforts.⁸⁵ Official reports in the days after the avalanche placed the death toll at around 256 (*El Peruano*, March 22

⁸⁴ Of these, 36% were on the payroll of the mining companies themselves, while 64% were subcontracted workers.

⁸⁵ The 1970 Earthquake was the deadliest natural disaster in the history of Peru, killing between 70,000 and 100,000 people. Part of the destruction occurred when the earthquake triggered an avalanche that destroyed the towns of Yungay and Ranrahirca, killing an estimated 18,000 people.

1971, 1), though there were many missing; most estimates place the final toll somewhere between 400 and 600 (Plafker and Eyzaguirre 1979, 269). The cause of the rock slide is not clear; unlike the 1970 landslide in Ancash, it was not triggered by an earthquake. Early news reports that an earthquake had accompanied the avalanche were later shown to be false (Ibid. 276). And although there are glaciers in the general region, the avalanche itself was not made up of ice but rather of boulders and blocks of limestone. Plafker and Eyzaguirre (1979), who visited the site a after the disaster, wrote that data was too sparse to make definitive conclusions but that the avalanche seemed to have been caused by a long-term process of natural erosion that had created an oversteepened slope. A previous, much smaller rockfall had occurred on the exact same spot a year earlier, and had generated a slight wave from the lake that also washed along the shore where the camp was. Although that earlier wave “did not cause any damage, residents were sufficiently alarmed to request that the camp be moved to higher ground for safety. After an investigation, however, the camp was considered to be a safe site” (Ibid., 276). Thus, there may also have been negligence on the part of the company in not heeding warnings that could have alerted them to the impending catastrophe. Many people from the surrounding communities, including Huayllay, Carhuacayán and Vichaycocha, lost siblings, children or other family members in the March 1971 disaster.⁸⁶ The Chungar company has since moved most of its operations to its other mining area, Animón, immediately adjacent to Huarón.

The workforce at Huarón: Life histories

I will now discuss the nature of work at the mine from the perspective of some of the individuals who worked there, as told to me during my research. Naturally, these accounts mainly tell us about the last few decades of the 20th century – i.e. from the late 1960s to the present. This was the period both of the introduction of new technologies at underground mines

⁸⁶ For example, one of my interviewees, Anselmo Roque, the young president of the *comunidad* of Huayllay in early 2010, explained to me how his father had lost his first wife and two children in the disaster, and, traumatized by this, had decided to leave mining and dedicate himself to livestock-raising (after which Anselmo was born). Another time, while riding the *combi* on the unpaved road from Huayllay towards the coast, an older woman (originally from Vichaycocha, married to a *huayllino*) pointed out to me the old mining camp site where the avalanche had occurred; she had lost several family members there as well.

and of the increased frequency of strikes by workers, as well as of the general economic crisis that affected Peru (like much of Latin America and Africa) beginning in the mid-1970s and particularly in the 1980s. I will try to place each account in the context of the individual's longer life trajectory, or at least those parts of their story that they discussed with me. Each of these life histories is based on one or more recorded interviews, which has allowed me to go back and listen again to specific details I did not pay attention to at first. In some cases, I had additional informal conversations or general fieldwork interactions with the people in question, which also added a bit to my understanding of their life story. I do not pretend to give a complete account of their lives, activities or concerns. The stories presented have gone through several layers of selection and elaboration: what people were able to recall, what they saw as most important or relevant, how they interpreted our interaction, what they choose to tell, and finally how I have selected from the dialogue, rearranging elements into a more or less orderly narrative. No doubt there are many aspects of their life histories that are missing here. I have tried to elaborate these narratives not only by carefully following the interviewees' own words but also by interpreting them in the context of what I know about local and regional society and of the history examined in these chapters. These life histories are meant as a complement to the other methodologies used in this dissertation, since they provide a different window into local life and into the social relations formed around the mining industry in this particular corner of the Central Highlands of Peru.

Domingo Soto

Domingo Soto was born in the city of Cerro de Pasco, in the neighborhood of Esperanza; his father worked in the mine there, while his grandfather had previously been a mining worker at Huarón. His father perished in a mine cage accident at the Cerro de Pasco mine when Don Domingo was four or five years old; afterwards, his uncle took him to Lima, where he lived till the age of 25. In Lima he worked as a mechanic and specialized in Volkswagen cars, but he was paid too little, 25 soles a day (in the late 1960s). In particular, he highlights the fact that he had difficulty paying his room (*casa, para pagar, no había*). Another uncle then convinced him to come work at Huarón, in 1968; he began as an assistant *carrilano* – i.e. working with the rail cars inside the mine. He says he made 63 soles a day (around US\$1.60 at the time), which was

“more or less okay” (*más o menos regular*) for that time, plus the mine offered him housing in the camp. Don Domingo remembers being given a carbide lamp attached to his helmet; since he was not accustomed to it (*no tenía la costumbre*), it weighed heavily on his head, and it would frequently turn off on its own. So he asked a cousin to lend him a battery-powered lamp, and then “I was able to work well.”⁸⁷ After the standard 3-month trial period, he passed into the company’s regular payroll (*planilla*), and thus also became a member of the union. After some time as a *carrilano*, he passed through other occupations inside the mine: assistant driller (*ayudante perforista*) and *chimenero* – i.e. the person who places the explosives to clear mine shafts and chimneys of debris.⁸⁸ Eventually, he became a *maestro palero* – i.e. the skilled operator of a mechanical excavator (*pala mecánica*).

Don Domingo emphasized that during the ten years he worked underground he was “very cautious” (*muy cauteloso*). Nevertheless, he told me about a few occasions on which he witnessed and/or narrowly escaped accidents in the mine. Once he was switched out of a section shortly before a cave-in occurred; afterwards he helped to get out the bodies of the two workers who had died. Another time was when he had been working six or seven months. He was about to enter a particular area inside the mine, but the *maestro* (master driller or timberman) who was with him began to chew coca and told him not to enter yet: “don’t go in yet son, the ground is making noise... the ground lets you know” (*todavía no entres hijo, está sonando el terreno...el terreno te avisa*); indeed, they could hear a slow intermittent noise. So Don Domingo began smoking a cigarette⁸⁹ while the *maestro* continued chewing coca, saying “We will give the *abuelito* his coca.” It should be mentioned that in Huayllay, Rancas and other areas of Pasco

⁸⁷ In his thesis about the Huarón mine (1949, p.79), Engineer Celso Sotomarinero writes that electric lamps were actually supposed to be prohibited in the more dangerous sections of the mine; there, workers had to use carbide lamps, because they shut off automatically when there was too much gas in the air, and thus served as a warning. Domingo Soto’s narrative shows some of the reasons why workers might have preferred electric lamps to the discomforts of working with carbide lamps, and it highlights the gap between regulations and practice when it came to safety.

⁸⁸ I was able to understand this particular term thanks to María Rodríguez’s (2004) linguistic thesis on mine terminology at the Uchucchacua mine (Oyón Province, northern Lima Department). Her definition (p.140) is consistent with Domingo Sotos’s description.

⁸⁹ It should be mentioned that coca, cigarettes and alcohol are the three elements that accompany ritual, ceremonial or special occasions in this region, as in many other parts of the Andes. That was the case on countless occasions during my field research in Huayllay and Rancas. Cigarettes are mainly sold for these occasions, as their “recreational” use in the Western sense is not common here.

Department the Spanish term *abuelo* (grandfather – diminutive *abuelito*) is used to denote the mountain or earth as an animate being; it is used almost interchangeably with other terms like *jirka* or *cerro* (both of which mean mountain, in Central Peruvian Quechua and Spanish, respectively).⁹⁰ At that moment, the foreman came by and shouted at them for sitting around for so long, and told them to get to work; “the ground is making noise,” they began to answer. Suddenly, as the men were talking, there was a rock fall in the area they were about to enter, and they narrowly avoided death. This story is not only representative of the dangers implied in mining work, but also of the ritual role played by the chewing of coca previous to any important or risky activity, whether inside or outside the mine.

When he had been working at Huarón five or six years, Don Domingo settled down with his wife, who was originally from the community of Vilcabamba in the *quebrada* of Chaupiwara (Daniel Alcides Carrión Province); they had four children – two boys and two girls. He also served as a union delegate representing his section of the mine. In that capacity he remembers organizing to obtain work implements from the company such as boots, soap and gloves – for example, they got the glove allotment increased from once a year to once every six months and then to once every three months. Once around the year 1973 he participated in a strike and walked to Lima on a *marcha de sacrificio* (“sacrifice march” as the miners’ marches to the cities were known from the mid-1960s through the 80s), demanding higher wages. He also played in one of the soccer teams at the mine.

After working underground for ten years, Don Domingo’s back was damaged and his spine bent, and he had to have treatment for almost six months. He managed to switch to working in the mine’s sampling laboratory, where he worked for five years. The lab worked round-the-clock on three 8-hour shifts, and he sometimes had to work during the night or early morning; the cold was uncomfortable and his spine continued to hurt. For those reasons, in 1983,

⁹⁰ I base this assertion on my own fieldwork in Huayllay and Rancas, specifically on the occasions in which I saw alcohol, coca or other items offered to the *abuelo*, *jirka* or *cerro*, whether as a formal offering (*mesa*) or as a brief libation. In my experience these terms are mostly used interchangeably; if there are fine differences between them, I have not been able to detect them. *Mesas* and libations can be directed at or placed in a mountain, or they can be directed simply at the ground. The terms are also used in the context of illness, as when the *abuelo* or *cerro* “gets” you. Of course, on these topics there is a wide literature in Andean anthropology, which no doubt influences my interpretation of what I observed locally, on this point I have attempted to stick to my own observations.

he talked with his wife and decided to leave the mine. Besides, at that time the crisis and first wave of mine closures had started; although the mass workforce reductions wouldn't happen for almost a decade, the company was already beginning to encourage workers to leave. Don Domingo got a payment from the company as an incentive to leave and used this to buy a small plot of land on which he built his house. Although it was more common for retiring mining workers to seek warmer, gentler climates like Huánuco or Huancayo – or, alternatively, the greater opportunities of the capital, Lima – Don Domingo decided to build his house in Cerro de Pasco, which, as he put it, “is my homeland” (*que es mi tierra*).

He was only around forty years old, so he continued working, but now dedicated himself to commerce. He would buy merchandise and take it to sell in the Huarón mine, where as he says, his former workmates would buy from him (*los compañeros me colaboraban con la compra*); he also went around selling in other mining camps in the region, like Raura and Buenaventura (Uchucchacua). He gave me a positive assessment of his life buying and selling merchandise after retiring from the mine: “I did well, and I am still doing well at my age” (*me ha ido bien y me sigue yendo bien ya con la edad que yo tengo*). He also learned to weave, and bought a small loom on which he makes sweaters and other items, which he also sells. His oldest son also works in clothing (*confección*), while one of his daughters began to study a journalism-related career in the university at Cerro de Pasco. When I met Don Domingo in 2008, he could be found most days in his small stall in Cerro de Pasco's main market area, Huamachuco, where he sold sweaters, blankets and related items. I interviewed him there in November 2008, and visited him occasionally after that.

Although like many of my interviewees Don Domingo compares the *gringos* – such as the French at Huarón – favorably in relation to the Peruvian engineers and managers who later ran the mines, he does not idealize the *franceses*, either. He emphasizes that “we worked in terrible conditions” (*trabajábamos en pésimas condiciones*), referring to the lack of sufficient implements such as boots and gloves during his first few years at the mine. In general, his assessment of the role played by the union is rather positive - he stresses that back then “we were very united in Huarón” and there were good union leaders (*dirigentes*). However, like many other former workers he attributes the later decline of the union to the fact that certain leaders

“began to sell out” (*comenzaron a venderse*) – this is a common discourse that emphasizes corruption rather than structural factors or larger political forces. When I asked Don Domingo about political activities at the mine, he mentioned that there was a lot of talk of Mao, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, as well as other political currents such as the APRA and Acción Popular. His own political sympathies tended to run more towards the left – yet he also emphasized that “we were not very political at that time...Politics was an outside thing, we were dedicated to working, there was little politics for us” (*No éramos muy políticos para esa vez... La política era fuera, nos dedicábamos a trabajar, muy poco era la política para nosotros*). His assessment of the changes that have taken place in the mines is almost uniformly negative – although he is appreciative of the technical improvements that have taken place in mining, he also emphasizes that “the subcontractors work in an inhumane way” (*las contratadas trabajan en un estado antihumano*). He also expresses bitterness over the gradual destruction of the city of Cerro de Pasco by the Volcan Company.

Octavio Dominguez

Octavio Dominguez⁹¹ worked for 19 years at the Huarón mine – from 1972 to 1991. I interviewed him once in 2008 – unlike most of the other individuals discussed in this section, I was not able to find him again, so the account given here is less detailed. Don Octavio was born in a nearby *hacienda* (some 15 km. from Huayllay) that was still owned at the time by the Lercari Brothers firm. His parents were from two nearby plateau communities, on the Junín department side. They worked as shepherds for, as he put it, the *gamonales*,⁹² taking care of the hacienda’s flocks. His mother died when he was small, and gradually the family moved towards the town of Huayllay, though they did not yet become *comuneros*. By the age of 22 he had already formed his own family, with a woman from Huayllay, so he was concerned about income, and he saw that he could make more working at the mine than continuing to work with the animals. His brother was already working at Huarón, so he talked to the administrators about

⁹¹ This is a pseudonym. When offered a choice, he preferred that I not use his real name.

⁹² *Gamonal* is a pejorative term for *hacendado*. According to De la Cadena (2000), in southern Peru at least, large *hacendados* used the term *gamonal* to refer to the smaller *hacendados* who they claimed were less civilized and more brutal in their treatment of Indian peasants. Opponents of the haciendas, on the other hand, used the term *gamonal* to refer to all *hacendados*, large and small.

getting him a job. He says his starting daily wage was 162 soles (slightly under US\$4 at the time).⁹³

Don Octavio began working as a *lampero* (shovel man). In his account, he highlights the arrival of new machines a couple of years after he started – before that, he said, it was all “shovel and wheelbarrow.” Thus, during the process of mechanization in the 1970s, he learned to operate one of the first types of scoop loaders that arrived at the mine, and worked in this capacity for many years. Although like all direct payroll workers he was affiliated to the union, he never occupied a position there, nor did he have a lot to say on the topic. He does remember some of the strikes that took place, but says he never participated in a *marcha de sacrificio*, though his brother did. In 1991, during the crisis, the company began offering workers incentives to leave, threatening that if they waited too long they would get nothing and lose their jobs anyway. Like other former workers I interviewed, Don Octavio remembers consulting with his wife and deciding to leave the mine. He says he later realized it had been a ruse (*artimaña*) on the part of the company. They moved from the mine camp back to Huayllay, and his *huayllino* father-in-law convinced him to become a *comunero* as well; in any case he was expected to do so if he wanted to be able to keep a few animals again.⁹⁴ In 2008, he participated in the *paro* (strike/road blockage) that the *comunidad* of Huayllay waged against the Animón mine, in which several *comuneros* were wounded; they demanded that the company accept more people from the community as direct, payroll workers, in return for the additional hectares of land the company had recently occupied.

At the time I met him, Don Octavio had an ongoing *trámite* (paperwork) to gain recognition and compensation for professional illness, given that he had worked underground for 19 years; his application had been rejected initially, so he was now working with the assistance of a lawyer. He had a small shop in Huayllay as well as some sheep. He had several sons-in-law

⁹³ These were the decades when state protections (such as job stability) and relatively strong unions were gaining important wage increases for mining workers. This could account for the significant difference between Domingo Soto’s starting wage from three years earlier and Octavio Domínguez’s. Alternatively, it could be due to a lapse in their memory.

⁹⁴ “*Mi suegro era comunero, entonces, a veces por la exigencia de él, me dijo ya pues tienes que ser comunero, entonces ya he visto que, como había la comunidad, más que nada como tenía mis animalitos, ya tenía que entrar ya, forzosamente comunero.*”

(*yernos*) who were working for subcontractors at the Animón mine; before the latest rise in production in the early 2000s, they had also been *ganaderos*. Unlike some of my other interviewees, like Domingo Soto and Gaudencio Machacuay, he was not particularly critical of the subcontractor system, or if he was he did not express it; he felt his sons-in-law were doing well for themselves.

Gaudencio Machacuay

Gaudencio Machacuay worked at Huarón for 27 years, from 1967 to 1994. I was initially directed to him by Domingo Soto, since the two had worked together inside the mine and had been friends. I interviewed Don Gaudencio twice, in 2008 and 2010, and spoke with him more informally around Huayllay other times. He was originally from a *comunidad campesina* called Huayre, near the southeastern shore of Lake Junín on the other side of the plateau. He first worked at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's San Cristóbal mine for seven years, from 1960 to 1967, then came to Huarón, where he met his wife, a *huayllina*, and ended up staying. He described his first job at Huarón alternatively as *ayudante* (assistant) and as *operario* (laborer). Eventually, he became a master driller, and later spent many years as a foreman (*caporal*). During his years in the mine, however, Don Gaudencio also performed a variety of other jobs: electrician, *tubero* (mine plumber), and *carrilano* (working with the mine rail cars); as he described it, "a bit of everything" (*un poco de todo*). He expressed pride in some of the more complicated tasks in which he participated over the years, especially the tunneling work developing new areas of the mine. He also remembers narrowly escaping a rock fall in one instance as well as a gas leak on another occasion.

Don Gaudencio served in several positions within the union (*sindicato*); he also participated in a *marcha de sacrificio* once, during a strike demanding higher salaries. The workers walked from Huarón south through Carhuacayán, over a high mountainous area in the direction of the Central Highway, but when they arrived in San Mateo de Huánchor they were blocked by the police; only a group that had gone earlier by car was able to get to Lima. On that occasion the workers were not able to get more than what the company had initially offered. He also remembers the social life of the mining camps, in particular the feasts, such as the

cortamontes during *carnavales*.⁹⁵ Like several of my interviewees, he liked to talk about the *Señor de los Milagros*, a Catholic religious festival that was particularly popular in the Huarón mining camp, as it is in Lima.⁹⁶ Each of the representatives (*delegados*) of the different sections would make a small altar for the *Señor de los Milagros* and they would stay up all night before the procession. The company provided people with cane alcohol and coca to be able to conduct the feast properly. For the Day of the Worker (1st of May), the company would have *pachamanca* prepared for all the workers, and each section would get together to celebrate. The union also organized festivities of its own.

Don Gaudencio retired from the company in 1994, during the years when the company was aggressively trying to reduce its workforce. He says his overall retirement settlement amounted to around 20,000 soles (around US\$7,000 or 8,000 in the mid-to-late 1990s), which is more than some workers got, but he considers that it did not adequately compensate 27 years of “sacrificing yourself in the mine, [with] risk to your life” (*que tanto te has sacrificado en la mina, riesgo de la vida*). Like other workers, he feels that if he had held out longer, he could have gotten more. After leaving the mine, he began the process of joining the *comunidad campesina* of Huayllay, which he could do since his wife was a *huayllina*. However, since Don Gaudencio was a *yerno* (in-law) of the *comunidad*, they required him to sponsor one of the *fiestas* before he could acquire full *comunero* status, which he did in 1999. The *fiesta* sponsorship was his first *cargo*; afterwards, he occupied two positions of authority in the *comunidad* and sponsored one more *fiesta* (in 2009), so that by the time of our second interview he had completed four *cargos* in all, and felt that he had fulfilled his duties to the *comunidad*. Don Gaudencio considered himself “wholly [*netamente*] *huayllino*” and was strongly opinionated on matters pertaining to the *comunidad* and to the administration of the communal

⁹⁵ The *cortamonte* (called *yunsa* or *unsha* in other parts of the Peruvian highlands) is a traditional ritual/celebration done during *Carnavales* in February, which involves dancing in a circle around a tree planted specifically for the occasion and hitting the tree with an ax; the person who gives the final cut becomes the next year’s sponsor.

⁹⁶ The *Señor de los Milagros* originated in Lima, where it attracts the most followers, but it is also celebrated in other places. In the Huarón mining camp it was one of the most important religious festivals of the year.

lands⁹⁷ He also complained that people were being granted full *comunero* status at younger and younger ages and that they were not being made to fulfill the *cargo* requirements.

In January 2008, Don Gaudencio's son died in a gas leak accident at the Animón mine.⁹⁸ After the tragedy, he felt that priority should have been given for his other son, who also worked in the mine through a contractor, to be shifted to direct, payroll status (*planilla*), and he resented the fact that this had not occurred. In general, he was critical about the change that had occurred from the days of "all-payroll" (*pura planilla*) to the present of "all-contractor" (*pura contratada*) work. Like many other former workers, he had a slightly nostalgic view of the old French administrators and engineers, in contrast to the Peruvians who have replaced them since. When I first visited him, in 2008, he was also well aware of the drop in mineral prices that year (a result of the world financial crisis) and had heard rumors that the mines might close soon (which they did not).

Although he claimed he only had a few *huacchilla*⁹⁹ sheep himself, his involvement with the *granja comunal* over the years had kept him connected to the world of *ganadería* (livestock-raising), and he was often out in the *campo* (fields, grasslands) with the animals. I once asked him how mining work compared with work with the animals in the *campo*. I will conclude his account by quoting his reflections on this comparison, in which he stressed that both have their risks and that work in the *campo* should not be idealized.

Well, in reality, the mine also, when you get used to it it's like your house... In the *campo* you suffer from cold, you suffer from the altitude. And the difference with the mine, the only difference is the smoke, and the risk... In the mine, it's risky, from the rocks that could fall. In other words, you leave your house for the mine with two possibilities: to

⁹⁷ By this he was referring not to the entirety of the Huayllay's legal communal property (most of which is held in private family usufruct through the *estancias*) but rather the portion that is administered directly by the *comunidad* as an institution, as a way to provide it with income; this is also known as the *granja comunal*. It is distinct both from the cooperative (in which only a subset of *comuneros* are members) and from the *estancias*.

⁹⁸ This accident is recorded in the OSINERGMIN statistics cited earlier, which give the name of each fatality.

⁹⁹ *Huacchillas* are sheep that are held privately by households and pastured according to traditional methods; they are defined in opposition to herds owned by large units that use economies of scale and, at least in theory, more advanced methods. Said units were represented in the past by the (modern) haciendas, later by the SAIS and CAP units formed during the Agrarian Reform, and today by the cooperatives that exist within many of the larger *comunidades*.

come back or to not come back. On the other hand, in *ganadería* [cattle-raising], it's the same – there might be a conflict with the cattle-rustlers, your life is also at risk... At this time of the year [the rainy season], for example, you suffer a lot being with the animals – when there is lightning, when there is rain. But in the dry season [*verano*], on the other hand, the *campo* is beautiful. Beautiful, quiet, you are there lying down in the *campo* watching your animals. But in this [rainy] season, the *campo* is sad... Many people say, the *campo* is easy. No. You suffer. In the *campo* you suffer. You have to follow behind your animals all the time. It's like in the mine, you have to do your job. If you haven't done your job, the boss is there, the foreman is there.¹⁰⁰

Desiderio Roque

Desiderio Roque belongs to a later generation of workers than Gaudencio Machacuay and Domingo Soto; although more contemporaneous with Octavio Dominguez, he differs from the latter in that his father was already engaged in mining rather than in shepherding work. Also, Don Desiderio's story differs from the ones told so far in that he, like a number of workers of his generation – though by no means all – pursued some university studies before entering the mine, even if he did not complete them. I conducted several recorded interviews with Don Desiderio, in addition to more informal conversations when I visited him in his house a number of times. He was one of the more expansive individuals as far as sharing details of his life trajectory with me, and I can only include a fraction of it here. Don Desiderio is a *huayllino*, though he was born not in the village of Huayllay or on an *estancia* but rather in the Huarón mining camp itself, in the early 1950s, and grew up there as one of 8 siblings. His family still had an *estancia*, though, and he remembers seeing his grandmother's pottery work there (see description in Chapter 1). He also remembers seeing his father leave for the *quebradas* to conduct exchanges, though he never accompanied him. His father worked at the concentrator plant at Huarón for approximately 40 years, from the 1950s to the 1990s, while Don Desiderio himself worked underground in the mine from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.

¹⁰⁰ “Bueno en realidad, la mina también, cuando te acostumbras es como tu casa... En el campo sufres de frío, sufres de altura. Y la diferencia la mina, solamente diferencia es el humo, y el riesgo... En la mina, está riesgoso de la roca que va a caer. O sea vas de tu casa ya con dos condiciones a la mina: volver o no volver. En cambio en la ganadería, tal igual también – puede haber cualquier conflicto con los rateros, también está en riesgo tu vida... Ahora por ejemplo este tiempo, se sufre bastante con ganados. Cuando hay rayo, cuando hay lluvia. Pero en cambio, en tiempo de verano, es lindo el campo. Lindo, tranquilo, estás botado allí en el campo mirando tu ganado. Pero en cambio este tiempo, es triste el campo... Muchas personas dicen, es fácil el campo. No, se sufre. En el campo se sufre. Tienes que estar atrás atrás de tu ganado. Es como si fuera en la mina, tienes que cumplir tu trabajo. Si no has cumplido, allí está el jefe, está el caporal.”

Don Desiderio belongs to a generation that saw regional universities being created in the Central Highlands – in particular the Universidad Nacional Daniel Alcides Carrión (UNDAC) in Cerro de Pasco, the Universidad Nacional Hermilio Valdizán in Huánuco, and the Universidad Nacional del Centro in Huancayo, all of them in the 1960s. Similarly, the high school in Huayllay had also been created in 1961; before that, students who wanted to continue beyond the elementary school level had to go to Cerro de Pasco to study. In the 1960s and 70s, the middle-aged workers in the different mining centers of Pasco Department, most of whom only had an elementary school education, were making efforts to ensure that their children completed high school and, in some cases, that they would attend one of the newly-created universities.¹⁰¹ In 1972, Don Desiderio graduated from the high school in Huayllay; he wanted to study to become a mining engineer, but couldn't get in. His father told him that he should at least start with a program that he could do right away, and later change to a different program. So he started accounting at the UNDAC, but he didn't like it, and ended up switching to the university in Huánuco to study law (*derecho*), spending a little over a year there. He also did odd jobs while studying to buy his books and other things. He would go back to Huarón to play soccer, and in that way he befriended one of the engineers at the mine. The latter offered him a job; it was as a temporary worker at first, but soon he was offered a more stable position (*estable*), and that proved too tempting, even though it was for working underground. Like other workers, Don Desiderio began as a shovel man (*lampero*), but after three months he was assigned to be an assistant to one of the drillers. Eventually, he became a master driller, but during his time in the mine he also did other jobs like timberman (*enmaderador*), and learned to operate new, modern machines like the new Wagner excavators that were being brought in at the time.

At the time he began working at the mine, Don Desiderio was around 23 years old, and thought it would be for the short term only, telling himself, “I will make money for a couple of years, then I will leave.” But he ended up staying; looking back, he says he felt he couldn't really afford to continue studying, and his younger siblings needed financial support, for which his father's salary wasn't enough. Regardless of the reasons at the time, he says that staying at the

¹⁰¹ Public universities in Peru are all free of charge; however, there are still costs involved in terms of room, board, materials, etc.; furthermore, studying uses up time that could be used working and earning money to contribute to one's family.

mine was a setback (*retraso*) for him: “Of course, in economic terms it gave you some relief, but it was a setback in terms of knowledge.”¹⁰² As he put it, “I had traded in my studies for the mine.”¹⁰³

When I asked him about his first impressions of the mine, he says he felt “uncomfortable” (*incómodo*) and asked himself, “What am I doing here? Better I go work someplace else, do something, or apply to be a teacher (*postular al magisterio*), because in those days there was room in the *magisterio*, with a high school degree.”¹⁰⁴ His discomfort also had to do with what he had been used to hearing from people around him – an expectation of progress:

Before I entered the mine, well, they told me that the mine is rough, that our old folks are miners, and the children are also miners, and we have to aspire to something. So then our aspiration was different. Not to be miners. That is how the mine hit me hard (*Allí es donde me choca fuerte la mina*).¹⁰⁵

According to Don Desiderio, this discomfort was compounded by his first experiences once inside the mine, when some of the older workers (*personas ya de edad*) treated him with disdain:

People tried to berate you. They said, “hey, you can’t even lift a piece of wood! How is the company accepting these people? You’d be fine for doing cleaning in the offices!”¹⁰⁶

His sense of alienation from some of his fellow workers wasn’t just due to age; it was also due to the fact that he felt marked out as a person with some higher education:

¹⁰² “Claro económicamente te aliviaba pero era un retraso en conocimientos.”

¹⁰³ “Mis estudios lo había canjeado por la mina.”

¹⁰⁴ “¿Que cosa hago aquí? Mejor me voy a trabajar a otro sitio, hacer algo, o postular al magisterio, porque en esos tiempos había campo en el magisterio, con quinto año de secundaria.” It is important to note that the teaching profession (*magisterio*) has been an important vehicle of upward mobility in highland Peru in the second half of the 20th century.

¹⁰⁵ “Antes de que yo entre a la mina, pues me decían que la mina es bravo, que nuestros viejos son mineros, y los hijos también son mineros, y nosotros tenemos que aspirar a algo, entonces nuestra aspiración era otra. No ser mineros. Allí es donde me choca fuerte la mina.”

¹⁰⁶ “Personas que, te trataban de humillar. Decían que, ‘¡Oye tú no puedes alzar ni un palo! ¿La empresa como recibe a esta gente? Tú estás bien para que hagas limpieza, en las oficinas.’”

At some point I mentioned, I had been studying in the university. So then they called me, hypocritically they insulted me, “this guy says he is a university student.” And there came a moment where I had to explain: “No. I was a university student... I am the same as you, I am a miner. I am not a *universitario*.”¹⁰⁷

Although he tried to appear as just another miner, to counter the image of weakness that the older miners tried to project on him, Don Desiderio recognizes that at other times he fought back against their disdain by playing on educational hierarchies:

I also berated them... ‘I am young still, not like you, you are old and you are in the mine,’ I told them. ‘You think I am just a nobody? At least I have finished high school’ I told them. So I insulted them too, like that.¹⁰⁸

Don Desiderio highlights his initial discomfort at the social relations that predominated in the workplace – the frequent teasing, offense: “everything is done in a rough, playful way, they even mess with, talk badly about your family, about your partner (*pareja*).”¹⁰⁹ Another element of these social relations included the small favors and services that those in a less powerful position had to provide, particularly when they were new at the job. For example, one of the older workers (perhaps a master driller or foreman, though he did not specify this) might call him over during the Monday morning shift:

‘Come here, kid’, they would say... ‘Yesterday I got drunk, when are you going to buy me something? Go to the restaurant, on your account, get a snack, bring a soda. Okay, I will give you some overtime, I will give you something in return [*te voy a reconocer en algo*],’ he says. ‘But boss, if you get used to this you will keep asking me,’ I would tell him. ‘No, no, this stays between you and me – you always have to pay your dues’ [*siempre tienes que matricularte*]... ‘Okay boss, but how do I get out?’ I tell him. ‘What will he say, if I run into the engineer they will say, where are you going?’ ‘Tell him you’re going to the infirmary, to the hospital.’ Like that, they taught you. That’s how I learned.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ “*Algunas veces les comenté, yo estaba estudiando en la universidad. Entonces me llamaban, así hipócritamente me insultaban, ‘dice que es universitario ese pata.’ Y llegaba un momento donde les aclaraba. ‘No. Fui universitario... Yo soy igual que ustedes, soy minero. No soy universitario.’*”

¹⁰⁸ “*Los humillaba yo también... ‘Soy joven todavía, no como tú, viejo estás en la mina,’ así les decía. ‘Van a pensar que, soy cualquier persona. Por lo menos he terminado mi secundaria,’ le decía. Así también yo les ofendía pues.*”

¹⁰⁹ “*Todo es a la maldad, juego, inclusive tocan hablar mal de tu familia, mal de tu pareja.*”

¹¹⁰ “*Chico, te decían, ven... ‘Ayer me he tirado una borrachera, ¿a qué hora me vas a invitar? Vete al restaurante a tu cuenta, pide un piqueo, una gaseosa tráete. Ya, te voy a pasar en sobretiempo, algo, te voy a reconocer en algo,’ me dice. ‘Pero jefe, si te acostumbras me vas a pedir ya,’ le decía eso. ‘No, no, ya eso queda entre nosotros –*

Other times, a young or low-level worker might feel forced (*por obligación*) to go to a birthday celebration for one of “the bosses” (*los jefes*), and bring a pack of beers, or contribute for the preparation of the food, “all for free.” In the quote above, Don Desiderio uses the expression “*tienes que matricularte*” (literally – you have to register) in a sense that is familiar in Peru, as denoted by other expressions such as *derecho de piso* (“right-of-floor”) that refer to the small and large exactions to which new employees are subjected in a workplace, as a way of “paying one’s dues” and keeping the job. His comments reference this well-known, generalized practice as well as the thick world of (often hierarchical) social relations that existed in the mining workplace, and that were played out both during ordinary breaks as well as on special occasions.

I quote Don Desiderio’s remarks not because they necessarily convey an accurate or complete representation of social relations down in the mine, but because I think they provide a window into certain important aspects of mining work that are not always easy to get at from the outside: the daily rhythms of teasing, humor and gendered discourse, replete with the everyday conflicts and hierarchies of any workplace but under the particular conditions of an all-masculine workforce and the specific stresses and hardships of the mine. Don Desiderio’s description must be understood in the context of his ambivalent feelings towards his experience in the mine and towards his decision to stay there for as long as he did. It should not be thought that he necessarily looked down on his fellow mining workers or considered himself their superior. In fact, in another of our interviews he explicitly voiced a critique of what he saw as the excessive pride (*orgullo*) of many mining workers (and their wives) at Huarón, who, according to him, thought they were too good to continue engaging in traditional activities like pottery or to attend the same school as the *comuneros* in the town of Huayllay. Although I do not necessarily agree that “pride” was the central issue in both of these developments, Don Desiderio’s comments nevertheless highlight the fact that he is explicitly critical of elitist attitudes. And just as he criticizes the attitudes and practices of his fellow mine workers, he also acknowledges that he

siempre tienes que matricularte pues... ‘Ya jefe, pero ¿cómo salgo yo?’ le digo. ‘Que me va a decir, si me encuentro con el ingeniero van a decir, ¿a dónde vas?’ ‘Dile que estás yendo al tópico, al hospital. Ya, te enseñaban. Así aprendí pues.’

eventually came to have good conversations with some of them, especially when he became more involved in the *sindicato* (union) after several years of working in the mine.

That involvement formed a central part of my conversations with Don Desiderio; like Gaudencio Machacuay, Desiderio Roque not only was affiliated to the union but also occupied several positions as a *dirigente* (officer). First, he was named a delegate from his section; later, he occupied the positions of Secretary for Welfare (*Asistencia Social*) and then Deputy Secretary of Organization (*Subsecretario de Organización*). Finally, he became Vice-President (*Subsecretario General*) of the union. His discussion of *sindicalismo* (unionism) is too extensive to include here. He expressed great pride in some of the things he was able to do in the union, but also has a humorous and irreverent view on many aspects of *sindicalismo*.

Don Desiderio's period of work at the mine came to an end in 1993, when he was pressured into leaving by the company. In his case, he argues, his situation was complicated by the fact that he along with other union leaders had been accused of fomenting an illegal strike, around the time the new labor regime pushed by President Fujimori came into place (Law 728). Only six months earlier, he had begun living with (*conviviendo*) with his wife, and she advised him to accept a settlement from the company and leave. Nevertheless, he managed to hold out a bit longer than his comrades and thus managed to get more out of the company – twelve monthly salaries, plus a bonus of 3,000 soles (a bit under US\$1,500 in 1993), in addition to the legally-mandated compensation for labor time (CTS).

Don Desiderio and his father had always talked about the goal of starting a small family business (*empresa*) to work in transport. Since his father had worked in the concentrator plant, which operated on three continuous 8-hour shifts a day, he had never been able to do overtime, and yet he had managed to save a small amount of money. Don Desiderio, on the other hand, did have the option of working overtime in the mine, so his father advised him to save all of the earnings from that and use only the regular 8-hour wages for daily expenditures. There was no other way to save, because the regular paycheck always got diluted by the *descuento por caja* – the purchases against one's salary at the company store; besides, they had a large family. After leaving the company, they combined these savings with Don Desiderio's termination settlement and purchased a car with which to start an *empresa* transporting passengers. After they finished

paying off that first vehicle, they bought a *combi* (passenger van), and in that way started to grow the *empresa*. At one point, a driver they had hired crashed and destroyed one of the cars, which set them back, but eventually Don Desiderio's siblings came of age and got drivers' licenses too, so they could help in the driving. The family eventually had two small *empresas* – one transported passengers between Huayllay and Cerro de Pasco, the other contracted with the mining company, transporting employees. Eventually, however, things started going badly. Don Desiderio's father passed away, and the plans they had made together for expanding the *empresas* were interrupted. Quarrels arose between the siblings, debts mounted, and eventually the vehicles were repossessed. "I lost everything," he says – "so much money, so much time."

At the time of our conversations, in 2008 and 2009, Don Desiderio was busy undertaking the first steps to create a new *empresa*, also to work in transportation but with the hopes of eventually branching out into other areas. He told me he had just spent 3,000 soles on drafting the project and on the paperwork to get the *empresa* registered. He lived not in the town of Huayllay but rather up in the small, wind-swept settlement of La Hueca, adjacent to Francois, the last portion of the old Huarón housing complex that still remains, next to the concentrator plant and main entrance to the mine, at 4,600 meters above sea level. He is separated from his partner, who now lives in Huancayo (where she was originally from), and their children move back and forth between the two places. Two stepchildren were also living with him when I met him. For a time, his stepdaughter sold coffee and *panqueques*¹¹¹ out of their house, in the evenings around the 8pm shift change at the mine. His stepson, on the other hand, had begun working underground, through a subcontractor at the Huarón mine, a short walk from their house. Don Desiderio had at least partial access to his grandparents' old *estancia*, in another part of Huayllay's territory, and had a few sheep, llamas and alpacas there. He also had been talking with the owner of a small new radio station in Huayllay about the possibility of having a one-hour radio show about mining labor law – a topic on which he feels he can instruct the current generation of mining workers in Huayllay, based on readings he has done over the years as well as on his experience in the old union. His stepdaughter had also voiced the possibility of

¹¹¹ Not U.S.-style pancakes, but rather a doughy, fried flatbread that is popular in this region. In Cerro de Pasco as in Huayllay, a popular afternoon-to-evening meal (*lonche*) consists of *panqueques* with a choice of either coffee, hot chocolate, or a hot cider made of either apple or *maca*.

someday following in his footsteps and studying law in one of the regional universities, and he said he would support her.

Estela Páucar

The last life story I will discuss here is not of a mining worker, but rather of someone who had close contact with the world of mining workers (and was on the company's payroll) through her job as secretary of the mining union at Huarón, Estela Páucar.¹¹² Like Desiderio Roque, Estela was born in the Huarón mining camp; her parents were from Palcamayo, near Tarma in Junín Department, and had moved to Huarón to work. Her father worked in the concentrator plant for 37 years. She grew up in the 1960s and 70s, a time when the labor force had stabilized to a great degree and a sizeable community of workers and their families had formed at the mine. She describes a world in which sons followed their fathers into the mine; as she put it, "it was a hereditary matter." On the other hand, as discussed earlier, by this time a number of mining workers were making efforts to have their children pursue university degrees in the new regional universities. Doña Estela herself would study accounting as well as economics at the university in Cerro de Pasco. Around the same time she was beginning her studies, however, the union at Huarón had a job opening for a secretary position; ten people applied – all men except her. The applicants were given an exam, and Estela came in second. However, the man who came in first had a wife and two children, and the monthly salary offered was only 9,600 soles, an amount which by the late 1970s had been drastically cut by inflation.¹¹³ This was not enough to support a family, so the man decided to decline the offer, and the job was offered to Estela; since she was single, she could manage it.

She began work on July 1979. In the first few years, she says, she had some difficulty learning how to manage the union, since she was studying accounting, and "to enter the world of the proletariat was different." Besides, at the time there were around 2,130 workers affiliated to the union, so it was a complex organization. Nevertheless, she says the old leaders (*dirigentes*) at the time were experienced, and they helped her out. There were 24 *dirigentes* in all – 12 office-

¹¹² Pseudonym

¹¹³ According to the data I have available, this would have amounted to between US\$70 (at the beginning of 1978) and US\$40 (at the end of 1979).

holders (*titulares*) and 12 deputy office-holders (*subdirectiva*). The different offices in the union included Organization, Discipline, Procedures (*Técnica*), Statistics, Subsistence, Women's Affairs (*Asuntos Femeninos*), Welfare, Culture and Sports, Minutes (*Actas*), and Archives. One of Estela's many jobs was to coordinate with the Secretary of Women's Affairs to organize the women's committees (*comités de damas*) in the camp. Although these committees were especially active during times of strikes, by the 1980s there were also efforts by the National Mining Federation to centralize and coordinate the activities of the *comités de damas* in the different mining camps across the country. Together with the members of the *comités*, Estela traveled to seminars, congresses and trainings in Lima, where she met not only women from other Peruvian mines but also, as she put it, *compañeras* from Brazil, Argentina and other countries. She emphasizes that "I learned a lot thanks to the union," and that the congresses and trips were "an opportunity to be able to get out, learn more, have more social contact." She also highlights the strength that the women's committees had in the mining camp: "A union leader who did not respect a decision by the *comité de damas*, was removed immediately, and also repudiated by the people."¹¹⁴

In the 1980s, the economy and the mining sector were in crisis and the company was beginning to roll back benefits that the workers had enjoyed for several decades – such as the coal, firewood and school supplies that were given to the families, as well as any monetary bonuses beyond the regular monthly salary. In Estela's account, the union resisted some of these cutbacks in benefits, but they also eventually had to accept them:

Everyone was looking out for the future of their children, they did not want to lose their jobs. Of course, it hurt, right? But in the end, in order to maintain their job stability, they accepted. But, not on their own will, rather through a unanimous decision of the mass. That was determined in a general assembly.¹¹⁵

In the end, however, the company began pressuring the workers to accept cash incentives and leave the company. Doña Estela sees this as a conscious attempt to weaken the union; in her

¹¹⁴ "Dirigente que no respetaba decisión del comité de damas, era retirado inmediatamente, y repudiado también por la gente."

¹¹⁵ "Todos velaban por el futuro de sus hijos, no querían perder sus empleos. Claro, dolía, ¿no? Pero en el fondo, por querer mantener una estabilidad de trabajo, ellos aceptaban. Pero, no a voluntad propia, sino a decisión unánime de la masa. Eso determinaban en una asamblea general."

account, the company accomplished this partly by fomenting divisions along generational and educational lines – pitting the younger workers who had completed high school or pursued some higher education against the older generation who had only done elementary school. They also managed to scare some of the older workers by telling them that they would lose their compensation for time of service (CTS), which legally did not make sense. After the majority of the workers had left, the company began demolishing the camps; Estela was part of a group that held out almost to the end, until about the year 2000, refusing to leave the housing blocks. By this time she was already married; many young couples, she says, had no house of their own to go to outside the camp, so they held out as long as they could. In the 1990s there was a lot of unemployment in the area, and even the few workers who were still left in the company were taking pay cuts or not being paid regularly – after the mine flooded in 1998, they were not paid at all. At that time, the Mining Federation was encouraging the *comités de damas* to form microenterprises (*microempresas*) to make up for the lost income from the mine, by producing clothes to sell in the markets and fairs. Doña Estela also got together with some of the miners’ wives to form a *comedor popular* – the self-run “people’s kitchen” model that had become generalized throughout the country during the economic crisis of the 1980s, and that by the 1990s began to receive more state support and assistance. The *comedor popular* they formed received official authorization from the office of the National Food Assistance Program (PRONAA) in Cerro de Pasco, and still functions to this day.

At that time, Doña Estela was still officially the secretary of the *sindicato*; although the union was technically her *patrón* (boss), her salary had always been paid by the company, according to an agreement (*convenio*) between the company and the union, whereby she earned the same as an *obrero*. In 2000, a representative of the company convinced her to resign, saying that all of her employee benefits, pension rights and compensation for time of service (CTS) would be respected, just like with any worker. However, soon after the Adminco (Hochschild) administration sold the mine, and the new company refused to acknowledge Doña Estela’s claims. Thus, she initiated a legal proceeding against her *patrón*, the union, and got a court order impounding the union hall in her favor until she was paid. However, she says one of the remaining union leaders “betrayed” her and gave the key to the building to the mining company, which took it over and turned it into a dining hall for its employees. When I met her in 2009, her

legal dispute with the company continued, and the court order impounding the old union hall was technically still valid and was her “last hope” for getting the company to pay what she was owed.

Doña Estela is married to a *huayllino*, but she herself is not a *comunera*. Her husband is now working at the Animón mine. She also maintains a strong connection to her family’s village, near Tarma. She once bought six sheep and tried to keep them with her in Huayllay, but was told she could not use the pastures near the town, so she had to take the animals to her family’s village. After I interviewed her in 2009, I would sometimes run into Estela and her daughter as they were taking her husband’s lunch to the 11:00am bus that would take it up to the mine. She said her husband was not interested in things related to *sindicalismo*, and there are no strong unions in the two mines in the district now anyway. Estela, on the other hand, still thinks a strong, independent *organización sindical* is important:

A union organization is the axis, the engine of a working class... That’s why a lot of exploitation of man by man will continue, if the union does not function, because the company will do anything to be able to continue exploiting man.¹¹⁶

Value and reproductive labor in Marxist theory

In the previous chapter I gave a broad overview of migration and work in 20th-century industrial mining in central Peru, with a particular focus on one mining company and on the transition from labor shortage to labor surplus. In the first sections of this chapter I have focused on the nature of industrial mining work and the mining workforce. Towards the end of this chapter, I will discuss issues of work not in the mine but rather in the sphere in which labor-power was reproduced and replenished. This will involve a discussion of the mine-countryside relation, but also of the mining household. First, however, it is necessary to analyze the theoretical status of such “reproductive” work, as this constitutes an important question in social history and in studies of migration as well as in the study of work in the industrialized world.

¹¹⁶ “Una organización sindical es el eje, es el motor de una clase trabajadora... Por eso es que va a seguir existiendo bastante explotación del hombre por el hombre, si es que no funciona la organización sindical, porque la empresa se vale de todo para poder seguir explotando al hombre.”

Here I examine this topic from the perspective of Marxist theory, which is where most of these debates have occurred.

At the heart of Marx's analysis of the capitalist mode of production is his conception of surplus value and the exploitation of labor. As is well known, for Marx the tendency within the capitalist mode of production is for value to be equated with socially necessary labor.¹¹⁷ Labor produces this value as part of the industrial labor process, and receives a portion of the newly-created value back in the form of a wage.¹¹⁸ The remaining portion – surplus value – becomes the source of the capitalist's profit and of the augmentation of capital.¹¹⁹ This surplus value arises because of the peculiar, contradictory character of labor-power under capitalism. It is treated as a commodity like any other, with a value of its own (the earlier labor required to produce it), but it has the specific property of being able to create new value – for in capitalism, as we said, value is equated with labor.¹²⁰ Moreover, because it is a property of living human beings, labor-power

¹¹⁷ That is, the proportion of the total social labor taken up, on average (not in each specific case), by the production of any particular item. Marx learned the labor theory of value from Smith and Ricardo, but unlike the latter, he emphasized the social and abstract character of value – i.e. value as a force and a social relation that manifests itself in the aggregate and in the long run.

¹¹⁸ This “newly-created value” does not include the value contained in the means of production (i.e. machinery, raw materials), which is merely transferred to the product without augmentation. The study of constant capital, technology and means of production was central for Marx, as part of the analysis of relative surplus value, the rate of profit, the theory of crises, and many other crucial aspects of his work. It was not, however, central to the specific issue of the origins of surplus-value, and for that reason Marx abstracted from constant capital in his discussion of the concept. For Marx, technology increased the productivity of labor, but in the long run (the time frame for which his theory of value is designed) this led to a reduction in the value and in the price of the commodity; thus, it could not be the source of surplus value.

¹¹⁹ For Marx, it was crucial to point out that such augmentation could take place only in production, not in circulation – i.e., not by buying cheap and selling dear, which could lead to individual fortunes but not to an increase in the overall capital of the society, since it tended to cancel out.

¹²⁰ To put it in Marx's terms, all commodities have a use-value and an exchange-value – the latter being ultimately (in the long run and in the aggregate) an expression of the commodity's value, i.e. of the proportion of social labor time that it requires for its production. The commodity labor-power has a value like any other commodity – the labor needed to produce it – and it also has a use-value. Its use-value consists of the production of value. The capitalist treats labor like any other commodity – pays for its value (the wage) – and consumes its use-value, i.e. sets it to creating value. This arrangement allows the capitalist to follow the rules of free-market exchange – i.e. that commodities be paid for at their values – while at the same time extracting surplus labor from the workers. The production of surplus value in capitalism is thus rooted in the articulation of the public and private spheres. The former is the “exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham” – in Marx's words – while the latter is the “hidden abode of production” where the capitalist can rule as a despot (Marx 1976, 280). Capital hires labor in the public sphere and sets it to work in the private sphere; it thus maintains a dual character of being about freedom and domination at the same time.

can be exercised in a variable way. Specifically, workers can be made to labor longer than needed to produce the value of their wages. That extra time is called surplus labor and the value produced during it is surplus value, while the other portion is called necessary labor and its product is the wage. Surplus value can be produced in one of two ways: either by extending the working-day beyond necessary labor, or by using technology to increase productivity and cheapen subsistence goods, thus reducing the time needed to produce the sustenance of the workers (i.e. reducing the necessary labor fraction of the working day). The first kind is absolute surplus value, the second is relative surplus value; Marx believed both were present within the capitalist mode of production, but the second tended to outweigh the first as capitalism became more developed.

This, in a very broad and abstract sense, is Marx's account of the origin of surplus value; it is also his concept of "exploitation," by which he understood the extraction of surplus labor from the worker by the capitalist.¹²¹ It is this dynamic that attracted the most attention from Marx himself and from later Marxists, both at the intellectual and at the political levels.¹²² But the focus on the exploitation of wage labor in the context of industrial capitalist production ignored many forms of oppression and domination that existed in the world and that actually affected larger numbers of people. In a broad, aggregate scale, and in the long run, issues of value in Marx's sense do affect much (indeed most) of humanity, since they condition the relationship between capitalism and other modes of production (and help explain the devaluing of the latter) and since they lie at the heart of phenomena such as economic crises. But in an immediate sense,

¹²¹ Specifically, Marx equated the degree of exploitation with the rate of surplus-value – i.e. the ratio of surplus labor to necessary labor, or of surplus value to the value of labor-power: "The rate of surplus-value is therefore an exact expression for the degree of exploitation of labor-power by capital, or of the worker by the capitalist" (Marx 1976, 326). The absolute magnitude of exploitation, on the other hand, is equated with the duration of surplus labor itself (Ibid.).

¹²² Attempting an interpretation of the meaning and consequences of exploitation of labor in concrete terms, we can say that, for Marx, exploited workers in fully-developed capitalism would receive a wage that was sufficient to maintain and reproduce them as workers (and, to the degree that it was necessary, as social beings), but they would either 1) work long hours, 2) see the value of their labor power (and thus to some degree of their social personhood and social power) decrease, in the sense that, although their consumption might remain the same or even increase, it would represent an ever-shrinking portion of the total social product, which would be massively expanding due to advanced technology. Again, the first would correspond to absolute surplus value, the second to relative surplus value; in practice, both occur simultaneously, and in conjunction with other phenomena such as what Marx called original or "primitive" accumulation (in David Harvey's terms, "accumulation by dispossession").

the focus on the exploitation of wage labor by itself does not directly help us understand relations such as ethnic/racial discrimination, unpaid domestic work, or the role of natural resources in the formation of wealth – the latter particularly important for the study of “nature-intensive commodities” such as minerals (Coronil 2000, 357). Marx did develop concepts for understanding some of these phenomena – primitive accumulation in the case of colonial dispossession, ground rent (both absolute and differential) in the case of natural resources – even if he did not give them the same attention he granted to the exploitation of wage labor. However, in the case of domestic work his silence was greater. Marx did open up an avenue that could have led to an examination of domestic labor, by taking seriously the need for worker’s labor power and social personhood to be replenished every day, and by recognizing the complex nature of workers’ needs, which were not a physical/biological given (as Ricardo and Malthus believed) but rather were “themselves products of history” and had to do with people’s “habits and expectations” (Marx 1976, 274-275).¹²³ However, he focused only on the commodities that workers purchased for their subsistence (food, clothing, etc.), without noting the fact that these needed to be actively transformed through a process that involved work, before they could satisfy people’s needs (Federici 2006, 3). In this way, Marx effectively rendered invisible the work of the millions of individuals – usually family members – who perform this activity.¹²⁴

A reaction against this invisibility of domestic work in Marxist theory came as part of the intellectual and political ferment of the women’s liberation movement in the late 1960s and 70s. The “domestic labor debate” was one of the key questions in the emerging Marxist feminist scholarship (Dalla Costa and James 1971, Seccombe 1974, Federici 1975, Smith 1978, Vogel

¹²³ For Ricardo’s and Malthus’ views on the nature of needs as biological givens, see Himmelweit 1983, 569.

¹²⁴ There were several reasons for this omission. One is the inherent male bias present at the time and in his work; another is Marx’s aim of analyzing not social reality as a whole but the capitalist mode of production in particular, which requires him to abstract (sometimes temporarily, sometimes permanently) from relations and spheres that are not contained within capitalist production. Another reason, as Silvia Federici argues, is that Marx “accepted the capitalist criteria for what constitutes work,” due to the fact that he “remained wedded to a technologicist concept of revolution, where freedom comes through the machine;” he thus was less interested in those spheres of work where technology did not or could not enter. Furthermore, as Federici reminds us, the role of the modern working-class housewife did not fully emerge in England until the late 19th century, after Marx had completed his writings. During the early Industrial Revolution, through Marx’s lifetime, capitalist accumulation had been based on cheap labor and on the unlimited extension of the working day, not only for men but also often for women workers, so that, according to Federici, “reproductive work was reduced to a minimum” and the working class was “almost unable to reproduce itself” (Federici 2006, 3-4).

1983, Himmelweit 1983, Molyneux 1983, among others). Prominent in these arguments was the work of a number of individuals associated with the Italian *autonomia* movement as well as currents in Great Britain and North America. Intellectuals and activists like Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Selma James and Silvia Federici drew attention to the contribution that women's unpaid domestic work made to the capitalist economy as a whole, and demanded "wages for housework." While other sectors of the feminist movement warned that this demand could have the pernicious effect of entrenching the domestic role of women even further, "wages for housework" proponents like Federici argued that "to say that we want money for housework is the first step towards refusing to do it, because the demand for a wage makes our work visible, which is the most indispensable condition to begin to struggle against it" (Federici 1975, 5).¹²⁵ For some of these writers, making the work visible meant reacting against the traditional Marxist omission on this point by placing domestic labor at the heart of the production of value in capitalism. As Dalla Costa and James¹²⁶ wrote in 1971, "within the wage, domestic work produces not merely use values, but is essential to the production of surplus value." They furthermore specified that "what we meant precisely is that housework as work is productive in the Marxian sense, that is, is producing surplus value" (Dalla Costa and James 1971, 16). These writers, as well as others such as Secombe (1974), made the argument that unpaid domestic work - performed mostly by women - produced the value of labor-power, and thus was part of the process of value production as a whole. More value was produced, and more surplus value appropriated by capitalists, as a result of domestic work performed in the home.

Just as the "wages for housework" campaign was criticized by other sectors of the women's movement for its perceived political implications and limited scope, the theoretical arguments of its proponents also received criticism from Marxist analysts. Some of them recognized the importance of the domestic labor debate but objected to the idea that unpaid domestic labor created value (or, for that matter, surplus value) in Marx's sense. In particular, Paul Smith (1978) criticized the lack of rigor in relation to this specific matter as it had appeared

¹²⁵ Similarly, Dalla Costa and James (1971) had written that "the demand for a wage is only a basis, a perspective, from which to start, whose merit is essentially to link immediately female oppression, subordination and isolation to their material foundation: female exploitation." (20)

¹²⁶ The authorship of this well-known text is actually disputed between Dalla Costa and James.

in the different sides of the domestic labor debate. He argued that domestic work in the household was not subject to the pressures and regulatory force of the law of value, which is the tendency for commodities to be exchanged at rates proportional to the amount of socially necessary labor they represent, and thus could not be seen as having been incorporated into society's pool of abstract, homogeneous, value-producing labor.¹²⁷ Domestic labor was indeed necessary for capitalist production, but it was not internal to it; rather, it was "one of its external conditions of existence, which it continually reproduces" (Smith 1978).¹²⁸ Smith emphasized that Marx's concept of value was precisely an attempt to represent the perspective of capital; thus, "it is not Marx's theory of value which marginalizes domestic labor, but the capitalist mode of production" (Ibid., 215). Using Marxist terminology, Smith argued that domestic labor does create the ability of wage labor to produce value – but this ability is labor-power's use-value (which is consumed by the capitalist in the labor process), not its value. The value of labor-power is still that of the commodities purchased for subsistence - a value that the unpaid domestic laborer transfers into the commodity (labor-power) without altering its magnitude.

Maxine Molyneux (1979) agreed with Smith that housework was "not subject to the general equalization of labor," hence "there is no basis for the calculation of a transfer of surplus labor-time" from the domestic sphere to the world of commodity production (Molyneux 1979, 9).¹²⁹ Moreover, she critiqued the assumption, which had been present in the domestic labor debate till then, that domestic labor actually had a significant effect on the value of labor power

¹²⁷ For Smith, the fact that domestic labor was not allocated through the Law of Value was seen in that "when the process of capitalist accumulation draws women into capitalist production as wage workers, this is not instead of, but in addition to, their performance of domestic labor" (Smith 1978, 205). Similarly, "domestic labor does not cease to be performed when there is relative overproduction of its particular product" (Ibid., 206). Moreover, domestic labor was not subject to the process by which "labor is socially regulated through exchange in its methods, technology and productivity" (Ibid., 205). All this meant that something other than the Law of Value was regulating and commanding domestic labor.

¹²⁸ This discussion is linked to Marx's emphasis on the close, symbiotic relationship between use-value and value (the latter expressed as exchange-value), in spite of their opposition as distinct aspects of the commodity.

¹²⁹ Like Smith and Molyneux, Lise Vogel (1983 and 2000) also agreed that domestic labor does not produce value in the Marxist sense, although she at first argued that it could be seen as part of or continuous with Marx's notion of the "necessary component" of the working day under capitalism. Necessary labor was thus "a more complicated conceptual category than previously thought," containing "two components, one with value and the other without" (Vogel 2000, 162). She seems to have later retreated from this model, while arguing that "whether domestic labor is conceptualized as a component of necessary labor or not, the bottom line is that some way to theorize it within Marxist political economy must be found" (Vogel 2000, 162).

and helped to keep wages low. Picking up on Marx's mention of the "historic and moral element" of the value of labor power, Molyneux argued that this value was shaped by so many social, cultural and political factors (in the process of definition of the workers' "needs"), that unpaid domestic labor at home was just one of them: "Within this multiplicity of determinations, the contribution of housework to establishing the value of labor power plays a relatively minor role" (Ibid., 10). It wasn't clear at all that domestic labor actually cheapened the value of labor; if anything, Molyneux pointed out, it was usually higher-paid wage workers in the advanced capitalist countries who had gained the option of maintaining a full-time housewife through the "family wage."¹³⁰ This led her to criticize the general functionalist tendency of the domestic labor debate, which assumed that housework always served an essential function for capital, whereas in reality "the confinement of women to the domestic sphere may be advantageous in some circumstances but not in others" (Ibid., 25). If anything, she argued, the domestic labor debate had so far largely ignored a type of household work that was actually of much greater benefit to capital (because it was much costlier to buy in the market) than servicing the immediate needs of the wage worker – the work of raising and caring for children, i.e. of reproducing the future generation of workers.

Molyneux argued for a shift from a narrow focus on housework towards examining the broader socioeconomic relations established by women and the household as a whole; she also criticized the attempt to assimilate housework into the analysis of capitalism as an abstraction, arguing that "the emphasis must be shifted from the level of the capitalist mode of production to the level of determinate social formations and their reproduction" (Ibid., 22). Moreover, she criticized the economicism that had characterized the domestic labor debate; although the oppression of women certainly had an important economic dimension,

An understanding of women's subordination cannot be reduced to economic or material factors alone, even when these are conceived in the broadest terms; it also entails consideration of the important work currently being carried out in the field of

¹³⁰ Molyneux did acknowledge that under specific conditions in which low-cost subsistence services (such as domestic work) are not available on the market, it could be said that having families perform their own housework does help to maintain the value of labor power at a lower level than if they had to pay for housework. But even in this case, other determinants of the value of labor power have to be present initially in order to raise the wage to a level high enough that maintaining family members engaged full-time in domestic work is even a possibility.

psychoanalysis, sexuality, language and ideology. It therefore involves, by extension, an analysis of inter-sexual and inter-familial relations (Ibid., 22).

As Vogel (2000) describes, the debate on the value of domestic labor was largely abandoned after the late 1970s and early 80s, although domestic labor analysis continued on other fronts. It is not the purpose of this chapter to offer a wholly new perspective on the debate of the 1970s. However, my own position is closer to that of Smith and Molyneux in asserting the importance of the distinction between capitalist value production and the forms of surplus extraction involved in unpaid domestic work, as well as the close links between the two (depending on the particular historical situation). The merit of the domestic labor theorists and activists of the 1970s was to bring housework, and along with it the experience of millions of people – a “massive laboring population in late capitalism completely outside the organizations and struggles of the proletariat” (Secombe 1974, 3) - to the forefront. They were correct in pointing out that Marxism had neglected this crucial aspect of social reality. However, the importance of distinguishing firmly between something like domestic labor, on the one hand, and value-producing labor in Marx’s sense, on the other, lies in the fact that such a distinction helps us to understand value in capitalism not just as involving exploitation but also exclusion. Certainly, the existence of unpaid domestic labor can, under certain circumstances, contribute to keeping the rate of surplus value high, by placing limits on the portion of the working day taken up by necessary labor (because it supplies goods and services needed for sustenance, which the worker does not then need to pay for). In that sense, domestic labor can be said to create or cause a certain rate of surplus value; however, causality in general is not the same as production in Marx’s specific sense.

The difference is not just one of theoretical semantics, but rather of specific moments within a larger dialectic (Ollman 2003, 66); “production” is one moment of reification (of “labor” into “capital”) in an ongoing process that also includes unpaid domestic labor as well as other activities that may be necessary for capital. Unpaid domestic labor in this sense is one step removed from surplus value, for it creates the use-values that sustain and reproduce the producers of surplus value. In particular historical and cultural contexts, capital does cause family members (spouses in particular) to work long hours at domestic chores, but it then excludes them from the status of value producers, by recognizing as the value of labor power

only that of the subsistence commodities purchased by the worker, not the work that goes into processing them after they're bought. This is a structural matter, and it would not be a simple task to change people's minds so that they do recognize other forms of work and value. Of course, through politics and struggle people can seek to assign value to other activities or products, but this will eventually come into conflict with the functioning of capitalism itself.¹³¹ Domestic labor performs a necessary service for capital, but the capitalist mode of production tends towards a structural inability to recognize the value of this service. In that sense, this discussion allows us to see value in capitalism not just as a quantitative matter involving exploitation and the enrichment of some at the expense of others, but also as involving a semiotic dimension that selects certain agents and forms of activity and systematically devalues others, even as it manipulates them and appropriates their products.

The discussion has so far focused on unpaid domestic work only – that performed by household members, often women, and which sparked the “domestic labor debate” of the 1970s. We have so far abstracted from another very important type of reproductive labor – that performed by paid domestic laborers.¹³² The importance of this type of labor is evident in both Third World as well as advanced capitalist societies, albeit in different ways. From the perspective of Marxist political economy, paid domestic work has traditionally been mentioned in the context of the distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” labor, both of which are paid. This is a relatively neglected conceptual distinction, which has attracted little attention

¹³¹ This actually makes sense if we remember the radical working-class politics of the Wages for Housework campaign, which certainly would have had no problem with undermining capital as a result of its demands. As Federici wrote, “We struggle to break capital's place for women, which is an essential moment of that planned division of labor and social power within the working class, through which capital has been able to maintain its power. Wages for housework, then, is a revolutionary demand not because by itself it destroys capital, but because it attacks capital and forces it to restructure social relations in terms more favorable to us and consequently more favorable to the unity of the class” (Federici 1975, 5).

¹³² As Duffy (2007) writes, social science scholarship has had to come to grips with “the inadequacy of the equation of women with unpaid domestic work in the private sphere and men with paid work in the public sphere...Two concurrent trends have made the limitations of this view more clear in recent decades: the increasing numbers of women in the paid labor force and the heightened visibility of the role of paid workers in reproductive labor. As a result, the concept has been expanded to bridge the unpaid and paid spheres” (Duffy 2007, 315). Going further, Constable (2009) writes of “the commodification of intimacy” to argue that the line between paid work and the intimacy of the home is not always so clearly drawn: “As scholarship on transnational intimacies illustrates, relationships assumed to be based primarily on paid work for money are often understood to involve complex forms of intimacy, love or emotion, and those assumed to be based on love are linked in new and evolving ways to commercial practices and material desires” (Constable 2009, 56).

even among Marxist theorists. Gough (1972) laid out Marx's arguments on the matter, while raising some questions about their internal consistency and applicability to contemporary capitalism; Savran and Tonak (1999), on the other hand, vigorously reassert the validity of the productive/unproductive distinction.

For Marx, "productive" labor refers to labor that directly produces surplus value. Two conditions must be met for labor to be considered "productive" in this sense: it must be employed directly by capital, and this capital must be productive (rather than commercial or financial) capital – that is, it must be capital that directly produces use-values and does not simply move money around. "Unproductive" labor, on the other hand, is exchanged for revenue – either profits or wages – or for non-productive capital.¹³³ Marx initially got this definition from Adam Smith, but, unlike the latter, he included immaterial production and services such as transportation within productive labor, so long as they took place within a capitalist enterprise (i.e. producing surplus value) and were a necessary part of the production of the finished use-value (Gough 1972, 53). Unproductive labor on the other hand, could produce essential use-values, but it did not immediately produce surplus-value. As with the concept of value itself, the productive/unproductive distinction does not refer to any intrinsic worth of the activity in question, but rather seeks to represent its relationship to capital.¹³⁴ As Savran and Tonak argue,

¹³³ Thus, not only are wage workers hired individually out of revenue or wages included within the category of "unproductive" workers, but also wage workers who are employed by capital that is engaged in circulation (or, presumably, finance) rather than production. According to both Gough's and Savran and Tonak's interpretations of Marx, commercial workers would be engaging in "production" in so far as they package and transport the product to the buyer, but would be engaging merely in circulation at the moment they sell it. This is probably the most controversial aspect of the productive/unproductive labor distinction. For Savran and Tonak, the classification of people engaged in the circulation of money as "unproductive" of surplus value is a necessary consequence of Marx's key argument that value can only be augmented in production, not in circulation – i.e. value cannot be produced by buying cheap and selling dear, which is presumably what "pure merchant capital," considered in the abstract, does. The distinction between production and circulation is grounded in that between use-value and exchange-value – production modifies use-values, whereas circulation changes the commodity into or out of the money form. According to Savran and Tonak, this is the definition of production in general, and is one of the two criteria for defining "productive labor" under capitalism – the other being that this production take place under capital.

¹³⁴ This is made clear by Marx, who writes that "Milton, who wrote *Paradise Lost*, was an unproductive worker. On the other hand, a writer who turns out work for his publisher in factory style is a productive worker" (Marx 1976, 1044). While it is clear that Marx is not being judgmental or dismissive of people who fit into the "unproductive" category simply because they do not work directly for capital (such as a teacher, or Milton, or Marx himself for that matter), that is less clear for the case of individuals who are classed as "unproductive" not because they do not work for capital but because they work in (purely) commercial or financial activities. As Savran and Tonak write, "it is

Major sections of the working class in capitalist society are unproductive workers. Naturally, this does not imply in any sense that they are less important either for the well-being of society or for the class struggle and for revolutionary strategy. The distinction PUPL [productive/unproductive labor] is significant exclusively for the analysis of the various significant variables of the capitalist economy such as the value of labor-power, the rate and mass of surplus-value and hence the rate of capital accumulation. This is sufficient ground for taking the distinction seriously for it is only through an examination of these variables that Marxists can adequately analyze the historical trajectory and the cyclical fluctuations of capitalist accumulation. (Savran and Tonak 1999, 147)

Paid domestic workers hired on their own would be included within the group of “unproductive” workers, while those who do the same kind of work but are employed by a capitalist enterprise providing, say, cleaning services, would be grouped with “productive” workers.¹³⁵ The former, together with other “unproductive” workers such as most teachers – who, like domestic workers, produce useful and necessary services but are not employed by capital – could very well help to raise the productivity of labor and thus the rate of surplus value, but they would be contributing to surplus value indirectly rather than directly.

Again, the issue is not one of presence or absence of causality but of moments within a process; “productive” workers are simply situated in the moment in which labor is reified into capital (a location that in a sense grants them a “privileged” status) but all the previous steps are part of the process as well. This does not necessarily mean that a surplus is not extracted from “unproductive” workers; the extraction of surplus is common to many modes of production, but the extraction of a surplus in the form of surplus value is unique to the capitalist mode of production.¹³⁶ The exploitation of “productive” wage labor – i.e. the production of surplus value

true that Marx regards the expenses of circulation (which obviously include the wages of workers employed in this sphere) as the *faux frais* of capitalism, as an expression of its irrational nature” (Savran and Tonak 1999, 143).

¹³⁵ This change in the status of a particular kind of work, depending on whether it is employed by capital, is made clear by Marx: “A singer who sings like a bird is an unproductive worker. If she sells her song for money, she is to that extent a wage-laborer or merchant. But if the same singer is engaged by an entrepreneur who makes her sing to make money, then she becomes a productive worker, since she produces capital directly.” (Marx 1976, 1044).

¹³⁶ Again, surplus value is the particular form that surplus extraction acquires in the capitalist mode of production – it is when workers are paid a wage (in theory enough to cover the reproduction of their labor power according to historically defined “needs”) but then made to work longer than is necessary to produce that wage, and the difference (surplus value) turns into profit and capital with which to begin the whole process again. In this way a surplus is extracted in a way that is different from that of feudalism or tribute economies. In capitalism, workers hired out of revenue or wages, such as independent domestic workers, are also made to work beyond what they would need for their own sustenance (which thus constitutes a surplus), but the difference does not immediately

– always needs other mechanisms of extraction; one such is primitive accumulation (what David Harvey has renamed “accumulation by dispossession”). “Unproductive” wage workers, or unpaid domestic workers such as housewives/husbands for that matter, may also be subject to their own particular mechanisms of surplus extraction.¹³⁷ These mechanisms may be pre-existing and may be appropriated by capital, or they may be set up by capital itself, or a combination of the two. Also, as Molyneux points out, they may not necessarily be functional to capital.

It thus becomes important to maintain the distinctions between the different spheres and modes of appropriation and to map out the links between them and the moments of transformation that they undergo; both the boundaries and the links have concrete implications. The production of value and surplus-value in the Marxist sense can then be “provincialized” (rather than diluting the concept by assimilating all forms of work to it) without losing sight of its central importance in the capitalist world economy as well as its status as one element in a longer chain.¹³⁸ As Molyneux argues, this requires both shifting between the abstract level of the capitalist mode of production and the “determinate social formations,” as well as moving from a purely material lens towards perspectives that also examine cultural, ideological and other aspects - without losing sight of the crucial material dimension.

In this section, I have discussed the theoretical status of reproductive and particularly domestic labor, from the specific perspective of Marxist theory. In the following section, I return from an abstract to a concrete level to more directly examine the question of reproductive labor in the mines of the Central Highlands and in the Huarón mine in particular. First I discuss the relationship between mining and rural production, and the reproductive role that the latter

become capital – it may turn into pleasure, status or well-being for the person who hires the labor, or it may simply free them up to go work as “productive” workers for capital.

¹³⁷ It should be mentioned that Molyneux (16-19) is critical of the notion that unpaid domestic workers constitute a separate “domestic mode of production” that is “client” to the dominant capitalist mode, as Harrison (1976) believed. While subordinate modes of production certainly do exist within the general capitalist social formation, the unpaid domestic work of spouses does not have enough independence to be considered a separate mode of production. It would instead seem to be a mechanism that is appended to, without really being included under, the capitalist mode of production.

¹³⁸ See Coronil’s (1997; 61) call to “displace the capital/labor relation from the ossified centrality it has been made to occupy by Marxist theory.”

fulfilled for the former. Then I examine some aspects of domestic and reproductive labor at the Huarón mining camp.

The division of labor and the reproduction of labor-power

The relationship between mining and rural production in the Central Highlands

Migration to the mines of central Peru in the 20th century was not solely an individual decision but rather one that involved and affected an entire household. This was true both when workers migrated alone and when they were accompanied by at least part of their families. The back-and-forth migration pattern characteristic of the mines in the first half of the 20th century has been noted by several authors; it was rooted both in the desire on the part of mining companies for low-wage (rather than skilled) labor and in the need of migrants to maintain a foot in rural production. This pattern meant a continued participation by the household in agriculture and/or animal husbandry, even when one or more of the adult males was working in the mines. Naturally, it was often women who had to perform a greater share of agricultural duties. As Mallon (1983) writes for the Yanamarca area of the Mantaro Valley in the early 20th century, when people were migrating to the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's mines, "most male migrants depended on wives and other female relations to tend the agricultural side of the household economy, often with the aid of occasional wage labor" (254). Similarly, for Huayllay in the mid-1940s – where herding rather than agriculture was the traditional basis of the economy – Tschopik (1947) wrote that "the tending of the flocks and herds is today largely the work of the women and the less acculturated Indians of the surrounding *estancias*" (Tschopik 1947, 52).

This general pattern – an intra-household gendered division between mining work and work in the rural subsistence economy - did not entirely disappear later in the century, at least for communities that were close enough to the mining centers that even stable, long-term workers could keep part of their family in the home village. Such was the case for the Mantaro Valley village of Ataura, where Laite (1980) conducted his research in the early 1970s, and many of whose adult men worked in the CPC's metallurgical complex at La Oroya:

Women working the land are a common sight. The wives and mothers of migrants tend several small plots of land scattered around the village. At seed time and harvest they will call upon another female relative for hand-work, or engage a retired immigrant with a pair of oxen. As he ploughs the woman will bring him beer and food which they take together, gossiping. He receives a flat cash rate for the job and the woman helps him carry his implements home (Ibid., 108-109).

During the same period, this situation was replicated in many communities in the herding region of the Pasco/Junín plateau.¹³⁹ Even after the relative stabilization of mining labor in the 1950s and 60s, the proximity of these communities to the mines meant that workers could maintain close links to their home village, where their family members often took charge of the flocks – which by then constituted only a secondary component of the household economy,

To the degree that this occurred, the division between the mining enclave and the surrounding society and economy was also – in part – a gendered division of labor. And in turn, the gendered division of labor at the mine cannot be understood without reference to the relationship of the mine to the surrounding society, in particular to rural production in agriculture or cattle-raising. This relationship, like domestic labor, is crucial to understanding the reproduction of the labor force. For that reason we must examine it briefly, primarily through the work of scholars who examined the Peruvian mining industry – and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in particular – in the 1970s. DeWind (1987) devoted much attention to the back-and-forth migration patterns of the first half of the 20th-century and the corresponding “peasant-miner” nature of the workforce – something agreed on by virtually all who have researched the history of mining in Peru, even if they may disagree somewhat about exact periodization (see previous chapter). On the basis of this “peasant-miner” phenomenon, DeWind argued that the agrarian sector subsidized part of the company’s profits, by allowing it to pay wages that were below what would otherwise have been needed to reproduce the worker’s labor power:

¹³⁹ In a 1970 Agrarian Reform Report written for the National Office of Peasant Communities, Chang and Núñez del Prado write about the plateau community of Villa de Pasco, which at the time had many of its men working in the mines: “Paradoxically, the *comuneros*, in spite of their fundamental cattle-raising roots, currently have this as a secondary activity. They leave in the hands of the women, children and old people everything relating to their family herds [*ganadería familiar*]... The women are the ones who practically carry the greater part of community life on their shoulders: they play the double role of housewife and shepherd for the family flocks, with the help of their children; additionally, they substitute for their husbands in the communal *faenas* when the latter cannot attend” (Chang and Núñez del Prado 1970, 11, 28-29).

A portion of the profits of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation were produced in the agricultural sector. Throughout the company's history the mine workers rarely lived on their wages alone but depended on agricultural produce for part of their livelihood. The close ties of the labor force to the agricultural sector enabled the company to reduce its wages, save on costs and reap higher profits on its mining operations. (DeWind 1987, 229).

The relationship to agriculture was not only with peasant production but also with the CPC's own haciendas, which it began to acquire after the "smoke affair" of the 1920s damaged the haciendas in the vicinity of the La Oroya smelting complex and compelled their owners to sell their land to the company. Once the "Cattle-raising Department" (*División Ganadera*) had been created, the company began acquiring more properties well beyond the Oroya area, eventually accumulating around 300,000 hectares (Martínez-Alier 1973, 6), before the Agrarian Reform of the 1960s expropriated this land. During those several decades, the CPC used its meat and dairy products to provide food to its workers at low cost and thus cheapen the cost of subsistence, thereby countering pressures to raise wages. This arrangement was predicated on the process of primitive accumulation that had originally led to the formation of the haciendas at the expense of indigenous lands during the colonial period and the 19th century (a process to which the company became the heir when it purchased the estates). In addition to this, the company's *División Ganadera* attempted to further modernize its haciendas and implement more efficient methods, which required securing and reinforcing boundaries with neighboring communities that had previously been more porous; this was interpreted by the neighboring population as an expansion into communal land.¹⁴⁰ That these processes of dispossession (either past or present) were not trivial is shown by the fact that the CPC's haciendas were among the first to be

¹⁴⁰ This process is described by Martínez-Alier (1973): "The expression 'expansion of the *haciendas*' refers to the effective exercise of property rights within the boundaries of the *haciendas*... My impression is that in the Central Highlands all of the *haciendas* have titles that go back to the colonial era. However, those titles have been the object of dispute, and, what from the point of view of the *hacendado* is taken to be the effective occupation of the lands that are [his/her] property, is considered dispossession by the Indians" (Martínez-Alier 1973, 2-3). What this means is that the process of primitive accumulation consisted not only of the initial formation of the *haciendas* in the colonial period, but also of the moment in which the owners decided or were compelled to effectively enforce their property rights, as the CPC did in the 20th century and in the 1950s in particular, in order to modernize its haciendas and make them more productive. It should be mentioned that for Martínez-Alier, this modernization consisted not only of enforcing boundaries but also of expelling shepherds' own sheep (*huacchillas*) from the haciendas and turning *huacchillero* shepherds into wage laborers; this was also an important factor in deteriorating relations with neighboring communities.

occupied during the land recuperation campaigns that peasant communities of the Central Highlands (particularly in Pasco and Junín Departments) undertook in the early 1960s.

For this reason, DeWind emphasizes the role of both the haciendas and the peasant communities in subsidizing the reproduction of the company's labor force: "Through its ties with both peasant villages and large commercial haciendas the company drained wealth out of the agricultural sector" (DeWind 1987, 229). Similarly, Laite (1981) discusses the role played by rural communities of origin in reproducing the labor power of migrant workers (such as the Mantaro Valley workers whom he studied), whom he contrasts with fully industrial proletarians:

It is the relation of migrant labor to the means of reproduction that clearly distinguishes it from an industrial working class. The industrial proletariat reproduces physically and culturally within the industrial sector, supported by the State and by wages that are high enough for both the laborer and his family to subsist and reproduce. The reproduction of a migrant labor force, in contrast, occurs outside the industrial sector. Industrial wages do not necessarily cover the subsistence costs of either the worker or his family. Workers must organize their own subsistence in the agricultural sector (Laite 1981, 201).

Earlier in this chapter we saw that Molyneux (1979) disputed the argument that unpaid domestic labor always played a significant role in the determination of the value of labor-power and helped to keep wages low. However, it is harder to dispute the argument, made by both DeWind and Laite, that agricultural production in central Peru helped to keep mining wages low for much of the 20th century, thus contributing to a higher rate of surplus-value for the mining companies. Granted, as producers of "nature-intensive commodities," to use Coronil's (2000; 357) term, the mining companies derived large part of their profits from (absolute) rents rather than from the production of surplus-value.¹⁴¹ However, the fact that the dynamics of surplus-value production common to other capitalist sectors were not entirely absent from the mines is evidenced not only by the large workforce employed at the time, but also by the fact that the mining companies actively sought cheap labor and saw this as one of the main advantages of

¹⁴¹ Marx's concept of absolute rent refers to the surplus-value that is drained from other capitalist sectors towards those engaged in the extraction of natural resources, by virtue of the latter's control over a scarce resource and thus exemption from the equalization of the rates of profit, as well as by virtue of political relations. Differential rent, on the other hand, is a better-known concept; in Marxist terms it refers to surplus-value that is drained from less productive towards more productive enterprises within the same extractive or agricultural sector – this value can then be captured by the owner of the land, if different from the capitalist engaged in extraction or agricultural production.

hiring local, mostly indigenous workers as opposed to bringing more expensive labor from the outside.

One way to interpret this would be to say that local labor was paid below its value. A different, stricter interpretation (one more in line with Smith's arguments detailed in the previous section of this chapter) would argue that labor-power was paid at its value, but that this value was low because the number of subsistence commodities purchased in the market was limited. The "necessary component" of the working day was thus kept short and the rate and mass of surplus-value could be kept high. The "peasant-miners" of the first half of the 20th century were in a sense suspended between two spheres – the capitalist mining industry, on the one hand, and peasant household production, on the other. The latter did not directly figure as (abstract, homogeneous) value for the capitalist sector, but it produced a crucial use-value – labor-power – that was extracted from it like a surplus or tribute.¹⁴² Certainly, this unstable "peasant-miner" labor may not always have been the most productive or skilled, but still, its working day could be extended well beyond the (low) point of "necessary" labor.

This articulation between the capitalist and non-capitalist worlds was thus a source of profitability for the mining companies in Peru, as it has been in other parts of the world where people who have a partial basis in non-capitalist production work for low wages in the capitalist economy.¹⁴³ Workers in the early years were barely paid enough to maintain themselves as individuals, let alone a "family wage." The subsidy from the peasant household economy to the mining economy could take the form of produce taken by the worker from his village to the mining camp. As Chilean labor lawyer and International Labor Organization official Moisés Poblete Troncoso wrote, in a 1938 report, based on his visit to the Cerro de Pasco Corporation camps,

¹⁴² These distinctions may seem overly abstract, but I believe the first interpretation (superexploitation, i.e. labor paid below its value) emphasizes the additional surplus extracted from the worker (beyond normal surplus-value); the second interpretation highlights a surplus extracted not just from the worker but from his/her family and from the non-capitalist economy in general. This would be more similar to tribute than to surplus-value in the capitalist sense.

¹⁴³ "Capitalist" is here understood in a narrow sense that refers to the presence of capital investment and profits, rather than in a broader sense referring merely to the presence of market exchange and money – the latter being a precondition of capitalism but not unique to it.

The author conducted a survey among several families of Indian *obreros* and among the *obreros* themselves, and was informed that said salary is not enough for the Indians to meet even their essential expenses. When the families of the majority of the *obreros* stay back in their regions of origin, they send agricultural products every week to the Indians who labor in the mines, so that they can at least satisfy their nutritional needs (Poblete 1938, 144).

More significantly, the subsidy from the peasant household economy consisted of the maintenance, at little or no cost to capital, of the worker's family as well as of the reproduction of the next generation of workers.

Nevertheless, there was a change in this relationship in the second half of the 20th century, once mining companies attempted – to varying degrees - to stabilize their workforce. This led to workers and their families being less associated with rural production and more restricted to the world of the mining camp itself. In fact, DeWind argues that at the CPC this contributed to the radicalization of the mining unions in the late 1960s and 1970s; the company had sought to turn its workers into permanent, more skilled laborers, and the workers demanded that salaries rise to a level high enough to make this viable.¹⁴⁴ Other factors intervened too. Population growth in the Peruvian countryside during the course of the century meant that there was an ever-increasing group of people that could not be sustained by the land. Moreover, the reforms undertaken by the military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) – particularly the Agrarian Reform and the formation of “industrial communities” – had some effect of furthering the split between the mining and the agrarian worlds. These reforms made it difficult for someone to be both a member of the newly-formed “industrial communities” at each workplace, and at the same time a *comunero* in their *comunidad campesina* of origin. Nevertheless, this process of “proletarianization” was always incomplete, and some households continued to be split between the mine and the community and to draw part of their sustenance from rural production. This was especially the case for workers who came from communities

¹⁴⁴ “The workers were not demanding ‘raises and improvements which exceed the social and economic bases which could justify them’ as the company claimed, but rather what they needed to maintain themselves as the skilled, disciplined and permanent labor force required by the new mechanized productive system. The real problem was that the mechanization of production had not increased productivity enough both to pay the workers adequate wages and to raise the company’s profit level. Unable to raise the productivity of labor any further, the company tried to reduce costs by opposing any increases in wages or expansions of the social services for the workers” (DeWind 1987, 228).

that were relatively close to the place of work, such as the *matahuasinos* and *ataurinos* who worked at the La Oroya smelting complex and whom Laite studied, or the workers who came to the Huarón mine from the surrounding plateau area.

Yet another way to study the mine-countryside relationship would be to focus not on the reproductive role of the rural world for the mines but rather on the potential for mining income to be channeled back to the rural sector. This is a complex topic and one that cannot be dealt with adequately here. However, Long and Roberts (2001 [1984]), who have most studied this issue, particularly for the Mantaro Valley, argue that significant links did emerge between the mining economy and the rest of regional society, but that this “did not result, however, in a significant regional accumulation of capital in agriculture and industry” (Long and Roberts 2001 [1984], 83). They point out that mining wages for the most part were not invested back in agriculture. This was in part because those wages were too low and in part because agricultural prices stagnated during much of the 20th century, due to the various governments’ free-trade policies, which permitted the massive importation of wheat and flour and even of Peru’s most traditional crop, the potato (Ibid., 103-108). This made investment in agriculture unattractive. Some mining workers were able to save, certainly, but they put these savings to other uses:

The savings of the mining workers were invested in the purchase and improvement of houses, in helping the villages to improve their infrastructure and in the establishment of small businesses such as shops, or in transportation. A few investments were made in agriculture through the purchase of land, cattle or a tractor and the improvement of the resource base through the use of fertilizers and other modern inputs. The general impression, however, is that salaried work in the mining sector constituted a complement to small-scale agriculture, allowing families to sustain themselves in spite of an inadequate and fragmented resource base (Ibid., 102; my translation).¹⁴⁵

Naturally, this relative lack of investment in the agricultural sector meant that there were no large-scale efforts on the part of some peasants to accumulate land in order to rationalize production – something that would have resulted in the dispossession of other, less successful peasant families. Rather, agricultural holdings in the Mantaro Valley remained dispersed and large numbers of people were able to maintain a base in rural agriculture. Although Long and

¹⁴⁵ Long and Roberts’ work was originally published in English, but at this point I have access to the Spanish translation.

Roberts characterize the regional economy as “dualistic,” because of its separation into the capital-intensive, internationally-connected mining industry and the local, labor-intensive agricultural sector, they argue that a symbiotic relationship developed between these two spheres.

This dualistic structure was not based on the separation of economic sectors but rather on a pattern of exchanges and interdependencies between them. The large mining company benefitted from the cheap labor force and inputs subsidized by peasant agriculture; this inhibited the consolidation of landholdings and the expansion of agricultural production (Ibid., 114).¹⁴⁶

If significant investment in rural production (agriculture/cattle-raising) was lacking in the Mantaro Valley – the most economically dynamic area of the Central Highlands – it was even more absent in other parts of the region, such as the sheep-raising communities of the Pasco/Junín plateau, such as Huayllay. My impression is that mining income in Huayllay – and probably in other similar communities – has historically been invested in home-building, educating one’s children, setting up shops or other forms of commerce, and in building a base in cities such as Cerro de Pasco or Lima. Locally there is a strong and widespread discourse about the community’s traditional activity of livestock-raising (mostly sheep, llamas and alpacas) being in a neglected and stunted state – although all lands are certainly in use. As in many communities in the plateau, a significant population has developed that is more dependent on mining than on cattle-raising for its subsistence, and that complements both activities with small-scale commerce and a few trades. A certain level of local and regional economic development has occurred in connection to mining activity (although with the latter as only one of several causes), even if it has been limited and even if it has come at the expense of the sacrifice of many mining workers over several generations as well as the everyday labor of their families.

The gender division of labor and reproductive labor in Huarón

In the previous section I discussed how the gender division of labor mapped onto the mine/rural economy division, not just at Huarón but at the other mines of the Central Highlands

¹⁴⁶ This of course contrasted with the consolidation of landholding in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation’s own haciendas, which as described in the previous paragraph led to significant conflicts with neighboring communities. However, those were mostly sheep-raising haciendas located in the higher-altitude regions closer to La Oroya, Junín and Cerro de Pasco, not in the Mantaro Valley region discussed by Long and Roberts.

as well. However, this was only partially true. It is true that many women took charge of agricultural and cattle-raising activities while men were working in the mines, but, especially in the early years, men also would return to these activities after their short periods of work in the mine. And, as we have already seen, an increasing number of workers also lived in the mine camps with spouses and/or other family members. In both the villages and the mine, patterns involving a gender division of labor played a role in daily life, even if there also had to be enough flexibility to accommodate the gender imbalances created by migration.

The ethnographies on the general areas from which workers migrated to Huarón – the Mantaro Valley, the northeastern highlands of Lima Department and the Chaupiwara and Huánuco regions – provide different views on this matter. In his study of the Mantaro Valley community of Muquiyauyo, Adams (1959) emphasizes the overall flexibility of men's and women's roles, particularly in agriculture, where only plowing was really restricted to men, and even that was flexible sometimes. He draws out some of the implications of this: "The fact that there is so little specialization in the field labor provides a certain amount of independence for widows, widowers and younger unmarried people who must carry on the field work without the aid of a family" (Adams 1959, 123). The pattern he documented in his 1949-50 research was one in which many young men were away at the mines – many of them at Huarón, others in the CPC – but also in which the community was making rapid economic progress and some young men were going into professions, while some of the women were becoming teachers. Women also dominated commerce and fairs, while the small shops in town – usually opened by families with a connection to the mines - could be operated by either men or women.

Whether due to a difference in perspective or an actual cultural difference between the two regions, Mayer (1974) focuses less on flexibility in his discussion of the gender division of labor in the Chaupiwara Valley community of Tangor, where he conducted research in 1969-70. He is more emphatic about agriculture being a male task, while the storing and management of household supplies – including, but not restricted to food – was a sphere controlled by women: "Households thus constitute pools of labor resources which are managed by the male head of the household, usually the husband, and accumulated goods which are allocated by the woman head of the household" (Mayer 1974, 64). While Mayer emphasizes that there are

household tasks that can be done by either men or women, he does highlight that “it is almost taboo that a man should busy himself with cooking pots” (Ibid., 65).

We can also examine Bourque and Warren’s (1981) study of gender inequality in the context of social change in Mayobamba and Chiuchin, two towns situated in the upper Chancay Valley in the highlands of northern Lima department, not far from the Huarón mine and adjacent to several communities that had regular barter relations with Huayllay. Like many other parts of the Central Highlands, this was a bilingual region, though with Spanish gradually gaining the upper hand over Quechua as “the language of everyday discourse” (Bourque and Warren 1981, 4). Their perspective is somewhat different due to their direct focus on the dynamics of gender, power and inequality; they thus provide analysis on these issues directly rather than simply mentioning the gender division of labor as part of an ethnography. Bourque and Warren focus on specific aspects of female subordination in this context of rapid transition, such as inequality in inheritance patterns, lower rates of literacy, and the marginalization of women by the local political systems, including the institution of the peasant community. While on the one hand they argue that “the division of labor by sex is not rigid and a day’s work by a woman is, in fact, reckoned as the equivalent of the same amount of work by a man” (Ibid., 9), they also highlight

...the sexual division of labor which assigns to women the responsibilities for cooking, harvest storage and management, clothing production, laundry and child care... Given the general lack of mechanization, electric power, refrigeration, and running water, the performance of such tasks as cooking, laundry and clothing production take awesome amounts of time, effort and endurance (Ibid., 97-98).

They also make their account more complex by drawing out the differences between Mayobamba, a peasant community, and Chiuchin, an emerging roadside commercial town:

Like Mayobamba, Chiuchin is a highly stratified town with broad patterns of economic participation for both sexes governed by a minimal sexual division of labor. In contrast to the agricultural community, Chiuchin’s commercialized economic base offers women the opportunity to accumulate capital or engage in steady wage labor (Bourque and Warren 1981, 144).

At the time of their research (the late 1960s and 1970s), Bourque and Warren show, this area of the upper Chancay Valley, like many parts of the Central Highlands, was undergoing a process of increasing integration with the dominant coastal society through migration as well as

the entrance of national institutions into local life. They argued that the forces of outside change “show no clear counter-trend” to patriarchy because the values of the dominant coastal society “either reinforce existing patterns of male dominance or offer a still more restricted view of women’s roles” (Ibid., 218). At the same time, however, Bourque and Warren were concerned to show that inequality was not being mechanically reproduced; they argued that women “actively locate assistance for masculine tasks in the sexual division of labor, broaden their access to critical resources, influence decision making, and formulate new options based on migration and education for themselves and their children” (Ibid., 214). Moreover, they highlighted the existence of forms of labor and economic cooperation among women, both within and across economic strata.¹⁴⁷

In Huayllay itself, the gender division of labor cannot be understood in isolation from the fact that this is a high-altitude herding area, unlike agricultural regions like the Mantaro, Chaupiwara and upper Chancay valleys. Agriculture, and the element of plowing that (usually) tends to fall under the purview of men, is virtually absent in Huayllay and the surrounding plateau.¹⁴⁸ The work involved in herding animals – above all sheep, and secondarily llamas and alpacas - has traditionally been performed by both men and women, even if, as Tschopik described for Huayllay in 1947 (see above), it was a task that fell to women when men were away working in the mines. Today at least, in both Huayllay and Rancas, where I have done fieldwork, there are also factors other than gender that structure the relationship of people to herding work – in particular class, or relative access to job opportunities or income derived from mining. In other words, shepherding may be done not only by women but also by men who don’t have access to a job in the mines – say due to lack of required work experience, or lack of membership in a *comunidad* that has agreements (*convenios*) with the mining companies to give its *comuneros* priority for jobs. There are certain very specific aspects of herding work that can

¹⁴⁷ Allen (1982) has critiqued Bourque and Warren’s work arguing that, in addition to ignoring issues of ethnicity, it focuses too exclusively on gender subordination, and downplays the importance of areas where women have substantial control, such as animal raising and commerce.

¹⁴⁸ The one important crop of the Pasco/Junín plateau is *maca*, which today is grown extensively in certain areas on the southeastern shore of Lake Junín, like Carhuamayo, Huayre and Junín. However, it is not grown to any significant extent in Huayllay.

be split according to gender – for example, the slaughtering of animals, or some of the rituals for the increase of sheep during *carnavales* in February.¹⁴⁹

Although livestock-raising was the traditional basis of the economy in Huayllay, it was for a long time supplemented by the production of crafts for exchange, namely clay pots and textiles. In the previous chapter I described the division of labor involved in the production of pottery in Huayllay: generally, women made the pots and men fired them, even if there has always been some room for flexibility of roles as well. Furthermore, it was usually men who went on the trips to exchange the pots, textiles and animal products with the communities of the *quebradas*. This traditional disposition of *huayllino* men towards traveling and transporting with llamas, like their work in the mines later, depended on the ability of women to take care of animal herds at home.

Still, this division of labor was intensified when twentieth-century industrial mining took significant numbers of men away from traditional subsistence activities that had involved the household as a whole. Their entry into mining work created a vacuum in their home regions that was often filled by women, and in many cases it also created the necessity for either spouses, daughters or other female relatives to move to the mining camp in order to perform needed tasks that happened to be associated with women, in particular cooking and washing clothes. In the case of some male workers, as we saw, relationships were formed at the mine itself that then allowed for the performance of these activities. In those cases in which men traveled alone to the mine, other people – often, but not exclusively, women – performed these services for them in exchange for a payment. The question of “reproductive labor” – or, work aimed at the production and restoration of labor-power - arose for mining companies as part of the problem of labor more generally. As we have seen, in the first half of the 20th century the problem of labor was one of shortage – i.e. how to attract sufficient numbers of workers at the appropriate times. Increasingly, there was also the question of obtaining labor of a sufficient quality, and/or retaining it for a longer period in order to train it. In the second half of the 20th century, the problem of labor was

¹⁴⁹ This is based on my observations during the *pishtapakuy* (slaughtering of animals) before the patron saint’s feast in Rancas, and during the February ceremonies (*marcación de ganado/herranza*) for the sheep in Huayllay.

centrally one of reducing worker absenteeism, improving worker productivity, and avoiding labor conflicts and the increased costs that could result from them.

In so far as it intersected with any or all of these issues, then, the labors of cooking, washing and other domestic tasks could be of significance for mining companies, even if, as Molyneux (1979) argued, these forms of work by themselves probably do not determine the value of labor power in most contexts. The importance of food and cooking is evident in a 1920 report by a superintendent at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's coal mine at Goyllarisquizga, which comments on a recent company effort to send food down to the mine for workers who apparently had not been receiving lunches¹⁵⁰:

The feeding has undoubtedly helped greatly to maintain the labor supply at the mines, and more work is got out of the men. Formerly at lunch time with few exceptions, they simply chewed their coca. Now, however, many of the shovelers and *carreros*, which is the class of men that required helping, avail themselves of the good food sent down the mine to them" (CPC archive – Goyllarisquizga Coal Mines, Annual Report - 1920).

This quote not only highlights the importance that the feeding of workers could have for a mining company – it also reminds us that we can by no means assume that a situation of domesticity was available to all workers. The fact that this particular effort was directed at shovelers and *carreros* (those who pushed wagons inside the mine), who tended to be the less stable, less skilled workers, hints at the fact that a domestic sphere at the mine was often not part of these particular workers' experience – at least not in Goyllarisquizga in 1920. To the extent that such a domestic sphere, however partial, did become available to a number of workers, however, industrial mining created a space of household labor in the camps that mirrored the space of mining labor in the mine. For many if not most workers, the preparation of their lunches would be done by their spouses (as in Huarón and Chungar/Animón today) rather than by someone paid by the mining company. This domestic sphere had to adjust to the distinct rhythms and timings of mining production – in terms of when to prepare food, how often to wash work clothes, etc.

¹⁵⁰ Goyllarisquizga, the only important coal mine in the Central Highlands at the time, was situated close to where the Pasco/Junín plateau drops off into the Chaupiwara Valley.

In the next chapter I examine issues of conflicts between men and women in Huarón and Huayllay around 1940-42, through the traces that spousal disputes left in the *Juzgado de Paz* records. The specific issue of domestic labor does not often find explicit mention in these cases though it probably played a role in many of them. The very absence of domestic work from the record is probably a testament to its pervasiveness, in the sense that it was taken for granted. However, a few of the cases from the *Juzgado*, from different years, do specifically mention issues of household work as being part of the dispute. One case examined in the next chapter is that of Inés Cuadros and Justino Colca, from La Oroya and Huarochirí Province, respectively, who were splitting up after what they claimed had been a *convivencia* of 3 months. Responding to Cuadros' accusations about his "bad character in the home" (*mal carácter en el hogar marital*), Colca countered that Cuadros "does not do her part of giving him his food at the right times, when he works or comes out of work he asks her for something to eat, but she gives it to him in a very bad mood" (*no cumple con darle sus alimentos a sus horas, que cuando el trabaja o sale de su trabajo le pide que comer, mas ésta se lo da de muy mal humor*).

In a case from a later book of *Juzgado* notes, from the year 1949, a man complains about his 19-year old wife leaving their home in the Francois camp at Huarón, and taking his things; he argues that he had given no motive for her decision to abandon him, "only, as in any home, there were a few moments of discord, over not washing the clothes" (*tan solo, como en cualquier hogar no faltaba unos pequeños disgustos, por no lavar la ropa*). In a much later *Juzgado* case, from 1976, a woman from one of the communities in the Junín/Pasco plateau, living in the Huarón mine with her *conviviente*, accuses him of having beaten and thrown her out over an incident involving the cutting of firewood for cooking. She had asked him to cut the firewood and this had made him angry, although he did it anyway; he then went out and came back at around 11 o'clock at night, having drunk alcohol, demanding to know "why she forced him to cut the firewood, that he was not her servant" (*que por que le obligaba a rayar leña, que el no era su muchacho*). These few cases show that arguments over household tasks could be a trigger, if not necessarily the root cause, for marital conflicts or even domestic violence, or alternatively they could be invoked as a justification; it is likely that a number of other cases involved these issues as well, even if on paper the disputes are simply attributed to "inability to get along" or "bad treatment" (*malos tratos*).

In her discussion of domestic life during the California Gold Rush of 1848-1853, Susan Lee Johnson (1999) writes of a “world upside down,” in which the shortage of women led to many men taking part in, and taking turns at, “household” tasks that would have been performed by women in their regions of origin. I have not found evidence for such a situation in Huarón or similar mines in the Central Highlands of Peru, which does not necessarily mean that it did not occur. In any case, the situation was different - the mines were not as distant from people’s home regions, so it was not as hard for family members to accompany workers. Furthermore, workers who traveled to the mine alone would not necessarily have had the flexibility, space or implements necessary to perform their own domestic tasks – crowded as many of them were into shared rooms lacking any implements. By and large, these workers had to pay other people for board (*pensión*) – often provided by women or families as a way to earn extra income.

For example, one of my interviewees, Emilia Flores,¹⁵¹ who was from Cerro de Pasco, lived with her husband in one of the sections of the workers’ camps at the Huarón mine. Her husband had begun working in the mine in the 1960s, first as an assistant timberman. Emilia “couldn’t make ends meet” (*no me alcanzaba*) with her husband’s wage, so she decided to start providing board to twenty people at the camp – presumably, though she does not specify, workers who did not have families with them. She and her husband did not have any tables in the room(s)¹⁵² they occupied at the camp, just some pieces of wood; they used those to make benches and tables for the boarders (*pensionistas*). Later on, she recalls, the salaries began to rise, including her husband’s, but she continued taking on boarders throughout her time at the camp, which lasted over two decades. This was in addition to her other activities, which included raising four children. In our interview, Flores was critical of the other workers and their families, who she said were always going to the company to ask for loans even when only a week had passed since payday. She related her exemption from this general pattern to the fact that she worked providing board – for one thing, she had no time to go to the company offices, and, for another, her work gave her enough money. Flores furthermore highlighted the fact of her economic independence from her husband, for, in her words, “I never saw my husband’s wages,

¹⁵¹ Pseudonym

¹⁵² In the interview Emilia Flores is not clear on whether they had only one room or two contiguous ones. Both arrangements were common for couples at the camp.

either, because he never told me, 'I make this much, I have that much.'"¹⁵³ While Flores' portrayal of her neighbors should be taken with a grain of salt, colored as it is by her particular construction of the past during our interview (i.e. her view of the workers as taking advantage of a generous company), her testimony is interesting in the emphasis it places on her economic independence as well as her hard work.

Her story thus not only highlights one of the ways that workers who did not have families with them procured their daily sustenance; it also shows that at least some women could organize their economic lives in the mining camp in such a way that they could avoid dependence on a man's wages from the mine. This brings us to another dimension that is crucial in any discussion of the gender division of labor in the mining camp: the involvement of both men and women in commercial activity – both the preparation and selling of food in the form of regular board, as in Flores' case, and buying and selling more broadly. A case from the 1940s shows that commercial activity could support a single woman who was not permanently attached to a family or partner at the mining camp. In November 1940, Filomena Rojas and Ignacia Orozco came to the *Juzgado de Paz* to accuse a third woman, Graciela Meza, of “defamation against their honor” (*difamación contra el honor*). All three were listed as residing in the market of the Huarón mine camp, where they had stalls. Meza agreed to take back her offensive comment (the content of which is not stated) and recognize its falsehood so as to, in the words of the Juez or notetaker, “allow the claimants to keep their honor before society” (*dejar a las demandantes libres en su honor ante la sociedad*). Ignacia Orozco was a widow, while Filomena Rojas was married and actually came to the *Juzgado* accompanied by her father, who was listed as a native of Huayllay. Graciela Meza, on the other hand, was a native of the town of Tápuc,¹⁵⁴ and no marital status was listed for her, nor was she accompanied by anyone. This could simply have been an omission; however, she reappears in another case seven years later, which provides more information. At that time, the *teniente gobernador* of the Huarón mining camp came to report her

¹⁵³ “No he conocido el sueldo de mi esposo tampoco, porque él nunca me ha dicho tanto gano, y tanto tengo.”

¹⁵⁴ In the notes it lists her origin as “Tápuc, province of Tarma.” I am not aware of any town called Tápuc in said province, while there is a very well-known community called Tápuc in the Chaupiwara Valley (Daniel Carrión Province). On the other hand, she may have been from the district of Tapo in Tarma province, in which case the name was misspelled in the notes. Both alternatives are possible, but the latter seems more likely.

death. He describes her as having worked as a vegetable vendor (*verdulera*) in Huarón “since a long time ago,” and emphasizes that she “does not have any relatives in Huarón.” Meza had died of a “colic” while in someone else’s house, while her own door was locked; for that reason, the *teniente gobernador* was asking for permission to enter her room so as to look for an address or some information that would allow him to notify a relative of Meza’s death, and to inventory her possessions.

The *Juzgado* minutes are not precise as to whether Meza lived in the workers’ housing blocks or in the small informal settlement immediately adjacent to the camp, nor do they explain the exact circumstances under which she had originally arrived; however, this case highlights the presence of independent women traders as part of the life of the mining camp itself. Commerce has accompanied mining activity in the Andes at least since Potosí’s heyday in the late 16th century. The 20th century industrial mining concerns such as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron also operated company stores (*mercantiles*), which competed with independent traders who operated at weekly or bi-weekly fairs and, to a lesser extent on regular days as well. Women were an important presence in the fairs at the mining camps as they were in the markets in many of the regions where workers came from. As Adams wrote for Muquiyaayo,

With the exception of the soap vendors and the clothing merchants, all the sellers at the fair in Muquiyaayo are women. In a few cases a Muquiyauyino and his wife will work together in the preparation of the lunches and breakfasts, but on the whole the selling and buying is done almost entirely by women (Adams 1959, 138).

At Huarón, since the dismantling of the camps, the bi-weekly fair has moved to the town of Huayllay, which now fulfills many of the functions of the old mining camp. These fairs attract a large number of vendors and merchants, both men and women; at the time of my research, there were also three very small markets that operated in Huayllay on a daily basis, in addition to the shops that sold dry goods. The ubiquitous nature of small commerce and food vending in a place like Huayllay, as in other parts of the Central Highlands, should be taken with a grain of salt, however. As one of the women who sold *lonches* (afternoon/evening meals) in the center of Huayllay town explained to me, many of the foods that were regularly sold there were things that she (*a huayllina*) did not grow up eating; these new foods had come from other places in recent

years. In the past, she said, everyone ate at home; “there wasn’t all of this,” she said while pointing to the dozen or so carts that sold food here every evening. Although saying that “everyone ate at home” is probably an exaggeration, it does highlight the fact that, in spite of the importance of commerce in mining regions, there have also been spaces where vending and trade have been less present, such as the world of the isolated *estancias* where many *huayllinos* have spent time at some point in their lives.

In this chapter I have examined issues of work in the mining camps, both inside and outside the mine. The discussion here has also touched on a number of everyday-life issues, still through the prism of labor. In the next chapter, I move more squarely into a focus on everyday life in its own terms, by examining issues of that are essential to social history such as the family, marital relations and the home itself, as well as the company interventions into everyday life that began to emerge in the second half of the 20th Century.

CHAPTER III

THE HOUSEHOLD AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE MINING CAMPS

In the first chapter of this dissertation I began a reexamination of the social history of industrial mining labor in Central Peru, focusing mainly on structural aspects of migration and on the transition from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. As mentioned, my intention there was not only to provide historical background for the rest of this dissertation but also to push forward the discussion of the history of mining labor in Peru – a topic which has largely been absent from recent scholarship on the country. In the second chapter, I examined issues of work at the mine, as well as the work involved in the reproduction of the labor force, a type of work that is essential to capitalism yet is excluded from the direct sphere of value production. In this chapter, I focus on issues of the household as well as more generally everyday life in the mining camps.

There are several reasons for doing this. First of all, in recent years these issues have become part of the scholarship not just on mining but on labor in general around the world, yet they have not yet been explored for mining labor in Peru. Second, and more generally, the history of everyday life in the 20th century is still at an incipient stage in Peru, without a significant presence either in scholarship produced inside the country or outside. While there are some studies for the colonial and 19th-century periods, historians of 20th-century Peru have not yet begun a significant examination of issues of everyday life through sources such as judicial (or, for that matter, police) archives. This is especially the case for more rural areas. Lastly, the focus of this chapter on the themes of household and community in the mining camps provides a link between issues of labor and those having to do with the “local community” – a relationship that is central to this dissertation. Attention to the household necessarily directs us to the ties that existed between the mining camp and the workers’ communities of origin. Additionally, it allows

us to comprehend the mining camp itself as a local community, one formed through the relationship between labor and capital.

The relationship between households and capital in Latin America has been examined by a number of scholars. Two examples, both drawn from cases of transnational enclave production, provide contrasting perspectives. In his study of the El Teniente copper mine in Chile during the first half of the 20th century, Klubock (1998) examines the shift from a situation of high labor turnover and unstable relationships between men and women towards the formation of a relatively stable community of male-headed households in the 1930s and 40s. In Klubock's perspective, this change, while conditioned by structural features of the world copper industry, was brought about through the active policies of the mining company, which in this way sought to obtain workers who would be both more skilled and less rebellious. This included interventions into the workers' non-work lives and forms of recreation as well as the active promotion of an ideology of domesticity and the provision of significant incentives for the formation of stable male-headed families. Both men and women initially resisted this in different ways, but eventually came to accept the new order while reformulating its precepts. Women articulated the ideology of domesticity to make claims on their husbands, while both men and women built on the newfound stability and cohesion of the community of households to nurture a militant working-class culture that forged links with the nationalism and paternalism of the Popular Front governments and challenged the company's power.

In contrast, in her study of the "banana zone" of Caribbean Costa Rica during roughly the same period, Putnam (2002) argues that attempts at social/moral reform on the part of the United Fruit Company or the state were either absent, ineffective, or simply irrelevant to the actual lives of men and women. Within the constraints of political economic forces and shifts, migrants created autonomous spaces of kinship and survival through multiple overlapping communities and relationships. The high labor turnover and unstable relationships that were maintained throughout this period suited the needs of capital in Caribbean Costa Rica in a way that they did not in the El Teniente mine in Chile after the 1930s. In both cases, however, men and women entered into relationships that exchanged men's economic support for women's labor of social reproduction and for sex. In El Teniente the nature of this "contract" shifted over time, but this

did not alter the unequal nature of the exchange. In Costa Rica, the more transitory nature of sexual and marital relationships throughout the period in question, together with the greater opportunities for women's self-support in the informal economy, meant that women had more opportunities to shape or escape these unequal exchanges. Violence against women was common in both, however, and was shaped both by changing socioeconomic structures as well as by ideologies about gender and sexuality.¹⁵⁵ The latter was not unrelated to the masculinized work culture of the banana plantation and the mine, where women were mostly excluded from wage labor in the company and in which the labor of social reproduction was devalued, in spite of its centrality to workers' survival. Whereas according to Klubock women in El Teniente resisted this by using the terms provided by the ideology of domesticity, in Putnam's account women in the banana zone protected themselves by forging kinship networks and economic independence as well as using the language and ideology of honor.

In this chapter, I examine some of the same issues as Klubock and Putnam; concretely, I analyze certain aspects of household relations and the social world in the mining camps of the Central Highlands – the traditional mining heartland of Peru - in the 20th century. With the exception of the final section, I focus primarily on the Huarón mine in Pasco Department - but always placing it in its regional and national context, as a particular case of a medium-scale mining camp of the Central Highlands. For reasons that have to do both with choice of focus as well as with the nature of my sources, I work mostly from the social world up, rather than focusing on the capitalist enterprise itself. In this sense my methodological approach is closer to Putnam's than it is to Klubock's. In the first section, I analyze material from a local judicial/dispute-resolution archive from Huayllay District, in the Huarón mine's sphere of influence (and in which around half of the cases – possibly more - involve individuals with a direct connection of work or residence to the mine).¹⁵⁶ The purpose of this section is to examine

¹⁵⁵ Similarly, in her study of relationships between men and women during the Chilean Agrarian Reform, Tinsman (2002) argues for the importance of sexuality – as a concept distinct from gender in general – to patriarchal power, and to the latter's intersection with class: "Sexuality should have a centrality to feminist materialist analyses that they have often lacked" (Tinsman 2002, 11).

¹⁵⁶ I say "possibly more" because there are a number of cases where people simply don't state their work or place of residence. In any case, the mining camps were the demographic center of the district at this time, and exerted a considerable influence over the entirety of the local area.

household, marital and family issues at the mining camp – to give an idea of how these relationships functioned in a context of migration and wage labor, and of how relations of gender and sexuality might have shaped everyday life. I attempt to do a critical and contextual reading of the documents as well as work from the topics that are most salient in them, in particular the separation of couples as well as monetary exchanges involving support for children. Although the archive comes from the *Juzgado de Paz* of Huayllay District, the majority of marital disputes (as opposed to, say, conflicts over property) involve migrants from other regions, and it is on those cases that I focus. The temporal focus of this section is on the years 1940-42. While this is in part due to the sources that were available to me, there are also other reasons for focusing on the 1940s. First, it is a period almost at mid-century, halfway between the eras of labor shortage and labor surplus discussed in the previous chapter. Second, given the private nature of the material discussed (the fact that it has to do with issues of marital and sexual conflicts voiced before a local dispute-resolution authority) I feel that a temporal focus that is somewhat removed from the present is less intrusive.

In the second and third sections of this chapter, I delve more deeply into issues directly involving the mining companies, which are relatively absent from the first section of the chapter. I do this through a focus on a very concrete topic: housing and living space, as well as the conflicts and tensions that arose from it. This is a crucial issue not just for this chapter but also for the rest of my dissertation, since the changes that occurred in Peruvian mining since the 1990s have involved a reconfiguration of space and of the division between the sphere of production and that of reproduction. First, I provide a long-term perspective on mining company housing as it developed over the course of the 20th century. Then, I shift to a more dynamic approach by examining the ways in which housing emerged as a site of conflict and contestation informed by ideologies of civilization and hygiene. In this discussion I look at both Huarón and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. Finally, in the last part of the section I shift fully to the CPC in order to examine one key way in which companies attempted to intervene directly into the lives of workers and their families: the practice of Social Work, as it developed as part of the labor-centered paradigm of governmentality in 20th century Peru. After a brief overview of Social Work in the mines, I focus on the life history of one particular social worker, whose experiences

and perspectives help to illustrate the tensions and complexities involved in the mining companies' relationship with the communities of workers in the mining camps.

Household and marital relations in a mining district: Huarón and Huayllay, 1940-42

In this section, I use primary documents from an archive in Huayllay to delve deeper into the nature of households and family dynamics – in particular marital relations – at the Huarón mine at a particular moment in time, the early 1940s. The archive in question is the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* – the same one I use in Chapter 1 and in Appendix A to inquire into the locations and regions from which people migrated to the Huarón mine. As we noted there, this archival material pertains to Huayllay district as a whole, not just to the Huarón mine. Most cases, however, denote at least a partial connection to the mine, and it is primarily on these that I will focus. To put it simply, 62 cases (63.3%) out of the total 98 cases in the 1940-42 actas from the *Juzgado de Paz* have at least one party to the dispute (and usually both parties) with a direct connection to the Huarón mine – either because they stated that they worked there and/or resided in one of the company's camps. I discuss this at somewhat greater length in Appendix B.

What are the cases about? Of the 98 cases in the 1940-42 book of minutes from the Huayllay *Juzgado*, 60 cases (61.2%) involve disputes either between husbands and wives or, more commonly, between *convivientes* – a man and a woman living together without legal or church marriage. These disputes include everything from separation and the recognition of children by their fathers to - less commonly - accusations of infidelity and/or domestic violence. Some of the other cases include spouses as well, but in those they are usually on the same side, against a common adversary who has offended or harmed them in some way; the 60 cases involving couples, on the other hand, are those in which a dispute between individuals involved in a relationship of marriage or of *convivencia* – either in the present or in the past - is the main cause for coming before the *Juez de Paz*. The 38 non-couples cases, meanwhile, have to do with either physical fights, accusations of theft, or most commonly, slander and defamation of character (*injuria, difamación*) – the latter, though, often having to do with issues of sexuality as well. If we look at the 62 cases with a stated explicit connection to the Huarón mine (either

through residence or employment of at least one of the two parties involved), we find that 43 of these cases (69.4%) involve disputes between couples. Among the 36 cases without a stated explicit connection to the Huarón mine, we find that only 19 cases (52.8%) involve disputes between couples.

The prevalence of cases involving issues of marriage, *convivencia* and sexual relations is not limited to the 1940s, but persists to the present, according to Vicente Morales, the assistant *juez de paz* whom I interviewed in Huayllay in 2010. Don Vicente, an elder *huayllino* and former mine worker, answered my question about what types of cases he sees most often:

Within the *juzgado* there are many complaints. Most of all, [they are] about abandonment by the husband, the wife, we see that there is resentment, they separate, the children are left helpless, so then a few months go by and they request child support [*pensión de alimento*].

He saw Huayllay's status as a mining area as one factor contributing to the prevalence of cases of abandonment and unstable relationships:

Also here as a place of work, we have living among the population, personnel from two companies, both Huarón and Chungar. So then they, always, as men, they utilize the girls, and then once they're already pregnant there it all goes off-balance, they go away to their towns, the girls are left here with a child. That's a big problem here... That happens a lot, since they are people from other places [*gente ajena*]. And at the same time they come like that, having a wife, and here they deceive the girls... For example here people work who are from Huancayo, from Lima, from Arequipa, Trujillo. From everywhere. The company, people who have a role in the company, who know how to operate jumbos, drills, all that, prepared people come. But here they pass for single, but in their home town they are married.

Don Vicente's statement evokes what is perhaps a stereotyped vision of mining town life, even if it is also one based at least in part on his own knowledge and experience as both a local resident and as a person who regularly arbitrates such disputes. In one sense, in his comments local women are portrayed as victims who are duped and betrayed. However, as he himself made clear to me (and as we will see for the 1940s), not all cases of conflicts between couples are like this; many of the disputes involve the separation of men and women who have been together for some time (and who are no longer so young). Furthermore, not all cases involve men who have a wife back home and who pass for single – that is simply one particular type of case.

Nevertheless, Don Vicente's comments do highlight the conflictive link that has historically

existed between mining (an industry with very particular gender dynamics), sexuality and family relations.

Returning to the 1940s, the *Juzgado de Paz* cases provide a window into the nature of households, families and relationships between men and women at the mine, as well as into the frames and concepts through which such relationships were articulated and understood. This window is partial and does not result in a representative sample. As we will see, of the 60 spousal disputes in the 1940-42 files, only 9 cases (14.8%) are between individuals who are married to each other (*casados*) either by the Church or the state. Of the other 51 spousal cases, the vast majority are between former or current *convivientes*. This contrasts with the 1940 census which shows more married adults than *convivientes* in Pasco department (by a 3:2 ratio). Although the census figures likely overestimate marriage rates, and in any case lump Huarón and Huayllay together with a much larger area, the contrast between the two figures shows that the *juzgado* archive privileges *convivencias*. Furthermore, it privileges those *convivencias* that were marked by dissension and that often ended in dissolution or abandonment. Nevertheless, by using these sources critically, and by keeping in mind the larger context, we can gain some insight into the nature of the households that existed at the mine, how they were formed and dissolved. This will in turn allow us to better understand the relationship between industrial labor at the mine, on the one hand, and the work of reproduction of labor power, on the other, as well as the relationship between the mining enclave and its surroundings. Before we delve into these issues, it is necessary to briefly discuss in more detail the nature of the archive, its characteristics and its limitations, given that it constitutes an important source for this chapter.

The nature of the source: The Juzgado de Paz

The *Juzgado de Paz* is an important institution in Peru. In general terms, the *Juez de Paz* is someone who resolves disputes and fulfills certain judicial functions at a local level, but who is not a professional judge or lawyer but rather a local resident appointed to the position for a limited period of time. Although there is probably a great deal of variation across the country, my interviews and conversations with two *Jueces de paz* (in the communities of Huayllay and Yarusyacán, both in Pasco), as well as the hundreds of records of cases I have reviewed in Huayllay, paint a picture that is largely consistent with legal scholar Hans Jurgen Brandt's 1990

study of the *Juzgado de Paz* as an institution. *Jueces de paz* are officially part of the national justice system, and try to abide by rules and procedures encoded in law, but they are often also part of a local space, where they know people by name and are in touch with local customs and norms. In both Huayllay and Yarusyacán the *Juez de paz* is elected in the communal assembly; both of the judges I got to know were older members of their communities, who had only attended elementary school but who had gained wide-ranging experience as adults – in their case working at various mines as well as other pursuits. Brandt writes that at a national level, the *Juzgado de paz* is the sphere of the justice system that is most frequently visited by people on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale; more economically powerful groups go to the professional judges of the higher courts – usually located in departmental capitals or other important cities. At the time of his study, there were 4,049 *jueces de paz* in Peru, versus 1,239 professional judges; the non-professionals thus comprised 77% of the total number of judges in the country (Brandt, 1990, 87).

Brandt's observations on the functioning of the *Juzgado de Paz* pertain to the 1980s, however. Do they apply to the years from which the cases discussed here come? Certainly, as a part of the justice system, the institution of the *Juzgado de Paz* would have reflected the local and regional configuration of power. In areas where power was exercised in a highly unequal and despotic manner, the *Juez de Paz* would have been likely to side with the powerful, whether landlords or town dwellers vis-a-vis rural people. Indeed, in a well-known 1888 speech, Peruvian radical writer Manuel González Prada had denounced "the tyranny of the *juez de paz*, the *gobernador* and the priest, that trinity which brutalizes the Indian." In the early 20th century, local and regional authorities such as the *gobernador*¹⁵⁷ and the *prefecto* were those charged with suppressing rural unrest, recruiting labor for public works and generally reinforcing the local system of power; it is likely that *jueces de paz* often fulfilled similar functions. Yet it does seem like in Huayllay at least, by the time the documents cited here were produced, the *Juzgado de Paz* was less like that described by González Prada and more like that found in the district today and described for the national level by Brandt. No doubt this had to do both with the specific social characteristics of the area (as opposed to other parts of the country) and with changes in

¹⁵⁷ Not a governor in the U.S. sense but rather the district-level official charged with security and law enforcement. The *prefecto* would fulfill a similar function at the departmental level. To this day, the *gobernador* is still chosen from above by the national government; the position of *prefecto*, on the other hand, no longer exists.

the local power structure that took place in the first part of the century: the formation of the *comunidad de indígenas* and the play of forces (such as mining wage work) that tended to erode previous social inequalities based on access to land and traditional social distinctions. All this was in spite of the inequalities that persisted between the population of Huayllay and, on the one hand, the mining company, and on the other, the large and medium-sized haciendas (El Diezmo, Huasca, Racracancha) that encroached on the *comunidad*'s lands.

While the owners of these haciendas and mining companies still had undue influence at the departmental and national levels at mid-century, this was less true at the local district level. Although several of the district mayors during the 20th century were officials of the mining company – a common situation in mining regions where companies wielded significant influence – other local authorities were members of the *comunidad de indígenas* of Huayllay. For example, such was the case of Alejandro López Guerreros, who became *gobernador* of the district in 1954, and who later, as *personero* of the *comunidad* in the 1960s, led the campaign to recover communal lands from the *haciendas*.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, Santiago Pajuelo, who served as *juez de paz* in the early 1940s, later appears as litigant in a case himself, when in 1949 he denounced that two employees of the Hacienda El Diezmo (owned by the Lercari family, possessors of several estates in Pasco Department) had attacked his two young children while they were pasturing their animals near the border between the *comunidad* land and the *hacienda*. The hacienda employees had requisitioned the animals – twenty llamas and two horses – apparently claiming that the land belonged to the *hacienda*. Here the former *juez de paz* appears not as an ally of the *hacendados* but rather as their adversary in a typical conflict between *hacienda* and *comunidad* members over access to land.

The *Juzgado de Paz* material from Huayllay thus constitutes an archive that must be understood in the context of its particular social conditions. In a sense, the social world into which it introduces us occupies an intermediate position, located between the national extremes represented by urban elites and middle classes on the one hand, and by the most socially excluded rural areas on the other. As noted above, the *Juzgado de Paz* today is not an institution

¹⁵⁸ This particular bit of information comes from a late 1980s publication by the community of Huayllay, given to me by Dalia Roque, who was one of the people involved in the edition. It contains a short biography of Alejandro López Guerreros and a few other community leaders.

frequented by the middle or upper classes of Peruvian society, who, as Brandt writes, “never go to the *juez de paz no letrado* to resolve their conflicts (Brandt 203).” This was already the case in Huayllay District in 1940-42 – *hacendados* and hacienda employees are absent from the record (except in a very few cases where they are denounced by people from the community), even though there were still several small and medium-sized haciendas in and near the district at the time. Nor do the French managers and engineers from the mining company air their own interpersonal disputes before the *juez de paz*. Brandt sees a geographical specificity to the institution, in the sense that the *juez de paz* tends to be a more important figure in rural areas and in the highlands:

In traditional areas the custom of couples going to see the *juez de paz* to seek mediation in the conflict is more widespread. This custom fades away with the process of the “modernization” of society (Ibid., 207).

Brandt writes that “in the highlands especially, this custom is very deep-rooted, regardless of the level of ‘development’ of each location” (Ibid., 209). However, although this may have been the case at the time of his writing (the 1980s), it’s not clear that everyone in the highlands always had access to the *Juez de Paz* in their locality. Earlier in the century, did rural people go to the *Juez de Paz* in those regions where semi-feudal relations were most entrenched, just like they did in places like Huayllay that were undergoing significant social and economic transformations? What about those places where the language gap between a Quechua-speaking community and the Spanish-language judicial system (of which the *Juzgado* was ultimately a part) was greater than in Huayllay?¹⁵⁹ Even in Huayllay district itself, people living in the camps of the Vanadium company are underrepresented in relation to those living and working in Huarón – only one of the 1940-42 cases involves someone at the former company, even though according to the 1940 census the Vanadium camps accounted for almost 19% of the district’s population. This shows that, for whatever reason, not everyone had the same level of access to or connection with the

¹⁵⁹ By most accounts, the population of Huayllay District in the 1940s would have been mostly bilingual, with a minority but significant sector of Quechua speakers who did not also speak Spanish. However, there is no explicit mention of linguistic diversity in the *Juzgado* cases I have examined. The cases consist of notes taken by the *Juez de Paz* or his assistant, and some of them could very well include translations from Quechua. As I note later on in this chapter, it is possible that the label *analfabeto* (illiterate) used in some of the cases might be referring to a linguistic difference rather than simply to the inability to read and write.

Juzgado. Thus, the *Juzgado* is not a direct, all-encompassing window into the life of the district, but, read critically, it can provide important evidence.

Moreover, although, as shown above, the *Juez de Paz* was not simply an ally of the *hacendados*, the mining company or regional elites, this does not mean that the *Juzgado* was an egalitarian space. On the contrary, the *Juez de Paz* was a figure of local authority, alongside others such as the *gobernador* and the *teniente gobernador*. Although it seems that, as today, many people saw the *Juzgado* as a relatively effective way to resolve disputes or to obtain some minimum degree of security (for example child support), the *Juez* was also someone who admonished and who threatened punishment if agreements were not kept or his directives not followed.¹⁶⁰ As a few of the case transcripts show, he also occasionally had to collaborate with the *gobernador* or with a representative of the *guardia civil*¹⁶¹ to seek out and apprehend individuals who disobeyed his authority.¹⁶² The authority invested in the *Juez* by the national judicial system no doubt merged with local, communal and patriarchal forms of authority and power. On the one hand, a lot of the cases are brought forth by women, seeking support for their children or denouncing bad treatment on the part of their husband or *conviviente*; in that sense, the *Juzgado* seems to have been a space that provided women a minimum of leverage in their relationships. On the other hand, the *Juez* was always male,¹⁶³ and in any case the notions and criteria that he worked with were derived from national codes and local custom that were not, on

¹⁶⁰ It's not clear whether these punishments were always enacted or whether they were simply threats. In his analysis of *Juzgado de Paz* cases concerning marriage agreements, Brandt argues that the stern warnings are usually just threats: "It must be noted that the *juez de paz* at certain moments utilizes intimidating phrases towards the intervening parties... According the information supplied by the *jueces*, this intimidation – which has no legal basis – is not carried out. It would not be possible to legally sanction the infraction; such non-fulfillment, however, entails something more serious: the contempt of the members of the community towards the person who does not fulfill the agreement" (Brandt 1990, 321).

¹⁶¹ The Civil Guard, one of several arms of the police in Peru for much of the 20th century, merged into the National Police of Peru in the late 1980s.

¹⁶² See the case of Melesio Guzmán and Isabel Quispe, later in this chapter.

¹⁶³ At least in all the cases I have and in all the information I have from the early and mid-20th century. In terms of contemporary *jueces de paz*, I have encountered one woman who was occupying this position, in a working-class neighborhood of Huancayo that sprung up as the result of a planned takeover of unused lands in the 1980s. She was the wife of a former worker at the state mining company and had been active in the mining women's movement in the 1980s.

the whole, egalitarian in terms of gender, even if both contained certain elements that could be used in women's favor.

Furthermore, although we cannot see all (or most of) the ways in which gender structured the interactions before, during and after the appearance before the *Juez de Paz*, there are a few clues in the case minutes. Men usually appear alone before the *Juez* (or at least, no accompanying relative is mentioned), while women are often accompanied by a relative (often their father or mother), who is explicitly mentioned in the notes. This is particularly true in disputes involving people from the local area, as opposed to women who were from outside and who do often appear on their own. Moreover, in the 1940-42 cases, there is a stark difference in how men and women certify their participation and agreement in the case minutes – men almost always sign their names, while women almost always place their fingerprint on the page and/or have a man (their relative or one of the witnesses present) sign on their behalf. Accompanying the signature is usually a phrase such as “on behalf of [woman's name], who doesn't know how to sign, I will do it” (*a ruego de _____, por no saber firmar, lo hago yo*). This is related to the significant gender gap that existed in the process – already underway at this time, for men – by which schooling and literacy were becoming more common in rural areas and small towns in the Central Highlands as in several other parts of the country.

The Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* records are different from the judicial documents used by historians like Hunefeldt (2000) and Christiansen (2004). They have worked with materials from larger, more formal courts: conjugal suits from Lima's archbishopric (at a time when marriage was strictly an ecclesiastical matter in Peru), in Hunefeldt's case, and criminal trials from the law courts in Cajamarca (northern Peru), housed in the departmental archive. Thus, although their documents are older (from the 19th century), they are often longer and more extensive, since they include written materials that were prepared by the different parties to disputes – or by the scribes who wrote on their behalf – over the period of time that the trial or suit lasted. That is not the case with the *Juzgado de Paz*; these were oral sessions in which the parties aired out their disputes and either the *juez* or an assistant took notes and drew up an *acta* or record of the agreement that had been arrived at – these minutes and records of agreements are the only traces

that get preserved from each case.¹⁶⁴ In essence, they constitute summaries of what the parties to the dispute have said, filtered through the *juez* or the notetaker. Thus, the language tends to be formulaic, with the same phrases repeating themselves from case to case. This is especially true at the beginning and end of each case; in the middle, however, the specifics of each litigant's version of events are recorded, giving more individuality to each case and allowing us a (mediated) glimpse into the concerns motivating each party to the dispute as well as the strategies through which they hope to obtain the desired result. Sometimes, the narrative shifts abruptly into first person, reflecting more closely the words used by the litigants.

The *Juzgado de Paz* is also different not only in the kind of documentation that it produces, but also in the nature of the decisions that are made. In a sense, it is more of a dispute-resolution mechanism, backed by local and patriarchal as well as judicial authority, than a regular law court in which judges emit sentences. As Brandt writes in his discussion of cases involving couples,

When the parties – be it the couple itself or their relatives – go to the *juez de paz* or the *teniente gobernador*, they do not have the intention of bringing about a formal accusation (for example, a criminal prosecution in the case of domestic abuse). That is, they are not thinking of a trial that ends in a sentence, instead what they seek is the mediation of the authority so as to attempt to reestablish the balance that has been lost in the relationship. The majority of accusations and suits are the legal coating of an interest that is not attended to in the law codes: mediation among different points of view, negotiation among different interests, moral support and pressure to fulfill local social and cultural norms. The objective is not to obtain a juridical treatment of each aspect of the conflict, but rather a global solution, an agreement, and harmony between the parties (Brandt 1990, 218; my translation).

Although Brandt may have an idealized image of equilibrium and balance in the relationship and in the community, and although he bases his analysis on a reading of cases from later in the century (as well as on interviews with *Jueces de Paz* in the 1980s), his comments do reflect certain aspects that pertain to the cases from Huayllay, even in the 1940s. Many of the cases carry a heading like *Acta de conciliación de mutuo acuerdo* (Record of conciliation by mutual

¹⁶⁴ In his 1938 *Manual para Jueces de Paz*, Peruvian legal scholar Felipe S. Guerra makes this clear: “The *jueces de paz* will not admit any written materials in the verbal cases, nor in the conciliation cases... and will limit themselves to extending by means of an *acta*, the summary of the circumstances of the case, as a mere record of what they have heard verbally from all the individuals who have attended the judicial act” (Guerra 1938, 16).

accord). They almost always conclude with an agreement between the parties rather than a sentence by the *Juez* – even if the latter’s watchful eye and authority (and threats of punishment for non-compliance) are ever-present, and constitute the reason for bringing the dispute into this space rather than attempting to resolve it out in the open.

Furthermore, the sources of law were also different for the *Juzgado de Paz* as opposed to the professional law courts such as the *Juzgados de Primera Instancia* in the provincial capitals. The Huayllay *Juez de Paz* certainly operated within the framework of national law, as codified in the Civil Code and other bodies of law, but it seems clear he also went beyond it, basing his work on local and regional customs and norms as well as official law. This helps to explain why so many of the 1940-42 cases from Huayllay have to do with the separation of common-law partners (*convivientes*), when no provision for this type of union (or its dissolution) existed in the Peruvian Civil Code until 1984 (though the Code did of course address the recognition of children born outside of wedlock, including those born in what we would term *convivencias*). As Brandt writes, “the *Juez de Paz* does not only admit proceedings specified in the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in a sui generis manner [admits] those that have their basis in customary law, such as the *actas* of marriage and the separation of *convivientes*” (Ibid., 317). This foundation in unwritten, customary norms would have been even more the case in earlier years, before the last few decades when there have been some efforts to provide official training to the *Jueces de Paz* in each region.

Short-term and long-term relationships, marriage and convivencia: historical and regional contexts

Just as it does not include all sectors of the district’s population equally, the archive also does not provide a representative sample of all types of marriage or kinship relationships. A judicial or dispute-resolution institution naturally privileges conflict, rupture and dissension over stability and amity. If treated uncritically, this can lead the analyst to over-emphasize the former at the expense of the latter. On the other hand, this kind of archive can provide a useful supplement to other kinds of evidence – in particular, life histories collected by anthropologists and oral history researchers, which tend to focus on long-term, more or less stable relationships and families. Such is the case in the life histories analyzed by Mallon (1983) in her discussion of

migration from the community of Acolla to the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the early 20th century (Mallon 1983 254-263). In general, anthropologists of rural areas, especially those influenced by Chayanovian and other models of the household, tend to emphasize continuity and the reproduction of the family life cycle over time. While this is understandable and certainly useful, it can also lead one to overlook less stable relationships, which become particularly important in situations of migration, flux and social change. In this sense, archives produced in the context of judicial systems and the resolution of disputes can provide a useful corrective and provide an interesting and different perspective on everyday life. The use of judicial archives to examine topics related to family, gender relations and sexuality has grown more common in other countries in recent years, becoming an important methodology of social history and related fields. Most historians have utilized materials from professional law courts or police files rather than the kind of dual institution that the *Juzgado de Paz* represents in a place like Huayllay – at once a dispute-resolution mechanism ran by (certain) local people and a part of the national justice system. In Peru, however, work on social, family and gender history through judicial sources is still in its incipient stages, especially for the 20th century.

In the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* cases from 1940-42, most unions are described as *convivencias* and a few are described as marriages. In Peru as in much of Latin America, *convivencia* refers to a man and a woman living together without formal Church or civil marriage, and is usually translated into English as “consensual union.” When I interviewed the assistant *Juez de Paz* of Huayllay in 2010, he explained to me that only *convivientes* could come to him to resolve disputes; married couples had to go to the higher court, located in Cerro de Pasco and presided over by a professional judge. I do not know whether it is really true that married couples are completely excluded from use of the *Juzgado* in actual practice today. They were not in 1940-42; the cases from those years include several marital disputes between individuals who state they are married (*casado/a*). Namely, of the 60 cases involving disputes between couples, 9 cases (15%) are between people who are said to be married to one another at the time of the dispute. In 51 of the cases (85%), the man and woman involved in the marital dispute are either explicitly said to be current or former *convivientes* (most common) or, in a few cases, they are said to be “single” (*soltero/a*) but described as living together in a conjugal-type

relationship, which in essence makes them *convivientes*.¹⁶⁵ These percentages are not by any means representative of the proportions of *convivencias* vs. married couples in the areas; they are simply an illustration of the types of cases and the types of individuals who tended to visit the *Juzgado de Paz*. As we can see, although technically married couples may not have been supposed to use the services of the *Juez de Paz*, in practice some of them did.¹⁶⁶

The distinction between marriage and *convivencia*, and between short-term and long-term relationships, is a complicated one. In recent years, numerous historians of Latin America have examined everyday constructions of marriage, sexuality and honor for both the colonial and post-independence periods. Using judicial, notarial and police documents, they have highlighted the power and influence of official moral codes as well as the reformulation and transformation of these codes in everyday practice, especially among plebeian sectors. In Peru, national laws until the early 20th century recognized marriage as a religious sacrament rather than a civil contract; civil marriage did not become even a possibility for most of the population until after 1918 (Hunefeldt 2000, 83-86).¹⁶⁷ Yet although Catholic Church marriage had been the official, state-sanctioned ideal since the time of the Conquest, in practice *convivencia* was very common in Peru, as in much of Latin America. As Christiansen (2004) writes, “regardless of institutional attempts to encourage formal marriage, it is generally accepted that common-law marriage was the norm for many in colonial and nineteenth-century Latin America” (57).

In fact, such common-law unions had deep roots in medieval Spain, where they were known as *barraganías*. These were supposed to be more or less stable and seem to have involved the drafting of a written agreement, often in the presence of a notary or scribe. As Spanish legal scholar and historian Francisco Martínez Marina wrote in 1808, regarding earlier times,

Barraganía was not a vague, indeterminate or arbitrary liaison; it was founded on a contract of friendship and company, whose principal conditions were permanence and

¹⁶⁵ In 2 cases (3%), it is not clear whether they are married or not.

¹⁶⁶ In fact, people often went to the *Juzgado* with different kinds of issues that were technically not within the *Juez*'s legal purview. For example, with transactions involving property, it was not uncommon for people to state that they come to the *Juzgado* “due to the lack of a notary.” There is another book of cases, from 1937-41, which I have also examined; it is primarily devoted to property transactions and related issues.

¹⁶⁷ As Hunefeldt explains, civil marriage technically existed since 1897 and even earlier, but it was only performed in a few provinces and was mostly reserved for non-Catholics and foreigners.

fidelity... The frequency with which the local laws [*fueros*] talk about *barraganas*, both among clerics and laymen, and even among married individuals, as well as their provisions and civil laws about the conservation, subsistence and rights of children and mothers, shows how universal the custom was (Martínez Marina 1808, Libro Sexto, 21-22; my translation).

Laws and customs regarding *barraganía* were actually codified in the *Siete Partidas*, the highly influential 13th-century Castilian legal code, which stated that

Holy Church forbids that any Christian man have *barraganas*, for to live with them is mortal sin. But the wise men of old who made the laws permitted that some men might have them without civil penalty, for they held that it was a lesser evil to live with one woman than many, and that the paternity of the children would be more certain (translated by and quoted in Borah and Cook, 1966, 950).¹⁶⁸

Although *barraganía* is a term that has fallen into disuse, the institution was in a sense the antecedent of modern Latin American *convivencia*. Hunefeldt writes that “from early in the colonial period, *barraganía* was an accepted form of marriage with the advantage or disadvantage (depending on who was asked) of avoiding the once-and-forever clause in Catholic vows” (Hunefeldt 2000, 106). In those days long before the modern institution of civil marriage, *barraganía* was a civil institution somewhat resembling marriage. However, Peru’s first Civil Code, issued in 1852 and based partly on the Napoleonic Code, contains no mention of either *barraganía* – unlike the Spanish medieval laws of the *Siete Partidas* – or, for that matter, *convivencia*. In fact, already the first project for a Civil Code for Peru, in 1834, had explicitly criticized the *Siete Partidas* for their tolerance toward *barraganía*.¹⁶⁹ The Civil Code of 1936, like that of 1852, also ignored this type of union, and it wasn’t until the 1979 Constitution and

¹⁶⁸ In the Spanish original (1807 edition): “*Barraganas defiende santa iglesia que non tenga ningunt cristiano, porque viven con ellas en pecado mortal. Pero los antiguos que fecieron las leyes consintieron que algunos las podiesen haber sin pena temporal, porque tovieron que era menos mal de haber una que muchas, et porque los fijos que nasciesen dellas fuesen mas ciertos*” (*Siete Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso El Sabio*, Tomo III, Partida Quarta, Título XIV. Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1807, p.85).

¹⁶⁹ This was M.L. Vidaurre’s *Proyecto del Código Civil Peruano* (1834). After quoting a section of the *Siete Partidas* that mentioned *barraganía*, Vidaurre argued: “Those who celebrate the customs and good morals of the ancient Spaniards, and ponder the corruption and reduction in morals [*desmoralización*] of our days, should pay attention to this and other similar specimens [*monumentos*]. It will be seen then, that concubinage [*amancebamiento*] was permitted, and rewarded over other, less scandalous unions. Title 13 of the fourth *partida* is a shame [*baldón* – shame, affront] for Spain. It deals with *barraganas*, and says in the introduction, that although the Church has prohibited them for all Christians, the wise men realized that it was better to have one, than many” (Vidaurre 1834, 204-205; my translation).

the 1984 Civil Code that *convivencia* was legally recognized and the rights and responsibilities it entailed specified.

The changes in civil and ecclesiastical laws and attitudes do not necessarily imply a change in people's behavior, however. In her discussion of 19th-century Lima, Hunefeldt highlights this gap between official doctrine and everyday practice:

According to the church, sex should take place within marriage; premarital and extramarital sex were condemned. However, illegitimacy rates in Lima remained high throughout the nineteenth century, indicating a serious weakness in the church's control over this intimate sphere of life. A high percentage of Lima's inhabitants did not comply with the church's sexual and courtship rules – or at least failed to follow the dictated schedule for rites of sexual passage – instead marrying after having had sexual relations, and even after having one or more children, or not marrying at all (Hunefeldt 2000, 179).

This by no means implies that the preoccupation with honor, well-documented in Latin American historiography, was not present here. As Chambers (1999) has argued in her study of urban Arequipa, Peru, the 19th-century saw a shift from an elitist towards a more egalitarian, republican conception of honor that was tied to conduct rather than to status. But although the link between honor and women's sexuality continued to be central, the stress was placed on long-term faithfulness rather than on virginity at marriage:

Plebeian women, like elite women, were expected to conform to gendered notions of honor, although sexual fidelity after marriage was more important than chastity beforehand. As long as a single woman was involved in a long-term relationship with a reasonable expectation of marriage, she could still claim that her conduct was honorable (Chambers 1999, 177).

In a similar but more emphatic vein, Christiansen, in her study of late-19th century Cajamarca (northern Peru), stresses the way in which people viewed long-term *convivencias* as not too different from formal marriage:

Popular attitudes reveal little prejudice against what official ideology labeled 'illicit sexual relations;' on the contrary, many common-law unions functioned as permanent unions...The population at large did not endorse the state's strict differentiation between formal and common-law marriage. On the contrary, most lower-class people treated informal unions much the same as marriage (Christiansen 2004; 56-69).

This pattern, certainly to be found in Peru today, has coexisted with a parallel tendency to value Church (and later civil) marriage as more prestigious than informal union, and to attach a slightly

pejorative valence to the term *convivencia*. The balance between these two tendencies has varied historically depending on class and location as well as on social and economic changes over time.

If at the national level a gap has traditionally existed between official, elite discourses and popular practice around morality, sexuality and honor, for rural and indigenous Andean populations in particular there has been a gulf between local marriage practices and outsiders' (mis)perceptions of them. Sensationalized images of and discourses about Andean sexuality and marriage appear periodically to this day;¹⁷⁰ though not exclusively, they have often centered on the supposed institution of "trial marriage,"¹⁷¹ known variously as *servinakuy*, *watanaki* or by other terms.¹⁷² Though without the sensationalism, early anthropologists of the Andes (in the mid-20th century) still maintained the concept of "trial marriage." As W.E. Carter wrote in 1977, "trial marriage has long fired the imagination of Andean scholars" (Carter 1977, 177). On the basis of his own fieldwork in Bolivia as well as that of other contemporary anthropologists like Ralph Bolton and Xavier Albó, Carter argued that what had been interpreted as "trial marriage" was simply one step in the multi-stage, complex series of rituals that constituted marriage in many Andean communities and that could extend over a period of years. That particular step did often involve cohabitation (before the Church wedding component of the marriage process), but

¹⁷⁰ For example, in film depictions (such as the 2006 *Madeinusa*) and in common statements by urban or middle-class people.

¹⁷¹ Writing about "trial marriage" in 1965, U.S. anthropologist Richard Price highlighted "the more than four centuries of active opposition by the Church and ridicule by the non-Indian highland population." He argues that "although Peruvian folklorists rarely tire of this quaint subject, we have yet to read an adequate description or analysis" (Price 1965, 310, 314).

¹⁷² One particularly crass example of such sensationalized misperception comes from Huayllay itself. In 1915, the *Compagnie des Mines de Huaron* hired Ernest Godet, a Swiss engineer, to oversee the harnessing of the area's lakes for the mine's water needs and to build a first hydroelectric plant. Godet, who had a family connection to the University of Neuchatel, wrote an article for the *Bulletin de la Société Neuchateloise de Géographie*, in which he attempted a geographic and ethnographic description of the area around the Huaron mine (commonly called Huancavelica at the time – again, not to be confused with the department of the same name in south-central Peru). Godet's article is permeated with superficial impressions and commonly-held prejudices from the time. On the subject of marriage, he writes: "In the Huancavelica region people practice free love par excellence; all the formalities of marriage are reduced to the following: I like you, come live with me; you no longer suit me, go away!" He later nuances this by adding a reference to Church marriage and "trial marriage," but again in a sensationalist way: "In certain cases, when the family has maintained a few Christian beliefs, the young Indian who desires to marry will request the intervention of a priest; however, before asking for the blessing of the Church, he will sometimes seek permission... on a trial basis (!) for a period of time to be discussed" (Godet 1918, 177-179; my translation – ellipsis and exclamation point in the original).

only as part of a structured, long-term series of transitions in which permission from family members was a crucial (and ritualized) element:

In all societies, marriage implies public recognition, by means of a prescribed ritual, of the fact that two individuals have begun a new way of life. We are accustomed to associating such recognition with a single rite. Perhaps this is because a single rite suffices in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Could it be our ethnocentric perspective that has led us to seek an analogous single rite to validate the marriage contract in other societies? Could it be that Andean trial marriage has nothing trial about it at all, but is merely the first of a series of interrelated life crisis rituals, none of which can stand alone, but all of which contribute to the sealing of the marital bond?" (Ibid., 211)¹⁷³

The legal category of *convivencia*, as recorded in judicial, census and other records, would thus tend to lump together a stage of the marriage process in Andean communities, as described by Carter, with all other forms of cohabitation in national society as a whole. Carter's discussion directs our attention to certain general features of rural and indigenous Andean forms of marriage that have been misunderstood by outside observers. Actual marriage practices in Andean communities have varied greatly, not only in terms of ritual – as described by Price (1965), Carter (1977), Bolton (1977), Valderrama and Escalante (1998) and others - but also as regards the presence of the Church and state, the level of integration into the broader society, and the ways in which socioeconomic changes over time transform the opportunities and constraints faced by women and men.

Although ethnographies of the Central Highlands of Peru have paid extensive attention to issues such as the household, reciprocity and the relationship between kinship and commerce, they have focused less on the meanings, rituals and forms of marriage. This is consistent with the general tendency of scholarship on the Central Highlands to foreground questions of political economy and economic anthropology rather than issues of culture and meaning as in the more uniformly Quechua-speaking southern highlands of Peru. Examining the areas from which

¹⁷³ In terms of the "trial" aspect of "trial marriage," already in 1965 Price had written about *watanaki* in Vicos: "the possibility of separation, despite its actual infrequency, lends the institution the flavor of a trial period which many commentators have mistaken for its sole function" (Price 1965, 320). On the basis of Price's data and Mishkin's 1946 estimations, Carter wrote: "If accurate, such figures reveal two important facts: 1) separation can and does occur both during the *watanaki* and after formal marriages; and 2) for both the incidence is so low that when one compares it with separation and divorce figures from U.S. society, [one] is forced to ask whether it is the Andean peoples or we who practice trial marriage" (Carter 1977, 179).

people migrated to the Huarón mine (and to other mines in the region), however, we can get some idea of the relationship between Church/civil marriage and *convivencia* in these locations at different points in time. In his study of the Mantaro Valley community of Muquiyauyo – which at the time of his research (1949-50) was sending many of its young men to Huarón – Adams (1959) does not delve into these issues in great detail, but provides some general impressions:

Most of the couples living together in Muquiyauyo are married, but there are some who live in common-law marriage; they are referred to as *convivientes*... Some informants claimed that there were no cases of common-law marriage in Muquiyauyo, but I encountered a few in my surveys (Adams 1959, 160).¹⁷⁴

It is possible that Adams may have underestimated the prevalence of *convivencia*, or not paid enough attention to the complex relationship between *convivencia* and marriage. On the other hand, as we will see shortly, the rate of formal marriages does seem to have been higher in the Mantaro Valley than in other areas of the Central Highlands at this time.

In their examination of two towns in the highlands of Lima department, Bourque and Warren (1981) devote a greater share of their attention to issues involving conjugal relations. Their study, which focuses on the interaction between local structures underlying women's subordination, on the one hand, and processes of integration into coastal and national society, on the other, is based on research carried out in the late 1960s and 1970s in Mayobamba and Chiuchin – the first a *comunidad campesina*, the second a crossroads trading town. The two are located in the general area of the northern Lima highlands from which a number of migrants came to the Huarón mine at certain points in the 20th century. Furthermore, some of the villages in the immediate vicinity of Mayobamba and Chiuchin, such as Tongos, Maray and Paccho, maintained traditional exchange relations with Huayllay, the community on whose territory the mine is located – i.e., they were destinations for the llama caravans that came from Huayllay to exchange their clay pots for local maize (see Chapter 1). Thus, it can be reasonably said that the area was not only proximate but maintained some direct connection with Huayllay and the area

¹⁷⁴ According to Adams, between 20 and 30 percent of births registered in the district records were out of wedlock; he furthermore argued that “no condemnation is attached to an illegitimate child” (Ibid.).

around the Huarón mine.¹⁷⁵ In their discussion of marriage, Bourque and Warren highlight the contrast between past and present practices;

In the Chiuchin-Mayobamba region, local communities regulated marriage practices in the past through mechanisms such as trial marriage, arranged marriages, and the use of powerful intermediaries for marital negotiations between families. In many areas, trial marriage practices (called *servinacuy*) died out in this century. Mayobambinos recall that a couple established a household together, usually in the home adjoining the home of the boy's family, after a period of courtship (Bourque and Warren 1981, 99).

Bourque and Warren's use of the term "trial marriage," and their description of past practices, may or may not be influenced by the direct comparison they make to Vicos, the community studied by anthropologists (like Price, quoted above) involved with the Cornell-Peru Project in the 1950s and 60s:

The transition from trial marriage to formal marriage was controlled by community officials. It was their responsibility to periodically round up all the couples who had lived together for more than a year and hold them until their godparents arranged for the legal marriage of the young couples. These spring round-ups involved communal celebrations and resulted in high rates of formalized unions among townspeople. Some aspects of trial marriage are still practiced in neighboring Tongos and in towns to the north such as Vicos (Ibid., 99).

By contrast, when describing conjugal unions at the time of their research, Bourque and Warren emphasize the decline of parental and communal control and highlight the prevalence of the institution of *convivencia* rather than "trial marriage:"

In the present, community control of marriages has weakened. Most marital unions now begin when a couple decides to live together, establishing an independent household into which children are born. These nonlegalized unions (known as *convivencias*) do not give parents or the community many formal opportunities to intervene in the domestic affairs of a couple... While most marriages begin as consensual unions, there is a tendency for most to be legally formalized through civil marriage in later years (Ibid., 100).

¹⁷⁵ In their discussion of Mayobamba and Chiuchin, Bourque and Warren write that "barter with other highland communities, using overland trade routes and llama packs, is still practiced, though coastal trade is much more important." (Bourque and Warren 1981, 3).

Although, like other scholars whose work we have quoted here, Bourque and Warren highlight the close relationship between *convivencia* and marriage, they are more emphatic in asserting the inferior status of *convivencia* and the disadvantages it held for women when compared to the more desirable option – legal marriage¹⁷⁶ (Ibid., 100-102).

Within my own research, I happened to pay more attention to issues of marriage and spousal relations in the community of Rancas than in Huayllay. Rancas is located about an hour away by car from Huayllay and about 8 km. from the city of Cerro de Pasco. It thus belongs to the same general geographic area as Huayllay – the highland plateau that straddles Pasco and Junín departments at around 4,300 m. As in Huayllay, Rancas' traditional subsistence base is centered on the raising of animals – sheep, llamas and alpacas, for which the high-altitude *puna* is specially suited; like in other communities of the area, over the course of the 20th century Rancas also became heavily oriented towards a combination of mining work, migration to urban areas, and commerce. In Rancas, as in many of the cases I have mentioned, both *convivencia* and civil/Church marriage are present. Certainly, the three weddings I attended there were all between couples who already had children; one was a young couple, the other two were middle-aged (one of the couples already had a grandchild).¹⁷⁷ In one of the cases, the spouses had decided to have a Church/civil wedding because being married was a prerequisite to sponsoring the annual patron saint's feast, something which they had already agreed to do. I knew several couples that were not married by law but that constituted stable, long-term unions and were treated as such by everyone in the town; it was generally expected that this would eventually lead to a Church and civil wedding. Nor had parental approval been unimportant at the start of these unions. This general pattern is no doubt similar to that found in much of Peru. It does not mean that there was no variation in the community; I knew at least one recent case of elopement – also a well-known practice in the Andes and in Latin America – as well as of couples who got married before having children. Similarly, as with other issues, people highlight variations that

¹⁷⁶ By the time of Bourque and Warren's study, and in the particular locations of Mayobamba and Chiuchin (which no longer had a resident priest as in the past), civil marriage was more common than Church weddings (Ibid., 99).

¹⁷⁷ In one of the weddings, I attended only the nighttime celebration; in the other two, I was able to be present in at least some of the rituals the night before and the day after the wedding – in particular, the ceremonial sessions in which godparents and relatives advise the bride and groom. A longer description of these events would be out of place in this chapter.

have taken place over time in regard to marriage. Weddings used to last several days and involve a more elaborate celebration than today. Moreover, certain patterns and customs have fallen into disuse. One elderly woman recounted how her marriage (in the 1940s) had been arranged for her by her parents, so that her husband was a stranger to her on their wedding night.¹⁷⁸ She was the only one of her siblings who had this type of marriage; it is no longer common today. It is also likely that the length of *convivencia* before Church/civil marriage has varied greatly over time. Today, it responds not only to custom but more importantly to practical considerations and the constraints faced by specific individuals.

In Appendix C I present and analyze census data on the proportions between marriage and *convivencia* in Huayllay, Rancas and the Pasco region as a whole, both in the latest census (2007) and in the 1940 census, the latter corresponding to the time period from which the *Juzgado de Paz* cases come. While according to the 1940 census around 60% of marital unions in Pasco province as a whole (including Huayllay) were civil and/or Church marriages, and 40% were *convivencias*, we earlier saw that in our (clearly non-representative) 60 marital dispute cases from the Huayllay *juzgado de paz* in 1940-1942, only 15% were married couples. The vast majority of the remaining 85% were either current or former *convivencias*. Many of the latter were no doubt long-term unions that were in practice very similar to marriage – in fact, a few of them are couples seeking to move from *convivencia* to married status (others remain as long-term *convivencias*). Other cases, however, were shorter-term unions that were in the process of dissolution or had already dissolved. The *juzgado de paz* cases almost always record relationships at moments of rupture, dissension or at least tension, since that was what the *juez* was a recourse for. These tensions could arise from a number of causes: aggression or “bad treatment” at home (*malos tratos*), infidelity or abandonment on the part of one of the partners, a woman’s refusal to carry out expected domestic duties, or simply “incompatibility of characters” – to use one of the *juzgado*’s standard, stock phrasings. Sometimes, the archive shows the *juez de*

¹⁷⁸ I heard this story from this person in Rancas in 2011; also present was Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, who had already interviewed her and recorded her story as part of her earlier research. She subsequently shared her impressions with me in order to help me understand this modality of marriage. Bourque and Warren recount having heard similar narratives from elderly women in Mayobamba and Chiuchin: “Many older women portray themselves as the unwilling partners to arrange marriages. Some women remember the frightening experience of being locked in a house with a bridegroom who was a virtual stranger” (Bourque and Warren 1981, 99-100).

paz calling on the two individuals to reconcile and resolve the cause of the problem, which they agree to attempt to do. Other times, however, we see the relationship at the moment in which both partners agree to dissolve it and settle an *acta de separación*.

Strictly speaking, by helping to certify the dissolution of a *convivencia* relationship, the *juez de paz* was not using the Civil Code or other national law as his basis. As we have already discussed, both the 1852 and the 1936 Codes recognized marriage only, not *convivencia*; in those codes “separation” referred to the separation of married couples (although the Code did implicitly acknowledge the offspring of *convivencias*, in its extensive regulations on “illegitimate children” – regulations that as we shall see clearly did influence the *juzgado de paz*’s work).¹⁷⁹ Although today there are handbooks and other materials for *jueces de paz* that talk about mediation in disputes involving couples as one of their most important functions, and that trace this and other types of cases to “customary law” (*derecho consuetudinario*),¹⁸⁰ that was not the case for the 1930s and 40s. The *Reglamento de Jueces de Paz*, in effect since 1853 and subjected to many piecemeal modifications over time, did not mention issues involving *convivencia*, or any sort of marital-like relationship for that matter.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, whether due to “customary law” or other sources, it is clear that in Huayllay in the 1930s and 40s the *juez de paz* played an important role in the mediation between couples and the separation of *convivientes*; as Brandt (1990, 207) argues, this is the case for *jueces de paz* in much of Peru to this day.

¹⁷⁹ The 1852 Code did not recognize divorce in the modern sense, since it defined marriage as an ecclesiastical matter. Short of annulment – very difficult to obtain – the Church only recognized a form of separation that did not dissolve the marriage bond or allow remarriage; this separation is sometimes called “divorce” in the 1852 code, but is not divorce as we know it. The 1936 code, by contrast, did allow both civil marriage and civil divorce; “separation” was a necessary first step towards divorce, for those cases in which “mutual dissent” (*mutuo disenso*), rather than a specific offense on the part of one of the spouses, was the only reason given for divorce.

¹⁸⁰ For example, the Instituto de Defensa Legal’s 2007 *Manual del Juez y Jueza de Paz* states that “On many occasions, the *Jueces de Paz* themselves employ the norms of the community to resolve a conflict, since there are many problems within communities that national law does not regulate, for example the life of *convivientes*, the raising of children, the situation of stepchildren, the use of pastures, of water, among others. This is regulated by customary law, which are the values, norms and procedures through which the community lives in harmony” (43).

¹⁸¹ Its provisions and language did evidently influence the *jueces de paz* (some of the Huayllay cases mention the *Reglamento*), but the text itself focused mostly on issues involving commercial transactions, debts, and the *juez de paz*’s role in the early stages of a civil or criminal investigation that would go on to higher instances.

In the following discussion, I will illustrate and compare some of the different kinds of relationships that the archive documents, namely short-term and longer-term relationships. All names given here are pseudonyms. The purpose of this analysis is not so much to tell stories or specific details as it is to highlight the different kinds of households that existed in the mining community at this time, as well as the dynamics of marital disputes and the different factors shaping the options open to men and women.

Types of households: Short- and long-term convivencias

Many of the 1940-42 cases involve the dissolution of *convivencias* that had lasted a relatively short time. In 1941, 28-year-old Inés Cuadros, a native of La Oroya, accused her *conviviente* Justino Colca of (in the notetaker's phrasing) "bad character in the home, this being the third time that he causes frequent fights for insignificant reasons." Colca, a native of a village in Huarochirí Province in the Lima highlands to the southwest, was a 21-year old *obrero*; he had been living with his *conviviente* in the mining camp at Huarón for the past 3 months. He countered Cuadros' charges by in turn accusing her of not living up to her obligations at home such as providing meals at the right times, and of having left the room they shared together, taking some of his things.¹⁸² Although they spoke negatively of one another, they came to an agreement about seeking a separation. According to the case record, the *juez* "admonished them severely making them see the nefarious consequences that would result from this separation and from the thinness of character of both of them,"¹⁸³ but then proceeded to draw up the agreement. Justino Colca would be obligated to give Inés Cuadros a monthly pension of 15 soles for the maintenance of their 5-month-old daughter, who had apparently been born before their *convivencia* had begun. This payment would continue for the duration of her "nursing" (*lactancia*).

A second case involving a short-term relationship is that of 21-year old Rosa Huamán, a native of Junín, on the highland plateau that extends to the east of Huayllay. Unlike Inés Cuadros

¹⁸² "El demandado Justino Colca, dice que su conviviente Inés Cuadros, no cumple con darle sus alimentos a sus horas, que cuando él trabaja o sale de su trabajo le pide que comer, mas ésta se lo da de muy mal humor" (JPH, 1940-42).

¹⁸³ "El Juzgado de mi cargo oyendo a las partes las amonestó severamente haciéndoles ver las consecuencias funestas que les han de sobrevenir por tal separación i por ligeresas de caracteres de ambos."

in the previous case, Huamán is not listed as currently residing in the mine camp, but instead in La Oroya. However, she had previously been the *convivienta* of 27-year old Reynaldo Porras, who worked as a carpenter in the Huarón mine and resided there. According to Huamán, Porras, a native of the Oyón region in the northern highlands of Lima Department, had abandoned her 8 months earlier, after having cohabited (*convivido*) for 3 months. After the abandonment, she had given birth to their son, who was now 5 months old. Like Inés Cuadros, Rosa Huamán was asking for child support (*pensión alimenticia*). However, unlike in the previous case, the man does not seem to have come into the *juzgado* with his former *convivienta* at first. Rather, he appears to be summoned by the *Juzgado* after Rosa Huamán had given her initial deposition. Nevertheless, Reynaldo Porras does not offer resistance, but instead agrees to Huamán's demands for child support. He also recognizes his paternity of the child in a more formal way than is recorded in the two previous cases.¹⁸⁴ Porras then agrees to give a monthly sum of 10 soles to his son until he turns 3, after which “another judicial contract will be drawn up.”

Both cases share certain features in common. Each one of the couples is made up of a individuals who are from two different places – in fact, two different regions – and who almost certainly would have met at the mining camp. They are all relatively young, in their 20s, and had conceived a child either before their cohabitation or during it. And the relationship has dissolved after only 3 months as *convivientes*. There are other aspects of these short-term relationships as well that will be discussed in greater detail later on. For now, I will move on to discussing unions and households that lasted longer – even if the nature of the archive means that most of the longer relationships recorded there did eventually dissolve, too. Compared to the shorter-term relationships, most of these longer-term *convivencias* – though not all - consisted of individuals who were from the same location, as recorded in the notes. It is likely that many of them constituted households that had already formed before arriving in the mine. An example of a longer-lasting relationship that eventually separated is that of Rosario López and Isidoro Soto, both from Huayllay District, the local area. Soto was a 31-year old *obrero*; according to the *acta* drawn up for them by the *juez*, he and López had been together for 10 years. In August 1941, the

¹⁸⁴ In the transcript of the Cuadros/Colca case, paternity is simply assumed, and the only question is how much the father will provide in support. In the Porras/Huamán case, on the other hand, a birth certificate in the district municipality is explicitly mentioned - the *juez*/notetaker writes that Porras has been summoned “so that he can recognize and at the same time authorize the birth certificate of the child.”

two *convivientes* agreed to separate “for not being able to compromise character-wise during all the time they’ve been together as spouses [*cónyuges*] for 10 years of mutual services in the home” and also due to “bad treatment” (*malos tratos*) on the part of Soto towards his partner.¹⁸⁵ They also came to an agreement regarding custody over their children, who were aged 9 years old and 6 months, respectively: they would stay with their mother and receive a monthly stipend from their father, until they reached a certain age when they would go with their father. As in many other cases involving women from the immediate locality, Rosario López did not attend the *Juzgado* on her own, but rather accompanied by her father Atilio, described as a 62-year-old *obrero*.

In other cases, the number of years the household had lasted is not stated in the notes, but we can infer its longer and relatively stable character from certain pieces of evidence, for example the number of children. In early 1942, Octavio Urbina and Encarnación Villanueva came to the *Juez de Paz* and expressed their desire to draft a “separation agreement by mutual accord” (*acta de separación de acuerdo mutuo*) – the standard name for this type of contract in the *Juzgado* notes – due to “not understanding one another in marital life in other words in convivencia” (*por no comprenderse en la vida marital o sea de convivencia*). Villanueva and Urbina were both from one of the relatively large communities in the Junín/Pasco plateau, fairly close to Huayllay, and they were living in one of the Huarón company’s camps. Urbina, aged 47, was an *obrero* at the mining company; an occupation was also listed for Villanueva – unlike most women in the *Juzgado* cases – in this case being “her home” (*de su casa*). Urbina was described as “able in the Spanish language,” while Villanueva was noted down as “illiterate” (*analfabeta*).¹⁸⁶ The two of them had had six children: two boys and four girls. The agreement

¹⁸⁵ “...por no transigir en caracteres todo el tiempo que llevan como *cónyuges* de 10 años de servicios mutuos en el hogar, y por malos tratos, de palabra i obra ocasionados por Soto.”

¹⁸⁶ It is not clear whether this phrasing simply referred to her inability to read and write (shared by almost all women who appear in the *Juzgado* archive and who abstain from signing at the end of the *actas*) or whether it referred to something more, for example a higher proficiency in Quechua than in Spanish. It should be noted that at this time, although perhaps the majority of the population of these regions of the Central Highlands were bilingual, a substantial percentage would still have been Quechua monolinguals. This was the case more for women than for men. In the *Juzgado* cases, again, almost all women have their inability to read and write explicitly mentioned at the end of the *actas*, when they abstain from signing, but only certain women, like Encarnación Villanueva, are labeled *analfabeta* at the beginning of the *acta*. The juxtaposition and proximity of the statement of Urbina’s fluency in the Spanish language with that of Villanueva’s *analfabeta* status would also seem to suggest that the latter is meant to

that was drafted in the presence of the *juez* disposed that the boys would go with their father and the girls with their mother. At the same time, however, the father asserted or was made to assert his continuing commitment to supporting all his children financially - “according to his possibilities” (*según el alcance que lo tuviera*) – and to “give to his children the goods acquired during the life of *convivencia*” with Villanueva. In another of the *Juzgado*’s typical phrasings, Urbina and Villanueva were both commanded to “not offend” each other “in word or deed, in this and any other jurisdiction” (*no ofender ni de palabras ni hechos en esta y en cualquiera otra jurisdicción*). Although as in all the other cases, here we do not know for sure all the different aspects of this family, the number of children and the reference to the goods acquired during the relationship suggest certain stability and relative permanence, even if in the end this household seems to have dissolved too.

Another similar case, between Melecio Guzmán and Isabel Quispe, gives a bit more detail about a longer-term union that was in the process of dissolution. In June 1941, 37-year old Isabel Quispe came to the *juez de paz* accusing her *conviviente*, 30-year old Melecio Guzmán, an *obrero* at the mine, of “continuous bad treatment” (*continuos maltratos*).¹⁸⁷ Guzmán and Quispe were both from a community in the Junín/Pasco plateau (a different one from that in the Villanueva/Urbina case above). The notetaker recorded that Guzmán agreed not to mistreat Isabel again, and that “neither would he give any motive for ill-feeling or continuous anger in his home.” Quispe in turn was expected “to not abandon her home again without previous notice or without sufficient motive.” Furthermore, she was to “seek out all possible ways to maintain tranquility and harmony in the home” (*procurará buscar los medios posibles a fin de mantener la tranquilidad i armonía de la casa*). Melecio Guzmán agreed to invest his savings of 40 *libras* (400 *soles*) in the construction of a house in their home village, in the name of their daughters Ana and Genoveva. Although the notes recorded Guzmán as making this announcement, they also remarked that this sum of money had been “acquired jointly by him and his *conviviente* Isabel.” Lastly, the *Juez* told them that if they did not fulfill their part of the agreement they

indicate a linguistic difference rather than merely an inability to read and write. No other mention of linguistic difference occurs in the *Juzgado* notes, and the Quechua language is never explicitly mentioned.

¹⁸⁷ Again, this is one of the standardized phrasings used by the *Juzgado*, rather than the words that were necessarily used by Quispe.

would be sanctioned with 3 days ´ imprisonment and a fine of 100 soles “to benefit public works in this locality.”

As in all the *Juzgado* cases, we do not know all of the details of the dispute outside of what made it onto the *acta* that was recorded by the *juez* or his assistant and read to the couple. What was the exact nature of Guzmán´s ill-treatment of his partner, and of her reaction, beyond the formulaic phrases used by the *Juzgado*, such as *maltratos* or “abandon her home” (*abandonar su domicilio*)? Was Guzmán´s commitment to start building a house in their home community an entirely separate issue, or was it the primary or ultimate purpose of the visit to the *Juzgado*? In any case, it indicates at least the expectation (either on the part of the couple themselves or of the *juez*) of continued stability in the relationship, as well as of maintaining close links to the home village and all that implied in terms of family and community relationships (as opposed to the inevitably more fluid nature of life in the mining camp). However, a month later Isabel Quispe went to the *Juzgado* again, this time accusing her *conviviente* of “abandonment” (*abandono*). Apparently, he came with her, but when the *juez* and the couple interrupted the discussion to make time for the midday meal, Melecio Guzmán left for the mine and did not come back. For that reason, and because he had not fulfilled his part of the agreement from the previous month, the *Juez* wrote that Guzmán had acted “in a rebellious and mocking manner towards my authority” (*a rebeldía i burla de mi autoridad*), and asked the *teniente gobernador* of Huarón that he “capture” Guzmán and bring him so he could be punished with 4 days in the local jail cell and pay a fine of 30 soles.¹⁸⁸ Four days later, Guzmán and Quispe reconvened before the *Juez*, who recorded their agreement to separate:

There not being any mutual understanding from either of the parts towards the other, they separate from marital life by mutual agreement... given the motives already stated they separate in a definitive way from the life of *convivientes*, under the intervention of the authority of this office.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ This was less money and more jail time than had been threatened the previous month in case Guzmán and Quispe did not fulfill their agreement.

¹⁸⁹ “No habiendo absolutamente comprensión de ninguna de las partes de mutuo acuerdo, se separan de la vida conyugal... dado los motivos ya expuestos se separan desde la fecha en forma definitiva de la vida de convivientes, bajo la intervención de la autoridad de este despacho.” AJPH, July 1941.

The agreement drawn up further stated that the couple's two daughters would stay with their mother, and would receive a monthly payment of 15 soles from their father. At the age of 7, the eldest daughter would be placed under her father's custody (*pasará en poder de su padre*). This latter provision appears in many of the cases – see López/Soto case above - and it is not clear that it was always actually carried out; this will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

In this section we have seen two types of households that existed at the mine: short-term unions between people from different places, and longer-term relationships between individuals from the same location. However, these were by no means the only types of unions that existed at the mine. Although on average it does seem like relationships between people from different places were more likely to be shorter and less stable than unions between people from the same location, this is not true for every case. Historically, in the mines of Central Peru, many people have historically formed stable households with individuals from other locations whom they met at the mining camp. According to Mayer's 1969-1971 research, even in Tangor – one of the less mining-prone among the Chaupiwara Valley communities - around 1/3 of *tangorinos* were married to individuals from outside the community, and 1/3 of those in turn were “people from the mining centers” (Mayer 1977, 62). Meanwhile, Adams also claimed that out of the (non-representative) sample of 25 *muquiyauyinos* he interviewed at the Huarón mine in 1949, one-quarter were unmarried, half were married to women from Muquiyauyo and one-quarter were married to women from other places (Adams 1959, 97).

In both Huayllay and Rancas, there are many cases of people who are married to individuals from outside the community. The latter are called *yernos* and *nueras* (son-in-law or daughter-in law) of the community; although they may initially and for a time later face some rejection or derogatory comments, after enough time has passed they are usually accepted fully.¹⁹⁰ By leading people to move around and encounter individuals from other places, the mines simply make these types of unions more likely.

¹⁹⁰ By contrast, outsiders who do not have an affinal bond to someone from the community normally cannot become *comuneros* or be otherwise accepted as community members. That is the case, for example, for the families of shepherds who come from the agricultural *quebradas* to work tending the flocks.

The dynamics of disputes

So far, I have used the cases from the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* to illustrate the kinds of short-term and long-term relationships that existed at the Huarón mine, and to give an idea of how the mine brought together individuals from different locations and regions. I will now examine the reasons given for the disputes themselves. Many of the cases state “bad treatment” (*malos tratos* or *maltrato*) or lack of “understanding” (*comprensión*) as the problem; less often, the term “discord” (*discordia*) is used. These may or may not have been terms that the litigants themselves actually used; most likely, they were part of the vocabulary that the *Juez* or notetaker were accustomed to using to denote the types of complaint that they heard most often. The term most frequently used, *malos tratos*, conjures images of domestic violence – a topic which has been examined, through judicial documents, by historians like Klubock (1998), Tinsman (2002) and Christiansen (2004). The ubiquity of cases of spousal abuse in any judicial (or police) archive should not lead us to overestimate the incidence of violence in any particular location. As Christiansen writes in her study of 19th-century Cajamarca,

Only the most extreme, and hence, by definition, atypical, cases of abuse reached the attention of the authorities. The bias in the sources can easily create an illusion of prevalent and extreme violence (Christiansen 2004, 65).

This bias is present both in documents such as the ones used by Christiansen – criminal cases from the higher law courts of the departmental capital – and in the documents from the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz*, a relatively more accessible institution. Yet although the latter archive does contain many mentions of *malos tratos*, it does not provide a great deal of detail. This is of course because the cases are much briefer, but also because, as Brandt emphasizes and as was discussed above, the *Juzgado de Paz* is more of a dispute-resolution mechanism than a regular law court seeking a prosecution and a sentence. This seems to have been the case in Huayllay in the 1940s as well; people went to the *Juez de Paz* with a particular end in mind, and that, rather than the investigation or prosecution of guilt, was what drove each case. *Maltrato* appears here more as a reason or justification for a decision to be made by the *Juez de Paz* than as something to be investigated on its own. Thus, while the archive can lead one to overestimate the prevalence of domestic violence – by the frequency with which it mentions *malos tratos* – it can also lead one to underestimate its seriousness, due to the paucity of details and to the fact that the

actual abuse takes a back seat to the resolution being sought, whether that was separation, an amelioration of the situation within the relationship, or something else.

Certainly, some of the *Juzgado de Paz* cases seem to clearly show instances of domestic violence. For example, the case of Balvina Pérez and Dionisio Matos at the Jumasha mining camp, discussed in the next section, makes explicit reference to the fact that Matos was “accustomed to hitting” his *conviviente*; for this reason Pérez wanted to separate even without obtaining Matos’ consent, though it apparently meant losing the right to alimony for her child. Another case involves Urbano Chaupi and Matilde Quiroz, both of whom are described as shepherds (*pastores*) and as *analfabetos*.¹⁹¹ Quiroz came to the Juzgado requesting her “definitive separation” from Chaupi, due to “*malos tratos*” by the latter.¹⁹² She claimed that her *conviviente*’s pattern of abuse was well-known to the “political and police authority of this locality,” for it had occurred “on several occasions.” In a passage that might actually be derived from Quiroz’s direct speech (either as quotation or translation), the notetaker wrote that, at their previous appearances before the authorities, Chaupi “makes false promises of reconciliation (*amistad*), but then outside continues to hit me whenever he likes and several times I have been in bed due to his beatings.”¹⁹³ For his continued abuse, the *Juez de Paz* punished Chaupi “with corporal punishment” (*castigado con la pena corporal*) in the public jail cell in Huayllay. Afterwards, he reconvened the two parties to the dispute and agreed to Quiroz’s request for separation, stating that the two *convivientes* must refrain from “maintaining marital relations” from that day forward. The *bienes gananciales* (marital property) that they had acquired together during their *convivencia*, namely six sheep, would be split equally between Chaupi and Quiroz. Since Quiroz apparently was pregnant, Chaupi was made to promise that he would hand over a

¹⁹¹ Again, it should be remarked that although a large proportion of the individuals in the Juzgado minutes are said not to know how to sign their names (in particular, the great majority of the women), only a few individuals are described as *analfabetos* (illiterate). See footnote 41 for my speculation as to whether the term referred to a linguistic difference (i.e. inability to speak Spanish) rather than simply to an inability to read and write.

¹⁹² This is one of the few cases we will discuss here that involve individuals without a direct connection to the mining camp - the other is that of Josefina Colqui and Manuel Castro, below.

¹⁹³ “*Pedía su separación definitiva por los malos tratos que este le daba por distintas oportunidades y que de este hecho tiene conocimiento la autoridad política y policial de esta localidad, a donde hace promesas fingidas de amistad a donde fuera de ella sigue golpeándose como le da la gana que en diversas ocasiones he estado en cama por dichos golpes.*”

monthly pension for the maintenance of the child during the time of *lactancia*, after which he would pick him or her up (for a discussion of the concept of *lactancia* and child custody, see next sub-section). If either of the parties did not fulfill their side of the agreement, they would be fined between 50 and 200 soles plus a term in the public jail cell.

In both of these cases, the end result is separation. However, there are also many cases in which the couple agrees to reconcile; the accusation of “bad treatment” brought forth in those cases (usually by the woman) seems to be aimed at stopping the abuse, not at ending the relationship, at least not yet. For example, in 1941 Nélica García took her conviviente Eloy Hernández to the *Juez de Paz*, accusing him of *maltratos*. The *Juez* recorded that the couple came to “a mutual accord adopted under my intervention” (*un mutuo acuerdo adoptado bajo mi intervención*). Hernández agreed to the *Juzgado*’s formulaic statement that he would “from this day forward not repeat said *maltratos* or *discordias* in his home.”¹⁹⁴ As for García, “since this is the first instance that the *maltratos* and offenses occur, she agrees to conciliate and to come to an understanding with her *conviviente* to continue as they have been cohabiting in a harmonious and amicable way from now on.”¹⁹⁵ If he did not keep his promise, Hernández would be fined 100 soles and punished with 3 days in the local jail cell. In this case, the *Juez de Paz* cited the fact that this was the first instance of “bad treatment” by Hernández as a reason to seek reconciliation rather than separation. This contrasts with the Chaupi/Quiroz case, where the recurrent nature of the offense that was brought up by Matilde Quiroz to support her petition for separation.

Just as there are cases where reconciliation is sought, there are also cases in which an accusation of “bad treatment” leads to an agreement to marry. For example, Efraín Poma, an *obrero* living in the Huarón mining camp and originally from Dos de Mayo Province in southwestern Huánuco Department, was accused by his *conviviente* Sabina Díaz of *maltratos*, which she said she suffered “constantly.” After a “severe admonition” (*severa amonestación*) from the *Juez de Paz*, the two *convivientes* came to an agreement, using exactly the same language as in the Rodríguez/García case: Poma promised to “from this day forward not repeat

¹⁹⁴ “...se compromete de hoy en adelante no repetir dichos maltratos ni discordias en su hogar.”

¹⁹⁵ “...siendo el primer caso acaecido con los maltratos i ofensas, acepta conciliar i ponerse de acuerdo con su conviviente a seguir como habían convivido en forma armoniosa i amistosa en lo sucesivo.”

said *maltratos* or *discordias* in his home,” while Díaz accepted that “since this is the first instance that the *maltratos* and offenses occur, she agrees to conciliate and to come to an understanding with her *conviviente*.” Thus, again, the *Juzgado de Paz* is used as a recourse for stopping *maltrato*; although Díaz said that the bad treatment occurred “constantly,” this was apparently the first time that the couple came before the *Juez de Paz*, and so the latter gave the man a chance to change his behavior. Presumably, if the situation was repeated enough times, and if Díaz wanted to leave the relationship, the *Juez de Paz* would help terminate it, as in the Chaupi/Quiroz case above. However, here there is a further element; after agreeing to reconcile, Efraín Poma and Sabina Díaz also agree “to marry within six months unfailingly from this date” (*contraer matrimonio dentro de seis meses indefectiblemente de esta fecha*). This leads to the question – without denying that the *maltrato* in this case may have been real, was it the primary reason for coming before the *Juez de Paz*? Or was the main motivation to obtain a formal agreement to marry? No other details are provided here, and we do not know whether the marriage actually went through.

Another case, involving a very young couple, shows a similar complexity: Uldarico Fuentes, a *criandero*¹⁹⁶ in his early 20s, came before the *Juez de Paz* with his 16-year old *conviviente* Alicia Sulca, and recognized “his grave offense” (*su grave falta*) towards Sulca, “committing *malos tratos* such as abandoning her for months and months without remembering her with a single cent for her sustenance, much less remembering her clothing to which she has been entitled from the moment that he took her out of her paternal home.”¹⁹⁷ After the *Juez de Paz* “severely admonished the parties involved, letting them know the obligations that both consorts have of mutual respect in the home,”¹⁹⁸ Fuentes and Sulca came to an agreement. Fuentes agreed to promise that he would not make the same mistake again, and that he was, in

¹⁹⁶ At this time in Huayllay District, the term *criandero* seems to have referred to people who were engaged primarily in the raising of their own animals (mainly sheep) rather than mine work, and who were not shepherds (*pastores*) taking care of someone else’s flock.

¹⁹⁷ “...profiriéndole malos tratos como son abandonándola meses de meses sin acordarse de ella con un solo centavo para su sostenimiento, ni mucho menos de su vestido a que tiene derecho desde el momento que la sacó de su casa paterna.”

¹⁹⁸ “...amonestado severamente a las partes haciéndoles conocer las obligaciones que tienen ambos consortes del respeto mutuo en el hogar.”

the *Juzgado*'s language, "committing himself to behaving like a gentleman in the home that has been formed over a year and a half by both *convivientes*."¹⁹⁹ Similarly, Sulca was supposed to promise that she would "continue to behave as she has up to now, providing his meals and clean clothing at the right times."²⁰⁰ Moreover, they agreed to have a Church wedding within eight months.²⁰¹ Again, here an accusation of *malos tratos* leads to the drafting of a formal agreement to move from *convivencia* to married status through a formal (and in this case Church) wedding. Additionally, this case shows the flexibility of the term *malos tratos* – "bad treatment" appears here not as domestic violence but rather as consisting of abandonment and of a failure on the part of the man to fulfill his responsibilities towards his *conviviente*, who had left the patriarchal sphere of her birth home to enter a new one with Fuentes.

Terms having to do with sexual crimes, like seduction, *rapto*, *violación* and *estupro* – concepts that have been widely analyzed by historians of 19th-century Latin America - appear very seldom in the *Juzgado de Paz* documents from 1940-42 and later years. Like other historians, Christiansen (2004) has argued that in judicial contexts these terms, though technically implying some form of deceit or coercion/rape, more often functioned as a mechanism for a woman who had been in a consensual relationship to oblige the defendant to marry her, or at least to receive monetary compensation for her lost honor. It's not that rape, in the sense of coerced sexual relations, did not occur, but rather that instances of what we would call rape were underreported and not usually taken to court. As Christiansen writes in her study of 19th-century Cajamarca,

In reality, only a few of these cases dealt with rape or sexual violence; most transcripts, in order to rescue the reputations of the young women concerned, relate tales of consensual relationships described as forced intercourse or seduction resulting from deceit (Christiansen 2004, 115).

In the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* cases from 1940-42, it seems that the objectives of ensuring marriage or obtaining some form of monetary compensation are usually resolved within the

¹⁹⁹ "...comprometiéndose a portarse como un caballero en su hogar formado en un año i medio entre ambos convivientes."

²⁰⁰ "...seguir portándose como hasta la fecha, prodigándole sus alimentos y ropa limpia a sus horas."

²⁰¹ "...tomar estado católicamente entre el término de ocho meses a partir de la fecha."

language and context of *convivencia*, abandonment and infidelity, without the need to portray a consensual relationship as if it had been forced. Again, this may have to do with the generalized, though not necessarily total, acceptance of *convivencia* in this region and at this time. There is one mention of *seducción*, namely when a 21-year old *obrero* is accused of committing “immoral acts” (*actos inmorales*) by being the *seductor* of his female cousin (who was also of age) and impregnating her. The accusation is brought forth by the cousin’s father; the young people are both punished and the *obrero* is made to agree that he will provide a monthly *pensión alimentaria* (see next section) of 10 soles when the baby is born. Both then sign promises that they will refrain from engaging in “carnal relations” (*vida carnal*) in the future.

This kind of language (“immoral acts,” “seduction”) is relatively rare in the 1940-42 documents. There are a few examples from other years,²⁰² for example in one case from the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* from the late 1940s. A worker at the Huarón mine was imprisoned in the public jail in Cerro de Pasco after having relations with and impregnating a young woman, who is described as being underage. The girl’s family got him to agree to marry her, and the marriage took place in jail; but eight days after returning to the Huarón mining camp, he abandoned her. According to the girl’s mother, who told the story, the man later offered to recognize the child and provide a monthly pension, but never did so; furthermore, he now had another *conviviente*, and was therefore “committing the crime of adultery” (*cometiendo el delito de adulterio*), so she asked that he be sanctioned. In another case from the early 1950s, a woman from one of the neighboring plateau communities came to the *Juez de Paz* with her daughter; she accused a certain individual of committing a “crime against sexual honor” by “seducing” her daughter, “offering to marry her, abusing the sexual act three times, and she did not know and he is the cause of her perdition.”²⁰³ Again, here the focus is on a sexual relationship that does not result in marriage and is thus portrayed as *seducción*. These kinds of cases, which are not too different from the 19th-century trials analyzed for Cajamarca and Lima by Christiansen and Hunefeldt (2000), are relatively rare in the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz*, but they did occasionally

²⁰² Although the 1940-42 cases are the only ones I have analyzed systematically and in their totality, I have examined a number of cases from other years.

²⁰³ “...ofreciéndole matrimonio, abusando del uso sexual tres veces; y que ella no sabía y que el es el causante para su perdition.”

occur.²⁰⁴ They offer a striking contrast to the majority of *convivencia* cases which do not explicitly privilege premarital virginity and which do not use accusations of *seducción* to achieve aims such as obtaining a commitment for marriage, dissolving a relationship, or ensuring financial support.

Actually, “honor” and “dignity” are terms that are found in the 1940-42 cases, namely in the 15 or so cases involving slander accusations, but these usually turn on questions of women’s fidelity to one partner rather than on the relationship between virginity, sexuality and (formal) marriage.²⁰⁵ Indeed, infidelity is one of the most frequent topics in the *Juzgado de Paz* cases, whether as rumor, gossip or as something that is acknowledged and that leads either to a separation or to reconciliation. Many of the separation cases, unlike those centered on slander, involve infidelity or “abandonment” on the part of men. As we saw previously in the statement by the assistant *Juez de Paz* whom I interviewed in 2010, the perception exists that mining attracts men who pretend to be single and who form a relationship at the mine, but who actually have a family in their hometown. There certainly are some cases that fit this stereotypical image. For example, a case from 1940 involves two people from the Mantaro Valley (ages 33 and 37, respectively) who had been living together at the mining camp for twelve months; the woman asked to separate “because she came to know that he is a married man with six children.”²⁰⁶ This relates again to the whole issue of the unstable, short-term relationships that formed at the mining camp; we do not know to what degree the woman in this case really was “deceived” and to what degree she may have known about her *conviviente*’s background.

However, just as there are cases where an accusation of “bad treatment” is followed by reconciliation, there are also cases in which infidelity or temporary abandonment does not result in separation. Furthermore, this occurs not only in cases of infidelity by men, but also, though

²⁰⁴ It should be mentioned that there are also two cases in the 1940-42 *Juzgado de Paz* minutes that appear to be accusations of rape in the sense of coercive sexual relations, even if the term “rape” (*violación*) is not explicitly used.

²⁰⁵ For the sake of brevity, these slander cases (which use phrases like *difamación contra el honor* and *injuria sobre la dignidad*) cannot be examined in detail in this chapter. Slander cases that have to do with issues of sexuality are almost always brought up by women rather than by men.

²⁰⁶ “...por cuanto llegó a saber que es hombre casado con seis hijos.”

more rarely, in instances of infidelity or abandonment by women. For example, Edilberto Galarza, an *obrero* at the mine and originally from a community in the Mantaro valley, went before the *Juez de Paz* to denounce that his wife Irene Tapia had been “seduced” by another man, Nicanor Cajahuanca, and the two had attempted to elope together. They had been stopped by the security guards at San José, and Tapia had been sent back, while Cajahuanca had “escaped.” Unlike in other cases, here the *Juez de Paz* considered that “this act of adultery was proven according to the statements of both parts.”²⁰⁷ Whether the story told here was really wholly accurate or not, the fact is that Galarza agreed to “forgive” this act of, as the *Juez de Paz* put it, “adultery” (*adulterio*). Irene Tapia “understanding her error,” promised not to do it again, while her husband “promised to not engage in any bad treatment (*maltrato*) or disagreements in the home.” Again, the wording here is largely formulaic, and likely derives more from *Juzgado* custom than from actual speech, but the point remains. Overall, women’s infidelity was still generally treated differently from men’s, as shown by the fact that it was overwhelmingly women who had to defend their fidelity and “honor” or “dignity” through slander accusations, and as seen in at least one case where an accusation of infidelity was used as an argument to attempt to take away a mother’s custody over her child (see next section). But the Galarza/Tapia case helps to moderate the perspective that stresses women’s fidelity as central to honor; like men’s, women’s infidelity could lead to rupture of the relationship or it could be “forgiven,” at least within the formal space of the *Juzgado de Paz*. There is at least one other case where a man also agrees to “forgive” (*perdonará*) his wife, though in that case it is not clear whether the adulterous act had been proven in the *Juez*’s eyes or whether it still remained at the level of gossip and speculation, as in the slander cases.

One last issue must be examined, and it remits us back to the cases of dissolution of *convivencias* that we saw earlier in this chapter. As mentioned previously, out of the 98 cases in the 1940-42 *Juzgado de Paz* documents, 60 are disputes involving *convivientes* or, less commonly, couples married according to the state or Church. Of those 60 cases, 38 involve separations that are occurring or that have already occurred. Within those separation cases, there are 7 that present a particular type of monetary transaction that the notes call a payment for

²⁰⁷ “...fue comprobado según las declaraciones de ambos este hecho por adulterio.”

“services” (*servicios*), from the man to the woman. This occurs in two of the cases we have examined already – namely, Colca/Cuadros and Porras/Huamán – as well as in a case that is discussed in the next section, that of Teodoro Yáñez and Catalina Sánchez. It is different from payments for child support, which are examined in the next section. Child support was a monthly payment, whereas “payment for services” was a one-time settlement; in any case, the two are clearly distinguished in each case of the seven cases. For example, in the Colca/Cuadros case, in addition to promising to give a monthly pension of 15 soles for the maintenance of their 5-month old daughter for the duration of her *lactancia*, Justino Colca also gave his former conviviente Inés Cuadros a one-time payment of 70 soles, for “services in the 3 months that she has had of marital life with Justino Colca.” Similarly, in the Porras/Huamán case, Rosa Huamán does not only ask for child support (*pensión alimenticia*), but also for “payment for my services,” citing the fact that “I have been abandoned.”²⁰⁸ In addition to the monthly stipend of 10 soles for their son, Reynaldo Porras agrees to “recognize the service period [*tiempo de servicios*]demanded by his *convivienta* Rosa Huamán, of 15 soles for the three months of *convivencia*.”²⁰⁹ Finally, in the Yáñez/Sánchez case to be discussed in the next section, Catalina Sánchez not only asks for support for her child but additionally demands that Teodoro Yáñez “recognize also the five months of services that he has had in their union.”²¹⁰ Yáñez agrees to give Sánchez, in addition to the child support, a payment of 22 soles and 50 cents “for the five months of services that they have had.”²¹¹

What the seven “payment for services” cases have in common is that they are all *convivencias* (not legal/Church marriages), and that all explicitly state a direct connection to mining, through residence or occupation (usually both) - either to the Huarón mine or, in one

²⁰⁸ “*Solicito la pensión alimenticia correspondiente, así como el pago de mis servicios, es así que he sido abandonada, así como mi hijo Eleuterio, desde hace ocho meses.*”

²⁰⁹ “*...prometiendo al mismo tiempo reconocerle el tiempo de servicios que reclama su convivienta Rosa Huamán de quince soles por los tres meses de convivencia.*”

²¹⁰ “*...le reconozca también los cinco meses de servicios que ha tenido en su unión.*”

²¹¹ “*Teodoro abonará 22 soles 50 centavos, a Catalina Sánchez, por concepto de servicios de 5 meses que han tenido.*”

case, to the neighboring Río Pallanga mine.²¹² Thus, this may have been a practice that occurred only with relationships formed at the mining camp, or some of them anyway. Three of the cases involve *convivencias* claimed to have lasted a few months (3 months in two cases and 5 months in one case), whereas three of the cases involve *convivencias* that had supposedly lasted 3 years or slightly longer (one case is unspecified). Four of the cases involve a man and a woman who were originally from different regions, while three of the cases involve individuals who are from the same location.²¹³ There does not seem to be a clear correlation between the stated duration of the relationship and the amount given. In one case, a payment of 70 soles is made for *servicios* in a *convivencia* that had lasted 3 months, while in another case of the same duration the amount is only 15 soles. Similarly, in one case a payment of 150 soles is made for services in a relationship that had lasted 3 years and 5 months, while in another the payment is only 30 soles for a 3-year long *convivencia*.

Like several other issues that come up in the cases discussed in this chapter, this modality of “payment for services” is not mentioned in the Civil Code, and may simply have been part of local or regional practice in the *Juzgados de Paz*. On the one hand, it may simply have been a payment designed to ease the former *conviviente*’s struggles once the household – however temporary – had broken up. On the other hand, it may have something to do with the monetary compensations that Hunefeldt (189-193) and Christiansen (116) document for the 19th century, for cases of seduction, *rapto*, *estupro*, or simply those in which a sexual relationship did not lead to marriage. It should be mentioned that the 1936 Civil Code, in its Articles 77 and 79, did stipulate a compensation payment when a formal promise of marriage (*esponsales*) went unfulfilled. However, the seven *convivencia* dissolution cases that include “payment for services” do not mention any promise of marriage. Inversely, although as we have seen there are several cases in the *Juzgado de Paz* minutes that involve agreements for matrimony, there seems

²¹² One case lists the man’s occupation as *motorista* but does not say where he worked or lived; however, it can be assumed that he worked at one of the mines, since *motorista* was a common mine occupation (i.e. the person who worked with the rail cars inside the mine – see Rodríguez 2004).

²¹³ Specifically, two of the cases involve a man from the Lima Highlands and a woman from the Pasco/Junín Plateau (not including Huayllay); one case is between a man from the Mantaro Valley and a woman from the Plateau, and one is between a man from the Lima Highlands and a woman from Tarma. In one case both individuals are from the Mantaro Valley, and in two cases both individuals are from Huayllay itself.

to be no connection between those and the “payments for services” in the cases discussed here. Alternatively, the “payment for services” could simply represent a form of economic valuation of domestic work, and/or an index of its commodification. The fact that I did not analyze these cases until after I had completed my field research means that I have not been able to ask people in Huayllay, Rancas or Cerro de Pasco about the “payment for services” as well as other issues that arise from a careful examination of the documents.

Child support, custody and the maintenance of children

So far our discussion has mostly concerned the household through the lens of marital relations and disputes between men and women. However, children were also an important component of households, and they do appear in the 1940-42 *Juzgado de Paz* cases we are analyzing. Most of the couples have children, and in most of the cases an arrangement is made regarding two intertwined aspects: financial sustenance for the child, and who the child would live with in the future. These issues were part of national law. Although the 1852 and 1936 Civil Codes did not formally recognize the existence of any form of union other than marriage in the Church and Civil (in the later code) sense, they did extensively regulate the relationship between parents and children born both inside and outside of marriage.²¹⁴ In the codes, this relationship revolved both around issues of inheritance and also of *alimentos* – alimony. According to Article 439 of the 1936 Code,

We understand by *alimentos* everything that is indispensable for the maintenance, shelter, clothing and medical assistance according to the social position [*posición social*] of the family. *Alimentos* comprise also the education of the *alimentista* and his/her professional training when he/she is a minor.

²¹⁴ The 1852 Civil Code distinguished further within the category of “illegitimate” children. *Hijos naturales* were those whose parents were not married but were eligible to marry – i.e. none of the common *impedimentos* to marriage (such as already-married status, consanguinity, membership in the priesthood) applied to them. Among the children who were not *hijos naturales* were *hijos adulterinos* – i.e., those born to a married person and someone other than their spouse. The rights and responsibilities outlined in the code are slightly different for these two categories of “illegitimate” children. This distinction is no longer found in the 1936 Civil Code, although the broader differentiation between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children is still present there. The distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” does not seem to be prominent in the 1940-42 *Juzgado de Paz* cases from Huayllay, although the recognition of children by their fathers is very important there. The legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy and the recognized/unrecognized distinction are two very different things: recognizing children did not make them “illegitimate” according to national law – only marriage between the parents could do that.

According to the Civil Code, *alimentos* were owed not only from parents to children but also between spouses and from children to parents who were of old age. In theory the concept referred to the everyday sustenance of any family, but in practice it became salient only in cases of family rupture or absence. In the Huayllay *Juzgado* cases, however, the terms *alimentos* and *pensión alimenticia* are almost always used in the sense of alimony from fathers to children; only once is it used to indicate alimony from a man to his former spouse.

As we saw earlier, there are 60 cases that have to do with marital or sexual disputes between men and women;²¹⁵ of these, 38 cases (62.3%) involve a separation that is occurring or that has already taken place.²¹⁶ Of these, in turn, 31 cases explicitly mention the presence of children, and 26 of those specify that the father will provide alimony payments to his child. These monthly payments range from a low of 5 to a high of 20 soles for one child and from 10 to 30 soles for two children; payments of 10 or 15 soles are by far the most common, however.²¹⁷ According to the Civil Code, the amount of alimony was supposed to vary depending on perceived ability to pay as well as the recipient's need.

There is more to this than a simple monetary payment, however. We saw in the Guzmán/Quispe case how the agreement drawn up by the *Juez de Paz*, in addition to specifying a monthly stipend for the two children, also stipulated that the eldest daughter would pass over into her father's custody at the age of 7. A very similar arrangement appears in the López-Soto case, where it was decided that the youngest child, who was 6 months old at the time, would be picked up by his father when he turned 6 years old. In fact, of the 31 separation/recognition cases that explicitly mention children, 14 also mention this arrangement – the child passing into the

²¹⁵ Again, these 60 cases comprise the majority of the total 98 cases from the 1940-42 book of *actas* from the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz. The other 38 cases involve disputes ranging from physical fights between men to thefts to around 15 cases involving insults (many of which involve issues of sexuality as well).

²¹⁶ I am not counting here the case of a couple that first drew an *acta* of separation, making it seem like the relationship had ended definitively, and then, a few months later, drew up a new *acta* agreeing to marry.

²¹⁷ To get a sense of how much this was, here are a few other monetary values to be found in the 1940-42 Juzgado cases from Huayllay. A man injured in a fight was compensated for 10 days of missed work at the mine with 20 soles. Other men injured in similar situations were awarded 20 and 50 soles, respectively, for an unspecified number of days missed at work. An adult cow together with its calf were valued at 65 soles. A set of four sheep was valued at 20 soles. A trunk (*cajón*) full of cans of milk was valued at 18 soles. A 3-story house in the village of Huaychao (certainly one of the "elite" homes in the center of the village) was valued at 800 soles.

custody of the father at a specified age. Sometimes, the child was supposed to stay with the mother till age 6 or 7; other times, only till age 3 or even less.

Certainly, from a contemporary perspective, the idea of children leaving their mother's side at such a young age seems strange. However, this pattern makes more sense if we look at it in the context of changing Civil Code provisions regarding three main issues: parental authority (*patria potestad*), custody during separation/divorce proceedings, and alimony itself. The cases we are examining here occurred not long after the transition from the 1852 Civil Code to the 1936 Civil Code; thus, it makes sense that the influence of both would be felt (in addition to the influence of local and/or regional custom). Regarding the first issue, in its section on *patria potestad* the 1852 Code stated that "children who are legitimate, legitimated, adopted, as well as recognized natural children, are subject to the authority of the father, or, in its absence, the authority of the mother" (Art. 285).²¹⁸ A mother's authority was secondary to that of the father and exercised only when the latter was judged to be absent or incapacitated. Furthermore, one of the rights of the parent who exercised *patria potestad* was "to keep the children in their possession and to pick them up from the place they are at" (Art. 287). The 1936 Code was more moderate in its assertion of male authority over children, but still privileged the father: "*Patria potestad* is exercised by the father and the mother, during matrimony. In cases of disagreement the opinion of the father will prevail" (Art. 391). Moreover, Article 394 asserted that *patria potestad* over recognized illegitimate children was likewise exercised by the father. However, the 1936 Code also added a provision that had been absent in the 1852 version: "The judge can, when requested by the mother, grant her *patria potestad*, or resolve that she may exercise it until the child is of a certain age, if the child's interest requires it" (Art. 391).

On the issue of custody during separation/divorce proceedings, there was an even clearer change from the 1852 to the 1936 Codes, from an emphasis on the father's custody towards one

²¹⁸ Legitimate children were those born to married parents; legitimated children were those whose parents married after they had been born. "Natural children" (*hijos naturales*) were those whose parents were at least marriageable (i.e. not close relatives, already-married individuals or members of the clergy). Being recognized by the father asserted their status as *naturales* and distinguished them from more stigmatized categories of legitimate children, such as *hijos adulterinos*.

that privileged the mother's.²¹⁹ Although these particular provisions applied only to marriages and not to *convivencias*, they still would have shaped the social and ideological context in which decisions about child custody were made. Not only did the emphasis shift from paternal to maternal custody; there was also a change (upwards) in the perception of how old children needed to be before leaving their mother's side, from 3 to 7 years old. Again, however, it seems likely that the influence of the 1852 Code, and of the broader societal norms which it shaped and in turn reflected, would have lingered for some years after 1936.

The Civil Code's changing provisions on alimony also related directly to the issue of parental custody. The 1852 Code not only considered the father to be the main provider of *alimentos* for all his children – both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” – but also permitted two options for providers: “The person required to give *alimentos* can fulfill this either by handing over the alimony payment (*pensión alimenticia*), or by receiving and keeping the person who receives *alimentos* at home” (Art. 258). The Code set an age limit to this latter option, however: “During the first 3 years of the child's nursing (*lactancia*), the father does not have the faculty to take the child to his house as a way of fulfilling his obligation to provide *alimentos*” (Art. 260). The 1936 Code, on the other hand, did not explicitly mention the option of taking the child home instead of providing an alimony payment, although this possibility is evoked in a more indirect way: “The provider can request permission to give *alimentos* in a form that's different from payment of a pension, when there are special motives that justify such a practice” (Art. 451).

Thus, according to the 1852 Code, a mother was not really guaranteed an alimony payment from their child's father; the latter could just as easily choose the (probably cheaper) option of taking the child with him. In theory at least, not only was a mother's custody over her

²¹⁹ Namely, the 1852 Code had stated that “the children of a marriage for which divorce or annulment is being sought, will continue, during the proceedings, in the husband's care, unless the judge decided to commend them to their mother, for the sake of their own well-being” (Art. 201). It is not clear whether this applied only to sons or to daughters as well. This ambiguity comes from the fact that *hijos* can refer either to children in general, or to sons only; also, other provisions seemed to grant mothers greater custody over their daughters, as well as over children under 3 years old. Article 202 of the 1852 code stated: “An honest woman [*mujer honesta*] cannot be denied the right to have her daughters [*hijas*] with her if it's the case that she has not given cause for the divorce request; the woman, in any case, has the right to keep her *hijos* [sons or children in general?] until the age of 3.” The 1936 Code, on the other hand, gave mothers the right to keep children during divorce proceedings: “The children will continue in their mothers' care during the proceedings, unless the judge, for their own good, decides to commend them to the husband... In any case, the woman can keep the children until the age of 7, unless there is some grave motive [for this not to occur]” (Art. 285).

children limited by the male-centered definition of *patria potestad* in the 1852 Code, which explicitly gave fathers the right to keep their children with them; she also could be faced with a choice between handing her child over to the father or renouncing the right to alimony altogether, in which case she had to meet all the financial needs of the household on her own. Clearly, these provisions had been superseded by the 1936 Civil Code by the time the cases in this chapter were aired before the *juez de paz*. However, their lingering influence is felt not only in the fact that there are 14 cases in which the mother agrees to have the father pick up the child rather than pay alimony; it also appears in the frequent use of the concept of *lactancia* - the period before the child was old enough to be picked up by his/her father. This term comes from the 1852 Code and is completely absent from the 1936 Code, yet it appears in the 1940-42 cases. No doubt the *Juzgado de Paz* was influenced by a confluence of provisions from both the old and the new codes. Those cases in which the child is to be picked up at 3 years of age show the influence of the 1852 Code's provisions on *lactancia* as well as on a mother's custody during divorce proceedings; the cases in which the child is to be handed over at the age of 7 would seem to reflect the 1936 Code's stipulations on mothers' custody rights during divorce proceedings (see footnote 53, above).

Certainly, it would be wrong to assume that everyday practice always followed the Code's provisions. The agreements drawn up before the *juez de paz* were no doubt influenced also by the immediate, practical concerns affecting the parties, as well as by unwritten local and regional norms. Besides, as with many historical documents, the *actas* we have are only snapshots, documents that served a particular purpose for the individuals involved at a particular moment in time; we do not know whether they were actually carried out to their full extent. The issue of parental custody was tightly linked to that of alimony. In many cases, the mandate for mothers to hand over their children to fathers may simply have been a way for the latter to excuse themselves from the obligation of handing over alimony payments after a certain age; a father could claim that he had been willing to meet his obligation by taking the child with him, even if this offer was not accepted by the mother. If so, then this norm would be a force constraining the options open to mothers and limiting their access to financial support for their children, but would not necessarily be enforced according to the letter of the agreement. Additionally, even many of the cases that do not mention the transfer of custody to the father still

specify that the latter will provide a pension only till the age of 3, after which time “another agreement will be drawn up.” It could be then that these rules were more about limiting the financial obligations of fathers than about actually transferring the custody of children.

On the other hand, it’s also possible that at least some of the children in these 14 cases were actually picked up by their fathers, just as others no doubt grew up with other relatives such as grandparents, uncles, aunts or others – arrangements that might have escaped any and all archival documentation.²²⁰ Among the 1940-42 cases, we have only one case in which there is an *acta* that documents the moment in which a mother complies with the agreement to hand over her child to the father. Alfredo Gálvez, an *obrero* at the mine, went to the Juez de Paz in Huayllay requesting that he be allowed to pick up his daughter, who was a month away from turning 3 years old, and who was still under the care of her mother - Gálvez’s former *conviviente* Paulina Huerta. Gálvez was from the northern part of the highlands of Lima department, and lived in the Huarón company camp, working as a hoist operator at the mine. Unlike Gálvez, who was listed as unmarried (*soltero*), Paulina Huerta was listed as a widow, despite her youthful age. Gálvez argued that his split from Huerta had been due to her “bad character” and a “supposition of infidelity;” he believed that Huerta had a *querido* (lover). The *Juez* directly tied this accusation to the issue of the child’s future – he called for Gálvez to prove his accusation and present his former *conviviente*’s current lover. If he was unable to do so, he would suffer a heavy fine and possibly jail time for “defamation of honor,” and would be unable to pick up his daughter, and instead would have to hand over a pension for alimony (*derechos de alimentación*).

Certainly, this case makes it seem as though the woman’s behavior was used as the basis on which to make a decision about custody over the child – either because of Gálvez’s accusation of infidelity or because of the fact that she was a widow who had had relationships with men after her husband’s death, both things that the Civil Code frowned upon. One legal provision that could have influenced a case like this was Article 202 of the 1852 Code, which, as we saw earlier (see footnote 53), stated that “honest women” could keep their daughters with

²²⁰ For a different region of the Peruvian Andes, Leinaweaver (2008) has analyzed what she calls “the circulation of children” - the common arrangements by which children sometimes grow up in a household different from that they are born into, without the mediation of any formal adoption bureaucracy.

them during separation proceedings unless they had given grounds for separation (and infidelity on the part of the wife was certainly listed as legitimate grounds for separation). On the other hand, this is the only one, among the fourteen cases involving the hand-over of children to fathers, that mentions or even implies issues of marital infidelity as having an impact on who got custody over the child. And while infidelity on the part of women would almost certainly have been frowned upon locally, in certain cases it was not an impediment to a couple reconciling and the man stating that he forgave the woman, as we saw in the previous section.

Regardless, the next *acta* for this case, a month later, makes no mention of the accusation of infidelity or whether Alfredo Gálvez was able to prove it. It simply shows Paulina Huerta handing over her daughter to Alfredo Gálvez and to his brother Ignacio: “I, Paulina Huerta, give my daughter Beatriz, of 3 years of age, to her blood uncle (*tío carnal*) don Ignacio Gálvez so that he may supervise and take care of her, both in his custody and in that of the father Alfredo Gálvez.” The notes state that Ignacio Gálvez “receives his niece with the greatest affection, since he does not have children at his age of 35.”²²¹ The two brothers expressed their commitment to give the child food, clothing and education; it was furthermore stipulated that “Alfredo has no reason to deny Beatriz’s mother the right to visit her daughter, as many times as she may like, just as he should make sure that the girl visits her mother so that she can provide her affection as the mother that she is.”

Here we have a case that shows some of the complexities of households, child care arrangements and informal or semi-formal adoptions – complexities that no doubt were present not only at the Huarón mine but in many places in Peru. Certainly, there are many aspects of this case that were not recorded and that we cannot know, even if we have tried to give some of the legal background as well as the context of other cases from the *Juzgado*. What were the exact reasons that caused Paulina Huerta to hand over her daughter to the child’s father and uncle? What role did the sexual accusations play in this? How distant were the two households, and to what degree was the child really leaving her home and her mother’s side?

²²¹ “...quien lo recibe a su sobrinita con el mayor cariño ya que el no tiene hijos hasta la edad que tiene 35 años.”

Although the majority of the 14 cases including agreements to allow fathers to pick up their children specify an age of either 3 or 7 years old, there are exceptions to this that shed further light on the complexities of this issue. In 1941, 27-year old Catalina Sánchez, a native of a district of Tarma Province to the southeast, but living in Huarón, came to the *Juzgado* to place a demand against her former *conviviente*, 26-year old Teodoro Yáñez. Yáñez, a native of one of the communities in the upper reaches of the Chancay Valley (Lima Highlands) to the west, was working as a timberman (*enmaderador*) at the Huarón mine. According to Catalina, they had “sustained marital relations” during five months, from which union she was now pregnant; however, Teodoro now had a new partner, and for that reason Catalina was requesting that he recognize the child’s paternity. Yáñez recognized his offspring-to-be, and the notes say that he was willing to hand over a pension “for the few months that Catalina keeps the child in her power;” however, the mother “insists on the immediate handover of the child,” and so Yáñez agreed to pick him/her up immediately after birth.²²² Again, here we do not know all of the details that would be necessary to interpret the case. What conditions might have compelled Catalina Sánchez to want to hand over her child to his/her father, if such was indeed her will? Had Sánchez and Yáñez really been *convivientes* in the sense of cohabitators, or was this a more furtive sexual relationship described as *convivencia* for the *juez de paz*? What problems might having the child with her have created for Sánchez?

A somewhat similar case is that of Julia Jara and Tomás Rapri. Jara was from one of the communities in the Chaupiwara Valley to the north; Rapri was from the same community and was listed as living in the Huarón mine, where he worked. They came to the *Juez de Paz* so that Rapri could recognize Jara’s 8-month-old daughter as his child. While Rapri is listed as “single” (*soltero*), Julia Jara is said to be “married” (*casada*) to a different man; yet Rapri and Jara are said to be *convivientes* of each other. The *Juez* certifies that Rapri recognizes the child and that he or his relatives will pick her up at some point in the future:

²²² “Teodoro reconoce al nuevo infante, a donde se le recojerá tan pronto vea la luz del día según la exigencia de Catalina Sánchez para entregárselo tan pronto (illegible word) en este mundo, teniendo o haciendo notar que Teodoro está resuelto a pasarle religiosamente por pocos meses que lo retenga en su poder Catalina, a la criatura, mas esta se aferra a la entrega inmediata a lo que el acepta gustoso.”

He assigns the sum of six soles as a monthly pension for the child Rosa Rapri until the family of the father of the child in mention arrives to pick her up, in accordance with the agreement by both parties, since the mother of the child suffers from an illness in her hands (*es enferma de las manos*) and cannot keep her in her power during the entire period of *lactancia*, because she could very well fall from her hands.

We do not know if the stated motive was the real reason why Jara would hand her daughter over to Rapri. According to the *acta*, for Jara this was a relationship outside of her marriage to another man, even if the term “infidelity” is not explicitly brought up in this case as it is in the Gálvez/Huerta case. What kind of constraints or pressures did this situation create for Jara? The 1852 Civil Code had a deeply negative view of children born of adulterous relationships, particularly on the part of the mother. Again, however, we do not know all of the details that would be necessary to really understand the situation presented in this case.

On the other hand, as we have pointed out, out of the 32 cases mentioning children, 18 do not include the arrangement by which the mother handed the child over to the father; at least it is not mentioned explicitly. Moreover, there are also cases in which the mother not only keeps her child but also gives up the right to alimony from the father. One such case is that of Dionisio Matos and Balvina Pérez – incidentally the only case in the 1940-42 book that involves people living in the other mining center in the region, the Vanadium Corp. of America’s camp at Jumasha. Pérez, who was five months pregnant, wanted to separate from Matos, her *conviviente*, after a fight that she argued was only the last of several.²²³ Matos wanted to reconcile and promised not to do it again, but Pérez refused. According to the minutes, “Balvina insists on not continuing to maintain marital relations anymore with her *conviviente*, for he is accustomed to hitting her, and she will maintain the child that she is to have, through her own abilities and work, without having to call on Dionisio Matos.”²²⁴ The fact that this was not a separation by mutual consent, as most others in the *Juzgado de Paz*, seemed to make Pérez ineligible for alimony in the eyes of the *juez*. It is not entirely clear on what specific provisions of the Civil

²²³ The case actually contains more details on this quarrel, which involved some of their family members, but I have omitted them since they are not necessary for the purposes of this chapter.

²²⁴ “*Justina se aferra a no seguir haciendo vida marital más con su conviviente por cuanto este está acostumbrado a golpearla y que el hijo que ha de tener ella sola la mantendrá a sus costos y trabajo sin tener que llamarle la atención por este hecho a Dionisio Matos.*”

Code this argument was based.²²⁵ In any case, Pérez was willing to accept this rather than remain with Matos. This is emphasized again at the end of the minutes: “Balvina Pérez will not have the option from this day forward to claim *alimentación*, for she renounces marital life.” This case shows that although laws and regulations on alimony and custody, combined with the inevitable financial pressure that having a child signified, inevitably created significant constraints for women, they still sometimes chose to exercise their independence.

Similarly, another case, that of Josefina Colqui and Manuel Castro, also shows a refusal of financial support.²²⁶ In this instance, however, it seems to be intertwined with an issue of paternal authority, for it is Josefina’s father, Raúl Colqui, who comes before the Juez de Paz and asks him to intervene in the relationship between his daughter and her *conviviente*. They had previously been given a deadline of eight days to settle their disagreements but had been unable to do so thus far. Colqui left open the possibility that a reconciliation might occur in the future, but in the meantime his daughter was five months pregnant and the future of the child needed to be attended to. He stated that he wanted Castro to recognize the child as his own, but not to hand over any form of payment for maintenance (*expontáneamente no desea recibir ninguna subvención de parte de Castro*) or for the costs of the birth, unless the two *convivientes* were to live together again (*vivir convivencialmente*). If the split between them was definitive, then Colqui did not want any form of payment for any purpose from his daughter’s *conviviente*. As with the other cases, here the *acta* provides only a snippet of what must have been a much more complex situation. What kind of social obligations would Raúl Colqui be incurring if he and his daughter accepted an alimony payment from Manuel Castro? What was the social meaning of these payments in everyday life, beyond the stale paper of the *Juzgado de Paz* and the Civil

²²⁵ It may have been influenced by the 1936 Civil Code’s regulations on separation and divorce (which admittedly were designed for marriages, not *convivencias*). The Code allowed separation and divorce either because of “mutual dissension,” in which case the agreement of both parties was needed, or because of any one of a series of specific reasons. One of these was *sevicia* (“brutality”), but it may have been difficult for someone like Balvina Pérez to prove to the *Juez* that her *conviviente* was actually guilty of this. If so, in theory, her “renunciation of marital life” could be seen as akin to abandoning the home – and Art. 165 of the Code stipulated that a wife who left the home “without just cause” lost the right to receive *alimentos* from her husband (although her child should still have received them). Again, this is speculation since the Civil Code’s provisions were not designed for *convivencias* anyway, but they inevitably helped shape the legal field within which the *Juzgado de Paz* operated.

²²⁶ This is the second case discussed so far that does not specify a direct connection to work at or residence in the mines – the other being that of Urbano Chaupi and Matilde Quiroz, above.

Code? Would receiving alimony have been tantamount to accepting that the father would pick up the child at a later date? Or was the father trying to make it easier for his daughter to find a new, more stable partner by cutting financial ties with the previous *conviviente*? Answering these questions would require a more in-depth study of the interaction between national laws and local customary norms regarding these issues in this period of time.

Housing and the world of the mining camp

Mine housing and living conditions

Another way to approach the question of the household is to examine the physical space of housing and the mining camp, where part of the reproduction of labor power took place, and which constituted an important space of negotiation between companies and workers. Mining companies often did not have a way to directly influence workers' family life, but they could exert some control over housing, even if here they also had to adapt to people's demands and practices.

Throughout the mines of the Central Highlands of Peru in the 20th century, workers' housing units were called *campamentos* (camps). This was likely a holdover from the world mining industry's past of temporary, makeshift camps built during mining booms. In Peru, some makeshift constructions could still be found for many years in a few of the smaller mining companies, and today they are found in the informal gold-mining operations in regions such as Madre de Dios.²²⁷ However, in industrial metal mines during much of the 20th century, the term *campamentos* referred to more permanent adobe, brick or concrete blocks of housing that might be occupied by a family for years or even decades. In my area of research, people might say "my *campamento*" to refer to their particular room or apartment within the housing blocks (whether when talking about the past, or, in those places that still have workers' housing, the present).

²²⁷ Also, in some of the "modern" mines today, the adoption of Long-Distance commuting or Fly-in/Fly-out labor systems (such as 14x7 or 21x7) sometimes leads to the construction of temporary units to house groups of single workers. These are made of modern, factory-produced materials, but they resemble the informal "camps" in their transient nature. They can range from trailer housing to constructions resembling containers or barns and housing large numbers of single workers at a time. I have observed this phenomenon (on a limited scale) at the Animón mine.

Alternatively, the *campamento* was the whole complex that included not just the workers' housing but also the surrounding installations such as schools, company stores, clinics and soccer fields; this living space was adjacent to or near the company installations such as concentrator plants, workshops, laboratories or shafts to enter the underground mine.

During the 20th century, the construction of workers' housing has exhibited remarkable regularity across Peruvian mines. I will begin by providing a brief overview of these patterns, no doubt glossing over many differences between specific regions and companies. Broadly speaking, the construction of housing by mining companies can be broken up into 3 main periods. The first, which developed gradually from the beginning of the century until the 1950s and 60s, with some improvements and modifications along the way, consisted of long rows of one-story housing containing single rooms. Each one of these rooms might be occupied by one or more single *obreros*, or, alternatively, by an *obrero* family. Increasingly, though not always, connections were made between adjacent rooms so that a family could have an entire two-room (or sometimes larger) unit to itself. Either way, the rooms lacked indoor plumbing, so toilets, showers and lavatories were located outside and shared by several families. *Empleados* usually had access to more space, and sometimes to indoor plumbing, while upper-level *staff* families had individual cottages or *chalets*. The 1970s saw a new generation of housing built for *obreros*: two- or three-story apartment buildings (with separate apartments on each floor) with indoor plumbing, even if in many places the supply of water continued to be sparse. Although often austere, small and lacking good maintenance, these new designs were not fundamentally different in concept from apartments in public housing projects in the developed world. Yet this new building style did not replace the former, but rather supplemented it; the near-permanent housing shortage at the mines meant that many of the older constructions continued to be used into the 1990s, and, in some cases (like in Cerro de Pasco), until the present.




Figure 6 – Section of Huarón camp, mid-20th century
(Photo courtesy of Juan Porras Benavides)

The third and last period in mining housing construction, from the 1990s to the present, is characterized by its absence: by and large, permanent workers' housing is no longer built, and, when torn down (as much of it was in the 1990s), it is no longer replaced. In the old mines of Pasco Department, workers are increasingly expected to rent a room or house in the nearest population centers and commute. Temporary, prefabricated housing might be erected for some – though not all - of the single workers who are on the *sistemas* (Long-Distance Commuting). This is more so the case at some of the new mines in other parts of Peru, such as Antamina or Las Bambas, where a closed-camp model has taken hold (Salas 2008, 191). At the old mines, many of the traditional cottages formerly occupied by upper-level (often foreign) staff have been left in place. They had always received better maintenance and so were in better shape anyway, and they now make comfortable accommodations for the Peruvian mining engineers and technicians who often feel as uncomfortable as their predecessors at the thought of living in the nearby towns and settlements.



Figure 7 – 1970s-style mine company housing: Iero de Mayo complex, Cerro de Pasco
(Photograph by the author, 2009)

Returning to the 20th century, the construction of housing by mining companies in Peru was shaped by two general conditions: on the one hand, the companies' need for workers, and on the other, the national laws regulating and protecting labor as a vehicle for civilization and progress— what Drinot (2011) has called the “labor state.” Regarding the first, mining operations in early-20th century Peru, as in many parts of the world, were often located in remote, rural areas, where only small villages existed and where little or no housing was available for rental. This was the case in Huarón but also in many other mines. Thus, companies had to build some form of housing if they wanted workers to come. Even with this imperative, however, there was some variation. Sometimes, small settlements or towns did emerge next to the mines (or had

already long existed, as in Cerro de Pasco), and companies could then discharge some of their responsibility for housing to the surrounding population. Also, the number of workers that could be housed together in each room was not set in stone, at least not in practice.

Regarding national legislation, Law 3019, passed in 1918, mandated that any industrial establishment employing more than 50 workers, and whose operations were located more than a kilometer away from the nearest population, had to provide free housing for its employees (Poblete 1938, 115). This law was passed in the context of growing public preoccupation over the low availability and quality of housing for workers in the cities; over the next few decades, the government undertook several workers' housing projects in urban areas, though never managing to meet the growing demand. There was a large gap between the word of the law and its actual practice, however. Although the regulations of the "labor state" certainly had an impact on the ground, many aspects of them were frequently flouted, especially in remote locations like the mines and plantations. As we saw in the previous chapter, that was the case for the provisions of the Work Accident Law; it was also true for aspects of Law 3019. For example, the law said each worker had to have at least 10 square meters of space, and that this surface should increase proportionally to the number of family members (Ibid.), but it is clear that this frequently did not occur: companies often did not build sufficient housing, so many several workers or entire families had to share a single room.

The obligation of mining companies to provide housing for their workers was ratified by later laws such as the Mining Codes of 1950 and 1970. It was only with the new Mining Code of 1981, and the accompanying Law 025—82-EM/VM, that the legal panorama began to change. Although the new law specified better housing conditions that mining companies had to provide (with a period of eight years in which to reach compliance), it also introduced the idea that the companies located 30 km. or less from populated centers could provide mechanisms to help workers purchase or build their own housing there, in which case the obligation to provide housing would cease. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, this changed legal framework, combined with the decline of the mining unions and the departure of the bulk of the workforce from many companies, would lead to the end of the camp housing model that had predominated for much of the 20th century.

Descriptions of mining workers' housing in Peru have typically emphasized its poor conditions. In 1919, before being hired at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, B.T. Colley, who later became an important officer there, visited the company installations. Later, in his company memoirs, he described his impressions of the worker housing:

The private residences for employees [*empleados*] were not available for inspection but they appeared to be only fair, and the houses for workmen were very poor, much below the type installed in Braden and Chuquicamata [Chile] which were also considered as inadequate even at that time, forty years ago. The workmen's houses seen in Morococha were really disgraceful, they could hardly be classified as hovels (Colley 1958, 6).

In his 1938 report written for the International Labor Organization, Poblete Troncoso provides a description of housing in the main CPC mines at that time:

These houses are composed of a group of single rooms, which serve as bedroom and kitchen for the whole family, with no consideration as to their number. The houses are made of solid materials, but they lack both space and a larger number of rooms per family, as well as a few indispensable services: an independent kitchen or one adjacent to the home, [as well as] sufficient bathrooms. There are no restrooms. (Poblete 1939, 150)

Some improvements in housing were made over the following decades, though new constructions were never sufficient to meet the growing need. Colley, the CPC official quoted above, compared the conditions he had encountered in 1919 with the time of his writing (the 1950s), highlighting the "great strides the Corporation has taken in recent years as indicated by the new workmen's houses it has lately constructed" (Colley 1958, 6). Some later observers, however, were not so impressed. Dirk Kruijt and Menno Vellinga, social scientists who conducted a study of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the early 1970s, wrote that although housing at the new Cobriza mine (built after 1966) was "satisfactory and sometimes even excellent," it was particularly bad at the company's camps in La Oroya, Casapalca and Morococha. In general, most of the mining camps looked "miserable, almost sinister," and "more like concentration camps than *Sierra* villages" (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, 69-72).

Of course, these were all outsiders' descriptions, based on the perceptions of people who did not live in the camps and who likely had their own particular priorities and customs. In both mining and non-mining contexts in Peru, housing occupies an important place in forming individuals' ideas about wealth and poverty. In my experience, people from urban or middle-

class backgrounds who travel through the rural Peruvian highlands tend to classify the dwellings they see as uniformly poor, and to make housing a focal point for their ideas about Andean poverty. Visitors who saw the mining camps as “miserable” likely would have said something similar about many houses in the villages where workers came from (as Kruijt and Vellinga actually do, see p.71). The workers and their families who lived in the camps probably would have interpreted them in the light of their own particular experiences and expectations. On the other hand, whether or not people were concerned about the lack of indoor bathrooms or the combination of dining and sleeping quarters, some aspects of mining camp did often represent a significant change from life in the small towns and villages. One aspect was the overcrowding of so many families close together, with a greater population density than would have been the case on the outside, even in nucleated agricultural villages. Another was the cold weather – although not in every case, on the whole most mining camps were situated significantly higher than most of the workers’ regions of origin.

At the Huarón mine, company reports document the building of camp housing as early as 1915-16; these early documents explicitly distinguish between *maisons ouvrières* and *maisons d’habitation pour les employés* –indicating that at least some of the *obrero/empleado* division was built into the structure of the camp from the very beginning.²²⁸ Gerardo Bedoya’s 1939 report for the Department of Indigenous Affairs, which I quoted from in the previous chapter, gives a very positive description of housing and camp facilities at Huarón. He highlights the existence of two elementary schools (with 80 students combined), a camp clinic and the company store. Moreover, he stated that the *campamentos* were “comfortable and hygienic,” and that each “apartment” varied “depending on the smaller or greater number of relatives of each worker.” Bedoya’s description should be taken with a grain of salt – during his visit, he was hosted by the mine superintendent and wrote glowingly of the company in general. While the company certainly did have the two small schools, clinic and store already at this time (in compliance with national law), his statement about living space being adjusted per size of family would have been true only to a limited degree, as shown by other accounts to be examined

²²⁸ Compagnie des Mines de Huaron, Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 11 Mai 1917, Exercice 1915-1916, p.3.

shortly. His description probably reflects the letter of Law 3019 more than actual reality on the ground.

Already by this time, the Huarón company installations were divided into three parts – a structure it would maintain until the 1990s. The highest area, situated at over 4,600 meters above sea level, near Lakes Llacsacocha, Lavandera and Naticocha, was Huarón proper (thus, this name could refer to the entire mine complex and company, or only to this section). Located next to one of the main mine entrances, this was the oldest zone, but it continued to function until the 1990s, when it was completely demolished and turned into a desolate plain. An elevated area on one side of Cerro Corpus separated Huarón from the second section, Francois, located at a slightly lower altitude and near a different mine entrance. Francois gained greater importance as the concentrator plant was built there; today, it is the location of the main company offices and mine entrance, as well as of the few housing blocks that still remain. Until the 1990s, both Huarón and Francois contained *obrero* and *empleado* housing, and were divided into several different “neighborhoods” with names like Huancavelica (the oldest), Lavandera, Favorita, Shiusha, Chosica, San Francisco, Alto Perú, Quinientos, Miraflores, San Isidro, Vista Alegre, and others.

The third and final main area, San José, was the “French neighborhood” – although it did contain a small amount of *obrero* and *empleado* housing on one side, it was best-known for the segregated zone where the administrators lived in individual cottages. It was located near Huayllay town, at a lower altitude of about 4,300 meters and more protected from the wind by the hills near the Stone Forest.

The theses by engineers working at Huarón, cited in the previous chapter, give some idea of the state of housing at the mine around mid-century. Both Sotomarino (1949) and Hoyos (1954) describe a situation of shortage similar to that of many Peruvian mines. Hoyos writes that “as regards housing, one has to lament the great discomforts (*incomodidades*) that the workforce currently goes through;” he recommends the construction of new housing as well as a new hospital as a way of “ensuring the welfare of the workforce and, consequently, their greater permanence in the mines” (Hoyos 1954, 154, 171). Writing five years earlier, Sotomarino detailed three main types of housing: 1) one-room dwellings for single workers; 2) two-room

apartments (which he calls “little houses”) for *obreros* with families, “but generally in an insufficient number;” and 3) “very comfortable” houses for engineers and *empleados*, of four or more rooms, with hot water and electric heating, located in San José. This conflation of engineer and *empleado* housing is probably an error. However, in another section Sotomarinó gives more precise figures: in Francoís there were 21 housing blocks for *obreros* and 24 “two-room apartments,” while in Huarón there were 30 blocks of 2-room units and 18 blocks of one-room units. This did not include the Huancavelica sub-section (technically its own camp, though in reality part of Huarón), which had 10 blocks, apparently made up of 1-room units. It is only for Huancavelica that the number of rooms is mentioned - 138 rooms for the 10 blocks or an average of 13.8 rooms per block. If we assume that that held across the whole camp, this would mean that, in 1949, the two main areas of Huarón and Francoís combined had about 1,000 rooms, broken up into both one- and two-room units.²²⁹ Sotomarinó emphasized that more housing was needed, and that it was being built but “at a very slow pace” (*con enorme lentitud*). From these accounts it appears that the ideal was to have unmarried workers in single rooms and families in two-room units (in compliance with the spirit of Law 3019), but that in actual practice the construction of housing could not keep up with workers’ need to bring their families with them. The result was that a number of families were housed in single rooms originally meant for unmarried workers.

My interviews with people who grew up in Huarón provide varying descriptions of living quarters, depending on each individual’s particular experience or what they heard at home. According to Desiderio Roque, his father, who began working in the mine around 1955, told him how at that time it was common for two or three workers or an entire family to occupy one room. Another of my interviewees, Raúl Alejos (born in the 1970s), also told me how, according to his father, “in the beginning... the camps were small,” but then they had grown larger over time, so that workers eventually came to have more *comodidad* (comfort). Domingo Soto, who began work at Huarón in 1968, explained to me that starting workers were given a single room – “there you cooked, there you slept, there you ate lunch.” After a year or two at the mine, you could

²²⁹ This does not include the engineers’ and administrators’ cottages at San José, or the small number of *obrero* and *empleado* housing that existed in that latter area and in the small auxiliary camps of Santo Domingo (the company’s coal mine) and Shelby (the railway station).

apply to be moved to slightly larger quarters, but you had to earn merits (*hacer méritos*) on a point system. Don Domingo felt that his children had grown up in a cramped space. He pointed to the more comfortable quarters enjoyed by *empleados* as well as some older *obrer*os who had been around long enough to earn more merits and gain access to better housing. Another of my interviewees, Elma Pablo, whose father, from the community of Huaychao, worked at Huarón from the 1950s to the 1980s, was more positive in her description of the camp quarters – she described units of 2, 3 rooms and larger, depending on the size of one’s family. All four of these individuals, as well as most of my interviewees, lived in the camps at the time when the new, apartment-style housing was being built (in the 1970s), but only some of them had access to these more modern quarters.

Although the main focus here is on Huarón, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture of Peruvian mining, in housing as in other matters. As mentioned earlier, there was remarkable regularity in terms of general housing designs and styles across Peruvian mines. However, there were also significant variations, both in terms of the services provided and in the number of rooms that were made available to each family. I already made some reference to housing at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation; it is also described briefly in Kruijt and Vellinga (1979) and DeWind (1987). Although conditions at the CPC and Huarón were certainly austere and crowded, they were better than at many other mines. Bustos and Murillo (1971) provide a description of housing at Caudalosa, a small-to-medium mine owned by Corporación Minera Castrovirreyna and employing around 379 workers in the south-central department of Huancavelica. They had been hired by the company in 1969 to start a Social Service office in the camp, which housed around 1,200 people including both workers and family members. According to their initial survey, there were 229 single-room units that were shared among 279 workers with families and 68 single workers.²³⁰ The consequence of this obvious shortage was that some rooms (which ranged in area from 9m² to 16m²) had to house more than one family, or a family plus a single worker, resulting in concentrations of up to 14 people in certain cases. There was a program underway to build 43 additional dwellings, but it was slow in coming, and in any case would fall short of the 73 rooms that Bustos and Murillo calculated would be

²³⁰ This does not include the 30 workers with families who had the privilege of living in units of two, three or more rooms – all combined, these 30 workers occupied a total of 80 rooms (Bustos and Murillo 1971, 32-33).

necessary to have one per family, let alone the 647 rooms that would be needed to achieve what they saw as the ideal (for “mental and physical development”) of three rooms per family (Bustos and Murillo 1971, 32-34).

Thede (1982) provides a description of some of the camps closer to Huarón both in style and in geographical location. At the time of her visit in the early-to-mid 1970s, the Milpo mine (located northeast of Cerro de Pasco) had long adobe blocks with rooms that were 16 m² in area; the restrooms, showers, faucets and washbasins were located on the outside and shared by the inhabitants of each block. As in other mines at that time, newer, better housing was in the process of being built. On the other hand, the temporary workers (still a minority at that time) lived in worse conditions – wooden barracks with 9 m² rooms and no facilities to wash or shower (Thede 1982, 1.2.3). At Atacocha, another medium-scale mine in Pasco Department, permanent-worker housing was similar to Milpo, but Thede stresses the frequent cuts in water and electric services, as well as the fact that the housing shortage had led to some of the permanent workers and their families living in the wooden barracks originally designed for temporary workers (Ibid., 2.2.3). At the small mine of Machcan, located nearby and employing only about 87 workers, rooms were similar in size to the other mines, but there were no facilities like running water (even outside), restrooms or electricity; many workers actually preferred to live in the nearby village (Ibid., 3.2.3). On the other hand, Thede, like Kruijt and Vellinga before her, recognized that the Cobriza mine, owned by the state company Centromín (formerly the Cerro de Pasco Corporation), had “much more agreeable” housing, representing the new model of two- and three-story apartment buildings for both *obreros* and *empleados* (Thede 1980, 59). Thus, beyond the broad regularities, there was by this time a variety of housing and living conditions in Peruvian mines.

Conflicts and tensions over space

Housing and camp life were important sites of contestation and negotiation in 20th-century Peruvian mining. Even if companies generally did not directly attempt to shape workers’ intimate life and relationships, they did have an indirect effect on them through the control of housing. Inversely, workers and their families often made the camps their own and resisted or adapted to company attempts to determine how they lived. After they began to be established in

a permanent way in the mid-1940s, the mining workers' unions also constituted important spaces for collective struggle over housing and living conditions. Additionally, housing was a site for contestations over notions of civilization and cultural and educational hierarchies.

Earlier I looked at some negative assessments of mine company housing made by observers at different points in the century. While such observers may have criticized the poor conditions provided by companies, many of them also cast a negative and demeaning light on the habits and practices of mining workers and their families. Using language derived from the discourse of public health and hygiene that was common at the time, a 1908 article in the Bulletin of the Peruvian Mining Engineers' Corps described the state of the workers' rooms in the mining district of Morococha:

Uncleanliness [*desaseo*] reigns in all of them, as does the promiscuity of their occupants. The rooms serve simultaneously to house an entire family, with various classes of animals, and even to satisfy urgent needs. This absolute lack of hygiene is no doubt a powerful factor in the transmission of diseases (*Boletín del Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Minas* – “*La Industria Minera de Morococha*,” 66).

DeWind (1987, 176) quotes similar accounts from Cerro de Pasco from 1916. Critiques of companies mixed freely with criticisms of workers' habits, as was no doubt common in journalistic accounts of working-class life around the world in the early 20th century. However, in Peruvian mining at least this discourse did not disappear later in the century, rather it became a recurring theme in the conflicts between companies and workers. As we saw earlier, there was an ongoing problem of housing shortage not only at Huarón and the CPC but also at many other mines, which resulted in working families either having to crowd into small, cramped quarters, or, alternatively, having to look for housing in nearby settlements and towns when those were present. Although their priorities and assessments may have differed in some respects from those of outside observers – i.e. they may not necessarily have agreed that the camps looked “sinister” or similar to “concentration camps” – workers did seek to gain access to more and better-quality company-provided housing. They needed the camps in order to avoid having to pay rent somewhere else; they also desired the greater comforts provided by the larger as opposed to the smaller rooms in the camp. This aim developed as an individual struggle and, after the legalization and recognition of the mining workers' unions in the mid-1940s, as a collective

endeavor also. Workers' complaints about insufficient housing were often countered by the discourse of hygiene and the critique of "rural" habits.

An example of that comes from 1948, near the end of the 3-year period of political openness during which both the formerly-proscribed APRA party and the mining unions had been legalized. In July of that year, prompted by the new unions' complaints about high living costs, low wages and poor conditions at the mining camps, the Ministry of Labor appointed a special commission to investigate the matter, under the chairmanship of Dr. Pedro Erasmo Roca, an economist from the University of San Marcos. In addition to visiting several of the mining camps of the Central Highlands, the commission requested written information from the companies on the subject of work and living conditions. On October 9, 1948, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation submitted its reply, in which it answered many of the complaints made by the workers. According to Enrique Góngora Perea, the head of the company's newly-created Department of Industrial Relations, although the CPC had not yet been able to build housing for all its workers, it was meeting its obligations under a strict interpretation of national law (Law 3019). The unions' demands for more housing were not justified, because workers were not making good use of existing housing:

The Unions demand more accommodations [*facilidades*]. In effect, they practically ask for the urbanization of the main operating centers, which may be the result of a real desire to improve their standard of living, or of an excessive zeal in their union duties, for it is well-known that among the working population of this region, only a small fraction knows how to make use of the accommodations provided. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is the fact that, with some exceptions, the true industrial worker does not yet exist. The great majority consists of a population of rudimentary agrarian and pastoral customs. The destruction of property [that goes on] is truly alarming (Roca 1950, 32; my translation).

Here Góngora expressed a practical concern over the wear-and-tear that the company-owned camps supposedly suffered as a result of the workers' "rudimentary customs." However, his complaint went beyond that practical aspect, using the discourse of hygiene to disparage the everyday practices of working families:

One of the most serious problems is that the workers, in spite of the norms that are in place in this regard, insist on raising all manner of animals, even in the home itself. The most undesirable aspect, and which seems to have the greatest acceptance among the

workers, is the raising of pigs. The result is that there are sections which no longer look like a *campamento*, but rather like real pigsties... It is thus incongruous that the very same Unions should demand that the Company make improvements, while such unhygienic practices subsist (Ibid.).

In his report, the head of the commission, Dr. Roca, stressed the housing shortage as one of the central problems facing mining workers, for it led to situations such as “families of four members or more, residing in a single room of 3m. x 3m.” (Roca 1949, 16). Additionally, he attributed the “extremely dangerous unhealthy conditions prevailing in the homes of the mining workers” in part to deficiencies on the part of the company – especially the small number of toilets and showers per block, which formed part of the unions’ complaints (Ibid., 18, 22). But he also echoed the company discourse in apportioning part of the blame to the workers and their families, focusing on the specific issue of the raising of animals in the camps. Roca furthermore made explicit what he saw as the ethnic dimension of the workers’ practices.²³¹

This general unhealthiness has its origins first in the absence or scarcity of adequate and sufficient water, sewage and garbage collection services in the camps; second, in the lack of knowledge and habits of personal and domestic hygiene on the part of the mining workers... As far as the personal habits of the mining workers are concerned, we must remember that the great majority are Indians [*indígenas*] and native to the surrounding highlands, accustomed to the inferior, rustic level of life, who then move to the mining camp [and] convert their room into a storage space for the provisions they accumulate, and even into a corral for the domestic animals with which they live (Ibid., 17-18).

The strategy of criticizing mining workers’ practices in the home as a way of deflecting union and worker demands, as evidenced in the previous quote by the head of Industrial Relations of the CPC, was not limited to this one instance. One of my interviewees, Aníbal Pérez Antonio, told me about how this occurred in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation’s mine at Cobriza (Department of Huancavelica), when he worked there for a few years in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Aníbal, who was originally from the community of Muquiyauyo in the Mantaro Valley (see Chapter 1), lived in the single worker barracks at Cobriza – long, military-style constructions made of corrugated tin (*calamina*) where large groups of workers slept on bunk

²³¹ At the time of Roca’s writing, the terms *indígena* and *indio* were still common in official Peruvian discourse. But this would soon change, as the use of these words gave way in the 1950s and 60s to the class term *campesino* (peasant) as a way of referring to rural Andean peoples, including their cultural aspects. This shift in terminology was later consolidated by the renaming of the *comunidades indígenas* of the highlands as *comuniades campesinas* in 1969, during the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, but it was already underway before that act.

beds. However, he was a *dirigente* (officer) in the union, so he was involved in negotiations over living conditions that involved the *obreros* with families as well. The latter lived in a different area of the camp, entirely segregated from the single workers as well as from the *empleados* and the upper staff (the other two groups in the mining complex's four-way division of space). The housing for workers with families at Cobriza was said to be among the best of any mine – since Cobriza had only recently started (in 1967), it featured the new, apartment-style housing (for families, not for single workers), with private, indoor bathrooms, that became more common in other mines in the 1970s. Still, the union had to pressure for more housing and better services in the camps. In response to my question about what these negotiations were like, Aníbal told me about the arguments that were made at the weekly meetings between the union and the Industrial Relations office:

So then the topic of housing, for example, had already motivated a coordinated effort [*gestión*] by the union, in the strike, so then we discussed with the company, “When will it be implemented? How will it be implemented?” They complained, I remember very well, as an anecdote: “But, what do you all want housing for if you don't know how to use it?” “What do you mean?” we asked him. “Look, here's the social worker [*asistente social*]. Look, we've given you a bathroom, a living room, two bedrooms so that you can sleep there, so that you can live there with your family. But we found out that you are using the bathroom as a storage space [*depósito*]. You take care of your needs in the living room. You don't know how to use [the space].”

As mentioned earlier, Aníbal was from Muquiyauyo, one of the more developed communities in the Central Highlands; in our interview, he had a clear sense of belonging to a generation of *muquiyauyinos* who differed from their parents' and grandparents' generation of peasant-miners in that they were completing high school and, in many cases, pursuing higher education or professional studies.²³² He himself had begun studies at the University of Huamanga (Ayacucho) but went to work in Cobriza because he was not doing well in his classes and in any case needed to save up money to be able to continue studying; after a few years at the mine, he would return to the university and complete his degree in chemical engineering (though he would never be hired as an engineer, due to his past in union work and his political activism with the New-Left *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* party). In Cobriza, however, Aníbal worked side-

²³² As he said, “We are not the peasant-workers [*obreros campesinos*] of the previous [time], we are peasant-workers who in some way have already finished high school, in the majority of cases, or, some of us have been able to be in the university.”

by-side with a diverse group of workers - not just from the Mantaro Valley like himself but also, most prominently, from Huancavelica and Puno in the south. In addition to geographic and cultural diversity, there was educational and occupational variability as well, particularly in terms of how close people were to the rural world. In his response to the company official quoted above, Aníbal attempted to speak on behalf of the more rural migrant:

So then I said to them, “It’s because our *compañeros* are *campesinos*, it’s the first time they see bathroom fixtures [*baño de loza*], first time they see a cool living room, first time they will sleep on a bed. They don’t know. Wait, instead, we should do a course, a training so that they will know how to use the living quarters.” That’s what we proposed.

The discourse of company representatives in Aníbal’s narrative thus focused on what they saw as the workers’ incorrect use of space. This theme was also present in Roca’s 1948 report as well as in CPC Industrial Relations’ reply to Roca’s questions, both cited earlier; they criticized the use of bathrooms to store provisions (rather than for their intended purpose) as well as the keeping of animals in the camps. Although Aníbal’s account of the discussion with company representatives does not explicitly mention the issue of animals, I then asked him about this point, to which he replied, “Oh, of course, it was not permitted.” Company efforts to clamp down on the raising of animals were common in all the CPC camps, and they were often resisted by the workers’ families. It was often the social workers at the company who were charged with enforcing these rules. One of them, who was employed at several of the Centromín (the CPC’s new name after nationalization in 1974) camps during the 1980s and 90s, explained to me that company policy was that people could have dogs, to keep away thieves, but no other animals. During her periodic home visits she would give people a deadline by which to get rid of their guinea pigs (*cuy*), rabbits, hens, sheep, etc. She described to me a particular incident that involved an argument over the keeping of animals as well as a misunderstanding based on linguistic difference. Once, when she had just arrived in Cerro de Pasco, she went into a home where a woman was keeping a lamb as well as guinea pigs and rabbits. People in Pasco, as in many parts of the Central Highlands, often use an affectionate term for their lambs – *pacho* or *pachito* – but the social worker did not know this. She was not from the area, and had been living in Lima before starting on the job; for her a sheep was a *carnero*, i.e. the standard Spanish term. When she told the woman that she had to get rid of her animals, the latter asked if she could keep her *pachito*, to which the social worker gave her approval.

I thought that *pachito* was what they called something else. I mean, the use of language is also different, isn't it? And it turned out *pachito* was the sheep. Then the lady was saying that I had given her permission to keep her *pachito*. So I then told her "Look, it was a language problem." For me the *carnero* is *carnero*, if the lady calls it *pacho*, that's her problem. But she had told me that she only had one *pachito* and I didn't understand what she was saying. "Your *pachito* is fine," I had said, "but you can't have the guinea pigs and rabbits there." I thought *pachito* was the name of her little dog or something like that, never in my life would it have occurred to me that it was the sheep that she was asking permission for. [So then I said] "if it's the sheep, then it must go."

Clearly, the company was selective about which animals could be kept in the camp housing – dogs were seen as an appropriate domestic animal, but sheep were not. Furthermore, in this case there was a clear cultural distance between the newly-arrived social worker and the camp residents, as she herself recognized – anyone who has spent time among people in Cerro and surrounding areas would know that a *pachito* is a lamb. Additionally, the difference in terminology was clearly an asymmetrical relationship – the highlands speaker had to adapt to the coastal standard, not least because the speakers of the latter were in a position of power.

People did have ways of evading company prohibitions on animals at the mining camp. According to Lucila Cornejo, who lived in the workers' housing in Cerro de Pasco, most of her neighbors kept animals of some kind; she herself kept turkeys and hens. Her mother, who lived in the *empleado* housing section, raised guinea pigs. When the social worker was coming around, she would use the opportunity to feed the *cuyes* so they would not be noticed– they make frequent chirping noises, except when they are eating.

The conflicts over animals in the mining camps, and over the use of space more generally, were symptomatic of the differences in priorities between the companies and the workers. Although these no doubt varied greatly, they can be sketched in broad terms. As we saw earlier, company officials were worried about the wear and tear on the housing blocks that they had invested money in, and that required periodic maintenance. More importantly, however, they shared the common urban and elite view of rural practices as unhygienic and harmful to the health of the individual and the social body. That social body happened to be their workforce, which they needed to be in a state conducive to the success of operations; it also included the rest of the population of the camps, for which they could be held to some degree responsible. Yet the mining companies for the most part were reluctant and ambivalent modernizers. The priorities

just mentioned were only part of the story; another element that was equally if not more important was holding costs down. As we saw earlier, for much of the 20th century, company housing in Peruvian mines was generally cramped, austere and insufficient in quantity – not in every case, but on average. Moreover, the concern over the domestic practices and social life of mining workers’ families did not spring fully-formed; it developed and changed over the course of the century, under the influence of evolving transnational industrial practices, changes in local society and expectations, and Peruvian state policies and interventions. As we shall see, the interventions into workers’ lives discussed in these pages did not only originate with the companies – they were also determined by the development and outlook of the Social Work profession in Peru, as well as by the government norms that regulated this professional practice.

From the perspective of the workers, if we can momentarily make a very broad generalization, raising animals in the mining camp was simply a continuation of one of the most basic aspects of the domestic economy in rural areas, villages and even (though to a lesser degree) in cities like Cerro de Pasco. Chickens, rabbits and guinea pigs were a normal part of many yards and kitchens, and were sources of protein. Among other things, sheep and pigs were a resource that could be saved for special occasions when they could be used for a feast or sold for cash. As we have already seen, although both men and women could participate in the raising of animals, it was a task that often fell more under women’s purview. The infrastructure of the mining camps placed constraints on the sustainability of these everyday practices. While in many cases the housing block rooms in the mining camps might not have been too different in size from the one-room houses where many (though by no means all) of the more rural families slept in their home areas, the space surrounding the main area *was* markedly different. Even in the most nucleated, agricultural villages, people would usually have had some sort of yard, open area or corral (if not the open countryside) where they could keep animals and conduct other activities; this stood in stark contrast to the cramped, densely populated housing blocks of the mining camps, with nothing but a wall separating families. This is a crucial dimension that was often ignored by outside observers who remarked that, although mine company housing was generally bleak, it was no worse, or actually better than, living conditions in villages of origin.

Working families' attempts to keep animals in the mining camp rooms were not "rudimentary" or "rustic" customs, but rather an attempt to maintain a central component of the domestic economy – something that was all the more crucial when salaries were modest in relation to family needs. If the close cohabitation of people and animals created unhygienic conditions, this was as much due to the companies attempting to bring large numbers of workers together at little cost to themselves as it was to the workers' "rural practices." Even at the better, more modern camps built in the 1960s and especially the 70s, such as Cobriza, the new apartment buildings, though more comfortable in some senses, were not designed to accommodate a component of the household economy as crucial as the raising of animals.

That general picture aside, however, it should not be assumed that all families had the same practices when it came to the use of space. Aníbal Pérez's comments about his *compañeros* (see above) should not necessarily be taken literally as applying equally to all workers; for example, by his time, many workers at the mines (though by no means all) would have had experience sleeping in beds. As mentioned before, different workers' families had different degrees of proximity to the rural world and to agrarian and/or herding work. Nor was it a straightforward matter of degrees of proximity or distance. Even families that did know perfectly well what use was expected of a living room or a bathroom according to urban standards, might still have "failed" the company imperative to not keep animals in the camp housing, just because of how widespread the latter practice was. The type of animals kept might have varied, though – i.e. sheep and pigs would likely have been seen as more out of place according to urban standards than chickens or guinea pigs.

These restrictions on the keeping of animals, and more generally on the proper use of space, were in place not only at the CPC/Centromín mines, but also at Huarón. In the previous chapter I mentioned one of my interviewees, the wife of a Huarón worker who had a somewhat negative view of people from the *quebradas* of southwest Huánuco Department – as she put it, "those people who have *chacras* (plots of land), who have animals, cattle," i.e. who were closer to what she saw as the rural lifestyle. She mentioned this in the context of a discussion of her role as supervisor (*fiscal*) of her housing block, in which capacity she had to work together with the

company's social workers, doing periodic inspections of people's *campamentos* (rooms or apartments in the camp):

Every twelve days, I checked on the *campamentos*. They weren't allowed to have any animal inside of the *campamento*. And, the children should sleep in one little room, the parents in another room. Because, sometimes, people who ignore a lot of things [*que ignoran muchas cosas*], sometimes they come home drunk, and the children are always curious. I explained all of that to them. And most of all that they should not get all filled up with children [*para que no se llenen de hijos*], most of all that they keep the *campamento* clean. That the bed should be here, the kitchen items should be there, [the items] of the living room here, like that. And that they should keep the gutter [*acequia*] clean. And, to not hang clothes inside of the room, because humidity is bad for a person.

Several themes are highlighted in this account. Besides the restrictions on the presence of animals in the camp, there is the ever-present concern with the organization of space and with having people and objects in their proper places. There are concerns about health and hygiene, but also an emphasis on "ignorance" as an explanatory factor. An anxiety over the mixing of adults and children, and over the latter's "curiosity," is also present. Finally, the narrative reproduces a discourse, common in Peru in the second half of the 20th century, that emphasizes overpopulation and traces it to the supposed bad habits of rural and working-class people: *para que no se llenen de hijos*. In this case, the speaker's point of view should not be taken as embodying an external or overbearing, repressive force. She was a camp resident and a worker's wife herself. As she told me, her role as supervisor of her block had come about because on one occasion, one of the social workers came to inspect her *campamento* and was suffering from stomach pain (*cólicos*). She gave her some "home remedies" (*remeditos caseros*) which made her feel better, and the two became friends; the social worker then asked her if she wanted to be supervisor. To some degree, in our interview she was just expressing the company's policies and the point of view of the social workers, even if she did seem to have internalized these perspectives in part, and saw herself as less rural than some of her fellow camp residents (especially those from the *quebradas* of Huánuco). In a different sort of interaction, say with a company official or a middle-class visitor, she might herself have been seen under the same light that she projected onto the camp residents whose homes she inspected.

Thus, the restrictions and negative views on working families' use of space were not just propagated by the company and the social workers, but also found resonance in, or had an

influence upon, the ways in which at least some camp residents viewed and interacted with one another. A brief case from the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* highlights this for the specific issue of the raising of animals in the mining camps. In 1975, 28-year old Rosario Lara,²³³ a married woman originally from Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley, came to the *Juzgado* to lodge a complaint (*denuncia*) against her neighbor who had “offended” her (*le ofendió*).²³⁴ Rosario lived in the housing blocks of the Chosica neighborhood in the Huarón company’s Francois camp. She had been setting up a pigpen (*chiquero*) when her neighbor came up to her, called her “ignorant” and said “Why are you doing this in my yard? If you keep doing that you will see what happens to you” (*Ignorante por qué haces esto en mi patio? Si sigues haciendo ya sabrás lo que te va a pasar*). This case is interesting because it shows that the company’s prohibition on animals at the camp – as stated in the block supervisor’s account in the previous paragraph – was either not in place at all times or was not rigidly enforced: Rosario was setting up a pigpen in full view and, furthermore, defended her right to do so against her neighbor’s criticisms. It is likely that the dispute was really about something else and that the pigpen was only an excuse – the notes from the case also mention an earlier argument over the use of shared clotheslines, as well as frequent insults uttered by Rosario’s neighbor. Still, the use of the word “ignorant” in reference to the setting up of the pigpen shows that the practice of keeping animals at the camp could be a legitimate target for the repertoire of insults that drew on educational hierarchies to express disdain. Rosario’s neighbor may not actually have had any negative feelings towards the raising of animals, and may even have kept some herself, but the fact that she chose to use that specific insult to attack this particular practice is still significant.

We should also not assume that the adoption of the ideas about hygiene and organization of space promoted by the social workers necessarily went hand-in-hand with a negative or derogatory view of the workers and their families. This is seen in the response of Estela Páucar, the former staff member of the union at Huarón whose life story I included in the previous chapter, when I asked her what aspect of life in the mining camp she remembered the most:

²³³ Pseudonym

²³⁴ Libro de Juzgado de Paz de Huayllay, 1975-1976, p.42.

The hygiene. The hygiene, and [a] complete [sense of] organization. A lot of respect. Hygiene. The neighborly commitments, we were very united, we were also very good at the social labor efforts with the Social Service personnel. They also taught us well, the Social Service personnel.

Unlike the block supervisor discussed above, Estela had a critical view of the company, or at least some aspects of it; as someone who had been actively involved with the union in the 1980s, she maintained some elements of a discourse of proletarian unity. During our interview, she did not voice (at least not explicitly) any disdain for her fellow mine camp residents, other than those who she sees as having betrayed the union in the early 1990. Yet she upholds the idea of hygiene as a positive aspect of life in the old mining camp, and lumps it together with other features such as “respect,” neighborliness and unity. Furthermore, she highlights the ways in which the camp population and company staff such as the social workers collaborated together. She mentioned to me that each year the women’s committees (*comités de damas*) that were organized by the union would give the company’s social workers a list of classes and workshops that they wanted to see taught at the camp: things like handicrafts (*manualidades*), confectionary (*repostería*), sewing, dressmaking, etc. Estela’s account placed the social workers and their ideas about hygiene within a context in which the practices of the old mining company compared favorably with those of the present. The old company may have exploited workers, but at least there was an organized, unionized workforce, as well as a variety of services in the camp and a concern for the well-being of workers’ families.²³⁵

Domingo Soto, whose story was also told in the previous chapter, expressed a somewhat similar view. In his account, the social workers (which he brought up in our interview without my asking about them) appear not as a repressive force brought by the company against the workers but rather as a service obtained from the company by the union’s efforts:

Over there in Huarón the mine had, we requested it through the union, that there should be a certain person who gives classes on how to keep the *campamento* tidy, very clean. A social assistant [*asistente social*] was hired. The social assistant would go and verify what state you were living in. That came from the company, the company was concerned over the state in which one lived, in everything related to cleanliness [*aseo*]. That is what the

²³⁵ As she put it, “With the company we worked in harmony. It’s just that we would misunderstand each other a little bit when we wanted a bit of a raise” (*Con la empresa trabajábamos en armonía. Sino que un poquito nos desconocíamos cuando queríamos un poco de aumento*).

union did, what it managed to get.... The social assistants give classes on cleanliness, on how to raise your child, what state [your child] is going to be in. That is what the social assistant did, and there was more cleanliness, everything was clean.

Like Estela Páucar, Domingo Soto was critical of many aspects of the old mining company but still compared the old order favorably to the present – in part no doubt due to the near-inevitability of nostalgia, but also for specific reasons like the greater labor stability that existed back then. I do not yet know for sure if it was really the union that requested the presence of the social workers at Huarón, but it is entirely plausible. At many medium-scale (*mediana minería*) mines like Huarón, the Social Service offices were created in the 1960s, following the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's own Social Service Section, created in 1955. According to Bustos and Murillo, at the Caudalosa mine in Huancavelica it was the union's insistence that led to the creation of the Social Service Office in 1969. In his account, Domingo Soto highlighted cleanliness as one of the positive features of the system that the union had forged together with the company. He said people were “more hygienic” then than in the present-day companies like Volcan in Cerro de Pasco (where he lives now), and claimed that Volcan no longer hired social workers. In a sense, then, social workers and their emphasis on hygiene appear here as an element from the past, as part of a vanished order.

While it could be argued that perspectives such as Domingo Soto's and Estela Páucar's are colored by the particularities of a smaller and especially paternalistic mine, we can find some similar opinions for the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. One such is the view expressed by Flor Dávila,²³⁶ a mining worker's wife who was living in the mining company housing in the city of Cerro de Pasco when I interviewed her there in 2008 (in Cerro, unlike in the more rural mines like Huarón, there was still substantial company housing when I began my research). She told me about what things were like when she was growing up as the daughter of a worker in the La Oroya camps in the 1970s and later when she moved to Cerro with her husband in the early 1990s. In response to my question about differences in practices between the CPC (nationalized as Centromín in 1974) and the current company (Volcan) that bought the Cerro de Pasco unit when Centromín was re-privatized in the 1990s, she highlighted the role of the *asistentas* in the camps:

²³⁶ Pseudonym

Centromín seemed more organized to me, starting with its people, its social service personnel was connected to the worker's family... In other words the *asistentas* came, maybe they saw problems the worker had in the family, which they don't do now. It doesn't matter to them, they are more a part of the company... Before, the *asistentas* were ladies who really were dedicated to the life of the worker, to the family, to getting ahead, to teaching things that the ladies needed in order to keep going. Embroidery, sewing, confectionary, there was everything, but now they don't do it anymore. If they do it, it's only for a small sector – two, three mothers, maybe ten, but they don't invite everyone.

Flor Dávila's account is accurate insofar as the Social Work department at the Cerro de Pasco mine still exists, but is diminished. As a part of a system of social inclusion and governmentality based around labor, social workers at mining centers reached their apex in the 1960s, 70s and 80s and have since declined. Flor's perspective, like that of Domingo Soto and Estela Páucar, is one that emphasizes the positive aspects of social workers in the past as a way of criticizing the current company for the reduced importance they give to their labor force.

Of course, this is only part of the story. Other individuals have a less positive recollection of the social work personnel and their interventions. Ernestina Lázaro is the wife of a former mining worker and was a leader of the women's committees of the union in Cerro de Pasco, and regionally, in the 1980s; she was also the daughter of a mining worker (who was originally from Huánuco) and grew up in the camps in Cerro. In her case, I asked her explicitly about the social workers, and she replied in this way:

They, well... since the company has always liked to have the *compañeras* in a backward state (*en el atraso*), without ever awakening (*que no despierten nunca*), they had them there in their office doing small things, dedicated to household tasks, but did not give them a good training... for example for setting up a small business (*empresa*).

She thus criticizes the company's social programs, trainings and courses for reproducing conventional gender roles that kept women in the home and limited them to domestic work – i.e. the embroidery, sewing, confectionary mentioned in the other accounts - rather than allowing them to gain other skills that could be put to wider use. It's also true that, unlike Flor Dávila, Ernestina Lázaro is less able to compare the past organization of the camps to the present, since she has not lived in them since her husband was fired from the company for his union work in 1991.

Another of my interviewees from the CPC/Centromín had criticisms of the social workers that were somewhat similar. Raúl Rivadeneyra is a former metallurgical worker from the company's smelting complex at La Oroya. He is originally from a *comunidad* in the district of Ulcumayo in Junín, but does not maintain a strong relationship with his home community; rather, he spent years as an *obrero* in La Oroya and as an important leader in the union and in the Centromín Workers' Federation, before he left the company in the early 1990s. In our discussion of life in the company housing, he criticized the social workers for "assistentialism" (*asistencialismo*) – a term that was already common in Peru in the 1980s. He did acknowledge that they "in some way did help a bit, no matter what." However, like Ernestina Lázaro, he saw the social workers as dedicated to teaching workers' wives things like "sewing, how to make their flower pots, how to prepare the milk bottle, to make clothes for their children," but not "how to improve their condition of life, not inside the company but also with a perspective towards the outside." They "tried to make sure that [people] kept their house clean, that they painted the walls correctly, but nothing for their future – all for the day-to-day livelihood." Furthermore, he articulated a view of the social workers as people who, by virtue of their work visiting people's houses, could act as a kind of spy for the company:

There were even some individuals who were practically utilized by the company as a way to have a report on how, on the thinking, the attitude of the husband, the wife. So then the company had, through the *asistentas sociales*, a real knowledge of what the husband thought, how he acted... Something like, an informant.

He did not blame this on the social workers as individuals, but rather on their structural position within the company: "The social workers, in reality, since they [were] employees of the company, they practically could not do anything that didn't come from [the company's] judgment [*critério*] – they acted under a work plan that was demanded of them by the company."

The social workers were not unaware that this view of them existed. As the main agents of the company who visited people's homes with some regularity, they were naturally subject to the suspicion that they reported to their superiors on what they saw. In fact, two of the former Centromín social workers whom I interviewed, Alina Véliz and Ruth Alvarado, made it clear that this wasn't just a suspicion – the company actually expected them to do this, although they tried to resist it as best they could. As Ruth Alvarado put it, "when you did the visits, the

company wanted you to be – at least I did not accept it – to be the neighborhood gossip [*la chismosa del barrio*]”. This could be about seemingly trivial things. For example, for many years workers were given supplies of firewood and/or kerosene to cook with; the only electricity they were supposed to use was for lighting, yet some workers who had learned electrical skills at work would improvise a connection to supply an electric stove that they had bought. The company thus wanted to find out that sort of information about families. Ruth would avoid reporting people for things like this. Yet to some degree this kind of thing was a structural part of the social worker’s job. For the workers and their families, living in the mining camp – which was the company’s property – meant being subject to both expected and unexpected inspections and, inevitably, some measure of invasion of privacy.²³⁷

Interventions into “the social”: The practice of Social Work at Centromín in the 1980s

All throughout this discussion of housing and the politics of space in the mining camps, the central role of social workers and Social Service departments in the second half of the 20th century has become clear. Without a doubt, they constituted one of the primary sites of interaction between mining companies and the everyday life of workers and their families. For that reason, I will now examine some aspects of the practice of social work itself, as it pertained to the mines. I will do this first through a brief overview, and then through the life history and perspective of one social worker in the state mining company Centromín (former CPC).

Although social workers were among the primary agents of company intervention into the lives of workers and their families, their presence in the mines was as much a product of the Peruvian state’s policies, and of transnational currents of thought and practice, as it was a creation of the companies. As mentioned earlier, Drinot (2011) has used the term “labor state” to refer to the complex of labor legislation, bureaucracy and technologies of government that emerged in the first half of the 20th century in Peru – though it persisted and continued to

²³⁷ In the 1980s, when many of the mining camps were placed under State of Emergency in response to the armed conflict, a new kind of invasion of the home space was added, especially at the Centromín camps - military personnel would enter homes to conduct searches and look for presumed terrorists, sometimes acting together with company security officers.

develop until the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s began undoing some of its features. Although the provisions of the labor state would eventually play a crucial role in the mines of the Central Highlands, especially in the second half of the 20th century, this did not happen overnight. As we saw in the previous chapter for the issue of work accident compensation, many decades had to pass before labor laws and institutions were enforced in the mining camps with the same force that they had for the urban, coastal workers on whom Drinot primarily focuses. Even in the center of state power (Lima), the labor state developed as a gradual process over many decades. On the surface at least, three dates are of primary significance in relation to the development of social work in the mines: 1937, when the National Social Work School of Peru was created by the government of General Oscar R. Benavides, along with the official professional title of *asistente social*; 1955, when the first Social Service office was created at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, and; 1965, when a law was passed mandating that all enterprises employing more than 100 workers should have at least one professional social worker on staff.

Yet the importance of these specific dates should not be overemphasized. As Maguiña (1979) makes clear in his history of Social Work in Peru, there were several antecedents or “proto-forms and prefigurations” (106) of the profession in the years prior to 1937.²³⁸ Moreover, even when the first professional social workers began emerging after that date, this did not have immediate relevance to the mines, since the radius of action of the profession in the first few years was overwhelmingly urban and primarily focused on the working-class neighborhoods and hospitals of Lima. Similarly, the 1955 date of the creation of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation’s Social Service Section (*Sección de Servicio Social*) does not mean that there were no activities akin to Social Work taking place in the years before. Nor does it mean that professional social workers took over on that date; for several years, non-professional *auxiliares* continued to staff the Social Service at many of the camps, and they continued to work alongside the professional social workers as more of the latter started to arrive in the 1970s.

²³⁸ According to Maguiña, these antecedents included religious charity as well as institutions such as the *Sociedades de Beneficiencia Pública* (Public Aid Societies), founded in the major cities shortly after independence and in the 19th century, and Juana Alarco de Dammert’s *Sociedad Auxiliadora de la Infancia* (Children’s Aid Society), founded in 1897. The latter organization in turn spearheaded the process that led to the founding, in the late 1920s, of the National Children’s Institute (Instituto Nacional del Niño - INN) and Children’s Hospital. Within the INN, the first school for *visitadoras sociales* – as the first social workers were called - was created in 1931. This school and profession constituted an antecedent to the *asistentes sociales* trained at the ESSP after 1937.

The founding of the National Social Work School (ESSP) in 1937 had been promoted by Catholic and aristocratic circles close to President Benavides' wife; it also developed under the tutelage of Belgian Social Work institutions and on the model of a similar school created in Chile twelve years earlier, in 1925. By the 1960s, not only were other schools being created in some of the universities of the interior, but the social composition of the profession was also changing. As Maguiña writes, the new students were being recruited "evermore from the intermediate layers of the female student population, with a decided professional vocation, in the sense of expressing the need to enter the labor market, and no longer so much from the oligarchic strata, interested more in mere enlightenment or in volunteer work than in receiving remuneration" (1979, 162; my translation). Together with this change, the new currents of thought and politics sweeping the universities in the 1960s began to enter the Social Work profession, especially after the incorporation of the ESSP into San Marcos, Peru's oldest and most important public university, first in 1964 and more fully in 1970.

Throughout this period, several enterprises and institutions outside of Lima had already been training their own non-professional social workers; such was the case in the Larco family's Chiclín Estate in northern Peru (Ibid., 106), and, after 1955, in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation.²³⁹ In 1965, as mentioned earlier, Law D.S. 009-65-TR created the requirement that companies with 100 workers or more employ at least one professional social worker. At the CPC, the number of professional *asistentes sociales* began to increase, so that by 1980 there were 22 *asistentes* and 52 non-professional *auxiliares*.²⁴⁰ The smaller, medium-scale mines of the Central Highlands also started hiring *asistentes sociales* around these years, for example in the Atacocha mine in Pasco (1965) and, as mentioned earlier, in the Caudalosa mine in Huancavelica (1969). The first social workers were also hired at Huarón around this time, so that by the 1970s and 80s there were some 7 *asistentes* employed by the company.

²³⁹ In the CPC, the Social Service Section created in 1955 formed part of the Department of Industrial Relations, which had in turn been created in 1948 (Roca 1949, 29-30). In the early decades of the 20th century, the area of work later known as Industrial Relations had been grouped under the name "Welfare" (Colley 1958, 4).

²⁴⁰ Centromín-Perú, Gerencia de Relaciones Industriales – Dirección de Bienestar y Servicios, *Servicio Social en Centromín-Perú*. 1980, p.6.

After this brief summary of the origins and development of the Social Work profession in Peru, I will conclude this section by delving more deeply into some of the tensions and contradictions that surrounded the interventions into workers' lives in the mines of the Central Highlands, in the last few years before the structural reforms of the 1990s. This is meant to complement the discussion of conflicts and tensions over space in the camps in the previous section. I do this by means of the life history of one particular social worker at Centromín – the state-owned mining company created through the nationalization of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. Thus, while much of this chapter (and the previous one) has been more focused on the medium-scale mine of Huarón and only secondarily on the CPC/Centromín, I conclude with material from the latter company.

It is important to highlight this shift in emphasis, for the practice of Social Work no doubt looked different at a large, complex company like Centromín as opposed to a *mediana minería* camp like Huarón. Furthermore, Alina Véliz's perspective should not be taken as representative of all social workers even at Centromín; in fact, it is rather unusual - as she herself is aware – though probably not unique. Nevertheless, I choose to focus on it because I think it highlights some of the tensions and ambiguities in the relationship between mining companies at workers in the mines, and thus serves to forestall a simplistic “workers vs. company” dichotomy. Moreover, as with the stories of Huarón workers presented in the previous chapter, I think life histories offer a useful complement to other methodologies and ways of presenting information and analysis, because they allow for a more subjective perspective on events. As with the other life histories, here it must not be forgotten that this is based on one person's point of view, based on what they remember and how they choose to enunciate it. Additionally, the account presented here is mediated by my own process of selection and elaboration.²⁴¹

Alina Véliz grew up in La Oroya, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's smelting center, where her father was a skilled *empleado* in the offices; though he started working as a gasoline attendant (*grifero*), towards the end of his career he ended up working with IBM information

²⁴¹ The account in this section is based on an initial three-hour recorded interview with Alina Véliz, and a subsequent two-and-a-half hour recorded conversation with her together with some of her former fellow social workers from the company. Elizabeth Lino Cornejo was present on both occasions and helped me to ask questions and subsequently to reflect on the material.

systems. The family was originally from San Jerónimo de Tunán, a town very close to the city of Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley. She got her primary education at the CPC schools, but then moved to Lima, where she did secondary school at one of the large *unidades escolares*. Her father had always encouraged his children to study, and upon finishing high school Alina thought about becoming a nurse, but her sister, who worked in a clinic in Lima, discouraged her from doing so. So she tried to think about what other career options were available to her at the time, and remembered the *auxiliares* of the CPC Social Service whom she had known in the La Oroya *campamentos* growing up. So she decided to study Social Work. This was in the late 1960s, when the National Social Work School (ESSP) – mentioned earlier – was already formally incorporated into San Marcos University but still maintained a separate institutional structure and location. The students had to do two years of general studies at the university before moving back to the ESSP. Alina still remembers the trauma of this transition from the politically effervescent climate of Peru’s most prestigious university to the more parochial, conservative environment of the ESSP; at the latter, she says, the staff still checked the students to see if their fingernails were clean and if they carried a white handkerchief in their pocket.

Yet as Maguiña (1979) also describes, even at the ESSP things were already changing. What Alina calls the process of “reconceptualization” of the profession had begun, under the influence not only of the universities in Peru but also of new Social Work currents coming in from Chile, Argentina, Brazil and other countries. As she says, “the training in the [ESSP] was no longer appropriate to the social problem of the country; we couldn’t keep doing *asistencialismo* when there were massive populations living in extreme misery.” As part of this process, the students staged a *toma* (building occupation) with the support of the federation of students at San Marcos. The result of all this was that the ESSP was fully incorporated into San Marcos, within the social sciences. Although this was a welcome move to Alina, she also says that the (mostly female) Social Work students “suffered from the prejudice” of the (mostly male) social science students towards them, because they “always saw us as the domestic servants of the house.” Nevertheless, she was glad to study with sociologists, anthropologists and historians; one of her professors was Dirk Kruijt, a Dutch social scientist who later wrote a book about the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979). She felt close to the anthropologists because like social workers, they also went out into the field. Her own fieldwork practices took

place in some of the new neighborhoods of Lima that were the product of *invasiones* (land takeovers), like Cerro San Pedro and Ermitaño. These experiences convinced her that “I should be a social worker [*trabajadora social*] and fight against that very silly, traditional, conventional idea of the *asistente social* – we are not social assistants, I said ‘I don’t assist anyone, if they need assistance I give it to them, but I am a *trabajadora social*,’ the work is something else.” After graduating, she worked for several years teaching at some of the new Social Work departments in the universities in the interior of the country, where she helped them in their own process of *reconceptualización* of the practice. Finally, in 1979 there was an opening in the state-owned mining company Centromín, the former CPC, and she was hired.

Alina describes what Social Work at the CPC/Centromín had looked like in previous years, since the creation of the Social Service Section in 1955. When she was growing up in La Oroya, there was an agreement that the daughters of company workers who had a high school diploma or were at least in the third year of secondary school could get work with the company, and the area they were most often sent to was the Social Service: “We always knew the *asistente* in the mining world, that she was the lady who went and did the campaigns to kill stray dogs, to make the stray pigs disappear, to give an orientation to the women on how to cook the chicken better, all domestic things for private consumption.” Echoing the critiques by Ernestina Lázaro and Raúl Rivadeneyra cited earlier, Alina also points out that many of the workers’ wives who attended the Social Service trainings would end up making large amounts of knitwear that they simply stored up at home, because they were never properly taught the idea that they could do something else with it, like sell it. To some degree, throughout our conversations, Alina defined herself against these non-professional *auxiliares*, who became less dominant as time went on but who continued to work under the supervision of the professionals like her. She portrays some of the *auxiliares* not only as immersed in traditional *asistencialismo* and conventional gender roles, but also as more conservative and more subject to manipulation by the company bosses and engineers, who often sought to use them to spy on the workers.

An even greater educational (and, to some degree, class) divide is described for the small Caudalosa mine in Huancavelica by Bustos and Murillo (1971), who had been hired to organize the company’s first professional Social Service office in 1969:

In previous years, these functions were performed by a local woman, with good intentions but without any professional training, without even a high school education. Her work was limited to resolving certain family disputes, to giving sewing classes to a group of six local women, and to demanding greater hygiene in the homes. The position had been given to her because of her *compadrazgo* ties with the Superintendent back then.

Thus, at the same time that the Social Work profession was becoming more class-diverse and moving away from its elitist, Lima-based roots (Maguiña 1979, 162), in many of the mining camps a division or hierarchy persisted between those new professionals and the non-professionals who had been performing some of the same functions, in a formal or informal way, until then.

The situation of the Social Service department at CPC/Centromín around the time Alina arrived was also one marked by the inequalities of what she calls “the masculine, patriarchal world” of the mine. This was embodied in long-term practices and traditions at the company. For example, until 1969, only single women could be *asistentas* or *auxiliares*; if one of them became pregnant, they were immediately fired. This is also mentioned by Maguiña (1979, 174), who points out that it was only the labor stability laws put in place by the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) that brought an end to dismissals for this reason (and others) at the CPC. Still, Alina pointed out to me, the lingering effects of this old policy were still felt, so that young *asistentas* or *auxiliares* who became pregnant were still subject to suspicion and “defamation” on the part of the managers and engineers. Another old practice had been that at the end of the year the Social Service personnel would be rotated among the different company operations; the managers would come and personally choose the *asistentas* that they wanted, and according to Alina this decision was often made on the basis of looks. She was part of the effort to replace this method of selection, which she calls “offensive,” with a rotation made through matching professional qualifications with the needs of each site. Other similar practices seem to have lasted longer, however. Both Alina and another social worker from around the same time, Ruth Alvarado, told me of instances in which, when the cooking staff was on strike alongside other workers, the social workers would be sent to the kitchen to cook for the engineers and managers. For them, ending these practices was part of the process of gaining respect not only

for their gender but also for their profession and work, in a context in which many in the company saw the Social Service as merely a legal requirement with which they had to comply.

I will briefly trace the outline of Alina's career at the mining company, before delving more deeply into certain specific issues she highlights in her own practice of Social Work and in her relationship to the workers and their families. For several years, she worked in the camp of the Yauricocha mine, one of the nine operating units that Centromín had inherited from the Cerro de Pasco Corporation.²⁴² An old colonial mine originally acquired by the CPC in 1927 and brought into large-scale production in 1948 (DeWind 1987, 34-38), Yauricocha was seen as a remote, high-altitude mine, located in the Western Cordillera but accessible only from Junín Department to the east. There were workers there from Ayacucho, Huancavelica, as well as Junín Department. In 1983, Alina had her first experience of being dismissed from the company, which she attributes to the resentment that her perceived closeness to the unions had generated among the administrative staff.²⁴³ After a year and a half, she was able to get rehired; the Minister of Labor had been sympathetic to her case due to the fact that they were both *sanmarquinos* (San Marcos graduates) and that his driver was Alina's cousin. Upon returning, she worked another two years in Yauricocha, then received a scholarship to travel to Tegucigalpa, Honduras (with the company's permission) to do a Master's program at the Latin American Social Work Center (CELATS). In 1988 she returned to Peru and was named Assistant Director of the Social Service Department, and finally in 1990 became Director, supervising all nine operating units (with a total of about 15,000 workers, plus their families) from the company headquarters in La Oroya. In this capacity, Alina attempted to put into practice some of the ideas and techniques that she had learned in her Master's Program. In particular, she sought to ground the practice of Social Work on a firmer footing of research and also to integrate it more closely with Operations. Out of these concerns came an effort known as *Proyecto Julián*, which was an attempt to conduct confidential interviews with a broad cross-

²⁴² Not to be confused with San Esteban de Yauricocha, the original name of the city of Cerro de Pasco.

²⁴³ Specifically, it involved an incident in which she helped secure a pension and a job for the widow of a mineral transport railway worker who had died in an accident; this meant going taking on the Accounting office, which had already ruled against the widow. This then caused her to become close to the union local to which the worker had belonged (the Pachacayo railway workers, one of the many Centromín unions), which began asking her to participate in their negotiations with the company. This in turn led to her dismissal.

section of workers to get their perspectives on workplace as well as family issues. She believes that this work made many of the managers and engineers uncomfortable and led to her second and definitive termination from the company, which came in 1995.

From her years in the mines, particularly in the remote Yauricocha camp, Alina recalls many of the same issues that are highlighted in other accounts and evidence of mining camp life in Peru, and that were the product of the overcrowding (*hacinamiento*) and the difficult living and working conditions: problems like gossip, infidelity (real and imagined) and domestic violence, as well as disputes over the use of shared spaces. She remembers being called upon to play “lawyer, priest and policeman” in many of these conflicts. On the other hand, in her account she emphasizes not just the everyday conflicts but also the solidarity that could be felt in the mining camp during difficult moments such as accidents, or during the violence of the 1980s:

Faced with problems, faced with the crisis, there really was solidarity among people. Sometimes they were enemies every day but when faced with death, then they were all together in sorrow. Or if something happened, for example during the time of terrorism,²⁴⁴ you went out to walk around the camps, and found individuals shot, dead, on the sidewalks. So then the neighbors [*vecinas*] would go out and ask ‘Who? Who is it?’ ‘It’s Teresa’s husband, do you remember?’ ... They had been in [that person’s] party, or baptism. So then they all went to Teresa’s, and they picked up the body and, well, there was that whole situation, they sympathized, you know? The pain, they did really feel it.²⁴⁵

One of the most striking aspects in Alina’s account of her work is the way in which the object of the Social Service’s interventions was defined as completely external to the productive activity of the mine. The *asistentes* and *auxiliares* were basically expected to enforce hygiene in the camps and to organize activities for the families, not to have anything to do with the world of work in the mine, concentrator plant or foundry. As she says,

²⁴⁴ In Peru, the term *terrorismo* became the dominant way of describing the actions of Sendero Luminoso during its “People’s War” that began in 1980. Moreover, people often say “the time of terrorism” (*la época del terrorismo*) to refer to all of the violence of the period, even when they acknowledge that state and parastate actors were also responsible for a part of that violence. In intellectual and left-wing circles, on the other hand, it is more common to say “the internal conflict” or “the armed conflict.”

²⁴⁵ “*Pero si había también mucha solidaridad. Frente al problema, frente a la crisis, si había solidaridad entre las personas. A veces eran enemigas todos los días pero frente a la muerte, allí todas estaban en el dolor. O pasaba alguna cosa, por ejemplo en la época del terrorismo, tú salías a caminar por los campamentos, y encontrabas baleados, muertos, en las veredas. Y entonces las vecinas salían ‘¿Quién, quién es?’ ‘No, es el esposo de la Teresa, mira que si te acuerdas’...habían estado en la fiesta, en el bautizo. Entonces todas iban en Teresa, y, recogían el cadáver, y bueno había toda esa situación, que compadecían, ¿no? El dolor, y lo sentían de verdad.*”

The doors of the operations were always closed to the social workers; our entry into operations was prohibited... The *asistentas* were for the outside, the engineers were for the inside. And there was one engineer after another who had a big social problem, but they were untouchable [*intocable*, i.e. beyond criticism].

This is of course one specific instance of industrial capitalism's separation of the home and workplace. It is also similar to the manner in which mining companies in Peru today tend to define Community Relations – which has largely replaced Social Work and Industrial Relations as the most important vehicle for the mining industry's interventions into society – as external to and entirely separate from issues of mine operation and environmental impact. In both cases, I believe this has to do with companies' need to shelter the “technical” productive sphere from intromission by social and political questions. Interventions into society, in addition to being mandated by law, gained through struggle or diffused through transnational professional and technocratic circuits, are meant to obtain “social peace” for companies and thus keep the social world at bay. Although they also have the function of assisting either the reproduction of the labor force (in the case of Social Work) or the access to land and minerals (in the case of Community Relations), the importance of this role is often downplayed both by engineers who want to stick to their technical criteria and managers who would rather portray social interventions as generous gifts from the corporation to the society. This thus results in the marginalization often felt by the professionals in charge of social issues, whether it be social workers (as in Alina's case) or Community Relations specialists today.

Although the company attempted to maintain this separation, evidence of the interconnection between the sphere of work and the sphere of the home was not hard to find. As Alina says,

The company establishes that the focus of your attention is the family, but the family where the father does not exist – Why? Because the worker – and here there is a double error – the head of the family is the worker, but the company assumes that the worker is its property and so takes the worker away for the operations and leaves the family without its head. But then for the family problems that you confront you need the head of the family – so then where do you find him? He's not there, and the company does not want to understand that.

Not only were the workers separated from their family during their shift, but, in many cases, workers had their families living in towns such as Huancayo, Jauja or Tarma; although

this arrangement was not as widespread as it is today, it was already present back then. This naturally created stress in the relationship between the worker and the family whom he saw only once every two weeks or so. It also led not only to infidelity but also to instances of workers who, as Alina put it, were “abandoned” by their families, with the latter only caring about receiving their share of the paycheck every 15 days. The social worker would then come to the *campamento* expecting to find a family, only to find a sick worker lying in bed with no one to care for him. It would then turn out that the worker’s supervisor was sanctioning him for not coming to work, without bothering to go and check in his home. All of these things made it clear that the sphere of work and the sphere of the home were interconnected. Furthermore, Alina tried to make this connection more explicit by teaching the workers’ wives about the world of the mine – a world she herself was never allowed to enter (as a woman and as a non-operations person) during all her years in the company:

I even taught them what the mine was like, through slides – back then people used slides right? I showed them that, so they’d be able to see the work conditions that their husbands have in the mine, that it’s a hard, ugly job, that for eight, ten hours, it’s sunny [outside] and you don’t know if it’s day or night, because you’re down below, inside the hole, and those conditions change people’s mood [*humor*], their frame of mind [*estado de ánimo*], how tired they are, etc. So then, ‘You, being on the outside, what is it that you need to give to your husband? Good nourishment, a sizeable bottle of liquid,’ because they would send them a little glass, ‘No, you have to send two, three liters of water, because inside they are perspiring, they get tired.’ So all that information, that was always prohibited, I liberated it and began to give it to the women, because they have to know where [their husband] is.

Although this discourse may seem to reinforce an ideology of domesticity that would help the company by creating a healthier, more productive workforce, in Alina’s narration the company appears more interested in “prohibiting” access to its operations; it is she who “liberates” information about the workplace and transmits it to workers’ wives. In general, her account – which is obviously only one perspective into the company’s functioning – paints a picture of a world driven less by social engineering and more by inefficiency and lack of interest in workers’ lives, a world in which the successful reproduction of the labor force was always less than secure. Some of this has to do not only with Alina’s overall critical perspective on management but also with the situation of economic crisis and overall chaos in which the country as a whole found itself during much of the 1980s and early 90s. However, I believe some of the same

features were found, in a more muted form, for earlier years as well – in the Peruvian mining industry (even in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation), the drive towards social engineering never fully won out over the imperative to contain costs.

As mentioned earlier, after becoming Director of the Social Service Alina attempted to bridge this gap between her own work and that of Operations through *Proyecto Julián*, an effort named after a worker who had gained recognition for his long term of service at the company. The project consisted of obtaining workers' input (through confidential interviews) into their work conditions and into what they wanted to see changed; more broadly it meant bringing criteria from those areas of the company considered to be part of Welfare (*Bienestar*) with those that were part of production, as a way to raise productivity:

I proposed that Operations and Welfare become a real work unit that would provoke, that would help raise the productivity index. Because if you have the worker doing jobs that involve 8 hours of work but with a doubled shift it becomes 16 hours of work, and they have bad housing [*vivienda de mala muerte*], many of them were boarders [so] nobody even brought lunch for them; in work conditions with high temperatures... with dehydration or with lead poisoning,²⁴⁶ when the first characteristic or symptom of lead poisoning is the sexual impotence of the worker, then, what are we talking about? We are not then talking about welfare... So I sell that idea, that the company has a Social Work unit that looks after the welfare of the worker and the family and that that will help to raise his productivity, insofar as the operations also offer safe working conditions and training for the worker.

This effort had some success at the copper, lead and zinc foundries, as well as in some of the mining units like Casapalca; according to Alina, workers and engineers would be reluctant to come in for the 20-minute interview, but then they would stay talking for two hours, relieved that someone was finally listening to their personal and workplace problems. However, the difficulties arose when some of the summaries she prepared quoted employees who called for the replacement of the Human Resources staff; the latter felt attacked and she believes that this initiated the process that led to her downfall and dismissal from the company in 1995. This process also involved the *bola* (rumor) that she was a *terrorista* and a *subversiva* (i.e. a member of Sendero Luminoso), an accusation that was rather common at the time. By then, in any case,

²⁴⁶ I believe here Alina is referring particularly to workers in the company's Lead Foundry that is part of the La Oroya metallurgical complex.

the piecemeal privatization of the company had begun, and people were being laid off or asked to resign for many different reasons.

Another aspect that comes through in Alina's account of the practice of Social Work in the mining company is the fraught, ambiguous relationship that the social workers had with the working population and in particular with the unions. On the one hand, Alina's background as a Social Sciences student - in the radicalized environment of San Marcos University in the 1970s - made her more sympathetic to union demands than the engineers (or also, in her opinion, the non-professional *auxiliares* of the Social Service) would have been. She discusses her conversations with fellow social workers on one specific occasion in which she tried to tell them to be wary of company requests to help perform the tasks of striking workers - particularly in the kitchen - during the unions' work actions:

All of us who had a university education [*de nivel universitario*] realized that these are union struggles [*luchas sindicales*] that, whether they are right or wrong, are means that the workers have to exert their force [*medidas de fuerza de los trabajadores*], and whether they get it right or wrong it's something that they have to resolve as an organization, face-to-face with the company. So then, as a social worker, what are you going to do?²⁴⁷

On that occasion, she says, the *obrero* union saw the social workers as "class enemies," due to the fact that some of them were working during the strike. So Alina and a few other social workers drafted a manifesto in support of the strike, which was read in the assembly of the *obrero* union and which "saved our image in the eyes of the working masses [*masa trabajadora*]." This caused some problems with management, but as she says, "What good is it to get along with the chief of [Industrial] Relations if the service you provide is not for the chief of [Industrial] Relations but rather for the working masses?" At another time, as mentioned earlier, she developed a good relationship with one of the union locals at the Yauricocha mine because she used what she knew of Law (from some of her courses at San Marcos) to help a widow get a job and a pension; according to Alina, "in the union they would say, 'the *señorita* is *zurda* [leftist], because she does understand the conflict, she does understand the worker. '"

²⁴⁷ "Todas las de nivel universitario nos damos cuenta que son luchas sindicales con razón o sin razón son medidas de fuerza de los trabajadores y si lo aciertan o lo equivocan son algo que ellos lo resuelven como organización frente a la empresa. Entonces tú como trabajadora social ¿qué vas a hacer?"

On the other hand, the position of social workers was always complicated by the fact that a large part of their job consisted in entering people's houses, and, as mentioned earlier, the managers often expected the *asistentas* to report to them on what they saw. Although they did not all comply, it was enough that some of them did to create the potential for a soured relationship with the workers and the unions. When this and other factors combined to generate a confrontation between the *asistentas sociales* and the workers, the resentment could be expressed in highly gendered and/or sexualized derogatory language. For example, when Alina first arrived at the Yauricocha mine, where she was to take over as the resident *asistente*, she found her entry into the camp blocked by four union leaders (*dirigentes*). They had had a conflict with the previous social worker, and did not want any more like her; they referred to the *asistentas sociales* as *asistentas sexuales*. This language equated them to the sexual workers who were brought to Yauricocha and the other isolated mining camps (like Cobriza) in special company buses every few weeks. Alina believes this comparison was due to the fact that there had effectively been a few cases in the past of engineers and managers who had affairs with the (often single) *asistentas sociales*, especially in the isolated mines. The four union leaders' language thus drew on the discourse of sexual shame and stigma in order to voice their grievances against social workers. On this occasion, however, Alina managed to convince them that not all social workers were like that and that she should be given a chance, after which they let her enter.

Even in the absence of such sexualized imagery, social workers like Alina could encounter as much sexism in their interaction with the workers as they did in their relationship with the engineers and managers. For example, on one occasion in the mid-1980s, she ran for office in the *comunidad minera*, as the *comunidades industriales* were known in the mining centers. These were the profit-sharing and worker participation arrangements created by the Velasco government in 1970, and which lasted, although in diminished form, until the early 1990s. In every company, workers and employees held internal elections for their *comunidad minera*; professionals like Alina were included in the same *comunidad* as the *obreros*. According to her account, she was the frontrunner in the campaign, and actually had the support of the professionals. But then the opposing candidate, a mining worker, began to say "But, how can you think that a woman is going to govern us?" and with that argument he won the election.

Although of course we don't know all the details of what happened, from Alina's account we can thus see how gender relations at the mine could be intertwined with class or educational divides (i.e. between professionals and workers).

Alina's story shows some of the complexities and ambiguities inherent to the position of social workers at the mines: they were supposed to provide a service for the workers' families, whom they often got to know closely, but they were also in a sense part of management, and were expected to assist the company (particularly Industrial Relations) in the handling of the workforce and in keeping a lid on its demands. Moreover, they were an overwhelmingly female sector in a male-dominated space, with all the tensions and difficulties that that involved. In Alina's case, there was the added factor of her critical, to some degree contrarian attitude, shaped in part by her experience in the politicized student environment of the early 1970s; this added further layers of contradiction to her relationship with her profession, with the workers and with the company. In a sense, her sojourn through the mines was part of a period that can be seen as the culmination of the labor-centered paradigm (of which Drinot's "labor state" was a part) that had shaped public policy and techniques of governmentality in Peru, as in much of the world, since the early 1900s. Social work arrived from abroad and gradually grew in importance as part of the labor-centered system; it reached its climax in the 1970s and 80s, which were also the decades of greatest labor stability, union strength and political radicalism in the country, all in the context of the post-1973 economic readjustment that was directed from the North but that led to crisis in Latin America and Africa. The techniques and systems that were part of the labor paradigm did not disappear in the 1990s – nor did work itself disappear, of course - but they certainly stopped developing, and certain key aspects of them went into decline or vanished altogether.

Social Work is one such area of intervention that has declined, though not entirely disappeared, in mining companies today. Alina sees the practice of Social Work in the mines as having undergone a process of involution in the last few years: "I think it has been fifty years of regression [*retroceso*], history has been erased with one stroke [*de un solo plumazo*]." Based on what she has heard from colleagues, and from her own encounters with mining company programs in later jobs that she's done, she feels that the proactive, critical professional

perspective that at least some social workers had begun to develop in the mines towards the 1980s and early 90s has been cut short. Companies hire social workers when required by law, but do not take their work seriously.²⁴⁸ Social workers are given meaningless office tasks while the new work of Community Relations is given to mechanics, architects, engineers people who do not understand social issues. Alina describes and analyzes her conversations with colleagues who still work in mining companies:

‘So then what things are you doing?’ ‘No, I’m just, all paper, a report about this, a report about that.’ So then they confine you to a little office and to your computer, then you are a data entry person, you are not a social worker. All that which today has to do with [maintaining] harmonious relations with the community, with welfare, and which we used to do, is no longer done by the social workers, now there is an architect, there is a mechanic. What do these guys know about the social [*lo social*]? ...So then I think that the social workers lost some ground, or abandoned a space, one that belonged to us by right and by our work. But unfortunately this is a good and clear example of the fact that the company does not give a damn about the social [*lo social le importa un pepino*].

Alina’s comments convey her sense that the social professionals lost the unequal battle they had been trying to wage against the engineers and managers and their purely technical concerns; the latter thus reign supreme. Certainly, in the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s, it was common for engineers to be in charge of the emerging field of Community Relations. This is often still the case (especially in the old mines of the Central Highlands), though now there are also cases of mining companies hiring anthropologists and sociologists and developing a more explicit focus on “the social” – now defined as “the local community” rather than the workforce. However, Alina sees a lack of connection between this new focus and the work that she and at least some of her colleagues used to do.

Recently, she was invited to present at an event on Corporate Social Responsibility organized by a prominent Peruvian mining and energy industry publication, *Minas y Petróleo*. A federation to which Alina belongs had proposed her to the event organizers. She agreed to go and do a presentation together with a former colleague, because as she put it, “I consider that *Proyecto Julián* was a Social Responsibility project, with an internal focus [*con partida*

²⁴⁸ Although less emphatic than Alina, her colleague Ruth Alvarado, who stayed at the company until shortly after it was privatized, agreed with her on this point: “There’s been a return to the figure of the social worker as a way to comply with a law or simply for whatever the boss wants, asks or needs.”

interna].” But she felt that no one was interested – “nobody gave it any importance.” When they were finished with their panel, the organizers of the event approached them and said, “Come with us to the auditorium, *now* we are going to have a ceremony.” This was a presentation about Social Responsibility projects by corporations like Yanacocha, Petro Perú, gas companies - “all the big companies;” they had brought community leaders all the way from the Amazon to be present at the ceremony. Alina felt offended by the emphasis on the word *now* and the implication that her panel had not been important – as she told the friends who had proposed her to the organizers, “Don’t invite me ever again for *Minas y Petróleo!*” This anecdote reflects the shift in emphasis from the “internal” work that social workers like Alina used to do, and the “external” focus now in vogue among the extractive industries in Peru. This shift is connected to the larger national and global transformations of the late 20th century, which I discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

CRISIS AND THE “UNMAKING OF THE WORKING CLASS”

Introduction

In the first three chapters of this dissertation, I have reexamined the social history of mining workers in the Central Highlands of Peru. Using both primary and secondary sources, I have maintained both a regional perspective as well as a specific local focus on the Huarón mine, and secondarily on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. In Chapter 1 I provided some historical background on the Huayllay area but also traced the general dynamics of labor and migration over the course of the 20th century, arguing that there was a gradual shift from a situation of labor shortage towards one of labor surplus. In Chapter 2, I focused on the work of mining families, both inside the mine and outside, as well as on the relationship between productive and reproductive work at the level of theory. In Chapter 3, I examined issues of everyday life in the mining camps, focusing on three main topics: marital and family relations in the Huarón mine camp in the 1940s, the politics of mining housing, and the place of social workers in the camps during a period of greater company intervention into family life.

The world of the mining camps described in these chapters came to an end in the 1980s and 90s. During these years, thousands of workers and their families left the camps as a result of mine closures and workforce downsizing. This occurred as part of a generalized crisis in the Peruvian mining sector in the 1980s, which was in turn part of a broader economic, social and political crisis in the country as a whole. Although mining is an industry well-known for its alternating periods of boom and bust, the crisis of the 1980s is significant because it was not just a period of recession and low production; it was also a turning point in the organization of mining life. Mining in Peru would pick up slowly in the mid-1990s, and especially after 2003, when the upturn in metal prices would allow the re-opening of medium and small mines that in

the 1980s had become unprofitable. But the world of the mining camp would not return in the 1990s or 2000s, nor did the strong labor unions, or the company schools, stores and hospitals.

The crisis and transformation in the case of the mining industry occurred not only in Huarón and Cerro de Pasco, but throughout Peruvian mines. Around 1979-1980, Peruvian anthropologist Carmen Salazar-Soler had conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Buenaventura Company's Julcani mine in Huancavelica (South-Central Peru), focusing on migration from rural communities to the mine and the impact that this transition had on traditional belief systems and rituals. Twenty years later, around the turn of the century (before the latest upswing in prices), she returned for a brief visit which she summarized in an epilogue to her (2006) book:

If in the years in which I conducted the work that I have presented throughout these pages, I had the impression of being present at what E.P. Thompson called "the making of the working class," now I had the sensation that I was observing the opposite: a process of "the unmaking of the working class." What was left of the mining center that I had known and of the worker whom I had studied? (Salazar-Soler 2006, 232).

Salazar-Soler found the mine in a process of closure, with a much reduced workforce, a large part of which was working through contractors.

Furthermore, the crisis and displacement of mining workers in the 1980s was not confined to the Peruvian mines. In Bolivia, where a large state-owned mining sector was focused largely around one metal, tin, the economic crisis of the 1980s led the government to close all the important mines in 1985. This was part of Decree 21060, a structural adjustment program implemented by Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the same politician who three decades earlier had been one of the leaders of the 1952 Revolution that nationalized the mines, and who now was advised by a team of economists led by Jeffrey Sachs. This move led to the dismissal of the great majority of the tin mining workforce (Gill 2002). In her 1993 preface to the new edition of her 1979 book study of tin miners in Oruro, Bolivia, June Nash wrote about the process of displacement that she observed on her return visit in 1985, shortly after Decree 21060:

What distinguished this episode in Bolivia's long history as the poorest country in South America was the extraordinary dislocation of families and communities that took place... With more than twenty thousand laid off from the mines and thousands more left without employment in agriculture or the factories, the destruction was far greater than anything experienced in the past (Nash 1993 [1979], xxiii-xxiv).

Similarly, in his “ethnography of decline” based on fieldwork carried out in Zambia in the mid-to-late 1980s, James Ferguson (1999) describes how the crisis of the copper industry at that time raised the prospect of a return migration to the land that reversed earlier narratives of progressive modernization:

Old linearities here seem strangely reversed. Urbanization has given way to “counter-urbanization.” Industrialization has been replaced by “de-industrialization.” The apparently inevitable processes of rural-urban migration and proletarianization are now replaced by mass lay-offs and “back to the land” exercises (Ferguson 1999, 11).

These simultaneous displacements and dislocations in the different traditional mining countries were all connected and all bore many similarities to one another. These nations were all affected by the late-20th century decline in metal prices, which began in the mid-70s and was interrupted by a brief late-70s boom only to result in an even bigger collapse in the early 1980s. This occurred at the same time as the Debt Crisis that affected virtually all Latin American and African countries in general. However, there were also national differences. Not only did Peru have a more diversified mining sector than Bolivia, with an important production of copper, silver, lead and zinc, but the process there also dragged out over more years and occurred in a more complex, layered way. By and large, in Peru the smaller mines closed, and the medium and large mines massively reduced their workforces and restructured the remaining part. The mine closures took place in two waves, first in the early 1980s and then in the late 80s and early 90s. In the mines that did not completely close, companies began pressuring workers to leave through a variety of methods. By the start of the 1990s, changes in the orientation of the government and in the labor laws made this process easier for companies, and in the case of the state-owned company special government decrees were also used to dismiss workers. This occurred during a period of political violence and, up to about 1989, heightened union militancy. As a result of these various processes, the largest numbers of workers left the mines in the early 1990s.

In this chapter, I examine the process that Salazar-Soler called “the unmaking of the working class” in the mines as a particular historical moment, one that I believe has relevance not just for mining contexts around the world but also for thinking about broader shifts in global capitalism. Although the mines had their own specific characteristics, the decline of formerly strong unions and the restructuring of labor was a wider phenomenon, as was the global

recession of the 1970s and the resulting crisis in Africa, Latin America and many other parts of the Global South in the last quarter of the 20th century. In this chapter I alternate between several contexts, all of which are interrelated: the global political economy, the national economic and political crisis, and the specific events in the mines of Huarón and Cerro de Pasco and to some degree the rest of the Peruvian mining sector. In terms of the third, more local level, I focus most on the very early years of the 1990s, when most of the workers left the Huarón mine, as they did in other medium-scale mines and also in the state-owned company Centromín. I also maintain a focus on the longer mining crisis that had lasted for much of the 1980s. I use oral history interviews and also union meeting minutes from the specific moments in which workers were discussing the possibility of leaving the mine. Later in the chapter, I broaden the focus of the document analysis by examining union meeting minutes from a smaller mine that was Huarón's "sister local" at the time, since it was owned by the same Hochschild group that had bought Huarón from the French in 1987. The reason for this momentary excursion away from the Pasco region and from the highlands (Mina Raúl was located on the coast, although its workforce came mostly from the highlands) is to zoom in on the specific moment of the dismantling of the workers' camps, rather than the broader process of displacement in general, and also to show that the events described here were common to many if not all the mines in Peru. Throughout the chapter I also keep a secondary focus on the state-owned Centromín (the former Cerro de Pasco Corporation), especially its Cerro de Pasco unit, though I do not use union meeting minutes from there. Importantly, in the middle section of this chapter I move away from the local and regional levels towards the national and global, to try to understand the broader crisis not just in mining but in other sectors of the economy as well as in politics and social life in general.

Narratives of Crisis and Departure

I will begin by introducing some of the ways in which this period of crisis and displacement is remembered by people locally. Some of has already been discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, especially in the life histories included in Chapter 2. Here I want to focus on certain themes that come up in people's accounts. One is a sense of deceptive permanence – the idea that people living in the camps had made them their home and had become used to living

there, and did not foresee that a change was about to come. This was evident in my conversation with Ernesto Blanco, who grew up in the Huarón camps. Ernesto was the son of a mechanic who died in an accident at the Huarón mine, and other members of his family also worked at the company in various capacities. He later studied and at the time of my research was working in a drugstore in Cerro de Pasco, where I interviewed him.

I was a witness to the exodus from Huarón. [The company] declared itself in crisis, and many people were leaving. We saw how the trucks left daily. There were people who had been born there, had grown up there and had gone to work there, they had never left, and they had to go. There were some who felt like they were *huayllinos*. There were people from Huánuco, an area very far from here. So then some of them didn't go back there, they stayed around here in Pasco [the department where Huayllay and Huarón are located]. Some went to Huancayo, others Lima, Tarma, Huánuco. When I travel around those places I always meet people from Huarón.

Blanco's account recalls how people had migrated to Huarón, as to other mines, from many different places in the Central Highlands. In the second half of the 20th century, and especially in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, a certain stability had developed, in terms of workers staying at the company for several decades, and many of them also bringing their families to the camp. In that way, there were people who had grown up there and who had come to think of Huarón and the Huayllay area as their home, and had not expected to have to leave.

A similar dynamic is present in the account of Máximo Roque, a *huayllino* who worked as an *empleado* at the Huarón company from the 1950s to the 80s. I mentioned Don Máximo earlier in Chapter 1, where I quoted his account both of the old exchange system and of seasonal mine labor in his father's time in the early 20th century. During my time in Huayllay, I conversed several times with Don Máximo at his hardware store, which doubled as a photography studio – before the advent of digital and cell phone cameras in the last few years, it was one of the few places in the area where people could get photos taken for IDs and other uses. He had taught himself the craft of photography since the 1950s, when, he says, he would sell souvenir photographs of the Huayllay Stone Forest to the French and other European engineers who came to work for periods of time at the company. Before our first interview, after I had mentioned my interest in the history of the mine and the area, he insisted on writing a small text ahead of time; he said his memory was failing him, and in any case he wanted to make sure he

got things correctly. Among other things, his two-page account mentions the departure of the workers from the camps:

In the month of March of 1991, the hour came for the workers to retire from the company, the motive being that, according to the managers, the price of the minerals went down. The company stops its activities and those who decide to retire need to present their letter of voluntary retirement and they will be paid their benefits immediately according to the years worked, with a deadline of seven business days to present their retirement in writing.

Don Máximo differentiates between the older workers, for whom retirement made sense, and the younger generation, who also got worried that they would lose the chance to receive their benefits and rushed to accept the company's pressures to retire:

So then the workers who had done 35 to 40 years of service, some of them lived alone, their wives and children in other places. In other words, in their towns – such as Jauja, Huancayo, Tarma, Huánuco. They presented their letter of voluntary retirement. Those who had 5 to 10 to 15 years of service also became worried (*se acomplejaron*), thinking that the time of service was going to be well remunerated. In the end it was a failure for these workers, even though the company gave them transportation. They also went to other places. [These were] merely naive pretensions [*pretenciones tontas*], since they didn't have a house, they arrived to rent some *corralones* [courtyards] so as to later buy a plot of land or a house. But it was all a failure... So then off to work again in anything that comes up so as to meet some of the expenses in the household.

Don Máximo's text points out that some of the older workers had made plans and established their families outside of the camp, whereas many of the younger workers had not made the appropriate provisions:

Some workers did not think that the hour to leave the company would come, all was bonanza on pay days...All this should serve as experience for the workers, in that they should worry first about a house in a place of their choosing.

This is a frequently repeated image - the worker who thought that things would go on as they had for a long time. Another former Huarón worker told me of how people in the 1980s took care of their camp housing "like their house" – the implication being that it wasn't really their house, as would later become clear. It is common for people to contrast the figure of the savvy, responsible worker who did not remain dependent on the company but rather built his house – a group in which Don Máximo positions himself – with the stories of "failure." The latter concern the families that had to struggle all of a sudden to build a house in the midst of

economic crisis and an insufficient retirement settlement to which they had agreed under pressure. Don Máximo for one had made sure to maintain his own house in the town of Huayllay. As he told me when we spoke, “I have not lived in the camps, thanks to Divine Providence, and to my own effort.” Thus the old camp, which for some people is the object of nostalgia, is here conceptualized as a space of dangerous dependence and an ultimately deceptive sense of permanence. This kind of discourse about dependence and housing is not exclusive to Huarón. Juan, a worker who was laid off from the Cerro de Pasco mine in the early 1990s, told an interviewer in 1995 that “I am glad I didn’t live a single day in the mining camp, compound, but built my own house and today this is not a house just for myself but also for my children” (Mountain Voices/Panos Oral Testimony Programme, Testimony No. 1).²⁴⁹

Returning to Huarón, one of the workers who felt pressured to resign was Octavio Domínguez. Don Octavio, for whom I provided a brief life history in Chapter 2, was the son of shepherds who had worked in a nearby estate, back in the days of the haciendas. He himself worked at the Huarón mine for nearly 20 years. He recalls how the smaller mines in the region had already closed, and how this made the workers fear that the same thing would happen at Huarón, and that they might lose their severance pay if they waited too long:

[The union] called, to a general assembly, all the *obreros*, workers, so then there they said that the company is bankrupt right now. For those who leave now there is money, but for those who stay till the end there is no money, nothing. So then I thought about that, and I said damn, now what do we do? Just like it happened in these small companies, for example close to here is Carhuacayán, there was the Santander mine. I think up to now they still have not fixed their severance pay (*tiempo de servicio*), what they have worked. So then I also thought, if the company doesn’t pay, now what do we do without money? So I talked with my wife, let’s see what we do, it’s better if I leave then.

Don Octavio’s account highlights how the departure of the workers from the mines at this time was a process that involved not just layoffs and mine closures but also decisions made by the workers (and their wives) under pressure and uncertainty in the face of rumor and crisis.

²⁴⁹ This is a person whom I myself interviewed later, and I quote from those interviews elsewhere in this dissertation. However, the quote above comes from the oral history project conducted by the London-based PANOS together with the Peruvian organization IPEMIN in the mid-1990s.

A different account is provided by Emilia Flores, whom I already quoted in Chapter 2 in my discussion of women's economic activities in the mining camp. The wife of a mineworker who had started at the company in the late 1960s, Doña Emilia had her own income from giving board to single workers at the camp throughout the many years she lived there. When I visited her in the house where she now lives in Cerro de Pasco, I mentioned that I was interested in the history of the mining camp. Like Máximo Roque, she insisted on writing a brief text on a piece of paper before beginning the interview.²⁵⁰ In that text she discusses more broadly the nature of life in the old camp and what she sees as the reasons why it came to an end:

In those days life was very peaceful and the union made sure to get respect [in regard to] all the anomalies [*anomalías*] that the company did with its workers at Huarón.²⁵¹ In the first place they gave us housing, electricity, water, charcoal, firewood and the company store (*mercantil*), the kerosene we did buy but at a low price.

This account recalls some important features of the old camp system, in particular the in-kind provisions that the union negotiated with the company. The union here is posited as a guarantor of this system that kept the company in line when the latter committed “anomalies” by not fulfilling the accords. In spite of this mention of anomalies, however, the company is also presented in a positive light:

All of that which was in abundance would have been in the year 1967 until 1989. Because the Huarón company was very good and [we,] all of us, are the ones who have ruined that. And also on Christmas they gave us good toys, good *panetones* to the children of the *obreros* and to the children of the *empleados* it was much better.²⁵² They also gave us sweets.

Here we see an idealized portrait of the company that needs to be understood as part of a widespread discourse of nostalgia for the old world of the camps and the old (often foreign) administrators. This positive portrayal is manifested in the reference to token things like the *panetones*, toys and sweets, but also to a more general sense of “abundance.” The blame for bringing about the end of this system is placed with the workers:

²⁵⁰ During my research, several other interviewees also mentioned their concern with “getting things right” and focusing their memories before the interview. However, Máximo Roque and Emilia Flores were the only two who actually wrote texts.

²⁵¹ “...*el sindicato hacía respetar todas las anomalías que hacía la empresa con sus trabajadores de Huarón.*”

²⁵² Panetón is an Italian sweet bread (*Panetonne*) that is popular in Peru around Christmas time. It is an item that is commonly given by employers to their employees during that season.

After a while all that began to be ruined because the workers themselves went on strike for anything even for a piece of wiping cloth (*huaype*) because of that it started to decay... The unionists did a strike and then the French began to wall everything up and then the Republican Guard came too and all the people became bitter until they did a *marcha de sacrificio*...²⁵³ And from all that the French got mad and began to close their doors firing their workers giving them retirement notices and then it all ended. Now it's all subcontracted (*ahora todo es contratada*).

Here Doña Emilia seems to give a broader account that combines different events and tendencies from those years: the high union demands and increased frequency of strikes, the soured relation with the company, the latter's move to reduce their operations and workforce, and the presence of security forces in and around the camp. This is a very particular view in terms of the vehemence with which it criticizes the workers – in this sense it echoes the ways in which mining industry officials tend to portray those years, as a time of excessive, unreasonable and chaotic union activity. Nevertheless, this is a legitimate view and useful insofar as it highlights the political dimension of the crisis of that time; it is also interesting because of the sense of change and temporality that it presents. A “peaceful” past is evoked, followed by a period of conflict and crisis, after which doors began to be closed and “it all came to an end.” Her assertion that “now it's all subcontracted” echoes the way in which other people from Huarón and Huayllay also tend to contrast a past of “all payroll” (*puro planilla*) to a present of “all contracting” (*puro contratada*).

If oral history accounts vary in terms of what they highlight and what perspective they take on similar events, another dimension altogether is provided by written documents such as the minutes from the assemblies of the *obrero* union at the Huarón mine. Here I will examine the assembly minutes from 1990-1991, when one of the largest mass resignation of workers occurred. Unlike the minutes from Mina Raúl examined towards the end of this chapter, the Huarón union minutes were not part of the archiving project undertaken by the National Mining Federation in the early-to-mid 1990s. Rather, they are documents that I was able to access during the course of my fieldwork. Since this is material from not very long ago, all of the names used in the quotations from union minutes are pseudonyms.

²⁵³ The Republican Guard (*Guardia Republicana*) was a national security force which in the late 1980s was merged with the National Police.

These handwritten minutes (*actas*) are multi-layered documents. Unlike pamphlets and communiqués from the National Mining Federation - which tend to speak with one voice and generally attempt to elicit support from member unions and from the general public - meeting minutes from the local unions record a wider variety of voices; these sometimes criticize the leadership of the union or one another. These voices are certainly not unmediated – they are recorded by the Secretary of Minutes and Archives, who probably summarized a great deal of what people said and/or left some out altogether. They follow a standard format, one which was common to many of the mining unions of the Central Highlands in the second half of the 20th century and which formed part of a regional union culture. After the Secretary General opens the meeting by announcing the number of members in attendance, a discussion facilitator (*director de debates*) is named. Correspondence received is read out loud and members make requests to discuss specific points; the officers of the union then give reports, after which the floor is opened up for comments from members. These comments from the floor are often recorded in a mix of first and third person.

Although the leaders of the women´s committees sometimes make an appearance in meeting minutes from other mining unions of the central region, the voices recorded in the 1990-1991 minutes from Huarón are exclusively male. Furthermore, it is natural to assume that these documents tend to privilege the voices of those workers most involved in the union, who not only attended the assemblies but also were more prone to speaking from the floor. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the union at the time was an organization that was central, not marginal, to the experience of workers at the mine. Founded in 1945, the Huarón *obrero* union (as in most mines, there was a separate union for empleados) included the totality of the stable, direct workforce, which at the time still constituted the majority of workers, even if contractors were already beginning to play an increasing role. Additionally, the assemblies were reasonably well-attended. At the beginning of the period under discussion, in 1990, attendance fluctuated between 680 and 750, out of a total *obrero* membership of around 980; by late March 1991, after a number of workers had resigned, attendance would drop to 415.

In terms of the general situation at that moment, the minutes show how changes that would become permanent and institutionalized after the crisis were already present as emerging

tendencies during this time. One of the principal complaints from the floor was the presence of contracting companies within the operations. In their comments in the assembly, union members demanded that the union put pressure on the company to get rid of the contractors, which according to the secretary general had a total of 405 workers laboring at Huarón in 1990.²⁵⁴ They were said to be working in the areas of transportation, security and even in the concentrator plant. At one point, a fight had broken out between union leaders and one of the contracting companies, which according to the union had “provoked” the women’s committee of the union. Another trend that emerges from the minutes is the crisis-induced erosion of the system of in-kind provisions by the company to workers – things like firewood, kerosene, work clothes, which were late in arriving – as well as the deterioration of living conditions in the camp itself, expressed through power outages, water shortages, and a lack of medicines in the health post.

In late 1990, conflicts emerged between the union and the company over the payment of the “9th month readjustment” – a bonus was supposed to partially compensate for the hyperinflation that was rampant at the time – as well as over management’s attempts to decrease the lunch period and establish what was called a “continuous workday” policy within what was still at the time an 8-hour workday. Furthermore, union members argued that the company was attempting to convince individual workers to accept monetary incentives in exchange for circumventing collective pacts. On 8 Nov., 1990, a delegate from one of the mine sections said in the assembly that “we have been surprised by the incentives and at no point have the majority of us accepted and now the company is intimidating my *compañeros* with changes of assignments to those who don’t accept the incentives.” Apparently, those who accepted these incentives tended to be the younger workers; as one of the older workers said on December 21st:

Compañero Roberto Quispe [says that] we have thought that our young people should have been something better than us the old people, yet they have fallen for the simple game of the incentives, and he asks that all the young people reconsider, [so] that later tomorrow they not lament this, and at the same time also that the company put its hand to its breast (*se ponga la mano al pecho*) and have conscience.

²⁵⁴ The contracting system already existed in modest numbers in the mines of central Peru in the 70s and 80s; the change in the 1990s was not that contractors emerged out of nowhere, but rather that they went from being a minority to being the majority of the workforce.

Quispe's intervention on the floor – “we have thought that our young people should have been something better than us” would have resonated with a popular myth of progress – a powerful view of social advancement and improvement based around education above all. Here this idea is used to shame the young workers away from falling for a company strategy, or perhaps simply expresses surprise that they have done so in spite of supposedly being “better” than the elders.

Incidentally, this age dynamic was also brought up by Estela Páucar, whose life history I included in Chapter 2. The daughter of a worker who spent over 30 years at Huarón, Estela was hired as the secretary of the Huarón *obrero* union and spent many years in that position. As she told me,

The young people in reality were not like, well, like our parents, illiterate, rather they had at least high school. And it [the company] begins to use them. How does it use them? They take them into their trust [*les toma como personal de confianza*]... That's when they begin to desist, a group of 14 young people from different sections disaffiliate from the union. They disaffiliate, begin to do campaigns, [to the effect that] the union leader isn't good for anything, that they are enough... [One of them] was taking the oldest ones to the company, to have them present themselves voluntarily to resign from the company. That is how the union fell, otherwise the union would not have fallen, because it was well formed, it had a good foundation [*cimiento*], rather it's our youth that ruin it.

Doña Estela's statement that the older generation was “illiterate” should not be taken literally, but rather as meant to highlight the contrast between the generations in terms of level of schooling. According to information provided by the company in 1986 and listed by Sulmont and Valcárcel (1993, 43), among the Huarón *obreros* 99% had done at least some elementary school, 65% had finished elementary school, 36% had done at least some high school, and 18% had finished high school (Sulmont and Valcárcel 1993 43). But young people would certainly have been overrepresented among the group that had finished high school, and even more so within the smaller group that had attended at least some courses at the university or technical institute in Cerro de Pasco. The high school in Huayllay had been created in 1961; before that, people in the district who sought to continue beyond the elementary school level had to travel to Cerro de Pasco to study. The mining company provided its own elementary school, as mandated by law; in the early 1980s, the union had led a campaign to get the company to build a high school for workers' children right in the mining camp itself, so they wouldn't have to travel

down to Huayllay each morning. This high school would function for only a few years before the dismantling of the camp. Before that, in the 1960s, the different mining unions of Pasco Department had also been active in the campaign for the creation of a university in Cerro de Pasco (the UNDAC).

In Doña Estela's account, the educational advancement of youth appears to explain their disregard for the authority of elders. This does not mean that she disregards the educational idea itself – she herself studied accounting at the university in Cerro de Pasco while working at the union. But just like elsewhere in our conversation she expressed ambiguous sentiments towards the old, stable order of the camp – there were established rights such as retiring workers obtaining employment for their children at the mine, but this in her view sometimes led to a neglect of children's education – here she voices an ambiguous perspective on education itself: it was the more educated youth, not the elders, who were responsible for the decline of the union. On the other hand, the age dynamic brought up by Doña Estela and by Roberto Quispe was likely only part of the story – no doubt there were older workers who were more acquiescent to the company's demands, as well as younger workers who were less compromising and more combative. In fact, in many of the other mining unions of the Central Highlands twenty years earlier, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it had often been the younger workers who had led the move away from the moderate stance promoted by the APRA party towards the more radical position advocated by those connected to the radical left.

Beyond just the educational and age issue, discourses of unity and division were both present at this time in the Huarón union. In terms of unity, at one assembly a worker named Demetrio Ortiz held the view “that the incentives should be for everyone in general and he supports the idea of the leadership and we should prepare for a struggle [*lucha reivindicativa*] to obtain the bread for our children.” “Bread for our children” was one of the phrases that were part of general mining union culture and discourse at the time, like “having conscience” (*tomar conciencia* – literally, to gain awareness).²⁵⁵ After Ortiz spoke, another union member agreed and stated that “we should have conscience because silence will only make it so that we don't even take bread home for our children.” Similarly, although some *obreros* complained about

²⁵⁵ On the first phrase, see, for example, Elizabeth Ann Bauch's 1988 dissertation: We shall not lose the bread of our children: Strikes at a U.S. copper company in southern Peru.

empleados joining with contractors to take over their jobs, as the threat of mine closure became evident another *obrero* argued that “now is when we will solve our problem without distinctions between *empleados* and *obreros*.” In fact, in January 1991 an alliance was signed with the *empleados*, and the following assemblies were held jointly between the two unions. In another assembly, a member argued that “we should not fight amongst ourselves, and if something comes up then all of us should show our faces and we should not give credit to the company.”

On the other hand, at the same assembly the note taker recorded that “*compañero* Vilcachagua criticizes the leaders and manifests that it is the leaders who support the company so that it can do what it wants.” Appeals to unity could also be based on divisive accusations: at one meeting, a union official “reads the names of 23 *compañeros* who gave up the work implements [work clothes, shoes, etc.], calling them traitors.” At the same assembly, another official criticized “those *compañeros* who in exchange for a pittance [*por una miseria*] are selling out the sacrifice of many *compañeros*, and they are the ones who talk the most here.” Appeals to unity and solidarity thus co-existed with a culture of accusation and rumor, especially under the pressure of crisis.

The crisis appears directly in the union assembly minutes. On December 21, 1990, the union’s Secretary for Defense informed the assembly that the company had said it was “in total crisis.” Two months later, on February 13, the assembly discussed the fact that workers’ salaries had only been paid at 60% - two fifths were missing, with the company saying that it could no longer get any more loans from the banks and that the remaining salary would be paid once a certain batch of concentrates could be sold. It was also reported that one of the top engineers in the company, Ing. González, had said that the company was seeking to close the mine for six months due to the low price of silver. One union member from the floor added to the general sense of worry by reporting that another engineer had said that there would be a mine closure or personnel reduction. Another member pejoratively called engineer González a “salesman” (*vendedor*) who “wants to copy the example of Carhuacayán” - a mine that had recently closed. But another worker, Edmundo Sulca, had a different view:

He [Sulca] clarifies that in reality so many mines are already closing and many of the *compañeros* of the miner class are in the streets. And he says let us think and put our hands to our breast and analyze the comments made in newspapers, radio stations or TV.

Engineer González is just another member of the Huarón family... We must be optimists and not pessimists. And to show that the working class of Huarón is ready for any type of work that presents itself if we are able to do it. And one more time to show that there is already too much breach of the contract agreements on the part of the company. We should work one Sunday for free on behalf of the company.

In this comment, Sulca, a frequent speaker from the floor in the union assemblies (though not part of the leadership at this time), was attempting to articulate a vision of the mine as a “family” that united both workers and management in the effort to survive the crisis. The next to last sentence in the quoted passage seems to contradict this, by switching to a criticism of the company – either some of the speech was not recorded, or it simply shows that the two arguments were not mutually exclusive. At the same time, by saying that they were “ready for any type of work that presents itself if we are able to do it,” Sulca was building on a common discourse in the region emphasizing the importance and inevitability of work.²⁵⁶

Sulca’s proposal to work one Sunday per month for free received the support of other speakers, and it was approved by the assembly (the offer would later be increased to two free Sundays of work per month). A commission was formed to travel to a company shareholders’ board meeting in Lima to assess the situation and present the union’s proposals.²⁵⁷ At the assembly a week later, the commission reported on the meeting:

We made it known through a memorandum to the shareholders to work a Sunday each month for free... on finding out about the contents of the memo Engineer Néstor Rivas, vice-president of that body [the shareholders’ board], felt very pained [*apenado*] and told us that during his professional career he had not lived through such a flattering [*halagadora*] attitude from the working masses.

According to the secretary general of the *empleados*’ union, who had formed part of the commission, Engineer Rivas and other company officials had met with the union officers afterwards and given them their explanation of the crisis: profits had been good in 1986 and 1987 and the company had made large investments, not expecting the 100 days of the national strike in 1988, in which year they did not get any profits. This downward trend had continued the

²⁵⁶ As people often say, “one has to work, if not then how?” “*Hay que trabajar, ¿sino cómo?*”

²⁵⁷ The workers had access to shareholders’ meetings through the *comunidad minera*, a profit-sharing and worker participation arrangement created by the left-leaning Velasco regime in 1970 (outside of the mining industry it was called the *comunidad laboral* in general). The *comunidad minera* had its own president as well as a “worker-director;” they were present at all union meetings. This institution was abolished in the early 1990s.

following year because of worker absenteeism and the wearing out of machinery, resulting in an accumulation of debts to the banks. In the words of the *empleado* secretary, “Engineer Rivas has good intentions of improving and continuing to operate and asks us all, the working masses, if we have some ideas of how to make it through.” Yet Rivas had later given them two “final alternatives:” the “liquidation of everyone in general” or to continue operating and receive a “minimum mining wage;” he had also supposedly told the workers’ commission that “the old people [*los antiguos*] should be making decisions already so that they do not lose their legal benefits.”

After this was reported to the assembly, someone asked about the minimum mining wage, but the leadership responded that they had talked about this with the Industrial Communities’ Office (OCLA), which had told them that only new employees entering the company for the first time were eligible for this special wage.²⁵⁸ Referring to the estimates the company had given them for how much each worker would receive (depending on the number of years worked and the particular law that applied to the time when they started), one union member said that the group administering the company “has driven us to failure and they should be judged first... that miserable compensation for time of service that they’ve calculated we do not accept, they should at least take us into account [*nos consideren*] knowing that we’ve left our entire youth behind.”

These accounts within accounts give a sense of the confusion that surrounded people’s views on the nature of and reasons for the crisis, the possibilities open to workers and the motivations behind both company officials and union leaders. As shown in the above quotes, the word “crisis” appears in the voices in the documents themselves, as something that was apparently affecting the company and the mine, and that threatened people’s jobs and their options for the immediate future - although, as will be seen later, the veracity of this threat was also doubted by some, for it seemed to contradict the continued physical presence of the mineral. The broader crisis of the mining sector - because of which “many of the *compañeros* of the miner class [were] in the streets” - is also articulated explicitly. Beyond this, for a few years people had no doubt been hearing about - and witnessing - the larger crisis of the national

²⁵⁸ The OCLA was the government agency that supervised the *comunidades laborales*.

economy and society, beyond just mining: the hyperinflation, shortages, recession, adjustment packages, political violence, etc. In the few sections, I examine the crisis at both the national and global levels, and both in the world of mining and in the wider society and economy.

Global and national crises

The mine closures and workforce reductions of the 1980s and early 90s were part of a severe crisis in the Peruvian mining industry. The immediate trigger for this crisis was a decline in international metal prices, which in turn was connected to the global economic slowdown that began in the early-to-mid 1970s. However, the mining crisis was part of a broader economic decline in Peru as a whole, similar to that which occurred in much of Latin America and elsewhere in the Global South at this time, and which was also related to structural shifts in the world economy. In this section I will first briefly examine the movement of metal prices, before discussing the broader crisis in Peruvian economy and society during this period as well as the global shifts and long-term structural tendencies in the world economy.

Metal prices and external shocks

Latin American nations, like many of those in other world regions grouped within the “developing world” or “Global South,” tend to be “nature-exporting societies,” that is, dependent on ground rents or land-based revenues derived from the production of primary commodities (Coronil 1997, 6-7). Within this broad pattern, there are four Latin American and Caribbean nations that depended on metal mining (rather than, say, agricultural exports or oil) over the course of the 20th century: Chile, Bolivia, Peru and, in the second half of the century, Jamaica. Yet whereas Chile, Bolivia and Jamaica were each dependent on a single metal (copper, tin and bauxite, respectively), Peru had a more diversified mining sector, in which copper, zinc, lead and silver all played important roles. Moreover, barring short-term fluctuations, over the course of the 20th century metal mining accounted for around half of Peru’s exports and foreign exchange earnings (as continues to be the case today). While still characteristic of a primary commodity-dependent society, this figure was less than that for the other Latin American metal exporters (Auty 1993, 38). In general, for analysts like Auty, out of the four metal exporters Peru seemed

least vulnerable to the effects of mineral price drops at the start of the 1970s (42, 45). Yet the decline in metal prices in the 1970s and 80s was systemic enough and severe enough that it affected Peru as well. In fact, as Auty himself remarks, Peru would experience the most severe economic deterioration out of the four countries mentioned (Ibid., 8). Although this was by no means due solely to metal prices, the latter did play an important role, and they are especially important to the subject matter of this dissertation; for that reason, they merit some discussion.²⁵⁹

Over the course of the 20th century, as a long-term trend, primary commodities (often called simply “commodities” in contemporary economic parlance) tended to decline in price in relation to manufactured goods, contrary to the expectations of the classical economists (Radetzki 2008, 64-66). This gradual trend (measured before the dramatic post-2003 rise in primary commodity prices) was more pronounced for metal prices, as opposed to certain food products like coffee, tea and cocoa which tended to rise in price over the long run (Ibid.). Yet it is also a well-known fact that, within these long-term trends, the prices of primary commodities are subject to more volatile, short-term variations than those of manufactured goods. For metal prices in particular, one moment of increase that stands out within the post-World War II era is the period of the Korean War (Ibid., 67). In Peru, the strong wartime demand for metals provided strong economic support to the conservative military dictatorship of Manuel A. Odría (1948-1956), particularly in its early years. Metal prices fell in the mid-to-late 1950s, though without erasing all of their previous gains. During the 1960s they twice rose again and twice fell again, exhibiting an erratic behavior that contrasted strongly with that of oil prices, which remained stable and at a relatively low level throughout this period. This variation in metal prices in the 1960s did not yet depart significantly from the general range set in the 1950s. At the start of the 1970s there was yet another brief rise in metal prices, just as oil was beginning its fast upward climb with the “oil shock” of 1973-74.

Yet whereas oil maintained and continued to increase its price, the prices of metals soon collapsed, as a result of the worldwide recession precipitated by the oil shock (though resulting also from deeper structural causes in the advanced capitalist countries, as will be seen shortly).

²⁵⁹ In this section, it is real, rather than nominal prices that are under discussion. Real price figures, adjusted for inflation, are given by Radetzki (2008) and other sources.

This price collapse of the mid-1970s was particularly acute in the case of copper, but silver and gold prices declined as well. For metal exporters, this moment was felt as an “external shock” (Auty 1993, 48), for it combined a decrease in export revenue with an increase in the price that needed to be paid for imports of oil; to this would soon be added the increase in the interest charged on foreign debt by the banks of the developed world. In Peru, this set off a recession and a period of economic decline, which occurred around the time of the transition from the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) towards the more conservative military government of Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980).

Metal prices rose again briefly but sharply at the very end of the 1970s, especially silver (as a result of speculation by the Hunt Brothers) and gold (as a result of widespread fears of inflation and geopolitical instability after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). However, they quickly collapsed again just as dramatically, leading to a period of depressed metal prices in the 1980s; taken together, metals fell to pre-Korean War price levels (this time, unlike in the 1970s, they were joined by oil, which also fell). In Peru, the price collapse of the early 1980s set off a first wave of mine closures which affected the small mines in particular. Furthermore, according to Auty, the price rises of 1979-80 had led Peruvian policymakers to make unrealistic predictions regarding future revenues, leading them to delay needed stabilization measures, which had a negative impact on the economy once the prices collapsed again (Auty 97). At the end of the 1980s, the global prices of certain metals would experience a brief and modest increase; however, by this time the chaotic economic and political situation in Peru prevented the country from taking advantage of this price rise, and so the national mining crisis continued. Peruvian mining began to recover in the 1990s, due to the generous incentives and privileges granted to foreign investors by the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), which brought an influx of foreign capital to the country. A modest recovery in metal prices during the middle of the decade collapsed again as a result of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. It was only in 2003 that a new period of sustained, large-scale increases in metal prices began, this time spurred above all by the industrialization of China. This trend was interrupted by the financial crisis of 2008, but has since managed to rebound.

Thus, to sum up, the period from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s can be seen as one long era of depressed metal prices, interrupted by a sharp but illusory rise in 1979-80 and by modest and short-lived increases in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, until a new era of high prices began in 2003 (as it did for primary commodities in general). Obviously, world mining did not disappear during the 30-year period of low prices, but it went through a process of restructuring and transformation. In Peru, the 1980s in particular were the period of “mining crisis” (*crisis minera*), in which small mines closed and medium- and large-scale mines eventually laid off or retired most of their workers, setting the stage for the restructuring of the 1990s.

Crisis and the Global South

While the trajectory of metal prices is an important part of the story traced here, it is not the whole story. Like other prices in the capitalist market, metal prices are both the expression and the proximate cause (i.e. the conduit) of structural forces in the world economy. As we saw, the first drop in metal prices in the mid-1970s was the immediate result of a recession in the industrialized world. Although the recession was precipitated by the OPEC-instigated “oil shock” of 1973-74, this only accelerated a process of deceleration of economic growth and of structural shifts in the world economic order that had begun at the end of the 1960s.²⁶⁰ The U.S. abandonment of the gold standard, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the “oil shock,” the U.S. “stagflation” of the 1970s and the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal economic policy across much of the world were all key moments in this transformation. They marked the end of what Hobsbawm (1994) called the “Golden Age”: the period of high, sustained growth in the industrialized capitalist nations (and, coincidentally, also in the Soviet Union) that lasted from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1970s. The last quarter of the 20th century would see a continued increase in world wealth, but growth would be slower than before, and it would be punctuated by repeated recessions and by structural shifts such as financialization, labor restructuring and a heightened dominance by capital and market forces across the world.

²⁶⁰ Kliman (2012, 59) argues that the OPEC oil shock was motivated not only by the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 but also by a desire to reverse the decline in oil revenues in terms of gold that had resulted from the rapid depreciation of the dollar relative to that metal in the late 1960s and early 70s. By contrast, Coronil (1997) sees the policies of OPEC states in the late 1960s and early 70s as related rather “to their political consolidation as sovereign states in the domestic and international arenas and to the development of specific state capacities” (55).

It is important to note, however, that the history of crises and booms of the last century looks different from the perspective of Latin America and other parts of the “developing world” than it does from the vantage point of North America and Europe. In the United States, the “Great Recession” that began with the financial crisis of 2008 is commonly described as the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The late 20th century, by comparison, yields a more mixed record, characterized by the recessions of the mid-1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s, as well as by phenomena such as deindustrialization and the rise of the “Rust Belt,” but also by the recovery of the mid-1980s and the long expansion and dot-com bubble of the 1990s. Vast sectors of the U.S. economy expanded during these decades, particularly finance, information technologies and defense; this to some degree neutralizes the memory of the economic dislocations of the 1970s, by contrast with the generalized sense of gloom that has taken hold after 2008. Similarly, the post-2008 crisis has affected Europe profoundly, even if it is the relatively weaker economies in the continent (i.e. Greece, Spain, etc.) that have been hardest hit.

By contrast, in most of Latin America it is the “lost decade” of the 1980s that stand out as the moment of the worst economic and social crisis in recent historical memory. The Great Depression of the 1930s, which so affected North America and Europe, did have a significant impact on Latin America, both economically and politically, but it was not as traumatic as the 1980s. The contrast between South and North is even greater when it comes to the post-2008 crisis, which has caused only a temporary halt to the Latin American economic growth that has been ongoing since the early-to-mid 2000s. As large parts of Europe have stagnated, Latin America has boomed, on the basis of primary commodity exports to the ascendant Chinese economy. Under the tutelage of mostly left-of-center, and a few right-of-center governments, Latin American GDP per capita has climbed in the last few years, reversing the (economic) losses of the 1980s, although without yet catching up to the crisis-ridden countries of Europe, let alone the United States.

Thus, it is important historically to zoom in on the late 1970s and 80s as a period not just of global restructuring, but also, for Latin America, as a moment of economic and social crisis comparable perhaps to the impact that the Great Depression had on the industrialized world. This

came at the same time as a similar, even more catastrophic crisis in Africa (a much poorer region to begin with, in monetary terms) – what Leys, Arrighi and others have called the “African Tragedy” (Arrighi 2002, 5). These simultaneous declines in Latin America and Africa led to a widening of the North-South divide at the time and to a crisis in the post-World War II development paradigm, even as one “Third World” region, East Asia, was actually improving economically. As Arrighi writes about the years from 1975 to 1990,

In this period a sharp bifurcation developed between the deteriorating performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and to a lesser extent the Middle East and North Africa, on the one hand, and the improving performance of East and South Asia on the other. The African collapse was a particularly extreme manifestation of this divergence (Arrighi 2002, 16).

Just like the decline in metal and other primary commodity prices (except oil) in the mid-1970s was a direct consequence of the economic recession in the industrialized world, the generalized crisis in Latin America and Africa in the late 1970s and 80s was also linked to the economic slowdown at the heart of the capitalist system. Falling commodity prices were one immediate reason for the decline of these countries, since they tended to be heavily dependent on primary exports. Another link that became increasingly important after 1979 was the fact that the United States responded to the economic slowdown and inflation of the 1970s by adopting monetarist policies and raising interest rates – i.e. the “Volcker shock,” after Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (Harvey 2005, 23). As is widely known, this triggered the Latin American and African Debt Crises, affecting two regions that, unlike Asia, had become heavily dependent on foreign borrowing in the 1960s and 70s. The interest payments owed by Latin American and African countries increased dramatically, during a period in which their export incomes were diminishing, thus pushing them towards insolvency.

The rise in interest rates was a response to inflation, but, as Arrighi argues, its effect was also to attract capital towards the United States and away from the rest of the world. Thus the U.S. went from being an important source of foreign direct investment to becoming “the world’s main debtor nation” (Arrighi 2003, 21). Debt was used to underwrite a trade and current account deficit and reinvigorate domestic demand; it financed the import of manufactured goods that were no longer profitable to produce in the U.S. Unlike Third World debtor nations, the size, power and prestige of the U.S. economy meant that the magnitude of its debts would not cause

its status as a safe borrower to be questioned, and capital would continue to flow in. As Arrighi writes, the shift in capital flows towards the United States was likely “the single most important determinant of the contemporaneous [positive] reversal in the economic fortunes of North America and the bifurcation of the economic fortunes of Third World regions” (Ibid., 22). For historical reasons that he explores, East Asian countries were best positioned to become labor-intensive manufacturers for the U.S. market in the 1980s (producing what the U.S. used to produce), while Africa (and Latin America) was simply left bereft of capital, saddled with high interest payments and low export earnings. In a sense, it can be said that, through the mechanism of monetarist policy, the U.S. externalized part of the crisis of the 1970s towards Latin America and Africa.

The origins of capitalist crises

If falling commodity prices and the new monetarist policy formed a causal link that led from the crisis at the core of the capitalist system to the decline of Latin America and Africa during this period, the reasons for the capitalist crisis itself remain to be addressed. The “oil shock” of 1973 was only the most immediate cause of the mid-1970s recession. As Harvey (2005) argues, monetarism and neoliberalism more broadly were a response to the increasing inability of Keynesian policy to deal with the emerging crisis of capitalist accumulation that had become evident by the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s. To recognize that neoliberalism was a highly skewed response, one which served to ensure a “restoration of class power” (rather than, say, a revolutionary solution), should not lead us to ignore the fact that the crisis was real, and that, as Harvey argues, “Keynesian policies were no longer working” (Harvey 2005, 12).

Analyzing the source of economic crises has been a central concern of Marxist theory. It is not my purpose here to conduct a full review of the literature on the origins of crises, but rather only to point out what I find to be the most relevant and significant points. One of the most important, but also most controversial elements in Marx’s analysis of capitalism was his belief in a “progressive tendency for the general rate of profit to fall” (Marx 1991, 319). The Law of the Tendency to Fall in the Rate of Profit (LTFRP), as it came to be known, was a necessary consequence of Marx’s theory of value and of the fact that capitalism tended towards the

replacement of labor by machines through technological advance. For this reason, I will briefly explain both the theory of value and the effects of technological change on the rate of profit.

Marx adopted the labor theory of value from Smith and Ricardo, who had sought to direct attention to human work and effort, not land or the hoarding of bullion (as with the physiocrats and early mercantilists, respectively), as the most important source of wealth (Foley 2006, 12). Marx modified their theory by drawing a distinction between value and wealth (with only the former coming solely from labor, and from the most abstract aspects of labor at that), and by circumscribing the applicability of the labor theory of value to the capitalist mode of production only, rather than human society in general.²⁶¹ Other factors besides labor (like, say, machines or raw materials) may embody, store and transmit value, but they cannot create new value. They may indirectly shape the production of new value (by increasing labor productivity and thus the amount of relative surplus-value produced), but labor must be directly present at the moment of production for new value to be generated. In other words, only labor can directly turn into surplus-value, and thus into profit and capital; to participate in the production and reproduction of capital, other factors have to be mediated by labor.

However, all this is true only in an abstract and aggregate sense. In the short run, and in any one specific case, it is possible to generate higher profits, or to fight the tendency towards the lowering of profits, by cutting costs and boosting productivity through the replacement of labor by machinery -which is why technological change is pursued. Yet soon enough, all firms adopt the new technological innovation, and they compete with one another to cut prices, which they can do since they now produce each item more cheaply. In this way, the same amount of value is now spread out over a larger number of cheaper goods, erasing the original gains as far as value is concerned. Yet the proportion of constant capital (i.e. capital spent on machinery and raw materials) to labor has risen, raising costs without increasing surplus value produced, thus putting a squeeze on profits.²⁶² In more concrete terms, we can say that, although technical

²⁶¹ The distinction between value and wealth has often been forgotten or neglected by both proponents and critics of Marxist theory. For an account that clearly maintains and dwells on this distinction, see Coronil (1997).

²⁶² Actually, technological change resulting in the mass production of cheap goods can lead to an increase in surplus value, in the sense that surplus labor increases in relation to necessary labor. Although the worker may have many more goods than before, the fact that those goods are cheap means that the reproduction of the worker now represents a smaller proportion of the total effort (i.e. value) of the society. A higher proportion of that effort is now

change may increase profits in the short-run, the resulting fall in the prices of the products cancels out those early benefits, while the high cost incurred for machinery must be accounted for.²⁶³ The result is a tendency for the rate of profit to decrease. In other words, capitalism contains a contradiction: it encourages technological progress, but this displaces labor which is ultimately the source of value, surplus-value, profit and capital itself. The result is the proclivity of capitalism to recurring crises.

Marx's LTFRP is thus in a sense based on the tension between the short-run and the long-term, between the individual and the systemic, and between the aid that technology initially provides to profit-making, and the high cost of that technology. It is important to remark, however, that Marx did not argue that profits are constantly falling. There is a tendency for them to do so assuming all else is equal, but capital finds ways to fight this through a variety of "counteracting factors," including such things as innovations to reduce the cost of raw materials and machinery, a more intense exploitation of labor, or foreign trade, among others. But the very fact that new methods must be constantly sought is an indication of the LTFRP at work, and their pursuit drives much of the course of the capitalist economy.

This theory has not found complete acceptance even among Marxist theorists. Both value theory and the LTFRP based on it have been among the areas of Marx's work that have come under the heaviest attack from mainstream economics (which accused them of internal inconsistencies), and they are the issues on which Marxists have tended to cede the most ground. Certainly, Marxists have been interested in accounting for economic crises, but they have tended to place more emphasis on explanations like overproduction and underconsumption, which may be related to the LTFRP but are not the same thing. In recent years, a new group of Marxist economists, such as Kliman (2007), have sought to reassert the validity and consistency of

surplus-value and can thus turn in to profit. This is the theory of relative surplus value (as opposed to absolute surplus value which is the lengthening of the working day), another central component of Marx's analysis, and one that helps to explain the relative disempowerment of workers in society even as their material wealth increases. However, relative surplus value does not lead to an increase in the total amount of value produced in relation to the capital invested in machinery and raw materials. In fact, it is predicated on a decrease of capital invested in labor and thus in the production of new value (v) relative to capital invested in machinery which transmits a fixed amount of value but does not create new value – in other words, the LTFRP, which thus reasserts itself in the long term.

²⁶³ On this specific point, I am influenced by the Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) discussed in Kliman (2007) – see below.

Marx's value theory and the LFTRP, through what they call the Temporal Single-System Interpretation (TSSI).²⁶⁴ In a later book, Kliman (2012) has shifted to an empirical analysis of profit rates and economic crises in the U.S., with a focus on the underlying causes of the Great Recession of 2008, but also extending back to the decades immediately following World War II. His work is in part a polemic against what he calls "the conventional Left account," with its focus on neoliberalism, financialization and rising inequality rather than on what he sees as the more important story: the "frailty of capitalist production" (Kliman 2012, 2) and the tendency of the profit rate to decline.

Kliman argues, following Marx, that one of the main ways in which the LFTRP can be reversed is through a decline in capital values (or, sometimes, the destruction of physical assets themselves); such destruction of value may cause great suffering, but it paradoxically serves to restore profitability and set the stage for a new boom (Ibid., 3). This would have been what happened after the large-scale destruction of capital value during the Great Depression and the destruction of physical assets during World War II, both of which led to increased profit rates and the great boom of the quarter-century after the war. Profit rates remained high through the middle of the 1950s and then began to decline, though the consequences of this for economic growth would not become evident till the 1970s. When the economic troubles of the 1970s hit, however, monetary and fiscal policies prevented a large-scale destruction of capital value in the U.S. such as had occurred during the Great Depression. The result was that the rate of profit never really recovered, and thus no new boom occurred, the dot-com and real-estate bubbles of the 1990s and 2000s notwithstanding. This frail state of capitalist production eventually led to

²⁶⁴ The TSSI proposes that the charges of inconsistency were based on a failure to note two key, interrelated aspects of Marx's theory: 1) the prices of inputs, not their values, enter into the determination of a product's value. The value that inputs transfer to the product is not the labor-time required to produce them (i.e. their value), but rather the labor-time required to produce the money with which to buy them. In other words, price and value, though often at variance with one another, are tightly interconnected, rather than existing on two different planes; prices go into the determination of commodities' value and surplus-value. 2) From this it follows that what matters when determining the rate of profit is not the replacement cost of inputs at the time of production, but rather their original replacement cost at the time they were purchased. The value of an input may go down over time (because value is socially, not individually determined), but the value that input transfers to the product is equal to the value originally laid out in its purchase. TSSI proponents such as Kliman (2007) argue that Marx himself agreed with these two points and included them as part of his theory (if one reads correctly), and that recognizing them eliminates the supposed internal inconsistencies in his theory of value and in the law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit.

the Great Recession of 2008 and subsequently to the “new normal,” i.e. the state of “not-quite recession” that the U.S. is now going through (Ibid., 2).

More important to the subject matter of this chapter, however, is the cause of the decline in the profit rate which led to the economic troubles of the 1970s (and to the subsequent frail state of capitalist production). Kliman believes that the data are consistent with Marx’s argument that cost-reducing technical change exerts downward pressure on the profit rate. Based on his various quantitative analyses, he concludes that around 89% of the decline in the profit rate observed between the end of World War II and the Great Recession of 2008 was due to the rise in the value composition of capital (i.e. the ratio of capital invested in machinery and raw materials to capital invested in the hiring of labor) (Ibid., 130).

On the other hand, Harvey (2010) critiques those who seek to find “one dominant explanation” for capitalist crises. He acknowledges the substance of Marx’s LTFRP, but seems to regard it as too abstract, given that Marx himself listed a whole series of factors that are brought into play to counteract the negative impact of technological change on the profit rate: “this list is so long that it renders the neat explanation for a solid ‘law’ of falling profits as a mechanical response to labor-saving technological innovation a little moot” (Harvey 2010, 94). Rather, Harvey sees a whole set of potential limits or barriers to capital:

Money capital scarcities, labor problems, disproportionalities between sectors, natural limits, unbalanced technological and organizational changes (including competition versus monopoly), indiscipline in the labor process and lack of effective demand head up the list. Any one of these circumstances can slow down or disrupt the continuity of capital flow and so produce a crisis that results in the devaluation or loss of capital (Ibid., 17).

When one of these limits is overcome, capital eventually encounters a new one; the solution to crisis in one generation often becomes the source of crisis in the next. In fact, for Harvey “crises are, in short, as necessary to the evolution of capitalism as money, labor power and capital itself” (Ibid.). In terms for accounting historically for the specific crisis of the 1970s, in his recent writings Harvey has been much more interested in analyzing the response that resulted from this crisis (neoliberalism) rather than the origins of the decline itself. One area on which he tends to dwell is the significant power and clout of organized labor in the industrialized

world by the 1960s and early 70s, and the way in which it posed a barrier to profits and capital accumulation that was eventually overcome through the attack on unions and the “restoration of class power” that neoliberalism entailed.

Whichever viewpoint we adopt, it is clear that by the 1970s, the crisis-prone nature of capitalism had manifested itself in the industrialized world, leading not just to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system but also to a particular vulnerability to an external trigger like the oil shock of 1973. The resulting recession led to a decline in commodity prices (other than oil), and the phenomenon of stagflation led the U.S. to adopt monetarist policies and raise interest rates, triggering a debt crisis in the Global South and drawing capital back towards the North. These developments resulted in a simultaneous crisis across most Latin American and African countries. I do not mean to imply that the trajectories of these countries during these years were purely a function of forces emanating from the industrialized world; they were not. Rather, I think it is important to counter the silencing of the global that tends to occur in countries like Peru, where social phenomena are almost always explained in terms of strictly national factors, ignoring the fact that similar situations are found across much of Latin America and even other continents. Besides, it is true that during these years countries of the Global South were subject to frequent external shocks – whether shifting commodity prices, changing interest rates, and IMF-mandated austerity and structural adjustment packages that were presented as a solution to the crisis. That said, it is important to remark that the different conditions of each country, as well as the ways in which they responded to the new conjuncture, shaped their respective outcomes. For that reason, I now turn to an examination of the economic, social and political crisis of the 1970s and 80s from the national perspective of Peru.

Crisis at the national level

The post-World War II economic trajectory of Peru was different from that of many other South American countries, which at the time were pursuing policies of import substitution industrialization (ISI), protecting their economies to encourage the growth of national industry. Peru, by contrast, had a liberal, laissez-faire, export-led orientation, renewed and reinforced under the conservative military government of Manuel A. Odría (1948-1956). As Thorp and Bertram (1978) write, in their authoritative study, the two decades following Odría’s ascension

to power in 1948 were “a remarkable twenty-year period of total integration into the international system, with complete commitment to the rules of the game” (205). The aristocratic civilian president who succeeded Odría, Manuel Prado Ugarteche (1956-1962) maintained these policies. The country grew rapidly during these years through the export of metals, sugar, cotton and fishmeal (and, to a lesser degree, oil), with GNP expanding 4.7% a year from 1950 to 1959, 8.8% per year from 1960 to 1962, and 3.9% per year from 1963 to 1968 (Ibid., 205). By the late 1960s, however, balance-of-payment difficulties (and the resulting problems of deficit and inflation) had developed, and structural bottlenecks had begun to appear in the economy. Export sectors like fishing, sugar and cotton had reached their maximum productive capacity and begun to stagnate, while only mining – which was largely in the hands of foreign capital – seemed capable of expansion. As Thorp and Bertram argue, “Peru, after nearly a century as one of the most diversified export economies in the continent, showed signs of becoming a virtual mono-export economy, dependent upon the mining sector” (Ibid., 287).

More seriously, the deeply unequal distribution of resources, wealth and power in the country were creating significant social problems. Peru was not completely devoid of progressive tendencies; it had had a relatively advanced social legislation and a system of rights and protections for workers in the formal sector – what Drinot (2011) has called the “labor state” – since the first half of the 20th century. Moreover, as De la Cadena (2000) has shown, the Peruvian state had a discourse of protectionism, however shallow, towards the country’s indigenous population (as opposed to a discourse of *mestizaje* and assimilation found in some Latin American countries). But the country also had a deeply conservative ruling oligarchy and a society plagued by severe racism and profoundly hierarchical, often caste-like relations. The distribution of the benefits derived from export-led economic growth was highly skewed; furthermore, a significant share of those benefits accrued to foreign investors who held sway over some of the most profitable sectors of the national economy. The largest anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist (though explicitly non-Marxist) party in Peru, the APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), had suffered ferocious persecution under several conservative governments (Sánchez Cerro, Benavides, Odría) from the 1930s through the 1950s. A 3-year period of greater political opening under José Bustamante y Rivero (1945-48), who governed in an uneasy alliance with the APRA, had ended with Odría’s 1948 coup. APRA leadership finally

shifted towards a more conservative stance around the middle of the 1950s. Yet as late as 1962, the military had conducted a coup and assumed power for one year so as to cancel a presidential election in which the APRA, with which it had a particularly bad relationship, had won the highest number of votes.

Table 1 – Peruvian Heads of State, 1919-2013

| | |
|--------------|---|
| 1919-1930 | Augusto B. Leguía |
| 1930-1931 | Junta presided by Lt. Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro |
| 1931-1933 | Lt. Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro |
| 1933-1939 | General Óscar R. Benavides |
| 1939-1945 | Manuel Prado Ugarteche |
| 1945-1948 | José Luis Bustamante y Rivero |
| 1948-1956 | General Manuel A. Odría |
| 1956-1962 | Manuel Prado Ugarteche (2 nd term) |
| 1962-1963 | Junta presided by General Ricardo Pérez Godoy |
| 1963-1968 | Fernando Belaúnde Terry |
| 1968-1975 | General Juan Velasco Alvarado (Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces) |
| 1975-1980 | General Francisco Morales Bermúdez |
| 1980-1985 | Fernando Belaúnde Terry (2 nd term) |
| 1985-1990 | Alan García Pérez |
| 1990-2000 | Alberto Fujimori (“self-coup” and suspension of constitutional order in 1992) |
| 2000-2001 | Valentín Paniagua (provisional government) |
| 2001-2006 | Alejandro Toledo Manrique |
| 2006-2011 | Alan García Pérez (2 nd term) |
| 2011-present | Ollanta Humala Tasso |

In the countryside, conflicts increasingly pitted hacienda owners both against their workers and the surrounding communities that claimed the same land. Although studies

conducted in the 1960s may have overestimated the degree of land concentration, particularly in the highlands, there is little doubt that both land distribution and working conditions on the estates had become explosive social issues in several parts of the country. At the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, separate peasant movements and land recuperation campaigns in the southern highlands (Cuzco) and the central highlands (Pasco and Junín) brought the issue of land to the forefront of the national agenda. In the country as a whole, the ruling elite, long accustomed to a cheap workforce and to hierarchical, deferential social relations, was unwilling to accept the new expectations of popular and peasant sectors – expectations that sometimes were the consequence of modernization and capitalist development itself.

The 1963 presidential elections brought to power Fernando Belaúnde, a centrist reformist sympathetic to John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Belaúnde had promised an Agrarian Reform, and was famous for having traveled over all of Peru, gaining significant support in the countryside. But his reforms were thwarted by the staunch opposition of the congressional majority, composed of a strange alliance between the formerly revolutionary APRA and its old persecutor, the UNO party of former dictator Odría, which represented the interests of the landed oligarchy. Frustration grew with the slow pace of the reforms and with the emerging economic problems mentioned earlier. World events also made their influence felt, with the Cuban Revolution inspiring short-lived guerrilla movements in Peru in 1963 and 1965, and with revolutionary and leftist ideas on the rise worldwide. Under these conditions, the military overthrew Belaúnde in a bloodless coup in 1968.

The 1968 coup has been variously interpreted as driven by the army's desire to thwart a possible APRA victory in the presidential elections programmed for 1969, or as motivated by the desire to speed up the anti-oligarchic structural reforms that the country needed if it was to avoid an all-out revolution. Others point to the emerging nationalist and radical orientation of a new generation of military officers. Whatever the case, the leader of the coup, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, surprised the country by adopting a radical rhetoric and program, making his government a rare case in Latin America of a left-leaning military regime. Famously declaring "Peasant, the landlord will no longer eat your poverty!" Velasco set about expropriating large estates around the whole country and conducting what has sometimes been described as the most

radical agrarian reform in Latin America outside of Cuba, even if significant problems arose around the question of how to distribute the expropriated lands.

In the industrial, mine and fishing sectors, Velasco created the “industrial communities” (*comunidades laborales* or *comunidades industriales*), mechanisms by which workers in medium and large enterprises would share in the profits as well as in management, and would progressively acquire more of the company’s capital until they became co-owners. He also reinforced the labor stability regime, making it very difficult to fire workers, thus aiding unionization efforts. During this time, the government pursued policies encouraging import-substitution industrialization (ISI), which had begun more tentatively under Belaúnde, and which encouraged the formation of national industries and limited imports of finished goods. Such policies were similar to those that other Latin American countries had been implementing for some time, with the aim of breaking with the region’s traditional role as an exporter of raw materials, with its attendant problems of deteriorating terms of trade, vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, and a general lack of development. Furthermore, Velasco nationalized several of the largest foreign companies in Peru, such as the International Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil), the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Marcona Mining Company (Peru’s sole iron producer). The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, as the Velasco regime was known, adopted as a symbol the figure of the 18th-century indigenous rebel leader Túpac Amaru II, and made Quechua and Aymara official languages, at least on paper.

Although not repressive in the same sense as the right-wing military dictatorships that emerged elsewhere in Latin America during the 1970s, Velasco’s government was top-down and bureaucratic. Though it promoted the growth of popular organizations, it also sought to control them through mechanisms such as SINAMOS (National System of Social Mobilization), and it placed military men in most cabinet positions. The former landed oligarchy despised Velasco for having broken their power, but some sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie benefitted from his challenge to foreign capital and his promotion of national industry, and actually cooperated with the regime. The APRA party, which had had bad relations with the military ever since a 1932 uprising, resented Velasco for copying much of their original anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist program, and for keeping them out of power once again. Many of the parties of the Marxist left,

which were undergoing a period of growth and radicalization at this time, were ambivalent towards if not deeply suspicious of Velasco and his military regime, labeling it variously as “corporatist” or even “fascist.” Only the Moscow-aligned branch of the Peruvian Communist Party (PC-Unidad) openly supported the government. The labor, peasant and popular movements supported the general aim of Velasco’s reforms, but also sought their own autonomy against the bureaucratic control of the military regime, and sometimes clashed with the latter, for example in a 1971 strike at the Cobriza copper mine which left five workers dead.

Its bureaucratic and authoritarian methods notwithstanding, the Velasco regime had sought to implement structural reforms that had been widely perceived as necessary, and to break with the country’s oligarchic tradition and bring greater equality and national autonomy. Yet in so doing, it risked clashing with criteria of economic efficiency, the autonomy and supremacy of which was about to be asserted with greater force than ever before around the world. Most of Velasco’s government was not yet felt as a time of economic crisis, as world commodity prices were on the rise until 1974, and as foreign banks continued to lend the country large sums of money, encouraged by the excess liquidity generated by the oil boom (i.e. oil nations deposited their petrodollars in foreign banks that then loaned them out to governments). But like elsewhere in Latin America, in the short run import-substitution industrialization policies actually generated a greater dependence on imports, namely imports of industrial inputs and capital goods to be used in the new industries. Since exports did not grow at the same rate, this generated a current-account deficit that, like the fiscal deficit brought on by the growth in government bureaucracy, was settled through the acquisition of more loans from the foreign banks (Parodi 2008, 132-135). All this had already begun occurring somewhat under Belaúnde’s more modest reforms, but it accelerated under Velasco.

The economic inefficiencies of this period became more evident when the mid-1970s recession in the industrialized world brought down copper and other metal prices, reducing export income that was already stretched thin. As Auty writes, “the mid-1970s mineral price decline forced the Peruvian military government to retreat from its role as the motor of the economy” (Auty 1993, 94). Yet this also required the political change that occurred when, in August 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez overthrew General Velasco. The latter had

previously been weakened by illness and by the police strike and street riots of February 5, 1975. Also, ideological fissures had been developing within the military, not all of which agreed with the leftward direction of Velasco's reforms. Although Morales Bermúdez had been Velasco's minister, and although he called his government the "Second Phase" of the revolution, he actually halted the further development of the reforms that had been underway. Morales Bermúdez altered the regime of industrial communities, crippling their growth, and halted the redistribution of land (although some land seizures continued independently, under the direction of peasant organizations and the radical Left).

Furthermore, the new government sought to address the balance-of-payment and fiscal deficit problems through structural adjustment, a type of policy then being promoted by the IMF that sought to stabilize economies by reducing domestic demand to cut inflation and fiscal deficits (effectively causing a recession) and by devaluing currencies to promote exports and reduce imports. At the time, these "orthodox" policies, as they were also called, were being implemented in Chile by the Pinochet dictatorship. In Peru, regime raised gasoline prices, reduced food subsidies (essentially raising food prices) and set limits on wage increases. At first, the adjustment policies in Peru were a lot milder than those of Chile, as the government sought intermediate solutions through negotiations over new loan/adjustment packages through private banks rather than the IMF (Parodi 2008, 141-146). By 1978, however, as these initial austerity packages failed to deliver results, the Peruvian government would sign an agreement with the IMF to implement further measures under its direction.

Even the early adjustment packages provoked deep opposition from the unions and the Left, both of which had expanded during the Velasco years. From the perspective of the Morales Bermúdez government, the austerity measures were a necessity imposed by the realities of deficit and inflation and by conditions set by foreign lenders. From the perspective of the Left, which still had socialism as a goal on the horizon, the adjustment packages were further evidence of capitalism's attack on workers and the poor. Thus, from a position of ambivalence towards Velasco, the Left parties passed into one of unambiguous opposition to Morales Bermúdez's government, as the latter abandoned the earlier reforms. Moreover, the latter half of the 1970s became the period of greatest strike activity in the country's history, as the unions reacted to

declining real wages and the austerity measures in general. On June 10, 1977, the Finance Minister, a well-known businessman appointed by the military government, announced further rises in gasoline and food prices and a devaluation of the currency. The response came in the form of a series of mobilizations and disturbances around the country and finally the massive General Strike of July 19, 1977, the largest strike in Peruvian history up to that time, with the participation not only of the different workers' centrals but also of university students, popular and regional organizations, and poor neighborhoods in the cities (Valladares 2007). The government retaliated by issuing a special decree authorizing the dismissal of workers who had led and participated in the action, leading to the firing of 5,000 workers, many of them key union leaders and activists. Yet the strike had weakened the government politically, and so Morales Bermúdez felt compelled to announce elections for a new Constituent Assembly as well as the handing over of power to a civilian government in 1980. Another large general strike occurred on May 22-23, 1978; similarly, that year, the teachers and the mining workers both staged the largest strikes in their history up to that time (Sulmont 1979, 31-32).

Although it waned somewhat after 1979, the strike wave of the late 1970s had placed some limits on the intensity of the austerity measures that could be applied. While there was certainly repression in Peru under Morales Bermúdez, the government's hold over society was nowhere near as total as in Pinochet's Chile. From a perspective that emphasizes economic orthodoxy above all, this meant that austerity measures were not at the level needed to reduce the structural imbalances in the economy in the long run. However, it wasn't only social pressure that complicated the imposition of economic rationality. It was also the brief but sharp 1979-1980 commodity price rise (which had resulted from global political events as well as speculation on the world market), as well as contradictions within the orthodox, liberal position itself. Policymakers were concerned above all with controlling the inflation that they believed would stem from the mineral price climb, so they pegged the Peruvian sol to the U.S. dollar from 1979 to 1982. When the dollar appreciated during the early years of the Reagan presidency, this accelerated "Dutch disease" in the non-mining sectors, more than would likely have been the case otherwise (Auty 1993, 98). At the same time, the government pursued a program of trade liberalization, reducing import quotas and lowering tariffs. As Auty writes, the "optimistic interlude" in mineral prices "lasted long enough to encourage a lethal combination of a pegged

exchange rate and more outward-oriented policies” (Ibid.). This combination would ruin the nascent Peruvian manufacturing sector in the early 1980s, which could no longer compete with foreign imports, much less compete on the world market.

By this time, power had been transferred back to civilian hands, with Fernando Belaúnde’s AP (Acción Popular) party winning the 1980 elections. A moderate reformist during his first term in the 1960s, Belaúnde retained significant popularity. By now, however, he had grown more conservative, and he formed a coalition with the PPC (Christian Popular Party), a conservative middle-class party. Yet although he continued the orthodox policies of the Morales Bermúdez period in terms of trade liberalization and the removal of subsidies, he also boosted public spending on infrastructure and other projects, in the belief that the high metal prices of 1979-1980 would continue. When prices collapsed, the trade deficit rose again, as did the fiscal deficit and the foreign debt (which had to finance government spending). This occurred just as interest rates were increasing due to U.S. Federal Reserve policy. Thus, after 1983 Peru could no longer pay all of the interest it owed, limiting further lending from the foreign private banks although not yet from the IMF, which made more loans on the condition of new austerity packages. The middle of the Belaúnde period, around 1982-83, was a time of recession and economic trouble. Towards the end of his presidency in 1985, some macroeconomic indicators had improved, but by then per capita incomes were below 1972 levels, half the workforce was officially underemployed and inflation was approaching 200% (Ibid., 103). This served to discredit the center-right (Belaúnde’s AP) and right (his governing partner the PPC), and paved the way for the APRA and the Marxist left (grouped in the *Izquierda Unida* or United Left coalition) to dispute the 1985 elections.

From its origins as a persecuted revolutionary and anti-oligarchic party in the 1930s and 40s, the APRA had swung towards the center and even the center-right after the mid-1950s, allying itself with Odría’s conservative UNO party in the 1960s. Yet by the late 1970s it had swung again towards the center-left, this time aligning itself ideologically with European Social Democracy. Since the party’s historic leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre had died in 1979, the candidate in 1985 was the young Alan García, a charismatic politician and gifted orator. After defeating the candidate of the Marxist left, the mayor of Lima Alfonso Barrantes, García

embarked on a “heterodox” program away from the “orthodox” neoliberal policies encouraged by the IMF, and towards structuralist and pro-growth remedies. This is not surprising given not only the APRA’s anti-oligarchic roots but also the fact that neoliberalism and orthodoxy had become discredited in Peru after years of austerity measures had failed to control inflation or reactivate the economy, while reducing the real income of much of the population. García’s team attributed inflation to cost push factors and inflationary expectations rather than to fiscal deficits (Parodi 2008, 206-207, Auty 2003, 103). Thus, they sought to reduce inflationary expectations by freezing prices, while raising wages and lowering indirect taxes to increase demand, which would not only stimulate growth but also mop up unused capacity and reduce cost push pressures (Auty, 103). At the same time, García attacked the IMF and capped debt interest payments at 10% of export income; this was supposed to free up more resources to finance the economic stimulus, but it also alienated the IMF, which declared Peru ineligible for future loans.

For the first year and a half, the government’s policies yielded an increase in GDP and in real incomes. Yet it soon became clear that the fiscal deficit was growing, due to increased subsidies and reduced indirect taxes; the current account deficit was also increasing, due to the increased domestic demand for imports which resulted from the economic stimulus, and which was not balanced by an increase in exports. Since foreign loans were no longer an option, the government increasingly had to rely on the consumption of the country’s foreign currency reserves and on the printing of more money. García attempted to address these problems by coordinating a program of investment and production with the heads of national business groups (known as the Twelve Apostles), so as to give real economic substance to his stimulus. But the Peruvian business class by and large preferred to send their profits overseas rather than invest them in unstable Peru, and so García gradually moved into a position of open confrontation with the national bourgeoisie. This political conflict was partly shaped by García’s erratic governing style. In July 1987, he decreed the nationalization of the banks, so that the government would be able to manage the country’s financial resources and facilitate credit to productive sectors of the economy. Neither the Left (a potential ally in this case) nor the members of his own party had been alerted to this sudden and radical move, generating confusion and doubt. The bankers and the Right, on the other hand, responded in a well-organized fashion and took to the streets. Led by Mario Vargas Llosa, Peru’s most famous writer and a man of strongly free-market views, the

movement against the nationalization of the banks initiated a new era of neoliberal ideological ascendancy in the country that in a sense continues to this day.²⁶⁵ In the face of this challenge, the García government had to backtrack on the nationalization of the banks.

Similarly, in light of the growing deficit, rising inflation and the imbalances in the economy, by the end of 1997 García had accepted that a return to austerity measures was inevitable. Thus, in 1988, the government issued three separate adjustment packages, each of which raised the prices of gasoline, electricity, rice and other foodstuffs by a much larger margin than salary increases, effectively cutting real wages. Due to their limited nature, as well as to the increasingly violent situation in the country, these austerity measures did not succeed in cutting inflation and increasing government revenue; as Parodi writes, it was an “adjustment without stabilization” (Parodi, 220). The heterodox experiment of 1985-87 ended in a crash: GDP fell by 9% in 1988 and 10% in 1989 (Auty 2003, 106). Between 1987 and 1989, the average real income in Lima fell by two-thirds; for the country as a whole, between 1988 and 1990 GDP per capita fell by a third, returning to levels from 30 years earlier (Verdera 2007). Hyperinflation took hold between September 1988 and April 1989, just as the impact of the austerity measures, including the real wage cuts, was being felt. The result was a massive increase in poverty. According to one study, the poverty rate rose from 43.1% in 1986 to 59% in 1991, while “extreme poverty” rose from 18.4% to 24.2% in the same period. In the rural highlands, “extreme poverty” rose by 22 percentage points, from 32.3 % to 54.5% (Verdera 2007, 113-116). These figures would not be significantly reduced until after the new period of economic growth that began in 2003.

The latter years of the García government would thus be remembered as a time of particularly acute economic crisis and general social breakdown, within the longer arc of the crisis that had begun in the mid-1970s and that was common to most of Latin America (and, as we saw earlier, Africa). By the early 1990s, malnutrition in Peru had risen to one of the highest levels in Latin America (Ibid., 183-184), and some social indicators were beginning to approach the levels of traditionally poorer countries like Nicaragua or Haiti. A large cholera outbreak in

²⁶⁵ Although this movement would be unable to win the 1990 elections, its program would be adopted by the Fujimori regime that took power that year.

early 1991, whether related to declining socioeconomic conditions or not, added to the overall sense of despondency. This general situation set the stage for the renewed imposition of neoliberal, market-oriented policies – this time without ambivalences or restraints – by the Fujimori government in the 1990s. However, the crisis was not just economic. Central to the sense of social breakdown in the 1980s was the conflict between the Peruvian state and two armed insurgencies, of which the largest by far was the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).

Crisis and violence

Sendero Luminoso was a group that had its roots in a 1964 split in the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), the organization founded as the Socialist Party by José Carlos Mariátegui (the founder of Peruvian Marxism) in 1929 but which had changed its name soon after the latter's death in 1930.²⁶⁶ In the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split generated a division between those who sought to maintain the party's alignment with Moscow, and those who were more inspired by Mao Tse-Tung's brand of communism. The Moscow-oriented camp became the PCP-Unidad, and under the leadership of Jorge Del Prado followed a moderate line aimed at a peaceful transition to socialism. The Maoist camp, of roughly equal size, became the PCP-Bandera Roja (Red Flag), under the leadership of Saturnino Paredes, a lawyer from the Ancash region who had worked defending peasant communities against the haciendas since the 1940s. Not long after the 1964 split, however, the majority of Bandera Roja's youth membership abandoned the party to form the PCP-Patria Roja (Red Fatherland), a party which would gain great influence over the national teachers' union, the SUTEP. Like the PCP-Unidad, in the 1980s Patria Roja would come together with other leftist parties to form the United Left coalition (IU), which won the Lima mayoral elections in 1983 and became a serious contender for the presidency before dividing again in 1989.

One of those who did not yet abandon Paredes' Bandera Roja in the mid-1960s, however, was Abimael Guzmán, a young professor of philosophy at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho. Guzmán was deeply fascinated with Maoism and went on an extended trip to China

²⁶⁶ The discussion of Sendero Luminoso in the next few pages is based on different sources, but above all on Degregori (1990 and 2011).

in the mid-to-late 1960s. Within Bandera Roja, Guzmán cultivated his own “Red Fraction” (Fracción Roja) in the city of Ayacucho (Huamanga); his followers played a role in, and in turn capitalized on, a massive 1969 struggle of peasants and students in the cities of Huanta and Ayacucho for the gratuity of secondary education, which appeared to be under threat from the government. Saturnino Paredes, who had come to see Guzmán as a rival, purged him and his followers around that time, though the latter would claim that it was them who had purged Paredes. After this final split, Guzmán’s group cloistered itself in the University of Huamanga, building organizational strength and above all ideological cohesion. Other groups on the Peruvian Left began referring to them as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), after one of their slogans: “On the shining path of José Carlos Mariátegui” (*Por el sendero luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui*). Fiercely sectarian, the party controlled much of the university, though it was also challenged by other parties of the Left, resulting in sometimes violent clashes.

In Degregori’s (1990, 2011) view, Sendero at this time was composed of two main demographics in Ayacucho: radicalized intellectuals from the provincial elite and middle class (like Guzmán himself), and young people of peasant origin who in the 1970s were accessing the university for the first time. Ayacucho was one of the poorest regions of Peru; during the 20th century it had never attracted significant amounts of capital, and was negatively affected by capitalist development in other regions of Peru, with inflows of cheap foodstuffs and goods damaging local production (Degregori 1990). It also had some of the most abusive, feudal-like conditions on the haciendas. This seemed to give credence to Sendero’s thesis that Peru was “semi-feudal” and needed a revolution modeled on that of China; Guzmán’s followers would continue to voice variants of this view even after Velasco’s Agrarian Reform (which they saw as “fascist”) abolished most of the haciendas in the 1970s.

Unlike other Left parties, Sendero did not participate in the late-1970s strikes and protests against the Morales Bermúdez regime and its austerity measures. However, that period of turmoil helped to convince Guzmán that the time was ripe for revolution. On May 17, 1980, on the eve of the elections that marked the transition from military rule to representative democracy, and while other Left parties were integrating themselves into electoral politics, Sendero launched its “People’s War” by burning ballot boxes in the village of Chuschi, Ayacucho. Slowly at first,

over the next couple of years the insurgency spread across rural northern Ayacucho, as Sendero militants entered communities and either convinced or forced villagers to take their side. In late 1981, President Belaúnde handed control of the region over to the army, which began torturing and killing people suspected of being *terroristas*, as Sendero militants quickly became known.

Rural Ayacucho was an overwhelmingly Quechua-speaking society, and racism helped to shape the conduct of many military officers, soldiers and the State. Government forces committed several large massacres of peasant villagers, at sites like Soccos, Putis and Accomarca. Sendero's own reputation for cruelty became established in the first few years of the insurgency. One event that would eventually become symbolic of Sendero brutality occurred on April 3rd, 1983, when militants acting on orders from Abimael Guzmán (by his own later admission) massacred 69 men, women and children in Lucanamarca, as punishment for that village's earlier execution of a Sendero commander. Sendero also spread its operations to the neighboring departments of Apurímac and Huancavelica, as well as to the Central Highlands (Junín and Pasco). In particular, the party was interested in raiding the mines of Huancavelica, Junín and Pasco. Disrupting production in the mines, which were central to the national economy, aided Sendero's goal of demolishing the "old order"; additionally, the mines became important sources of explosives for Sendero actions around the country. The government responded by militarizing the mining camps, giving the army the authority to enter and raid workers' homes.

Sendero furthermore targeted local authorities such as district and provincial mayors, members of Acción Popular (Belaúnde's party), the APRA and in some cases the United Left; as participants in the "Old State," they were asked to resign, and assassinated when they refused to do so. To "conquer power in the entire country" (*conquistar el poder en todo el país*) became Sendero's slogan and goal. Ideologically, the party maintained a hard line against those whom it called "revisionists," and whom Guzmán described as "a colossal pile of garbage;" most prominent among these were the Marxist parties of the United Left. At a global level, even a hardliner like Albania's Enver Hoxha was labeled a "revisionist" by Guzmán. Sendero received ideological support and allegiance from the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, a global coalition of small, hard-line Maoist parties that had formed in reaction to China's abandonment

of Mao's legacy after the ascension of Deng Xiaoping. By the end of the 1980s, Sendero was actually losing the war in rural Ayacucho, as more communities turned against them. However, it used this as an opportunity to move more of their operations into the capital, Lima, threatening the very center of national power through a campaign of car bombings, attacks on police stations and "armed blockades" (*paros armados*). In spite of their violence, some young people joined Sendero's ranks; they were attracted by their seeming fulfillment of the idea of revolution that other groups had only talked about, and felt compelled to take sides in this context. Besides, the severe social and economic crisis of the 1980s appeared to give credence to the idea that the poverty and injustice of the "old order" justified radical change.

The other, smaller armed insurgent group was the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), formed in 1984. Unlike Sendero, the MRTA drew its ideology not from hard-line Maoism but rather from the tradition of Latin American guerrilla movements since the Cuban Revolution. Indeed, one of the main organizations that formed the MRTA was a branch of the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement). That group had launched a short-lived Cuban-inspired insurgency in 1965, and had originally been founded by left-wing militants of the APRA who were disappointed after that party abandoned its original anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist stance in the late 1950s. The MRTA decided to launch its insurgency in 1984 as a fulfillment of the perceived need for revolution (common to many of the Left parties in the 1970s, before their entry into electoral politics in 1980) and as a response to the generalized misery that had been heightened by the economic crisis. They were also concerned about leaving the field of armed struggle to a possible Sendero victory. The MRTA was less dogmatic than Sendero, and did not target civilians on a large scale in the same way. However, towards the end of the 1980s it began carrying out kidnappings of businessmen as well as some targeted assassinations and executions, adding to the general sense of crisis and social breakdown. Certainly, the state also responded to the insurgent groups and to other perceived threats not just with army actions but also with paramilitary forces such as the "Rodrigo Franco Command," an execution squad rumored to be associated to the Ministry of the Interior under the APRA government.

Crisis and the mining unions

One important set of social actors that were affected by the crisis, and in turn responded to it, were the mining workers' unions (*sindicatos mineros*), such as the union at the Huarón mine whose assembly minutes were examined in the first part of this chapter. Though never as central to national politics as their Bolivian counterparts had been - due to Peruvian miners' greater isolation and fragmentation as well as Peru's more diversified economy (Damonte 2005, 63) - the mining unions had nevertheless become an important political actor by the second half of the 20th century.

Although there were strikes and labor conflicts in the mines of the Central Highlands in the early 20th century, these took place in an almost spontaneous fashion and did not involve the building of stable organizations (Flores Galindo 1993 [1974]). While it is likely that the anarcho-syndicalist labor agitation of the urban areas in the 1910s and 20s would have had some effect in the mines, this seems to have been quite limited. The widespread use of the *enganche* and *contrata* systems at the time, as well as the unstable nature of mining employment, would have made labor organizing difficult in any case – not to mention the ability of the mining companies, especially the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, to call on police forces when there were disturbances. The first systematic attempt to organize labor unions in the mines came around the start of the Great Depression. José Carlos Mariátegui, the founder of Peruvian Marxism, had taken a keen interest in the problems faced by mining workers and the possibilities for organizing them. His contact with the mining camps of the Central Highlands increased after the cave-in at the CPC's Morococha mine on December 5 1928, in which at least 28 workers died, and which Mariátegui's biweekly paper *Labor* covered extensively. Mariátegui was interested in the mining workers not only out of a Marxist concern for a working class confronted with big capital, but also precisely because of their difference from the supposed "classic" model of the English proletariat: they were an incomplete, transitional working class with deep connections to the rural world. Mariátegui believed strongly in an articulation of workers with the indigenous peasants who constituted the majority of the population at the time. Mining workers, who went back and forth between employment at the mines and their rural villages, were naturally suited for such an alliance (Flores Galindo 1974, 159; Manrique 2010, 23). Mariátegui died in early

1930. Yet the work begun by cadres from the Socialist Party which he founded (and which was soon renamed Communist Party and aligned with the Comintern), like Jorge del Prado, together with activists from the Central Highlands like Gamaniel Blanco and Adrián Sovero, led later that year to the first large-scale attempt at organizing unions and federations in the mines.

This short-lived Communist-led attempt collapsed after the government and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation violently repressed the workers, most prominently at the Malpaso massacre of November 12, 1930, in which 23 workers were killed (Del Prado et al. 2010; Flores Galindo 1974). For the next 15 years, labor activities at the mines were suppressed, with few strikes and no unions operating openly. From 1945 to 1948 there was a brief political opening in the country, as the centrist lawyer José Bustamante y Rivero presided a diverse but fragile coalition of parties ranging from the center and center-right to the APRA and the Communists. His government legalized the latter two parties, and the APRA, which had grown faster than the Communists, began a period of intense political activity. Its platform was still anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist (though explicitly non-Marxist), and it had significant following among workers on the coast. Between 1945 and 1947, 264 labor unions were legally recognized in the country (Contreras and Cueto 2007, 289). Among other things, APRA militants dedicated themselves to organizing unions in the mining centers of the Central Highlands.

It was during this period that the basic form of the mining unions was set – how the assemblies would be run, how the minutes would be recorded. The *sindicato* at Cerro de Pasco was founded on September 16, 1945, and the one at Huarón on October 28; other mining unions (Casapalca, Morococha, Atacocha, etc.) were also founded around the same time. This period of political opening came to an end in 1948, when part of the APRA instigated a last attempt at an insurrection in Lima, and the military responded with Odría's coup. Although the APRA was again persecuted, the mining unions did not disappear during this period as they had before. After the restoration of civilian rule in 1956, and the APRA leadership's increasingly conservative turn, that party became a force that sought to moderate and limit union demands.

Although there were tensions earlier, it was at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s that the mining unions turned definitively away from the APRA and towards more radical positions that brought them into contact with the Marxist Left. One by one, union officers

seen as aligned with the APRA were deposed at union assemblies. An important moment in this process was the strike at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation on September 1969, when the local unions at La Oroya and Cobriza rejected an agreement signed by the other, APRA-aligned unions, and staged a long *marcha de sacrificio* (“sacrifice march”) to Lima, after which they won a higher wage increase. This increased the prestige of the radical position and helped to delegitimize the APRA-aligned faction. Another important antecedent had been the 1967 strike and march of the workers at the Atacocha mine in Pasco, regarded by some as the first time that the mining workers used the term *marcha de sacrificio*. Yet another important milestone was the founding of the National Mining Workers’ Federation (FNTMMSP), in La Oroya in 1969. Led by Víctor Cuadros Paredes, a worker from the Southern Peru Copper Corporation, the Federation espoused an explicitly *clasista* line (see below).

Several factors led to the radicalization of the mining workers after the late 1960s. DeWind (1987), who was doing his fieldwork at the time these changes were taking place, argues that technical change and the resulting stabilization of the workforce had pulled workers further away from their connection with the rural areas, which meant that they were now fully dependent on their mining wages. But these wages had not risen to a level high enough to fully support a family; the resulting contradiction led to increased radicalization. No doubt this was one of the factors at work. Additionally, some of the workers in regions like Pasco had been in contact with and even participated in the land recuperation movement of the 1960s. This was the case for example of Teófilo Rímac Capcha, from the community of Tíclacayán and one of the leaders of the 1967 Atacocha strike and an important figure in Pasco in the following years. Also, importantly, this was a time when, unlike in the past, some mining workers were beginning to access higher education. Many times, they attended the universities and technical institutes for short periods, without finishing their studies, due to economic and other pressures; but during this time they were exposed to the radical political currents that responded to world events such as the Cuban Revolution, Maoism, and others.

All this mirrored what was happening elsewhere in the Peruvian labor movement, where *obrero* unions were rejecting the APRA and adopting the perspective of *clasismo*, which became dominant in the 1970s. *Clasismo* was defined in opposition to the APRA above all, but it was

also a term that was used to define the speaker against other Left-aligned unions that were deemed too conciliatory. In the mines, the weakening of the APRA position at the end of the 1960s initially led to a strengthening of the influence of the Moscow-aligned PC-Unidad and its allied labor central the CGTP. However, this was limited and short-lived, as other, more radical Marxist parties began organizing in the mines. One of these was the technically Maoist PC-Patria Roja, which gained some following in certain locals; another was Vanguardia Revolucionaria, a “New Left” party inspired in part by the Cuban Revolution. Vanguardia split into several factions early on, but some of them would come together again in later years, forming an important matrix or current for a large sector of the Peruvian Left. Initially composed mostly of radicalized middle-class university students, over time the Vanguardia factions made significant inroads into the popular, peasant and labor movements. By the time they coalesced into the PUM (Partido Unificado Mariateguista) in the mid-1980s, as part of the electoral United Left Coalition, they were the most significant Left force within both the National Peasant Confederation (the CCP) and the National Mining Federation (the FNTMMSP). Vanguardia’s connections with the mines had begun in the very early 1970s, at the initiative of one of the party’s founders, whose cousin was the secretary general of the union at one of the Pasco mines. As an internal party document stated in 1971,

If, additionally, it is understood that the mining proletariat maintains organic ties with the peasantry, for various reasons that range from the location of the camps to the origins of the mining proletarians, we then find renewed arguments for the task of the Marxist-Leninist Party, given that here we have an organic link between the two fundamental sectors of the people [pueblo] (*El proletariado minero...*, 11).

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that although the radical Left position was dominant within the mining unions in the 1970s and 80s, no single party had complete hegemony or control. The political culture of the mining unions, like that of the Left parties, was very fractious, even as a discourse of solidarity and unity was also frequently invoked. Besides, none of the Marxist parties in Peru really developed a solid, organic culture and social structure like that which the APRA party had had in some of the coastal cities, or that which the Communists in Chile had perhaps developed at one time.

More importantly, it is not that the rank-and-file of the unions were ideologically Marxist; they were not. Direct engagement with Marxist ideas was often limited to the leadership

and the most politicized workers at some of the larger unions like La Oroya, Cerro de Pasco and Cobriza. The point, rather, is that the radical position of those leaders (not necessarily the specific individuals themselves) commanded legitimacy in many of the mining camps during this period; people were willing to participate in frequent strikes and marches and to enforce norms of solidarity and militancy. This was reinforced by the crowded, intimate setting of the mining camps, and by the fact that the workforce was more stable than it had ever been before, with large numbers of families, women and children. As Kruijt and Vellinga wrote in 1979:

A social movement had sprung up in the camps; every work stoppage, every work-to-rules action and every strike begun to function as a collective ritual that reinforced the movement's internal integration and further increased her momentum (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, 127).

These were the years of the *marchas de sacrificio*, the *ollas comunes* ("common pots") and other ritualized performances and forms of protest. This shared union culture provided a common form to struggles that were often about very local issues of pay, employment and living conditions such as camp housing.

This movement also began making its presence increasingly known in Lima. Mining workers from across the country participated in the General Strike of 1977, against the austerity measures of Morales Bermúdez (with the exception of the Centromín workers' federation, which was controlled by a faction that believed the strike was led by "revisionist" elements). The next year, the mining unions carried out the largest strike in their sector up to that time; foremost among their demands was the reposition of the leaders who had been fired by government decree after the General Strike of the previous year. On that occasion, thousands of mining workers marched to Lima, and were hosted by the students of San Marcos University at the School of Medicine. This strike was only defeated when the police broke into the university in the middle of the night, rounded up the miners, packed them into trains and sent them back to the Central Highlands. The drop in metal prices in the early 1980s precipitated a first wave of mine closures, which affected small mines above all; there, the workers began doing marches to save their workplaces from the owners who wanted to close them. Such was the case of the Canaria mine in Ayacucho, where the workers staged two *marchas de sacrificio* to Lima, in 1982-83 and again in

1985, that achieved national notoriety, as the workers' families camped in the middle of the city and boarded buses to tell their story.

However, the mining unions began to be affected by the climate of political violence that was then increasing in the country. As mentioned earlier, the center of the fighting was rural Ayacucho, but from there Sendero began to spread out its activities towards the neighboring departments and north towards the Central Highlands. Raids on mines in the middle of the night became increasingly common, as Sendero militants sought to steal dynamite and disrupt production. Particularly affected were the mines in Huancavelica, but the climate of insecurity spread north to Pasco and Junín as well. Sendero also sought to gain the allegiance of the miners themselves, as with workers in other sectors, through its front organization the *Movimiento Obrero de Trabajadores Clasistas* (MOTC).

Although the mining companies would often accuse the unions of being sympathetic to if not complicit with Sendero, mining workers by and large were not supportive of that group's aims or methods. There were doubtless a few who did lend their support to Sendero, at least initially. As early as 1979, well-known Sendero militant Luis Kawata Makabe had traveled to Pasco, together with other cadres, to begin organizing work there, both in the countryside and in the mines. There they joined forces with one radical, breakaway faction of *Vanguardia* that was already established in Pasco. On the basis of those first efforts, Sendero would eventually gain some strength in a few of the *quebrada* communities of northern Pasco and southern Huánuco Department. According to one account, however, Kawata had been completely unsuccessful at convincing the miners, who constituted Sendero's "Achilles' Heel;" this experience had supposedly led him to re-think the viability of the coming People's War, leading to his break with Abimael Guzmán in 1980 (González 1986). On the other hand, one of my sources who lived through that time told me that there was a small group of mining workers among those who joined Kawata and Sendero in 1979, after a heated debate in the university in Cerro. Regardless, such workers were a minority faction; most of the union leaders and activists were aligned with the other Marxist parties, which were then entering electoral politics, not armed struggle: the PUM, UNIR (Patria Roja), FOCEP and PCP-Unidad (all part of the United Left).

In Pasco the conflict was not quite as violent as in Ayacucho, which was truly ravaged by the fighting and killings. However, in Pasco the fighting was fierce in those *quebrada* communities where Sendero had gained a significant foothold, and where the army thus focused its attention. In the rest of the department, Sendero undertook an extensive campaign of assassinations of mayors and other elected officials (when they refused to resign), seeking to decapitate the “old state.” The provincial mayor of Cerro de Pasco, Víctor Arias Vicuña, of Belaúnde’s Acción Popular party, was murdered in November 1983. The mayor of Yanacancha (one of the three urban districts in Cerro), Luis Aguilar Cajahuamán, of the APRA party, was assassinated in May 1985. The mayor of Huayllay, Luis Oropeza de la Cruz, also of the APRA, was murdered in October 1989.

The violence extended to the mining unions also. In March 1986, Tomás Miranda, a leader of the union in Cerro de Pasco, was shot dead in the middle of a march through the streets of the city; the miners apprehended the assassin, who admitted to being with Sendero. Later that year, an army unit kidnapped and murdered Teófilo Rímac Capcha, a former mining union leader, peasant organizer and teacher in the university in Cerro, who had been involved in the movement against the haciendas in the 1960s and in the 1967 Atacocha miners’ strike and *marcha de sacrificio*. Since he was originally from the community of Ticlacayán, where there had been a significant Sendero presence, he was accused of being a *senderista* himself. On March 2nd, 1989, gunmen broke into the miners’ union hall in Cerro de Pasco, in the midst of a general assembly, and shot dead the secretary general of the union, Seferino Requis. Similar things occurred in other mining centers outside of Pasco; on May 7 1989, the secretary general of the union in Morococha (Junín Department), Antonio Cajachagua Leiva, was assassinated by gunmen believed to be from Sendero.

A sense of the pressure on union leaders can be gleaned from the discourse contained in a threatening letter sent to Juan Santiago Atencio and which he shared with me during my research. Santiago, who was originally from the community of Rancas, and was aligned with the United Left parties, was the secretary general of the Cerro de Pasco union in 1990. At the time, there were attempts to launch a new national mining strike (see below). Although Sendero did not lead or organize the strikes, it sought to make use of them for its own purposes, namely

furthering the People's War. The authors of the letter thus warned Santiago of what would happen if he did not support the strike:

Today our people and proletarian class finds itself on war footing principally, undertaking the People's War, and the struggle to conquer power in the whole country; but, part of that being the *lucha reivindicativa* [labor struggle or struggle for rights] it also continues to undertake it in a vigorous way, carrying forward the class struggle... For that reason the struggle of the workers of the mining proletariat serves that purpose; who have today posed an indefinite strike for the defense and conquest of their rights, benefits and liberties, which is most just and correct, but it is propelling this in a heavy struggle to unmask, repudiate and crush the revisionism and opportunism of any stripe that has always sold out and betrayed the struggle of the workers, and which plans to do the same with this strike, negating and stepping on the class struggle, negating the general crisis of this old society which falls to pieces through the actions of the People's War, and putting itself at the service of the exploiters, as so many others have done like Requis, Miranda, Cajachagua, Damián, etc. Who were executed [*ajusticiados*] in their due time.

The authors of the letter furthermore warned Juan Santiago that if he did not do as they said, the "working masses" and the "People's Guerrilla Army" would take the necessary measures "like they did with other revisionist, trafficking, worker-selling traitors." Threats, rumors and accusations permeated politics and social relations at that time. A union leader could be accused of being a "terrorist," a "revisionist," an "informant" or a "yellow" collaborator, or simply of being corrupt. Nor was it always entirely clear who was responsible for particular assassinations; some are still debated to this day.

In spite of this situation of violence at the local level, the mining unions still attempted to pursue an agenda of unity during the 1980s. In the middle of the decade, the longtime leader of the National Mining Federation, Víctor Cuadros, had been replaced by Saúl Cantoral Huamaní, a worker from the Marcona iron mine on the coast and originally from the highlands of Ayacucho. Under Cantoral's tenure, the FNTMMSP would wage a campaign for what was known as the *Pliego Nacional*, i.e. industry-wide bargaining, in other words a system where the Mining Federation would negotiate with the mining companies for a single contract for all workers in the sector. This proposal was inspired on similar systems that existed in the mining sectors of other countries, especially in Europe and North America. The idea was not that all mining workers would receive exactly the same pay and benefits, since small mines could not afford the same expenditure on labor as large mines; rather, the *Pliego Nacional* would provide a basic floor

level of salaries and benefits, above which workers at larger mines could then bargain for more. The project sought to go beyond the division that had long existed between the workers at the small mines, who were often badly paid and endured very bad housing and living conditions, and the relatively privileged workers at the large, more modern mines. Over the course of many months, Cantoral visited virtually all the mining camps of Peru to build support for the strike. The first National Mining Strike for the *Pliego Nacional* began on July 18, 1988, and it was a resounding success; workers went out on strike in the great majority of the mines in the country. The government of Alan García agreed to support the petition of industry-wide bargaining, but it was unable to bring the Mining Society (SNMPE), the association of mining companies, to the table. A second National Mining Strike began in October 1988 and also brought out a very large number of workers, lasting almost two months.

The project of the *Pliego Nacional* and the National Mining Strikes had been aimed at transcending the self-centered focus of many of the mining unions and achieving a higher standard of living for all the workers and their families, even those at small mines. However, the strikes also hurt the acquisition of foreign exchange at a time when the economy was already in crisis. And although Mining Federation leaders were by no means allied with Sendero, and, in line with the pragmatism of most mining workers, were quite willing to end the strikes if their central demand of industry-wide bargaining was accepted, the strikes could be seen by some as contributing to the Sendero's purpose of paralyzing the "old society." This point was exploited by the mining companies, as can be seen in this full-page ad published by the National Mining Society in the national daily *La República* on December 13, 1988, around the time of the second national strike:

WE DIALOGUE WITH OUR WORKERS, NOT WITH A POLITICIZED FEDERATION

The mining workers have always dialogued with their companies, arriving at agreements that are satisfactory for both, in a direct and peaceful way.

If this has yielded results until now, what purpose is driving the leadership of the Federation to name a sole "Permanent Secretary" who will decide for all?

Why should there be an intermediary, who besides not knowing the reality of each mine, is moved by political interests? What is it that they really seek with this strike? Is it perhaps to paralyze the country?

On February 13, 1989, Saúl Cantoral was found assassinated in a park in Lima, alongside Consuelo García, the national organizer of the mining women's committees, who had also been killed. At the time, the government blamed the murder on Sendero, but it is widely believed that the actual culprit was the Rodrigo Franco Command, a paramilitary group linked to Alan García's Interior Minister Agustín Mantilla. Cantoral's murder greatly weakened the Mining Federation; when a Third National Mining Strike was launched after his death, in August 1989, the attempt ended in failure. The strikes had managed to wrest certain concessions from the government, such as a new retirement law for mining workers, but they did not accomplish the central aim of industry-wide bargaining. Furthermore, they bled the mining unions, which were simultaneously weakened by the violence and tension at the local level.

Thus, the mining unions found themselves in a weakened position when the companies began stepping up pressures for workers to retire in the early 1990s. Beyond just the mining unions, social and labor movements in general were worn out from the violence and economic crisis at the end of the 1980s. In 1990, novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who had led the protests against García's nationalization of the banks in 1987, proposed adopting a radical "shock" program to address the economic crisis. He was widely expected to win, but instead the majority voted for Alberto Fujimori, an unknown engineer who promised he would avoid a shock. Nevertheless, soon after assuming office, Fujimori accepted IMF conditions and implemented a dramatic shock program (known locally as the "Fujishock"), raising the prices of foodstuffs and other products overnight. Although this was not what people had voted for, there was no mass rioting as in Venezuela in 1989, nor was there an organized political response; much of the country was under state of emergency anyway, and besides the social and political movements were weakened and the population worn out.

Fujimori not only imposed an economic shock, but also set about implementing radical changes in labor and other laws that cut back at rights and benefits gained decades earlier. His position was strengthened after the "self-coup" of April 5, 1992, when he closed down the parliament and judiciary and assumed dictatorial powers together with the army. One leader who did attempt to organize large marches and demonstrations against Fujimori's structural reforms

was Pedro Huilca Tecse, the former head of the Construction Workers' Federation and the current Secretary General of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), the largest union central in the country. He was assassinated in December 1992, just as his confrontation with Fujimori was escalating. As always, the government accused Sendero of the murder, but it is widely believed to have been carried out by the Colina Group, an execution squad connected to Fujimori's intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos.

The leader of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, was captured in October 1992, and after that the group began a dramatic decline, which raised Fujimori's popularity and the image of order that his government projected. His structural reforms halted hyperinflation and brought new capital and investment to Peru, after a couple of years in which the IMF and other lenders had shunned the country in the late 1980s. The mid-1990s saw some modest growth as well as the arrival of new commodities in the cities and new mining projects in the countryside. Yet social indicators like poverty rates did not improve; in any case, any gains that might have been made were then wiped out by the effects of the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s. It would not be until 2003 that a new period of rapid growth would resume and living standards would begin to recuperate, albeit within the new patterns and frameworks developed in the aftermath of the crisis of the 1980s.

With these national and global contexts in mind, I will now return to the specific situation of crisis at Huarón and other mines of the region at the start of the 1990s, keeping a focus on the options and constraints faced by workers and their families as they debated whether and under what conditions to leave the mines and the camps.

The departure of workers from the mines

As we saw earlier, at Huarón, the idea that a crisis was affecting the company, and that a mine closure was imminent, putting legally-mandated severance payments at risk, motivated many of the workers to resign.²⁶⁷ On March 17, it was announced at the union assembly that,

²⁶⁷ The legally-mandated severance pay in question was the *Compensación por Tiempo de Servicio (CTS)*, which is calculated based on the number of years worked and the pay received during those years. It's not clear that these

according to the latest shareholders' meeting, 440 people had resigned from the company to date: 44 engineers, 107 *empleados* and 289 *obreros*. Arguments began over whether the union leadership should focus on protecting the jobs of the workers who were left or ensuring the payment of benefits to those who had resigned. One worker criticized the leadership for allowing rumor and misinformation to rule:

There is something fishy here (*hay un gato encerrado*), from the beginning we are falling into a game of old wives' tales (*cuentos de comadres*), we have become used to blackmail and we don't have a formal role, the company makes us fall into the trap and I criticize our commission, the leader is there to lead the masses and not the masses to lead the leaders.

Two other speakers from the floor, on the other hand, blamed not the union leadership but the engineers for "surprising" the workers, gathering them in the cellars inside the mine and encouraging them to resign.²⁶⁸ At a later assembly, one of the union officers would repeat this charge against the engineers, arguing that the latter's resignations had been fake, that "they had made a deal with the company for two months and are now coming back." Yet he also blamed certain union leaders (other than himself), "who were paid off, I don't want to say more, because I do not want their children to talk badly about their parents." Yet at the March 17 assembly other speakers from the floor also said that "the only thing we have left is to fight like one man" and that "here we are looking for the culprit, but that's not how it is, and the [leadership] should name a commission for those who are leaving and nobody should go down [to the company office] to get their money, we should fight for everyone."²⁶⁹ On March 24, another worker stated that "we the workers do not blame anyone, those of us who leave, or those of us who stay; rather the issue is that they are not paying those of us who are going, like they should."

By that date, attendance at the assembly had dropped down to 415 *obreros*, and some of the leadership positions had to be filled with new people since some of the officers had resigned from the company. Efforts now centered on trying to keep the mine open. At an earlier assembly one worker had proposed offering to take three months' vacation without pay "so as to not kill

payments were at risk legally, but they certainly were in people's perceptions, according to my interviews and the union minutes.

²⁶⁸ "To surprise" (*sorprender*) in this context means not just to do something unexpected but also to deceive.

²⁶⁹ "That's not how it is," in Spanish: *No es así* – a common phrase that means "this is not how things should be."

our union;” this offer, together with the proposal of working for free two Sundays out of every month for three months, was now sent in a letter to the shareholders.

The union did consider other, more confrontational strategies. In April, the union organized a “common pot” (*olla común*) because a representative of the regional government was supposed to come together with a TV channel (they did not come in the end). Like the “march of sacrifice,” the “common pot” was part of the repertoire of popular political performance and of the general mining union culture of the 1970s and 80s. It was supposed to signify both communal solidarity and the sacrifice and deprivation that families underwent during strikes. Strikes always included an *olla común*, and people ate there even if they had food at home. As the union secretary for organization put it, the purpose of the *olla común* was “so that they would see the reality that we are going through in our sector.”

In addition, repeated invocations were made to the workers to “struggle together with the wives’ committee” (April 7 1991). The traditional weapon of the strike itself could not be exercised, since it could play into the company’s hands and give the government reason to issue a resolution allowing for a mine closure, as had happened in the Raura mine to the north (this example was mentioned at one of the assemblies). At a March 3 assembly, someone had suggested organizing a protest against the government for refusing to do more to help mines like Huarón to stay open. Another union member stated that “the only way to do any kind of protest against the current government is to block the Central Highway.” The secretary general of the union replied that “knowing that we are already in a state of emergency, there is nothing that can be done regarding that request.” On March 24, another worker asked “what would happen when we go to do demonstrations and protests in Lima, the first ones that would be arrested would be the union leaders, accused of being terrorists.”

Leaving the mine and questioning the crisis

Thus, under these pressures and given the lack of available options, a large part of the workforce left around this time. Yet unlike in many of the smaller mines, Huarón did not actually close at this time. Rather, it continued to produce for seven more years, with a reduced workforce and limited operations, as more and more of the older workers were persuaded to

leave. Finally in 1998 a catastrophic flood led to the complete closure of both Huarón and neighboring Animón/Chungar (killing six Animón workers); the mine then remained closed for three years, until it reopened under new, Canadian ownership in 2001. The fact that the mine remained open after the mass resignations of the early 1990s encouraged the belief that the crisis of the company had been made up as a strategy to get rid of the unionized, stable workforce. Even before it became apparent that the mine was not really going to close, some people had already voiced the opinion that the company was hiding something. Responding from the floor to the commission's report on the shareholders' meeting on February 21, one union member, Justino Cárdenas, argued that "the company is lying because we know that it is hiding the copper in large quantities, therefore a careful investigation should be made."

At the time, while the mining industry argued that the crisis of the sector was due to the government's protectionist exchange-rate and fiscal policy as well as to labor indiscipline and strikes, the discourse of the Mining Workers' Federation and its labor allies was that the crisis of the sector was due to the "bad management" or "bad administration" on the part of mining companies. This latter view held that the crisis was "not of production" but rather either about "bad administration" or outright fraud. Thus, on March 24 a representative of an NGO that worked on labor issues came to the assembly and was recorded in the minutes as saying that:

[He] also invokes [the workers] to keep struggling forward and on a national level because the mining crisis is not [a crisis] of production, rather it is provoked by the businessmen themselves and even more the current government in complicity with them. And the companies are amassing fortunes in dollars.

Similarly, as Justino Cárdenas' comment above – "it is hiding the copper" - indicates, at the local level this critique of management sometimes took the form of a belief that administrators were actually hiding mineral concentrate or stealing it. Estela Páucar made a similar point in our interview:

Within that group [that administered the company] there were people that did not have a great [sense of] responsibility, or they cared little about the future of the miners and their families, so they wanted, they began, to steal, in other words, the minerals. The concentrate would go out, and it got lost on the way, it didn't make it, some vehicles didn't make it. But each vehicle carried 40 tons of mineral. Imagine that each month 3 or 4 units get lost, with that quantity of mineral.

Other people also cited stories of engineers and managers hiding or stealing mineral. Similarly, in the union assemblies people frequently argued that the crisis of the company could not be “real” – as one speaker from the floor put it, “Huarón has enough reserves to produce and only wants to take advantage of this panic that we are living [through].”

These disagreements on the reality of the crisis point to the more general fact that around the country (and beyond) the physical substance of the ore remained the same as before, and yet global factors pertaining to the world of value nevertheless seemed to render the mines unviable.²⁷⁰ If the mine had enough mineral reserves, and if the miners were all willing to work, why couldn't they continue to produce and make a living? In his discussion of Thucydides' application of the Greek medical concept of crisis to the field of society and history, Randolph Starn writes that, “as much as key points in processes of change, crisis situations became moments of truth where the significance of men and events was brought to light” (Starn 1971, 4). In this case, the crisis highlighted the difference between use-value and exchange-value; it brought to light the special significance of the fact that the physical qualities of the mine were not enough to guarantee its survival. People obviously knew that before, but it had not been as crucial a factor as it was now. To the degree that it was hard to accept, explanations were sought that involved the actual “stealing” or “hiding” of the physical body of the metal.

The assertion that the crisis had not been “real” is also evident in the account of Octavio Domínguez, whom I quoted earlier in this chapter regarding his decision to leave the mine:

Well, sometimes, the companies give a little something to the leaders and the leaders work on their people... But it's only been a ruse (*artimaña*) by the company... The union leaders have worked on us (*nos han trabajado a nosotros*). Six hundred of us left that year. And 600 stayed. But back to normal. It wasn't in crisis, no.

Here, the veracity of the crisis is thrown into doubt, and the assertion is made that it was all just a “ruse” on the part of the company. In addition, the union leaders are blamed for playing a role in this. Don Octavio's comments should be understood as part of a very common discourse in Peru that sees corruption and under-the-table deals as central features of most political and social

²⁷⁰ Of course, non-renewable resources like minerals do by definition decrease over time (though “running out” is always relative to the social world of value, including political factors); but this obviously would not have explained the simultaneous state of crisis at all the mines in Peru and beyond.

institutions. Also, as mediators between the company and the workers, the union leaders naturally became subject to suspicions of corruption and duplicity.

The role of rumors and interpersonal relations in prompting the decision to leave the mine is also apparent in the account of Emilia Flores, when she told me about her and her husband's departure from the mine:

So then, the company, there were several people in the union, among them was my marriage godson (*ahijado de matrimonio*). And you know what he tells my husband – he says, the mine is closing, so you are not going to get anything, nothing, nothing of your compensation for years worked [CTS]. So then my husband, listening to his advice, his son-in-law, and his son was also working there in the mine, they have presented their resignation letter, and my husband from working 25 years they gave him only 2,800. [Having worked] in the mine!²⁷¹

Here there is also some hint of blame placed on the union; more importantly, the mention of Doña Emilia's marriage godson is important. In Peru, as in much of Latin America, godparent-godchild relations mediate not just birth but other important life events such as baptisms and weddings. Such relationships are supposed to facilitate trust and reciprocity; here Doña Emilia's husband follows his marriage godson's advice and ends up making a bad decision, leaving the mine with a measly severance payment when he could presumably have gotten more if he had held out longer. The worker who retired under pressure and received inadequate compensation for many years worked in the mine, or who did not qualify for a pension due to the fact that he was not yet at retirement age, is a common figure in people's stories about that time. Over the next few years, the mine continued to pressure its workers to leave, offering them additional incentives; those who managed to hold on the longest managed to get a better deal.

One such case was that of Desiderio Roque, whose life history I presented in Chapter 2. In his account, he describes how the company had sought to have him fired for his union activity, but he managed to win the legal case; the company then gave him the choice to return to work or accept a special severance payment:

So then I was in a fight with the Huarón company, with Hochschild, 17 months of a legal process with Huarón, through which I managed to get something. That is where we sat on the table to discuss... I was living with my wife, we had been living together for six

²⁷¹ Meaning, underground rather than in the surface – the former being seen as harder work.

months. So then she tells me, “leave the company” (*liquidate*). Because otherwise, maybe I would have been working up to this moment.

Like several other accounts, Don Desiderio’s emphasizes how the decision to leave the mine was made jointly with his wife. He also reaffirms the continuing importance of collective struggle:

But for me, if I had gone back to work, my pride would have been to take my *compañeros* at work and by then we would have paralyzed the mass liquidations, there would not have been the mass liquidations. So my pride was to fight against all that, and to do a 15-day strike against Huarón to recover all those things that had been lost. That was my objective.

Since he accepted the severance payment and left the mine, this collective struggle to “recover all those things that had been lost” never took place. But he’s still proud of his individual struggle, through which he got more money than other workers:

The weakness was that I took the chance to retire... But I am proud to say that I did a struggle with Huarón, which never believed in me, I fought with them (*le hice lucha*). On the other hand [my] *compañeros* did leave [earlier] because Huarón offered to give them 3 months’ pay, 4 months, 5 or 6 months.’ And I am the only person to whom they gave 12 months’ pay.²⁷²

In a sense, this part of Don Desiderio’s narrative can be said to highlight the shift from collective to individual struggle that several commentators have pointed out as having taken place in Peru as a result of the neoliberal solution to the crisis in the early 1990s. His account points to the unequal and individualized outcomes of the process of leaving the mines. Things like compensation for labor time (CTS), special monetary incentives and, in the case of older workers, retirement pensions, were seen as the foundation on which to construct a house, put up a small store or workshop and otherwise build a life outside the camp. Legal fights to ensure the payment of CTS and, when applicable, retirement pensions, sometimes became long and costly. In a smaller way, families tried to take different parts and implements from the mining camp – such as ovens, roofs and work tools – to use in their new locations. For example, Emilia Flores complained that the camp administrator, who never liked her, did not allow her to take the chimney or the oven, only an iron slab for cooking with charcoal.

²⁷² These were special incentives in addition to the legally-mandated compensation for labor time (CTS).

An hour away in Cerro de Pasco – one of the 14 production units of the state-owned mining company Centromín, the old Cerro de Pasco Corporation – the process of departure from the mine was somewhat different. This company was also in crisis, though in this case the emerging liberal consensus attributed the troubles to the supposed inherent inefficiency of state enterprises. After Alberto Fujimori took office in 1990 and undertook a sudden and sharp shift to a full Washington Consensus model (as opposed to the partial structural adjustment packages of the late 1970s and 1980s), Centromín officials started to focus their efforts on making the company more efficient so as to render it more attractive to investors and thus amenable to privatization. Between 1990 and 1993, 5,329 people left the company – 3,748 *obreros*, 1,313 *empleados*, and 268 administrative staff – out of a workforce that at its height in early 1990 had numbered 17,168. Some of the smaller Centromín mines were closed; the larger ones, like Cerro de Pasco (which included both an underground and an open-pit mine) continued to operate but under a stringent rationalization and reorganization program. This included the shedding of its large infrastructure of company schools and health centers, which were handed over to government ministries and are now part of the public education and health sectors, disconnected from the private companies that now own the old Centromín mines. It also involved changes in the work process and the large-scale reduction in the workforce.

This reduction took place in a number of ways. According to a study conducted at the time, about one half of the 5,329 workers had resigned voluntarily out of fear of not being able to get their CTS severance payments; one quarter had qualified for old-age retirement, and one quarter had been involuntarily removed from the company.²⁷³ As in Huarón, the “voluntary” resignations had taken place under a climate of rumor and worry. Word had spread that the CTS would soon start to be paid in government bonuses rather than cash, setting off a panic. Thus, a later announcement that the company had secured a loan to pay the CTS in cash, so long as people left immediately, provoked massive resignations.

The “involuntary” departures at Centromín took the form of a list, drafted in late 1990, of 728 names of individual workers who were declared “surplus [*excedente*] personnel” and

²⁷³ This was a study of the characteristics and perspectives of workers who had left Centromín. It was commissioned by the company and conducted by Walter Twanama and Denis Sulmont, a sociologist at Peru’s Catholic University who had for many years collaborated with the mining unions and wrote a history of the Peruvian labor movement.

included in a “collective termination” (*cese colectivo*). The general belief was that this was a list of the workers who had been most active in the unions. One of the “surplus” workers in the Cerro de Pasco unit, Juan Santiago Atencio, argues that this termination included all union officers from the previous ten years:

At that time we were saying that, no matter what government enters in, be it left or right, be it communist or socialist or whatever, we the people [*pueblo*], more than anything the workers, be they miners or not miners, we have to subsist from, to live from, our labor power. And we don't care about anything else. But, this did not happen...nobody knew anything, how it was going to begin. We thought that it would start in a different way, but what happened was something unprecedented [*insólito*], incredible, to go back, or to go retroactively, to fire the workers, who in previous years were the ex-leaders, ex-delegates, [members of] commissions, who occupied [these roles] from the year 80 to the year 90.

In the 1970s and 80s, the mining unions had often gone on strike even when very small numbers of workers were fired, demanding their reinstatement. But now the new laws and the continued climate of political violence made that more difficult. Although the “surplus” workers formed a defense front, this was limited to legal and judiciary channels:

All legal actions and public denunciations, comunicués, a series of things. To do actions like, demonstrations, marches, etc., well, people were extremely scared, the rest did not want to join, they did not want to support us.... And besides, they were labeled, whoever did any instigation, or any demonstration, whoever brings the people out, well they were typified as apology of subversion, apology of terrorism.

Apología del terrorismo was the legal name given to the crime of defending subversive activities even at the level of discourse, let alone demonstrations. As in the case of Huarón, Juan Santiago's discussion of the events at Centromín shows how, although the crisis in itself was an “economic” phenomenon, the climate of political violence helped pave the way for the “neoliberal solution” by closing off all possible avenues of resistance from workers.

Santiago's account also shows how the dismissal of hundreds of workers at one time, and, more importantly, the lack of effective resistance to this, were seen as a novel and significant departure from previous practice. Under the labor laws reinforced by the Velasco government (1968-1975), it had become almost impossible to fire workers; additionally, job stability (*estabilidad laboral*) was one of the values most zealously defended by the unions. The

labor reforms of the early 1990s changed this, making it possible to dismiss workers who supposedly did not perform satisfactorily and to undertake “collective terminations” of part of the workforce in special cases like that of the state-owned Centromín.

In most cases, however, unless a mine closed altogether, it wasn't always possible to simply expel entire communities of workers and their families. The power of the mining unions, though much weakened, could not simply be eliminated overnight. It was here that rumor, uncertainty and the context of economic crisis and political violence played a central role. Once the stable, unionized workers had left, their places could now be filled with subcontracted workers. Moreover, the departure of enough workers meant the automatic decline of the union – that's why at Huarón the offer to take three months' unpaid vacation and therefore keep the mine active had been framed as an effort “to not kill our union.” The union was not an abstract form of organization, and the working class was just not an abstract category; both were substantiated in specific families and individuals in the camps. Once this group scattered, and was not replaced by others constituted within the same framework, the continuity that had characterized the camps for several decades would prove hard to reproduce.

Life and economy after the mines

As in the rest of Peru during the crisis, families that left employment at the mines had to resort to a variety of strategies to make ends meet. In people's narratives from that time, two aspects stand out in relation to this. One is the setting up of *comedores populares* (people's dining halls) during the crisis. The *comedores* were a well-known form of social organization throughout Peru, especially in working-class urban neighborhoods; they were organized by groups of women through arrangements with a government office (today the PRONAA). At the Milpo mine (close to Cerro de Pasco), the miners' wives committee created one such *comedor* in the early 90s; at Huarón one was created when the mine flooded in 1998 – there may have been one during the initial departure of workers in 1991 as well. In cases like these, many families that saw their incomes suddenly reduced had to rely on these women-run institutions. At Milpo, the former head of the miners' wives committee had to literally fight with local authorities to obtain a space for the *comedor*.

Another strategy that was even more important was the greater reliance on petty commerce and what is sometimes labeled the “informal” sector. This was not a new phenomenon; in the mining camps women had often taken on boarders, washed clothes for pay and set up small stores and restaurants – both in the camp housing per se and in the small informal neighborhoods that grew up around them. When men left employment in the mine, their families often had to rely on commercial skills to a greater degree than before. In those families in which the father had been living alone in the camp after moving the family to an urban area, women had had greater opportunities to develop their skills in the realm of petty commerce. After leaving the mines, most men entered the world of petty commodity production as well, either through commerce or through different kinds of trades, whether carpentry, car repair, welding or tailoring. This represented an end to their status as formal-sector workers, which in the case of miners had often meant higher pay and benefits but also greater labor exactions and risks.

Though a large percentage of mining workers at this time still came from rural backgrounds, during the time at the mine they had often developed urban orientations. Although in Huarón a number of workers stayed in the adjacent *comunidad campesina* of Huayllay, becoming *comuneros*, most moved to regional urban centers like Huancayo or Huánuco, or to Lima, settling in working-class neighborhoods on the urban periphery. Among those who left the more urban mining centers owned by Centromín, like Cerro de Pasco or the metallurgical complex in La Oroya, even fewer went “back to the land.” Among those former Centromín workers sampled by Sulmont and Twanama in 1993, 25.3% were working in small retail commerce, 11.8% were working in transport, 7.6% had set up some sort of small workshop (mechanical, electrical or carpentry), 5.9% in agriculture, 4.3% in construction, and 44.6% were either unemployed or retired. The overwhelming majority of those working did so either alone or with family members (rather than with non-relatives). To the degree that the world of petty commerce was less segmented in terms of gender than the mining camp had been, there was a partial convergence between the activities of men and those of women.

Here it is worth quoting the narrative of Raúl Rivadeneyra, a former worker and leftist union leader at Centromín’s metallurgical complex in La Oroya. Originally from an agricultural

community near Paucartambo, Pasco, Don Raúl did not return to his village after leaving the company, but rather moved to the city of Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley. In the 1980s, he had participated in a land occupation on the outskirts of the city, to found an *asentamiento humano* – as self-built working-class neighborhoods are usually known in Peru – where he lives now and where I visited him on a couple of occasions. As a former leader, he applied his union and political experience to organizing the new neighborhood and creating workshops and small enterprises on the basis of the skills that his former fellow company employees possessed:

Since I retired from the company, I had to work here in Huancayo for the sustenance of my home; I had two children studying, my wife who helped me in work, who had a business, but no matter what I had to work, no? So then, since I had experience from work, in the neighborhood where I live, which is an *asentamiento humano*, since I had the experience of being a leader, I began to be a leader here in the *asentamiento humano*... So then we have organized ourselves, and we have made a microenterprise, workshops, we have unified, seeing which ones are builders, which ones are mechanics, which ones are electricians.

Don Raúl's narrative is influenced by his experience both as an organizer and as someone who has significant familiarity with the world of NGOs and the discourse of "microenterprises" that became common in the 1990s:

The women, the *compañeras*, my wife for example, directed the women here, the ones that live here, they put their textile business, their microenterprise, 30 women would get together, each would put their sewing machine that they had, they began to look for financing, a market, they organized, and now they had income. Because my wife was also treasurer of the union, [and] president of the mining women's committee. In other words, she also transferred that over here. Just like I organize with the miners.

Here references to unionism mix freely with the discourse then being promoted by government agencies, financial institutions and many NGOs: microentrepreneurship, competitiveness and markets. This should not be surprising. The opposition between "proletarian" identity, on the one hand, and petty commodity production and commerce, on the other, may have existed in certain intellectual ideologies, on both the right and the left, but it was not found in the experience or the discourse of most working-class people at the time.²⁷⁴

However, Don Raúl does not idealize the world of petty commodity production either; he told

²⁷⁴ The term *proletario* had some currency among the working class in the 1980s, though it is no longer common today.

me how the sewing business started by his wife and other women was cheated when a distributor from Villa El Salvador (a large working-class neighborhood in Lima) received a large order from them and then failed to pay them.

Subcontracting and the dismantling of camps

At Huarón, the full closure of the mine did finally occur on April 23, 1998, when a large lake collapsed into the adjacent Animón mine, completely flooding Huarón as well. Of the 200 to 400 workers who had still been on the company's payroll at the time, many stayed to take care of the installations after the company left, waiting to see whether the mine would reopen. A new transnational company bought the mine two years later, cleaned it and restarted production in 2001, settling with all but twelve of the old workers. Those twelve continue to work to this day, but lost the legal battle to maintain recognition for the old union, since it no longer had the minimum number of required members. An attempt was made in 2007 to revive that union to include both the old and the new workers. However, most of the new workers were on temporary 3- and 6-month contracts, the company simply chose not to renew the contracts of those workers who joined the unionization effort (the company subsequently created a separate, dependent union for the non-permanent direct workers). Today, during the new mining boom that started in 2003-2004, as many people work at Huarón as in its best days, but the great majority are either on temporary contracts with the company or subcontracted altogether. The subcontracting system has become dominant at virtually all the similar-sized mines of the region and central Peru more broadly. This system is not brand-new; it had always been present in limited numbers alongside the direct workforce, the change was that it went from encompassing a minority to a majority of the workforce. This process of labor flexibilization was not so much a devious strategy on the part of individual managers as a worldwide trend that companies were increasingly expected to adjust to in order to stay afloat. Although it couldn't fully be implemented until the 1990s, companies had been making plans in this direction since the 1980s. As a report commissioned by the state mining company had said then:

The transfer of services to third parties would have undeniable advantages: it would decrease the permanent personnel and its passive load (*carga pasiva*) of fringe benefits and other services; it would lower the reserves needed for compensation packages and other costs; it would allow us to keep [only] housing that was strictly necessary... it

would allow for all our technical and economic efforts to center on exploring, producing and refining minerals and giving them more value added. The advantages would be so many that we omit pointing them out in this part of the work entrusted to us so as to not make it unnecessarily long.

The consolidation of this system has also meant that the mining labor force is now more differentiated than before in terms of wages and conditions.²⁷⁵

Besides the contracting system, another change was the demolition of the majority of the workers' camps. This happened at Huarón and also in most of the other mining centers in Peru in the 1990s. As Estela Páucar told me,

They begin to demolish all the camps... This was planned by the National Mining Society, in Lima. And Huarón was still not complying. So they began to demand, the other mines began to demand, because, this was already happening in Milpo, it was happening in Atacocha, even in Cerro de Pasco itself.

At the Milpo mine, about 30 minutes from Cerro de Pasco, the remaining workers began moving to the outlying neighborhoods of the city, from where they now commute. In Cerro de Pasco itself, Centromín and its successor Volcan did not immediately demolish most of its camps, since they were part of the city landscape, but allowed them to gradually deteriorate; in the last few years they have finally been demolishing most of the older camp housing in Cerro. Thus, besides the departure of workers from the mining companies, there was a second departure of the remaining workers and their families not from employment itself but from the life of the mining camp.

I do not have union assembly minutes from the moment when this occurred in Huarón; in any case the union may not have been meeting regularly by that time anymore. However, since this was a process that occurred at mines throughout the country, we can gain further insight by examining the dismantling of the camps at one of Huarón's "sister" mines, Mina Raúl, owned by the same company at the time. The union minutes from Mina Raúl record the discussions over the end of the camp system and what was perceived to be at stake in that change.

²⁷⁵ On average, direct workers earn around twice as much as subcontracted workers. Subcontracted workers' wages are usually between \$11 and \$16 a day, which results in a monthly wage above the national minimum - otherwise people would not agree to work in the mines, given the long hours, risk of accidents and limited possibilities for advancement. There is also a gap between the wages of workers in underground mines like Huarón and those in open-pit mines.

“We are not renters, we are workers:” The politics of space at Mina Raúl

Mina Raúl, a much smaller mine than Huarón, was located on Peru’s coast, near the town of Mala a few hours south of Lima. In the years 1986 to 1998, Huarón and Mina Raúl – together with the Caylloma mine in Arequipa - were owned by the same company. Thus, at Mina Raúl union meetings workers referred to Huarón and Caylloma as the “sister locals” (*hermana base*). Officers from these unions traveled to each other’s assemblies with some frequency in order to coordinate strikes and pacts. Located on the coast and closer to Lima, Mina Raúl’s workers would have had stronger urban orientations and would have been seen as immersed in a more “modern” milieu. However, the mine drew its workers mostly from the highlands. The union’s founding document from 1960 gives some idea of this by recording the birthplaces of union affiliates. Among those workers who were present at the union’s founding, a significant number came from the area around Puquio in southern Ayacucho Department. Another important contingent came from Pataz Province in La Libertad Department in the north, as well as from different parts of Ancash Department (Recuay, Huari, Pomabamba). Small numbers also came from other parts of the country, as well as from the mine’s immediate surroundings in Mala.²⁷⁶ According to a 1974 survey, 45% of Mina Raúl workers who were questioned identified as children of agriculturalists or cattle-raisers; 36% said they had themselves been dedicated to agriculture or herding before becoming miners (Sulmont and Valcárcel 1993).

In the early 1990s, the Mina Raúl union was faced with a scenario of crisis similar to Huarón’s – both the economic crisis of the company and the weakening of the union. In 1998 the union had participated in the first National Miners’ Strike, but by the time of the III National Strike in 1989, workers at the assembly complained of exhaustion and did not participate. In 1990 and 1991 the company began pressuring the workers to leave. Whereas in 1988 and 1989 there were around 235 affiliates to the union and assemblies had regular attendance of between 150 and 190 members, by early 1994 there were around 76 unionized workers left and attendance at meetings ranged between 30 and 60. Like at Huarón, the mine did not close down completely until about a decade later, but in the early 1990s, faced with crisis, it reduced costs and massively reduced its workforce.

²⁷⁶ This information comes from the union’s 1960 founding document and from Sulmont and Valcárcel’s (1993) data from 1985.

At union meetings in early 1994 workers complained not only of sometimes being made to go into areas of the mine on their own rather than in pairs, as had previously been mandated by collective bargaining agreements, but also, as one worker put it, of being made to produce the same amount of mineral as in previous years but with half the workforce. Already the previous year the union had been compelled to accept a thoroughgoing revision of benefits and pacts agreed upon since 1960. Now, the most intense discussions at union assemblies were over the interrelated issues of the camp elementary school and of the camp housing itself.²⁷⁷ On 12 January, 1994, the secretary general, Víctor Yépez, mentioned at assembly that the company had informed that the school would no longer function at the camp and that instead they would provide transportation for the children to attend the school in the towns of Mala and San Antonio. The attendees at the assembly expressed their rejection of the offer, and one said that there were no longer spots in the school in Mala so special arrangements would have to be made with the school district. The minutes quote another worker in attendance: “Elías Robles says that it is not possible that the school pass over to Mala, when they have committed by law to give this benefits to the workers. And he also says that the company has not lost, rather it has gained, because more than 100 workers have already left and for that very reason they are saving money.”

Three weeks later, on February 2, Yépez communicated that the company offered to give 500 soles, as an advance on the workers’ wages, to those who would leave the camp, and in addition would provide them with transportation so they could move to the nearby towns of Mala, Flores and San Antonio and Asia. One member after another then spoke from the floor, urging rejection of the company’s offer. As the secretary of notes and archives recorded,

Compañero Eusebio Ramos says that this is an abuse by the company and he totally rejects the company’s proposals... if we accept we would lose so many benefits conquered through struggle like school supplies, company store (*mercantil*), *comunidad minera*, union, all that would be lost if we agree to leave the camp.

²⁷⁷ Before the new Mining Code of the early 1990s, mining companies had been required by law to provide elementary schools for the children of their workers, even if, as at Mina Raúl in 1961, the union had had to enforce this provision at the bargaining table (See Sulmong and Valcárcel 1993). Small mines like Mina Raúl only had an elementary school inside the camp.

Ramos' statement explicitly linked the camp with a whole complex of arrangements and institutions. Some of these, like the school supplies and the union itself, actually were the product of long-term struggle; others, like the *comunidad minera*, had been imposed from above (by the Velasco government) but had subsequently become a part of the institutional life of the mining camp. Ramos repeated this argument in an assembly a week later:

The purpose of the company is to eliminate the camp and therefore the school, the hospital, and meanwhile also the workers' organizations [*organizaciones gremiales*] like the union and the *comunidad* [minera] and therefore it is a political position on the part of the company, and not only the company, rather it's an agreement from the National Mining Society for all the mining centers.

The Mining Society was and is the central organization of mining companies in Peru; in the late 1980s it had defeated its primary antagonist at the time, the National Mining Workers' Federation, which had waged three national strikes attempting to establish a unified bargaining framework for all the mining workers in the country. Another worker linked the elimination of the camps to national policy, but added a chauvinistic tinge, blaming "the Japanese who occupy the ministries" (a reference to President Alberto Fujimori and some of his ministers).

Although at Mina Raúl (like at Huarón) the mining union minutes are also populated overwhelmingly by men's voices, at this meeting the head of Micaela Bastidas, the workers' wives committee (*comité de amas de casa*), also spoke:

The president of Micaela Bastidas asks for the unity of the workers and the wives, and says that it seems like some workers have no conscience and that the price of a house is above 16,000 soles and we should unite and if they kick us out they should kick us all out, she says.

The idea of unity, and of finding a single solution for all, was still a prominent and commonly voiced ideal in the internal rhetoric of the mining unions. Of course, it was an ideal, not necessarily a reality. Its opposite was also a mainstay of union discourse: the figure of the union leader who makes a separate deal with the company, who "negotiates" and betrays the rest. This opposition of unity vs. individual, backroom negotiation was part of the rhetorical performance of union meetings. As one worker said at a later meeting, "It could be that some workers are going to negotiate with the company and why do they not speak up in the assembly,

why do they go to the company?” Eusebio Ramos, while arguing that “the camp will be eliminated no matter what,” also claimed that “there are some *compañeros* who want to negotiate (*negociar*), and he recommends that no *compañero* should make a deal until the leadership reaches an agreement. And that all of us united will make the company retreat.”

At the following meeting, on February 17, Elías Robles proclaimed that “the leadership should say to the company that the workers want a camp and that we are not renters, we are workers.” The idea of being a worker was still linked to stability and benefits like housing; furthermore, the worker was a relevant social category and a part of the organic entity that was the company, and thus could not simply be evicted like a renter. The link between the community of workers’ families, its proximity to the mine and its ability to make demands on the company was explicitly voiced. As Eusebio Ramos said at the same meeting:

The purpose of the company is to throw us out of here, because as long as we stay here we will always be making our claims and that is the heart of the matter (*la madre del cordero*), if we leave, for the company all those problems will be over.

The week before, the secretary general Víctor Yépez had used a term – neoliberalism - that was common in publications of the Mining Federation and its leftist allies, but that, unlike more popular terms like “conscience” or “struggle,” was not frequent in rank-and-file pronouncements at local union assemblies:

The National Mining Society together with the government are applying the neoliberal policy in other words that the businessmen should just earn money on its own (*ganar líquido*) without spending on camps, on medicines, on schools, on everything that is expenditure, and that the worker collect the envelope only with their salary without any benefits... if the company wants us to leave they should build another camp, that is the position of the leadership.

At the next assembly, Yépez reported that the company was willing to raise the compensation to 1,500 soles as a loan whose terms of repayment would later be discussed. In addition,

If people do not want to leave the camp, the company will not provide any kind of maintenance, it will not paint the rooms, there will be no [help in] relocating, people will stay where they’re at and in the shape they’re in, there will be no fumigation and the power and water will be rationed.

Thus, the implied threat was that if the workers did not at this time take the offer of the loan and the transportation for leaving the camp, they would lose both and afterward they would get nothing. Though there wouldn't necessarily be a forced eviction from the camps, the company would cease providing the services it previously had and the camp would become less livable as time went on.

In an assembly a few days later, the bargaining commission informed the union members that the company had given a deadline of February 28 to accept its offer of 2,000 soles "plus the fiber cement roofing, the wood, doors, toilets, etc;" after that date the offer would no longer hold and the outcome would be uncertain. A series of statements by union members followed, vowing not to leave the camp and emphasizing that if the company wanted them to leave they would have to pay the real cost of a house. Yet at the next assembly, when a vote was taken, this time the difference between those who wanted to maintain the commitment to not leave the camp and those who were willing to consider otherwise was only 17 to 14. Finally, on March 29, Secretary General Yépez informed the assembly that the company had given the union a list of 24 workers who had agreed to leave the camp, among whom were 3 union officers. In light of that fact, the bargaining commission had decided to reach an agreement with the company on the subject of the camps; the compensation would be raised to 2,500 soles, and it would be made a donation rather than a loan. The union's official position thus changed from staying in the camps to encouraging the remaining workers to leave. Immediately, Elías Robles spoke:

Elías Robles criticized the action taken by the leadership, there is something fishy going on here (*aquí hay gato encerrado*), if possible the entire leadership must be removed, they are the direct culprits, they should have let those 24 *compañeros* go, because they did not have the authorization to negotiate, this is treason and the leadership should be changed immediately... He said that this is treason to the workers and that, even though he has a plot in [the nearby town of] Mala, he will not leave the camp.

Robles' stated position should not be taken as necessarily representing a more principled stance than that of the leadership; people often changed sides, or did things for personal or unstated reasons rather than for what is recorded in the transcript. Factionalism and infighting were as much a part of mining union culture as were the ideal and performance of unity and solidarity. Divisions increased under the impact of the economic crisis, the weakening of the unions and the pressure from the company. Nevertheless, these documents show the way in

which leaving the mining camp was seen as a significant change – although part of the larger cycle of the crisis and weakening of the union – that would have an impact on the way in which the collectivity of workers would continue to exist as a unit and on the kinds of demands and struggles that would be articulated. The worker as a relevant social category would undergo a transformation due to this particular production (and destruction) of space: the dismantling of the unit of laboring families working for one company and living together in close proximity to the workplace.

The end of the mining camp model

The dismantling of the camps was the result of the adoption by mining companies in Peru of a practice that had grown worldwide in the 1970s and 80s: that of replacing the traditional mining town with a model labeled either Long-Distance Commuting (LDC) or Fly-in/Fly-out (FIFO). This scheme meant that workers would be brought in to work for a certain number of days and then returned to their places of origin to spend a period of rest with their families. LDC built on the tradition of labor migration associated with extractive industries – as Storey and Shrimpton (1988) argue, the scheme is “a new variant on the old theme of going away to work in the resource sector” (Storey and Shrimpton 1988, vii). Yet it was also a new departure, one that initially began to take root in the oil sector in Australia and Canada in the 1960s. In mining, the Asbestos Hill mine in Canada was one of the first to use LDC in 1972 (ibid. vii), but at this time the traditional mining camp model was still in full swing – between 1960 and 1975, some 25 new mining settlements had been built in Australia. By 1991, however, at least 41 mining operations in that country were using LDC.

In Peru, mining workers’ housing was still being built all over the country in the 1970s; a new generation of camp buildings, with two stories, indoor plumbing and a more modern appearance, was emerging alongside the single-story adobe rows, with outdoor shared faucets and bathrooms, left over from the 1940s. In 1977, the Buenaventura mining company published a plan to build a whole new town for its workers, with 1,200 dwelling units (Buenaventura 1977). Pressures to reverse this trend began to be felt in the 1980s, but it wasn’t until the 1990s that the dismantling of the camps became the policy for mining centers around the country.



Figure 8 – Last remaining blocks of workers’s housing, Huarón mine (Francois section), with settlement of La Hueca below. Many of the former family apartments have been split up into rooms for single workers on the 14x7 system. In the back are some of the foundations of demolished housing blocks. Photograph by the author, November 2008

In Australia and Canada, many of the mining companies using LDC were remote operations in arid or frigid areas; there commuting literally took the form of “fly-in/fly-out.” In Peru, a pattern would develop where a portion of the workforce – especially administrators, engineers and higher-skilled workers – would be brought in by car from the cities for their days of work, while the less-paid and subcontracted workers would simply move to the nearest town and build their houses.²⁷⁸ The traditional white bungalows for administrative staff were for the most part not touched in the 1990s, and still form closed compounds where administrators and

²⁷⁸ Although, at some of the larger and relatively more remote mines in Peru, upper-level administrators do literally fly in and fly out, by helicopter.

some specialized workers and engineers stay during work. This physical permanence of the administrators' compound contrasts strongly with the near-disappearance of the workers' housing.

The abandonment of the mines and the workers' camps can be seen as an ambiguous process. In people's accounts, it appears as a loss of benefits (schools, health centers, etc.) and a betrayal of company obligations, but also as a process of overcoming dependence and opening to new horizons. Another effect, though, was the increase in the spatial separation of the spheres of production and reproduction of the labor force, the removal of large numbers of women from the immediate vicinity of the mines and a resulting re-masculinization of the productive sphere, as was noted at the time by activists from NGOs that had been working with mining women in the 1980s (Amat y León 1990s).²⁷⁹ In the 1980s, the mining wives' committees (CACs) had been active in the camps during the strikes as well as, to a lesser degree, in the organization of everyday life. Furthermore, a discourse had begun to emerge in the leadership of some unions, and especially among the NGOs that were working with them, about recognizing women's unpaid labor as part of the productive process. Aquilina Robles, a leader of the women's committee at the Milpo mine, told me how during a protest in Lima, when the company refused to recognize the committee, she had been encouraged by a member of the NGO Filomena Tomaira Pacsi:²⁸⁰

She told me, 'Why? Why won't they recognize you? You wash the overalls, you send the lunch, you dry the boots, you knit the socks, without a salary. If they didn't have you, the company would do all that, and how much more would they then spend? '

This discourse, and the social formation of the mining camp itself, served to highlight the role of women as part of the productive process of the mine, and was the foundation of the visible and active role of the mining women's committees at the local and national levels. Such a close connection would be lost as the sphere of reproduction of the mining workforce spread from its formerly concentrated location near the mine into the broader society. At the same time, it cannot be denied that this had been a role that was politically subordinated to the male-dominated union, and that furthermore was based on a rather strict division of labor.

²⁷⁹ This spatial transformation was noted at the time in documents of Filomena Tomaira Pacsi, the main NGO that worked with mining women.

²⁸⁰ This NGO was named after a young woman who died giving birth during the Minas Canaria march of sacrifice.

Among the families that remained in mining or that entered it anew during the new boom that began in 2003-2004, the division of labor between men and women has mostly continued as in older times, with the difference that most of the women are now farther away from the mine. At Huarón, only a few workers' camp buildings are left - at the neighboring mine of Animón there are none. Workers from Huayllay live in the town with their families and commute every day. Among those from other areas, some rent a room together with their spouses in Huayllay, while others have their families elsewhere and only come to work their fourteen 12-hour days and return to their towns on the seven off-days. In Huayllay, thus, the mining camp has to some degree fused with the town, which in this case is also a *comunidad campesina*.

As Lefebvre has argued, "every society produces a space, its own space... A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself" (Lefebvre 1991, 53-4). The fusing of mining camp and town constitutes a clear example of the way in which transformations in physical and social space are part and parcel – as both mechanism and effect – of social transformations. Indeed, the very model on which the demolition of the camps was premised – the long-distance commuting or fly-in/fly-out model – implies a strong element of the tearing down of spatial barriers or "annihilation of space through time" (Harvey 1991; 205). This occurs as high-skilled workers and administrators are brought in from their different spheres of reproduction into the productive sphere of the mine. The "accumulated time" systems of 14x7 (or other variants) allow for this, as they also allow contractors to do the same with their workers.

At the same time, however, this annihilation of space is accompanied by the preservation of distance in other dimensions in social space. At Huarón, the high-end employees who live in the company compound are as isolated from the families living in the town/*comunidad* of Huayllay (most of which are families of people who work at the mine) as ever before. This was brought home to me in a conversation with a high-level company administrator, who tried to convince me and a colleague to stay in the company compound rather than in Huayllay, arguing that conditions in the town were not proper to stay in. He told us about the one time during his years of work at the mine that he had arrived late and had been forced to seek lodging in the town, and shuddered as he reminisced about the cold, lack of water, and overall discomfort. In

general, the people who live in the compound are not seen walking around the town or other parts of the *comunidad* except on official business. Similarly, company officials and employees live at the compound without their families, since they come only for limited periods and then return.²⁸¹ Furthermore, whereas before there was a sharp 3-way division between *obreros*, *empleados* and *staff*, now the separation between the first two categories has lost much of its old force. Yet the division between those outside and those inside the company compound (the latter heirs to the *staff* of old) has remained or perhaps increased. In the town itself, the payroll/subcontracted division produces a significant split in terms of pay, benefits and the possibility for organized action.

At the same time, however, we should not imagine that capital has unlimited power to remake space according to its own designs. In the first place, if the departure of thousands of workers from the mines in the early 1990s did respond to the needs and interests of capital at the time, this dynamic also built on the pre-existing spatial practices of the workers and their families. When workers left under the threat of mine closure, as at Huarón, or were directly fired, as was the case for some at Centromín, their decisions as to where to go and what to do were based on certain accustomed trajectories that had developed in the mining culture of central Peru. Mining work had been seen as something with a finite time span – not necessarily a short-term seasonal migration, as in the early 20th century, but finite nevertheless. People generally did not grow old in the mining camps. The ideal was to work a sufficient number of years to be able to educate one's children and build up savings with which to return to one's town or, increasingly, move to the cities. In Cerro de Pasco, moving to the warmer climate of the city of Huánuco and its surroundings has been a longstanding cultural ideal among retired mining workers. And, although people's narratives emphasize the figure of the worker who did not foresee leaving the

²⁸¹ It must also be mentioned that, although this and many other present-day mines are owned by foreign companies, all administrators and engineers on the ground are Peruvian. Also, some of the younger mining engineers in present-day Peru are children of mining workers from the Central Highlands, unlike the older and more established core of engineers who are of middle-class or upper-class roots. On average, however, the direct payroll, fly-in/fly-out contingents at closed company compounds are still somewhat lighter-skinned, more urban and culturally different from the local populations. The foreign communities of U.S. and European administrators and their families at Huarón and Cerro de Pasco have disappeared altogether.

camp, it is clear from my interviews that building a house outside the camp was a cultural ideal among mining workers and their families even before the crisis.²⁸²

The difference that the crisis made was that people had to leave earlier than they had planned, maybe before they had been able to build a house. Furthermore, those who were close to but not quite at retirement age saw their chance of getting a retirement pension slip away, even if they had worked a good number of years. The sudden reduction in income and the uncertainty with which the future presented itself made previously predictable life trajectories suddenly unstable, and reversed expectations of progress that had been in the process of establishing themselves. This was emphasized by one of my interviewees, the wife of a former Centromín worker at Cerro de Pasco, who said that if her husband had not been fired, “maybe my children would also have been much better; only one of them is an engineer, the rest, well they also wanted to be engineers.” Also, once the mines began hiring large numbers of people again, former workers who had stayed in mining areas like Huayllay often saw their sons going to work through subcontractors - with the implications that had in terms of pay and benefits – rather than through direct payroll as they themselves had worked.

However, not only did capital have to find ways to make its own spatial strategies coincide at least partly with those of workers’ families, but there were also other spatial practices at play that did not necessarily mesh so well with the needs of capital. As examined in the next two chapters, one such spatial development during the 20th century has been the growth and empowerment of *comunidades campesinas* – the landholding institutions that by the 1990s owned much of the surface land in Peru. These communities have been able to set some conditions on the mining companies operating on their land; one of the most common of these conditions is the demand for direct rather than subcontracted jobs. This places some limits on the tendency of the LDC system to “annihilate space” and bypass the local population when hiring personnel. Furthermore, although spatial strategies such as the communities’ recuperation of

²⁸² People in the region often tried to establish or maintain a foothold in different spaces: their *comunidad* of origin, the mining camp, the city of Cerro de Pasco (where their children could more easily access higher education), and lower-elevation valley cities such as Huánuco and Tarma where the climate is better for health. In the case of families with slightly more resources, spatial trajectories could extend to cities like Lima and Huancayo. The particular mix of spaces accessed varies depending on the individual family, however. I have met former mining workers who did not maintain close ties with their *comunidad*. Similarly, there were many who did not have a firm foothold in Lima (though almost everyone had a close relative there).

their lands may be located within the world economy dominated by capital, they are not part of the logic of capital, and are not directly controlled by it. Rather, they flow from parallel historical processes, which are intertwined with but not always dominated by capital (Chakrabarty 2000).

Even in the realm of labor, capital's power to remake social relations is not unlimited. Though the growth of subcontracting and the changes in the labor laws (in particular the end of labor stability) have served to make permanent the weakening of the mining unions that occurred in the context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, some past conventions and regulations do remain and serve to place limits on the erosion of labor rights. The Ministry of Labor still conducts inspections at mining sites. Some of the excessively long work periods that began to emerge in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as 21x7 systems, have since been standardized into the 14x7 system, even if the latter does still represent a greater exaction of labor than in the past. Discontent over the subcontracting system, however muted by the decline of labor politics, was strong enough during the 2006 elections to motivate presidential candidate Alan García (the former president) to promise its end. Although he did not fulfill this proclamation after becoming president, his government did have to place some regulations on contractors. And the Mining Federation still exists, even if it now represents a minority rather than a majority of mining workers. As in Huarón, there have been several protracted struggles by subcontracted workers to obtain union recognition - most notoriously at Casapalca in 2006 – though mostly without success. Finally, as in all of the above dynamics, the ability of retired and laid-off mining workers to ensure the payment of retirement benefits, severance pay and pensions has rested on past political processes, which thus have not been completely erased from the present.²⁸³

²⁸³ To give a concrete example of this: in 1989 the APRA government was compelled to issue a new retirement law for mining workers, in response to the strength shown by the National Mining Strikes and as a consolation prize given the government's inability to force the National Mining Society to agree to the Mining Federation's foremost demand of industry-wide bargaining. The new retirement law made it possible for underground mining workers to retire and receive a pension at age 45 (if they had worked at least 20 years, 10 of them underground), and at age 50 for open-pit workers and 55 for other surface workers (if they had worked at least 25 or 30 years, respectively). Before, the retirement age had been 60, an age which many underground workers reached in ill health or not at all. Although some of the provisions of the new law were eliminated by the Fujimori regime in the 1990s, several others remained. In general, the law provided the context within which many workers who were over 45 at the time of their departure were able to get pensions, even if this often required a long legal process.

CHAPTER V

COMMUNITY, LAND AND WORK

In their 2003 review of the new anthropology of mining, cited at the beginning of this dissertation, Ballard and Banks write that, since the 1980s, “local communities” have “swiftly assumed a pivotal position in the politics and analyses of the wider global mining community” (288), complementing earlier attention paid to actors such as the state, corporations and labor. They trace this development to the late 1970s expansion of the mining industry into remote “greenfield” areas of the Asia-Pacific region, that were new to mining and that often were inhabited by tribal or indigenous populations. That experience, and the conflicts to which it gave rise, led to a new industry and academic focus on the local community as a central actor in world mining. In mining countries such as Peru, the “local community” has since the 1990s become a key category in public discussions of mining and in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs undertaken by mining corporations.

Though the centrality of “community” to the mining industry may be relatively new, however, in broader discourse the category itself is course much older and has long encompassed a range of both academic and everyday meanings, ranging from social cohesion and cooperation to simply a shared connection to a local space. In the specific case of Peru, moreover, the term *comunidad* (literally, “community”) has a particular history. Since 1920, the state has recognized the institution of the *comunidad indígena* (indigenous community), on the basis of older colonial-era institutions that had lost legal standing after independence in the 19th century. *Comunidades indígenas* in the highlands were in turn renamed *comunidades campesinas* (peasant communities) in 1969, and they retain that designation today.²⁸⁴ Although *comunidades*

²⁸⁴ For the Amazonian region of Peru, the equivalent legal category is *comunidad nativa* (native community).

vary greatly in terms of their actual functioning, in theory at least they are collections of households that hold a single property title to a territory (though usufruct is generally household-based rather than collective); and that possess a political structure dictated both by state guidelines and by local custom. After the peasant movements and Agrarian Reform of the 1960s and 70s eliminated the old hacienda system, the *comunidades campesinas* were left owning much of the rural land in highland Peru – nominally in some cases, effectively in others. By the 1990s, there were over 5,680 *comunidades campesinas*, occupying – according to different estimates – somewhere between 40 and 56% of the productive land in the country, both agricultural and pasture land (Burneo 2007, 157-158). This moment of greatest territorial control by *comunidades* and by highland peasant populations in general has thus coincided with the new mining boom that began in Peru in 1993-1997 and that took on renewed force after 2003 – motivated by interrelated factors such as investment-friendly policies, world economic restructuring, high metal prices and, increasingly in recent years, the industrialization of China.

In this chapter and the next, I begin an examination of the topic of mine-community relations by focusing on Huayllay and Rancas - two *comunidades* in Pasco Department, a traditional mining region. I conducted ethnographic and oral history research in these two communities (as well as in the nearby city of Cerro de Pasco) beginning in 2008 and especially in 2009 and 2010. My aim is to contribute to the growing literature on mine-community relations in Peru and other countries that has emerged since the 1990s. Here it is important to note the specificity of the context described in this chapter and the next. While much of the mining expansion of the last two decades in Peru has been characterized by the predominance of large-scale, open-pit methods, mining in Pasco Department is still primarily underground, though there are two open-pit mines (Cerro de Pasco and Brocal). While some of the most important open-pit mines in Peru today are either primarily copper (Antamina, Tintaya, Southern Peru Copper Corporation) or gold (Yanacocha), in the Central Highlands region of which Pasco Department is part the primary products are silver, lead and zinc, though copper is also present. And, most importantly, while some of the mining conflicts in the last few years – in Peru and elsewhere - have involved community protests that seek to prevent the building of new mines (i.e. Tambogrande, Majaz, Tía María, Conga, Cañariaco, etc.), the region discussed here is a historic mining area in which there is an established relationship between the local population and the

mining industry. Nevertheless, this relationship is neither static nor free of conflict, nor is it devoid of the struggles over territory and land that characterize mining conflicts in other parts of Peru and the world. In Pasco, since most mining operations take place on communal lands that are not bought or sold, they require formal mine-*comunidad* agreements that must be renegotiated periodically. These agreements or *convenios* exchange the use of land for a combination of monetary compensation, local development programs and, importantly, work opportunities at the mine.

In the next chapter I will develop an argument about the role of land and landownership in the mine-community relationship, as well as about the shift in the “social burden” in the particular case of Huayllay, as indicative of broader shifts that may not be as visible elsewhere. In this chapter, however, I lay out the basic background on the nature and functioning of the communities of Huayllay and Rancas, in particular the use of land. I also focus on the relationship between the traditional work on the land – in this case the raising of livestock – and mining work, as well as other activities. I try to keep in mind the different, overlapping senses of “community”: a specific legal entity encompassing a group of people and a territory; a broader, less rigidly-defined local space and its resident population; and, finally, an object of intervention and action by mining companies.

The regional space

Rancas and Huayllay are both located in Pasco Province, which along with Daniel Alcides Carrión (D.A.C.) and Oxapampa Provinces make up Pasco Department. While D.A.C. Province more or less corresponds to the agricultural *Quebrada* (intermontane valley) of Chaupiwara, and while Oxapampa is entirely located within the eastern rainforest region, Pasco Province is composed of both agricultural *quebrada* (to the east) and, to the west, livestock-raising plateau or *puna* lands. It is on the plateau that Rancas and Huayllay sit (as does the city of Cerro de Pasco), although they have historically had close relations with the *quebrada* communities. As mentioned earlier, there are slightly over 40 officially recognized *comunidades*

in Pasco Province.²⁸⁵ Some, like Rancas, Huayllay, Huaychao, Vicco, Racco, Huaraucaca, Ninacaca and Villa de Pasco, are entirely or primarily plateau, livestock-raising communities. Others, like Tielacayán, Yarusyacán, Huachón and Quiparacra, are primarily *quebrada*, agricultural communities, though most of them also possess some *puna* (high-altitude grassland) lands. Beyond Pasco Province, the agricultural communities of D.A.C. Province (Chaupiwaranga Valley), such as Tusi, Rocco, Vilcabamba and Chacayán, are also very much a part of the region centered around Cerro de Pasco, even if they also have their own separate identity and sub-regional space.

These references to discrete *comunidades* refer to the legally constituted entities that own the majority of the land and that group most of the families that live on it. There are other ways to describe the regional space. One is the Peruvian state's division of abstract space into different political jurisdictions. I have already mentioned the division into departments (now also called regions), which are in turn divided into provinces; the latter, in turn, are made up of districts. Each district has a mayor (*alcalde*), who has authority over both the urban and rural parts of the district; there is also a mayor for the whole province. The authority for the entire department/region, on the other hand, is called not a mayor but rather a regional president (*presidente regional*). Thus, Pasco Province (located in Pasco Department) is divided into 13 districts; Huayllay is located in the district of the same name while Rancas belongs to Simón Bolívar District. In both cases, the central village of each *comunidad* is also the district seat; there are also villages that are not district seats but rather have the lower jurisdictional status of *anexo* or *centro poblado menor*. Historically in Peru, the creation of new districts and provinces has been a way for formerly peripheral but rising population centers to assert their independence from a local or regional center. With the new mining boom and the novel mechanism of the *canon minero* that has gone into effect in the last decade – by which 50% of profit taxes paid by mining companies return to the regions of operations – the importance of district, provincial and departmental/regional authorities has grown even more, since it is they (rather than, say, private entities like the *comunidades*) that receive the rents generated by mining.

²⁸⁵ Specifically, the 1998 listing produced by the Ministry of Agriculture's Special Land Titling Program (PETT) names a total of 43 *comunidades* in the province.

Another way to describe the region is to focus on the actual settlement patterns and use of space. I will do that more thoroughly for Huayllay and Rancas later in this section. For now, however, it is important to point out that the existence of forty-odd *comunidades* in Pasco Province does not imply an exactly equal number of settlements or population clusters. It is true that most of the older, historic communities, like Huayllay and Rancas, are associated with particular villages that were the product of the 16th-century *reducción* program. However, the ecological conditions of a high-altitude pastoral environment have long implied a spread-out settlement pattern, with shepherds' houses located all along the plateau. Thus the *pueblos de indios*, as the *reducción* towns were often called in colonial days, may have functioned as ceremonial or political centers, but most of the population spent more time in smaller, spread-out dwellings. As the mining economy and other activities, such as commerce, intensified, more dense settlements could be supported, and the towns grew in importance. Although this process certainly started earlier, it accelerated in the 20th century.

Today, the spread-out rural settlements – often no more than two or three dwellings clustered together - are called *estancias*, and they form the rural counterpart to the towns. While from the perspective of urban Peru the term *comunidad* is associated unambiguously with the rural world, in a relatively developed region like Pasco many of the *comunidades* are actually made up of a town-country pairing, with the “country” (*campo*) consisting of the *estancias*. Yet while the towns of the larger *comunidades*, like Huayllay and Rancas, really stand in the middle ground between the rural and the urban, the smaller, more peripheral *comunidades* are more wholly rural, even in their central towns or settlements. Moreover, in some cases, clusters of *estancias* may grow into a small village, which is then usually called a *caserío* (hamlet). Or the *estancias* may remain spaced apart but be organized into a zone or *sector*, with a central location and their own authorities that are subordinate to those of the *comunidad*. Actually, what is called a *caserío* in one community may be called a *sector* in another. While in many communities these formations remain within the *comunidad*, in some of the larger *comunidades* there may be *caseríos* or *sectores* that attempt to assert their independence as a separate *comunidad*, as was happening in the community of Yarusyacán during the time of my research.

In any case, the *comunidades* are not, for the most part, units of production. As Diez (2007) argues, the *comunidades campesinas* in Peru today can be seen as “political, rather than economic, institutions and spaces” – meaning that their primary functions are “the organization, regulation and solution of conflicts among their members, the relationship with the outside and external agents, and the defense of territorial integrity” (Diez 2007, 119). This perspective contrasts with the early 20th-century views of *indigenista* intellectuals, who were interested in the *comunidades* as economic spaces of cooperation if not socialism. It also contrasts with the tendency of the last two decades – among many anthropologists as well as other observers in Peru – to downplay the importance of the *comunidades* altogether. Although Diez’s argument is meant as a hypothesis for Peru as a whole, glossing over the great variation among different regions, I do find it helpful for the *comunidades* of Pasco. There, the *comunidad* is an important political institution, connected above all to the defense of territory, which usually cannot be bought or sold. For the most part, however, the *estancias* operate independently, and are in the possession (not legal ownership) of individual families. The latter may pasture their own animals on their *estancia*, or, as often happens nowadays, they may hire a shepherd who will work either through the *al partir* system, for a money wage, or a combination of the two. In theory, communal authorities can take away an *estancia* and give it to someone else, but more often they are simply passed from parents to children.

Moreover, *estancias* are not simply shepherds’ dwellings – they are specific places, with a name and a character of their own. People often feel a great emotional attachment to the *estancia* that has been associated with their family for several generations, even if they themselves no longer live there. Importantly, there are also other, more collective units of production besides the *estancias*. A *comunidad* may itself own and directly administer a number of animals, for which it sets aside a small section of the communal territory; such is the case in Huayllay. These are the small “communal farms” (*granjas comunales*) that arose in many communities in the 1940s, as a way to provide the communal institution with its own income; each *comunero* had to donate a small number of animals for this purpose. Also, there are the much larger Communal Cooperatives that exist within many of the *comunidades*; these are the product of the Agrarian Reform of the 1960s and 70s, and are usually set up on at least part of the lands of the old haciendas. For the most part, however, livestock production consists of the

aggregate of *estancias* that operate independently. Beyond the world of livestock, other economic activities (commerce, transport, etc.) are also not determined by the boundaries of a *comunidad campesina* (except in the case of the communal companies) though they are strongly influenced by the ties of kinship and locality that can be said to constitute “community” in the broader sense.

I have already provided historical background on Huayllay in the first chapter of this dissertation. Here I will merely summarize it, before moving on to a brief discussion of the history of Rancas. As discussed in the earlier chapter, Huayllay was a late-16th century *reducción*, as was its most proximate neighbor, Huaychao (Degregori and Golte 1973, 3). Both villages are mentioned in the 1601-1603 records of the third *Visita* of Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo (Benito 2006, 180, 208, 264).²⁸⁶ During the colonial and 19th-century periods, the local economy of Huayllay turned on both herding and small-scale mining. The pottery craft and regional barter system that existed in the early 20th century was no doubt already present in earlier times as well. The village of Huayllay became the center of its own district in 1857, during the government of Ramón Castilla. In 1912, a French mining company acquired the rights to the silver and copper deposits of Huarón, in Huayllay District, and began industrial-scale production in 1918, dominating the local economy for much of the 20th century. After the 1920 Constitution recognized *comunidades indígenas* for the first time since Independence, the *comunidad* of Huayllay obtained official recognition in 1929, followed by neighboring Huaychao in 1933. In 1962, in the midst of the peasant land recuperation movement in Peru – of which the department of Pasco was one of the centers – the *comuneros* of Huayllay and Huaychao occupied the local haciendas that were owned by the Fernandini sheep-raising empire. After the end of the hacienda system, their lands eventually passed into the hands of Huayllay, Huaychao and other neighboring *comunidades*. The 1990s saw the closure of the mining camps, which had formerly constituted the demographic center of the district. With the new rise in

²⁸⁶ Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo was an Archbishop of Lima who traveled through much of central and northern Peru in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. In Benito’s (2006) transcription of his *visita* records, Huayllay appears alternately as “San Juan de Huaylac”, “S. Joan” and “San Juan de Guailas,” while Huaychao appears as either “San Agustín Guachao” or simply “San Agustín.” The modern names of the two towns are San Juan de Huayllay and San Agustín de Huaychao, respectively. This, combined with the geographical order in which they appear in the *visita* records (next to the neighboring towns of Pari and Ondoires) leave little doubt that it is Huayllay and Huaychao that are being referenced.

global metal prices after 2002, the formerly small town of Huayllay began a period of rapid growth, as it fulfilled the functions that the mining camps had once performed.

Like Huayllay, Rancas can also trace its history to the early colonial period. It is listed in Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo's *visita* records from 1601-1603 (Benito 2006, 208, 262-263).²⁸⁷ Moreover, public discourse in the community locates the official recognition of communal lands, and the enshrinement of this recognition in a document known as the *garashipo*, in early colonial days. The date most often given for that in communal publications is 1585. However, haciendas also formed on territory claimed by Rancas; most important of these was Hacienda Paria, which would maintain a land feud with the community that would last until the peasant land recuperation campaign of the 1960s. It was also in or very near the community's lands that the mining settlement of Cerro de Pasco began, with the initial name of San Esteban de Yauricocha. According to regional tradition, this occurred around the year 1630. Thus, from early on, the community of Rancas, the Hacienda Paria and the mining operations of Cerro de Pasco all bordered each other and competed for what was in a sense the same local space. Small, artisanal mineral processing mills dotted the landscape and, together with the mines themselves, employed labor from many of the nearby communities.

The 20th-century history of Rancas is inextricably tied to the history of land recuperation and Agrarian Reform. By the middle of the century, the *comuneros* of Rancas, like those of other nearby communities, felt hemmed in by the haciendas; on one side was Paria, which had been purchased by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (which managed it as part of its Livestock Division), and on the other was Hacienda Pacoyán, which had been purchased by the Lercari Hermanos firm.²⁸⁸ Although the wave of land recuperations in Pasco can be said to have begun

²⁸⁷ Benito's transcription of the *visita* record uses the names "San Antonio de Caranca," "Yarancas" and "Arancar," alternatively. Based on their similarity to the official name of San Antonio de Rancas, and on where they appear in relation to other towns (such as Vico, Yanamate and Pasco), I believe these names refer to the modern town and community of Rancas.

²⁸⁸ As Martínez-Alier (1973) has described for the cattle-raising haciendas of the Central Highlands, haciendas and communities often claimed the same space, with their corresponding land documents; conflicts waxed and waned depending on how vigorously the haciendas decided to enforce what they claimed to be their boundaries. In the 20th century, the modernization of the haciendas along capitalist lines demanded a more stringent enforcement and the erection of fences where none had existed before, as well as the termination of longstanding *huacchilla* arrangements by which local people could pasture their own sheep alongside the hacienda's. The *comuneros* saw this process of boundary enforcement as an encroachment into spaces that they considered to be rightfully theirs.

with the neighboring community of Yanacancha, which in late 1959 attempted to enter the lands of the CPC's Hacienda Paria, it was Rancas' standoff with the same hacienda a few months later that attracted the most attention and galvanized the movement. On April 29, 1960, after months of planning, the *comuneros* of Rancas occupied a field known as Huayllacancha, which had been fenced in by Hacienda Paria but which they claimed as theirs. On May 2nd, the Prado government in Lima sent a large police detachment to evict the *ranqueños*, but the latter resisted, and in the ensuing clash three *comuneros* were killed, including the president of the *comunidad*, while many were wounded. The *ranqueños* had the support of nearby communities as well as the mining unions and the leftist mayor of Cerro de Pasco, Genaro Ledesma; after the events of May 2nd, their resistance elicited the sympathy and solidarity of other groups around the country. Other communities in Pasco (such as Huayllay and Huaychao, in 1962) began seizing hacienda lands that they claimed were ancestrally theirs, at the same time as a parallel, unconnected peasant movement was taking place in the southern department of Cuzco. The government violently repressed the *comuneros*, and several pitched battles were fought between the Pasco communities – often acting in a coordinated fashion – and the police.

In spite of the repression, the movement spread from Pasco to Junín Department, while the land takeovers also increased all over Cuzco Department. By some estimates, there were between 350 and 400 land seizures, involving around 300,000 peasants (Handelman 1975, 121). As Handelman writes, “the peasant mobilization of the early 1960s was unquestionably one of the largest peasant movements in Latin American history” (Ibid.). This movement forced the question of land distribution upon the Peruvian state in a much more forceful way than before, so that in 1963 the centrist reformist Fernando Belaúnde was elected president with a platform of land reform. Several of the largest haciendas in Pasco were dissolved during this period, while Belaúnde's Reform proceeded much more slowly in other parts of the country. In 1968 a coup brought to power the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado, who decreed a much more radical Agrarian Reform. By the mid-1970s, the power of the old landowning class had been broken nationwide, and the hacienda system was basically over.

Another factor which played a role in the land recuperation movement of the early 1960s was the workforce reduction that took place in the CPC mines in the 1950s, after which mining work began to absorb less of the community's surplus labor force than had been the case in the past (Handelman 1975, 66-67).

As Lino (2012) argues, the role played by Rancas as one of the first communities to recover lands from the haciendas has become a defining factor in the construction of its identity in the years since. Every year on the anniversary of “the massacre of Huayllacancha,” as the clash of May 2, 1960 is known locally, the community conducts a pilgrimage to the spot, in honor of the memory of its three martyrs – Alfonso Rivera, Teófilo Huamán and Silveria Tufino. In public, official as well as everyday discourse, *ranqueños* articulate a sense of themselves as inheritors to a tradition of courage and determination in the struggle against the haciendas. This self-awareness is not entirely unconnected from knowledge of the notoriety gained by Manuel Scorza’s magical-realist novel about the events, *Redoble por Rancas*, which was published in 1970 and translated into more than twenty languages.²⁸⁹ The existence of the novel has meant that many Peruvians, and a few people in other countries, have heard the name Rancas, even if they do not know it is a real place. In Rancas itself, however, although the existence of the novel has contributed to the community’s sense of its own importance, the work of memory has developed quite independently, with frequent and conflicting narrations of the events of 1960 by those who participated (Lino 2008, 2012). Also, to a much greater degree than in Huayllay, there are local publications produced by *ranqueños* that tell the history of the community and above all of the land recuperation campaign.

Today, Huayllay and Rancas are towns, district capitals and *comunidades campesinas*. They are both former *comunidades indígenas*, and, like most of the inhabitants of highland Peru today, generally consider themselves to be the descendants of the local pre-Conquest population. However, according to a common type of categorization, they would be described as mestizo rather than Indian. I am referring to the term mestizo not as used in the relational sense of being opposed to or differentiated from a local Indian population (as in the *runa/misti* division described in ethnographies of Southern Peru from the 1970s and 80s). Rather, in this usage it refers to people’s longstanding adoption of certain key cultural markers such as Spanish language and Western dress, and more generally in their relative integration into national

²⁸⁹ Manuel Scorza was a Peruvian writer who collaborated with the communal movement in Pasco and with Genaro Ledesma in the 1960s. *Redoble por Rancas* forms the first installment of a series of five novels about the land conflicts in Pasco called *La Guerra Silenciosa* (“The Silent War”). He died in a plane crash in Spain in 1983.

society.²⁹⁰ However, as De la Cadena (2000) has argued for other parts of Peru, such selective adoption of Western cultural traits, as well as the shedding of those characteristics that are deemed most “Indian,” in no way implies the loss of all local cultural traditions or the loss of identity (as outside observers have often believed). Here it is useful to reference Romero’s (2004) discussion of *mestizaje* in the Mantaro Valley, which he sees as “the gradual appropriation of modernity by indigenous Andean peasants” (45). At the same time, it must be remembered that this appropriation was not a straightforward or easy process, because dominant notions of “modernity” in Peru traditionally excluded indigenous culture; according to them, you could be modern or indigenous, but hardly both. Elements of a new modernity did emerge in Peru over the course of the 20th century, but this transformation was beset by contradictions and difficulties. For Huayllay and Rancas, some of this painful process is captured in a statement I often heard made by middle-aged people in both locations— that their fathers “forbade” their mothers to speak to them in Quechua, so that they would not learn the language.

Even though they are both *comunidades campesinas* (peasant communities), today most of the inhabitants of Huayllay and Rancas are not “peasants” in the original sense of the term. Although, as we shall see, many of them maintain a strong relationship to the land and to herding work, that “traditional” sector no longer serves as the main source of livelihood for the majority of the people. Instead, many *ranqueños* and *huayllinos* work in mining or other occupations, while some have entered the professions or commerce. Many complement these activities with the possession of animals, while a minority is dedicated to livestock primarily or exclusively. This distribution varies with time, however; during periods when mining production decreases, more *comuneros* work directly with the animals on the land. Thus, while the name *comunidad campesina* is officially retained in both places, Huayllay and Rancas are as much working-class,

²⁹⁰ Personally, I am not particularly interested in labeling people as either mestizo, Indian or indigenous, and would rather leave issues of identity for the individuals and communities in question to define themselves. In Peru today, identities are fluid and more often implicit rather than explicit. In this part of the Central highlands in particular, there are social inequalities and hierarchies today, but they are not as profound as either the *runa/misti* division referred to above, or the *costeño/serrano* division found on the coast. Yet it is important to emphasize that communities like Huayllay and Rancas, which switched to Spanish over the course of the 20th century, have often been labeled mestizo, unlike the Quechua-speaking communities of the south. Actually, another term that was frequently used in social science in the 1960s and 70s, was *cholo*, an originally derogatory term which in social science usage was supposed to denote a “transitional class” between Indians and mestizos. Thus, in his 1975 study Handelman wrote that “most of Pasco’s *comuneros*, then, were *cholos* rather than Indians.”

semi-proletarian communities – and semi-urban at that - as they are “peasant communities.” The term “peasant-miner,” used by some of the social scientists who studied the Central Highlands of Peru in the 1970s and 80s, still applies today, even if the relationship between the two elements in this binary has changed.

That said, the land is still important, not only because it complements mining work and other activities, but also because the relationship between the mining companies and the *comunidades* often turns on issues of land. For that reason, I will now examine the use of land today, as well as the political functioning of the *comunidad* - which is intimately connected, if not to everyday production on the estancias, then to the access to the land itself, both historically and in the present day.

Comunidades and the use of land

As mentioned before, Rancas and Huayllay are both relatively large communities, both in terms of population and territory. Some numbers will help to give an idea of the relative populations of the *comunidades* as well as of the surrounding areas. One way to examine the size of each *comunidad* is to look at the number of *comuneros titulares* – i.e. registered community members; they are the ones who can vote at communal assemblies and who act as the link between their households and the *comunidad* as a whole. In each *comunero* household, either the husband or the wife can be a *titular*, but not both, and it’s usually the husband; adult children living at home can also become *titulares* themselves. In Rancas, in 2006 there were around 378 *comuneros titulares* registered; by 2008, this had increased to 545, of whom around 70% were men and 30% women. The number of registered *comuneros* has likely continued to increase, though I do not have more recent figures. In terms of the total number of people living within the boundaries of the *comunidad* (including both the town and the estancias), in 2009 I calculated this to be around 1,300 individuals, based on the survey I conducted in the community that year. Of the individuals surveyed, 72% would be found in the town, and 28% in the estancias (granted, many people go back and forth). In terms of households, we managed to survey 292 households

(the vast majority) within the communal boundaries. Around 82% were *comunero* households and 18% were non-*comunero* households (the latter mostly migrant shepherds).

According to the most recent national population Census, that of 2007, in that year 913 people were counted in the town of Rancas – this does not include the estancias on the community's lands, since the national Census does not use the *comunidad* as a unit of analysis (i.e., all the rural lands in the different *comunidades* in the district are lumped together). The total population of the district of Simón Bolívar, of which Rancas is part, is much larger (13,681 in 2007), since it includes some urban neighborhoods of the city of Cerro de Pasco.

By contrast, in 2007, the much larger town of Huayllay was counted as having 6,736 people, out of a district total of 10,617; the population has almost certainly increased since then. The larger size compared to Rancas is not only because the *comunidad* of Huayllay is larger, but also because the town functions as the nearest population center (and thus surrogate mining camp) to the mines of Huarón and Animón. Thus, unlike in Rancas, which is basically home to *ranqueños* plus some migrant shepherds, the town of Huayllay attracts large numbers of migrants due to mining and commerce (whereas in Rancas the nearby city of Cerro de Pasco plays this role).

If we focus only on the *comunidad* of Huayllay, at the time of my research the number of *comuneros titulares* had recently increased sharply, from around 800 to about 1,500. According to the comments of local people, the increase was due to the greater benefits that being a community member entailed in relation to mining activity, especially after the renegotiation of the mine-community agreements in 2006-2008. In particular, being a *comunero* helped to get work at the mine, either directly or through the communal company. As a result, children of *comuneros* who in the past had migrated elsewhere or just did not have interest in the communal institution or the communal lands, were now eager to formally join the *comunidad*. In terms of the entire communal population of the *comunidad* of Huayllay (i.e. *titulares* plus their family members), a rough estimation would place this figure at somewhere around 3,500 in 2009-2010.

In terms of territory, Rancas possesses a total of around 16,000 hectares of land, while Huayllay owns around 34,000 hectares. While these extensions of land may seem very large, it is

important to remember that they are situated almost entirely in a high-altitude grassland region (*puna*). At 4,300 meters above sea level, large amounts of land are needed to support a relatively small population. For example, Mayer (2009, 46) argues, citing Caballero (1981), that in the Andes 51.6 hectares of high-altitude grasslands can be considered roughly equivalent to one hectare of irrigated agricultural land at under 3,000 meters of altitude.

The landscape of this area is inevitably shaped by its high altitude. Not only are there no trees, but there is also an absence of the sharp, steep slopes that are characteristic of many Andean communities, especially in the *quebradas* and valleys. Yet Rancas and Huayllay are not on the flattest portion of the Pasco/Junín plateau, where, for example, the community of Vicco is located. Rather, the landscape is one of rolling, gentle hills, broken by the occasional jaggy outcrops of rock (which in one section of Huayllay turn into a dense rock formation known as the Stone Forest). The snowcapped peaks of the Western and Eastern Cordilleras can be seen at a distance. The highest areas around the two communities are home to several lakes, the largest of which are Lake Alcacocha in Rancas and Lake Huarón in Huayllay, though there are other smaller ones. People have traditionally obtained water not only from these lakes but also from the occasional *puquiales* (freshwater springs). It is only in the easternmost section of the communal lands of Rancas that the high-altitude region ends and the ground gives way to the *quebradas*; here, potatoes and other crops can be grown, the slopes become steeper, and bushes and a few trees begin to appear.

In pre-colonial days, before the arrival of sheep from Europe, the high-altitude grasslands of Pasco and Junín were a land dedicated to the raising of llamas and alpacas and, in some parts, to the cultivation of *maca*.²⁹¹ Today, it is sheep country above all, with alpacas in second place and bovine cattle in third. Llamas, the Andean pack animals par excellence, were also very important up until the early 20th century. In the 19th century, the raising of llamas was tightly interconnected to the mining economy, for they were virtually the primary way to transport minerals. Some haciendas were devoted primarily to raising llamas, since they could charge high rates for their use and earn substantial profits. This came to an end in the early 1900s when the

²⁹¹ Some aspects of the early colonial period in this area (i.e. the Province of Chinchaycocha), including the raising of animals, are described in the 1603 chronicle reproduced by Duviols (1974).

new foreign mining companies (such as Huarón and the much larger Cerro de Pasco Corporation) built railroads to transport their minerals. Llamas continued to be used in the peasant economy, for example for the exchange trips to the *quebradas*, but later in the 20th century the arrival of automobiles (and the decline of long-distance barter) put an end to this too. Sheep and alpacas have also been connected to mining insofar as they were sometimes explicitly raised for the purpose of feeding mining workers at cheaper rates than if their food were to be bought on the market in the mining towns.

Today, sheep are raised for their meat, hides and wool, while alpacas are raised above all for their highly valued fleece, and secondarily for their meat. As a general rule, it can be said that the sheep and alpacas kept in the areas of family usufruct (i.e. the *estancias*) are raised either for consumption of their meat by the households themselves or for sale to butchers and other buyers in the most local markets (i.e. the town of Huayllay itself, or Cerro de Pasco in the case of Rancas). The communal cooperatives, on the other hand, sell meat and hides in larger quantities and attract buyers from more distant markets such as Huánuco or even Lima. This is especially the case with the alpaca fleece, which is largely not for local consumption but rather is sold to companies from elsewhere in Peru. The cooperatives also periodically send some of their members to other parts of the country to purchase new breeding stock to improve their herds, and these can be quite expensive. Bovine cattle – Brown Swiss to be precise – are also kept in limited numbers. For example, at the time of my research the Communal Cooperative of Huayllay had one of its three units devoted to bovine cattle, with around 600 head of cattle. In the *estancias* of Rancas, taken as a whole, I estimated the ratio of cows to sheep to be around 1:16 – in other words, one cow for every 16 sheep (although there were many *estancias* that had no bovine cattle at all).

The fact that this is a region devoted to animal husbandry rather than agriculture has important consequences for countless aspects of local society – not just the extensive nature of land use, but also the relative integrity of communal territories. Although as noted earlier, the *estancias* are managed by individual families, they generally do not build fences or enforce a strict separation of pastureland between neighboring *estancias*. Moreover, they recognize that the land ultimately belongs to the community, and that it is only usufruct that is household-based.

While it is true that this is due in part to national legislation that made communal lands unalienable (from the 1920s to the 1990s), in other, more agricultural regions there has often been, in practice, a stronger tendency towards parcelization and the division of communal lands. The relative weakness of this phenomenon in the high-altitude areas of Pasco is consistent with Burneo's analysis – based on the work of several Peruvian anthropologists – that sees increasing collective control as one moves upwards away from agricultural zones and towards high-altitude pasture lands (Burneo 2007, 166-167).

The land the communities possess today includes both that which they had managed to register as *comunidades indígenas* (from the 1920s to the 1950s), and the land that they gained during the Agrarian Reform – the latter in turn a result of the land recuperation campaigns of the early 1960s. Scholars like Caballero (1981) have criticized the tendency of observers in the 1950s and 60s to exaggerate the predominance of large estates in highland Peru, when actually small producers occupied a wider area. However, in this particular region, there actually was a process of concentration of haciendas during the course of the 20th century, so that they did comprise a small number of very large cattle-raising estates: the 308,000 hectare Algolán (Fernandini), the Cerro de Pasco Corporation's *Ganadera* Division, and Lercari Brothers. Although their roots lay in colonial-era estates, by the 1950s these haciendas were also attempting to modernize along capitalist lines.

Because the land recuperation movement had been particularly strong in Pasco, and because of the high-profile, relatively modern haciendas that existed here, the expropriation of the estates took place earlier than in other parts of Peru. In other words, it got underway during President Belaunde's moderate and piecemeal Agrarian Reform program (1964-1968), rather than during President Velasco's more radical reform (1968-1975) as in much of the rest of the country. In Pasco, Belaunde's Reform began to divide up much of the Algolán and CPC estate lands among the surrounding communities, instructing them to create cattle-raising "communal enterprises" on their portions of the expropriated land (these enterprises became new spaces of coordinated production, in addition to the small "communal farms" that had been formed by many of the communities in the 1940s). The communities had to pay for the land they received under the Agrarian Reform, and thus acquired substantial debts. Other portions of the

expropriated estates were turned over to the former hacienda workers in the form of “agrarian cooperatives.” When Velasco came to power in 1968, his Agrarian Reform conducted further adjudications and additionally converted most of the “communal enterprises” into “communal cooperatives,” as they are known to this day. Thus, by the 1970s, Rancas had recovered land from the CPC (Hacienda Paria) and Lercari (Hacienda Pacoyán), while Huayllay had gained/recovered land from both Algolán and Lercari.²⁹² A final adjustment occurred in the 1980s, when *comunidades* like Huayllay and Rancas recovered some additional land from the “agrarian cooperatives” of the former hacienda workers. On their remaining land, most of the *cooperativas agrarias* then constituted themselves as new *comunidades* in their own right.

Thus, in Huayllay’s case, the land recuperation and Agrarian Reform processes legally added some 17,000 hectares to the initial 17,000 that had been legally registered by the *comunidad indígena* in 1931. However, a duality is still maintained between the two portions of territory. The original lands are where the families’ *estancias* (here also called *majadas*) are located, whereas the new lands for the most part comprise Huayllay’s Communal Cooperative (Cooperativa Comunal No.16). This duality in space correlates with a duality in production techniques: whereas the cooperative is conceptualized as a sphere of technical, managed animal husbandry, the *estancias* are the space of the *huacchilla* animals, cattle raised following traditional techniques.

In the case of Rancas, on the other hand, the community had been more hemmed in by the haciendas, and seems to have been in the possession of no more than 3,000 hectares (possibly less) at the start of the land recuperation and Agrarian Reform. In the latter process, the community legally added around 13,000 hectares of land (much of which had long been claimed by the community as theirs).²⁹³ Unlike in Huayllay, only a portion of the recovered land became

²⁹² The *comunidades* had long considered the land to be theirs; nevertheless, the blueprint for knowing what land should belong to what community was not entirely clear. The decisions were initially made by Belaunde’s Agrarian Reform officials, on the basis of criteria like the population of each community as well as the latter’s claims. Later officials from the Velasco era would criticize the way the unequal way in which the allotments had been made in the 1960s (SINAMOS 1973). In this sense, the Agrarian Reform was as much a reinvention of communal territorial boundaries as it was a recuperation of land by the *comunidades* as a whole.

²⁹³ It is important to emphasize that the land areas given in this paragraph refer to official figures, which still maintain the distinction between the lands registered by the *comunidades indígenas* and those adjudicated by the Agrarian Reform. In the case of Rancas especially, people assert the unity of the communal territory rather than this

part of Rancas' Communal Cooperative; the rest became estancia territory or was dedicated to other communal uses to be described shortly.

In both Rancas and Huayllay, the term *estancia* refers to both the shepherd's dwelling and the physical space that surrounds it and in which the animals are pastured. Estancias are particular places with individual names that are widely known; for the people who grew up in them, they may provide a source of spatial identity as significant as the larger *comunidad* to which the estancia is attached. Additionally, the term *majada*, especially in Huayllay, can refer to either the physical territory of the pasturing grounds, and the flocks that are pastured in them.

The estancias typically consist of small clusters of two or three small houses or huts, each usually containing a single room. Sometimes, one such cluster is set off alone in the middle of the plain or on the side of a hill; often, though, several such clusters are located quite close to one another and can be thought of as one unit that is in turn set off from the rest of the estancias. In those cases, it is often siblings or other close relatives who have stayed on their parents' land while other siblings have gone to reside in the town or the cities. The estancias typically have earthen walls (*tapial*); in the past, some of them were also built out of *champa*, i.e. the blocks of sod that are also used for cooking. In the last few decades, corrugated tin has mostly, though not entirely, replaced the former straw roofs. Other ad hoc building materials may also serve as supplements. The estancias are clearly distinguished from the houses in the towns of Huayllay and Rancas by their lack of running water or electricity.

In Rancas, the estancias are organized into two *sectores* or areas, on the western and eastern halves of the territory, respectively. Each of the *sectores* has its own organization, with its own president, communal hall and rules and obligations, in addition to also being part of the larger communal organization. Much of this land is territory that was recovered from the haciendas Paria and Pacoyán in the 1960s. There is also a third area of estancias, located closer to the town of Rancas; although it is sometimes referred to as a third *sector*, it does not have a formal *sector* organization. Taking all of these areas together, there are between 110 and 120

separation. Also, it is important to remember that before the Agrarian Reform, boundaries were often fluid, and were subject to contestation as peasants and haciendas came into conflict over whose animals could pasture where and in exchange for what kinds of labor.

estancias within the communal boundaries. This figure, from our 2009 survey, refers to the individual units that people in each area tended to identify as separate estancias. Some of them were located close to one another – sometimes they belonged to close relatives, sometimes not. If we instead count the separate areas of pasture land that have individual names – *parajes* or *canchas*, each sometimes containing more than one estancia - the figure is closer to 60. The estancia pastures are generally not fenced off from one another, though people usually know where one begins and one ends. In my own visits to the estancias I found one case where there seemed to be strong tensions between two neighboring estancias over pasture lands, though there may be others that I did not become aware of.

In addition to the estancia lands of individual family usufruct, which comprise the majority of the communal territory, there are a couple of areas that fall under special regimes. One such is the commons area situated on the slopes behind the town of Rancas, separating it from the Occroyoc tailings deposit to the east and from the Communal Cooperative to the north. This land is meant for families in the town that do not have access to an estancia but want to keep a small flock of sheep or alpacas in their backyard; they can send a family member to pasture them during the day or in the afternoon and return home before night. Similarly, there is an area on the other side of the town where *comuneros* can extract *champa* sod, the main biofuel used in the area.²⁹⁴ Any *comunero* can extract *champa* free of charge here, though they have to pay whoever cuts and transports it for them (this is usually done once a year).

Another special area is the Communal Cooperative, which sits on part of the former lands of Hacienda Paria and functions in the old hacienda buildings (including one built in 1880). Officially founded as a cooperative in 1968, the cooperative fused with the older “communal farm” (*granja comunal*), which had originated in 1948. The cooperative lands are fenced off from the rest of the communal lands; as an institution it constitutes a separate legal entity (*persona jurídica*), though in practice still a part of the community, on whose lands it sits. Not all *comuneros* of Rancas are members (*socios*) of the cooperative, but all *socios* must be *comuneros*.

²⁹⁴ *Champa* is almost the sole fuel used in the estancias; in the town, it is often used alongside gas stoves, but is a lower-cost fuel than gas.

Finally, there is the special, fenced-off area set aside for the community's vicuñas. Vicuñas are the undomesticated relatives of the llama and alpaca; once close to extinction in the Peruvian Andes, they have increased in recent years thanks to government repopulation programs. In the late 1990s, the community of Rancas applied to such a program and received around 100 vicuñas, which by 2008 had multiplied tenfold. These animals are owned directly by the *comunidad* as an institution and managed by a special committee known as the *Comité Conservacionista de Vicuñas*. Twice a year, the community organizes a *faena* (communal work day) known as the *chaco de vicuñas*, in which community members form a gigantic circle and use a very long net to round up the vicuñas and place them in a special enclosure, in which they are sheared, given medicine and released again.²⁹⁵ The vicuña wool (*fibra*), highly prized today, is then sold by the community.

Returning to the *estancias*, when we surveyed them in May 2009, around half were found to have a hired shepherd that was taking care of the flocks, while the other 50% were at that moment under the care of the *comuneros* themselves. If we examine the *comunero* households found in the community as a whole, around 22% had *estancias* under the care of hired shepherds, while some 30% had *estancias* without hired shepherds – i.e. someone from the household or from a sibling household took care of the animals. The other half of *comunero* households did not have access to *estancias* – of these, around a third reported keeping flocks in town that they pastured in the common area. The rest (i.e. around a third of the total number of *comunero* households found in the community) claimed not to have animals at all; they were solely and completely devoted to other pursuits, whether mining work, commerce or a profession.²⁹⁶ Two things must be kept in mind, however. One is that this is a snapshot of an inherently fluid and ever-changing reality, and is meant to give only a very general idea. The other is that these percentages refer to *comunero* households that were found in the community at that moment. Some *comuneros* do not reside permanently in the community but rather in the city of Cerro de Pasco or even in Lima or Huancayo. So long as they come often and fulfill their obligations, they remain *comuneros*. Between 20 and 30% of *comuneros titulares* fell into this category at the

²⁹⁵ I participated in the *chaco de vicuñas* in late 2008.

²⁹⁶ The data on households is based mostly on self-reporting, whereas the figure for the *estancias* (i.e. hired shepherds vs. not) also contains an element of observation.

time; while I do not have a precise sense of their direct connection to the world of the *estancias* and the animals, I suspect it is weaker, and therefore if included it would lower the percentage of *comunero* households involved in this traditional activity. However, it is also important to note that even those *comuneros* who are not at present involved in the raising of animals consider this activity to be part of their cultural heritage, something that they did as children or which they may occasionally revisit by going to a sibling's or cousin's *estancia*.

In Huayllay, the groupings of *estancias* are called not *sectores* but rather *caseríos*. There are seven *caseríos* in all; as with the *sectores* in Rancas, each *caserío* has its own president, communal hall and *faena* obligations. Most of the *caseríos* are entirely rural and are simply collections of *estancias*, while some have begun to coalesce into small hamlets. Within the *caseríos*, the pasturing grounds available to each family are called *estancias* but more often *majadas*. Although I visited some of these spaces, I did not conduct a systematic survey as in Rancas; however, a communal publication from 1987 indicates that there were 89 *majadas* in all. These areas of family usufruct are largely situated on the lands that had formed part of the community since the *comunidad indígena* period (i.e. after 1929 but before the Agrarian Reform), unlike in Rancas which had had much less land at that time. As discussed in Chapter 1, local memory in Huayllay recalls the formation of the *comunidad indígena* - which occurred in 1929, though this precise date is not usually remembered by people - as a process by which individual property or possession in land gave way to communal property (if such a process occurred in Rancas, it is not talked about in that way).²⁹⁷

By contrast, the lands gained by the community during the Agrarian Reform mostly comprise the Communal Cooperative, which was founded in 1966 as a “communal enterprise” (*empresa comunal*) and became a cooperative in 1972 during the Velasco years. Unlike in

²⁹⁷ This does not mean that the *comunidad indígena* of Huayllay that emerged in 1929 was entirely new and that there was no continuity between it and the old *pueblo de indios* or *común de indios* of Huayllay. Such continuities are asserted by some *huayllinos*, even if they are less important for others. Rather, it simply means that local historical memory highlights the moment in which individual possessors came together to register the communal land title (thus abandoning any pretension to an individual title), whereas in Rancas the *comunidad* is more often spoken of as a unified historical subject that is projected back over the centuries. The actual history of the formation of the *comunidades* in the 20th century, their processes of “communal hegemony” (Mallon 1995), and their continuities and ruptures in relation to older communal institutions, are not clear for most communities in Peru; this is a little-studied topic in Peruvian historiography.

Rancas, where the Cooperative forms a smaller, contiguous territory, in Huayllay it is composed of three separate units (Gaya, Rumichaca and Cajoncancha) situated on the lands of the different former haciendas of the district. One is dedicated to sheep, another to bovine cattle (as well as a small trout farm) and the other to alpacas and llamas. All together, the units cover some 14,000 hectares of land. As in Rancas, not all *comuneros* of Huayllay are members of the cooperative, but all members must be *comuneros*; the cooperative is thus a subset of the community but with its own, separate legal status. To become eligible for membership, the *comuneros* must have successfully completed two *cargos* (positions of authority or sponsorship of feasts) in the community, in addition to making a payment. At the time of my research, according to the president of the cooperative, it had around 480 *socios* – i.e. *comuneros* of Huayllay who had also become cooperative members. All *socios* owe *faena* (work party) obligations to the cooperative, which takes them to the fields occasionally, but other than that most of them are not directly involved in the day-to-day activities. Rather, the cooperative has a staff of around 42 employees, including shepherds, technicians and administrators. At the time of my research, most of the cooperative's shepherds were not from Huayllay (and thus not eligible for membership themselves), but rather from neighboring communities; the cooperative president explained this was because *huayllinos* were more engaged in mining work.

Unlike in Rancas, where the earlier, smaller *granja comunal* (communal farm) from the 1940s merged with the cooperative, in Huayllay it has maintained a separate status, as an area of land that is managed directly by the *comunidad*, through a special committee. Like the other *granjas comunales* in the region, it was formed in the 1940s, when each *comunero* donated a small number of animals so that the *comunidad* would have an institutional income. In the past, the *comuneros* in Huayllay took turns pasturing these animals and received no salary (Chang 1970, 136); today, there are around 9 hired shepherds, who receive the monthly minimum salary. Unlike in the cooperative and in some of the estancias, however, the hired shepherds in the *granja comunal* are not migrants from outside the community, but rather are almost all

huayllinos.²⁹⁸ The *granja comunal* has sheep, alpacas and bovine cattle, but in much smaller numbers than the Communal Cooperative.

In both Huayllay and Rancas, the communal institutions described so far today coexist with a new kind of entity: the Communal Companies (*empresas comunales*) that operate as contractors for the mines and that have been formed as a way to create jobs for *comuneros* and their children. In their organizational structure and in the role they play within the community they bear some similarity to the cooperatives and the communal institution itself. But, unlike the latter, the Communal Companies do not occupy the land, for they do not engage in cattle-raising but rather in the operation of heavy machinery, construction, landscaping and other activities related to the world of the mining companies.

In both Rancas and Huayllay, the phenomenon of migrant shepherds merits some examination. Shepherding arrangements in the Andes have always been complex; shepherds take care not just of their own animals but also of those belonging to other people, often relatives to whom they are tied by webs of reciprocity and obligation. This is even more so the case in a region like Pasco, where families often have had one foot in the countryside and one foot in the mining camps, leaving their *estancias* in charge of relatives or, sometimes, hiring shepherds to whom they are not related. My research took place while the post-2003 mining boom was still ongoing (the slight dip in 2008-2009 notwithstanding); thus, this tendency was heightened, as people in Rancas and Huayllay were well aware. The demand of metals from China had, since 2003, led to increased mining production, with all the traditional underground mines of Pasco working at full capacity, and some previously abandoned mines re-opening. Together with the new mechanism of the mining canon (i.e. the redistribution of 50% of mining companies' taxes to the municipal and regional governments in their areas of operation), this led to a new dynamism in the regional economy. Thus, there were more job opportunities in the mines, in construction companies contracting with the now-wealthy municipal governments, and in the public sector. Combined with the prejudice against shepherding as a low-status occupation without prospects, this led to fewer *ranqueños* and *huayllinos* being willing to stay in the

²⁹⁸ The description in this paragraph is based on my own interviews. However, it mostly matches that found in González et al. (2002).

estancias and look after the animals. In Rancas, as mentioned already, in 2009 around half of the estancias were under the care of *comunero* families – either the owners of the animals or a close relative. The other half were under the care of non-*comunero*, non-*ranqueño* shepherd families, with the *comuneros* who employed them coming frequently to check on them.

Thus, in Rancas I estimated that around 14% of households living within the communal boundaries were composed of hired shepherds; of these, we managed to survey 41 households (the great majority). Some of these “households” were composed of a single shepherd on the estancia, while in other cases an entire family lived there. Of the shepherd households, 35 were working on the family-owned estancias, while 6 were employed on the Communal Cooperative’s pastures. These figures do not include most cases where a relative took care of a family’s animals, since in those cases the family did not usually refer to them as a “hired shepherd” (*pastor contratado*). Thus, most of the “hired shepherds” (some 38 out of 41) were neither *comuneros* nor *ranqueños*. Of 33 such shepherd households for whom I have information on area of origin, only 2 were from other plateau, high-altitude communities, while 31 were from the *quebradas*, the steep intermontane valleys to the north, northwest and northeast of Rancas. Specifically, 11 were from Huánuco, 15 were from the Chaupiwara Valley (Chacayán, Yanauanca, Tusi), and 2 were from other *quebradas* in Pasco Department (i.e. Ticlacayán and Huariaca). Although these numbers provide only a static and somewhat simplistic picture (some households maybe from several places at once, or they may have distant kinship links to *ranqueño* families), they give some idea of the dynamic by which people from the *quebrada* agricultural communities travel to the high-altitude plateau area to work as shepherds. They take over from the traditionally livestock-raising *ranqueños*, more of whom are now working in the mines. Insofar as this occurs, there is, as one *ranqueño* explained to me, a movement by which “the agriculturalists have become shepherds and the shepherds have become miners.”

Although I do not have precise figures for the hired shepherds in Huayllay, my interviews and observations indicate that a similar dynamic is at play there, though Huayllay may have slightly more migrant shepherds who come from other plateau communities, not just from the *quebradas*. It should be emphasized again that in Pasco there is a reversal of the dynamic found elsewhere in Peru, where higher altitude is associated with lower socioeconomic status as well as

with a lower level of modernity (the ideological coast vs. highlands opposition being the most extreme variant of this). In Pasco, the lower-altitude *quebradas* (situated at under 3,800 meters above sea level) are seen as being less modern, more “traditional,” and more Quechua-speaking than the communities of the highland, plateau region (4,200-4,400 meters above sea level). This ideological division is to some degree based on a real social difference between livestock-raising and agriculture, and most importantly between communities closest to the mines (and to foreign capital in the 20th century) and those a bit further away. The difference should not be exaggerated, either in socioeconomic status or in ideology; it is not nearly as dramatic as the coast vs. highlands opposition in Peru as a whole, for example. Many links have historically united the plateau and *quebrada* communities, and continue to do so today, in the sphere of kinship, commerce and work. And it is important to also remark that the more “traditional” image of the *quebradas* to the north and northeast (Huánuco, Chaupiwara, etc.) does not seem to extend to the *quebradas* to the west, where the Andes descend towards the coast. This area, with which Huayllay (much more so than Rancas) has historically had close ties, is if anything seen as more “modern” than the plateau, due to its proximity to the coast and its higher degree of commercial development.

The relations between hired shepherds and the *comuneros* who employ them are marked by both monetary and non-monetary transactions. Historically, in this area, people have taken care of flocks belonging to the owner of a pasture in return for the right to keep some of their own animals there. That was the nature of the relationship between the *huacchilleros* and the haciendas in former times; landed property had as much to do with control over labor as it did with control over land (Martínez-Alier 1973). Additionally, there is the widespread *al partir* arrangement, whereby a person takes care of someone else’s flock in return for half of the offspring as well as the products obtained from the animals. *Al partir* may mediate relations among *comunero* families as well as between them and hired shepherds. In addition, hired shepherds today are often paid a wage; that is the case in many of the estancias in Rancas and Huayllay. However, these wages are usually low – 250 or 300 soles per month, i.e. less than half the national minimum wage. That is because these wages are usually complemented by *al partir* arrangements, as well as by more complex forms of in-kind exchange between shepherds and those who hire them. *Comuneros* who possess estancias and own flocks are expected to bring

their shepherds food, warm clothing and other products. For example, one family in Rancas would bring rations of milk to their shepherd every week.²⁹⁹ By contrast, the shepherds employed by the Communal Cooperatives receive only a monetary wage – in the case of Huayllay’s Cooperative, it was the minimum wage.

Although in the figures for “hired shepherds” given above I have abstracted this category to make it more visible (based on how people in Rancas themselves used the term), in reality there are also many different shepherding arrangements among *comunero* families themselves. The hired shepherds stand out insofar as they are not *comuneros* and find it difficult to become so. In both Rancas and Huayllay, the *comunidad* is defined by kinship as much as by territory; *comuneros* are people who have acquired their status either by virtue of having been born to other *comuneros*, or by marrying into the community. The latter case is very common, as the communities are not endogamous. Many *ranqueños* and *huayllinos* are married to people from outside, both from plateau and *quebrada* communities. These individuals are known collectively as the “in-laws” (*yernos* or *nueras*); although they may face some suspicion or rejection at first, if they fulfill their responsibilities they are eventually treated like any other *comunero*. But outsiders who do not marry into the community cannot become *comuneros*, even if they spend time there as do the hired shepherds. That is certainly the case in Rancas. In Huayllay, I was told that outsiders could become *comuneros* if they did enough feast sponsorship *cargos*, even without marriage, but I didn’t actually meet anyone who fell into this category. In any case, as the president of the community of Huayllay explained to me, this would not help shepherds, since they do not usually have the financial resources required to successfully sponsor a feast. In this sense, the hired shepherds can be said to constitute an excluded class, who tend flocks without gaining access to the benefits of being community members. At the same time, some hired shepherds may be relatives of *yernos* or *nueras* who come from the *quebradas*, thus blurring the line between inclusion and exclusion somewhat.

²⁹⁹ These exchanges can go the other way too. For the *quebrada* communities of Pasco, Mendoza (2006) writes about an arrangement “whereby the female shepherds, besides taking care of the livestock, are expected to gather and carry firewood, spin wool or knit an item of clothing, if they do not carry out these activities they are subject to strong criticism by the relatives” (71).

Mining work and the community

As discussed earlier, Rancas and Huayllay are landowning *comunidades campesinas* (peasant communities), and at the same time spaces that include a varied population dedicated to multiple occupations beyond just the work on the land. To some degree, the term “peasant-miner” used by an earlier generation of researchers still applies, though without the implications of linear change that many of them saw (as in DeWind’s 1987 title, “Peasants into Miners”). The nature of what it means to be a *campesino* and what it means to be a “miner” has changed. And other occupations have arisen in between these two. Small-scale commerce is among the most common; construction work on municipal projects undertaken with the new *canon minero* funds since 2002 is another. In addition, Huayllay and Rancas also both have a few young and middle-aged professionals, most of who graduated from the university or the public technical institute in Cerro de Pasco. This is especially the case in Rancas, which is closer to Cerro de Pasco and has historically been less confined to mining work. These young professionals include nurses, teachers, animal science specialists, accountants, and a few others. Most of them do not stay to live in the community, but some maintain a strong connection and visit often. The pursuit of higher education by young people from the mining camps and, secondarily, the *comunidades* of Pasco began with the founding of the University of Cerro de Pasco (the UNDAC) in the 1960s, and increased in later decades. These students often rent small, cold rooms around the university and the technical institute in the neighborhood of San Juan Pampa, or they may stay with relatives in the city. They face obstacles as a result of the traditional neglect by the Peruvian state towards public universities, especially those in the highlands. The arrival of *canon minero* funds (a small fraction of which are meant to go to public universities near the mines) since 2002 has not been able to solve the serious institutional and academic problems that beset the UNDAC. Furthermore, young professionals with degrees from Cerro de Pasco have a hard time obtaining jobs when competing with graduates from larger, more established institutions, such as the universities in Lima.

Returning to mining, it is still one of the most significant sources of employment in both Rancas and Huayllay, though much more so in the latter. Some quantitative data may help give us at least a partial idea of this. In Huayllay District, the 2007 National Census indicated that

57% of the Economically Active Population (PEA) living in the town of Huayllay was working at jobs related to the “exploitation of mines and quarries.”³⁰⁰ In other words, 1,357 people out of a total PEA of 2,355 and a total town population of 5,782 (which admittedly includes not only *comuneros* but also migrant workers from elsewhere who rent rooms in the town). The bulk of these individuals were no doubt employed at the Huarón and Animón mines.³⁰¹ Here, the community has merged with the mining camp to a great degree, as discussed later in this chapter. In the town of Rancas, some 18% were engaged in the “exploitation of mines and quarries,” with another 18% in construction and 11% in transport. These numbers certainly fluctuate each year and should only be taken as a very general illustration.

In Huayllay especially, there is a sense that mining work historically has led people to neglect, and lose proficiency in, the work on the land, i.e. the raising of livestock (as well as other activities like craft production). This discourse is less present in Rancas, where the dominant narrative focuses rather on land recuperation, even though a history of mining work has also been present since the early 20th century and even before. In both communities, however, there is a belief that the current mining boom is discouraging young people from studying and pursuing training or higher education, by offering them money and apparent financial solvency in the short run. I encountered this view spontaneously in several of my interviews. For example, a native and resident of Rancas who happens to be a professional and was working at the district municipality at the time of my research gave me this account:

The young people leave the schools, they apply to the universities or the technical institutes, they don't get in, and the only source of work is to go work for the *contratas* [subcontractors]. So then they enter the service of the mining company. So then these young people who, when they were students, did not receive any money, and now that they are workers they work longer than 12 hours, some of them, they do not make good use of their youth. And, since they have money, suddenly, they earn more than 700 [soles per month], up to 1200 soles, then they don't know what to do with the money. So then what they do is spend it in the clubs [*discotecas*], spend it on those kinds of amusements that unfortunately have a negative impact on their formation. And very few decide to

³⁰⁰ In the neighboring town of Huaychao, the percentage engaged in mining was less – around 39.81%. In the small community of Los Andes de Pucará (a former hacienda whose inhabitants are almost entirely dedicated to livestock raising), also in the district, the percentage dedicated to mining is negligible. For the district as a whole, the percentage dedicated to “mines and quarries” is 60%.

³⁰¹ There are some people who can be said to work in “quarrying”, but this is negligible.

continue studying... So we run the risk that 5 years from now, Rancas will not have professionals, because the majority will become miners.

Here we see the specter of a crisis in what we could call the “myth of professionalization” – a subset of the broader “myth of progress” that has been analyzed for Peru’s Andean populations (Degregori 1986) and which is in turn one particular version of a much larger, global assortment of ideologies of progress. The “myth” in question is of course not a myth in the sense of being false but rather of serving as a powerful mobilizing ideology. In Rancas, Huayllay and much of Peru today, having one’s children obtain professional degrees is a central hope for many parents, so much so that the term *profesional* acquires a powerful, almost sacrosanct quality. In Rancas in particular, this hope has been realized to a greater degree than in many other communities. *Ranqueños* largely see themselves today as a community of livestock raisers, small traders and professionals (as well as defenders of a communal patrimony in land). While mining work was important in the first half of the 20th century, it decreased as a source of employment for *ranqueños* after the 1950s. This was not only because of the mechanization underway in the mines at the time, but also because the community’s occupation of the mining company’s Hacienda Paria in 1960 – which eventually brought about the expropriation of all the CPC’s haciendas – led the company to discriminate against the hiring of new *ranqueño* workers for several years. With much more pasturing land now available, and with the new university in Cerro de Pasco nearby, the community expanded in the direction of both livestock and higher education/technical training. In any case, most of those *ranqueños* who did work in the mines retired during the period of workforce reduction in the early 1990s. But in the last decade, several factors are increasing mining work opportunities for young people: the increased activity of existing mines in the area (Cerro de Pasco, Brocal, etc.) as well as the opening of a few new small, nearby mines (Chancadora Centauro, Aurex), both the result of increased metal prices. Another important factor is the formation of Rancas’ communal company, formed in 1990 with the capital received as compensation for tailings disposal on one of its pastures (see next section). This phenomenon of a renewed shift towards mining work among youth is what explains the concern brought up by the *ranqueño* professional quoted above.

In Huayllay, although the link to mining work has historically been stronger and more continuous (and more central to local identity), and although the access to higher education since

the 1960s has been less than in Rancas, the “myth of professionalization” is also present, as a hope for many and reality for some. And people also seem to see the renewed increase in mining work in recent years as discouraging young people from studying. This came up in a conversation with the mothers in the local *Vaso de Leche* (Glass of Milk) committee in Huayllay.³⁰² I had asked them if they wanted their children to work in mining, to which they answered “yes, but as an engineer” and “as professionals”: “I would not like them to work as a miner, working with the shovel [*tirando lampa*], so to speak.”³⁰³ One of them elaborated on this:

This is the desire of the mothers, of all women, that your child succeed, no? Not to be the same as the father, but to improve. That is the vision of the women, here in the town [*pueblo*], that’s why they make sacrifices as much as possible so that their children can study.

But, one of them added, there is a parallel tendency or current that is undermining the pursuit of progress through education:

Although, now the women are saying, there is talk [*habladuría*], “Why do the children work so hard in the university [*para qué tanto se matan los hijos en la universidad*] for 5 or 6 years, and there is no jobs for what they’ve studied, for example doctors are looking for jobs. So then it’s better to work in the mine and then they are earning their money.” So then there is conformism [*conformismo*] from that side. Perhaps we don’t all think the same, there are people who think a bit like that, “I want my son to start earning money, with his money he can make his house, he can look to build his home, he can set up his store [*negocio*] and that’s it.”

Another one of the mothers nodded in agreement, describing a belief that she doesn’t see herself as sharing:

The opinion of the greater part of the people is, “I put my son through high school [*le hice terminar el colegio*], if after that he wants to study he can study on his own means, otherwise he can look to start a family [*que busque su familia*] and there is the company and the mine, go work with the shovel [*a lampear*].”

³⁰² The *Vaso de Leche* (Glass of Milk) is a nationwide program that provides government food assistance through local committees headed by women. It was founded in 1984 by Lima’s leftist mayor Alfonso Barrantes, in response to the demands of women’s organizations in the working-class neighborhoods of the city, then spread to the rest of the country. During the 1990s the program was heavily subject to clientelistic manipulation by Alberto Fujimori’s government. Today the *Vaso de Leche* committees are still among the most ubiquitous women-headed institutions in the country.

³⁰³ *Tirando lampa* is used here in the general sense of unskilled, low-paid work, not necessarily implying that hand shovels are still extensively used in the mines.

These quotes illustrate a particular kind of concern that exists in Huayllay and Rancas regarding the effects of the recent mining boom (2003-present): mining employment brings income and financial security in the short run, but it lures people into a false sense of complacency and away from education and professionalization, which demands sacrifices in the short run but promises progress in the long run. Also in both communities, there is a strong awareness that mining is not sustainable, that it is only for a short time, unlike livestock. This sense comes not only from the spread of sustainable development discourse, but also from the local memory of the mining crisis of the 1980s and 90s and the mass workforce reductions that followed. Furthermore, the mining companies (Volcan, Pan American Silver) themselves encourage this, wittingly or unwittingly, by talking frequently about crisis and the possibility of closure during negotiations over land, in order to pressure communities to moderate their demands and acquiesce to company terms and conditions. The concern over the undermining of educational progress bears some similarities with certain discourses expressed when talking about the past in Huayllay (but less so in Rancas), that also have to do with negative effects of a dedication to mining work over the long run. In Huayllay, as mentioned, people frequently talk about how mining work not only moved people away from the world of raising livestock and craft production but also led them to lose the skills and cultural knowledge associated with that world. They see their long-term engagement with mining work as having stunted the development of livestock production in Huayllay, even if it brought other kinds of growth and development. Another such discourse about the past has to do with the false sense of complacency that is attributed to the families that lived in the mining camps up to the early 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 4: those families felt secure with their income, benefits and camp housing, and did not invest in building their own house somewhere else, so when the layoffs and workforce reductions came they found themselves in dire straits.

In Huayllay and Rancas, mining and mining-related work is sometimes a means for young men from poorer households – those that tend to stay with the flocks in the estancias, often taking care of relatives' animals – to gain access to more income than they have ever had before, even if it is only for a time, with no job security and for long work hours. They may find it hard to enter more skilled positions in the mines, since the latter now require two years' experience. But they can get unskilled jobs or, so long as they are *comuneros* or children of

comuneros, they can hope to get employment through the communal company. Other young people from more established, more affluent *comunero* families may also find the temptation of the income provided by a job as a driver or scoop operator in the mine too strong to bear. They are then seen as neglecting their own education and possibilities of professionalization. It is also important to note another source of employment that is often similar in terms of the work involved (i.e. driving and operating machinery) but that is indirectly rather than directly related to mining: work with the contractors engaged in construction projects for the municipalities. With the swelling of municipal budgets as a result of the post-2003 mineral price increase as well as the new mechanism of the *canon minero*, construction was all the rage in both Huayllay and Rancas at the time of my research; this new development had the mayors and the contractors as its main protagonists. Unlike the more capital-intensive mining contractors, which are almost always from outside the region – often founded by engineers from Lima or other major cities – a few of the small contracting firms that work on municipal construction projects are owned by the more affluent families of Huayllay and Rancas, though the majority are not.

The changes that took place in industrial mining work over the course of the 20th century, as well as those that occurred as a result of the restructuring of the 1990s, have been described in earlier chapters. In industrial mining regions like Pasco, the century saw the long-term shift from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus, with the 1950s as a point of inflexion - though this has as much to do with the changes in the surrounding society (i.e. the decline of traditional rural systems of production and exchange, the growth of population and the emergence of an industrial reserve army) as it does with anything that goes on directly inside the sphere of production (i.e. mechanization). The process of mechanization in the medium-scale underground mines of Pasco and Central Peru took place gradually over the course of the 1970s and 80s, with scoop loaders, dump trucks and trackless mining systems increasingly replacing the old world of mine railways, shovels and timbermen. More slowly (and unevenly), raise-bore and jumbo drills have replaced jackleg and other handheld drills (some of the latter were still in use in the Huarón mine at the time of my visit). The changes in underground mining in Peru were paralleled by another, more dramatic technological leap – the rise of large-scale open-pit mining, in Cerro de Pasco but also in other Peruvian mines such as Toquepala (1950s), Cuajone (1960s), Tintaya (1980s) and several others since the 1990s (Antamina, Pierina, Yanacocha and a

host of developing projects). To all these gradual, long-term shifts was added the more sudden, drastic change in the legal regimes and the social organization of labor in the 1990s, as discussed in Chapter 4. Only a few more comments are necessary here, from a more contemporary and ethnographic angle.

The situation of mining work today, when compared to the period before the 1990s, can be summarized through reference to four main aspects: the rise of contracting, the shift towards the new accumulated-time *sistemas* and the accompanying 12-hour work day, the lack of labor stability, and the decline of unions. In a way, the contracting system harkens back to the early days of the 20th century, when *contratas* were common in many of the mines of the Central Highlands. They declined during the course of the century, as mining companies needed to have more control over its workforce so as to increase their training and duration on the job. *Contratas* began to appear again in the 1970s and 80s, but only to a very limited degree. But they increased markedly in the 1990s, after the majority of payroll workers had left the mines, and has continued to do so. At the time of my research, for example, the Animón/Chungar mine in Huayllay had a total of between 1,700 and 1,800 people working there, but only around 400 were on payroll. The rest were employed by 67 different *contratas*. The company had more than 200 people from the community of Huayllay working there, of whom only around 60 were on payroll – and those on payroll were there largely because of the mine-community agreements or *convenios*. At Huarón, the proportion of payroll workers was significantly higher, though many of them were on 3-month or 6-month contracts. In Cerro de Pasco, at the time of my research, a minority of the workforce was on the Volcan company's payroll, and the company was in the process of increasing the proportion of subcontracted workers as well as those on short-term contracts.

Today, the *contrata* vs. *planilla* (payroll) division has become all-important in the mines of Pasco. Being part of the *planilla* is a highly desired but rarely achieved status. The distinction has very concrete implications; not only are *planilla* workers usually paid more, but they also have a better chance of accessing a more permanent position – i.e. an “indefinite-time contract;” rather one that must be renewed every 3 or 6 months. In addition, there is the issue of the profit-sharing arrangement known as the *reparto de utilidades*. By law in Peru, all private companies

that have at least 20 employees must share a portion of their pre-tax profits with their workers. This is a holdover from the days of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), who established the “industrial communities” as a mechanism for worker participation and for workers’ gradual acquisition of their companies’ capital. While the most radical aspects of Velasco’s Industrial Reform were dismantled by later governments, profit-sharing remained in the laws, albeit under new rules and only to a limited extent. For mining companies, workers are eligible to receive, collectively, up to 8% of pre-tax profits. With the rise in metal prices after 2003, payroll workers at large mining companies began receiving significant *reparto de utilidades* payments at the end of the year. This mechanism was part of the reason for the image of mining workers in Peru today as a highly-paid, privileged sector of the workforce. But not only are the profits in the medium-sized underground mines smaller; also, contracted workers do not receive profit-sharing payments from the mining companies in which they work. Rather, they only receive payments from the specific contracting firm for which they work, and this is inevitably much smaller, often negligible.

Another important change has been the implementation of “accumulated-time systems” by which workers’ time is rationalized and compressed into separate work and rest periods. In other words, rather than working more 8-hour days, as in the past, people now work a smaller number of days but these last around 12 hours. The introduction of the 12-hour work day took place in the 1990s and early 2000s— in those early days when labor was weakest, there often was an extension of the work day without an accompanying increase in the number of rest days. Abuses by contractors were common in the mines of this region as in other Peruvian mines, as both workers and some company officials acknowledge. Eventually, the 12-hour workday stabilized into the accumulated-time systems, of which the most common is 14x7 – 14 days of work followed by 7 days of rest. The 14 days of work are in turn divided into 7 days of day shifts (7am-7pm, or 8am-8pm) and 7 days of night shifts. Systems like this come from labor innovations in the global mining industry associated with the rise of Fly-in/Fly-out systems (FIFO), but in this part of Peru they occur even when people are not commuting from afar. Under the 14x7 system, people technically work the same number of hours as before, but there is less “dead time” during shift changes (since there are two rather than three shifts per day), and there are less workers at any one time, so the company can economize and rationalize their time

better. The *sistemas* are also convenient for the companies in that they allow them to bring specialized workers and technicians from afar without having to provide services for their families. But for the most part, they apply to workers who are from the surrounding area as well. At Huarón, for example, the concentrator plant workers are on the old 8-hour day, but almost all the workers in the mine are on the 14x7 *sistema*. The same is true at Animón/Chungar. In Cerro de Pasco, many of the payroll workers are on the old schedule, but most of the *contrata* workers (who comprise the majority) are on *sistema*.

The 12-hour work day is actually subject to different interpretations. At Huarón, although signs at the entrance to the mine complex state that the shifts are 8am-8pm and 8pm-8am, company officials consider that the actual workday is 10 hours and 15 minutes. They state that 45 minutes are spent at lunch, and one hour moving to and from one's place of work inside the mine, thus the total shift is 12 hours. On the other hand, if one examines the total time from when workers leave their home to when they return, including commute, this can extend to as much as 14 or 15 hours, depending on the nature and length of the commute. Such is the case for example with workers from Rancas who go board the buses to the new Chancadora Centauro mine, or, to a lesser degree, those who live in Huayllay and board the buses to Huarón and Animón/Chungar. In both communities, the workers assemble at around 5:45 am to board their buses, and return home around 8 or 9 in the evening. In Rancas, they assemble in the main square of the town, while in Huayllay each *contrata* (including the communal company) has its own street corner where its workers gather awaiting the bus that will take them up to the mine. In Huayllay, around 11:00 am, the workers' families (often, but not always, their wives) gather to send them the lunches they have prepared, which are transported up to the mine by a bus.

One implication of the *sistema* is that workers spend virtually no time with their families during their "on" days; they come home and go straight to sleep. During the 7 night-shift days, they sleep during the day, and their families must be careful not to wake them up. The *sistema* is thus associated with a high degree of separation between the activities of men and women – something that was the case under the old 8-hour day, but less so. Naturally, this is something that people are aware of. For example, I once overheard a conversation between a juice vendor in one of the small markets in Huayllay and a young couple who were her customers. She was

telling the man that he should “stop being a miner,” and explained that when you have your own *negocio* (small business or store), you can work alongside your partner. But if you work all day in the mine, she argued, your wife cannot work, because she has to prepare the lunch to send to the mine, take care of the children alone, etc.

Although the new *sistema* order represents an extension of the work day beyond what it was in the past, there is a lot of stoicism on the part of workers regarding this fact. Whereas they object to and criticize the companies’ reliance on contractors, and see no benefits in being on *contrata* rather than *planilla*, the assessments of the *sistema* and the 12-hour workday are more ambiguous. One *ranqueño* worker, who at the time was driving a dumper truck for a *contrata* at the Cerro de Pasco mine, phrased it to me in terms of adaptation by the body to the intensified rhythm of work. He described his conversations with the older workers who, unlike him, are on the company payroll, and who are not on *sistema*, unlike the majority *contrata* workers:

We talked about it with the guys on the company payroll [who are older] and they said, as long as you are young, you don’t feel it, you can work 12 hours. For example in the case of machine operators, from the time you come in, out of the 12 hours you effectively work 10 hours, 9 or 10.³⁰⁴ And so, the *señores* who are on payroll say, “When you get to be a certain age, do you really believe you’ll be able to last 8 or 9 hours driving?” And, well, in the time I’ve been working so far, what I see is that, it seems the body gets used to it. Or maybe it’s like the guys on payroll say, “it’s only when you’re young.” [But] there are other companies, for example the Milpo company, their payroll workers are on the *sistema*, and they are older guys.

Besides the spread of contracting and the new labor *sistemas*, the 1990s saw the end of the old regime of labor stability. The old order had developed gradually over the course of the 20th century, as part of the protections that the Peruvian state offered formal-sector workers. It reached its apogee in the early 1970s, when the Velasco government implemented further adjustments in the norms that made it very difficult for companies to fire workers under regular circumstances (which did not prevent the later government of Morales Bermúdez from firing, through a special decree, hundreds of workers for organizing and leading the massive 1977 general strike). By contrast, in the early 1990s the government of Alberto Fujimori followed

³⁰⁴ That is, not including time moving to and from the place of work inside the mine, eating lunch, or listening to the daily safety talk. Under the old 8-hour system, the time directly devoted to “actual work” was also less, by all accounts – 6 hours or even less.

worldwide trends, and complied with the demands of the Peruvian business class, by implementing a series of dramatic legal reforms that effectively ended the regime of labor stability. Today, there are two types of labor contracts in the mines of Pasco: indefinite and fixed-time contracts. Indefinite-time contracts are more permanent, though even there the degree of labor stability is lower than in the past, for the laws of the 1990s made it easier to dismiss workers for a number of reasons. Fixed-time contracts, on the other hand, have the mechanism for dismissal built into their very structure: they last only 3 or 6 months, and it is entirely the employer's prerogative whether to renew it or not. This distinction based around the type of contract introduces an additional division in the workforce, on top of the *planilla/contrata* split.

Thus, the workforce in any one mining company can really be thought of as being divided among three groups: *contrata* workers (technically not even employed by the main company), fixed-time *planilla* workers, and indefinite-time *planilla* workers. The second and third groups technically receive all the same benefits and rights (unlike the first); the difference is that fixed-time workers are under constant threat of non-renewal of contract, which in essence amounts to a dismissal. At Huarón, according to data provided to me by the company in 2009, there were approximately 660 *contrata* employees, 440 fixed-time *planilla* and 440 indefinite-time *planilla* employees. Although the company did not specify, my sense is that most of the 440 indefinite-time *planilla* workforce corresponded to the 315 *empleados* (roughly, white-collar workers and technicians). Thus, only a few *obreros* would be on indefinite-time contracts, which is something that entirely corresponds to the perception of the local population. In fact, there is a well-known group of 12 *obreros* (blue-collar workers) from the old days who managed to hold on through the 1990s and early 2000s, and who still have more protected contracts. At Animón/Chungar, according to the information provided to me by one official in 2010 and mentioned earlier, there were around 400 *planilla* workers and some 1,300 or 1,400 *contrata* workers, and virtually all the *planilla* workers were on fixed-time contracts.

The end of labor stability is the single biggest factor accounting for the decline of the mining unions in the last 20 years: more than the assassination and intimidation of union leaders in the 1980s and early 90s, more than any labor-saving technological changes, and more than the rise of the *sistemas*, the closure of the mining camps and the resulting scattering of working-class

communities that had stabilized somewhat in the second half of the 20th century. The workers I have spoken with certainly perceive it as the biggest reason why unionization is not even a possibility or something that seems relevant to their situation at the moment. The unions that remain basically exist for those payroll workers who are on indefinite-time contracts. The non-renewal of contracts for workers who sign up to belong to a union is not an idle threat, rather it is standard, accepted practice. This has occurred numerous times, for example in Huarón in 2007. The head of Human Resources there told me clearly that they were accused of firing workers for joining the union, but they had fired no one – they had simply not renewed their short-term contracts. It also occurred in the Cerro de Pasco mine in 2012. Whereas the Huarón workers in 2007 had attempted to join the union maintained by the 12 remaining old-time workers (this union was eventually dissolved after the attempt failed), the fixed-time workers in Cerro de Pasco in 2012 were trying to form their own union. Thirty-one of them were suspended until their contracts ran out, and the contracts were of course not renewed. This set off a labor conflict in which the fixed-time workers managed to get the support of the stable workers, who had their own grievances, but the campaign eventually failed and the workers are now in the courts trying to resolve their situation.

The decline of the once-strong mining unions is one of the most striking aspects of the social situation in the mining centers, and it is something that is readily admitted by the remaining unions themselves, all of whom are aware that the companies now have the upper hand. This development has largely removed a once-important political actor and local institution from the social scene. There is a generation gap between the former workers of the 1970s and 80s, most of who are now retired, and the mostly young men who work in the mines now. Most of the latter have not been exposed to the union culture that existed at that time, and so the generational gap is a cultural gap as well.

A gathering at the estancia

I will now conclude this chapter with an ethnographic vignette to illustrate some aspects of the relationship between the worlds of livestock-raising and mining. Specifically, I will

describe a particular celebration of the yearly propitiatory ritual for the sheep that took place in an estancia in one of the *caseríos* of Huayllay in February 2010. In this area, this ritual is most commonly referred to simply as *carnavales*, due to the time of the year in which it takes place – i.e., right before Lent and at the same time as carnival celebrations in the Andes and around the world. It is also sometimes called *herranza* (literally, branding or horseshoeing, although this does not take place unless bovine cattle are involved), *fiesta de los animales* (feast of the animals) or even *cumpleaños de los animales* (birthday of the animals). The term *carnaval ganadero* (livestock carnival) is sometimes used in public discussions nowadays, to distinguish it from other types of carnival. It is one version of the broader family of Andean livestock rituals. This wider genre includes other carnival-season rituals all around the Peruvian Andes – such as the *haywarisqa* and *ch'uyay* described for different pastoralist communities of southern Peru by Flores Ochoa (1977, 212-214) and Ricard (2007, 209-217), respectively. It also includes the well-known rituals conducted in July and August, such as the *Santiago* (popular in the Mantaro Valley), the cattle-branding rituals of the upper Chancay Valley described by Rivera Andía (2005), and the *t'ikachay* for the llamas celebrated by the pastoralists of Ausangate in southern Peru (Ricard 2007, 217-218). In the Pasco/Junín plateau, although certain rituals and tasks in relation to livestock may be conducted at different points in the year, it is the February *carnavales* that have preeminence by far. My intention here is not so much to delve deeply into the meanings and ritual aspects of the celebration; these are analyzed at greater length by other authors. In addition to studies from more distant areas of Peru, Mendoza Villanueva (2006, 57-72) offers an account for the general cultural area of the plateau communities of Pasco, while the analysis of Rivera Andía (2005), mentioned above, pertains to an agricultural *quebrada* region that has historically had close relations with Huayllay specifically (the upper Chancay Valley). Rather, my purpose is to use the gathering at the estancia as an opportunity to illustrate the different relationships to livestock-raising and mining work that exist within a single extended family, as well as to show the ways in which people relate to tradition and custom in a context of long-term change. Other aspects of local society described in this chapter should also become clearer through this account.

Unlike other local celebrations such as the patron saints' days or the *Cruces de Mayo*, which are public and linked to communal institutions, the livestock rituals of the *carnavales* are a

private, household affair – indeed, a family gathering - that takes place away from the main towns. As people often say when asked about it, “that’s something that the families do in the estancias.” The livestock rituals are also somewhat less open to outsiders than the communal celebrations. They do have a public nature through local radio stations, which broadcast the traditional songs for the livestock as well as greetings sent by individual families for their animals. In addition, the feast of the estancias now has a very public counterpart. Since 2000, the Municipality of Simón Bolívar District has organized the *Festival de la Herranza Andina*, a public festival in which communities represent their own customs around the livestock *carnavales*, in a coliseum in the community of Yurajhuanca, situated between the community of Quiulacocha and Rancas, near Cerro de Pasco. It was initially created by then-mayor Valentín López Espíritu, a local politician from Quiulacocha who, before his tragic death in an auto accident in 2011, was associated with a position of revalorization of Andean culture. The festival, subtitled “Tribute to the *Tayta Jirka* [Father Mountain] and the *Pachamama* [Mother Earth],” takes place in mid-March, a few weeks after the rituals that it represents. Although now also promoted as a tourist attraction, it attracts locals rather than tourists (there aren’t many of the latter in the Cerro de Pasco area). Delegations from the different communities compete in their performance of the rituals of the estancias and of local culture and identity more generally.³⁰⁵ In the last couple of years, the *Festival de la Herranza Andina* has followed other regional festivals from around Peru in gaining national attention by conducting a previous launch event at the National Congress and in the main square of Lima. In November 2011, festival organizers obtained an official resolution from the Ministry of Culture recognizing “the *Herranza* of the Provinces of Pasco and Daniel Alcides Carrión” as “Cultural Patrimony of the Nation.”

By contrast, the ritual in the estancias retains its private, family character. I had been unable to attend in February 2009, while staying in the city of Cerro de Pasco. But in February 2010, when I was living in the town of Huayllay, I expressed my interest in attending the *carnavales* to one of my closest local contacts, Dalia Roque. Her own family no longer had an

³⁰⁵ I attended the public *herranza* festival in Yurajhuanca in 2011, a year after the estancia *carnavales* described in this section. I owe the analysis of this festival as self-representation and as a performative event to my conversations with Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, who had already attended the public festival the previous year.

estancia, but she arranged for me to go with another family, explaining to them the nature of my research. Given her own interest and work in local tourism promotion, she added that it would be good for gaining experience in “experiential tourism” (*turismo vivencial*). So on Tuesday, February 16, 2010, I set out on the back of an old pick-up truck with the Calderón family from Huayllay to their estancia, Chiuric, in one of the *caseríos* of the community.

As Mendoza (2006) writes, the *carnavales* in the high region of Pasco often include the rituals for the three classes of animals: alpacas (and llamas), cows and sheep, in that order and on separate days. The celebration includes not just the propitiatory rites but also the marking of animals that belong to different owners within a single herd or flock, and often the shearing of sheep as well. In recent years, many families have had to shorten the period of celebration, which used to be around a week, in order to accommodate work and other obligations. The Chiuric estancia does not include bovine cattle and, as far as alpacas and llamas are concerned (which in Chiuric actually outnumber the sheep), the family explained to me that they were planning to do a separate marking event for those animals in May, not during *carnavales*. For this reason, the description in this section does not cover the entire range of practices associated with the livestock *carnavales* in Pasco, but rather to one part of the rituals pertaining to the sheep, and, more importantly, to the context of the family gathering in which such practices take place. As the father, Don Isidro, explained to me, the family had initially planned to do it on Carnival Sunday, but some problems came up and it had to be moved to Carnival Tuesday (the day before Ash Wednesday). The sponsors of the celebration would be his son Freddy and his wife Katy.

The Calderón family does not spend most of its time in Chiuric, which is the land where many of the older folks grew up. Rather, like many others, they have long since relocated to the town of Huayllay, but the older members of the family come often to mind the business of the estancia. The estancia is in the charge of a shepherd. While some of the shepherds in Huayllay, as in Rancas, are migrants from other communities, in this case the shepherd is a female relative, Juana, a member of the extended family who lives in the estancia with her two young children.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ This is a pseudonym.

Chiuric is located relatively close (some 4-5 minutes by car on a dirt road) to the center of the *caserío*, which is a grouping of 5 or 6 buildings that include the communal hall, a church, a school, a small “communal theater” and the office of the local women’s committee, all arranged around a square plot of flat land that serves as the *plaza*. A bit further away are the ruins of an old mineral processing center (*ingenio*) from Spanish colonial days. Chiuric itself is located on the banks of a small river that runs between two parallel rows of hills, the latter filled with a multitude of the large rocks characteristic of the Huayllay region and the Stone Forest. We parked the pick-up truck on the other side of the stream and then hopped over rocks to get to the estancia, which is made up of 4 small constructions around a courtyard. The largest is the main estancia house, with two rooms and a storage space above one of the rooms; its earthen walls are painted white, though part of the paint has worn off. The family explains to me that in the old days, when the grandparents were alive and there were more people in Chiuric, the house had a straw roof; this was warmer, but it required changing every year to prevent it from leaking water, and there wasn’t anyone to do that anymore. So now the roof has been changed to corrugated tin. The other three constructions around the courtyard are all small, one-room houses made of earth and rock and with straw roofs; one of them is the kitchen. Behind this area are several corrals for the animals, made of rocks stacked on top of one another, as well as a few small sheds. The number of animals on the estancia is not very large – some 100 alpacas and a few llamas, and some 50 sheep; they belong to different members of the extended family. On the other side of the river is another grouping of small, straw-roofed houses and sheds - technically another estancia, though also part of Chiuric – but there did not seem to be anyone there at that moment.

I arrived the morning of the main day, with some members of the family, but others had already arrived the night before. Thus, I did not participate in the initial offering (*mesa*) to the mountain (*cerro/jirka*) that is usually performed the night before the livestock ritual, as on so many other important occasions. The morning was entirely devoted to preparing the meal of the day, *pachamanca*, the traditional dish cooked with hot rocks on the ground and commonly served on festive occasions in the Central Highlands – though Don Isidro, the father, referred to it simply as “meat roast” (*asado de carne*) or “peasant lunch” (*almuerzo campesino*). While his wife and the other women worked at seasoning the meat and at other cooking tasks in the main

estancia house, Don Isidro heated the rocks that would be used, using firewood and dousing the flames with alcohol, while we talked.

A retired mining worker in his sixties, Don Isidro worked at the Huarón mine for 28 years, from 1963 to 1991; towards the end of his time at the mine, he became a scoop loader operator. In the old days, he says, things were different; the French were nice people (*buena gente*), they “shared with the worker from their table.” Sure, they were better to those who were on their side, but they had to share with the rest too, if nothing else to keep up appearances. For that reason, the workers had good *convenios* (agreements with the company). The later administration of the mine (Hochschild, which took over in 1987) was not generous. But what really changed things was the first government of Alan García (1985-1990) with its *paquetazos*.³⁰⁷ Did I know what the *paquetazos* were? That “screwed the workers” (*eso jodió a los trabajadores*). Then came *El Chino* (Fujimori) and “finished us off” by taking away labor stability.³⁰⁸ Now García is president again – he won in Cerro de Pasco (in 2006) by promising to restore labor stability, but then he didn’t do it. That is what ruined the workers, the lack of labor stability.³⁰⁹ Don Isidro also criticized the changes that have taken place over the decades in the organization of work at the mine, in particular the increase in engineers and technicians in relation to ordinary workers. In the old days, he says, people worked well, not like now when there are a lot of useless people (*inútiles*) inside the mine. Now, in each corner of the mine you

³⁰⁷ *Paquetazos* (“big packages”, conveying an image of a large load falling on one’s head) was the popular Peruvian term for the price and structural adjustment measures implemented from the late 1970s through the early 1990s - modeled on the designs of the international lending agencies (and sometimes directly ordered by them), as a response to the economic crisis then affecting Latin America. Although the earliest such measures occurred during the Morales Bermúdez government in the late 1970s, they were temporarily interrupted during the first two years of Alan García’s government, from 1985 to 1987. When the *paquetazos* resumed in 1987, with sudden price increases in the midst of a severe recession, this caused widespread immiseration among broad sectors of the population. Although the workers in Huarón were initially in a relatively better position compared to many other, poorer sectors, Don Isidro’s statement highlights the *paquetazos* of García’s period as indicative of the broader crisis that marked a turning point for many formal-sector workers like himself. The biggest *paquetazo* would be the “Fujishock” of 1990.

³⁰⁸ Although of Japanese ancestry, President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) was popularly known as *El Chino* (the Chinese man) during his government. He appropriated this term as a folksy nickname and used it widely in his campaigns.

³⁰⁹ Indeed, Alan García promised labor stability when he visited Cerro de Pasco during his 2006 campaign, but once elected ignored this promise, which was entirely unacceptable to the Peruvian business class whose support he courted (and won) during his 2006-2011 government.

have an engineer. You can't do anything without the engineers. But they don't know [how to do things]. The worker is the one who knows. If you are an engineer you have to listen to what the workers say, they are the ones that matter. The engineers don't know, they may have studied, but they don't know (he would repeat this point when we met again in the town).

While Don Isidro heated the rocks, the women in the family put the finishing touches on the meat and vegetables. They begin to talk about how in the old days the *carnavales* for the livestock were much bigger – back when the grandparents (*abuelitos*) were still around. Back then there were more families here in Chiuric, in those houses that now are abandoned (they point to the houses on the other side of the stream as well as others further away). In those days they did a *cortamonte*, the popular dance that takes place around a tree during *carnavales* throughout much of the Peruvian Andes (known elsewhere as *yunza*, *unsha* or by other names). Since there are no trees around here, they had to bring a tree all the way from Huariaca, in the *quebradas* on the border with Huánuco. They also brought an *orquesta* (as the saxophone/clarinet bands from the Mantaro Valley are known); they would go meet them near the road and bring them to Chiuric on horseback.

Meanwhile, I also speak with Orlando, one of Don Isidro's sons-in-laws. He's from a different *caserío* of Huayllay. He asserts for his own *caserío* what people often say about Huayllay in general – that people there are not devoting themselves much to the *campo* (i.e. the rural land and rural work), that they are more dedicated to mining, as well as to commerce. Orlando is a trained professional in the field of animal science, who works with different producers in the area (such as the Communal Cooperatives). We talk about how recent increases in the price of mutton have encouraged more people to raise sheep, and about how alpaca meat sells for less, but there's more of it on a single animal. He thinks that livestock raising can be a viable economic activity if it is done in a more technical way (*con manejo*); when done as *huacchilla*, like here, it can provide some support (*sustento*) but not enough to live. For him, *huacchilla* means raising animals “in an empirical way, almost as if by custom” (*empíricamente, casi por costumbre*), on the usufruct lands. He thinks it would be better to have fewer animals but of better quality. The ones who produce more, he argues, are the *parceleros*, i.e. people who have divided up communal lands (in practice if not in actual title), for example in Pucará (a

former hacienda nearby). However, when I ask him if people in Huayllay could fence in their pasturing grounds, he says it would not be feasible, there would be problems, conflicts; right now, he says, there are no fences, but people know more or less where the limits are.

Once the stones were sufficiently hot, Don Isidro removed the ones on top, using a shovel to set them aside; we then all brought the meat (mutton, chicken and alpaca meat) and set it on top of the bottom rocks. The rocks that had been set aside were then placed on top of the meat, then the potatoes, sweet potatoes and other vegetables were added. The whole thing was then covered with an oilcloth and then with sod (*champa*) and earth, taking care to ensure no smoke could escape. After about 45 minutes, the food was cooked; we tasted some of the potatoes and meat and then moved to the space in front of the main estancia house, forming a semi-circle while one of the aunts prepared and distributed each of the plates. When we were finished eating, we all grabbed sheepskins from the main house (to sit on) and began moving to one of the corrals in the back, where the ceremony with the animals would take place. By that time, another son had arrived – Mario, who worked in commerce together with his wife. They had been driving on the steep, solitary road from Canta on the other side of the Western Cordillera, and it had not been clear that they would make it in time.

As we sat in a row in the corral where the sheep were, it began to hail, but fortunately this passed quickly. Someone began to pass the bag of coca so we could each grab a handful to chew. The cigarettes began to circulate as well, and one of the young women began to serve the *calientito* – a hot drink made of alcohol (*aguardiente*) and lots of herbs and burnt sugar. As always, a single glass is shared by all the participants, who take turns accepting the drink from the server. As people chew their coca, they talk quietly about various topics. In the communities of Pasco, this is what is usually referred to as the *chacchapada* (from *chacchar*, to chew coca), an extended moment of reflection and communion that precedes the placing of offerings (*mesas*) or important occasions like weddings. The trinity of coca, alcohol and cigarettes is always present at such times. On this occasion, the radio was also on, as Huayllay's Radio Oro played the traditional songs dedicated to the animals during *carnavales*. Many of these songs deal, in a humorous way, with the relationship between shepherds and owners of herds/estancias – a central theme of the *carnavales* in general, and one that was referenced several times during the

course of the day.³¹⁰ The radio also broadcasted greetings to the different estancias, including Chiuric. These greetings had been solicited by the sponsors, Freddy and Katy, and were dedicated to the sheep, who were addressed with proper names. After a while, one of the aunts grabbed the *tinya* (a small drum that is played only by women, and associated most strongly with the *carnavales*) and began beating out the steady rhythm of the *carnaval* songs while singing along with the radio. Don Isidro then joined her too, singing the mostly Quechua lyrics with great emotion, sometimes following the radio, other times singing independently without paying attention to the broadcast.

As we chewed the coca, we were supposed to save and set aside a particular class of leaves, namely those that were small and well-formed, without holes or tears; I had been advised of this earlier in Huayllay, and Don Isidro's daughter Elizabeth now repeated it to me so I would know. After a while, Freddy, in his role as sponsor of the feast, came around and collected these small leaves, which were referred to as the *ñawi*. When handing the *ñawi* to the sponsor, you have to say how much you have, but in thousands – if you have 6 *ñawis*, you say, “six thousand.”³¹¹ After this, it was time to begin the main activity of the afternoon, the ritual marriage of the sheep.³¹² Two sheep were separated from the rest of the herd that was in the corral – one was dark brown, the other white. When they were first pinned to the ground, the

³¹⁰ In his discussion of livestock *carnaval* songs from the highlands of Pasco, Mendoza (2006) writes that “the songs have the form of a back-and-forth, call-and-response between shepherds [*pastoras*, i.e. specifically female shepherds] and owners [*propietarios*], accusing each other of not fulfilling their responsibilities. The *patrones* are criticized, in an ironic way, for their lack of support for the shepherds and their herds. [The *patrones*] do not let this go unanswered, either; with great humor they sing demanding firewood, woven cloth and yarn, sometimes accusing the *pastoras* of being lazy” (70). During the *carnavales* in Chiuric, Juana and Don Isidro often addressed each other as *pastora* and *patrón*, in a playful, humorous way. At one point, however, it was Juana, not the *patrón*, who made a joke echoing the common accusation against shepherds, that they tend to lose the *patrón*'s animals. When Don Isidro approached her during the dance and said “Let us dance, *pastora*,” Juana replied laughing that “this *pastora* loses too many animals, you shouldn't ask me to dance!”

³¹¹ Increase, growth and multiplication are central themes in the *carnaval* livestock rituals, which have as their purpose the survival and growth of the herds.

³¹² Mendoza writes that in the *carnavales* in the community of Huachón (in the eastern *quebradas* of Pasco), “the families do not just do the *poncho* and the *puya*, they also simulate the marriage of their animals in a symbolic way, and call it *casarachishun*” (Mendoza 2006, 69). For the cattle-branding ritual in the communities of the Upper Chancay Valley, close to Huayllay, Rivera (2005) writes that, in the final days of the feast, “the cattle, in order to be ‘domesticated’ are treated almost as human beings... The owners give their cattle human names, dress them with necklaces and earrings, and even arrange weddings between their calves and young people” (148) (In those communities, he argues, this humanization of the cattle enters into contradiction with the fact that people also sell their cattle at the end of the feast).

sheep became anxious and restless, as if they were about to be slaughtered, but they later calmed down. One of the aunts brought over a glass in which the *ñawi* had been mixed with wine and quinoa, and this was given to each of the sheep to drink while they were pinned down. Next came the *puya*, the tying of yarn to the back of the sheep to resemble wedding garments. Bits of red yarn were tied to the sheep's fleece, in groups of three and forming two parallel rows from the neck all the way down the back to the tail. As the family said, they were making a *poncho* for the ram, and a *manta* (blanket or shawl worn by women) for the ewe. Don Isidro's daughter Elizabeth added, "*estamos puyando*" (we are doing *puya*). Meanwhile, different family members were going around and playfully flinging flour, confetti and talcum powder at people (and at the sheep), as is normal during carnival in the Andes.

When the *puya* was complete, Fredy and Katy lifted the two sheep over their shoulders and began to dance around the corral, as the rest of us followed in a row and as one of the women played the *tinya* drum. After a while, the two sheep were finally set down and they rejoined their herd. As part of the family continued to dance – and as the coca, cigarettes and *calientito* continued to be shared – others began inspecting the whole herd of sheep to see which animals did not yet have the required ribbons hanging from their ears, in which case they were pinned to the ground and a needle was used to thread the ribbon. Their tails were also cut, and the blood smeared against our cheeks. At some point during this time, Juana's son, Raúl, a worker at the Animón mine, arrived with his girlfriend, whom the shepherd referred to as her *nuera* (daughter-in-law). Meanwhile, the whole atmosphere was festive as the children continued to fling flour and confetti as well as placing streamers on our necks and those of the animals; they also asked to borrow my digital camera and began to take photos of everything. After a couple of hours, with the threading and tail-cutting concluded, the animals were speedily rushed out of the corral towards the surrounding pasture, while we threw candy at them as they ran.

As we exited the corral following the sheep, the shepherd spoke to me about how in the old days the celebration was much bigger, you left the corral crawling on your knees from the effects of the alcohol and the festive atmosphere in general. Other family members also spoke nostalgically about the past. Don Isidro remarked how "it's not like before," when people were more dedicated to the *campo* (land) and the feast was much larger, in the days of the *abuelitos*

(grandparents). Now it's much less, he says. But, he pauses, "we never lose our *costumbre* (custom)." Elizabeth adds, with a hint of self-deprecation, "We still do it, if nothing else as an adornment" (*todavía siquiera como adorno lo hacemos*). Mario in turn laments what he sees as the general neglect of livestock raising and the land in general, and adds: "Not to badmouth, but mining has ruined all of this" (*no es por hablar mal, pero la minería ha malogrado todo esto*). He is referring to the fact that mining has drawn people away from livestock raising, the traditional activity of the area.

For the rest of the evening, we continue to dance in a circle, to the *huaynos* (the popular music of the Peruvian Andes) coming from a battery-powered tape player, while sharing *calientito* and beer. Sometimes we dance in the central courtyard of the estancia, sometimes in the one-room kitchen, depending on whether it is raining or not. As the evening wears on, people become more talkative and prone to sharing feelings with one another. The older people become emotional remembering their parents and grandparents who are no longer alive, or they talk about the obligations that *yernos* and *nueras* (sons- and daughters-in-law) have towards their in-laws. Raúl, Juana's older son who works at the Animón mine, tells me how this is the first time in years that he's been able to come to *carnavales*. Like most mine workers nowadays, he works on *sistema* (i.e. the accumulated time systems, such as 14x7), and in previous years the *carnavales* in Chiuric always took place on days when he was working either the day or the night shift. But this time it finally coincided with his *días libres* (rest days); he had just gotten off work in the afternoon, so he rushed over to the estancia. He says he comes because of his mother, since she lives here in Chiuric, and besides he has a lot of memories of growing up here in the estancia. When his mother is no longer here, maybe he will no longer come. The group continues to dance until late in the night, when everyone finally lies down to sleep on the sheepskins that have been set out on the floor.

CHAPTER VI

LAND, CONFLICT AND THE “SOCIAL BURDEN”

In the previous chapter I laid out the social geography of the plateau region of Pasco Province, where my research took place and where the communities of Rancas and Huayllay, as well as the city of Cerro de Pasco, are located. I then delved into the basic functioning of the traditional livestock-raising sector, which alongside mining constitutes the center of local economy and identity. The chapter also briefly discussed the nature of mining work today, as it takes place in the underground and open-pit mines of Pasco Province. That discussion can be thought of as a complement both to the historical account of mining work at the Huarón mine in the 20th century found in Chapters 1 and 2, and to the analysis of the transformations in mining labor in the 1980s and 90s found in Chapter 4. Finally, I illustrated some of these various themes through a discussion of a family gathering for a livestock ritual in an estancia located in one of the *caseríos* (sections) of the *comunidad* of Huayllay.

In this chapter, I focus directly on mine-community relations and conflicts, in particular negotiations over land. Both Rancas and Huayllay have mining companies operating directly on their territory. Huayllay and its neighboring community Huaychao are hosts to almost the entire operations of the Huarón and Chungar/Animón mines – two important underground mines operated by Canadian-owned Pan American Silver and by the Peruvian Volcan Compañía Minera, respectively. Rancas, on the other hand, is host to only part of the operations of the Volcan-owned Cerro de Pasco mine – namely, its large tailings deposit (Occroyoc). Other waste deposits from the mine are also located on territories included in the community’s historic land titles, even if the company disputes the validity of these documents. The open pit, on the other hand, is located in the middle of the city of Cerro de Pasco, not on communal territory – at least not on land that any *comunidad* currently seeks to include in its legal claims (although the city

was of course originally built on land belonging to local communities and claimed by a hacienda).

The central theme of the chapter is that land and landownership are of crucial importance for analyzing the relationship between the communities and the mines. First I examine mine-company negotiations and conflicts in Rancas, a community which is caught up in a particular kind of tension. On the one hand, Rancas played a leading role in the land recuperation movement of the early 1960s, and this history is central to local identity today. Moreover, it was precisely the mining company (the Cerro de Pasco Corporation), in its role as hacienda owner, that the *comunidad* of Rancas targeted in order to recover its lands in 1960. On the other hand, the community has since 1990 permitted the use of one of its pasture lands for tailings deposition by the mining company; this was exchanged for a sum of capital with which to start a “communal company” – in practice, a contractor for the mine. I focus most of all on the negotiations which took place in 2008-2010 over the renewal of the agreement for the tailings deposit, and on the tensions and ambivalences involved in this process. I argue that in the case of Rancas, history and the defense of territory still play a fundamental role in the relationship with the mining company; the benefits obtained through agreements with the company today are seen as flowing from the struggle of past generations to preserve communal patrimony.

Later in the chapter, I focus on the mine-community relation in Huayllay, where a whole new framework of accords and forms of compensation came into being in 2006-2008. I argue that the programs, policies and practices that mining companies (and many observers) interpret as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be understood as ways of attaining the “social peace” necessary for production, just as in the past the challenge lay in achieving “labor peace.” This is particularly evident in Huayllay, because such policies and programs are codified in extensive, detailed mine-community agreements, which local people see as the product of their actions and as their prerogative due to the fact that the companies operate on their land. Moreover, I also argue that there is a degree of continuity between the old labor *convenios* and the new mine-community agreements. In Huayllay District, the “social burden” has shifted, with land and community replacing labor as the repository of the social. Although this development has to do with specific local conditions, the close juxtaposition of labor and community in a

place like Huayllay can nevertheless help illuminate their relationship at a broader level. The changes discussed in this section – namely, the shift in the “social burden” and the increased vulnerability of capital to community demands - also has to do with larger global shifts; these are explicitly traced in a sub-section of the text.

For both communities, part of my goal is to emphasize that studies of corporate-community relations should pay attention to local agency and power, however limited it may seem. Also, I believe that structural factors, rather than a particular company’s ethics, philosophy or intentions, are most important in shaping any particular framework of mine-community relations. This is evident in the case of Huayllay, where one company utilizes CSR discourse to a significant extent, whereas the other does not – yet both must respond to community demands in roughly similar ways. It is the increased vulnerability of mining companies to community protests, as a result of global as well as regional and local shifts, that explains the newfound prominence of “social license” and CSR. I thus agree with scholars like Welker (2006) and Rajak (2011) who see CSR neither as a deceptive facade nor as a high-minded, philanthropic solution to global problems. In my own case, I am interested in CSR as a crucial element in a system of production, not unlike similar elements (worker housing, social work, etc.) that were part of earlier productive paradigms worldwide.

Community-company negotiations in Rancas

As discussed earlier, Rancas was at the forefront of the land struggle in Pasco in the early 1960s, when it occupied part of the adjacent Hacienda Paria owned by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation as part of its cattle-raising *División Ganadera*. The community’s confrontation with national police on May 2, 1960, which left three *comuneros* dead (including the president of the community) galvanized the land recuperation movement in the region, which in turn was part of the broader national process that led to the Agrarian Reform and the end of the haciendas in Peru. This event not only constitutes an important part of local identity in Rancas; it also constitutes a key antecedent to later land disputes between the community and the company

owning the Cerro de Pasco mine. At that time, however, the conflict was with the mining company as a cattle-raising *hacendado*, not with mining operations per se.

This changed over the next couple of decades, as open-pit operations grew and the state mining company Centromín – which had taken over from the Cerro de Pasco Corporation upon nationalization in 1974 – began depositing increasing amounts of waste materials on the west and north sides of the open pit. This expansion encroached upon the southeastern edge of the community’s lands. In particular, in the early 1980s, the company began to look for a new space to dump its tailings, as the old Quiulacocha deposit (a former lake) became full. The place chosen was a pastureland known as Occroyoc, which belonged to Rancas and which provided a naturally enclosed space situated at a slightly lower altitude than the mine, so that the tailings could be carried by gravity through a tube. In 1983, the government issued an order expropriating 540 hectares of land from the community for this purpose, in exchange for a minimal payment. Yet the community refused to hand over the land, and the conflict dragged on for seven years. Finally, in 1990, an agreement was reached between the state-owned company and the community; the former offered the latter a one-time payment of US\$2.5 million in return for being allowed to use 141 hectares of land for 20 years. This was an uncommonly large payment in mining company-community relations in Peru at the time.³¹³ In addition, the company also agreed to provide stable jobs to ten community members (*Libro Blanco*, 30), and it promised to implement a remediation program for the land before returning it to the community at the end of the 20-year period. Moreover, the company promised to ignore the earlier expropriation order that covered a larger, 540-hectare space.

One of the most significant things about the 1990 agreement, however, is what the US\$2.5 million compensation money was used for. Namely, it became the starting capital for the new “Communal Company for Multiple Services,” Ecoserm-Rancas. Whereas older community

³¹³ That this payment was unusual can be seen by comparing it with other agreements that the Cerro de Pasco mine made with other neighboring rural communities in the 1990s, as listed in the official “white paper” on the privatization of the mine in 1999. Granted, in these other cases the use of community land was much less intense than the large tailings deposit that was built in Rancas. For example, in 1998 the company paid the *comunidad* of Yurajhuanca 78,000 soles (around US\$25,000) for the space taken up by the company’s water pipes, pumps and other installations of its domestic water system for a period of 13 years. Similarly, in 1999 the company agreed to pay the *comunidad* of Santa Ana de Tusi US\$26,400 for the use of 55 ha. of land that would receive overflow from the mine’s water store at Lake Alcacocha, for a period of 3 years.

enterprises, such as the Communal Farm and the Communal Cooperative, had been dedicated to cattle-raising, the new Communal Company would have mining, construction and transportation as its business. The compensation money was invested in expensive machinery and heavy equipment, and the communal company essentially became a contractor for the mines. Ecoserm-Rancas would become the model for other communal companies across the province – particularly in those communities situated next to the mines – thus inaugurating a new type of company-community articulation (Chacón 2009). From the beginning, its creation was explicitly tied to the community's cession of the Occroyoc land for the tailings deposit; this link is frequently recalled in present-day discussions about the communal company. Thus, the community exchanged one section of its pasture land for the ability to enter more fully into mining work, with community members becoming both the business' administrators and its workers. Not only did the creation of the communal company signify the entry of the subcontracting model into the community; it also offered a way to counteract the unemployment that was rampant at the time, due both to the economic crisis and to the longer-term tendency towards the creation of a surplus labor force in the mining industry. From the beginning, and like other communal companies in the province, Ecoserm-Rancas would be explicitly conceived not just as a business meant to yield a profit but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a means of creating jobs for the young *comuneros*.

During the 1990s, as Rancas' communal company was trying to establish a foothold as a mining contractor at Cerro de Pasco and several other regional mines, the former pasture at Occroyoc was gradually filled with tailings from the mine's two concentrator plants, becoming a fixture of the landscape readily seen from the surrounding hills as well as in satellite images of the region. By the middle of the next decade, it was clear that the 141-hectare tailings deposit needed to be expanded. The 2005 Closure Plan documents submitted by the Volcan company (which had bought the Cerro de Pasco mine in 1999, as part of the piecemeal privatization of the old state company) estimated that the deposit had enough capacity for just another 10 years at the current rate of tailings deposition.³¹⁴ In any case, the 1990 agreement with the community of Rancas had been for 20 years, so it was set to expire in 2010. More generally, the cycle of high

³¹⁴ The "Closure Plans" are legally mandated documents; they do not signify an intent on the part of the company to actually close the mine at any particular moment.

mineral prices that begun in 2002 pushed the mining company towards a general policy of expansion that made negotiations with its neighbors necessary. Thus, at the same time that Volcan was pursuing the “Plan L” negotiations with the city of Cerro de Pasco, with the aim of expanding the open pit, the company begun to request a new agreement with the community of Rancas so as to be able to maintain and expand the tailings deposit. Whereas in the first case it dealt with a multitude of individual homeowners as well as the municipality located in the urban area, in the second it had to negotiate with the *comuneros* who collectively claimed ownership to the land through the institution of the *comunidad campesina*. Conversations between the community and the company began in 2006, but they really got underway in 2008.

In the eyes of the community, the 1990 agreement with the old state mining company had invalidated the 1983 expropriation order that covered a wider, 540-hectare tract of land. In practice, however, the company had been using parts of this broader area to dump its waste ore and build auxiliary installations. This whole region in a sense constituted a “gray zone” between the community and the mine, to which both lay claim. A few estancias occupied this area – some in regular use, others less so; herds of sheep, llamas and alpacas could be regularly seen pasturing close to tailings and company installations. By 2007, the Volcan company had begun building a new cyanide leaching (lixiviation) plant in which to process, and put to profitable use, its vast stockpiles of ore. For the city and the area as a whole, there were environmental concerns involving the new plant. On the one hand, it would potentially eliminate at least part of the huge, uncovered mounds of ore that constituted a locus of acid mine drainage and contamination with heavy metals on the west and north edges of the city. On the other hand, the plant would also generate its own waste; furthermore, it would introduce a new and toxic element – cyanide – that had not previously been used in operations in Cerro de Pasco. Furthermore, construction of the plant had begun months before the required Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) had even been presented to the public. For the community of Rancas, however, the new plant was also an encroachment on its land. Its construction was taking place – without community permission - on one side of a hill known as Shuco, adjacent to the Occroyoc tailings and traditionally claimed by the community as one of its *parajes* (pastures).

The plant construction, combined with the upcoming expiration of the 1990 agreement on the tailings deposit, thus brought to a head the broader issue of the status of the lands historically claimed by the community but increasingly utilized by the mining company, generating a conflict that was ongoing around the time I began my fieldwork in Cerro de Pasco and Rancas in 2008. Although not as violent as the conflict in Huayllay discussed later in this section – or other mining conflicts elsewhere in Peru – the dispute between Rancas and the Volcan company did have some moments of marked tension. Early on, these revolved around the legally-mandated public hearings on the EIA for the new lixiviation plant. In a way, these hearings served to legitimate what the community considered was an illegitimate situation, due to the lack of community permission for the plant and the fact that its construction was underway prior to EIA approval. On May 6, 2008, one such hearing had to be canceled when members of the community of Rancas occupied the municipal auditorium in the neighborhood of Paragsha, where it was to take place. Another public session was supposed to take place on July 11, in the town of Rancas, which is not only the seat of the *comunidad* of the same name but also the capital of the larger district of Simón Bolívar, in which large part of the Volcan Company's operations are located. But when the *ranqueños* attempted to enter the auditorium of the municipality, they were turned away on the grounds that it was full. According to the *ranqueños'* account, the company had brought in busloads of their workers and their families from elsewhere in the district, filling up the available space and purposefully preventing people from Rancas from attending. In response, the bells in the Rancas church were rung, and the community assembled and forced the organizers to cancel the session. Later that day, in what was widely perceived to be a retaliatory move on the part of the mining company, two *ranqueños* were arrested by police while leaving a restaurant in Cerro de Pasco and held overnight on false charges, accused of stealing video equipment from the company. The two had been heavily involved in communal affairs and in the defense of communal territory; furthermore, one of them was the grandson of the president of the community who was killed by police during the 1960 land recuperation. The next day, on July 12, a large group of *ranqueños* mobilized and marched through the streets of Cerro de Pasco and in that way obtained the release of the two *comuneros*.

In response to these events, a 24-hour *paro* (strike/march) was called for July 17, the date on which yet another public session on Volcan's EIA was supposed to be held in Cerro de Pasco.

On that day, approximately 800 people marched to the company offices in the neighborhood of Paragsha.³¹⁵ Although many of the marchers were from Rancas, an effort had been made to reach out to the other communities as well as urban neighborhoods in Simón Bolívar district, and they also sent delegations. Speaking outside of the main Volcan offices, the march organizers asserted that Shuco (the site of the new plant) and Rumiallana (the site where the mining company was dumping its waste ore) both belonged to Rancas. Furthermore, they spoke about environmental problems that served as evidence of the irresponsible attitude of the company: the contamination of the water, lakes and rivers, the presence of lead in blood, the destruction of pastures and the death of cattle. It was emphasized several times that the marchers were not against mining per se, and that it was possible to coexist with the industry, but that they wanted responsible mining, not the irresponsible and abusive practices of the Volcan company.

The march had been given added urgency by the fact that a conflict had also broken out between one of Rancas' neighbors, the community of Pacoyán – a former hacienda that later became a *comunidad* – and Chancadora Centauro, a small gold mining company operating in its territory. The *comuneros* of Pacoyán had blocked access to the mine, complaining that the company had not fulfilled its agreements with the community. Earlier that day, the police had been sent to clear the road and had wounded six community members. A *comunero* of Pacoyán spoke about this conflict to the demonstrators outside the Volcan offices in Cerro, drawing a link between the abusive practices of both mining companies. Finally, the demonstrators named a commission to meet with the regional mining supervisory authorities; they managed to achieve the march's goal of canceling Volcan's public session planned for that day.

Through these actions, the community managed to get the attention of the regional offices of the National Ombudsman (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) as well as of the national supervisory agency for the mining sector (OSINERGMIN); the latter finally ordered the company to stop construction of the lixiviation plant in August 2008. This constituted a temporary victory for the

³¹⁵ I had not been present at the July 12 demonstration, but I did attend the July 17 march.

community of Rancas, even if it does not seem to have altered the mining company's long-term plans for construction of the plant.³¹⁶

This situation of confrontation between the community and the company continued during the talks over the renewal and expansion of the lease for the tailings deposit. One of the strategies followed by the mining company was to weaken the community's bargaining position by attacking the legitimacy and soundness of its legal claim upon the land. This involved several things. On the one hand, Volcan argued that the 1983 expropriation order had never been formally rescinded and thus was still in effect, no matter what the 1990 agreement between the community and the state mining company said. On the other hand, the company's legal team also attacked the validity of the community's land titles. As mentioned earlier, the community of Rancas traces the first official, state recognition of its lands back to the late 16th century, when the Spanish Crown is believed to have granted a first land title known as the *garashipu*. The community's first modern, notarized land title dates from 1910, and is inscribed in the national property registry system (*Registros Públicos*) that was created in 1887. In 2009, during the negotiations over the tailings deposit and the land in dispute, Volcan's team of lawyers argued that Rancas' 1910 title was faulty because it laid claim to pastures that had already been registered in a 1903 land title by the Hacienda Paria.

The date of 1903 for the Paria title was not coincidental – that was the year that James B. Haggin's Cerro de Pasco Investment Company (later renamed Cerro de Pasco Corporation) arrived in the area and began buying both mining claims and surface properties. One of the first of these properties was Paria, the hacienda which bordered both the city and mine of Cerro de Pasco as well as the village of Rancas, and which the *ranqueños* consider to have been one of the main usurpers of their lands since colonial times. The 1903 registration of the hacienda's land title was evidently part of the process of purchase from the former owners by the U.S. investors. By bringing this up, Volcan's representatives affirmed the link between their company and the old U.S. corporation as well as the previous hacienda owners – a connection that was not only symbolic but also made up of real property transactions. Furthermore, like the old Cerro de

³¹⁶ Volcan's Annual Report for 2011 made no mention of the earlier conflict over the lixiviation plant and announced its construction for 2012-2013 (40).

Pasco Corporation, Volcan could afford a better team of lawyers to delegitimize the community's land claims, and it could portray itself as being on the side of law and reason.

These arguments, made forcefully by the company's lawyers and by the outspoken general manager of the Cerro de Pasco operating unit, Teódulo Quispe – who, unlike the members of Volcan's Board of Directors, was a native of Pasco – provoked offense among many members of the community, for they struck at the very heart of Rancas' identity, tied as the latter is to the integrity of an ancestral territory recovered through long, difficult struggle. Some *ranqueños* countered that the 1910 notarization and inscription of its land title had only been the end result of a longer legal battle, which anteceded the hacienda's 1903 inscription; others emphasized that, no matter what legal documents the company could produce, the lands had always belonged to, as they put it, the “ancestral community” of Rancas. Still others argued that their continuous occupation/possession of the land in question would reaffirm their legal right to it no matter what the older documents said (through a right akin to adverse possession).

In reality, however, it seems clear that the Volcan company was not trying to deny the community's land claims altogether. Such a denial might have been attempted in earlier decades, but by 2009 the legacy of the community's multiple struggles could not simply be wiped away. To do so would have provoked a much bigger conflict, and it would also have gone against the precedent of the 1990 lease agreement for the tailings deposit, which was after all premised on the idea that the land belonged to Rancas. In fact, the company was willing to legally transfer its alleged ownership of part of the disputed territory over to the community – precisely the portion corresponding to the tailings (as opposed to the larger area in dispute). This was presented as a gesture of good will that was supposed to speed up the signing of an agreement, which surprised community members who believed the land to be theirs already. The mining company was likely well aware that an extension of the lease for the tailings deposit would require a new lease and a new payment to the community. Thus the fact that Volcan representatives saw it necessary to delegitimize Rancas' land documents can be interpreted not literally as proposing that the community's land rights be taken away, but rather as an attempt to weaken its confidence and its bargaining position and prevent it from making overly ambitious claims upon the company.

This strategy could have some effect on the community because it resonated with a view that existed parallel, and in a sense opposite to, the discourse of proud and unyielding defense of land. Alongside Rancas' pride in its martyrs and in its historical role in the struggle against the haciendas, there was a discourse that portrayed past communal leaders, and to some degree the community as a whole, as a careless and ineffective defender of its boundaries. According to this view, community leaders earlier in the 20th century had been naive and easily manipulated by lawyers, *hacendados* and mining companies. Although in 1960 they had stood their ground and recovered much of their ancestral land, in the years since the community had once again allowed its boundaries to fall into disrepair and permitted the encroachment of its neighbors, whether it was the mining company to the east, the community of Pacoyán to the west (formed as a new community on the grounds of the former Hacienda Pacoyán, rather than annexed to Rancas as some would have wished) or the urban neighborhood of Asentamiento Humano José Carlos Mariátegui at the northwestern edge of Cerro de Pasco. This less triumphant, more regretful discourse could be, and sometimes was, used as a rousing call to revive the defense of communal land. But it could also weaken confidence in the legal standing of the community's land claims, thus making some individuals more willing to accept the solutions proposed by Volcan's lawyers, which offered *saneamiento* (legalization, elimination of legal defects) of the community's boundaries – less expansively interpreted - in return for acquiescing to the company's demands.

There were also other issues that came up during the dispute. The 1990 agreement had stipulated that the company would be responsible for resolving any problems related to damage to community lands around the tailings deposit. In 2009, Volcan representatives were willing to acknowledge that they had used or otherwise affected an additional 40 hectares of land, besides the 141 hectares of the tailings deposit. The community, on the other hand, had, through a contact, hired a small environmental consulting firm from Lima to conduct analyses of soil and water, which showed that a much wider area was affected by mining activity (EQUAS 2008). The community thus demanded that this problem be addressed in any agreement to be signed, either through environmental remediation actions or through compensation payments.

The communal company, which as we saw had been born out of the original 1990 agreement, inevitably became involved in the dispute between the community and the company in 2008-2010. Namely, its administrators decided to temporarily pull their machines and workers out of Volcan operations. As they explained to me, they felt that Volcan was using its relationship with the communal company as a weapon with which to pressure the community, in the sense that they would threaten to cut its contracts and work assignments if Rancas did not sign the agreement over the tailings deposit quickly. Pulling out was thus a way for the communal company to assert its independence, and that of the community, from the mining company. They were able to do this because they had contracts in two other mining companies – particularly in the Chancadora Centauro gold mine, located close to Rancas, as well as in the slightly more distant Brocal (Colquijirca) mine. Since its inception almost two decades earlier, the communal company had attempted to diversify and avoid dependence on any single mine, and that proved useful at this time. The decision to withdraw from Volcan operations was initially questioned by some *comuneros* at the communal assembly, but it was eventually ratified as part of the community's strategy during the land dispute with the mining company.

Nevertheless, this withdrawal was understood by all to be only temporary. The communal company's continued engagement with Volcan operations was seen by many as central to the future well-being of Rancas; in fact, obtaining more and better contracts for the communal company was mentioned as one of the community's objectives in the negotiation process. Volcan also used this possibility as a way of enticing and pressuring those *comuneros* who were most afraid of losing access to mining work. Negotiations over land thus were also negotiations over access to jobs, and over the viability and stability of the communal company – because the latter ultimately owed its existence to the community's hold over land.

As would be expected, not all *comuneros* felt the same way during the negotiations with the mining company; although the community sought to present a unified front to the outside, inside there were fissures and disagreements. Some of this had to do with the fact that the communal authorities (the *junta directiva*) serve only a two-year term; elections for a new *junta* took place in the middle of the negotiations. Some of the individuals in the first *junta* (not all) were seen as being more favorably disposed towards the mining company. Moreover, they had

set up their own, private contracting firm while the communal negotiations were going on. This aroused suspicions from other *comuneros* who wondered how, and in exchange for what, they had obtained their starting capital, and there was a push to expel them from the *comunidad* (i.e., formally take away their *comunero* status). At the end of 2008, a new *junta* was elected; its members were generally seen as being more hostile to the mining company. Nevertheless, they, and other sectors known to be very vocal about the defense of communal lands, were also occasionally subjected to rumors of corruption – an exceedingly common type of accusation in Peru today. In early 2009, numerous copies of an anonymous flier were distributed around Rancas and surrounding towns that launched all kinds of accusations (including, but not limited to, corruption) against several such individuals who were well-known for their critical stance towards the company. This attack was widely seen as coming not just from the pro-Volcan camp inside the community but from the mining company itself.

It is important to emphasize, however, that among those sectors most willing to compromise with Volcan were to be found not only the two or three private contractors from Rancas eager to do business with the mining company, but also some young men with families who depended on mining work through either the communal company or other contractors, and who were thus anxious about the possibility of a protracted confrontation that would make it difficult for them to work.³¹⁷ On the other hand, some of those most willing to hold out included individuals who had more options and who were not as immediately dependent on the mine.

Nevertheless, a strong discourse of communal unity served to bring the different sides together within the umbrella of the community, and to hold their disputes in check. Furthermore, in spite of their differences, they continued to interact socially at private and communal events. Because of the particular history of Rancas, moreover, it was the discourse of the defense of communal territory, and of a general critical stance towards the mining company, that had the

³¹⁷ The mining company encouraged this anxiety by explicitly bringing up the specter of crisis, namely the drop in mineral prices that had resulted from the world financial crisis in 2008. According to the mine's General Manager, Volcan's Directory in Lima had been willing to close the Cerro de Pasco unit due to the decrease in prices, but he, as a *cerreño*, had prevented this from coming to pass, as it would mean job losses and economic suffering in the city and its surroundings. This account seems unlikely or at least exaggerated - the 2008 drop in prices, though significant, was not so severe as previous ones in recent Peruvian history, and, although it may have slowed down some investments, it did not result in the closure of existing mines in Peru – but it seems to have been aimed at provoking anxiety over jobs and increasing the community's willingness to acquiesce to the company's conditions.

upper hand. Even those who were less enthusiastic about these notions had to phrase their comments in such a way as to acknowledge the importance of the events of 1960 and of the continuing need to honor the memory of the martyrs who died for the land. It is important to remember that for the community, those events are not a distant or abstract occurrence; some of those most involved in communal affairs were children, nephews, nieces or grandchildren of the three martyrs from 1960, or of other community members who were wounded and who in some cases suffer the consequences of their injuries to this day. The land recuperation campaign is moreover memorialized every year in a public event on the main square of Rancas and in a pilgrimage to the statues of the three martyrs at the hill where the confrontation took place. Thus, in internal discussions during the negotiations with Volcan in 2008-2010, the fact that Rancas' lands were a legacy of the martyrs and fighters of 1960 was frequently brought up, as was the argument that the lands needed to be preserved for future generations. This was combined with a discourse, common in Rancas at the time of my research, to the effect that mining is only temporary, and that the current mining boom would come to an end sooner or later, whereas the raising of animals on the land is something that will always be there to sustain the community.

Yet the parallel with 1960 was of course imperfect – on that occasion, the *ranqueños* had recovered land from a livestock-raising hacienda (albeit one owned by the mining company) and had then put it to the same use, raising animals. By contrast, in the 2008-2010 negotiations, as in 1990, the defense of communal territory was not ultimately about ensuring the availability of pasture lands for future generations. On the contrary, a section of land was being covered with tailings, from which it was unclear that it would ever recover. Although the Occroyoc pasture could be seen as small in relation to the community's overall landholdings, some *ranqueños* wondered out loud how much they would be willing to allow the tailings and other mining waste to advance over time, and how much space the community was willing to give up. Similarly, the tailings deposit could one day affect not just the community's pasture lands and *estancias* but also the town of Rancas itself, from which it is currently separated only by a couple of small hills (though Rancas is more protected than the neighboring towns/*comunidades* of Yurajhuanca and Quiuilacocha, which are actually more exposed to the Occroyoc tailings even if the latter are not situated on their land).

These concerns were brought up in conversations and in communal assemblies, as was a vague, almost tragic feeling that the community was in a sense betraying the legacy of 1960 and of its ancestors' efforts to defend the lands. On the other hand, the "progress" of the community was also seen as a legacy of those struggles – as was, in a very concrete sense, the communal company - and this progress necessitated the provision of work opportunities for *comuneros* and their children. Thus, I would argue that the community's overall willingness to continue ceding a portion of its land for the tailings deposit – provided its rightful ownership of the land was acknowledged and respected – can be seen as part of a search for a balance between, on the one hand, the preservation of a source of long-term sustenance and identity (i.e. pasture land), and on the other hand, the pursuit of progress and advancement as defined locally – i.e. employment, educational attainment and a better life. Though seemingly in tension with one another, both goals depended on the preservation and defense of communal patrimony, i.e. the land, either for the purposes of pasturing and cattle-raising or as the basis of a claim on the mining industry that could then serve as the foundation for communal enterprise, work and other opportunities.

Moreover, the willingness to sign an agreement with the mining company cannot be understood without emphasizing two very concrete factors. First, as mentioned above, it must be remembered that Rancas is a relatively large *comunidad* when compared to others in the province; its landholdings are large, due to its antiquity, population, and the central role it played in the struggle against the haciendas. In 1990, and again in 2008-2010, the community was not ceding all of its pasture land, but only its southeastern corner. Second, this was not a question of agreeing or disagreeing with a new mining project; the Cerro de Pasco mine had operating, and producing tailings and other waste, since long before the community was in a position to successfully defend its boundaries. In 2008-2010, a hypothetical refusal by the community to renew the lease on the Occroyoc deposit would neither have eliminated the tailings already dumped there (or, for that matter, in the older, neighboring Quiuilacocha tailings deposit, which lies abandoned), nor would it have prevented the continued emission of tailings by the mining company, which then would have had to find another neighboring *comunidad* with which to sign an agreement with monetary compensation, job opportunities, etc.

After holding out and extending negotiations over the course two years, towards the end of 2010 Rancas' communal assembly finally voted to sign an agreement with the mining company. This *convenio* involved a renewal of the lease for the Occroyoc tailings deposit for another 20 years, in return for a compensation payment of approximately 10 million soles (around US\$3.5 million, or \$1 million more than the 1990 agreement). The company also agreed to give the communal company more contracts and to implement certain environmental remediation programs around the tailings area. The last few months before the signing of the agreement had seen a new round of animosity inside the community. Some accused the communal leadership of betraying the legacy of the 1960 martyrs by accepting the continued use of pasture lands for tailings storage; others believed that the community should have held out longer and obtained more in compensation. It is important to note that, whereas in 1990 the monetary compensation had been invested communally – in the purchase of heavy equipment for the new communal company – this did not occur in 2010. Although some favored doing a similar communal investment, others were apprehensive that the money would not be well spent or that it would fall into corrupt hands. For that reason, it was finally decided that the money would simply be split among all registered community members (*comuneros titulares*) – that is, heads of households and single individuals over 18 – with different amounts based on seniority.³¹⁸ On average, each *titular* was supposed to receive around 15,000 soles (approximately US\$5,300).

This money was put to a variety of uses. Many families used it to buy an automobile, both for personal use and to use it to work transporting passengers to and from Cerro de Pasco and on other routes. The increase in vehicles in the community became evident to me when I returned to Rancas on May 2011 for the annual commemoration of the 1960 land recuperation. Whereas in previous years most people had crowded into the back of one of the old community-owned trucks for the ride from the town of Rancas to the hill of Huayllacancha, this time a large number of private cars appeared beside the monument at the top of the hill – station wagons, pick-up trucks and others. One young couple that I knew bought a motorcycle; another purchased both a vehicle and a refrigerator so as to sell homemade ice pops (a common side occupation for women in Peru). A *ranqueño* friend of mine, who had previously worked in the

³¹⁸ In Rancas, single adult women are usually *comuneras*, but not married ones, since only one person in a married couple can hold that status and the women usually (though not always) give it up for their husbands.

communal company as well as in a couple of small businesses, used his share of the compensation money to create his own small contracting firm together with his cousin. In 2011, they were doing “environmental work” (*trabajos ambientales*) around the tailings deposit – i.e. implementing the environmental remediation programs stipulated in the *convenio*, such as building a barrier to prevent the animals from eating grass too close to the tailings area. Like with other remediation programs, the *convenio* had reserved this job for the communal company, and the latter in turn subcontracted it out to my friend’s firm. Another friend pooled his compensation money together with part of that received by one of his siblings (who was also a *titular*) and invested it into a restaurant that he opened in Cerro de Pasco, in which he gave board (*pensión*) to workers at a contracting firm. Eventually he closed this business, in part because the shortage of water in Cerro forced him to buy his water for cooking from a cistern truck, which proved too expensive; he later opened up a second restaurant in the booming town of Huayllay, an hour away.

Huayllay: Community and Labor

So far in this chapter I have discussed the process of negotiation over land between the community of Rancas and the nearby Cerro de Pasco mine, owned by Volcan Compañía Minera. I will now examine the land relationship between mine and community as it has taken place in Huayllay, which is located near two underground mines: Huarón (today owned by Pan American Silver) and Animón/Chungar (today owned by Volcan). While Huarón was an important and well-known mine for much of the 20th century, the formerly small Animón has grown dramatically in the last decade, catching up to Huarón and even surpassing it in terms of the magnitude of its operations. Since the two mines are located immediately adjacent to one another, they can be said to form a single mining district, with two different owners.

In this discussion, it is important to keep in mind a key difference between Rancas and Huayllay that has already been mentioned. Whereas Rancas is located very near the city of Cerro de Pasco, which is the center of the mine of the same name, Huayllay is situated much further away from other large towns, and is thus its own center. Although many *ranqueños* worked in

the Cerro de Pasco mine for much of the 20th century, the labor link was significantly stronger in the case of Huayllay. Since the old mining camps were dismantled in the 1990s, the new mining boom of the 2000s has seen the formerly small village of Huayllay become the place of residence for many of the workers at both Huarón and Animón; in a sense, the community has become the new mine camp.

In Huayllay, as in Rancas, the mine-community relation is mediated by the negotiation of formal agreements or *convenios* between the company and the *comunidad*. There is both a new and an old aspect to these agreements. On the one hand, the negotiations and conflicts to be discussed later in this chapter began in 2006, and they marked a significant departure in company-community relations in Huayllay. As one of my informants put it, this constituted a “revolution” in the *convenios* and in the mine-community relation. Namely, in 2006 the *comunidad* conducted a 3-day *paro* (strike/blockage) against the Huarón mine, after having presented the company with a list of demands. This was followed by a dialogue process that culminated with a new *convenio* between Pan American Silver and the community of Huayllay in early 2007. In 2008, the *comunidad* conducted a new *paro*, this time against the Volcan-owned Chungar mine. This time, unlike in 2006, the *paro* ended in violence between the police and the *comuneros*. Nevertheless, a dialogue process was also put in place that culminated with a new *convenio*.

On the other hand, as I discussed in Chapter 1, *convenios* over land between the Huarón mine and the community of Huayllay go back to 1933, just as the French mining company was restarting operations after the Depression. Importantly, it was also just four years after the *comunidad* of Huayllay had gained official recognition under the modern regime of *comunidades indígenas* established by the 1920 Constitution. As mentioned earlier, the 1933 agreement gave the town of Huayllay electricity in exchange for the use of its lands as well as for the effects of contamination. The revisions of the agreement in 1936 and 1941 increased this electricity supply to 100 light bulbs of 40w and added a monetary rent payment for the lands used (250 soles per year plus 2.50 soles for each additional hectare of land).

Thus, while there was a *convenio* between the company and the *comunidad* on whose lands it operated, the amount of the compensation was by any measure small. Even assuming

that there may have been increases in the amount of monetary payments after 1941 (although I am not aware of any specific increases), the portion of the agreement referring to the electrical supply is remembered today as having remained unsatisfactory throughout the 20th century. The amount of electricity supplied did not keep up with population growth, so that each house received only a faint glow and only for part of the day, thus reducing the advantage of progress that a community near a mine, like Huayllay, was supposed to have in relation to the rest of the Andean countryside.

A letter from the company to the community, dated 1977 and preserved in the communal offices, complains of the low level of the lakes that supplied their hydroelectric plant and announces that as a result, electricity would be supplied to the community only between 6:00pm and 10:00pm until further notice. A community publication from 1987 (Villareal 1987) discusses the problem at greater length.³¹⁹ It quotes the district mayor of Huayllay at the time, Luis Oropeza, as having stated that “without electrification there is no progress;” the mayor himself writes an article in the publication in which he addresses the issue:

The Huarón Mining Company, in compensation for the use of the lands that are property of the *Comunidad Campesina*, grants the community an electrical supply that is deficient and for limited times, which is insufficient, given the demographic increase of the population. Since our locality has its respective educational centers (primary, secondary, occupational school) the lessons are taught in half-darkness, requiring the use of lamps, which harms the intellectual capacity of our students. Due to this awful service, the outlying neighborhoods of the town, during the hours of greatest demand, find themselves almost in darkness with a supply of barely 30 W. It is sad to contemplate our streets with a gloomy appearance (Villareal 1987, 4)

Similarly, another writer in the 1987 publication connects the problem of the electrical supply to broader issues of pillage and abuse by extractive companies:

After the Revolution of October 3 1968, the capital of the Huarón Mining Company passed wholly into Peruvian hands.³²⁰ Unfortunately, the methods of the foreigners

³¹⁹ This *revista* [magazine] was a one-issue publication printed by the *comunidad* and the communal cooperative around 1987. Agapito Villareal Escobal is listed as the person who directed the project. This is a valuable source that presents information on a variety of different issues pertaining to the community, from its history and customs to its signature institutions and communal endeavors. These kinds of publications are also found in a few other *comunidades* in Pasco, such as Yarusyacán (which produced a long pamphlet in the 1960s) and Rancas (which in 2010 published a community history, with testimonies, of the 1960 land recuperation campaign).

³²⁰ This detail is actually incorrect. Juan Velasco’s Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which took over in the “Revolution” (actually a coup) of 1968, did nationalize the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in 1974, but it

remain. This company did not pay the *comunidad campesina*, nor does it pay now, for the immense areas of land from which it extracts incalculable riches, condemning the *caseríos* [outlying sections of the *comunidad*'s territory] and district [seat] of Huayllay to a painful and inclement backwardness. For example: It is incredible that this company refuses to provide an efficient lighting system to these *pueblos* [peoples/towns]. The town of Huayllay receives, from 6:00pm to 6:00am, a light of 30 W that as can be imagined is not enough to power even the engine of a sewing machine (Ibid., 39)³²¹

The deficiency of the power supply that had been supposed to function as compensation for the use of land can be seen as iconic of the weakness of the mine-*comunidad* relationship at the time, at least compared to today. On the other hand, it is important to remember that at this time there were other kinds of *convenios* – namely, those between the mining workers' union and the Huarón company – that were negotiated and put into practice not in the town of Huayllay but rather up in the mining camp just a couple of kilometers away. These agreements had developed gradually since the union's founding in 1945 – during a period of political opening in which many of the mining unions of the Central Highlands were organized – and had reached their apogee by the 1970s and 80s.

Although these *convenios* were based around the labor relation and thus may seem completely unrelated to the mine-community link that is under discussion, in actual practice these old agreements were not just about wages but also about everyday life issues and in-kind provisions that the workers' families had come to see as their right. According to the former secretary of the union, whom I interviewed, at one point there had been over 300 *convenios* between the workers and the company – meaning over 300 specific points on things like firewood and coal provision for cooking, school supplies for workers' children, towels, toilet

did not do the same with medium-scale mining companies like Huarón. There was a process of “Peruvianization” in the company in the 1970s, under pressure from the government, as its place of incorporation moved from Paris to Lima and as the foreign personnel was gradually replaced by Peruvians; furthermore, some Peruvian capital was admitted. However, the French company Peñarroya (Groupe Imetal) retained ownership of a majority of shares until 1987, when it sold the mine to the Hochschild group. Also, the quote states that the company “did not pay” the community for the use of land. As we saw, there were agreements over monetary compensation as early as 1936; clearly, what the writer meant was that there was not a remotely adequate or sufficient payment..

³²¹ It is important to mention that the community of Huayllay did not simply stand idly by waiting for the mining company to provide them with electricity. The 1987 community publication notes that in 1974 the organization of *huayllino* migrants in Lima (Centro Unión Huayllay) collected money for an electrification effort to be implemented jointly with the government, but this project fell through and the money was donated to the high school in Huayllay instead. The town of Huayllay did eventually gain access to a better electrical power system in the 1990s, but not through the mining company.

paper, etc. These in-kind provisions and agreements are definitely one of the things that people remember the most from the old Huarón mining camps, and which they recall having been central to what the workers' union, and especially the women's committees, fought for. Although several of their accounts could be cited on this point, for the sake of brevity I will only quote that of the former secretary of the union, who was in charge of organizing the women's committees, and who provides a good overview of the system that had grown around the old *convenios*:

We had a *convenio* that they would give us 30 centimeters [for] the size of a piece of firewood, because we used coal and firewood to prepare our food. So, the [women's] committee worked on the fulfillment of this [agreement]. The committee also, what did it work on? On controlling the company stores. Controlling the weight, the delivery of the merchandise. It also worked on the hospitals, for a good [quality of] care... In the schools, for example the women's committee was always present in the educational centers. We demanded that the teachers have their professional degree [*sean titulados*]. Before, we had seen that the teacher arrived on Tuesday, and left Thursday. They did not work Monday or Friday. But when the women's committee began to work [on this], any teacher that did not work their hours, we proposed their immediate dismissal.³²²

The intricate web of *convenios* of course extended to issues of payment and the workplace. The agreements could be quite specific, and over time they acquired certain stability, becoming part of a system of mutual expectations between workers and the company, almost a local tradition. This was facilitated by the fact that a (relatively) stable community of workers' families had developed in the second half of the 20th century (i.e., people working at the mine for 25 years or more, individuals who had been born and grown up in the camp and then stayed to work). Some of this specificity, intricacy and stability of agreements is reflected in the comments of Walter Peña Jumpa, an engineer who worked at Huarón and wrote his thesis about the mine in

³²² Similarly, a group of *huayllina* women whom I interviewed told me about their memories of their mothers' participation in the women's committee in the old mining camp: "When there were abuses against the workers, for example if they didn't bring them their exact amount of fuel, then [the women] went out and the company had to keep quiet and just give it to them" (*cuando ya había abusos en los trabajadores, no les traía por ejemplo sus combustibles exacto, entonces ellas salían ya y la empresa les tenía que dar calladito*). Additionally, Octavio Domínguez (pseudonym), one of the former workers whose life story I recounted at the end of Chapter 1, told me of how "[the women] controlled, for example, when there was a shortage of basic staple items, like sugar, milk, other things. So then they worked on that, the women's committee. For example, [if] the fuel, firewood, coal for us to cook [with] did not arrive. So sometimes it did not arrive, or there was a shortage, then they had to come to the union to make their complaint [*hacer reclamos*]. Then they got together with the union and went to the General Manager's office to complain"

1992. He describes one of the agreements, part of a wider web that was then in the process of being dismantled:

In the San Narciso section [of the mine] an agreement has been made [*se ha pactado*] with the *obrero* workforce, since many years ago, for the payment of two extra hours for each day in which water from Lake Lavandera is used for perforation, as opposed to water from Lake Naticocha which is normally used. This concession, like others that used to be formerly practiced, is based on the desire to maintain a policy of LABOR PEACE in the face of union demands (Lake Lavandera is an old recipient of sewage from the Camp of the same name, in which people no longer live, located near the Huarón camp, thus the demand) (Peña 1992, 8; emphasis and parentheses in the original).

Peña's comments convey a sense not only of the specificity of the agreements but also of their direct connection to the issue of "labor peace" (*paz laboral*)— i.e., preventing strikes that could disrupt operations and cause losses.³²³ Like the company-community *convenios* to be discussed shortly, the worker-company agreements at the old mining camp were a condition for the attainment of the "peace" necessary to carry out mining operations.

They are also relevant to the discussion of mine-community relations because the Huarón mining camps constituted a formative experience for many people living in Huayllay today. Many of the men involved in communal affairs in Huayllay are former mining workers; most other community members had at least a brother, a father or a husband who worked at the mine, and many lived in the mining camps at some point in their lives. Even those who lived permanently in Huayllay village or in one of the *caseríos* or *estancias* were familiar with the mining camps and went there frequently. Thus, together with the longstanding land-for-electricity arrangement that the *comunidad* had since the 1930s, the old union agreements form part of the background to contemporary negotiations with the company.

In the 1990s, however, the workers' *convenios* were eliminated one by one, just as people were pressured to retire, labor laws changed and the union became gradually weaker. Today, as in other mines in Peru, there is no intricate web of agreements between the mining company and

³²³ Peña was critical of companies like Huarón that he said "attempted to maintain 'LABOR PEACE,' ceding to all the demands since profits could still be obtained so long as the operations were not paralyzed. In that way, little by little, the union organization was given sufficient force so as to make the most capricious (*antojadizas*) demands." While one may disagree with this engineer's assessment of union demands as "capricious," his comments show the way in which the union had been able to negotiate quite intricate and detailed *convenios* with the company.

a community of workers and their families. Terms and conditions of work are set by the company or by national laws; even in cases where those terms do reflect some sort of demand from the workforce, they are nowhere near as complex as the old *convenios*, and they do not usually involve issues of everyday life or families (rather they are focused on pay and strictly workplace issues). Similarly, the ability of the workforce to disrupt the “peace” of operations is much weaker than before.

When the workers and their families departed the mining camp in the 1990s, most went to other regions, but some moved to the town of Huayllay; this was especially the case, naturally, for workers who were originally *huayllinos*. Some men who had migrated to the mine and married *huayllina* women now joined the *comunidad* for the first time. During this time, the demographic center of the district shifted from the old mining camps to the town of Huayllay. This transformation became more dramatic in the next decade, after the Huarón mine reopened in 2001, followed shortly by Animón. When mineral prices started climbing upwards in 2003-2004, giving rise to a new mining boom and to expanded operations at both Huarón and Animón, people began flocking to Huayllay. Some were returning *huayllinos*, other were new migrants. While both mines continued to provide housing for their upper-level staff, there was no more *obrero* housing at Animón, and only a small amount at Huarón. Many of the new workers thus found rooms in Huayllay itself, either renting living quarters themselves or sharing rooms rented by the contractor for whom they worked. This new growth of the town that is also the seat of the *comunidad campesina* is part of the background necessary to understanding the renewed importance of the mine-community relation.

The rise of “the local community:” Global and national contexts

Just as important is the larger national and international context in which the local shifts took place. In the early 1990s, the pro-market government of Alberto Fujimori encouraged the arrival of foreign mining investment as a way out of the economic crisis, and as a result new mining projects began either operations (Yanacocha) or exploration (Antamina). Though temporarily interrupted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 (which had a significant impact in

Latin America), this first moment of mining growth set the stage for the second, more significant period of expansion that began after 2003. Furthermore, it brought the industry into contact with certain rural areas that had not had significant previous mining experience. This was similar to what had happened at a global level in the 1970s and 80s, when the mining industry moved into remote “greenfield” areas of the Asia-Pacific region (Ballard and Banks 2003). That global experience, and the resulting widespread conflicts with tribal and indigenous populations, led to a new industry and academic interest in the “local community” as a central actor in global mining. This worldwide shift, and its national variant, was noted by the Peruvian mining industry in the 1990s. In the latter part of that decade, Peruvian mining industry interests (through the *Instituto de Estudios Energético Mineros – IDEM*) commissioned a first study of mine-rural community relations in the country (Ossio 1998). This was not the first time that such issues were discussed in the country, but it did mark a shift in terms of the mining industry itself recognizing that rural communities constituted a subject of central importance for their operations.

Another crucial factor was the development of the modern environmental movement and its impact both on public consciousness and on legislation and policy worldwide. In Latin America, a new wave of what Brañes (2000) calls “environmental legislation proper” (as opposed to earlier waves of “casual” and “sectoral” laws) began in the 1970s. This wave arrived in Peru in the mid-1980s, when two different government agencies, under the guidance of the United Nations, began work on the drafting of an Environmental Code. This Code was finally passed in 1990, against the opposition of the Peruvian business community; it established the modern regime of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and Environmental Remediation Plans (PAMAs). In addition to environmentalism, the influence of international human rights norms and discourses, as they developed in the second half of the 20th century, should not be underestimated. The same applies to transnational indigenous rights activism, which gained renewed force beginning in the 1980s, bringing new concepts and influences to Andean countries that had older histories of conflict, ideology and state policy around issues of indigeneity.

If the mining expansion of the 1990s (like that in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1970s and 80s) brought renewed attention to “the local community” on the part of the mining industry,

and if environmentalism, human rights and the transnational indigenous rights movement all influenced this process, there is a national context that merits at least as much attention – namely, the changes in land regimes in highland Peru. As mentioned earlier, a crucial moment in this history was the 1920 Constitution’s recognition of *comunidades de indígenas* (indigenous communities) as legal entities. This constituted a shift from the policies enacted shortly after Independence, a hundred years earlier, which under the influence of liberal ideology had abolished the colonial protectionist regime towards Indian lands (the old *común de indios* or *pueblo de indios*) and had sought to turn Indian community members into individual property owners who could sell their land freely. That 19th-century regime had not actually succeeded in eliminating the communities, but it is generally blamed for strengthening the haciendas and encouraging their expansion at the expense of Indian lands.³²⁴ The 1920 reentry of the *comunidades* into the national legal system took place early in Augusto B. Leguía’s “Patria Nueva” regime (1919-1930) and was a result of the influence of the intellectual and political *indigenista* movement as well as of ongoing indigenous peasant activism in rural Peru, particularly in the South. It was complemented by the creation of the Office of Indigenous Affairs (*Asuntos Indígenas*) and by the 1933 Constitution’s declaration of communal lands as “unalienable” (i.e. not to be sold).

Over the next few decades, this new order provided the framework in which communities sought to assert their claims to land against the competing claims of the *haciendas*. Finally, in the early 1960s this dispute erupted into open conflict, in a way it had not since the early 1920s; beginning in both Cuzco (South) and Pasco (Center), but soon spreading to other parts of the country, peasants occupied hacienda lands. This movement led to the first and second Agrarian Reforms of the 1960s, and finally the more radical Agrarian Reform under General Velasco (1968-1975), who also changed the name of the *comunidades indígenas* to *comunidades campesinas* (peasant communities). In this way, the hacienda system had ended by the 1970s. Although the Agrarian Reform attempted to turn some of the larger haciendas into large, multi-community productive units (SAIS and CAPs) so as to take advantage of economies of scale, most of these collapsed in the 1980s and their lands passed into community hands as well. As a

³²⁴ As Castillo (2007, 19) writes, “the community did not disappear in reality, even though it was absent from legal texts for nearly a century” (i.e. from 1824 to 1920).

result, the late 1980s saw the final and largest expansion in the number of recognized *comunidades*, with 1,321 recognized in 1985-1990 alone, during the first government of Alan García (Burneo 2007, 154). This was the culmination of a historical cycle of land recuperation, and it resulted in the present order in which 5,000-6,000 *comunidades* own around half of the agricultural and cattle-raising land in the country – albeit with private household usufruct inside of each community, and with widely varying forms of communal organization (Ibid., 157-158).

Already by this time there were changes in the protectionist regime of 1920 and 1933, however. The new Constitution of 1979, and the General Law of Peasant Communities (1987), allowed the sale of communal land under exceptional circumstances, requiring a specific law from Congress and the approval of 2/3 of community members at a special assembly. Apparently there were no cases of communities that actually took advantage of this provision to sell their lands at this time (Castillo 2007, 68-70). Land laws changed more dramatically after 1990, when Peru shifted towards wholly pro-market policies (as opposed to the restrained liberalism of 1980-1985 and the “heterodoxy” of 1985-1990). In 1991, all lands in the country were made fully alienable via Legislative Decree 653, which sought to create a market in rural lands and give communities the freedom to dispose of their property; this was confirmed by the 1993 Constitution, promulgated a year after Fujimori’s “self-coup” of 1992. As Mayer (2002) argued, the liberalization of land regimes on paper did not result in any immediate rush to either dissolve communities or sell parts of their land, at least not in the highlands.³²⁵ Besides, although communities could now sell any or all of their land, for highland and rainforest communities this still required the votes of 2/3 of registered members.

However, the conflict over communal lands did not end here. In 2008-2009, during the second government of Alan García – now a fervent convert to neoliberalism and a harsh critic of communal property – this suddenly became an explosive issue in Peruvian politics. In 2008, using special powers granted by Congress to facilitate the negotiation of the Peru-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, President García issued Legislative Decree 1015, allowing communities on

³²⁵ “Interestingly, neither in Mexico nor in Peru was there a great rush to dissolve *ejidos* or *comunidades*... Communities refuse to go away despite the inducements to privatize. It seems that the legal status of communities as communal land with individual usufruct is unsettling to neo-liberal minds. Yet neo-liberalism happily admits to condominium property regimes in urban areas, and there is no reason why Andean communities could not be under the same legal regime” (Mayer 2002, 325).

the highlands and the Amazon region to sell their lands with only half of attendees at an assembly, rather than the more stringent requirement of 2/3 of registered members. This was a legal shift that had already occurred for coastal communities in 1997. While in that case the beneficiaries had been private agricultural investors, the 2008 extension of the same lax land sale regime to the highlands and rainforest was widely seen as a move calculated to facilitate the advancement of extractive activities such as oil, mining and forestry. This decree provoked massive protests by Amazonian indigenous organizations, who occupied several oil installations, leading the Peruvian Congress to override the President and repeal Decree 1015 and reinstate the previous 2/3 requirement for both the highlands and the rainforest.

The 2008 protest was a prelude to the more violent events of the following year, when the Amazonian organizations again occupied oil facilities and roads demanding the repeal of a series of other Free Trade Agreement decrees that were also seen as harmful to communities' rights over their territory. On June 5th 2009, the government sent the National Police to the northern Amazonian town of Bagua to forcefully clear the roads of protesters. The latter fought back, and the ensuing conflict resulted in the deaths of at least 10 civilians and 20 police officers - many of the latter executed by a particular group of protesters at one of the oil stations – as well as hundreds of wounded. The *Baguazo*, as the bloody conflict became known, forced the government to cancel more of the offending decrees, and became a defining event of García's second government.

Besides the evolution in land tenure regimes – both on the ground and in the law – there is another land-related context that must be taken into account: the relationship between mineral and surface rights in Peruvian law. As is well-known, in Latin America mineral deposits have, since colonial times, belonged to the state, not to the proprietors of surface land or to any other class of private owners. Of course, the state does not always conduct mining activity itself; today, in fact, that would be the exception rather than the norm. In Peru, the state grants what are called “concessions” (*concesión*) over mineral deposits to private companies, who then own the ore that they manage to extract. Taken by itself, this system pertains exclusively to the subsoil and has nothing to do with what happens on the surface. In practice, however, mine operators need to go through the surface land in order to dig shafts, blast open pits or dump tailings.

During most of the 20th century, this juxtaposition was not specifically regulated for mining activity; companies expected to be able to access any deposit so long as they had obtained a concession from the state. Early in the century, in particular, much of the land was still in the hands of haciendas and other individual, private owners, who were often willing to sell their surface properties to mining companies provided they paid an appropriate price. When that was not the case, and when holders of mining concessions needed to enter through surface lands belonging to someone else, there was the general legal concept of *servidumbre* (easement), which was the same either for a road, mine, water source or any other use. This easement right consisted of the ability to usufruct someone else's property without in any way interfering with their property rights, as in a right-of-way.³²⁶ Although the Civil Code provided some regulations for this procedure, it did not prescribe any particular amount of compensation, which when necessary was supposed to be worked out by the parties involved. The term *servidumbre* is still how people in Huayllay refer to the payment that they receive from the mine for the use of their land.

There was however one other way for holders of mining concessions to resolve the potential dispute with surface land owners, and that was through outright expropriation by the government. Even *comunidad indígena* land, which was otherwise “unalienable” under the 1933 Constitution, could be expropriated “for reasons of public utility” (Art. 209). Expropriations of community land for purposes of mining did sometimes take place, as we saw earlier for the case of Rancas in 1983, when the government officially expropriated 540 hectares of community land for a new tailings deposit and other uses related to the Cerro de Pasco mine (the 1990 agreement was meant to override this earlier decree, but as we saw the latter was still occasionally invoked by mining company officials in 2009). Two years earlier, in 1981, the government had expropriated 2,368 hectares of land from the community of Antacama (Department of Cuzco), for the building of the Tintaya open-pit mine.

³²⁶ This general *servidumbre* was already regulated in the Peru's first Civil Code of 1852. Beyond the legal sense of easement, the term *servidumbre* means “servitude” in Spanish (as in servant labor). In the case of easement, the property affected is called the “servant” (*serviente*), while the entity (such as a mining concession) making use of the “servant” is called the “dominant” (*dominante*).

The state's ability to expropriate land for mining use came to an end in the early 1990s, however. This had to do with the pro-market shift in the government after 1990, which was enshrined in the Constitution of 1993. This new orientation rejected the legacy of the left-leaning Velasco government (1968-1975), with its multiple expropriations of private property (mining and oil companies, newspapers) and its land redistribution policy.³²⁷ The new order sought to limit the state's role and ensure the property rights of potential investors in agriculture as well as other sectors; as a result, the new Constitution set much more demanding criteria for allowing expropriations (Castillo and Del Castillo 2003, 3).³²⁸ For the agricultural sector, this change was reinforced in 1995 by the new "Law for the Promotion of Investment in Economic Activities on Lands in National Territory and on Peasant and Native Communities," better known as the Land Law (*Ley de Tierras*). This law restricted even further the possibility of expropriation and added a provision that had no precedent in Peruvian law, namely that mining investors were required to reach an agreement with the owners of the agricultural lands above their mineral concession. Although such agreements did often take place, they had not previously constituted a legal requirement for mining companies (Castillo 2007, 92).

This provision (Article 7) aroused deep concern among mining industry representatives, who saw it as a threat to their interests and to the attraction of foreign investment towards the mining sector in Peru (Ibid.). We can think of this tension as exposing an internal contradiction in the neoliberal model of Fujimori's Peru, based as it was both on the defense of property rights and, on the other hand, on the generation of hard cash by an industry that had become reliant on the use, taking or harming of other people's property. Even if the industry was willing to pay or

³²⁷ The Velasco government's expropriations and nationalizations should not be overestimated. They are considered excessive according to the standards of contemporary political discourse in Peru, but they weren't necessarily radical by the standards of other Latin American and Third World governments at the time – especially as regards natural resource policy, where nationalization was common in the 1960s and 70s. Velasco did not nationalize all natural resource companies, or even all foreign ones, but only some of the larger, most emblematic ones – the International Petroleum Company, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Marcona Mining Company. Similarly, the government's payment of compensation for the CPC nationalization was harshly criticized from the Left. On the other hand, the neoliberal and conservative critique (indeed, pillory) of Velasco's memory has as much to do with his expropriations of newspapers and, above all, his radical redistribution of land.

³²⁸ The mining industry recognizes that the 1993 Constitution's limits on expropriation changed the conditions under which they work. As Luis Rodríguez Mariátegui, a lawyer for the National Mining, Energy and Petroleum Society, wrote in 2003, "expropriation is an option that is denied today, as a result of other norms with legal and constitutional standing, for which reason only the option of *servidumbre* is left" (Mariátegui 2003, 36).

otherwise compensate for the lands, it could not allow this transaction to be completely optional – some level of legal coercion or pressure was needed.³²⁹ As a result, only a few months later, in January 1996, mining interests managed to secure the passage of Law 26570, which amended the Land Law by introducing a new procedure that evoked the old notion of *servidumbre* (easement) but changed its basic character. Whereas the old *servidumbre* was a vaguely defined concept regulated by the Civil Code and assumed to be voluntary, the provision encoded in Law 26570 – which became known as the *Ley de Servidumbre Minera* – stated that if no voluntary agreement was reached, the owner of mineral rights could initiate a specific bureaucratic process at the end of which the state could force a *servidumbre* agreement on the surface owners. In theory, like all *servidumbres*, it was not supposed to infringe on property rights in any permanent way. In practice, however, this of course depends on one accepting mining companies’ claim that they return the land “as they found it.” This, combined with the new procedure’s coercive nature, made it resemble the old expropriations – as some have put it, “an expropriation in disguise” (Castillo and Del Castillo 2003, 25).

In the next few years, the *Ley de Servidumbre Minera* would become a symbol of the Peruvian state’s continued pro-mining bias, and as such it would be frequently denounced by organizations like CONACAMI (National Coordinator of Communities Affected by Mining) and by communities opposed to the development of new mining projects. In fact, Law 26570 resulted in only a few legal *servidumbre* proceedings being initiated under its provisions. Rather, its impact was felt more strongly in the way in which it functioned as an implicit threat hanging over any mining-community negotiations – if no “voluntary” agreement was reached in a definite period of time, a mining company had the option of requesting a coercive *servidumbre* procedure through the state. This thus strengthened the bargaining power of mining companies in their negotiations with the owners of surface land, both to start new projects and to set the terms

³²⁹ This is not surprising. Capitalism relies on the property rights of liberal doctrine but cannot do completely without some form of what Marx called “primitive accumulation,” which goes against those liberal rights. It’s a question of whose property rights are going to be respected. The 1993 Constitution’s reinforcement of property rights was meant to benefit capitalist investors - such as those entering agribusiness on the Peruvian coast – rather than highland or Amazonian *comunidades*. In reality, there was not much of a conflict between large coastal agribusiness and mining projects, not only because the latter are located mostly away from the coast, but because both sectors share a common general outlook on the kind of development that Peru needs. Interestingly, it was small coastal agricultural producers (not agribusiness) – in Peru’s largest fruit-producing valley – who led one of the most emblematic fights against a mining project on their land (the Tambogrande conflict, late 1990s and early 2000s).

of compensation around existing operations. Ultimately, it is the struggle over “social peace” that determines the outcome of these negotiations, but the *Ley de Servidumbre* is an important part of the legal context that conditions this struggle. In the end, the whole concept of *servidumbre* - as a temporary right-of-way or right-of-use that does not interfere with the long-term property rights of the original owner – undergoes a distortion in the context of mining, an activity that causes significant and long-term alterations in the land and territory.³³⁰

In analyzing the background to contemporary company-community negotiations in Huayllay, it is important to emphasize also the new turn that mining-community relations took across much of Pasco region in the 1990s. I described earlier the 1990 tailings deposit agreement between the community of Rancas and the state mining company. This agreement was significant not only because it resulted in the cancelation of an earlier expropriation order, but also because of the large compensation settlement that the community was able to obtain, which provided the capital for one of the first communal companies engaged in mining work. This outcome was no doubt a departure for mine-community relations in Pasco, but it was not the only one. Around the same time, old problems of contamination were garnering renewed interest in the region, under the influence of the new Environmental Code (1990), just as the mining companies’ image was tarnished by their mass layoffs and reductions in services (schools, hospitals, housing). One of these problems was the pollution of Lake Junín/Chinchaycocha.³³¹ The communities located around this body of water – Ondores, Pari and Vicco, among others - had long complained about the death of fish and other lake life due to tailings waste, as well as the flooding of part of their lands by the Upamayo dam at the north end of the lake (built by the old Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the 1930s).

³³⁰ As Castillo and Del Castillo write, “The common situation is that when mining activity ceases the lands over which property is recovered [by the original owners] are lands that have undergone severe modifications, over which inert material has been deposited or which have been in direct contact with highly contaminating substances. More serious is the case of mines that have been exploited through the open-pit system, in which there will be no land to recover properly speaking, but rather an enormous hole in the ground, with zero utility. In this sense *servidumbre* is denaturalized and becomes a real form of disposition of the land on the part of an outside party, in this case the mining company. Nor does [the law] take into account the collateral damage of mining activity, such as the cost of restoring the river basin where [the mine] is located, the possible harm to lands that border the servant property, the environmental impact and the social cost.” (Castillo and Del Castillo, 24-25).

³³¹ The second largest lake in Peru, Lake Junín is situated in the middle of the Pasco/Junín plateau and is the source of the Mantaro River; for much of the 20th century, it received contaminating effluents from the Cerro de Pasco and Brocal (Colquijirca) mines, through the San Juan River.

On April 23-24, 1994, a group of *comunidad* leaders and young professionals from the communities around the lake organized a press conference on-site to show journalists and congressional representatives the extent of the destruction; they timed this event to coincide with Earth Day and to capitalize on the attention that was then focused on the state mining company Centromín (the former CPC) due to the government's attempts to privatize it (Palacín 10-14). Initially formed as the Lake Junín Defense Committee (*Comité de Defensa del Lago Junín*), the group soon changed its name to Ecological Defense Front of the Communities of the High Andean Zone, better known as the *Frente Ecológico*. Several of those involved in this group would later go on to play a significant role in the Coordinator of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), the national organization that emerged in 1999.

In the years after the Lake Junín protests, one of the communities involved, Vicco, became caught up in a conflict over land with the Brocal Mining Company. Located not far to the northeast of Huayllay, Vicco is a community with very particular characteristics. Like Huayllay, it is a plateau community, and thus practices cattle-raising rather than agriculture; furthermore, it is also a community that can be traced back to a late-16th century Indian *reducción*. However, unlike Huayllay, since the 1950s Vicco had moved away from mining work and towards transportation. One after another, the *viqueños* began purchasing vehicles, and through their hard work became rather prosperous truck drivers in charge of much of the transportation along the highways of this part of Central Peru, while maintaining cattle-raising as a secondary activity (Chang and Núñez del Prado 1970, 42-44). A number of *viqueños* also accessed higher education at the university in Cerro de Pasco. One of them was Miguel Palacín Quispe, a young Animal Science engineer (*ingeniero zootecnista*) who studied in Cerro and who played a leading role in the *Frente Ecológico* of Lake Junín as well as in the conflict between Vicco and Brocal.

This latter dispute was significant both because, like the Lake Junín protests, it contributed to the formation of CONACAMI, and also because it was one of the first times in Peru that a community managed to stop a new mining project from developing. Although I have not conducted research in Vicco itself, here I will provide a brief description of the conflict and its impact on mining-community relations in the region, based on a critical reading of published

accounts such as Palacín (1999), Chacón (2004), as well as information from the press and, tangentially, from my own research in the larger region of which Vicco is part.

The conflict had to do with the Brocal company's San Gregorio project, a new open-pit zinc/silver/lead project not far from its present open-pit mine in Colquijirca, just south of Cerro de Pasco.³³² San Gregorio was a *paraje* (pasture/section) of the community of Vicco's lands, but the company did not request permission when it began exploratory work in 1992, which motivated the community to complain to the Ministry of Mines as early as 1994 (Palacín, 15). The community's main struggle, however, would be against the company's pursuit of an administrative *servidumbre* arrangement through the Ministry of Mines, particularly after this procedure was specified – as an ultimately coercive arrangement – by Law 26570 (the *Ley de Servidumbre Minera*, which passed on January 1996). The community filed legal actions against the *servidumbre* proceedings as early as September 1996, insisting on direct dialogue with the company instead, but in July 1997 the national mining authority (the DGM) approved the initiation of the *servidumbre*.

Although some leaders were more willing to accede to the company's terms, by 1998 a faction more opposed to the company had won the communal elections, with Miguel Palacín from the *Frente Ecológico* as the community's *fiscal*.³³³ Soon after, the communal leadership managed to interrupt and suspend the on-site inspection that was part of the *servidumbre* proceedings; in response, the mining company filed a criminal complaint against them, accusing them of kidnapping, for supposedly having held the inspectors and Brocal employees against their will.³³⁴ By this time, the community had established connections with NGOs from Lima such as the Peruvian Environmental Law Society (SPDA) and CooperAcción, and began also building links with environmental and indigenous organizations in Canada; in 1998 it also filed a

³³² The Brocal company was originally founded by Eulogio Fernandini - who also became one of the largest cattle-raising *hacendados* in the region – at the ancient silver mining site of Colquijirca, just south of Cerro de Pasco. Today, around half of Brocal shares are owned by Buenaventura, the large Peruvian mining company that also owns the Yanacocha gold mine, jointly with Newmont.

³³³ The *fiscal* occupies an important position in communal governments in Peru, as the person in charge of oversight, control and inspection over the rest of the community's authorities.

³³⁴ This is a common accusation in social conflicts in Peru.

complaint with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The conflict also involved on-the-ground actions on the disputed land, with the mining company blocking an irrigation canal that had been built by the community, and with the latter planting 100 hectares of *maca* – the traditional high-altitude crop of the area – on the proposed San Gregorio open pit site in late 1998. Also that year, hundreds of *viqueños* marched to Lima to express their opposition to the *servidumbre* proceedings.

The faction most opposed to the mining company left the leadership at the end of 1998, with Miguel Palacín becoming more involved in presiding the newly-founded CONACAMI than in the day-to-day of the Vicco struggle. Nevertheless, in the following years the community continued to oppose the imposition of the *servidumbre* procedure by the company through the government. It did indicate a willingness to reach an agreement with the company for the use of the land, but through direct negotiations and without legal pressure. By 2000, in any case, the Brocal company was in less of a hurry to go ahead with the project, due to the fall in world metal prices that had resulted from the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis; the mining boom of the 1990s had come to an end. Metal prices would rebound after 2003-2004, but the relationship between the company and the community has continued to be difficult. In 2009, the latter gave permission for further explorations and perforations during two years; this permit was renewed in 2011, but in 2012 there were conflicts again, with the community complaining of unfulfilled agreements. Thus, twenty years after the first exploration attempts in relation to the San Gregorio project, no mining has yet taken place at the site.

Although the account presented here of the conflict over San Gregorio is of necessity brief, several aspects stand out as important for the discussion in this chapter. The conflict was significant because it was one of the first times that a community had stopped a mining project from developing, especially one that involved a company as well-established as El Brocal. As we saw earlier, the community of Rancas had resisted an expropriation order for several years in the 1980s, but this had been only for a tailings deposit, not for an entire new mine, and in any case Rancas had eventually reached an agreement with the mining company.³³⁵ At the same time, it's

³³⁵ The Rancas dispute no doubt had an impact on the conflict in Vicco, since the two communities are part of the same general region. One of the founding members of CONACAMI explained to me that the *viqueños'* expectations were raised when they saw what Rancas had obtained for its lands in the 1990 agreement with Centromín.

not that Vicco completely rejected the possibility of accepting the San Gregorio operations. As becomes clear from Palacín's account, the strongest opposition was to the imposition of the administrative *servidumbre* arrangement, with its coercive aspects. The community wanted its right to the land to be respected and preferred direct face-to-face negotiations with the mining company; in this way a better agreement could be obtained. Indeed, as the community held out longer, the proposed amount of the compensation was revised upwards.³³⁶ This was significant, for, together with the earlier negotiations between Rancas and Centromín, it helped to raise expectations around the entire region for what communities could expect to get as payment for the use of their land by mining companies. Even leaders like Miguel Palacín - who would later be associated most strongly with a position hostile to the mining industry (through his work in CONACAMI) - were not completely opposed to the development of the mine, provided the community's conditions were met.³³⁷ In this sense Vicco was different from the Tambogrande conflict of 1998-2004 that became emblematic of the new mine-community conflicts in Peru, as a coastal agricultural population managed to stop the development of a gold mine.

On the other hand, in Vicco's case the end result of the community's actions has also been the indefinite postponement of the mining project. While the conflict was partly about a demand for direct negotiation and greater compensation, it is also true that the community has seemed to be in no hurry to allow the development of the mine.³³⁸ Moreover, other factors have

³³⁶ Thus, in March 1998, the government experts tasked with evaluating the proposed *servidumbre* proposed a compensation of US\$574,916 for the use of 3,277 hectares (soon after revised downward to 2,900 hectares) over a period of 50 years (Palacín 20, 27). Then on April 1999, the same government agencies proposed a compensation of US\$1'209,840, for 2,907 hectares for the same period of time. Although this represented an increase, the community pointed out that it still meant only US\$8.32 per hectare per year (Ibid., 34).

³³⁷ As Palacín writes in his account of the conflict, "We are aware, however, that the mining operations cannot be paralyzed. They are a source of jobs and a means of obtaining foreign exchange. At the same time we are worried about the defense of our lands" (Palacín, 17). He lists the conditions for a direct dialogue between the company and the community over the implementation of the mining project, as laid out in a document presented while he was one of the communal authorities. Among those conditions are: 1) Withdrawing all criminal complaints against the community's leaders; 2) Reposition of the irrigation canal closed by the mining company; 3) Withdrawal of the administrative *servidumbre* procedure through the Ministry of Mines; 4) Reduction of the area of the mining project to that strictly necessary, and the implementation of separate dialogues for the exploration and operations phases, respectively. Palacín also proposed making the approval of the San Gregorio project dependent on a public *consulta* with the population of Vicco, as well as giving the community a direct participation in the profits generated by the project (Ibid. 44-45).

³³⁸ Whether this was due to the fact that Vicco is not dependent on mining work as is Huayllay and, to a lesser extent, Rancas, is something that only localized research in the community would be able to determine. As stated

played a role in the conflict, in particular the critique of mining contamination voiced by communal leaders and the *Frente Ecológico* – it could hardly have been otherwise in Vicco, a community which borders the San Juan River, heavily contaminated by mining waste.

The Vicco dispute contributed to a renewed sense of strength among communities in Pasco and Central Peru vis-a-vis the mining companies on their territory, as well as to the growing visibility of the problem of contamination left by 20th-century mining in the country. It also contributed to the emergence of the National Coordinator of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI), under the leadership of Miguel Palacín and with the support of NGOs such as CooperAcción and Oxfam.³³⁹ That organization played an important role around mining conflicts in the early 2000s, even if it later moved largely away from these conflicts so as to dedicate itself to the building of an indigenous movement in Peru (Vittor 2008, 54-60)³⁴⁰. At the time of my research, CONACAMI and its sister organization, CAOI (Andean Confederation of Indigenous Organizations) maintained some links with the community of Rancas, but not so with Huayllay. Nevertheless, the organizing around mine-community issues in the 1990s and early 2000s had created a changed context that would impact the situation in Huayllay as well. As an official at one of the mining companies operating in Huayllay (Pan American Silver) told me, when his company bought the Huarón mine in 2000, “Central Peru was considered the anti-

earlier, Vicco is regionally well-known for being a community of truck-drivers. During the conflict with Brocal, the Ministry of Mines attempted to accuse members of the community of being involved with drug trafficking, alleging that this was the reason why they did not want the attention that a large new mining project would bring.

³³⁹ CooperAcción is a Lima-based NGO that formed in the 1990s out of another NGO called IPEMIN, which among other things has worked with mining workers (in the late 1980s and early 90s), fishing communities and, more recently, the rights of the elderly and retired. CooperAcción played an important role in the early years of CONACAMI, organizing a national workshop for communities affected by mining activities in November 1998, in which community leaders proposed founding a national organization that then became CONACAMI. The latter’s first Congress was then held on October 2009.

³⁴⁰ As Luis Vittor, a member of CONACAMI, writes in his history of the organization, about the II National Congress of 2003, “The accords of the congress marked the beginning of a new phase in CONACAMI, with the approval of the change from ‘coordinator to confederation’ and its self-affirmation as an indigenous organization” (Vittor 2008, 54). About the various shifts in the organization over the next few years, Vittor writes that “the changes in CONACAMI signified the ‘stagnation’ of the possibility of consolidating the process of national articulation around the mining conflicts, even though [CONACAMI] had contributed to placing the issue of mining on the national political agenda. We believe that the decision to affirm itself as an indigenous organization has assigned [CONACAMI] a different role from the initial one of an organization of people affected by mining” (Ibid., 60). CONACAMI’s “indigenous turn” did not necessarily have to result in the organization’s distancing itself from the day-to-day of mining conflicts, but in practice the two shifts took place simultaneously.

mining bastion of Peru; it is the cradle of CONACAMI, which was born in Vicco, a stone's throw away from us.” While this description may be an exaggeration – in terms of all of Central Peru being an “anti-mining bastion” - it does convey a sense of the changed climate around mine-community relations in Pasco around the start of the millennium.

Huayllay: “Social peace” and the “social burden”

Company-community negotiations in Huayllay: 2006-2008

It was in that context that operations restarted in Huayllay District's two mines, Huarón and Animón/Chungar, in 2001, under the new ownership of Pan American Silver and Volcan, respectively. Both mines expanded their operations in the next few years, as metal prices began their upward climb after 2003, due to the rise of China. In 2005, the community of Huayllay formed its current *comunidad*-owned company, EMICONSATH, after an initial attempt at a communal company had failed. And in 2006 a new communal leadership at the *comunidad* of Huayllay began taking action to renegotiate the *convenios* with the two mining companies operating in its territory, starting with Huarón first. Feeling that the company was not being responsive enough to its demands, the *comunidad* decided to do a *paro* by blocking the access roads to the Huarón mine for two days, on August 15-16.

On August 17, a meeting was finally held between the company and the *comunidad*, in the latter's offices, which gave rise to a *mesa de diálogo* (“dialogue table”), as formal processes of negotiation around social conflicts are commonly known in Peru. The mesa included several meetings over the following months, as well as the formation of a number of committees to work on specific areas such as labor, education and *servidumbre* payments, as well as others. These efforts concluded on June 11, 2007, with the signing of the *Convenio Marco* or Framework Agreement (another common term in mine-community relations in Peru).

The renegotiation of the *convenios* between the community and the Huarón company in 2006-2007 led to a significant increase in the forms of compensation received by the community, and in the company's local development and Social Responsibility programs. Some forms of company assistance, as well as the annual payments for the land used, had existed before.

However, most of the Social Responsibility programs that existed at the time of my research (2009-2010) got their start in 2006-2007 or later, as a result either of one of the *convenio*'s specific stipulations or of the company's broader efforts to stabilize relations with the community after the confrontation of 2006. Just like one of my informants from Huayllay described this moment as a "revolution" in the agreements that had traditionally existed between the community and the mine, the company also recognized this as a turning point. Its 2007 Social Responsibility Report stated that, "For Huarón, the most important thing about this Mesa de Diálogo has been the transition from a scenario where there was certain mistrust, towards one based on dialogue and agreement (*concertación*)" (PASSAC 2007, 48).

After the negotiations with Huarón were complete, the community began a similar process with the other mine in the district, Volcan-owned Animón/Chungar. A first request for a dialogue was approved in the communal assembly in September 2007, and submitted to the mining company the following month. A *mesa de diálogo* between the community and the company was finally installed on March 28, 2008, and it met periodically until September of that year. The negotiations produced an agreement on points that were similar to those accorded with Huarón – work for *comuneros* and scholarships for the young people, a donation of alpacas to the community, and economic development programs. As the negotiations were coming to an end, however, the subject of land and compensation became a sticking point. The community claimed that the company had expanded over one particular parcel of land without the community's permission, and that it had secretly moved the land markers to hide this fact. In response to this, the community staged a *paro* against Animón/Chungar in October 2008, blocking access to the mine. This time, however, unlike in 2006, the blockage escalated into a conflict with police, the result of which was several *comuneros* wounded, two of them seriously. One of them eventually had to have a leg amputated as a result of the wounds; another suffered serious head injuries. The community and the company returned to the negotiating table to settle this issue, and an agreement was reached on October 22, 2008.

Having briefly described the process of negotiation between the *comunidad* of Huayllay and the two mining companies, we can now examine the nature of the *convenios* and of the ways in which they structure mine-community relations. One of the main aspects of the agreements

was the increase in *servidumbre* payments for the land used by the two mining companies. Here, the term *servidumbre* does not necessarily imply the administrative procedure that was laid out in the 1996 *Ley de Servidumbre Minera* and that was at the heart of the conflict between the community of Vicco and the Brocal mining company. Rather, in the Huayllay negotiations the term *servidumbre* is used in its more general, older sense of a right to use someone else's property without permanently damaging it (something that is certainly questionable in the case of mining activity). While many people in Huayllay see all or most of the company's programs or donations to the community as a form of compensation for the use of land, they generally use the term *servidumbre* to mean only the monetary component of that compensation.

During the first few years of Pan American Silver's operations in the district, the *servidumbre* payment for the lands was US\$100 per hectare. In the 2006-2007 negotiations, the community asked that this be increased, at least for the new areas into which the company had expanded since 2000. At one point, a demand of US\$1,000 per hectare was put forth by the community. Finally, an agreement was reached that the *servidumbre* for the new lands would be set at \$400 per year per hectare, and that it would be paid retroactively for the years since 2000, for the new hectares of land into which company operations had expanded. One company representative whom I interviewed, and who had taken part in the negotiations, saw this four-fold increase as a result of the new "current" or "conjuncture" of increased community demands upon mining companies, especially in the other nearby mines of Pasco Department – he cited the example of the conflict between the community of Ticlacayán and the Atacocha mine a few years before. In this context, he felt, the US\$400 agreement was not too bad for the company.³⁴¹

³⁴¹ Again, this increase in *servidumbre* payments was for the new lands occupied – the old surface area continued to be paid for at the former rate. I do not at present have the exact number of hectares contained in the "new" area – one source mentions 25 hectares (Defensoría del Pueblo, Reporte No.32, Oct. 2006, 12), while the former president of the community mentioned 54 hectares to me. The total area occupied by the productive installations of the Huarón mine is 180.41 hectares, of which 61.33 ha. consists of tailings (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, Informe No.221-2010-MEM-AAM/ABR/SDC, 9-10). Ministry of Mines documents consider the broader area of influence to be approximately 15 km² (Ibid.). The company claims ownership over 472 ha. of the former San José hacienda (PASSAC, Plan de Cierre, 2008), which its French predecessor bought from the Andueza family in 1915 (it ceded part of the hacienda to the community in the 1930s). In addition, there is an old tailings deposit of 19.39 hectares next to the town of Huayllay, left by the former company and which the current company has covered with clay and grass, as part of a Special Environmental Management Plan (PEMA) (Ibid.).

Another major area of demand by the community had to do with employment. In a previous chapter I described how this area, like many mining regions, experienced a change from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus over the course of the 20th century. Although there are more mining workers than ever before in Huayllay District (largely due to the growth of Animón/Chungar from a small to a medium-scale operation, while Huarón has stayed the same), the demand for labor by the mines is not sufficient given the supply - which is much greater than before – and many of those employed by the companies and the contractors are actually people from other regions. Therefore, the community has seen it as imperative to seek more opportunities for its members – especially its young people – in the two mining companies. Some of that has taken place through the formation of the communal company. During the 2006-2007 negotiations, the community also pressed for company commitments to hire more *huayllinos*. At one point, there were demands for quite extensive hiring of local people.³⁴²

In the end, the company agreed to offer jobs to 30 *comuneros* each year, as well as to have a general policy of preferential hiring for local people and for contracts for the communal company. A demand closely related to that for jobs was that for education, particularly technical training, since a lack thereof is often seen as a reason why many *huayllinos* do not get jobs at the mines. Thus, one of the points of the agreement was that the Huarón company would provide at least 10 scholarships each year for young *huayllinos* to attend CETEMIN, a well-known mining technology training center located near Lima. Similarly, the company agreed to create a mining technology training center in the local area, where young people could learn modern mining skills and eventually seek a job in the company.

Besides monetary compensation, employment and education, another important area of the 2007 agreement between the community of Huayllay and the Huarón mine had to do with obtaining company support for local productive activities. In particular, the company agreed to the community's request for a large donation of alpacas for the *comunidad* pastures.³⁴³ On

³⁴² According to the Peruvian Ombudsman's (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) monthly report on social conflicts, the community at one point demanded that 70% of *comuneros* and children of *comuneros* be hired as direct, payroll workers (Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe No.32, Oct. 2006, 12).

³⁴³ This is a section of land that is owned by the *comunidad* as an entity. It is distinct both from the family-occupied *estancias* and from the communal cooperative's lands.

August 31, 2007, one thousand female alpacas – brought from Puno in trucks hired by the company – were handed over the *comunidad*. This donation, which had originated in a request made by the community, itself, came up frequently in my interviews and conversations in 2009-2010. The company’s flagship Social Responsibility project, however, is its weaving program, directed at local women in both Huayllay and Huaychao. Although it came about more as a company initiative than a formal *comunidad* demand, it also started around the time of the negotiations, namely in 2006 and more fully in 2007.

Thus, the period between 2006 and 2007 saw a significant shift in the transactions, forms of compensation and institutional arrangements between the Huarón mine and the *comunidad* of Huayllay. Similarly, as part of that, the company started implementing a set of Corporate Social Responsibility programs aimed at the local community, and began publishing both a local institutional bulletin detailing its development activities and an annual Social Responsibility report. During my time in Huayllay, I was able to speak to both Huarón company officials and different local people about how they perceive these institutional arrangements, social responsibility programs and forms of compensation. Before delving into the analysis of these arrangements, I will briefly describe the provisions of the 2008 agreement with the other mine in the district, the Volcan company’s Chungar/Animón unit.

In many ways, this accord resembles the earlier one with Huarón, and was undoubtedly influenced by the latter. Again, one of the most important areas of negotiation had to do with labor, and with the related issue of education and training for local youth so that they will have access to jobs in the future. The Chungar/Animón company agreed to take forty workers from Huayllay into its payroll– in other words, people who were working for subcontractors at the mine and who would now be shifted into the more desirable state of direct workers on the company’s payroll (*planilla*). Specifically, it would be 10 workers in 2008, 15 in 2009, and 15 workers in July 2010, after which new people from the community would be admitted “depending on the prices of metals on the world market.”³⁴⁴ More generally, the company agreed

³⁴⁴ Certainly, their incorporation into payroll did not imply job stability as it would have before the 1990s. Unlike at Huarón, where there is a small number of actually stable workers who held on from the days of the old company, all *obrerros* at Animón – even when on the payroll - are on fixed-term contracts (*plazo fijo*), which are renewed every few months at the discretion of the company. The *convenio* with the *comunidad* specifically states the *plazo fijo* status of the forty workers being shifted to payroll.

to give priority to *comuneros* and children of *comuneros* when there were job openings; the *comunidad* would supply the names and information of community members interested in working. Similarly, the mine promised to give priority to the communal company when it came to contracts. In regard to training and education, the company agreed to provide internships as well as temporary summer work for the children of *comuneros*, and to fund 10 scholarships per year to SENATI (one of the best-known technical trade schools in Peru).

Also like the Huarón mine, Chungar/Animón agreed to make a contribution to the communal pastures – in this case, with 400 alpacas. In addition, the *convenio* included a large number of highly detailed points specifying forms of support for local schools and communal institutions. On the issue of payments for use of land, these also went up to \$400 per hectare per year for the new parcels of land occupied. Additionally, there was a one-time payment of compensation for the approximately 50 hectares of lands whose unauthorized use had given rise to the conflict in 2008. This was 900,000 soles (about US\$360,000). Similarly to what happened in Rancas with the compensation money in 2010, in Huayllay some people advocated investing the money in some kind of communal enterprise, but ultimately the position in favor of splitting the money and handing it out individually won out. Thus, although the compensation for the land was a rather large sum, once it was split among all 1600 *comuneros*, each received only around 500 soles (slightly under US\$200).

Land, mine-community agreements and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

At the time of my stay in Huayllay (2009-2010), the renegotiated agreements between the *comunidad* and the two mining companies had produced a situation of relative stability, notwithstanding the violence of October 2008 when police attacked the *comuneros* blocking the road to the Chungar/Animón mine. Mining operations were proceeding along without major interruptions (other than a brief labor strike by Huarón's direct, *planilla* workers for several days in April 2010). Many of the provisions of the 2007 and 2008 *convenios* had actually been implemented – such as the donations of alpacas and the increased *servidumbre* payments – or were already in process, as with several of the educational and training programs. Generalizing for a moment, I would say that in my conversations and interviews with people in Huayllay, there was a general sense of partial fulfillment of the accords. Almost everyone complained

about specific points in the agreements that had not become reality, or not in a satisfactory way. But most people did not accuse the mines of outright failure to comply – rather, they considered that the companies were in the process of meeting at least part of the responsibilities outlined in the *convenios*.

Certainly, most *huayllinos* share the same skeptical and critical lens through which people in much of highland and rural Peru view powerful entities, whether they be the government or mining companies. In particular, they are critical of the extraction of mineral wealth away from the local area, the disparities in wealth between the companies and their community, the insufficiency of job opportunities and the subcontracting system (these are probably the four most common critiques that I heard, alongside the pervasive belief that contamination is an inevitable part of mining). But, on the other hand, there was not a significant public discourse denouncing or accusing the companies of complete and outright irresponsibility, like there was in the city of Cerro de Pasco at the same time. In the latter location, those accusations and denunciations were pervasive, whether on the radio, at public events and in everyday conversations. The fact that they rarely led to any organized action on the part of Cerro's residents – due to the urban population's fragmentation and lack of representative institutions, as well as other factors discussed elsewhere in this dissertation – does not invalidate the observation that the discourse on the local mining company is significantly more negative in Cerro de Pasco than it is in Huayllay.

In Huayllay, most people I spoke to, especially communal leaders, did not talk about a company's "responsibility" in vague or abstract terms, as often occurs in global CSR discourse; rather they see it as hinging on the fulfillment of specific, concrete agreements worked out with the *comunidad*, a fulfillment which they saw as taking place - partially. It is important to remark that this general attitude was, on average, held equally towards both Huarón and Chungar/Animón. Some people gave a more negative assessment of one company and some of the other, and certain specific officials were considered to be more manipulative or misleading than others, but, on the whole, I did not detect a consistent difference in how people assess the behavior of the two companies. This is interesting given that the two mines operating in the district projected different images at the time. Pan American Silver, the Canada-based company

which owns Huarón, had a more developed Corporate Social Responsibility discourse, as evidenced in the monthly newsletters and annual reports about its programs in the Huayllay area. Chungar/Animón, on the other hand, was owned by Volcan, which also ran the Cerro de Pasco mine and which had a negative image as a traditional, family-controlled Peruvian mining company whose operations were gradually destroying a city. Yet in Huayllay, the general attitude of the population emphasized the community's own agency in enforcing an agreement with the mines that were operating on its land, so that the companies' specific attitudes or conducts seemed less important.

I have pointed out a significant difference in how communal leaders discussed the mining companies' "social responsibility" as opposed as to how the companies themselves, and global CSR discourse more broadly, approached the subject. The *huayllinos* tended to answer questions about whether companies were "responsible" in terms of the fulfillment of specific accords, not of the abstract concepts on which global discussions of CSR often dwell. This can be illustrated through the following quotes from two individuals active in communal affairs – the first, a former mining worker who occupied a post in the *junta directiva* at the time of my research, and whom I had asked about which of the two companies had a better relationship with the community:

I think that currently, partially they are at the same level, yes, they have the same commitments. Before, sure, Chungar was a smaller company, I'm talking about the 70s, more or less the 80s, it was small, but later it has strengthened its progress a lot, its operations, today it has surpassed Huarón, almost 80% more, but they are all under the responsibility [*responsabilidad*], they are fulfilling the obligations that we have thrust upon them [*que nosotros le hemos implantado*] that they should fulfill their obligations with our community, but even so it's still a bit slow [*con pasos un poco lentos*].

Here, not only is "responsibility" directly linked to the formal agreements with the community, it is also linked to production – a company's responsibilities towards the community increase proportionately to the scale of its operations. In this other quote, by Javier Vega, the communal president in 2006-2007, who played a key role in the negotiations with Huarón, , the term "social responsibility" is also used in the sense of the degree of fulfillment of the specific accords:

What I see is that the mining company also has to have a bit more responsibility in fulfilling these *convenios*. The *convenio marco*, it really is broad, and there are several

items that are still in need of implementation. They are not being fulfilled at a hundred percent... I would really like to highlight also for the company, ask them that they really, that they have a social responsibility [*responsabilidad social*], to fulfill what has been written down. We would not want that to stay up in the air. It's two years that have passed already. We're closing in on two years, and up to this moment there hasn't been a fulfillment of 100% of that *convenio marco*.³⁴⁵

Here I am not so much interested in whether it is true that some of the agreements are “not being fulfilled” as in the fact that “social responsibility” is linked above all to the fulfillment of specific provisions of the mine-community *convenio* – an agreement that moreover was the result of demands by the community. By contrast, although Huarón company officials certainly do mention the *convenio*, they, like the industry more broadly, tend to define Corporate Social Responsibility in more abstract terms and through a focus on the company's own actions and agency. Here is just one example from the company's first Social Responsibility Report, published at the end of 2007, not long after the signing of the *convenio marco* with the *comunidad*:

Our Good Neighbor policy is based on forming an integral part of the communities in our area of influence, concerning ourselves with their needs and problems, for that reason we are always willing to dialogue and to apply social management tools [*herramientas de gestión social*] designed to achieve the community's development.... These activities are the result of our **corporate social responsibility** policy [emphasis in the original], which reveals our commitment to conduct a joint effort with the community and contribute to improving the quality of life of the population; to this end the company plans and executes, in a concerted way, participatory community development projects, turning the community into a protagonist of its own change. One example of what we have described above is the installation of the *Mesa de Diálogo*, formed by the company and the *comunidad campesina* of Huayllay, which has culminated in accords directed at the execution of sustainable development projects (Pan American Silver, *Reporte Social* 2007, 21).

In this passage, the agreements and the *Mesa de Diálogo* are certainly acknowledged, but they appear as a function of the company's social responsibility policy which is in turn described in the broad, expansive terms of contemporary world CSR and sustainable development

³⁴⁵ Some examples that he gave of commitments that had not been entirely fulfilled included the construction of a specific bridge in the town, the implementation of a promised fund for development projects (though he partly blamed the communal leadership for that), and the allocation of change in the allocation of water from the local hot springs (a decrease in the share used by company staff and an increase in the share allocated to the community-operated thermal baths, to 100% during half of the week).

discourse. This is similar to the reply I obtained from the company's chief Corporate Social Responsibility officer, when I asked him to define what social responsibility meant in the context of mining operations:

A responsible mining company has to be very careful to contribute positively to the social web [*red social*]. That's the first thing. And, secondly, to develop ties of trust, coordinating them and sharing them with the social actors, and to support development, within its capabilities. That is the concept. The explanation could take five hours.

Here, again, we get a sense of the general, transnational concepts through which social responsibility is defined by the company (and others like it). In fact, in this passage, and in the rest of the interview, the *Convenio Marco* and the *Mesa de Diálogo* were not even mentioned. Another company officer – in Community Relations – did talk to me directly about the negotiations with the community, but when I asked him to define social responsibility, he also saw no need to refer to the accords, but rather explained it in terms of the company “sharing” with its neighbors:

Social responsibility is the opportunity that a company has to share part of the product of its operations with its surroundings. For me it's that, in other words if a company, through a particular activity, is going to have a profit, it should at the same time share with its surroundings. When we talk about the surroundings we are talking about all the institutions nearby, not only the *comunidad*, [but also] the schools, the municipality, the Church, all the institutions that make up a community.

I quote these various statements in order to highlight some of the different ways in which “social responsibility” is understood by the mining companies, on the one hand, and by *huayllinos* – particularly those most involved in communal affairs – on the other. It is not only a distinction between the broad, jargon-rich CSR discourse of the companies and the local residents' focus on concrete agreements and commitments; there is also a difference in where the agency is located. The company portrays CSR policies as a product of its own ethic, while community members tend to see them as *convenios* that they have obtained through their own demands and struggle. I will illustrate this through a statement told to me by a *huayllina* woman in the local *Vaso de Leche* (Glass of Milk) committee, in the context of a discussion about labor and hiring issues – how the two mining companies initially were hiring more people from outside, not giving enough preference to *huayllinos*:

So it was too much, the company was here in the *pueblo* [town, people, locality] holding us back, even though it is from our lands that they are obtaining the wealth. We have united, the whole *pueblo*, and we've done a campaign, a protest, from which [we] obtained various *apoyos* [contributions, support] from the company, that they give the *pueblo*, among which is the work for the *comuneros*, who should enter the companies, and that the workers who work well should be *afiliados* [i.e. put on payroll]. That was gained through a protest, all of that was gained through a *huelga* [strike, blockage].³⁴⁶

Several aspects are worth highlighting here – the focus on access to employment, on the fact that the companies operate on Huayllay's lands, and of course an emphasis on local agency and organization as being necessary to win better conditions. The point here is not to romanticize local struggle – several *huayllinos* I spoke to were actually critical of the way some of the communal leaders in 2008 handled the Chungar/Animón protests – but rather to understand that local people see Social Responsibility policies less as a product of mining companies' generosity or ethics and more as something that they have won through either negotiations, protests, or both. A different, less radical version of this can be seen in the comments of a *comunero* who participated in the commission negotiating with Chungar/Animón in 2008, and who spoke at an event in April 2010 inaugurating a company program to provide breakfasts at school for children. He made reference to this and to other items in the *convenio*, such as the English classes for children also provided by the company:

Although it's true that this is a benefit that Chungar is providing, it's the *gestión* [effort, arrangements] of our *comunidad*. Everyone knows well that in the year 2008, talks had to be held the whole year. Still, we have been able to obtain benefits that are for the good of our education... Let me also call on the Chungar mining company, that if there are still some items contained in our *convenio marco*, that they should continue to fulfill them. Because we as a commission have a chronogram of the *convenio marco*... We are going to continue demanding that they meet their obligations.

On the one hand, the local discourse about agreements, demands and obligations is not necessarily contrary to that of CSR. Although companies prefer to present their responsibility as a product of their own ethics and values, CSR discourse also emphasizes the importance of local community involvement and participation – as in the passage from the 2007 Huarón report quoted earlier, “turning the community into a protagonist of its own change.” Indeed, the CSR head at Huarón emphasized to me the importance of a “healthy civil society” and a strong “social

³⁴⁶ Interview conducted jointly with Jessica Smith.

web” as key to a successful mine-community relationship. And it could be argued that the relative strength of the institution of the *comunidad campesina* in Huayllay, like elsewhere in Pasco, can be an asset to mining companies as much as it is a challenge, in that it allows for the organized channeling of demands and complaints as opposed to other local contexts that are more unstable and volatile.

On the other hand, company discourses and local perspectives part ways insofar as the latter tend to see the mine-community relationship as a matter not just of cooperation and negotiation but also as a power relation in which the community must exert its force as a landowner in order to gain better conditions - *servidumbre* payments, jobs – as well as support for educational and technical programs to benefit the community. While the companies do acknowledge the importance of land, they see it as directly related only to the issue of the *servidumbre* payments, not to the broader conditions of operation or to the social responsibility programs. I would argue that this way of thinking – i.e. to separate issues of land, and of operations more broadly, from corporate social responsibility – is common to many mining companies in Peru. It can be illustrated through this quote from a Community Relations officer at Huarón. I had asked him whether company programs were a form of compensation for the use of land, but he saw the different issues as clearly separate:

One issue is the *servidumbre* which is a separate topic, in other words it has a cost, a tariff, an amount that you have to pay. Apart from that [in the negotiations] we have touched upon issues of education, of work, we have touched upon health, social responsibility. Those are the axes, within the axes we have discussed a series of issues, on which we have accepted to collaborate, if you like, or to participate as part of the community’s development, to ensure that the community will be sustainable in the future.

By contrast, many *huayllinos* tend to see land not just as one of several issues but rather as the heart of the entire mine-community relation, and as the starting point for any agreement. It is important to emphasize the importance of land ownership, since I feel it is an issue that has been relatively downplayed in many recent social science studies of mining in Peru. These have tended to focus on the “local community” simply as a “local population,” or as an actor susceptible to potential or actual environmental and health impacts, but not as a landowner.

As in all of Latin America, Peruvian law has historically maintained a strict, if abstract, division between surface land and the subsoil. Private owners – including *comunidades* like Huayllay – own only the surface, while the state owns all of the subsoil and grants it in concession to mining and other extractive industries. Most communal leaders in Huayllay – as in Rancas and other nearby communities– do not actively challenge this, since it is a well-established principle in Peruvian law and society (even if there are voices at the national level that support the recognition of communal ownership as extending to the subsoil). Yet although mining companies operate most directly on the subsoil, they also affect, remove and generally use surface land, and it is on this basis that the right of the *comunidad* as landowner, vis-a-vis the mining company, is constituted. The centrality of land to local perspectives and discourses on mine-community relations was evident in the earlier quote by the *Vaso de Leche* participant – “it is from our lands that they are obtaining the wealth.” Similarly, another woman in the same group later said, in the context of a discussion about whether the companies were fulfilling their obligations, “But seeing as they are inside our *comunidad*’s lands, it’s logical that they should contribute more to the *comunidad* of Huayllay, no?”

The importance of land to mine-community relations can be seen even more directly in the following statement by Anselmo Roque, who was communal president in 2010. I had asked him why, if the mining companies pay their taxes and fulfill their obligations with the state, do they have a responsibility with the local community, to which he answered:

The very fact that they are on our lands, no? They exploit our minerals and if the community does not give them one meter of land, they cannot accelerate their operations, they cannot expand their works. In this regard, whether they like it or not, they have to relate [*relacionarse* – establish relations with] the *comunidad*, because the *comunidad* is the owner of the lands. If the *comunidad* will not allow them to take one step further, it just won’t allow it.

Similarly, when I asked him how the Mesa de Diálogo worked, he related it directly to the company use of land, on the one hand, and to the different projects that the companies implement in the community, as a form of compensation:

We ask them for a dialogue so that they compensate [*indemnize*] for trespassing [*invadir*] upon our properties, because you cannot trespass upon anyone’s property without

authorization. So they have to [participate in] a *mesa de diálogo* so that they can compensate [*retribuyan*] in some way, in some projects for the community.

As in the case of Rancas, where the use of a parcel of land was exchanged for the capital with which to build a communal company to provide jobs for the community's young people, in Huayllay land is central to the mine-community relationship. And it's not just land in a general, vague way, but specific tracts of land over which the community exercises ownership. In the case of Rancas and Huayllay, this right of ownership is the outcome both of processes of community formation going back at least to the late 16th century (i.e. the *reducciones*), and, more importantly and immediately, of 20th-century land struggles and political changes that led to the end of the haciendas in most of highland Peru.

Mining investors and prospectors arriving in the Pasco region in the late 1800s and early 1900s came upon a world in which surface land was primarily in the hands of individual *hacendado* families (and, sometimes, institutions such as convents) – or in which the latter were the main socially recognized owners, as different reports from that time attest. By contrast, mining companies arriving today in the region – and in much of highland Peru – have to work within a context in which the main landowners are the *comunidades*. In Pasco especially, the collapse of the haciendas and the victory of the *comunidades* was particularly complete – and the *comunidades* are relatively strong institutions, both in terms of their political functioning and of their relatively higher degree of economic development when compared to other parts of the highlands.³⁴⁷ All this makes the communities' ownership rights over their land particularly strong in this region, which in turn becomes significant in the presence of mining companies. In itself, communal land ownership is not technically that different from other forms of private ownership – *comunidades* are private entities like any other. However, unlike the old haciendas, they are composed of large numbers of people – 1600 *titulares* and their dependents in Huayllay,

³⁴⁷ I mean a higher degree of economic development when compared, say, to many parts of rural southern Peru – not when compared to some of the more prosperous communities of the Mantaro Valley. In terms of the end of the haciendas, it needs to be emphasized that in Pasco this happened earlier (1960s as opposed to 1970s) and more thoroughly than in some parts of Peru where certain *hacendados* managed to keep parts of their former estates, and where many communities did not obtain legal recognition and/or land titling until the 1980s and even 1990s. Also, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, in Pasco Province the pressures to individualize communal land are weaker than in some other regions, due both to the fact that it's a high-altitude cattle-raising area, and that the mining economy relieves some of the pressure toward the accumulation of land.

some 600 *titulares* in Rancas - all of whom at least theoretically have equal voting rights and can make a claim on the basis of communal land ownership. And, in spite of the liberalization of land laws since the 1990s, most *comunidades* still tend to abide by the 20th-century legal tradition of the non-alienability of communal land – which again makes them different from most private landowners.

Certainly, communal ownership rights over land are not the only way to articulate the relationship between local populations and mining companies. In Cajamarca (northern Peru), where the *comunidades campesinas* are not such strong institutions today, it is instead the *rondas campesinas* (self-organized peasant patrols, which are not themselves landowning entities) that have led the resistance against the Conga mining project since 2011. And in the Tintaya mine in southern Peru, the conflicts and dialogues with the landowning *comunidades* have been accompanied by a parallel process of clashes and negotiations with the broader population centered around the provincial capital of Yauri – the latter group defined not by ownership of land but rather by geographical proximity and political jurisdiction over the mine. What this means is that if relatively solid communal property rights did not exist in Pasco department, other social relations or identities could very well emerge to take the place of communal land as the main articulators of mine-community interactions – i.e. simple geographical proximity, a sense of local belonging, etc. However, the reality today is that the *comunidades*' property over land is one of the most important “anchors” structuring mine-community relations and strengthening local populations' ability to influence, in however small a way, the nature of mining activity and the forms of compensation that companies have to provide.

The property rights of *comunidades* do not in themselves *cause* local people to assert themselves vis-a-vis a powerful outside entity like a mining company; rather, in this region, and probably in many areas of the Peruvian highlands, those property rights become the vehicle through which such assertion takes place. And they are a powerful index of the changes that took place in much of the Peruvian countryside over the course of the 20th century – the end of the haciendas, the legal recognition and eventual expansion of the *comunidades*, and the decline (particularly in the Central Highlands) of caste-like hierarchical social relations. All over highland Peru, large groups of rural people are less marginalized today than they were a hundred

or even fifty years ago; the property rights of *comunidades campesinas* are one important indicator of that, though by no means the only one.

These property rights are of course a modern, legal construct, but they function as a way of indexing a variety of ways of relating to the land – some historic, some more recent. The relationship to the land in the *comunidades* of this region takes several different forms, all of which overlap a great deal. For some, particularly in a community like Rancas, there is a strong emotional component, insofar as people saw parents, siblings and other relatives die or suffer disabling injuries in order to recover the lands in the 1960s. For others, particularly those individuals in both Huayllay and Rancas who have been or are most closely involved in cattle-raising activity, the land is an intimately known space - made up of individually named *parajes* or *majadas* (pastures/sections) and *estancias* - which offers the promise of a more reliable and long-term activity, in contrast to mining. And to other individuals – particularly younger people living in the towns of Rancas and Huayllay, away from the *estancias* – the land is a patrimony on the basis of which to assert rights to employment, education, technical training and other opportunities in the context of mining operations, and to obtain company support for communal as well as personal projects.

This third meaning is particularly strong in Huayllay today, where the number of active members in the *comunidad* has grown rapidly in the last few years, as young people have come to see membership in this landowning entity as a means of empowerment and as an advantage in terms of gaining access to work in the communal company and to educational opportunities such as the scholarships provided by the mining companies. The very different social and cultural context notwithstanding, here it might be useful to recall Ballard's (1997) observation for mine-community relations in Papua New Guinea, when he emphasizes “the way in which landownership confers ‘voice’ – the right to speak and the ability to influence the flow of benefits from the land and its resources” (48).

Social peace, the “social burden” and mining operations

As mentioned earlier, one of the main benefits or forms of compensation that the community expects in return for the use of its lands consists of access to employment at the

mines. Due to the long-term, 20th-century shift from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus, people in Huayllay – like people in other mining areas in Peru - tend to feel like they are frequently excluded from jobs at the mine, or at least from stable, payroll jobs. While this feeling is not as strong as in open-pit mining areas – for underground mining does still require a fair amount of labor – it is present nonetheless. Thus, employment is always one of the demands; through the exertion of pressure by the community, the effects of the tendency towards exclusion are countered in part. Again, this was evident in the earlier quote from the *Vaso de Leche* participants; similarly, according to Anselmo Roque, the communal president in 2010,

After the *paro* [strike/blockage] against the mining companies, the mining companies take the *comuneros* into consideration more. Now they are afraid to accept people from other places, because if they want to have a good relationship, they have to have the *comuneros* of Huayllay [at work]... Now the *comunero* is respected by the mining companies.

Thus, the 2007 and 2008 agreements with the two mining companies included the provision that a specific number of *comuneros* would enter the companies and/or be switched from contractors towards direct, payroll positions. In addition, both companies promised to have a more general policy of local hiring. In themselves, these kinds of policies and agreements, incorporated into the *convenios*, are limited. The numbers of positions for local workers specified in the accords do not go above a few dozen at most. Mining companies tend to shield operation and production affairs from the social concerns of community relations; the last thing they want to do is lose the labor rationalization gains of the last 20 years by taking on a large number of direct, payroll workers that they do not need.

However, there is also the communal company, which works as a contractor in the mines – especially at Animón – and to which the *convenios* promise to give preference in the allocation of contracts for specific tasks. As in Rancas, the communal company is seen primarily as a vehicle for providing jobs to young people in the community, rather than necessarily yielding a profit. In Rancas, as we saw, the communal company arose as a direct result of the 1990 agreement to lease communal land for a tailings deposit. In Huayllay the connection is not quite as direct, but still, as in Rancas, the awarding of contracts to the communal company figures prominently among the demands that people make or would like to make on the mines, in exchange for the use of their lands. In this sense, it can be said that in both Huayllay and Rancas

– and in several other nearby communities – the use of land is exchanged for the opportunity to work; this allows a way to (partially) counteract the effects of the long-term change from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus.

While the demand for jobs can be thought of as an intervention – however modest – into the structure of production, the other programs are more liable to be seen as either a form of generosity/ethics (from the perspective of the mining companies) or as a form of support-as-compensation (from the perspective that is common in the community). In his interview with me, Javier Vega, who was communal president during the 2006-2007 negotiations with the Huarón company, emphasized this as much as the employment issue, and repeatedly used the term *apoyo* (support) to describe it.

The *comunidad campesina* of Huayllay, there has been one hundred years of mining in our surroundings, and it has not received the *apoyos* that it really should have in the previous years. So it was because of that that we did this protest. And my concern has been, really that the community should have that kind of *apoyos*, because the wealth that it has, the mining greatness [*la grandeza minera*], they carry it off so easily.

A few of these forms of “support” were already in place before, but they have greatly increased since the negotiations of 2006-2008. Some of these arrangements have already been mentioned: scholarships, special classes, school lunches, support for ‘productive projects’ (*proyectos productivos* – as development efforts to improve local production are commonly called in the region). Certainly, the alpaca donations and the scholarships to technical institutes like CETEMIN and SENATI stand out among the most significant and talked about. But there are actually a multitude of other, smaller items in the *convenios* – actually, too many to list here. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the degree of detail and specificity found in the agreements. In the 2008 *convenio*, the Chungar company promises not only to generally help equip the different schools in Huayllay and in the seven *caseríos*, but also to pay the salaries of around 10 teachers (i.e., extra teachers hired to teach specific new courses), to help implement a chemistry lab for the high school, and to donate 10 musical instruments for a school band (the latter, like many of the points in the agreement, had been a specific request from the high school). The company also promised to build a veterinary clinic to improve the management of the sheep and other animals in the community, to construct a bathing space for the animals in one of the *caseríos*, and to build a hydroponic system in another *caserío*. Similarly, the Huarón

company, in addition to its flagship weaving program, also agreed to a number of educational commitments. In 2008, for example, they paid the salaries of 9 teachers in the district. In 2009, when I visited one of the elementary schools in Huayllay that they were supporting, the company had just constructed a small greenhouse as well as a computer room (which the school had then named after the company's Operations Director). The company was also engaged in a number of other projects – many of them based on specific requests from the communities, others less so.

These multiple, expansive demands on the companies would seem to suggest a sort of dependence on the part of the local community – echoing the common complaint by mining companies in Peru, that they are frequently asked to fulfill functions that properly belong to the state. No doubt, there is a measure of dependence and patronage in the relationship between the two mining companies and the local community in Huayllay – the companies take the form of a wealthy patron to whom local people turn for support when something needs to be done. This is certainly stronger in Huayllay than it is in Rancas; the former after all has a more intimate historic relationship with mining. For example, one *huayllina* woman, when I asked her which company had a better relationship with the community, focused on her discontent over a very concrete incident – she complained that, as president of her son's class in the school, she had gone to one of the companies with a written request that they make a contribution for a school trip, and it had been denied.

On the other hand, another way to think of these multiple requests is not to see them as dependence but rather simply as part of the normal pattern, in both Huayllay and Rancas, by which institutions are expected to contribute to collective endeavors, according to their means – whether the institution in question is the communal company, the communal cooperative, or the (much wealthier) mining company. And, notwithstanding mining industry complaints that they are made to supplant the state, it is clear that companies like those operating in Huayllay are proud of the way in which they are frequently called upon to fulfill immediate needs. This helps to build their legitimacy and integrate them, however partially, into the fabric of local society. As the head of Corporate Social Responsibility at Pan American Silver said to me,

They must have told you in Huayllay, the day a bridge falls and everyone is left incommunicado, the only one that goes and builds it back is the mines. In other words, we put it in and we get everyone back on their feet.

Moreover, I believe there is another, significant aspect to the intricate and extensive nature of the agreements between the mining companies and the community of Huayllay. If we examine the matter historically, we see that the new mine-community *convenios* have taken over some of the role of the old labor-centered *convenios colectivos* between the mining company and the workers and their families.

On the surface, this may seem far-fetched. First, the *comunidad campesina* of Huayllay existed side-by-side with the mining camp of Huarón throughout the 20th century (and legally since the early 1930s). As discussed earlier, the *comunidad* had *convenios* with the Huarón company since early on; other mining companies in this part of Peru also had similar agreements with the communities on whose lands they worked. Thus, in themselves, the mine-community *convenios* are not a new phenomenon. Second, although the *comunidad* institution in Huayllay and the Huarón mining workers' union certainly interacted, and although there were many individuals who were active in both, the two institutions are ultimately seen as pertaining to different spheres: one to the world of the mine and the mine camp, the other to the community-owned lands and the raising of animals. Third, there are still unions and collective bargaining agreements at the two mines of Huarón and Animón, even if they are very much weakened and concern only a minority of the workers.

Certainly, when I discussed this with the head of Community Relations at the Huarón mine, he disagreed with my view that there had been some displacement from companies' former responsibilities towards their workers in favor of their new responsibilities towards the "local community." In his view, the company practiced responsibility towards both sectors at the same time:

That responsibility that [mining companies] had with the worker has not been transferred or deployed towards the communities. No, this is a different thing, because the responsibility with the workers has not concluded, it has not ended, what happens is that the systems have changed... The issue of social responsibility, I personally consider that this is a separate issue, it is a responsibility that you have towards the community, towards that third party that is not involved in your operations, that town that is near your operations but does not benefit... Independently of your responsibility with your workers, with the families of your workers you have a responsibility with the community. And this community that is in your surroundings obviously wants that, no matter what, that you contribute to or participate in their development.

Yet I would argue that, although the two issues are formally separate, there is an underlying commonality between them. At some of the newer, open-pit mines in areas without significant mining experience, the local community may indeed be a “third party” that is “not involved in operations.” But that is not the case in Huayllay and, I suspect, in similar, historic mining areas in Central Peru and elsewhere. Many of the *huayllinos* alive today either worked in Huarón or the then-smaller Chungar/Animón mine or spent some time living in the camps that existed until the early 1990s; among those who did not have one of these two experiences, almost all have a close relative who did. The community of workers and their families that once existed up at the camps was the demographic center of the district and a partial but important formative experience for the community of Huayllay as it exists today. The *comunidad* of course has an older history and preceded the camps, but after the early 1990s it merged with the latter. At that time, most of the workers and their families left the camps. Although many of those who were from other regions returned to their places of origin or moved to larger cities, many of those who were from Huayllay simply returned to the *comunidad*. Or, if they left, they have returned with the new mining boom that began after 2003. Also in the early 1990s, most of the old *convenios* between the Huarón workers’ union and the company were eliminated, as the company asked the remaining workers to make ever more sacrifices or lose their jobs.

While in many of the “new” mining areas in Peru there is the desire for work on the part of the local population but not the reality of it (due to the low labor requirements of open-pit mining), in underground, silver-lead-zinc mines like Huarón the labor requirements are still significant enough that they can employ an important part of the local community – more so if the latter pressures the company for job opportunities. Thus, many of the *huayllinos* today *are* involved in mining operations – as their parents and grandparents were – even if nowadays it often is only through contractors. Moreover, many of the contractors that hire people from Huánuco or other places rent rooms in the town of Huayllay to house their workers. In this sense, the town that is the seat of the district and of the *comunidad campesina* is also, to some degree,

the new mining camp; again, the relationship is not so much one of replacement but rather of fusion.³⁴⁸

Huayllay is not the only place in Pasco Department where this has happened – at the time of my research, the *comunidad*-as-mining camp phenomenon was even more present in the community of Huaraucaca, adjacent to the Brocal company’s operations. Most of the families in that town were working at Brocal through Huaraucaca’s large communal company. In a sense, the community had become both a subcontractor and a housing camp for the mining company.³⁴⁹ The dependence on mining activity was even greater than in Huayllay; this was due to the fact that Huaraucaca had much less grazing land and much less commercial development than Huayllay, and also to the Brocal company’s specific policy of encouraging and supporting the formation of communal companies.

In Huayllay, the “local community” is in actual fact both an internal and an external actor, yet in company discourses – such as that of the Community Relations director quoted above - the relationship is represented as wholly external. In this way, obligations are presented as generosity, and pacts and relations that are part of the process of production appear as contributions to an external actor’s development. As discussed earlier, *huayllinos* usually see company programs and payments as compensation for the use of their land, through the mediation of formal agreements made possible by community pressure. This certainly describes an important aspect of the relationship between the mines and the community. The other aspect discussed here – the transfer of the role of the old agreements from the mining camp towards the community, as a result of the fusion of the two – is also evident in the following statement from the *fiscal* of the community in 2009:

As far as the [mining] company is concerned, yes, it does assist with its responsibilities because as you know, these last few years because of the government we had with Mr.

³⁴⁸ In thinking through these issues of fusion between the camp and the surrounding communities in mining areas in Peru, I am indebted to conversations with Guillermo Salas.

³⁴⁹ I assisted in a communal survey in Huaraucaca for two days in 2008; this survey was organized by Víctor Falconí and Mariella Estrada, to whom I am indebted for this opportunity. While such quick observation obviously does not give me any in-depth knowledge of Huaraucaca, it does allow me to make the observation noted here, about the majority of *comunidad* members and residents being employed in mining-related activities. Huaraucaca is moreover known for this in the region.

Fujimori, it practically destabilized the labor aspect, and the companies made it so they would not have camps near the workplace, all that. Formerly the company managed all its educational centers, it had a social burden [*carga social*], now that social burden has been brought here to the town, in other words all the workers from here go to the mining centers here in Huarón [and Chungar/Animón], and all their children stay here in some cases, in other cases they've gone elsewhere.

The term “social burden” is actually used with some frequency in discussions of labor, payrolls and company expenses. Although company officials are reluctant to recognize that obligations towards their workers have been reduced, they do sometimes acknowledge the change in the “social burden” that they have to bear. For example, the head of Human Resources at the Huarón mine explained that among the benefits of the new accumulated-time labor systems (e.g. fourteen 12-hour work days by seven rest days) was the fact that they rationalized and economized workers' time so that they were not around when they were not truly needed; in this way, “it saves us a social burden that we would [otherwise] incur.”³⁵⁰ The head of Community Relations, quoted earlier, also discussed the change in the labor systems, though he focused particularly on how the old systems “made it necessary that the worker's family also participate in the activities of the company, but not now.” Thus, the fact that the change in the labor systems (and the near-elimination of the old camps) has led to a transformation in the relationship between the company and the workers' families, and by extension the “community” that such families make up, is something that does not go unacknowledged by mining officials.

Thus, the community has fused (partly) with the mining camp, and now serves to house a significant portion of the mines' workforce. At the same time, people in Huayllay do understand the labor relation and the land relation to be different. It's just that in this case, the groups included in both relations overlap a great deal. Both relations existed before and both relations exist now, but the relative strength of each has shifted. In their expansiveness, detail and sheer variety, the new mine-community agreements resemble more the old labor *convenios* than they do the old, austere agreements between the company and the *comunidad*. Because of the flexibilization and fragmentation of the workforce, the elimination of the camps, the change in the labor laws and the decline of the unions, the labor relation has become less viable as a repository for people's aspirations for progress and advancement, as well as for the organized,

³⁵⁰ Interview conducted jointly with Jessica Smith

collective defense of local dignity in the face of an outside entity like a mining company. Labor agreements at the companies now cover only a minority of workers and deal mostly with issues of pay and working conditions, not issues like education. Similarly, a strike by payroll workers at the Huarón mine – for a few days in April 2010 – had to do simply with the payment of the share of profits to which employees are entitled under Peruvian law. Just as the “social burden” has shifted from the mine camp to the community, so has the vehicle for social pressure changed from the labor to the “mine-community” relation.

It is in light of this, I believe, that the multiple demands on the company by the community – and the resulting extensive *convenios* that double as CSR programs - should be interpreted, rather than merely through the lens of dependence or patronage. This is particularly the case as regards support for education. In the old days, the mining companies provided schools for their workers’ children, as well as opportunities to learn skills by working in the company during the summers. Now, the companies no longer maintain such schools, but they provide partial financial support for the local schools, as well as scholarships and training programs. Formerly, the recipient was the community of workers’ families, now it is the “local community,” which in this case – as in much of highland Peru – is also a *comunidad campesina*. Before, both sides interpreted the relation to be about labor. Now, one side (the companies) present their support as having to do with responsibility and local development, while the other side perceive it as being based on their right to the land on which the mines operate.

I do not pretend that there is a precise symmetry between the old labor relation and the current mine-community relation. Clearly, times have changed, and so have people’s expectations in regards to education and other vehicles of progress in which the companies are supposed to play a role. The changes in the operations of the mines themselves also make a difference – for example, training and experience used to be provided on the job, whereas now people are supposed to have at least two years’ experience, and possess certain skills, when they enter the companies; this helps to explain why training, internships and scholarships to technical schools figure prominently in the *convenios* with both the Huarón and Animón mines. What I mean to point out is that there is more continuity between the two relations than appears on the surface. Just as the “social burden” has shifted, land and geographical proximity have to some

degree replaced labor as the repository of the social; labor was never only about labor, and land and community are never only about land and community.

What we have is thus the weakening of one relation and the strengthening of another. In Huayllay, they happen to overlap a great deal, whereas in certain other mining settings they may overlap less, but the shift in their characters is nevertheless present. By “weakening” I do not necessarily mean that workers are paid less or treated worse than before; that’s clearly not the case in many large open-pit mines, where the high technical requirements of the job imply a high-paid, relatively privileged workforce. Rather, I am referring to the degree to which labor articulates a significant community that can make social demands on the company. High-paid, skilled workers are paid well because of their skills and their position in the labor market, not because of social or political pressure applied by an organized community (at least not in Peru where the mining unions are weak today). And even if that were not the case, the number of such high-paid workers is usually small, making their story less significant to the overall society.

I believe a case like that of Huayllay is interesting because it positions the labor and the mine-community relation side-by-side, clarifying their similarities and differences, continuities and ruptures. And it serves to highlight the ways in which the new order of mine-community relations and Corporate Social Responsibility constitute a *system*, an arrangement that is inextricably related to production, just like the old labor-centered system was. I thus agree with scholars like Welker (2006) and Rajak (2011) who take CSR seriously, rather than dismissing it as mere facade. Like them, I see CSR as a source of power for corporations, and a response to critique. In this case, however, I place CSR in the context of the pressures that landowning communities exert to modify their relationship with mining companies. CSR is a corporate response to these pressures, and is shaped by them. In fact, in the case of Huayllay, only one of the two mining companies utilize a CSR discourse to any significant extent (Pan American Silver – Huarón), yet both have to respond to community demands in roughly similar ways. This indicates that structural factors, rather than a particular company’s ethics, philosophy or intentions, are most important in shaping their policies and practices.

The power of communities like Huayllay is limited. They do not own the subsoil, and furthermore, their ability to demand higher rents and more substantial forms of compensation for

the surface land is limited by the administrative, coercive *servidumbre* proceedings codified in Law 26570 (the *Ley de Servidumbre Minera*) – part of a longer legal tradition that subordinates surface property rights to state decisions about resource extraction. Although in this case – as in most mining negotiations in Peru - the official, state-administered *servidumbre* has not been directly used, it nonetheless acts as a threat that conditions the bipartite *servidumbre* arrangements to which the companies and the community arrive independently. Moreover, mining companies frequently invoke the specter of crisis and potential closure, with resulting joblessness, as a way to forestall what they consider to be excessive demands.

Nevertheless, these limits have not prevented a transformation in the ability and willingness of local communities in this part of Peru to pressure and make demands on mining companies since the 1990s. While in that decade the mining industry in Peru dramatically reduced its vulnerability to labor actions and strikes – compared to what it had been before - its vulnerability to community protests increased. I believe some of this has to do with general tendencies in capitalism as a whole. Capital may overcome challenges in the economic sphere of value – in part by reducing labor needs and creating a surplus population - but it cannot do away with heightened expectations in the sphere of use-value (which is inevitably cultural, political and social). Put another way, social, cultural and political shifts in the ways that the rights of local populations are understood globally may come to challenge the unquestioned dominance of capital; this challenge is only heightened if there are large groups of people whose inclusion in the world of labor is forestalled or at least called into question or made precarious.

These broad tendencies in capitalism acquire special relevance and particular characteristics in the context of the world mining industry. There, certain currents of the late 20th century – in particular, the environmental, human rights and indigenous rights movements – have had a particularly deep impact, due to the specific characteristics of mining and its growing impact on surface land as production volumes increase and as open-pit methods come to predominate in the industry. Compared to the early 20th century, mining today requires less labor and more land. All this has changed the context for local communities as a new mining boom began in Peru in 1993-1997 and, more fully – after the interruption brought on by the Asian crisis of the late 1990s – after 2003. These changes made themselves felt in local realities and

tensions – i.e. scarcity of jobs, mining company encroachment upon communal lands - as well as in the example of mining conflicts elsewhere in the world, and in the rise of environmental ideology and legislation. In Peru, these developments coincided with the fact that the three decades immediately preceding the 1990s had seen the victory of peasant land recuperation movements and the consolidation of communal land ownership over territory that had previously been claimed by haciendas. While in terms of legislation the 1990s saw the beginning of an erosion in the status of communal land tenure, in actual practice the institution of the *comunidad campesina* was probably stronger in highland Peru – on average - than it had been for many years. In Pasco, a region of relative communal strength, the mining boom of the last decade seems to have strengthened rather than weakened the communities, since the land owned by them has become a way to access rent payments, special benefits and above all work, either directly or through communal companies. While the global developments in the mining industry certainly change the relationship with local populations in general – regardless of land ownership – in this part of Peru it is land ownership that serves to consolidate and strengthen the bargaining position of local populations.

Thus, to mining companies' earlier concern with "labor peace," a new, more diffuse notion of "social peace" or "social license" has been added. Although as late as 2005 a mining entrepreneur as prominent as Roque Benavides, co-owner of the Yanacocha gold mine, could say that he "hated the term social license" (he believed one should only need a license from the government) by the time of my research the term was in wider use. At the Huarón mine, the head of Community Relations explained to me that "the important thing is to win the trust of the community – if you follow that, the community will give you the social license." It was clear that to him, like to other local-level mining officials, "social license" had a very concrete meaning: avoiding *paros*, i.e. road blockages or protests that could generate losses, tarnish company image and, in the worst-case scenario, paralyze operations after massive investments had already been made. Dialogue mechanisms, (partial) acceptance of local demands, and Corporate Social Responsibility policies are a response both to this local context and to other similar contexts and antecedents in the mining industry worldwide. As the same Community Relations official at Huarón explained to me, when I asked him about these policies,

It was a response to the conjuncture that the country was going through at that moment, principally the mining companies. In other words the communities, propelled by the NGOs and other institutions, were propitiating *paros*, were propitiating demands that the companies could not fulfill. So then, we have at all times in the negotiations considered two important elements that must not be lost, which are leadership and initiative. If we lost those two things we were going to fail in our negotiations.

Here, company commitments to the community – which often double as CSR programs, in the case of the Huarón mine – become a way for the company to regain some authority, power and legitimacy. I am not suggesting that the threat of *paros* by local populations has become the sole or most important challenge faced by the mining industry. During the governments of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and especially Alan García (2006-2011), mine-community conflicts did seem to acquire a widespread, quasi-pandemic character in Peru. Yet for global decision-makers in the mining industry, changes in mineral prices are probably a more pressing concern. At that level, mine-community conflicts factor in as one more element adding to the cost of production, and in some cases threatening the viability of a project as a whole. In that sense, Corporate Social Responsibility and the gaining of “social license” become one more element in the process of production. This is evident in a statement made by a Community Relations official at a different, nearby mine (Brocal) to Victor Falconí, Mariella Estrada and myself in 2008:³⁵¹

The development of a mine in productive terms has already been solved with the technology we currently possess. What do I mean by this? To blow up a mountain in 8 to 10 days, with the technology we currently have, is the easiest thing. But the hard thing is managing the behavior of human beings. In other words, at this moment, for a mining company, what is harder? To produce its minerals? Or to relate with its communities? For a mining company, what is more complex – to know that technology is going to allow greater production, or that the communal environment [*entorno comunal*] is at some point going to paralyze things and not allow it to do its job? ...Because if we [Community Relations specialists] do not generate peace and tranquility, if we don't make it so that the communities work, say, with a positive mindset towards the mining companies, then this social environment is going to become much more complex, it's going to become much more difficult, and they [the people involved in Operations] won't be able to produce. The strikes [*hulegas*] will come, they will close down the mines, and what good will technology or science do then? None.

³⁵¹ This interview was arranged by Falconí and Estrada as part of their research in Huaracaca. I am indebted to them for having allowed me to participate.

This was in response to a question about the relations between the “social” and “operations” areas inside the company. Naturally, the speaker in question has a personal bias in favor of the importance of his own area of work. Nevertheless, his comments illustrate the concrete, immediate nature of Community Relations work as a part of the process of production. Here the “social” as one block is juxtaposed with operations; the former could in theory include both labor and community relations. But it’s clear from his comments that he is referring to the threat of trouble from the local communities as such, rather than from labor (ignoring for a moment the fact that in Brocal, as in Huarón and Animón/Chungar, the two overlap a great deal). Even the term *huelga* [strike] is used here in its general sense of a blockage or collective protest, as it often is in Peru, not in the more specific sense of a labor strike. This is not to dismiss the existence of occasional job actions and unions in the mines today, but to acknowledge that their power has been radically reduced from what it once was, and that to mining officials they seem more of a manageable problem rather than the menacing specter that mine-community conflicts seem to bring up. The Brocal official quoted above specifically acknowledged this, as did many of the other mine officials I spoke to during my research (and, for that matter, the workers themselves).³⁵²

Thus, in both Brocal and in Huayllay’s two mines, the *convenios* with the communities mediate a potentially conflictive relationship so as to allow production to proceed, just like the old labor *convenios* used to do. Moreover, in the case of Huayllay, the mine-community relation becomes a vehicle for the local population’s aspirations for progress and advancement, particularly as regards education as well as productive projects. Land and geographical proximity in some way become a receptacle for “the social” that has been decoupled from labor. The analysis of this process directs our attention to the systemic, structural character of contemporary mine-community relations and Corporate Social Responsibility, rather than seeing the latter either as a voluntary concern with local development or as a mere public relations strategy or

³⁵² In the words of the Brocal official, “The issue of unionism [*sindicalización*] in Peru has passed over into a completely different phase. Some 15, 20 years ago the issue of the unions was something that generated a series of, I don’t want to say difficulties, but yes, there was a power on the part of the unions towards the companies. But lately, it’s not that it’s become weaker, but rather it’s that, I think there is a much more open, much more sincere dialogue between the unions and the companies. So then, they arrive at accords that are much easier, much quicker so then that makes it so conflicts don’t happen.”

facade. Although the *convenios* mediate the relationship, they do so within the conditions that limit the *comunidad*'s power, namely the precedence of state rights to the subsoil over private rights to surface land, and the threat (often explicit) of mine closure by the company. Additionally, the *convenios* function within a context in which the community of Huayllay – unlike nearby Vicco - is historically dependent on mining work.

The fact that the community is able to wrestle concessions from the mining companies in exchange for the “social license” the latter need to operate does not, however, necessarily lead to the conclusion that the predominance of mining activity – and its recent expansion as part of the new mining boom that began in 2003 – is beneficial to the local population. That is a more complex question that would require long-term analysis, quantitative measurements, and value judgments on the basis of the local population's desires and expectations (which in any case need not be stable or unanimous). In Huayllay, as in Rancas, the general feeling towards mining activity is one of ambivalent acceptance. People recognize their historic relation to mining, as well as their present-day need for the cash income it offers. At the same time, many see it as an unreliable activity that has turned people away from the raising of animals, maybe even impeding improvement in the latter sphere. They also see the mining companies as aggressive, expansive entities that encroach upon their land, which must then be defended both as communal patrimony and as a bargaining chip or foothold with which to wrest better conditions (i.e. more payroll as opposed to subcontracted jobs), compensation and benefits from the companies.

Conclusion

In the previous chapter and in this one I have not covered all aspects of the local social articulation around mining in my region of study. In particular, I have alluded to but not thoroughly discussed a new phenomenon that is of central importance today: the emergence of mineral rent income as a significant factor at the local level, through the mechanism of the *canon minero*. This is a new system by which half of the profit tax (*impuesto a la renta*) paid by mining companies is returned to the local area of operations, specifically to the district and provincial municipalities, the Regional Government and the regional universities. The *canon* has emerged

both from recent transnational policy innovations and from longtime demands by regional and popular movements within Peru. The latter had long complained of the inordinate power wielded by the Peruvian capital, Lima (perceived to be not just geographically but also culturally and ethnically different from the rest of the country) and of the way in which regions of resource extraction were bled dry by foreign corporations and by the state. The *canon* was first put into place in 1992 (when it was set at 20%), but it really took its present form in 2004 (50%), not long after a general movement towards decentralization that took place after the fall of the Fujimori government. It has thus coincided with the post-2003 rise in mineral prices that has been sustained by the industrialization of China.

Together, the novel institutional mechanism and the global price rise have made municipalities in Peruvian mining regions suddenly wealthy, turning formerly unimportant mayors into powerful brokers. Although this has been most dramatic in regions like Ancash, which houses the massive Antamina mining operation, it is also true, to a slightly lesser extent, in Pasco. On the surface, the *canon minero* may not seem like mineral rent income, since it is derived not from a special payment from mining companies to the state-as-landlord, but rather from the general profit tax that all companies in Peru (mining or not) pay. Mining profits in the last few years have just been extraordinarily high, out of proportion with the rest of the Peruvian economy, thus creating important revenues for both the national and now (thanks to *canon*) the local governments. The source of the high profits is not hard to locate – it is the rise in metal prices that results from world economic expansion, specifically economic expansion in one corner of the world (China), which has continued even after Europe and North America entered into recession in 2008.

Personally, I believe this can be understood as a transfer of part of the surplus-value produced in China towards the extractive industries, resulting in high profits for the latter and thus high tax payments to states such as Peru.³⁵³ This transfer is due to the nature of mining as a “nature-intensive” industry (Coronil 1997) that is tied to specific locations and physical

³⁵³ I am not saying that no surplus-value is produced in mining itself (i.e. by mining labor) – clearly it is. Metal-mining in Peru is not like the oil exported by Venezuela, which according to Coronil (1997) requires little labor for its production. As much of this dissertation has made clear, labor has been central to Peruvian mining. But the surplus-value produced by this labor, though important, would not be the source of the excess profit generated by high prices in the last few years.

characteristics and thus is not subject to the general tendency towards the equalization of rates of profit. In this sense, high mineral prices can be understood as themselves resulting in a form of mineral rent, which is based not directly on the power of landlord-states but rather on the irreducible importance of nature and place in the contemporary world economy; the rent itself can be appropriated by either corporations or states, or both.³⁵⁴ In other words, I am calling attention to the specific nature of mineral wealth as different from other forms of wealth; this specificity marks the *canon* income as mineral rent even if it is merely a general profit tax rather than a payment to the state-as-landlord per se. Although rent in this sense is an abstract concept, it helps to index the concrete dependence of mining on manufacturing (and thus of Peru on China), as well as the (partial) detachment of state mining income from local labor.

Regardless of the nature and ultimate (as opposed to immediate) source of this sudden influx of wealth into municipal coffers, its local effects have been examined by Arellano (2011), who compared three contemporary mining regions in Peru: Pasco, Ancash and Moquegua. He argues, through meticulous quantitative analysis of published data, that districts and regions that have mines and that are rich in *canon* income have not seen improvements in living standards that are superior to those found in districts and regions without such income. In other words, there is no evidence of a positive local impact from mining activity through the *canon* mechanism (or other local-level mechanisms for that matter), at least not in the short run.³⁵⁵ Arellano also examines the possible reasons for this. He emphasizes that the new extractive

³⁵⁴ I am inclined to interpret this price rise under the light of Marx's concept of absolute rent, insofar as it is a payment due not to unusually productive deposits (resulting in low costs of production), as in differential rent, but rather a transfer from manufacturing sectors to the extractive industries. The latter appear as "land" (regardless of who owns them or who keeps the profits) in relation to manufacturing which appears as "capital." I owe my interest in absolute rent to conversations with Fernando Coronil, who expressed his belief in the importance of the concept (as opposed to rent in general). The analysis here differs from his use of the concept in Coronil (1997), where absolute rent appears as a result of the political action of landlord-governments; I am instead interested in absolute rent as a regular feature of the capitalist economy and as a concept that helps us to understand the place of nature in capitalism (something that is also a general concern of Coronil's book). In both cases, however, such rent appears as a transfer of surplus-value from non-extractive (mostly manufacturing) sectors towards the extractive industries (either state or private), through the mechanism of high prices, rather than as a transfer from extractive (or agricultural) capital towards landlords, through the mechanism of advantageous conditions of production, as in differential rent.

³⁵⁵ It should be mentioned that Arellano's study is not concerned with the macroeconomic role of mining income through its impact on national accounts, and how that in turn may influence local development, either in a positive way (i.e. macroeconomic stability and economic growth in the short run) or in a negative way (i.e. the "resource curse" in the classic sense).

industry policies being promoted worldwide, which emphasize decentralization, transparency and participation in the allocation of mining income, far from reducing conflict, have intensified it. He also argues against the view, common in Peru, that the inefficiency and incapacity of local and regional governments is responsible for the failure of mining income to yield positive results in terms of development and well-being.

Rather, he argues, the problem is the framework of incentives currently in place, which force local and regional authorities to spend their bloated, *canon*-based budgets in the shortest time possible, without regard to the quality of investments or to their likely impact on local living standards. These imperatives originate as much with the national government, media and mining companies (eager as they are to divert blame for the failures of mining-based development onto local and regional authorities, and to frame the problem solely in terms of the percentage of budgets spent), and with the new electoral rules that permit the recall of elected authorities, as they do with local demands. Furthermore, Arellano argues, the sudden influx of mining income encourages the rise of mafias and clientelism around local municipalities. Although he sees these particular problems as being less serious in Pasco than in Ancash – where the influx of money has been greater and the local political structures less prepared to withstand it – they are nonetheless present there too.³⁵⁶ And although municipal capacities are somewhat greater in Pasco than in Ancash, the framework of incentives determines the same kind of short-term expenditure of mining income on projects that for the most part do not have a positive long-term impact on local well-being.

Arellano conducted his study at the same time I was beginning my research, and some of my observations complement his analysis of *canon* income and its consequences. However, such a discussion, though crucial, is beyond the scope of the present chapter, which has focused not on the role of the state (whether at the national or local levels) and its use of mineral rent income, but rather on the direct relationship between local communities and mining companies, particularly around issues of land, compensation and employment.

³⁵⁶ Arellano 2011, and Arellano (personal communication).

I will thus conclude by summarizing the arguments and conclusions presented throughout this chapter. I have analyzed the mine-community relationship in both Rancas and Huayllay, focusing on company-community negotiations over land use and compensation. In the discussion on Rancas, I examined the importance of history, communal identity and the defense of land, as well as the ambivalences and anxieties that result from the cession of pasture land for tailings deposition. In the sections on Huayllay, I focused on how mine-community *convenios* (agreements) have taken over some of the role of the old labor *convenios*, as the “social burden” has shifted from the labor relation to a new relation based around land, geographical proximity and “community.” Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is understood locally not in terms of corporate ethics or policies but rather in terms of specific, detailed and extensive mine-community *agreements* that the community is able to impose on the company as a result of its role as owner and possessor of the lands. The central issue is structural; although one of the companies in the district has a well-developed CSR discourse and the other does not, in the end both must implement more or less the same *convenios* with the community – there are differences, but these are minor. CSR can thus be understood as part of a system of production, one that responds to the newfound prominence of local communities in the global mining context, and to the corresponding precariousness of “social peace.” I examined some of the reasons for this prominence and precariousness at the local, national and global levels. Although these factors are specific to the mining industry, I believe some of them are also related to broader tendencies in capitalism, such as the development of a relative surplus population, the complex relationship between inclusion in and exclusion from the system, and the contradiction between capital’s reorganization of the sphere of value production, on the one hand, and the growth of expectations and desires in the sphere of use-value (and thus a corresponding shift in the “social burden”), on the other.

CHAPTER VII

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Contamination in historical perspective

In the introduction to this dissertation I discussed how just as working-class politics seemed to decline in many parts of the world at the end of the 20th century, other social relations were rising to the fore as sites of conflict and also of governmentality. One such development has been the “rise of the local community” which I analyzed in the previous chapter. Another closely related yet distinct phenomenon has been the emergence of environmental issues as “hybrid” social objects that combine science and politics (Latour 1993). Issues of pollution, side effects and hazards, though not new, have acquired a new visibility and currency, and often exercise a significant influence on the form and language of political conflicts.

Such is the case in Peru, where, in its March 2010 Report on “social conflicts” in the country, the National Ombudsman’s Office (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) classified almost half (49%) of such conflicts as “social-environmental conflicts,” mainly around the extractive industry sector. This is far greater than the share apportioned to other types of sources of conflict, such as “local government affairs” (14.5%), “labor” (11%), “national government affairs” (7.8%), “communal” conflicts (5.5%) and problems of “territorial demarcation” (4.7%) (*Defensoría del Pueblo* 2010, 6). The Ombudsman’s division of conflicts into these particular categories is obviously a mediated, social construction. Still, the large number of cases that give at least partial grounds – whether in terms of content, form, or both - to be classified as “social-environmental” conflicts around extractive industries, do give a sense of the relative importance that this type of politics has gained in contemporary Peru. Though such conflicts gather together a complex set of problems of land, autonomy, labor and distribution of resources, they also bring

to the foreground issues of side effects and pollution. Most importantly, the language of *contaminación* has become ubiquitous in mining-related conflicts in Peru.

In this chapter, I trace the emergence of environmental issues around mining in Peru, both historically and in terms of the role they play today in politics and everyday social relations in the Central Highlands and Pasco in particular. My interest lies in how environmental issues are both old and new, and how their meaning shifts over time. In this first section, I present a brief environmental history of mining in the Central Highlands, from the early records of pollution problems to the new post-Environmental Code order. I also explore how “the environment” has emerged as a category in recent years. In the second, central section of the chapter, I provide an ethnographic account of health-affecting environmental pollution in the urban context of Cerro de Pasco – in particular, the “lead in blood” problem. I focus on issues of uncertainty and confusion, “corporate response,” and compensation. Finally, in the last section of this chapter I shift from the topic of pollution and “hidden hazards” to the ways in which “environmental” issues intersect with issues of modernity, urbanity and the relationship between mineral wealth and society; I do this through an examination of the water shortage in Cerro de Pasco. In particular, I focus on the historic competition between the city and the mine for available water sources, the impact of privatization and the move away from a “company town” model, the production of uncertainty that accompanies open-pit mining in the city, and finally the contradiction between the state-centered nature of mineral wealth and the individualistic ethos of contemporary, market-oriented ideology.

Poisons, fumes and accidents

Just like the unhealthy effects of certain metals – like lead and arsenic – have been known in small ways at least since antiquity, the issue of contamination has been a feature of debates over the mining industry more broadly for a long time, long before the rise of modern environmentalism. Writing in the mid-16th century, Georgius Agricola (1950) acknowledged the harm to the environment caused by the industry to which he had dedicated his life’s work:

The strongest argument of the detractors is that the fields are devastated by mining operations... They argue that the woods and groves are cut down, for there is need of an endless amount of wood for timbers, machines and the smelting of metals... Further,

when the ores are washed, the water which has been used poisons the brooks and streams, and either destroys the fish or drives them away. Therefore the inhabitants of these regions, on account of the devastation of their fields, woods groves, brooks and rivers, find great difficulty in procuring the necessaries of life, and by reason of the destruction of the timber they are forced to greater expense in erecting buildings. Thus it is said, it is clear to all that there is greater detriment from mining than the value of the metals which the mining produces (Agricola 1950, 8)

While acknowledging that these issues were real, Agricola countered these arguments by asserting the inescapable necessity of metals and therefore mining: “If there were no metals, men would pass a horrible and wretched existence in the midst of wild beasts” (Ibid., 14).

Furthermore, he echoed present-day depictions of regions surrounding mining operations (at least in Peru) as unproductive and inhospitable, by arguing that only rich agricultural regions should be an object of concern: “As the miners dig almost exclusively in mountains otherwise unproductive, and in valleys invested in gloom, they do either slight damage to the fields or none at all” (Ibid., 14). Lastly, he invoked the value which the minerals stored underneath the earth could command in the wider world of commodity exchange, so as to help society escape the constraints of any particular natural space: “Moreover, with the metals which are melted from the ore, birds without number, edible beasts and fish can be purchased elsewhere and brought to these mountainous regions” (Ibid., 14).

Thus, the effects of mining activity on the environment and on human, plant and animal health were not unknown, yet references to them in mining documents and chronicles before the 20th century are not common. Furthermore, they often do not appear as a separate sphere of “environmental” issues, as they do today, but rather as part of other concerns related to workers’ health or accidents. For the Andes, references to accidents and the pernicious effects of mining work on indigenous workers’ health can be found in some of the colonial chronicles of Potosí. The mercury mine at Huancavelica, Peru, which, together with the Almadén (Spain) and Idrija (Slovenia) mercury mines, supplied the Habsburg Empire with the mercury that was essential for the amalgamation of silver, was also notorious for its impact on workers’ health. As Brown (2001) and Robins (2011) have documented, besides the great dangers faced by workers in all mines, such as cave-ins, silicosis and carbon monoxide poisoning, workers at Huancavelica – both *mitayos* (coerced) and non-coerced - were subject to the toxic effects of mercury on the nervous system and other parts of the body, especially in the period before 1642, when the Belén

ventilation adit had not yet been built. This occurred both inside the mines and in the refining ovens, and was well-known at the time, with affected workers known as *azogados* (from the Spanish *azogue* for mercury). Some of the mercury inevitably got spread to the larger environment and to the non-working population through workers' clothes and through the vapors from the refining ovens.

In Cerro de Pasco, as in Potosí, we know of the frequent accidents during colonial times, such as the collapse of a mine in 1746 which killed around 300 workers. Writers also often describe the inhospitable, high-altitude conditions of the place, and it is in this context that the Spanish botanist Hipólito Ruiz, who visited the city between 1778 and 1784, mentions the effects of fumes from the mercury amalgamation process then used to separate silver from its ore³⁵⁷:

There [people] cannot walk long stretches on foot without resting from time to time so as to recover their breath and breathe more freely and not suffocate with the large amounts of mercury and carbonic acid that rise up in the burning of minerals and of *champas*,³⁵⁸ infecting the atmosphere with a poisonous air... (Ruiz 1931, quoted in Espinoza and Boza 1981, 4).

Descriptions of harmful gases and substances occur together with accounts of accidents and hazards affecting workers in the mines and amalgamation centers; one such account comes from Peruvian naturalist Mariano de Rivero y Ustariz's 1828 report on the mining industry in Cerro de Pasco. Having crushed the ore in water-powered mills and mixed it with water and mercury (for which process both horses and people's feet were used), the laborers then placed it in earthen jars (*porongos*) over the fire. This process, according to Rivero y Ustariz,

...is risky, because if the earthen jar breaks the worker is exposed to receiving vapors which are harmful to their health and which are the cause of the many paralyzed people that one sees in Cerro (Rivero y Ustariz 2010 (1857), 32).

³⁵⁷ The mercury amalgamation process was the primary means of refining silver from the late 16th to the 19th centuries. Mercury is no longer used in Cerro de Pasco, as it is in artisanal gold mining in Peru.

³⁵⁸ *Champa* is the primary biofuel available in this area, and it remains the main fuel used for cooking in the rural communities surrounding Cerro de Pasco. It consists of blocks of a particular star-shaped species of highland grass that are cut and dug out together with part of the soil. This is done shortly before the start of the annual rains, when the ground is driest, and the *champa* blocks are stored underneath sheds next to people's houses. This fuel burns well and is more economical than buying gas.

The Second Industrial Revolution and the Smoke Affair

The arrival of industrial-scale mining in Peru in the early 20th century, in the form of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation, not only brought the attention of Lima-based *indigenista* activists to mining and smelting accidents (Mayer 1984 (1913)), but also led to the controversy known as the “smoke damage affair” surrounding the company’s smelting complex at La Oroya. This was part of a wider global phenomenon associated with the Second Industrial Revolution and its demand for copper and other metals, which led European and North American capital to set up copper mines and smelters around the world. As Nriagu (2002) writes,

By the end of the nineteenth century, emissions of arsenic from base metal smelters and coal-burning power plants reached unprecedented levels because of low-level technology and little attention devoted to air pollution control. During this time, there were numerous complaints from smelter districts in many parts of the world that the smelter smoke was poisoning the horses and other livestock (Nriagu 2002, 14).

In the Cerro de Pasco region, we have evidence of such complaints from the areas surrounding the Huarón mine, where the small San José smelter was installed in 1914-1917,³⁵⁹ and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation’s initial smelter at Tinyahuarco, which functioned from 1906 to 1922.³⁶⁰ However, it was only when the latter company moved its smelting operation from

³⁵⁹ Kapsoli (1975) cites a complaint from the early part of the century by representatives of the *comunidad* of Huayllay, where Huarón is located: “The fumes killed the animals, destroyed the grasses and even caused huge damages to the inhabitants of the district.” An agreement between the community and the mining company, from the 1936, also mentions “the damages that the fumes from the San José smelter had caused” (González et al., 2000, Appendix 12).

³⁶⁰ This first smelter, closer to the city of Cerro and known alternatively as Tinyahuarco, “La Fundación” or “Smelter”, lies today in ruins. Its environmental impact during the time that it functioned is less-well known than that of the Oroya smelter, since it did not give rise to governmental commissions or receive much attention in the press. In his 1958 recollections, long-time corporation executive B.T. Colley argued that “in all of the period of its operation” the smoke question “was never seriously raised.” He attributed this to the Tinyahuarco smelter’s geographical setting, with a favorable air current that carried the smoke above the ground and diluted it, in contrast to La Oroya which was set in a tight valley which kept the smoke close to the ground and sent it downstream through the valley. He did acknowledge that the proportion of lead and other metals escaping through the fumes must have been as great as in La Oroya, and that the hills nearest the smelter were “and still are, almost nude of vegetation,” but unlike in La Oroya, these were owned by the company, so there were no landowners to complain. On the other hand, Kapsoli (1975) cites a 1940 complaint by the *comunidad* of Vico against the company: “When the Smelter was in operation, the fumes ruined the greater part of our grasslands which have become barren and unproductive until now, without the company having compensated us either for the ruined grasslands or for the enormous mortality of our cattle” (60). In the Cerro Corporation archives, we find a 1924 complaint to the company from prominent *hacendado* Antenor Rizo Patrón, owner of the hacienda Atocsaico, which argues that there was a symmetry in the effects of smelter smoke on cattle at Tinyahuarco and at La Oroya. At the time, such effects were categorized as a disease called *renguera*. “The company can easily verify the reports I have that the *renguera*, which presented itself for the first time in the haciendas of Pacoyán, Quisque, Conoc, Racracancha [all haciendas close to

Tinyahuarco to the more centrally located railroad town of La Oroya in 1922 that the complaints grew large enough to attract national attention, forcing the government to name several investigative commissions over the course of the next few decades. This “smoke affair” has been examined by several scholars (Caballero 1981 89-106, 164-170; Laite 1981 59-64, DeWind 1987 54-57, Mallon 1983 226-229, Flores Galindo 1974 50-52).

At the time, the corporation was primarily interested in copper and secondarily in gold and silver; the lead in the ore, as well as other metals like arsenic, were thought to be of too low a grade to be profitably recovered. Thus, fine, volatilized particles of these metals were simply emitted with the rest of the fumes through the smokestack. B.T. Colley, a long-time company executive and at the time a close assistant to General Manager Harold Kingsmill, would later write that “the new Oroya plant was therefore practically without what now would be classified in any form as smoke control” (Colley 1958, 16). Early versions of Frederick Cottrell’s electrostatic precipitation methods, designed to remove pollutants from smoke, were already known at the time, but were implemented only in a very limited form and in a gradual fashion, due either to financial pressure from the company’s high accumulated debts (DeWind 1987, 56) or to opposition from General Manager Kingsmill, who tended to downplay the smoke problem (Colley 1958, 18, 20). As a result, in November 1922 the smelter began emitting massive amounts of sulphur dioxide, lead, arsenic and bismuth. Company tests and subsequent government reports showed that between 80 and 120 tons of fine particles of these substances (Colley 1958, 17) were falling daily on the town and on surrounding haciendas and *comunidades*, over a distance of 50 to 60 kilometers (DeWind 1987, 232). According to company reports cited by Caballero (1981), in the first year of operations 32,537.54 tons of the polluting particles were emitted through the smoke (91). The effects were immediately evident; as Colley wrote in his 1958 recollections,

Tinyahuarco] and others of that region, as a result of the installation of the smelter, is disappearing in them with the interruption of the activities of that plant, at the same time that it intensifies its harmful effects in the haciendas next to Oroya. Additionally, the mortality of the large cattle has decreased there in a similar proportion as it has increased in the other place [Oroya].” It’s clear that knowledge of the effects of smelter smoke on cattle and grass was widespread among both *hacendados* and *comuneros* at the time, and that notions about the possibility of compensation for these damages circulated in the region.

The whole hill immediately across the river from the smelter belonging to the community of Old Oroya was that year planted to barley, the most or one of the most sensitive plants to sulphur dioxide burns. Many people thought that the hill was so planted that year to be a proof of smoke damage and a method of collecting from the Corporation. But that was definitely not the reason. What happened was that Old Oroya was following a time-honored custom of the Peruvian Indian in the high country who plants three crops in three successive years on the same ground, rests it for four years, and then repeats the process. The hill across the river at that time was fitting into its regular schedule. In a very short time the barley was all burned white and destroyed (16).

Complaints began pouring in not only of damage to crops but also to animals. According to Mallon (1983), by 1924, 30 *comunidades* and 28 *hacendados* had begun proceedings for damages (227). Many of the latter were wealthy families from the Peruvian elite, who had the ear of the national government and could not simply be dismissed by the company, even if the latter did initially attempt to argue that the deaths of animals were due to an infectious disease rather than to the smoke (Caballero 1981 99-101). For example, a judicial proceeding initiated by the Sociedad Ganadera de Junín – a company that owned several haciendas in the area – found that cattle mortality at its Hacienda Piñascocha had jumped from 4.94% in 1922 to 20.41% in 1923 whereas at its Hacienda Cochas it had increased from 4.77% in 1922 to 15.33% in 1923 (Cerro Corporation Archive, “Eugenio Rivero” 106_1499, 106_1504). In the organs of the dead animals, laboratory analyses found “considerable quantities of arsenic, lead and sulphur gas” (Ibid., 106_1505). Colley describes the effects on animals owned by the mining company itself:

These animals were heavily poisoned and badly affected by voluminous diarrhea; as they would rise from the ground the very liquid dung would pour from them, uncontrolled; they were lifeless and weak with staring eyes, slow moving, and very thin (Colley 1958, 19).

Mallon (1983) similarly describes the effect of the smoke on the animals of the *comunidades* in the area, as recounted in some of her oral histories (227-228). The communities closest to the smelter, such as Old Oroya, Huaynacancha, Huayhuay and Saco basically had to cease their agricultural and herding activities. According to Colley “the situation became critical and also dangerous. For instance, the community of Chacapalpa, one of the largest, threatened to blow up the smelter” (Colley 1958, 31). The effect on humans were less documented; the first government commission did not perform analyses of individuals’ organs, but it mentioned that people complained of irritation of the lungs and eyes, loss of hair and skin problems (DeWind

1987, 234). The government ordered the company to temporarily reduce its operations from four furnaces to one only and to improve its smoke control measures. The latter was done only gradually, with the installation of new and improved Cottrell plants. As Colley writes, “it took 19 years (1922-1941) to consummate this project of smoke control and even now [in 1958] it does not seem to be sufficient as the quantity of fume passing from it seems to be too great” (Colley 1958, 20).

By the late 1930s, the amount of arsenic, lead and other metals escaping daily through the stack had been reduced from 80-110 tons per day to 30 tons per day (DeWind 1987, 240); according to Colley, by 1941 it had been reduced to 3-5 tons per day. This process of smoke control was motivated by the realization that as Cottrell particle retention methods improved and as the demand for lead, bismuth and other metals increased, the substances previously emitted through the smoke could instead be retained, processed and sold. Environmental remediation thus became a source of profit.³⁶¹ Thus, rather than be simply dumped in the surrounding countryside, an increasing share of lead and other metals previously regarded as by-products would be shipped abroad and become part of other lived environments.

In the meantime, while the smoke was still at its worst, to deal with the discontent, the Company had to pay compensation to the haciendas and *comunidades* for the animals and crops lost. But it also adopted a policy of purchasing the damaged haciendas, at low prices, in order to avoid having to pay further compensations. Although the hillsides closest to La Oroya retain a moon-like appearance to this day, the gradual implementation of smoke control methods meant that the fields farther away from the smelter would eventually recover enough to be productive and profitable again. The Corporation thus began the process of constructing its separate *Ganadera* (Cattle-Raising) Division and becoming Peru’s largest hacienda owner, at one time claiming to own 322,000 hectares (DeWind 1987, 230), an area slightly larger than the state of Rhode Island.³⁶² This policy of land accumulation would eventually make the company the

³⁶¹ As Colley wrote, “thus the recovery of fume from metallurgical smoke by the Cottrell process has grown into one of the most important and lucrative operations of the Corporation. It was never thought of before the smoke problem was forced on the Corporation, almost against its will, and it has grown into one of its most important and lucrative operations” (Colley 1958, 23).

³⁶² The smoke affair thus had a dual effect on the company: it accelerated its transformation from a copper company to a producer of lead, zinc and other metals that were previously discarded in the smoke, and it turned it into an

target of some of the first successful land recuperation struggles waged by *comunidades* in the early 1960s (in particular the community of Rancas next to Cerro de Pasco), a process that eventually led to Peru's radical Land Reform.

In the case of damaged land belonging to *comunidades*, the company could not simply buy up the land, since only a few years before the Leguía government had drafted the first modern legal recognition regime for *comunidades* (then known as *comunidades indígenas*), which among other things prohibited the sale and purchase of their land.³⁶³ The result was thus a complex combination of land-for-land exchanges, monetary compensation for animals and crops lost, and other agreements between the company and the communities. The negotiations and agreements were similar to many of those found between mining companies and communities today. It was not always clear which land belonged to communities and which to private individuals, since this was often contested, as was the exact membership and boundaries of communities. Laite (1981) describes the complex nature of this process for the community of Oroya, whose land was closest to the smelter and had mostly been ruined for productive use. The company bought a hacienda in the nearby valley of Tarma to compensate the community for its land. Some of the families of Oroya claimed to be private landowners and preferred cash compensation, whereas others had their rights to the ruined communal land questioned, and had to accept cash for their animals and crops only. Of those who had their rights recognized, about half – often the older *comuneros* who were more oriented towards agriculture and herding – took the new land, whereas the other half – often their children – preferred to stay in La Oroya, take cash compensation, and work in the company. In later years, many of them joined their relatives in the new land. As La Oroya became increasingly polluted in the 1920s and 30s – due to the slowness of the implementation of the smoke control system – those who had stayed and still raised animals petitioned again, and formed a federation with two other communities with help from the APRA party. As a result, in 1947 the company had to buy a second *hacienda* for the community.

hacendado engaged in substantial cattle-raising activities in addition to mining. As Colley wrote, the smoke question “entirely engulfed the Corporation for the time being, finally greatly changing its history and completely altering its operations and its various products” (Colley 1958, 16).

³⁶³ The difference in land regimes was noted by Colley: “He (Kingsmill) was negotiating the purchase of many privately owned properties claiming damage, and arranging with the Government for the payment of annuities for damages to properties which legally could not be purchased, such as communities” (Colley 1958, 18).

In the process, many of the *comuneros* from the areas surrounding La Oroya had thus abandoned agriculture and herding either for wage work in the mines and smelter or for investing their cash compensations in the growing town's commercial opportunities; often a mix of both strategies was attempted.³⁶⁴ Some of the surrounding *comunidades* had managed to obtain significant compensation packages, whereas others had not;³⁶⁵ the ability of particular families to have their rights as members of these *comunidades* recognized had also varied greatly.

The contamination of rivers

Just as smoke constituted the main pollutant associated with the Cerro Corporation in La Oroya, further north the Cerro de Pasco mine itself, as noted in the previous chapter, was contaminating the San Juan river – the main tributary of Lake Junín, where the Mantaro river is born – as was the Colquijirca mine, owned by the Brocal company. This forms part of a larger story of the dumping of tailings and other mining waste into rivers near mining centers in Peru in the 20th century; this was common practice before environmental regulations began to weigh in during the second half of the century. As with the case of the Oroya smelter smoke, companies discarded that which could not be profitably processed and sold at the time, or whatever was simply a nuisance, such as the water pumped from the mine. It was of course known that slag heaps, waste ore and tailings could become profitable under changed technological and economic conditions, and for this reason they were sometimes retained in enclosed spaces such as tailings dams. Nevertheless, a significant amount made it into the nearest stream. Evidence of this can be found in mining regions themselves, where local people are usually aware of this history and of which rivers are contaminated and which not. It can also be gleaned from mining

³⁶⁴ DeWind (1987) cites a 1969 survey by the Ministry of Agriculture: “With few exceptions the only communities which had developed commercial activities in addition to livestock and agriculture were those most affected by the smoke. Of these affected communities half were dependent on mining as a significant source of their income” (Ibid., 242-244). Thus, for communities closest to the Oroya smelter, it can be said that environmental pollution accelerated the process of incorporation into a wage-earning working-class.

³⁶⁵ The amounts of the compensations were different for each community and the whole picture is highly complex, more so since agreements were sometimes renegotiated. Flores Galindo (1974), citing Basadre (1969), gives a list of 30 communities claiming smoke damages in the 1920s. According to a 1928 company report found in the Cerro Corporation Archive, it seems some of these communities received an annual indemnity, some received one-time payments for specific damages, and a few did not receive compensation. 26 communities had received some form of payment in the 4 years since the beginning of the smoke affair, and the total amount spent by the company on these compensations up to the end of 1928 was 840,331.12 soles. This was, however, less than it had spent on buying haciendas and compensating their owners for damages, which was 7'024,168.18 soles. (See appendix)

company reports, studies and documents – although they do not usually devote extensive attention to environmental issues, they do sometimes make passing reference to the dumping of tailings and other residue into rivers.³⁶⁶

For communities and haciendas in these areas, this pollution often meant the loss of one source of water and river fauna (fish, frogs, etc.) – as was the case with the utilization of rivers and lakes as water sources for the mines’ concentrators, smelters and hydroelectric power plants. There were usually other streams, natural springs and lakes to supplement this shortfall. In the case of the San Juan River and Lake Junín into which it flowed, however, the contamination was particularly severe, and was the subject of numerous complaints from the *comunidades* of the lake area. A Cerro de Pasco Corporation internal memorandum from 1969 mentions a visit from officials of the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco, which had recently taken power and which had a pro-*comunidad* discourse. One of the visiting officials, an army major and advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture on matters pertaining to the Agrarian Reform, made his views known to the company employees who hosted him:

In my opinion, he said, the communities have been sending memoranda since twenty years ago, asking to have their claims for damages attended to, without being heard. [He said] that now things have changed because they are listened to as soon as is needed, and that the Government is willing to lend them all necessary help...the previous commissions have limited themselves to studying solely the La Oroya area when in his opinion the problem originates in Cerro de Pasco, where the “poisoned” waters have ruined some 30,000 hectares of grass in the Ondores zone (Centromín Archive – Memorandum Interno, 22 de Junio de 1969).

³⁶⁶ For example, in 1952 Cerro de Pasco Corp. General Manager Robert Koenig was trying to assess whether there might be leftover lead and zinc tailings in the company’s Casapalca mine which might be recoverable. A company employee replied to Koenig: “Until the Oroya smelter went into operation no lead nor zinc was recovered in Casapalca. It all went down the Río Rímac [the river on whose banks, much further downstream, is located the capital city of Lima]. After the smelter in Casapalca closed down Oroya did get some of the lead but the zinc was still sent down to the river until 1924.” This information, Koenig concluded, “definitely kills the idea that there may be any recoverable zinc in the Casapalca tailings pile” (Cerro Corporation Archive, 106-1344). Colley also describes how in its early days the Oroya smelter dumped its waste directly into the Mantaro – the river that forms the traditional Huanca heartland and one of central Peru’s most important agricultural valleys. “The Corporation was dumping all of its granulated slag into the Mantaro; owners of stock could show flake-like particles of slag adhering to the inner lining of animal stomachs. The Government appointed another commission to investigate this subject and that caused the installation of the existing slag depository on the opposite bank of the Mantaro River” (Colley 1958, 17). At the French-owned Huarón mine, the 1936 mine-community agreement mentioned earlier also mentions “the contamination of the waters of the Huayllay river by chemical substances” (González et al., 2000, Appendix 12).

As mentioned previously, in 1981 the state mining company Centromín, which had taken over from the Cerro Corp., sought to reduce the contamination of the San Juan river and Lake Junín by building a new plant to treat the water before releasing it. The motivation for this was not so much concern for the communities along the banks of the San Juan and Lake Junín as it was a project at the time that sought to connect the Mantaro river with the Rímac, so as to secure a larger supply of drinking water for the capital city of Lima. Since the Mantaro is in a way the continuation of the San Juan River – after passing through Lake Junín – it seemed necessary to attempt to decontaminate the latter river so as to prevent the release of large quantities of heavy metals into the Rímac river. However, the new water treatment plant produced its own residue, and this began to be dumped on Lake Yanamate, formerly the source of the city of Cerro de Pasco’s drinking water.³⁶⁷ Nor was the contamination of the San Juan river and Lake Junín eliminated altogether, it was simply reduced, as the measurements in the previous chapter showed.

For the urban population of Cerro de Pasco, the issue of contamination has been one of gradual increase rather than sudden emergence. From the small but ever-present ore stockpiles described in colonial-era and 19th-century travelers’ and engineers’ accounts there have emerged the massive waste ore deposits of today. While in the past the rivers were contaminated with mercury used to extract silver in the old amalgamation method, today acid mine drainage (AMD) filters into the San Juan and Tingo rivers. Some lakes, like Yanamate and Quiulacocha, are poisoned with tailings and acid water, while others, like Patarcocha and Esperanza, have been filled in with solid landfill from the mine. Open-pit mining, which has existed on a large scale in Cerro de Pasco since the late 1950s, produces a much larger volume of waste than underground production methods. But contamination is a problem that has historically appeared in combination with, not in isolation from, other phenomena such as the danger of mine accidents, occupational illnesses such as silicosis, and the gradual destruction of the old city by the advancement of the open pit.

³⁶⁷ A 1982 letter from the state mining company to the Ministry of Mines states that “the utilization of the enclosed basin [*cuenca ciega*] of Lake Yanamate as a container for the effluents from the Mine Water Treatment Plan has as its purpose to reduce the contamination of the waters of the Mantaro river with the objective of making feasible the Mantaro Transfer Project [*Proyecto Transvase Mantaro*] which has been declared to be of public utility and need and high priority” (Centromín Archive, Box 1263, -Procesos Administrativos). The Mantaro Transfer Project was a well-known government project in the 1980s.

Environmental Law

However, although it has a long history, in recent years the issue of contamination has taken on new force. While other political categories and currents, such as class and exploitation, and their corresponding mechanisms of articulation, such as labor unions, have diminished in strength, environmentalism has instead grown in prestige and institutionality, at both the national and international levels. In September 1990, just as Peru was beginning a rapid shift toward fully market-oriented policies under the Fujimori government, the country was also passing the most important piece of environmental legislation in its history: the Environmental Code (*Código del Medio Ambiente*). The Code, together with subsequent legislation based on it, introduced to Peru two mechanisms that have become central to debates and conflicts over mining: Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), for new projects, and Environmental Remediation Plans (PAMAs), for existing projects. This was, of course, part of a wider global move towards more stringent and encompassing environmental regulation.³⁶⁸ The Environmental Code had been prepared over several years during the 1980s through the collaboration of government agencies such as the National Office for the Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN) and the now-defunct National Planning Institute (INP) (Suárez de Freitas 2000, 63), with the technical assistance of international bodies like the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (Brañes 2000, 29). It was also discussed in the Peruvian Congress over the course of 4-5 years (Caillaux 2000, 18), and was left for the Fujimori government to approve when it took office in 1990.

At that time, as Caillaux writes, the Code met with the opposition of the business community, which had not been part of its preparation, and which asked that the new law be

³⁶⁸ Raúl Brañes, who in his role as United Nation advisor participated in the drafting of the Peruvian legislation, has placed Peru's Environmental Code within a wider Latin American and historical context in Brañes (2000). He traces three periods in Latin American legislation related to the issues now categorized as environmental: "casual," "sectoral," and "environmental legislation proper." In the 19th century, civil codes sought to protect property rights and assist in the resolution of disputes, and only "casually" affected matters pertaining to the use of natural resources; in the early 20th century, conservationist ideas and growing urbanization led the state to issue "sectoral" legislation on issues related both to the protection of water, flora and fauna and to public health and work safety. Beginning in the 1970s, on the other hand, "environmental legislation in Latin America experiments a true explosion and starts to be profoundly altered in conformity with a global tendency" (Brañes 2000, 32). This is what he labels "global" legislation or "environmental legislation proper;" by 2000, 17 out of 20 Latin American countries had passed it in some form: Colombia (1974), Venezuela (1976), Ecuador (1976), Brazil (1981), Guatemala (1986), Mexico (1988), Peru (1990), Bolivia (1992), Honduras (1993), Chile (1994), Costa Rica (1996), Nicaragua (1996), Cuba (1997), El Salvador (1998), Panama (1998), Dominican Republic (2000) and Uruguay (2000) (Ibid., 37-8).

repealed (Ibid., 18). In a January 1991 statement, leftist leader and then-senator Hugo Blanco presented a narrative of the Code's inception that connected it to the history of mining contamination in Peru:

For a long time, the mining companies have been poisoning the air, water and soil of our country. They are killing the fish, plants, grasses, and as a result the cattle and people. We can see that in La Oroya, in Bambamarca and in Ilo. For this crime against people and against nature, the peoples of our country have protested and have been able to obtain an Environmental Code that requires companies to put in place mechanisms to prevent the poisoning of water, air and soil. The advancement of technology and science allows a mine to be exploited without contaminating the environment. However, the mining companies want everything to be profit, they don't want to spend one cent to prevent poisoning. For this reason, the mining companies with the multinational Southern Peru Copper Corporation at their helm have attacked the Environmental Code.

According to Blanco, the companies had been able to persuade the Senate to pass a motion to repeal the Code, but the Chamber of Deputies had been able to kill this move so that the Code remained in effect.³⁶⁹ As with the mining tax redistribution (*canon minero*) laws passed a few years later, which have similarly transformed the social landscape of mining in Peru, the attitude of business and in particular the mining industry towards the Environmental Code eventually changed from one of opposition to one of acceptance. The Code's provisions have furthermore become part of the image of modernity and social responsibility that the industry tries to project (Salas 2008).

Although some of its elements were subsequently curtailed by other laws protecting foreign investment and the mining sector in particular,³⁷⁰ the Environmental Code has helped to focus attention on contamination by mining companies, so that the ways in which they handle

³⁶⁹ Comunicado de Hugo Blanco Galdós, Archivo Documental de la FNTMSSP, Roll 6, XXIII Asamblea Nacional Ordinaria de Delegados, 1991. Hugo Blanco is a well-known figure in Peru. Born to middle-class but rural origins in Huanuco, Cuzco, he went to study in Argentina in the 1950s and became a Trotskyist. He then returned to Peru and became involved in the peasant struggle against the landlords in La Concepción, Cuzco, being elected president of the Provincial Peasant Federation at the height of the struggle that led to the first Agrarian Reform but also to his arrest in 1963. Imprisoned for several years, he was pardoned by Velasco in 1970 and then exiled, returning in the late 1970s as one of the most popular leaders of the Peruvian Left, and then serving in Congress throughout the 1980s and early 90s. Today he is an outspoken supporter of peasant movements against the mines, for example in the ongoing Conga conflict.

³⁷⁰ For example, the Framework Law for the Growth of Private Investment (*Ley Marco para el Crecimiento de la Inversión Privada*) and the Law for the Promotion of Investment in the Mining Sector (*Ley de Promoción e Inversiones en el Sector Minero*) (Távora 2000, 57).

their tailings, smoke emissions and other waste are subject to greater scrutiny than before. Companies have invested large sums of money to comply – to different degrees - with the environmental remediation plans (PAMAs) that they are now required by law to submit to the Ministry of Mines. At the same time, however, this new culture of environmental regulation has taken hold precisely at the time in which mining has been expanding massively in Peru, in both traditional mining areas and in new frontiers previously dedicated more exclusively to agriculture and herding. There has thus been a tension between the increased production of environmental pollutants, as a result of the growth of mining activity (often through open-pit methods), and the greater emphasis placed on their containment and dilution. Environmental regulation and remediation has also encountered limits in the fact that EIAs and PAMAs are overseen not by an independent entity – even after the Ministry of the Environment was created in 2008 – but rather by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, historically committed to and linked with the mining industry.³⁷¹

The post-Environmental Code order has not eliminated mining-related contamination or made it an issue of the past; it has rather forced companies to contain their toxic by-products within more enclosed spaces or to find profitable uses for them. This development has been uneven; given the lax attitude of the government and the Ministry of Mines, much depends on the strength of local groups to pressure companies to reduce contamination. Such strength is most commonly found in the *comunidades campesinas*, as owners of the land, whether in the “new” mining areas, where they sometimes (though not always) oppose new mining projects, or in the “old” areas, where they usually demand compensation for environmental damage to their land, as well as rent payments for its use. In this sense, the fact that Cerro de Pasco is an urban space, with a multitude of individual owners of urban plots, rather than a *comunidad* with a socially recognized claim to land and a pre-established political organization, goes a long way

³⁷¹ Such limits take very concrete forms. One well-known example is that of La Oroya, where the company has been able to obtain extensions for the completion of its PAMA, and, when the government finally threatens to enforce its deadlines, the company mobilizes its workforce by threatening to close down and eliminate their jobs. Another example is the tendency of the Ministry of Mines to approve almost all EIAs presented by companies. Finally, there is the ability of companies like Volcan to acquire the assets of the old state mining company without acquiring any responsibility for its liabilities, in particular for the tailings and waste rock left behind, which are thus effectively excluded from the private companies' PAMAs.

towards explaining why even in the post-Environmental Code order the enforcement of environmental measures there has been so lax.

The emergence of “environment” as a category

The changes that have occurred in the last few decades both in regulation and in the prominence of environmental discourses and categories mean that, in the mining regions of the central highlands, there is a dual quality to environmental problems: there is something both old and new about them. They were known before, but did not seem to extend to as many domains; nor did they seem to have the central importance that they have today in local politics and economy. In the case of the contamination of the San Juan-Lake Junín-Mantaro hydrological system by residues from the Cerro de Pasco mine, the problem was well-known long before the Environmental Code; in the 1970s, its solution was included as a demand by the Federation of Workers of the state-owned mining company Centromín. However, one of my interviewees, Octavio Núñez³⁷², a former worker and union leader at the Morococha mine, claimed it was never a priority for the Federation, but simply a way to get the peasant communities on the side of the mineworkers:

We have considered that there should be sufficient communication between the mining workers and the peasant *comunidades*. We would go to the assemblies of the *comunidades* and say, ‘we as mining workers are demanding to the company that they purify the Mantaro River.’ That was our language, but it was an almost lyrical language. Why lyrical? Because we have not done anything, we have not demanded it with firmness, nor did we launch a strike so that the Cerro de Pasco Company would decontaminate the Mantaro River.

It is interesting to note that although here he speaks of the *comunidades* in third person, Núñez was himself from a *comunidad*. Years after leaving the mining company in the early 1990s, and after engaging in commercial activity in the city of Huancayo, Núñez became president of his own *comunidad* of origin, on the border of Lake Junín, and led protests over the contamination of the lake.

³⁷² This is a pseudonym. He preferred that I not use his real name.

Similarly, Ernestina Lázaro, a former leader of miners' wives' committees in Cerro de Pasco, argued that there was a lack of discussion of topics related to pollution and to the destruction of the city.

No, nothing, there was a total lack of knowledge about it in those days... The open pit was already growing, more and more each time, even the houses were already being demolished, but nobody, nobody said anything; not like now that we see that the environment [is talked about], so it's only now that with these problems they talk about the environment, when actually that's been going on for years now.

Lázaro's statement that "nobody said anything" as the open pit was growing should not be taken literally; we know from written sources as well as local memory that in the 1960s there actually was opposition to the growth of the open pit and the demolition of houses, churches and other buildings. These protests led the company to build a new section of the city, San Juan Pampa, to replace the old city that was rapidly being taken over by the pit. Lázaro's terms instead highlight the contrast between the role played by environmental and urban livelihood issues in local politics at the time and in the present, as well as the changes in the terms used to construct and label these problems.

Elsa Ojeda, the wife of a mining worker, provided a very different account when we discussed the differences in how environmental issues were discussed in the past vis-a-vis the present. Though she lived in Cerro de Pasco at the time of my research, she grew up in La Oroya, where her father was a worker in the company's smelting complex. She did not talk about a lack of knowledge of contamination; rather, people were aware of the problem, but the company did not act to solve it. This difference in her account may be due to the difference between Cerro and La Oroya – the latter location had been the site of a pollution-related conflict that had received much attention (the "smoke affair"). She emphasized the changes that had occurred since the implementation of the PAMAs in the 1990s and 2000s, as the Environmental Code had gone into effect. She thus emphasized not so much changes in categories and awareness but rather what she saw as actual modifications in environmental practice:

Yes, it was talked about, but they didn't pay attention. But now they do. The Doe Run company now for example wants the environment to be all green areas.³⁷³ Now they say

³⁷³ It is common for mining companies now to put up signs pointing to the "green zones" where they plant trees (often *quenuales*, small trees that grow at high altitude). These signs often include sayings such as "Let's take care

the company has a technology that no longer is like before, how it used to come out from the chimney in La Oroya, the smoke very thick. La Oroya would be all covered up but with fog, with that toxic gas that meant you couldn't walk, it stung. But now recently, I went to La Oroya the other week and you still feel it but only a bit, I mean your throat itches and everything, but it's not like before, not anymore.

On the other hand, Raúl Alejos, a schoolteacher who grew up in the Huarón mining camps and now lives in Cerro, was more like Ernestina Lázaro in emphasizing a change in awareness and in the categories used. In his case, he linked these changes to his own experience of leaving the camp and connecting to a wider world – of becoming aware of new things. In response to a question about how people got along with each other in the mining camp and in the nearby town, he said that:

There are a lot of things that in their time were not perceived. There is a truth [that says that] when you live there you do not take account of what is going on. But when you leave, you can perceive the problems that exist. For example, the contamination of the rivers, the expansion of the tailings, which for us were not noticeable, for us who live [there], but when you leave you notice that there is a certain backwardness, and certain conditions that are prejudicial to peasant families.

Question: When you lived there was there awareness of the contamination of the rivers, in Huarón?

Answer: I think not.

Question: Was it talked about in school?

Answer: It was not talked about, no. They didn't talk about it. It's only now that it has become popular (*boga*). And what's more, in spite of it being popular, the students are not prepared [on that topic], they only do it when they have to present a research project.

Mendoza's statement suggests the emergence of "the environment" as a subject of discussion and as a topic of study for students. Indeed, "environmental engineering" is now one of the careers offered, alongside mining engineering, at the Daniel Alcides Carrión National University (UNDAC) in Cerro de Pasco – traditionally a focal point for the educational aspirations of the area's young people, especially the children of mining workers. "The environment" (*medio ambiente*) and the adjective "environmental" (*ambiental*) have also become spheres of work, enterprise and economy. For example, one of the communal companies with

of the environment." Here "environment" (*medio ambiente*) is linked not to the effects of the company's productive activities, but rather to an unrelated act undertaken by the company for the benefit of the community – such as planting trees.

which I was acquainted during my research was engaged in putting up barriers around a tailings deposit in order to prevent herds (of sheep, llamas, etc.) from going too near the tailings and eating the grass around it. The communal company had in turn subcontracted this project to a smaller contractor who was a friend of mine. To him, this was an *obra ambiental* – in using the term *obra* (public works), generally used for construction projects, he was linking this type of “environmental” activity to the broader world of contractors, municipal budgets and mining rents distributed through the *canon minero*. Similarly, another communal company, with which I conducted brief fieldwork in the *comunidad* of Huayllay, had an acronym as its name (EMICONSATH). Spelled out, the acronym read “Huayllay Mining, Construction, Environmental Affairs and Transport Company.” “Environmental Affairs” thus becomes one more type of work into which the communal company can enter and thus secure jobs for its young people and some income for the community.

In this way, the category of the “environmental” becomes associated with the broader world of the modern. For example, I asked an older *comunero* of Huayllay – who worked many years in one of the mining companies and now splits his time between Huayllay and Lima, where he currently works - why the town had grown so much in the last few years since the start of the current mining boom. His answer was, “because of mining, of course. Because of the *canon*, royalties, environment [*medio ambiente*], all of that brings money.” For him, “environment” was just another one of the new terms and categories that, like the *canon minero* and royalties (*regalías*), had risen to prominence in the last few years and that “brought money” to the town.

Environmental pollution and health in Cerro de Pasco today

If environmental problems are both old and new, in that they have always been there but have acquired a new valence and political importance in recent years, this is particularly true in Cerro de Pasco, Peru’s most traditional mining city. In Appendix D I provide an overview of the available data and studies regarding mining-related contamination of the environment in the lakes, river and soil of the area surrounding Cerro de Pasco. In the national media, Cerro de Pasco has been identified with the problem of mining-related contamination, in particular since a

2008 law was passed demanding the city's relocation due to its polluted state and its gradual destruction by the open pit mine that sits in its midst. The relocation never occurred, and in fact it was eventually rejected as an option by local authorities, who were worried that such a plan would jeopardize the execution of *obras* (public works, without a large number of which no mayor can be politically successful today) in the present city. A state of "endless waiting" and "toxic uncertainty" (Auyero and Swistun 2009) has been produced by the constant deferral and uncertain prospects of the relocation as well as by the gradual, irregular and haphazard advance of the open pit.

As we have already seen, the Cerro de Pasco mine, located below and in the middle of the city, has been exploited since around 1630 (the date usually given by local tradition). After independence in 1824, the city continued producing silver, albeit with significant oscillations in volume. Silver declined in the world market at the end of the 19th century at the same time that demand for copper rose as a result of the Second Industrial Revolution. In 1902, Cerro's copper potential caught the interest of U.S. mining baron James B. Haggin, who raised capital from other well-known investors to found what would later become the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. Over the course of the 20th century, the CPC built a vast network of mines, concentrator plants and hydroelectric dams, as well as the refining complex at La Oroya, becoming the biggest mining company as well as the largest landowner in Peru. CPC built its strength initially on copper and, increasingly after the 1940s, on lead, zinc and silver. In 1974 the company's operations in central Peru were nationalized by the left-leaning military government of General Velasco, albeit with a compensation of net \$28.5 million (Dore 1988 171).³⁷⁴ The state company Centromín ran the aging mining complex until the 1990s, when it was re-privatized in a piecemeal fashion.

Whereas a U.S. company (Doe Run) bought the smelting complex of La Oroya and the Cobriza mine, the original mine at Cerro was purchased by the Volcan company, whose main

³⁷⁴ In addition to its mines in Peru, the CPC had been investing in industrial operations in the U.S., such as copper wire factories, since the 1950s. When in the late 1960s and early 1970s it began to foresee nationalization on the horizon, the company began diverting capital away from Peru and Chile and towards its U.S. assets. In 1976, the company's U.S. industrial, sales and construction operations, into which it had invested the compensation money, were bought by the Marmon Group, thereby doubling the latter company's size. In 2007, majority stock in the Marmon Group was in turn bought by Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway group.

stockholders were the Peruvian entrepreneur Roberto Letts Colmenares and the Dutch commodity trading group Trafigura. In the context of the rise in metal prices that began in 2003, as a result of the strong demand from a growing China, the Cerro mine made Letts one of the richest men in Peru, worth around \$1.5 billion at the time of his death in 2010.³⁷⁵ The production of risk and environmental hazards in Cerro is thus intertwined not only with the production of wages, rents and economic activity in the local sphere, but also in very specific ways with processes of accumulation at the national and international levels.

Today, Volcan's mining complex at Cerro is composed of both the underground mine, worked since the 1600s but expanded through the 20th century, and the large open pit whose exploitation began in the 1950s.³⁷⁶ The current underground workings have grown out of the consolidation of what were originally multiple mines, around which the city was built in a haphazard fashion. The tunnels are thus directly underneath the urban population, and it is not unheard of for cave-ins to occur.³⁷⁷ The methods used to mine the ore include both cut-and-fill and room-and-pillar. The open-pit mine, on the other hand, occupies the center of the city. Though no longer the largest open-pit mine in Peru, it was one of the first of its kind in the country. In 2006 it measured 1800 by 1100 meters, and was almost 400 meters deep; the stripping ratio in 2005 was 3.41 to 1.³⁷⁸ Though employing fewer workers than the underground mine, it produces a greater quantity of ore; in 2005 it accounted for 66.79% of the total mineral processed.³⁷⁹ Since the 1950s, the expansion of the open pit has progressively destroyed most of the old city as well as other neighborhoods. Some of the monuments and landmarks from the old city were transferred to the new areas, others had replicas take their place. In 1997 an agreement

³⁷⁵ For this latter figure, see press accounts from the time of Letts' passing, for example http://www.poder360.com/article_detail.php?id_article=4130&pag=2. It should be noted that Cerro de Pasco was Letts' largest mine, and that his standing within the Peruvian business community grew significantly in the years after its acquisition in 1999, and especially since the rise in metal prices experienced in the last decade.

³⁷⁶ The modern pit grew out of smaller pits dug at least since the 19th century, but these were very modest compared to the operations that began in the 1950s. At that time the new open mine was called "McCune Pit," after the U.S. mining engineer who first explored the Cerro deposit for James B. Haggin in 1902; it is now known as Tajo Raul Rojas, after a Peruvian engineer who died during a flooding of the mine.

³⁷⁷ One such incident occurred during my stay. The underground mine is composed of many different levels, of which levels 400 through 1800 were in exploitation in 2006. This information and the quantitative data in this paragraph come from Volcan's Closure Plan of August 2006, prepared by CESEL S.A. The information is thus from that year.

³⁷⁸ For the stripping ratio, see Closure Plan, Chapter 2, 15. This is the ratio of rock discarded to that processed in the Concentrating Plant.

³⁷⁹ Closure Plan, 2.2.2

was signed between the municipality and the state company that ran the mine at the time, agreeing to a further expansion that promised to be the last, and which demolished two neighborhoods. Nevertheless, this agreement was forgotten after privatization and the change in ownership in 1999. Thus, at the time of my fieldwork Volcan was beginning work on “Plan L,” an expansion plan supposed to enlarge the pit over one of the last remaining areas of the old city, though this plan has since been put on temporary hold.



Figure 9 - Cerro de Pasco Open Pit, with Paragsha, José Carlos Mariátegui and San Juan neighborhoods in the back. Photograph by author, 2009.

Within the matrix determined both by the visible signs of contamination in the city and by the rise of environmental consciousness at both the national and international levels, the phrase “lead in blood” occupies a privileged place. This is in spite of the fact that lead is only one amongst several polluting metals in the city. The place of lead in local discussions of

contamination was evident to me on my first visit to the city, in 2008, when a painted political advertisement included the phrase “No more lead children!” (*no más niños plomo*) under its candidate’s name. On one of the cement panels that ring the open pit, someone had spray-painted “Avoid lead in blood... Wash your hands” – apparently a parody of the mining company’s argument that the problem was the result of inadequate hygiene. Similarly, when people knew I was a researcher, they often assumed that I was there to study contamination and in particular the lead issue. One time, during an afternoon conversation at a restaurant, someone in the group I was with asked what I was studying, and before I could answer one of them interrupted: “Lead in blood? Lead in blood right?”

Lead is, of course, one of the three main metals produced in Cerro, along with zinc and silver. Volcan, the company that owns the mine, is the number one producer of lead in Peru, thanks to both Cerro and its underground mine at Ticlio in Junín department.³⁸⁰ Lead has been produced in large quantities in Cerro since the 1940s; it has been sold for industrial purposes abroad, and today its foremost use is in the manufacture of car batteries (Kesler 1994, 218), as well as solder, cable sheathing, ammunition, glazes and plumbing fittings (WHO 2003, 1). Lead was formerly (and notoriously) used in fuels, but this has been phased out in most of the world.

Lead’s privileged place among the metals accused of being a contaminant, in public discourse in Cerro, is due to its worldwide notoriety as a pollutant. Unlike zinc, its frequent companion within ore deposits, lead is not needed for nutrition or any other known biological function in humans, and is a known environmental hazard (Kesler 1994, 214). Concerns over contamination from lead pipes and lead paint have prompted legislative action in industrialized countries, as when the United States banned the use of lead paint in homes in 1977. As the World Health Organization states, lead is “a cumulative general poison:” the known effects of chronic lead exposure on the health of humans include muscle weakness, disturbances in mood, lower scores on psychometric tests, and symptoms of neuropathy; acute intoxication can cause headaches, muscle tremors, abdominal cramps, kidney damage, hallucinations, and encephalopathy (WHO 2003, 5). Pregnant women, infants and children at 6, as well as fetuses, are particularly vulnerable.

³⁸⁰ Volcan Annual Report, 2008, p.96.

It is thus not surprising that lead has been singled out in discussions of environmental pollution in Peru, as in other places. The metal has also gained notoriety in the country through the case of La Oroya, the city that houses the large smelting complex built by the CPC in 1924 and which still today processes the concentrates from Cerro and other mines.³⁸¹ In Cerro itself, measurements of the population's blood lead levels began to be done in the 1990s; until then, studies of the effects of pollutants had largely been limited to mining workers, within an industrial safety framework rather than one of public health. By the time I arrived in the city, studies had been conducted by both the National and Regional Health Offices (DIGESA and DIRESA) and, in 2007, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In some parts of the city health workers were giving calcium supplements to children with high lead levels, to counteract the effect of the metal on calcium absorption in infants. People in certain neighborhoods had become accustomed to nurses and other health workers coming to take samples of their blood and to hearing talk of lead over the radio.

In particular, one set of cases from 2006 had served to raise the profile of lead contamination in the city. Several children from two neighboring families had shown lead measurements that were much higher than those of the rest of the city's young population, most of which tended to show chronic rather than acute levels. These two families lived in a section of the *asentamiento humano*³⁸² of Columna Pasco, apparently near an abandoned mine chimney or shaft that contained large amounts of lead; the children had become contaminated in this way, and some of them had lead levels that could be described as acute contamination. One of them, Thais Palma Carhuaricra, had an extremely high level of 120 ug/dL and, according to both her family and the local health officials I spoke with, as well as available documentation, had already suffered convulsions and neuropathy. Her case had received attention in the city and had even appeared in some national media. When she was five years old, in 2009 (while I was in Cerro), a

³⁸¹ In 2002, a well-publicized study by the Ministry of Health's Environmental Health Division (DIGESA), which monitored the blood lead levels in 346 children in La Oroya, found that 99.1% of the children had levels above the acceptable maximum of 10 ug/dL.

³⁸² This is the term used in Peru to refer to the new, self-built neighborhoods that grew up in the outskirts of urban areas during the period of population growth and migration to the cities in the second half of the 20th century. Columna Pasco arose in the 1970s and 80s is one of the largest such neighborhoods in Cerro de Pasco.

fundraiser was conducted over the local radio stations to raise funds for her to travel to Cuba for treatment.³⁸³

At the time, people in Cerro were aware that they and their children might be contaminated, but they were uncertain about the precise nature of the pollution and its effects. Some individuals I encountered saw signs of illness in their families, and they wondered whether it was linked to lead or other forms of contamination, or whether it was an unrelated sickness. I knew of at least one *mesa* (ritual offering) placed specifically for a child with high blood lead level results who was having health problems that seemed to impair her learning.

The recent foregrounding of environmental topics is not only due to influence from outside, but also to the visibility of contamination within the city – the waste ore, tailings, chimneys, the proximity between the open pit and the houses, etc. Yet these visible manifestations do not necessarily make clear the exact nature of the hazards, their degree of intensity and whether there is any method for preventing them. Other signs, such as rashes on the skin or pains in the body, are even more uncertain – are they due to contamination from the mine, or to other causes? These types of questions produce confusion not only in the researcher; they also underlie much of the uncertainty among city residents themselves. As Auyero and Swistun write, anthropology tends to concern itself more with what people know rather than what they don't know. Yet, in contaminated places such as Cerro and the Argentine shantytown of Villa Inflamable, which they study, we must ask the question: “How can local residents not be mystified if even local doctors are confused and/or wrong about the sources of suffering?” (Auyero and Swistun 2009, 105). People's uncertainty about the sources, effects and intensity of contamination is intensified by both the relative opaqueness of hidden hazards in themselves, and by the “labor of confusion” (Ibid., 19) of state and corporate officials (see next section).

In the some of the neighborhoods nearest the mine and the mineral waste deposits, like Paragsha, Champamarca and Quiulacocha, a handful of studies have been conducted in which residents and their children have offered up their blood to be tested for lead. In some cases, people received their results and can recite them by heart, in phrases like “my child has 16.75 of

³⁸³ Cuban medicine is highly regarded in Peru; cures promoted as *medicina cubana* are sometimes sold in the fairs in both Cerro and Huayllay.

lead.” In others, people either complained of not receiving the results or doubted their accuracy, sometimes alleging the dishonesty of corrupt health officials supposedly bribed by the mining company. Compared to other types of evidence, blood lead measurements carry more symbolic weight, but they are also more controlled by “experts.” Furthermore, people rarely received explanations about the meanings of these numbers, or about topics such as the difference between acute and chronic lead contamination.

Given this lack of information, residents of the city often oscillated between two extremes. On the one hand, people sometimes interpreted contamination by metal particles through a framework derived from infectious disease – as if the “disease of lead in blood” (*la enfermedad del plomo en sangre*), as it is sometimes called, could have sudden and catastrophic effects that would be visible and spread around the whole city in a homogenous way, rather than the long-term and often invisible impact of chronic contamination with heavy metals. On the other hand, other people seemed unconcerned or accepting of the level of contamination, or at least unwilling to leave the city in order to avoid the hazard. This second response is probably more common, and it makes sense if one contextualizes it within in the city’s mining history. Although the accumulation of waste ore and tailings has certainly increased in recent decades, these have been around for a long time, if in smaller quantities. More importantly, families with a history of mining have obviously long been aware of the dangers associated with the industry, even if they were conceptualized more in terms of work accidents or occupational illnesses such as silicosis, rather than the current preoccupation over childhood lead contamination. Risk has always been a part of mining work and had to be accepted in order to be able to work and support a family. Thus, side by side with people who argue that “we are all contaminated,” many individuals express skepticism over whether lead is really harmful at all.

This attitude of acceptance often leads to the perception, especially on the part of health officials, that people simply do not care about the problem, or that they will feign to care only in order to be eligible for some form of compensation. One local health official told me that people suffered from a “lack of conscience” (*inconciencia*) when it came to following their guidelines for preventing lead contamination. Echoing company arguments about the cause of the lead problem, she complained that people neglected to wash their hands or to teach their children how

to do so (though she quickly recognized that this might be hard to do given that the city is without running water for most of the day).

Another health worker, whom I will call Ester - a nurse who has been involved in the local health office's campaign to identify contaminated neighborhoods and educate people about prevention – also echoed common company arguments that place the blame on the way people live their lives. She complained that people don't know how to wash their hands or use the bathroom, that they use old plates and utensils that may contain lead, that in order to save money they paint their houses with low-cost paint which comes in a bag and supposedly contains lead. Ester and her team had been giving calcium supplement tablets to children with lead levels above the accepted 10 ug/dL threshold, since lead tends to limit the absorption of calcium in children. Mothers would bring their children for this treatment once and then not return again. Moreover, she complained, when people came from the countryside to sell milk in the month of August, mothers would buy milk but not to give it to their children, as they should. Rather, they would give the milk to the sheep they kept in their yard, to strengthen them and prevent them from dying during the time of the frost. Finally, she blamed the lead problem on fathers having children with more than one woman and then letting the children run unsupervised, playing in lead-contaminated areas. All of these arguments, of course, not only echo current company allegations as to where the blame lies, but also are part of a long tradition of pathologizing the lives of working-class people and the way they live. On the other hand, Ester said, she felt like health officials like herself were caught “between two fronts:” the company wanted them to blame the population's lifestyle, and the people wanted them to place all the blame on the company.

In Appendix E I provide an analysis of the available data on blood lead measurements from Cerro de Pasco that I have been able to find. Although I am not an expert on issues of public health, and although the data is sparse, my general sense is that there is a generalized phenomenon of chronic lead contamination among children in the neighborhoods closest to the open pit, the waste ore deposits and other foci of contamination. The concept of “chronic” as opposed to “acute” contamination refers to the idea that there are likely harmful effects at work, but that these are manifested in the long term (for example, in lower learning abilities) rather

than through immediate, severe illness or death. Summarizing the data from the three different studies discussed in Appendix E (a 2005 Health Ministry study, a study by the Atlanta-based CDC and Bianchini (2009)), we see that they report different averages for blood lead levels among children in different city neighborhoods: 15.79, 10.5 and 8.257 ug/dL, respectively. Just as important as the averages are the ranges: 6.17 to 34.53, 1.8 to 64.0, and 2.61 to 23.25 ug/dL. However, although most of these figures fall into the “chronic” rather than “acute” category, some of the levels are high enough to be considered “severe” – such as two children above 60 ug/dL (Conklin 2008, Tables 6 and 7), and 21 children between 20 and 44 ug/dL (Ibid., Table 9), according to the CDC study. In addition, there are also a few cases of “acute” lead contamination in the city, such as that of Thais Palma mentioned above. Again, it is important to remark the distinction between “chronic,” “severe” and “acute” is a technical one – all of these levels are harmful, as discussed below.

If we compare the levels in Cerro in 2005-2008 with those of La Oroya in 1999 (Cerdestav and Barandiarán, 2002, 29-30), before the most recent clean-up efforts in that city, we find that the levels in Cerro are somewhat lower. In the last decade, however, certain improvements have been made to the La Oroya foundry as part of the Environmental Remediation Program (PAMA) required by the national governments well as programs to reduce lead intoxication in children (Wilson 2008); it is possible that these may have resulted in lower blood lead levels in La Oroya today.³⁸⁴

On the other hand, the levels in Cerro are higher than the average for the United States today. Since 1999, the average level in the U.S. has been about 2.2 ug/dL (CDC 2005, 3). This low U.S. level came only after the massive process of de-leading that took place in the 1970s and 80s as a result of decades of activism and public concern over lead poisoning. As Warren (2000) has detailed, although occasional lead poisoning has accompanied humanity since antiquity, for the United States the 20th century entailed a “saturnine binge” (Warren 2000, 258) in the form of the near-universal use of white lead paint and leaded gasoline, as well as other products.

³⁸⁴ The government began requiring companies to institute PAMAs in the 1990s. In the case of La Oroya, the PAMA began under the old state mining company in 1996 and continued when the metallurgical complex was acquired by the U.S. company Doe Run in 1997. On the company’s request, the PAMA’s initial 10-year span for completion was extended to 13 years (Wilson 2008, 3), but even after 2009 it had still not been fully completed and remained a source of public controversy in Peru.

Incidentally, a good portion of this lead came from the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in Peru, including the company's original mine at Cerro itself – in 1952, the company claimed to be the largest producer of refined lead in all of South America.³⁸⁵

In the U.S., while white lead paint accounted for many cases of acute lead poisoning (above 70 or 80 ug/dL), often leading to irreversible brain damage and even fatality, leaded gasoline was the single agent most responsible for chronic lead contamination. This was signified by the fact that in 1965 the average U.S. resident's blood lead level was around 20 ug/dL (Ibid., 211). After this problem grabbed national attention in the 1970s, leaded gasoline was phased out over the next two decades; this had an immediate effect on measured blood lead levels. For example, between 1976 and 1980 they fell by 40%, from 14.6 to 9.2 ug/dL (Ibid., 222). Over the next decade, aggressive restrictions on these and other products brought further reductions; the drop in average blood lead levels between 1978 and 1994 is estimated at 78%, from 12.8 to 2.8 ug/dL (Ibid., 239).

Thus, lead contamination formed a crucial and visible part of the U.S. experience in the 20th century, particularly as awareness grew in the second half of the century. This is in part what accounts for lead's visibility in transnational public health discourses and in places like Cerro de Pasco and La Oroya today. As Beck (1987) argues, "risks of modernization sooner or later also strike those who produce or profit from them" (Beck 1987, 23). In other words, issues of risk are different from issues of class in that they can sometimes affect the rich as much as the poor, or the industrialized countries as much as the developing world. This is not always the case, especially within countries, as environmental justice activists have noted. But comparing across countries and continents, more industrialized societies can sometimes suffer the effects of pollutants as much as if not more than less developed countries, for the former are more dependent on industrial products. Thus, the experience of lead contamination is shared by the place that produced the metal (Cerro de Pasco and Central Peru more generally) and by the country that consumed it (the United States).

³⁸⁵ Cerro Corporation Archive, "General Information," January 7, 1952. In 1962, the company calculated that since 1906 it had produced 2,803,820,707 pounds of lead (Cerro Corporation Archive, 106_1718, "Reply of October 30, 1963 to Questionnaire on Resources Survey for Latin American Countries)."

Yet as knowledge of the effects of lead have increased, risks from lead have been reduced in the U.S., but not so (or not as much) in Cerro. Whereas in the U.S. the primary vehicles for lead contamination were white lead paint and leaded gasoline, it is unlikely that this is what is causing harmful lead levels in Cerro today, as documented in the 2005-2008 data. The phasing out of leaded gasoline in Peru was officially completed in 2004, and in any case the number of cars in Cerro is much lower than anywhere in the U.S.³⁸⁶ White paint is not widely used, either. Rather, spatial data from the CDC (Conklin et al. 2008) and from Van Green et al. (2012) support the idea that the main sources of chronic lead contamination in Cerro are the waste ore deposits that lie on the city's northern and western sides.

Discussions of blood lead measurements often focus on the issue of whether a person is above or below the internationally accepted threshold, namely the CDC's "level of concern." At the time of my research this was 10 ug/dL (i.e. 10 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood). Yet such numeric guidelines should not be essentialized or treated as fixed – they are historically changing constructions, elaborated in dialogue with changing scientific evidence. As Warren has shown, the idea of "threshold limit values" or "maximum allowable concentrations" originally comes from the fields of industrial safety and hygiene in the U.S., where successful campaigns against fatal lead poisoning were waged in the 1920s and 30s. It was this industrial background of fatal lead-poisoning accidents that initially set the standard for ideas of what was a permissible concentration of lead in the blood. In the 1970s, the U.S. lead industry still saw 80 ug/dL of blood as a safe threshold limit value for workers (Warren 2000, 248). In the mid-century, such threshold values permeated the more general public discussions on the effect of lead on public health.

As childhood lead poisoning became a public issue in the 1950s and 60s, and as evidence of the full extent of lead contamination of the environment began to be published, these thresholds began to be revised. Thus, between 1960 and 1990 the blood lead level for individual intervention in young children was lowered from 60 to 25 ug/dL (CDC 2005, 2). In the 1970s, the work of scientists such as J. Julian Chisolm and Herbert Needleman brought attention to the

³⁸⁶ For the date of the Peru phase out, see the data from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP): <http://www.unep.org/pcfv/PDF/MatrixLACLeadjul06.pdf>.

long-term health effects of lead exposure even when it was asymptomatic, thus helping in “the reconstitution of childhood lead exposure as a pandemic thief of intelligence” (Warren 2000, 236) rather than only as a cause of fatality in more extreme cases. In 1991, the CDC further revised its “intervention level” of 25 ug/dL downward to 10 ug/dL.³⁸⁷ At the same time, the very notion of a “safe” threshold came to be questioned, as evidence continued to surface of the health effects of blood lead concentrations below 10 ug/dL, particularly on children’s IQ.³⁸⁸ Thus, in its 2005 public policy document on the issue the CDC stated that “Although there is evidence of adverse health effects in children with blood lead levels below 10 ug/dL, CDC has not changed its level of concern, which remains at levels ≥ 10 ug/dL... If no threshold level exists for adverse health effects, setting a new BLL of concern somewhere below 10 ug/dL would be based on an arbitrary decision” (CDC 2005, ix). Further, it argued,

The concept of a threshold existing for the population makes little sense toxicologically since even if individual thresholds exist, these are likely to vary. Nonetheless, the threshold concept plays a major role in regulatory toxicology, and it only becomes clear in cases like lead that such constructs can be highly problematic (CDC 2005, 6).

Although in 2005 the CDC still believed that revising the 10 ug/dL threshold downward would be “arbitrary,” in 2012 it changed course and decided to set a new “reference value” of 5 ug/dL. This calls into question the assumption that seemed to permeate public discussions of the lead issue in Cerro in 2008-2009, namely that there was a sharp break in terms of harm and health effects between those directly above and those directly below the old 10 ug/dL threshold.

The focus on lead in Cerro de Pasco furthermore marginalized other, possibly harmful metals from the discussion. Arsenic, for example, is present in the environment, particularly around the abandoned Quiulacocha tailings pond, which sits between the urban neighborhood of Champamarca and the village of Quiulacocha. The data for these other metals is even sparser than that for lead. In his measurements in the neighborhood of Paragsha, Bianchini (2009) found several metals at levels of concern: arsenic, chromium, nickel and aluminum. These were all

³⁸⁷ “The scientific evidence showing that some adverse effects occur at blood lead levels at least as low as 10 ug/dL in children has become so overwhelming and compelling that it must be a major force in determining how we approach childhood lead exposure” (CDC 1991, 9).

³⁸⁸ Robert Taylor, of the LEAD Group in Australia, has compiled a list of sources on the effects of blood lead levels above 2 and below 10 ug/dL in children:

http://www.lead.org.au/fs/Dangers_of_BPb_Level_Above_2ug_children_20101202.pdf.

above allowed limits (see Appendix E). Similarly, the CDC study found somewhat elevated levels of cesium and thallium (Conklin 2008).

Environmental pollution and its impacts on health were not solely topics that arose in discussions among health officials and local residents; they also attracted attention from outside visitors. During part of the time I was in Cerro, a film crew was making a documentary about pollution in the city, as it had done in a previous film on La Oroya, focusing especially on the lead problem; the film was subsequently screened at various film festivals. Furthermore, in 2008 the well-known TV program *Cuarto Poder* had done an extensive report on the contamination and destruction of the city and its possible relocation.

However, there was a particular visual economy that sometimes characterized interactions between local residents and outsiders interested in the effects of contamination. Here I will give two examples of this. In June 2009, during the course of my research, I was asked to serve as a guide and translator to two European journalists who were going to visit Cerro de Pasco. Informed by a friend about the contaminated state of the city and its expected relocation, they had come to gather material for an article, before heading to the Peruvian Amazon to take pictures of wildlife as part of other journalistic work. We spent the day walking through the city, as they met city residents and representatives of various organizations. The journalists explained to me that since pictures “speak louder than words,” they were especially interested in taking photographs, if possible of the effects of contamination on individuals. At one point, we headed to Quiulacocha, a small village located on the outskirts of the city and locally notorious as a particularly contaminated space within the Cerro de Pasco area. There we met a group of women gathered outside, who told the journalists about the widespread pollution. One in particular responded to their interest in visible marks by explaining that her husband was suffering from a skin rash induced by the chemicals in the water. The photographer in the pair asked if it would be possible to take a picture, to which she replied that her husband was away at work, but that we could find him in the evening. The photographer, worn out from the effects of altitude sickness and a long day’s walk, was reluctant to make the trip again, and requested that I ask her if the rash was big, so as to know whether, as he put it, it was worth coming back for.

When we returned that evening, after dark, the husband took his shirt off to show his back where the rash was supposed to be, as the photographer clicked away with his camera. Afterwards we said goodbye, I went on with my research, and the two journalists went off to the Amazon and from there back to Europe. Although I do not think that the two journalists were particularly unethical people, the interaction felt voyeuristic. What I want to highlight about this encounter is the particular visual economy it encapsulates as well as the broader economy of suffering in which environmental pollution both takes a central stage in the public imagination and also does so only in very particular ways. The husband and wife were acting within a standardized frame of highlighting the effects of contamination to outsiders for whom this topic currently seems to be of greater interest than others. At the same time, environmental suffering must present itself as visible marks on bodies or lived spaces. Furthermore, the marks must be sufficiently spectacular to sustain outsiders' attention – to be, as the photographer put it, “worth it.”

A similar interaction had taken place a couple of months earlier. The initial encounter had come about while I was sitting inside one of the cramped cars that make the journey from the center of the city to the nearby villages of Quiulacocha, Yurajhuanca and Rancas. I made a comment about lead to my travel companion, and that prompted one of the other people in the car, a middle-aged woman whom I will call Inés, to begin telling us about her family's experience with contamination and lead. She told me that her daughter was very ill and could not walk, “because of the lead;” other children of hers were suffering different ailments. Like the couple mentioned above, Inés lived in Quiulacocha, and her house was practically a stone's throw away from the edge of the Quiulacocha tailings deposit. Her father had worked for the U.S. mining company, and she had grown up next door in a workers' camp that was later dismantled to make way for the tailings. The house she lived in now had belonged to her grandparents, who were also from the community.

Like other people I spoke to, Inés spoke of vague hopes that she would receive some sort of compensation from the authorities or the mining company – maybe a house farther away from the tailings. However, she also told me she was in the process of obtaining support to travel to Lima with her daughter and from there to Cuba, where she would be healed. I visited Inés a few

weeks later, when I was with a pair of foreign visitors (different from the ones in the other encounter) who were trying to document the ruinous state of the city and its contaminated population. I thought Inés might provide some good insight from the perspective of a local resident, and so took the visitors to her house to do an interview. To my surprise, she brought out her daughter, who looked to be around eight years old, and carried her in her arms to a chair on the side of the house, as my companions took photos of her smiling, her clearly debilitated or non-functioning legs slanted to one side, against the orange background of the tailings and the waste ore behind. Again, I was struck by the voyeuristic tone of the encounter, and after these two occasions I decided to be more cautious when mediating such interactions that are based around “the presentation of the contaminated and damaged self” (Auyero and Swistun 13) for outsiders.

However, these incidents also helped me to understand the particular qualities that the discourse on contamination assumes in such interactions. Auyero and Swistun write that, for the case of Villa Inflamable in Argentina, “two years and a half of intensive fieldwork convinced us that most of the ‘pollution critical talk’... is, to a large extent, an artifact of outsiders’ incursions” (82). By this they do not mean that people’s critiques of pollution are “invented” out of thin air at the moment when journalists, researchers or state officials show up, but simply that these are times when a lot more of such talk is produced. In “contaminated communities” (Edelstein 2003) such as Villa Inflamable and Cerro de Pasco, encounters between local residents and outsiders – whether they be environmental activists, journalists or health officials – take on certain standardized qualities. People talk to visitors about pollution both because it is something they are confused about – even if it is not the only or necessarily the uppermost thing on their minds – and because it is one of the few things that outsiders are interested in and will listen to. Discussions of lead contamination with outsiders can also take a light-hearted tone; a common joke with visitors is that whoever comes to visit Cerro and surroundings takes a bit of lead in their blood with them.

Corporate response

Benson and Kirsch (2010) argue that “the defining feature of contemporary capitalism is the corporate response to critique” (p.474). How does the Volcan Mining Company respond to

the ubiquitous talk of contamination on the radio, at public events and in interactions between locals and visitors? In late 2008, Teódulo Quispe Huertas, at the time Operations Manager for Volcan's Cerro de Pasco unit, gave a speech defending the company in relation to the much-discussed "lead-in-blood" problem. Unlike the company's Director and main shareholder at the time (Roberto Letts Colmenares) and most of its Board of Directors, Operations Manager Quispe was from the local area, and was a charismatic, combative and well-known figure in the city. He had worked for both the old state-owned mining company and the nearby Milpo mine, before becoming head of Operations at Volcan's Cerro unit in 2006.

A group of local journalists seeking to denounce the company edited a small part of Quispe's speech, so that one particularly insensitive turn of phrase was heard over and over again: "The issue of contamination by lead is due to the lack of hygiene." In Peru, radio is a particularly powerful medium, since it is usually turned on not only at home and at work but also in buses (passenger vans or *combis* in this case), stores and other public places. In Cerro, the radio ad with Quispe's speech fragment was heard repeatedly. Volcan issued a response ad, which was also broadcast extensively, and which argued the following:

The edited fragments, taken out of context, of the declarations by Ing. (Engineer) Teódulo Quispe Huertas, have been distorted, and aim to hurt the image of Volcan Mining Company and its Operations Manager. In what follows, [we play] the actual speech by Ing. Teódulo Quispe Huertas.

The ad then played a longer fragment of Quispe's speech, which started by referencing the 2007 study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta:

We have conducted studies in Pasco, by the CDC Atlanta, from the United States, so as to do an honest, precise job, so as to not be deceived. I will speak about Chaupimarca, Ayapoto and Paragsha. There we can observe a low level, of less than 10 micrograms per deciliter, in women: 192 [individuals], which is equivalent to 90.6%. Among children, 162 [individuals], which is equivalent to 47%. Therefore, to be brief, the issue of contamination by lead, is due to the lack of hygiene. The lack of intuition [*intuición*, in the sense of having the intuition to wash one's hands]. That is where all of us must pay attention, so as to solve the problem.

Quispe's speech, and its reiteration in the form of the company ad, provides a window into some of the rhetorical strategies that the company uses in its defense within the public sphere in the city. The reality of the problem of contamination is not denied outright, rather it is

acknowledged but addressed in two main ways – one is to minimize it, the other to deflect responsibility. First, Quispe selectively quotes from the CDC report. This study, which will be discussed in more depth in the next section, actually argues that there is a problem of “generalized contamination with lead in Chaupimarca, Paragsha and Ayapoto” (Conklin, 16, my translation), and also highlights a problematic level of two other lesser-known heavy metals – cesium and thallium. Rather than mention this, Quispe highlights the high percentage of women in fertile age who have blood lead levels below the 10 µg threshold. When referring to children, who are the population particularly at risk for lead contamination, he again mentions the percentage who are within the threshold, but does not seem to realize that by mentioning the 47% figure he is actually acknowledging that a majority – 53% - have levels above that considered “safe.”

In the next sentence, he switches from a strategy of denying the significance of the problem to one of acknowledging it but placing the blame on a lack of hygiene by the population. He is referring to an argument commonly voiced by the company – and parodied by the graffiti quoted in the previous section – that the “lead problem” is due to people not washing their hands. As Warren (2000) discusses in his social history of lead poisoning in the U.S., there is a tradition of blaming the victim that was similarly at play in the early years of awareness of childhood poisoning with lead paint in the United States, when “cultural assumptions about the poor shifted blame from the toxin to the victim.” As one paint industry representative told a Pennsylvania health advisory group in 1972, referring to inner-city parents who supposedly were absent from home while their children ate the lead paint off the walls, “parental neglect is the root of the problem” (Warren, p. 185). What the CDC report actually states is that while unwashed hands could be one source of exposure to heavy metals, the relative weight of this medium cannot be adequately evaluated “due to existence of multiple routes of exposure through contact with the air, soil, water or contaminated foods.” (Conklin, 16, my translation).

The radio ad then cuts to an announcer’s voice extending the arguments made by the Operations Manager:

Volcan has never denied the collateral effects that mining generates in the environment, but has also made it clear that the levels [of metals in blood, as well as other health and environmental indicators] claimed by certain interested parties, are not what they claim.

All human activity generates collateral impact on the environment. The important thing is that it be mitigated, as modern mining [*minería moderna*] does today. As Volcan does in Cerro de Pasco.

Here the company attempts to establish a link between itself and the concept of *minería moderna* (Salas 2008, Damonte 2006), a discourse utilized by the mining industry to describe the new era of mining investments that began in the 1990s, a period marked both by an expanded scale of capital-intensity and by the new prominence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Ironically, as an “old” mine, Cerro de Pasco is not usually considered part of “modern mining,” and several officials from other mines whom I interviewed actually cited it as a paradigm of the opposite of responsible mining. In any case, the ad then goes on to argue that “the cases of contamination with lead in blood detected in Cerro de Pasco do not correspond to the zone of operations of Volcan.” This may seem odd given that the three neighborhoods mentioned in Quispe’s speech – Paragsha, Ayapoto and Chaupimarca (centro) – all border the open pit; Paragsha is actually where the company’s offices and two concentrator plants are located, and Ayapoto is a tiny neighborhood sandwiched between the pit and the company’s mineral stockpiles. It may be that this passage is referencing not the three neighborhoods from the CDC study but rather individual, high-profile cases like that of Thais Palma mentioned earlier, who was from Columna Pasco. This is a neighborhood more distant from the waste ore, stockpiles and concentrator plants, but which borders a smaller, long-abandoned pit that is also owned by Volcan and that is now in the process of being incorporated into the large open pit;³⁸⁹ Noemí’s father’s complaint was about a ventilation chimney, which the company may not count as part of its “zone of operations.” More generally, the statement in the radio ad may also reflect the company’s tendency to define its area of legitimate responsibility as narrowly as possible. This tendency is seen in the fact that the environmental wastes left behind by the former U.S. corporation and the state mining company – such as the Quiulacocha tailings deposit and the Excelsior waste ore pile – did not pass into the scope of Volcan’s operations during the privatization process in the 1990s. The assets were privatized, not so the liabilities, which today are never included in any of Volcan’s environmental management programs or maps of its operations, even though they are adjacent to the mine.

³⁸⁹ In 2009, dozens of houses in Columna Pasco were being bought and demolished by the company in order to make way for this expansion project.

Finally, the ad then makes an argument that acknowledges contamination, but delinks it from mining activity altogether and instead presents it as the result of age-old, non-human natural processes:

And it is public knowledge that the soils of our city, where our children play, are mineralized. Not because of mining activity, but rather since millions of years ago, because of its geomorphological formation. In the opinion of medical specialists, to live among soils like ours requires special precautions, such as adequate hygiene, to prevent contact between minerals and our organism, as well as adequate nutrition, so that our body has enough defenses.

Here, the company ad invokes the specter of a non-human, non-political nature working silently over millions of years to produce a soil rich in minerals that then find their way into residents' bloodstream, without the mediation of any corporation or other social actor that can be held accountable. Of course, the company is right that long-term geological processes did produce an unusually high concentration of silver, copper, lead, zinc as well as other minerals in the area. This is what led to the founding of the city in the first place and what has propelled generations of migrants in search of work and economic opportunity to move to a place otherwise inhospitable to large concentrations of people. At the same time, the ad fails to mention that the rock and soil under the city have been almost continuously moved around for the past 380 years, and particularly in the last half-century since the initiation of open-pit operations. Rather than co-exist with an undisturbed, pre-human soil, residents of the city share their living quarters with large hills of waste ore particles freely exposed to the air and rain, with the twice-daily explosions from the open pit in the center of the city, and with the dust brought up from the mine in workers' clothes. As the CDC study and multiple volumes on environmental toxicology emphasize, there are usually multiple sources of exposure to contaminants, in this case metals. And as most of the literature argues, in the specific case of lead (unlike with arsenic), contamination is almost always the result of human activity: "Lead is unique in that man-made sources contribute almost solely to exposure in the post-industrial era." (Patrick, 2006, 4).

The purpose of this analysis is not so much to highlight the duplicitous nature of Volcan's discourse as to emphasize the multiple and varied arguments that the company uses in its approach to the issue of contamination. Rather than deny the problem outright, which would

be unrealistic given the visual landscape in Cerro, as well as the high profile of mining-related contamination worldwide, Volcan makes a token acknowledgement – “Volcan has never denied the collateral effects that mining generates in the environment.” At the same time, it downplays the problem not only by selectively quoting from the CDC study – and mentioning the 47% of children below threshold levels rather than the 53% above – but also by alluding to the specter of an unspecified sensationalism and exaggeration: “the levels... are not what they claim.” Further, the ad throws into the mix certain statements which are generally uncontroversial – such as that unwashed hands could conceivably be one source of ingestion of metals into the body, or that inadequate nutrition can worsen lead contamination in children, or that there are long-term geological processes specific to a mineral-rich district like Cerro – and uses them for particular ends, in the latter case arguing that there is no human mediation that takes place between geological processes and human health. At other times, the statements switch from a descriptive mode to a normative one, such as arguing that “the important thing is that [contamination] be mitigated” - without giving concrete evidence as to whether or how this occurs to a sufficient degree in Cerro.

These varied strategies do not necessarily add up to a logically coherent whole, and in fact in a strict sense some of them could be seen as mutually contradictory – for example, saying that the presence of metals in the city is not due to mining activity, on the one hand, and acknowledging that mining activity generates a “collateral effect” on the environment, on the other. Rather, the overall rhetorical strategy is a more flexible one of closing off different avenues of critique at once by combining the questionable with the uncontroversial, the descriptive with the normative, denial with partial acknowledgement, and vagueness with specific (and selectively quoted) numerical figures. In this way, the company manages “critique in such a way that recognition of and discontent about harm are converted into structures of feeling that promote cynicism about the ability to alter social structures and makes resignation a dominant mode of political action” (Benson and Kirsch 2010, 474). Volcan Mining Company is not the only agent creating such structures of feeling, but the corporate response analyzed here is one way in which such management of critique happens. It is part of the “labor of confusion” (Auyero and Swistun 2009, 66) that also includes other factors such as the government’s vagueness on and lack of concern for the question of the city’s relocation. Such labor need not be

conscious or intentional; Volcan's ad is varied and vague enough in its arguments that company officials and employees can probably each find a specific part in which to believe.

Benson and Kirsch argue that corporate response to critique often goes through three main phases: denial, partial acknowledgement/token accommodation, and finally strategic engagement. Mining companies in Peru generally combine elements of all three phrases. Phase 1 is much more important at the level of the specific than at that of the general – in other words, the environmental impact of mining on the environment in general is usually not denied, but companies deny specific incidents. Phases 2 and 3 are both found in industry responses. In Cerro, however, the specific history and social configuration of the place determine that Phase 2 responses are more important than Phase 3 – that is, generic acknowledgements, vague statements and various forms of manipulation are more important than formal partnerships with institutions or mechanisms of negotiation, which do occur in other mining projects in Peru (whatever the co-opting effects of these forms of engagement may be).

It must be mentioned that there is one key factor that is missing from the radio advertisement and that is prominently included in Volcan's corporate response at other times: the question of jobs. The company's strongest argument, in the end, is the fact that it "provides" employment to a large portion of the city's workforce. There is little doubt that if the mine were to close, the city's economy would suffer a negative impact. Significant numbers of people would probably need to leave, affecting commerce and leading to even more departures. In 2008 and 2009, the company was using this fact to pressure the city government into accepting the open pit expansion project known as "Plan L," which was to demolish 11.5 hectares in some of the last remaining blocks of the old neighborhoods of the city. In January 2008, when the municipality suspended Plan L negotiations because the company had not yet presented the corresponding Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study, Volcan responded by mobilizing its workforce in a demonstration through the city. This is similar to tactics used by Doe Run Peru, the owner of the metallurgical complex at La Oroya, in response to criticisms over its inability to meet deadlines for the implementation of its Environmental Management Plan (PAMA) in recent years. At Doe Run, the mobilization of workers against environmental and health concerns has been a more recurrent phenomenon, however. Although I have not

conducted fieldwork in La Oroya, my sense is that there are at least two reasons for this. First, as a smelting rather than a mining city, La Oroya has different labor dynamics, and is more dependent on work at the company than Cerro is today. Second, the Doe Run smelter at La Oroya was actually under threat of closure from the government (for environmental violations) several times, which the mine in Cerro de Pasco has not been under such threats at any point. Nevertheless, although to a lesser degree than in La Oroya, in Cerro the strategy of pitting labor against environmental and health concerns is also sometimes utilized.

Hidden Hazards and Logics of Compensation

The new scrutiny placed on environmental problems is the result of a heightened awareness of risks and invisible hazards associated with modernity and industrial production – part of what Beck (1992) calls “risk society.” As Beck writes, “the focus is more and more on hazards which are neither visible nor perceptible to the victim” (Beck 1992, 27). Visible signs of contamination are still present in places like Cerro, in the form of waste ore mounds and the exposed tailings deposits. Similarly, in the two incidents recounted earlier in this section, local residents either were asked to or decided to show visible marks of contamination on their bodies. Yet beyond such visual practices, the contests over recognition and compensation are also about abstract, numeric indicators like blood lead levels. As Beck writes,

Hazards in those days assaulted the nose or the eyes and were thus perceptible to the senses, while the risks of civilization today typically escape perception and are localized in the sphere of physical and chemical formulas (e.g. toxins in foodstuff or the nuclear threat).” (Ibid., 21)

As the study of toxicology has progressed, awareness has grown among scientists that exposure to heavy metals and other substances at levels that were previously thought to be harmless, can actually produce cancer, reduce learning ability or cause birth defects.³⁹⁰ As Warren writes for lead exposure in the United States,

³⁹⁰ It should be mentioned that, according to the Regional Health Office (DIRESA), the second leading cause of mortality in Pasco Region in 2010, after acute respiratory infection, was stomach cancer (personal communication, and “Análisis de la Situación de Salud” (ASIS) 2011). According to the data in the ASIS report, for the highland area of Pasco only, stomach cancer accounted for 5.1% of deaths (p.73). I do not know how accurate these official ASIS figures are.

The great irony of this geometric rise in the population defined as at risk is that it occurred at a time when the average American's exposure to lead from all sources was beginning its fall to today's historic low. Changing technologies in paints, food preservation, and automotive fuels reduced the amount of bioavailable lead in the environment. But as the 'background' level of lead exposure dropped, researchers were able to identify the mineral's role in health problems at or below previous years' average blood-lead levels. Consequently, as Americans' exposure to lead dropped dramatically, their 'exposure' to the troubling issues of low-level lead absorption rose just as dramatically. (Warren 2000, 228)

Similarly, in Peru, at the same time that greater stringency has began to be placed on environmental remediation in mining areas, attention has shifted from a sole focus on immediate and visible effects – such as accidents, dead animals and lifeless rivers – and expanded to include long-term effects on health, for example on internal organs.

These consequences generally occur in the long run and are mixed with the effects of other factors, making it difficult to trace a direct connection in individual cases. As Beck writes about risks:

[They] induce systematic and often irreversible harm, generally remain invisible, are based on causal interpretations, and thus initially exist only in terms of the (scientific or antiscientific) knowledge about them. They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social definition and construction." (Beck 1992, 22-23).

Risks are thus both present everywhere and questioned everywhere – though they remain the province of "experts," they are subject to confirmation, exaggeration or denial on the part of different actors with varying amounts of power. This not only gives rise to "toxic uncertainty." Rather, the particular openness of risks to social construction – their often hidden, invisible and abstract nature - also gives them a flexibility that allows them to become a focal point of many different kinds of disputes. This fact in turn helps to make contamination an ever-present issue in demands and complaints in mining regions. Furthermore, this occurs in a context in which environmentalism enjoys relative prestige worldwide, compared to other causes. Since it is one of the few issues that outsiders seem to care about, residents and communities frame their demands in terms of pollution even when they are also about other things. Also, the environment and pollution are seen as relatively "neutral" and "safe" issues, belonging to science rather than

politics; this makes them an appealing vehicle for other demands.³⁹¹ This does not mean that contamination in a place like Cerro de Pasco is not a real problem, rather it becomes the articulating demand around which other concerns and interests gather. As Warren writes for lead pollution in the United States, quoting Saul Bellow,

It often seems that lead exposure has become emblematic of the nation's ills – in the words of Saul Bellow's dean, it is simply what we have 'fixed upon but stands for something else that we all sense.' Lead becomes a proxy for the nation's education problems, for its failure to provide decent housing, and for its inequitable health care system." (256-257).

In Cerro, the discourse of contamination, health and harm becomes a way for people to negotiate around structural issues that have persisted or even become more pronounced in the last few decades: the lack of enough jobs and the subcontracting of employment, the reduction in the services provided by the mining company, and the continuing asymmetries in power and wealth between large mining companies and the local population.

This is true not only for the discourse of contamination per se but for the idea of being "affected" (*afectado*) more broadly. This language meshes well with currently dominant ideologies that emphasize the passivity of ordinary people – portraying them less as producers of wealth, as workers or as citizens endowed with rights than as "the poor" or "the local community" who receive aid from a generous government, corporation or NGO. Though long present in negotiations between mining companies and communities, the discourse of being "affected" takes on greater prominence in this context. As shown earlier, in interactions with outsiders a situation is produced in which people are encouraged to show their affected and damaged bodies; this extends to their houses as well.³⁹²

³⁹¹ Stuart Kirsch, personal communication.

³⁹² Several times when I was taking groups of visitors around Cerro, in the streets closest to the open pit, we were stopped by people who wanted to show us the cracks in their houses. Such cracks were generally believed to be the result of the twice-daily explosions in the open pit, which in the closest neighborhoods felt like a sudden, brief tremor. These buildings were also in a state of decay due to their age and – like the infrastructure of the city in general – to the lack of improvement and planning characteristic of a city that is always on the verge of moving someplace else. We would walk up rickety steps as our hosts pointed out long cracks in the walls, sometimes extending from the ceiling to the floor.

If the logic of being affected, of suffering an “impact,” and demanding compensation, is something that has long mediated the relationship between mining companies and local populations in highland Peru, it has also lent itself to the accusation that local people feign damage in order to extract payment from companies. During the “smoke affair” at La Oroya in the 1920s there was the argument that local communities had planted barley in their fields opposite the smelter in order to receive compensation from the corporation – supposedly part of a broader practice that General Manager Harold Kingsmill called “smoke farming,” but which another company official, B.T. Colley (1958, 18), denied was taking place.

Such accusations of manipulation by local people occur not only in the context of discussions of environmental pollution, but also of conflicts over space more broadly. In Cerro de Pasco at the time of my research there was a frequently voiced argument about people whose houses were situated close to the open pit. The latter was undergoing a process of expansion for which the company needed to buy houses so as to demolish them. According to this common story, people would sell their homes to the company, and then use the money to buy or build another house slightly further away so as to again obtain money from the company when the pit expanded further. This tale seemed to almost take the form of an urban legend, in its vagueness as to the individuals involved and in the formulaic way in which it was recited again and again by different tellers. It has sometimes been reproduced uncritically by academics and journalists, as an account of an actual practice, which it may or may not be. In the course of my research, I was never able to witness this practice or hear someone admit to it themselves, and I cannot testify to its actuality. The slowness and especially the unpredictability that characterizes the advance of the open pit makes it difficult to believe that such a strategy would be workable, at least at an individual level. What I did frequently encounter was the practice of holding out in one’s house for the longest possible time, in the hopes of obtaining a higher payment from the company.

Such practices, whether real or imagined, also express a more general underlying pattern in the area (and arguably in highland Peru in general and other places as well) by which class conflicts tend to take the form of struggles over space. The land is one of the few dimensions in which local people can hope to assert themselves against either mining companies or, in the past,

large landowners. Negotiations and contests over space of course have been central to demands for compensation in mine-community relations in Peru, especially since the 1960s as *comunidades* have taken over most of the lands that formerly belonged to the haciendas. Whereas the haciendas in the past could and usually were sold to mining companies that needed them for various purposes, a community's land could not legally be sold, and so long-term rent payments and compensation agreements had to be put in place. These occurred in response both to the use of land, as a form of rent payment, and as compensation proper for contamination of rivers or other spaces. I showed an example of this in the previous chapter, where I discussed the history of negotiations between the community of Rancas and the Cerro de Pasco mine, over the use of pasture land for the dumping of tailings. That history is a good example of how “environmental” issues are interwoven with economic questions and with different ends, goals and strategies.

Like with space and land, compensation may also be sought for damage to human health, even in extreme cases. In early 2009, a group of journalists in Cerro held a fundraiser over the radio to collect money for Thais Palma Carhuaricra, the 5-year old girl who had very high levels of lead in blood and had suffered various acute ailments as a result. The money from the fundraiser was to be used to finance her trip to Cuba where she would receive treatment. In the days leading up to the fundraiser, Thais' father gave interviews on the radio, detailing how his daughter's health problems had come about. His house was located in Columna Pasco, an *asentamiento humano* on the northeastern side of the city, away from the waste ore and tailings but close to the open pit nevertheless. According to Mr. Palma, close to his house there was a chimney through which gas emanated from the mine.³⁹³ In fact, a hole had opened up from this chimney directly into his house. It is not unusual for there to be cracks in the walls in the houses closest to the open pit, or even for wholesale cave-ins to occur.³⁹⁴ This, according to Mr. Palma, had contaminated his four children, who suffered from headaches, stomach pains, low learning

³⁹³ The company's 2006 closure plan lists 19 ventilation chimneys from the subterranean mine as part of its closure responsibilities in the urban radius (Plan de Cierre, Resumen Ejecutivo, No.2). However, it is possible there may be other chimneys, as mining installations that are abandoned and not part of the company's direct responsibilities (for example, the Quiulacocha tailings deposit) are not listed in the closure plan.

³⁹⁴ At least one such cave-in occurred during my time in Cerro, in the middle of a street next to the southern edge of the open pit. Also, as mentioned earlier, I saw many of the cracks in the houses nearest the open pit, and some of the neighbors were eager to show them to visitors. At least one house in the old part of the city collapsed in 2009, whether as a result of the daily explosions or simple structural decay.

ability and frequent sleepiness, and whom measurements had shown to have high blood lead levels (as affirmed to me also by city health officials). Particularly affected was five-year old Thais, whose development had been seriously compromised. In the Children's Hospital in Lima, the father said, doctors had stated that "here in Lima there are no specialists able to do Noemís' treatment. You have to make an effort to take her to the country of Cuba, because there are specialists there." When asked by the interviewer whether he had sought to make a legal demand against the company, Mr. Palma explained how he had tried to obtain compensation from the mine:

I spoke with Ing. Teódulo Quispe [the mine's General Manager], so that maybe they could help me in some other way. I asked him for a job on the payroll [*trabajo en planilla*], and other things. And that did not happen...

Later, however, he had managed to secure the company's help in holding a raffle to raise money for the treatment:

I spoke with Ing. Teódulo Quispe last year, to do a raffle for health [*pro salud*]... Thanks to his support, I did it. I distributed all the tickets. But, the problem is, there are contractors, that to this day do not pay me, there is a debt of almost 10,000 soles. To do that raffle I took out a loan... Some of them paid me, the ones from payroll. And maybe two, three contracting companies that paid me. But most of the workers from contracting companies who bought raffle tickets still do not pay me. Some already left [the mine], some continue to work, but to this day they do not pay me. I have a document of which companies owe me money.

As these quotes show, a stable payroll job at the mine – something that has become scarce since the labor restructuring of the 1990s - is seen as at least partial compensation for the damage. The company is also expected to help with organizing a raffle – which in Peru is one of the common ways of raising money to cover medical as well as other costs. None of this is meant to imply that the girl's health problems were not real, or not related to environmental pollution; the evidence on both counts was accepted by all parties involved. Rather, these quotes show how complaints over contamination and its effects on health are interwoven with issues of jobs, compensation and economic problems. Environmental and health problems do not present themselves to people in pure and isolated form, but rather as part of a broader complex of issues. The reality of pollution-related illness, and the desire for treatment, is in no way incompatible with its role as an argument for compensation in the form of a job or direct assistance. This does

not mean that the complaint or conflict ceases to be about health or the environment at the same time that it is also about other things.³⁹⁵

I write this because twice in the beginning of my research, I heard academics in Peru state that the mining conflicts in the country “are not environmental conflicts” because, even though communities make statements and complaints about contamination, their actual lists of demands ask for compensation in the form of money, job opportunities, training and other non-environmental objectives. In my opinion, this view of mining conflicts is based on a conventional vision of environmentalism in which the environment is seen as a sphere separate from and incommensurate with other domains. Instead, according to the position taken in this chapter, the “environment” is contiguous with other domains such as the economy and politics. What makes a conflict environmental is, first, whether there is credible evidence of contamination taking place – as is the case in Cerro de Pasco and many other mining regions in Peru – and, less important but still significant, whether there is perception of or concern over possible contamination – as in almost all mining areas in the country. Given this, as I argue in this section, communities accept money, jobs or other forms of compensation because they tend to see contamination as an inevitable part of mining activity, over which they have little control; compensation then becomes a way to make up for some of the damage done. Compensation must also be seen in the context of wider contests over the distribution of wealth and resources.

To put this in further context, it may be useful to consider it alongside another long-established pattern connecting harm to the right to work: the expectation that when a worker died in an accident at the mine, in addition to his family receiving compensation money for the death, at least one of the worker’s children or other close relatives would then be guaranteed a job. This pattern is widely known and was also recounted to me several times during my fieldwork in the Pasco area. For example, Ernesto Blanco, the son of a mechanic who died in an accident at the Huarón mining company in 1962, before he was born, told me what had happened with his family:

³⁹⁵ On the other hand, the view that mining conflicts “are not [only] environmental conflicts” can be somewhat helpful in pointing out that environmental concerns are not the only or necessarily the most important ones for communities or local residents, as certain simplistic strands of environmentalism might assume.

When my father died, my older brother was around 14 or 15 years old. And the company gave him the opportunity to work and take on the sustenance of the family, since we had been orphaned. And my mother actually a widow, and on top of that my mother was illiterate. So yes, the company helped us out a lot.

Similarly, in Chapter 2 I discussed the life story of Gaudencio Machacuay, a former worker at the Huarón mine, and how in 2008 his son died in a gas leak accident at the Animón mine. Don Gaudencio asked that his other son, who was working at the same mine, be switched from the subcontracting system to a direct payroll job— in other words that he be included within the few payroll spots that the community has reserved for its members at the mine, through its agreement with the company. He complained that this had not happened, and so his son was still working on the subcontracting system

And so I asked the leadership, as *comuneros* that we are, I want your help. I want my son to enter in replacement for my [other] son... because my son has lost his life in the Animón mine. Do you think they agreed? What happened? Soon after, the [community] president's son, [got into] payroll. The *fiscal's*³⁹⁶ son, into payroll. And they left me out. That's how it is.

Although here it is the visible harm of job accidents, rather than the invisible risk of hidden environmental hazards, that is at issue, there is a similar logic as in the case of Thais Palma's father: a job is one form of compensation for harm. This does not necessarily mean that the presentation of the harm – whether accident or health-impairing contamination – is being “manipulated” for personal purposes. Rather, contamination and harmful effects are assumed a given fact of mining activity, and compensation in other realms – such as work or money - is therefore sought to ameliorate its effects.

Lastly, on the topic of compensation, a comment by Ester, the nurse quoted earlier, may help shed some light on the issue. Rather than protect their children from lead contamination, Ester complained, in Cerro people “use the lead issue to get money.” She said that people do not believe that methods that her team tries to promote, like covering food or mopping the floor instead of sweeping it, could possibly help reduce contamination. So one time when they took a few specially-designed stoves to an assembly in one neighborhood, people said “We don't want those little stoves, we want money.” However, Ester also mentioned a belief she had encountered

³⁹⁶ Another communal authority position.

among people, to the effect that when health workers go to withdraw the 5 centimeters of blood that they need for the analyses, their real purpose is to gather all that blood in a bucket and sell it somewhere.

This belief carries echoes of the Peruvian myth of the *pishtaco* – the killer who extracts people’s body fat to sell it in first-world countries where it is used in some kind of manufacturing process (for example, to make cosmetics or oils with which to grease machinery). Of course, health workers in this area do not fit the stereotypical image of the *pishtaco* as a white man, and they do not kill their patients. Nevertheless, in an area where the *pishtaco* myth is very much alive (especially in 2009, when there was a national scandal involving *pishtaco* allegations centered on an area not far to the north of Cerro de Pasco), it is reasonable for people to think that there are profitable uses to be made of the extraction of parts of the human body, and that those who pretend to help them are actually self-interested. This applies specifically to the case of this belief regarding health workers who extract blood for measuring lead levels. However, generalizing more broadly, one could ask: In a world where other people are making money at one’s expense – in all kinds of ways - why should people who have high blood lead levels or who have suffered some other form of environmental harm not try to obtain some money from this? The drive for monetary gain may not be an inborn, natural human characteristic, but it has become a structural and accepted, even celebrated feature of the world beyond the immediate realm of kinship and community (and sometimes in those realms as well). Compensation claims for environmental harm must thus also be seen within that logic, as an attempt by people to tap into that system and improve their position within it.

Mining, Water and the City

Earlier in this chapter I have discussed environmental issues in terms of contamination as well as “hidden hazards” such as lead. In this section, I shift to an examination of the intersection between environmental concerns and issues of modernity and urbanity. I focus on a particular link between those two realms – namely, the problem of running water and water shortage in the mining city of Cerro de Pasco. Although water shortage is a problem in many parts of Peru, the

lack of water in this city of 80,000 people has certain specific characteristics. Unlike in other Peruvian cities where running water is scarce or absent in the outlying *asentamientos humanos* but present in the central areas of cities, in Cerro the water shortage affects the city as a whole, even if it is more acute in the outlying areas.³⁹⁷ The central parts of the city have water for no more than 2 hours a day, not to mention the occasional service cuts that last several days at a time. The *asentamientos humanos* often have water for no more than 2 hours every other day. Furthermore, whereas in other urban areas in Peru some effort has been made in recent years to extend water connections to more of the outlying areas of cities, in Cerro little or no progress has been made. Thus the city appears as having one of the worst drinking water and sanitation systems of any urban area in the country, according to the National Water Supervisory Authority (SUNASS).

One aspect of the city's location and geography – its high altitude, at over 14,100 feet – helps to explain the water shortage. Yet there are other aspects of the local geography that are not in consonance with the lack of water – namely, the presence of many lakes nearby, most of them located at a similar altitude within the highland plateau in which the city sits. Additionally, the lack of running water – a powerful symbol of urban modernity, though to a lesser degree than electricity - seems to be in contradiction with the fact that the city has historically been a producer of great wealth, as one of the most important silver mining centers in late colonial South America and more recently as a producer of copper, lead, zinc and silver for the world market. In this section I approach this problem historically by tracing several aspects of the relationship between the mine, the city and the environment. I focus on certain key factors: 1) the competition between the mine and its urban population for available water sources; 2) the loss of lakes due to either draining or contamination; 3) the shift from a company-town model to one of reducing the social burdens on companies; 4) the uncertainty about the future that open-pit mining has produced; and, lastly, 5) the contradiction between the nature of mineral wealth in the form of rent, on the one hand, and the emphasis that contemporary market-oriented ideologies place on a “culture of payment,” on the other.

³⁹⁷ *Asentamientos humanos* (human settlements) is the name given in Peru today to the self-organized neighborhoods that arose in the outskirts of cities during the second half of the 20th century, which like in many parts of the world was a period of population growth and rural-urban migration. In Cerro, the difference in living standards between the *asentamientos humanos* and the rest of the city is less marked than in a city like Lima.

In the city, obtaining water for daily needs like washing, cooking and drinking can be an object of intense activity. People gather water in buckets, plastic cylinders, and in used-up kerosene and gasoline containers. In some parts of the city, there are public faucets where residents of certain neighborhoods can congregate to draw water at particular times. During the rainy season, some residents install tubes to draw the water from their roofs into cylinders. Business owners who need to be assured of a plentiful supply of water, such as owners of large restaurants and public showers, often must purchase it from cistern trucks. Only a handful of the restaurants and hotels in the city – those that serve owners of larger contracting companies, engineers and the occasional visitor – can guarantee their guests a constant supply of water. Some city residents who are not served by the existing water network install their own, clandestine connections at strategic locations – a practice on which the local water company has been trying to crack down in recent years. In addition, in the past at least one of the *asentamientos humanos* tried to create its own independent water system, acquiring pumps and building a connection to one of the last remaining springs near the urban area.

In Peru, as in most countries, the provision of potable drinking water tends to be associated with urban modernity and to differentiate urban from rural spaces. However, in Cerro this particular inequality between the urban and the rural tends to diminish, and is even inverted sometimes, at least as regards some of the nearest and more urbanized villages. One of these, Rancas, has a system to channel water – albeit without treatment - from a nearby spring (*puquio*) into taps in people’s backyards, and it does so for more hours than in the city. The difference is particularly clear during the rainy season. As a friend told me when I moved from Cerro to Rancas, “at least you’ll have water there.” Inversely, when people move from the more urbanized villages like Rancas to the city, they often experience a decreased availability of water.

As mentioned earlier, the chronic shortage of water in the city is in part due to location – although the larger region contains many water sources, it’s also true that the urban area itself is located in an upland spot slightly more elevated than the surrounding plateau – hence the name Cerro (mountain). The two rivers closest to the city - the San Juan and the Tingo - are both situated slightly lower than the urban area, which sits between 4,300 and 4,400 meters above sea

level.³⁹⁸ Unlike most other cities of its size in Peru, all of Cerro's drinking water must be pumped upwards with the use of electrical power. The high altitude of the city is not a purely "natural" factor but is rather the result of the larger transnational economy's interaction, since the 17th century, with the products of non-human agents, namely geological processes – not only did the latter have to produce the mineral deposits at that location in the first place, but social groups interested in exploiting them had to find them also. It is doubtful that any settlement of this size would have emerged at this altitude were it not for mining. The costs of harboring a population at high altitude – in terms of health and availability of water and other services - have not been borne in their entirety by the owners of the mines.

However, location by itself does not suffice to explain the shortage of water in the city; a number of other social and historical factors have also contributed. I will now examine each one of these in detail, beginning by tracing the historical evolution of the relationship between the mine's water needs and those of the urban population.

Competition over water

Before the 20th century, there were a number of small lakes in the immediate vicinity of Cerro de Pasco and at the same elevation. Adjacent to the town were lakes Patarcocha-Tomar, Patarcocha-Lavar, and the smaller Lake Esperanza, while slightly further away were Lake Yanamate (to the south) and Lake Quiulacocha (to the west).³⁹⁹ Patarcocha-Lavar was the place where women gathered to wash clothes, whereas Patarcocha-Tomar provided the urban population with drinking water. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, water was brought from this lake to people's houses and sold by women organized into a guild; in addition to the lake, they also collected water from a spring on the outskirts of the city.

Already at this time, there was competition between the domestic use of water and that required by mining, as the amalgamation of silver, conducted in many small mills until the late

³⁹⁸ The San Juan River begins at around 4,200m. (Bianchini 2009, 20) and ends its course at Lake Junín at 4,080m, where the Mantaro River is born (INEI – Compendio Estadístico 1996-1997, 1.13). The Tingo River begins its course just outside of Cerro de Pasco, but moves downward with a slope of 35.95m/km (Bianchini 2009, 19). The central Chaupimarca square in Cerro de Pasco sits at 4,338 meters.

³⁹⁹ Here I write "Lake Quiulacocha" or "Lake Patarcocha" for the sake of clarity, but this is actually a redundancy, since the Quechua word *qocha* (cocha) in itself means lake.

19th century, required water and in turn tended to pollute it with mercury. Ironically, excess mine water was also a constant problem for the mines in Cerro, as the constant documented attempts to build drainage tunnels and install steam pumps show.

The water needs of mining activity in Cerro increased in the early 20th century with the arrival of industrial-scale mining. One example of this comes from the planning for the construction of the U.S company's new smelter: in a report from Nov. 23, 1903, A.W. McCune (the agent of company founder James B. Haggin) discussed the different locations available in terms of the proximity of water supplies:

I found an absolutely ideal location for a Smelter, with any quantity of water from 3 rivers...I am worried a great deal about the site that [smelter manager] Klepetko has located the smelter on. We have no water whatever, except what will have to be pumped from a river a mile and a half away, and the cost of pumping that water will always be a heavy expense. The water at smelting works of this capacity is of vital importance, and it would pay to go to quite a little expense to put the Smelter where we will have plenty of water (Cerro Corporation Archive).

Inevitably, the company's utilization of available water sources for industrial purposes brought complaints from the local population. In 1913, the municipal council of Cerro de Pasco, still led by some of the most important *hacienda* owners and elites of the city at the time, wrote a memorandum to the national government in which they complained about the use of one of the two Patarcocha lakes:

The utilization of the water from one of the lakes for industrial uses has produced a notable decrease, [so that] the water is close to running out, and as a consequence, possibly as a result of underground connections, [it has caused] the reduction also of the level of water in the other [lake], that which serves the city, and which in this way is similarly threatened with extinction (quoted in Pérez Arauco 1997, 442).

The municipal council not only complained about the use of local water by the mining company; it also asked the national government to finance the construction of a water system for the city as was being done in other Peruvian cities at the time. Only small sums were forthcoming from the government, however, and as the century wore on, the city's population came to rely on the U.S.-owned mining corporation for the provision of drinking water. This was in some ways a predictable development: the company had in any case to build a water system for its workers' camps. At the time, this service basically meant providing outdoor taps for rows

of housing, to be shared among many families. In addition, water was a central element in the mine's operations; it needed both to drain it away from its underground workings, in which it was a nuisance, and to pump it towards its processing plants, where it was a vital necessity. The city's drinking water supply thus became interlinked with the company's system for the provisioning of water for its industrial needs. Gradually, this domestic/industrial water system came to be supplied from Lake Yanamate as well as from the San Juan River. For much of the twentieth century, water drained from the underground mine was also supplied to the population. As in other mining areas in different parts of the world, city residents had to add lime to the water to make it drinkable.

The loss of lakes

At the same time, during the course of the century the various lakes in the vicinity of the city or in the immediate surroundings were gradually rendered unusable by the company's operations. Those that were closest to or directly above the underground mine had to be drained and filled with waste rock, to prevent mine flooding. Such was the case of the small Lake Esperanza, which is today a soccer field in the neighborhood of the same name, and the larger Lake Patarcocha-Lavar. The latter was filled in only in the late 1970s and early 80s; it is now the location of the city's main bus terminal as well as of an urban neighborhood. Its role as the main location for washing clothes in the city is a distant memory now. I once met an older woman from the nearby town of Huayllay who had lived in various mining camps in her childhood and youth. For a time, she told me, her father had worked in the Cerro de Pasco mine, and she had gone with her mother to wash clothes in Patarcocha-Lavar. However, the spot they chose was one customarily used by another woman, who rudely kicked them out. She laughed as she recalled this incident and asked rhetorically of the woman: "Where is your lake now?"

Next to it, Patarcocha-Tomar, once the drinking-water source on the edge of the city but now surrounded by new neighborhoods since at least the 1970s, was spared the fate of its sister lake but instead became a repository for sewage. By 1985, at least 10 sewage canals poured into it, a development that was apparently unplanned.⁴⁰⁰ Today there is a sewage treatment plant just outside the city, but it is non-operational, and as city water officials acknowledge, the city

⁴⁰⁰ *El Pasqueño*, No.83, March 1985

currently has no system for the treatment of sewage. At the time of my research, Lake Patarcocha-Tomar was regarded as a focal point for disease and contamination.

Slightly further from the mine, two important lakes – Quiulacocha and Yanamate – were not drained and filled in but rather became depositories for tailings and other residues from the mine. Quiulacocha, on the western edge of the city, began to be used as a tailings deposit for the first concentrator plant in Cerro in the 1920s. Subsequently lead- and zinc-rich tailings were deposited there from the 1940s until 1992. This 114 acre tailings deposit now lies abandoned in the open air, superseded by the newer, larger Ocroyoc tailings deposit (formerly a pasture land in the community of Rancas) to its immediate north.

Meanwhile, Lake Yanamate, to the south of the city, continued to be used as a source of clean drinking water for the city until 1981. On that date the state company Centromín (which had taken over from the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corp. in 1974) began filling the lake with discharge from its new Solvent Extraction/Electro Deposition Plant. The purpose of this plant was to extract copper from the acid waters pumped from the mine and in that way also reduce the amount of contaminants released into the San Juan River, since there was a plan to use water from the Mantaro River (the continuation of the San Juan) to supply the urban population of Lima, the country's capital. An outlet had to be found for the residue from this new plant, however, as well as for the excess acid mine water that could not be treated. Lake Yanamate was chosen as the outlet, effectively sacrificing it in order to reduce – although without eliminating entirely – the contamination of the Mantaro River. Today, as all company documents acknowledge, Yanamate is effectively a dead, lifeless lake.

As more bodies of water were becoming repositories for the mine's effluents, the company also had to find sources of water for its industrial operations, since water recycled from the mine and processing plants could supply only part of its needs. Eventually, the company began drawing its water not only from the San Juan River but also from Lakes Alcacocha and Huicra. A large lake, Alcacocha is situated on the border between the highland community of Rancas and the valley communities of Santa Ana de Tusi and Chacayán. In Rancas, it is also important in local narrative as the site of a submerged town – a story found in many communities

throughout Peru.⁴⁰¹ Today, water for the mine is drawn from Lake Alcacocha and conducted by means of a natural canal to Lake Huicra, a smaller body of water situated halfway towards the mine, in the middle of the land belonging to the community of Rancas. From there it is pumped towards the company's reservoir in the city.

Thus, the city's provision of water had to compete more and more with the use of lakes and rivers as depositories for effluents and as sources of water for mining use. When Lake Yanamate became a container for acid waters from the new plant in 1981, a replacement had to be found for this former source of drinking water. Such a replacement was found in Lake Acococha, situated some 33 kilometers to the west of the city, at 4,580 meters above sea level and near the larger Lake Punrún. Acococha was considerably more distant from the city than were Alcacocha, Yanamate or the other lakes previously mentioned. The company began drawing water from this lake through a combination of open-air canals as well as pre-existing, natural streams – the whole system finally brought the water to the San Juan River near the village of Yurajhuanca (upstream from where the river is contaminated with waste from the mine and the city). From there it was pumped over the final 7 kilometers to the reservoirs in the city. This system still remains the primary way in which drinking water is provided for the city.

Thus, one by one many of the freshwater sources around the city have effectively been ruled out, forcing water operators to go further in their search for possible sources for the city's population. All this adds to the cost of providing water for the city beyond the factor of altitude.

Privatization and the End of Dependence

Thus, during all these years, Cerro de Pasco, like the company's smelting city of La Oroya, had become dependent on the mining company for its supply of water. However insufficient or contaminated the supply may have been, the company was expected to provide the city with water. This persisted even after the nationalization of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation and its transformation into the state company Centromín. However, the company was already at this time attempting to divest itself of this obligation, which it claimed placed an

⁴⁰¹ See Morote Best (1988: 241-282) and Mannheim and Van Vleet (1998: 338-340). The particular version from Rancas referenced here comes from the oral history research of Elizabeth Lino Cornejo (Unpublished Manuscript) and was told to her by Felipe Atencio Tufino. I subsequently heard shorter versions of the story from other individuals in Rancas. This story is also mentioned in the early colonial-era Huarochirí Manuscript (c.1600).

onerous burden on its budget. Such complaints gained renewed force when in the early 1990s Centromín and other state companies began a more general policy of withdrawing from the provision of services – like health care and education - to their workforces. This was a result of new national and international policy guidelines which emphasized privatization of state-owned assets and the general retreat of the state from productive enterprise as a solution to the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s. This new policy was often framed in terms of ending the situation of “dependence” in company towns like Cerro and making local society more autonomous from mining companies. Company documents at the time argued that the neglectful attitude of the local and national governments had forced the company to cross the line between production and “extra” activities that were not its real responsibility.⁴⁰²

The discourse of reducing dependence is still present among mining companies in the area today, and it tends to recast the past history of the mining industry as one in which companies became involved in providing services that were alien to their real mission of extracting minerals. Whereas in the early 20th century promoters of the mining industry in Peru promoted the view that mining companies were purveyors of modernity, and that their schools and hospitals were among the best in the country, today the industry often downplays or even critiques the quality of these company-provided services of the past. As an executive from a nearby mining company told me, “I do not know any company that is an excellent educator. Or any company that is an excellent health provider – any mining company... when you have all the children studying in a mining school, they all end up being miners.”

In order to make state-owned companies attractive to foreign and domestic investors, they had to be brought back into economic solvency, which was to be accomplished in part by trimming their obligations and budgets and centering their efforts more exclusively on

⁴⁰² They insisted that the company, “which has as its principal operations the extraction, concentration, smelting and refining of minerals, has found itself circumstantially involved in the provision of a public service that does not correspond to it.” Draft agreement between Centromín-Perú and the “Proyecto Especial ‘Agua potable y alcantarillado de Cerro de Pasco,” version of January 15, 1992. Centromín Archive, Box 1263, Folder 25 – “Aguas.” Furthermore, the company acknowledged that because of the insufficient supply of water provided to the city, “it is a common and permanent situation, the conflicts and controversies in relation to the distribution of potable water in the populations of the localities of La Oroya and Cerro de Pasco” (“Alternativas para el problema del agua potable en Cerro y La Oroya.” Centromín Archive, Box 1263, Folder 25 – “Aguas.”). If the responsibility for the water was not handed over to an independent entity, this would “lead the company to greater conflicts with the population and the authorities.” (Internal memorandum CST-828193, 23 September 1993).

production. Thus, as in La Oroya, at this time the company began arrangements to transfer responsibility for Cerro's water either to the local municipality, the regional government, the national water authority or a combination of these entities. The company succeeded in persuading the national, regional and local governments to create a new, independent water company for the city. The new water agency created at that time has since evolved into the current water company Emapa Pasco; though this entity has the legal status of a private company, the stock is jointly owned by four of the local municipalities. It continues to draw water from Lake Acococha as well as from two springs near the city. The city's water system has thus become largely, though not entirely, separate from that of the mine. However, the move away from dependence on the mine has not succeeded in solving the problem of providing a sufficient source of drinking water for Cerro. This becomes evident when one compares indicators of water provision in Cerro with those of other cities in Peru, using data provided by the National Water Supervisory Authority (SUNASS).

Expectations of Relocation and the Production of Uncertainty

The takeover of available water sources by the mine and the shifts in the ideologies and discourses of companies and the state are still not enough to explain why the city does not have sufficient water. There still are other lakes and rivers further away that could be used, and the current system of provision from Lake Acococha could be improved upon. It is precisely in the last 15-20 years since the system began to operate more independently from the mine that the contrast with other cities in Peru has increased; whereas water services in the country as a whole have improved, in Cerro the provision of water has stagnated or even receded.

One reason for this stagnation in recent years has been the sense of instability and inability to enact long-term planning that has resulted from the various relocation projects and plans since the beginning of open-pit operations in the center of the city in the 1960s. It may be useful to briefly recall this history. When houses in the old city began to be demolished around 1963, protests from the urban population pressured the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation into building a new city. The chosen location, San Juan Pampa, was a mere 1.5 kilometers from the old city center, and was meant to be only a temporary solution. Nevertheless, construction there continued after nationalization in 1974; today, San Juan is simply another of the city's three

main divisions, and sits practically on the edge of the open pit. Throughout this time, the idea persisted that the city would have to move again, as people who grew up during those years recall. In the late 1980s, a plan began to be implemented to start a new relocation to the town of Villa de Pasco, situated on the flattest part of the plateau, to the south of the city. New projects were drafted in 1995 and 1996, but nothing occurred in the next few years.

In 2006, however, one of the recently elected congressional representatives for Pasco Region, Gloria Ramos, began new efforts to promote the construction of a new city, this time in the form of a law that declared the relocation a national necessity. Unlike other cases where companies themselves relocate populations as a condition for beginning or expanding operations, Volcan was opposed to the new relocation law, for it feared that it would be expected to shoulder a large part of the costs. The city's mayor was also skeptical about the proposal. The law was finally passed by the National Congress in 2008; although it has received a lot of attention nationally and locally, it has so far had little practical effect. Except for one brief period, the executive branch of the government seemed to take little interest in the relocation project, and instead a multisectorial commission was formed. On the ground, people are skeptical that the relocation will materialize, and authorities generally admit that the project would take decades.

Naturally, all these expectations of relocation and the uncertainty about the city's future have had the effect of inhibiting the ability to plan for the long term and to build large-scale infrastructure (as opposed to individual buildings and other small-scale projects) for the current city. Why invest in a new water system for the city when it might move in the next few years? Indeed, after the relocation law was passed in 2008, the other Congressional representative from Pasco, Oswaldo de la Cruz, asked that construction cease on new water and sanitation infrastructure in the current city. New domiciliary water connections have continued to be built, but larger-scale investments needed to bring a sufficient amount of water towards the city have not been implemented. As it is, local governments are already hesitant to make investments that are harder for voters to see and that will not bring them immediate political capital; the uncertainty surrounding the city's future serves to reinforce this tendency. Thus, we can see that the nature of extractive activity not only complicates the provision of water to the city by contaminating nearby lakes and rivers; it also impairs the ability to plan by producing

uncertainty. Mining created the city and attracted a significant population to this otherwise difficult space; yet open-pit mining methods also make the urban space unviable, creating the expectation of relocation. But the national government and the mining company both take little interest in the future of the city. The apathy of the government is enabled by the contemporary preference for decentralization over large-scale state planning. The inaction of the company, on the other hand, is due to the limited ability of the local population to exert pressure – a weakness that has to do with its status as a divided urban collectivity as opposed to a land-owning peasant community like those that occupy the rural surroundings. Without strong executive action in either direction, the city is left in a limbo that inhibits the provision of services such as water.

Mineral Wealth and the Culture of Payment

However, there is also a more immediate reason for the inability of the local water company to provide an adequate supply of water to the city: its lack of funds. This seems paradoxical at a time when the city forms part of the broader mining boom in the country. Unlike in previous times, not only is the mining company making large profits, but local government budgets are also swollen from the influx of money through the new mechanism of the *canon minero*. The *canon* is a mechanism by which 50% of the income tax paid by mining companies has to return to their area of operations, in the form of monetary transfers from the national to the local governments. It could be argued that this increase – which became significant only around 2006-2007 – is too recent and that, given more time, local governments will utilize *canon* funds to improve the city's water system. Yet, at the same time, officials at the water company identified the problem of insufficient funds not as one of a delay in local government investment but rather of city residents' unwillingness to pay their fair share.

Indeed, one point on which both water company authorities and at least some local residents agree is that the population does not pay a sufficient amount for its drinking water. Moreover, a significant percentage is remiss on its payments at any one time. Attempts to raise the water bill in Cerro have met with opposition from the population. As several people pointed out to me, people are barely willing to pay 10 soles a month for water in Cerro, while in Huancayo the cost is several times higher. Moreover, it is said that those city residents who also have houses in Huancayo or in Huánuco are willing to pay high water bills there, but not in

Cerro. Of course, it is also true that the water service in both cities is many times better than that of Cerro. There would seem to be a vicious cycle – as one resident and local authority emphasized to me – whereby people do not want to pay more because the service is so bad, and the service is bad because people do not pay more. Also, as several people pointed out to me, during the years that the company provided water to the city – no matter how limited in amount or how contaminated it may have been – a cultural pattern developed whereby people came to expect this service free of charge. Since the company abandoned its provision of services to the city, people have had a hard time developing the “culture of payment” – as one water company official put it – that is now expected of them.

There is thus a tendency among local authorities to blame the local population for the water problem. This takes the form of several charges: that people do not want to pay, that they waste the water, and that they create illegal connections to tap into the water system without paying. As one water official put it, “We are fighting against a monster: lack of conscientiousness [*inconciencia*].” He claimed that the *asentamientos humanos* on the outskirts of the city were the ones that generated the problem, “because of their customs from the countryside;” according to him, they do not know “the value of water,” and do not understand that it is a service, like telephone, which has to be paid for. This official argued that many people were willing to pay 40 soles a month for TV cable, but do not want to go above 10 soles for water. While he acknowledged that the result of all this was that the water company did not have money to provide an adequate service, at the same time, and somewhat contradictorily, this official claimed that the problem was not one of insufficient service but rather of water waste by the local population. Therefore the aim, he argued, should not be to give people more water, but to have them ration it more.

The discourse of water officials thus locates the source of the problem in the local population; the solution is to “sensitize the people” and create a “culture of payment.” As they explained to me, the water company, though owned by the local municipalities, is legally a private company, and the idea of a private company, they argue, is that it be self-sustaining. However, this market-oriented ideology is not solely a discourse, but rather a reality that has powerful effects - the company is actually expected to sustain itself solely through the payments

people make. The possibility that the local and regional governments' *canon* funds – derived from mining companies' tax payments - might pay for improvements to the water system is thus not considered here. A population of consumers paying for a service out of their own pockets, and not the vast mineral wealth circulating through local government budgets and contractors' pockets, is held up as the solution to the water problem. While officials may be right that a responsible “culture of payment” may ultimately be more sustainable than using mining income to finance a new water system, this begs the question: What good is mineral wealth if it cannot be used to obtain water for the city?

Such a question points to a contradiction inherent in current dominant ideologies around economic and social policy in Peru and probably other parts of Latin America as well. On the one hand, government and industry argue that mining activity benefits the country because of the vast wealth it creates – the values it is able to realize in the market are much greater than those of the agriculture or animal husbandry with which it competes for rural space. Mining is thus an avenue toward successful insertion into the capitalist world. On the other hand, the ideology of capitalist modernity holds up values that are not those of extractive-based societies, in which a portion of mineral wealth is disconnected from the productivity of local labor, but rather those of individual, taxpaying property-owners.⁴⁰³ In other words, the government tells people that they should accept mining because of the vast wealth it creates, while at the same time they are told that this wealth – or the large portion of it that does not go into wages – should not finance public services like water, because this would go against the “culture of payment” and the model of a private company that a water service like Emapa-Pasco should seek to emulate. The market-oriented ideology of individual responsibility, which attempts to reduce the public sector and move away from politics, thus ends up clashing with extractive-based capitalism, which is inevitably linked to political relations and forces, and to the state – particularly in Latin America, where the state is legally the owner of the subsoil and its resources. The government is the only

⁴⁰³ Similarly, for the case of Venezuela, Coronil (1997: 389) argues that “the infusion of oil money into the domestic economy helped naturalize wealth, disconnecting it from the productivity of local labor by basing it on the valorization of a mineral resource which required little labor for its extraction.” See Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). In the case of metal mining, of course, significant labor *is* involved; again, it is *a portion* of the circulating mineral wealth that is disconnected from local labor and is derived instead from global pricing and from capital-intensive inputs manufactured abroad. It is that portion that impresses promoters of the mining industry, who point to the vast sums of revenue that mining generates. By contrast, the idea of the “culture of payment” focuses precisely on the local.

entity that can re-appropriate for the nation that portion of mining company profits that derive either from differential rents or from a sudden increase in the demand for minerals, such as that which began in 2002-2003. Contemporary market ideology promotes small states and small public sectors, whereas, in countries where the state owns the subsoil, mineral wealth tends to enrich governments, placing more financial resources at their command.

It may be that, given more time, mineral wealth – whether in the form of *canon* or other mechanisms – may be used to finance a suitable water system for the city. Indeed, on July 5, 2011, an agreement was signed between the Provincial Municipality and the Regional Government promising to undertake a “definitive solution” to the city’s water problem. It was unclear whether the projected investment of 129 million soles was to come from their own *canon*-based budgets or whether they would petition the central government for funds. Such solutions have been promised before, and it remains to be seen whether this one will materialize. Yet as of 2011, the answer to the city’s water problem, for at least some authorities – such as those at the water company – was still limited to the issue of creating a culture of individual responsibility and payment among local residents. *Canon* funds, on the other hand, were being used by local governments for a variety of construction projects – building roads, stadiums, buildings of various kinds. These projects strengthen contractors, who – when successful - are able to build profitable enterprises, as well as local mayors, who not only become agents of development but also receive substantial payments. *Canon* money is prevented from becoming the solution to the city’s water problem both by mayors’ preference for cement-based public works that involve less planning and that can be seen right away, and by the ideology that says that people should pay for their own water and that the water company should be self-sustaining. To the degree that this occurs, the contradiction between the anti-political slant of contemporary market ideology and the state-centered nature of mining wealth becomes one more factor accounting for the scarcity of drinking water in the city.

CONCLUSION

I began this dissertation by highlighting the decline in class-based politics and labor movements in particular in the latter decades of the 20th century. This decline, which occurred in much of the world, was in large part a result of the neoliberal “solution” to the crisis of the 1970s. In industrial capitalist countries like the United States and Great Britain, not only were many of the unions politically defeated, but the industrial base itself was reduced, while finance and services emerged as growing sectors of the economy. Of course, manufacturing and factory labor have not disappeared from the world; they have simply moved to East Asia, and most recently to China, the new “world’s workshop.”

In this dissertation I have not directly examined this story of the shift in the locus of world industry. Rather, I have focused on an area in the periphery of global capitalism, namely Peru, and on an extractive rather than manufacturing sector, namely mining. Nevertheless, here too the same decline in labor politics occurred, perhaps even more dramatically. Although mining is an extractive activity based around a natural resource, underground mining in particular has historically involved a significant amount of labor. For that reason, a sizeable collection of working-class communities, based around wage-labor, had developed in the mining sectors of countries like Peru, especially after the requirements of production began to demand a stable rather than transient workforce. If during the first half of the 20th century the mines had struggled to attract workers, by the 1980s these relatively stabilized communities had become obstacles to the restructuring that the mining companies sought. Besides, the drop in metal prices, resulting from the global economic troubles of the 1970s and the decline of manufacturing in the traditional industrial countries, created economic difficulties for mining companies. This occurred at the same time that the broader national economy was in crisis due not only to the decline in metal prices but also the shift to monetarist policies in the North, and

the resulting Debt Crisis in the South. Also, during the second half of the 20th century many countries in the South had pursued social reforms and greater autonomy at the expense of economic efficiency, and it was the latter that was reasserted by institutions such as the IMF during the 1980s. This broader crisis in the national society, together with the situation of violence that was stimulated by it and that in turn contributed to the crisis, created the conditions not just for mine closures and workforce reduction but also for structural transformations in labor whose influence would be felt once prices rebounded and production resumed and even surpassed previous levels. Furthermore, the political defeat of the mining unions by the National Mining Society in 1988-89, and by the Fujimori government in the early 1990s, together with the physical departure of the majority of the miners and their families from the old camps, ensured that a cultural gap would arise between the previous and the newer generation of workers.

The dispersal of the mining working class as it had developed up to that point marked the dissolution of a peculiar sector in national society, numbering perhaps no more than 80,000 families. This group resided in isolated settlements but formed part of the modern, formal sector of the economy – the world of pensions, social insurance and company-provided benefits, the latter varying widely depending on the size and type of company; they had achieved this status in exchange for difficult work and a high degree of risk. Upon dispersing, they mostly entered the realm of commerce, petty commodity production and the “informal economy,” with some retaining or recovering certain links to the land. The monetary resources and skills with which they rejoined this broader world varied widely, though they were often greater than those of their new neighbors. Older workers were usually able to secure pensions, although long legal proceedings were sometimes required. On the whole, this process represented a reversal of previous expectations of progress, even if for some it also constituted an opening away from the narrow world of the mining camp. Like other sectors of the population at the time, the former mining workers paid the costs of the crisis, and eventually moved on with their lives. This dispersal also marked the decline of an important social and political actor, one that had maintained a certain degree of contact with both the rural world and the urban labor movement and political parties.

When mining capital began investing again in Peru in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, seeking to open new projects and to restart production in mines that had been closed or moribund, it encountered a different kind of challenge. Conflicts began to arise not so much with their workers but with other local populations on or near the sites of operations. One of the first of these disputes, discussed in Chapter 6, was that between the Brocal Company and the *comunidad campesina* of Vicco in Pasco, over the San Gregorio open-pit zinc project. The conflict began as early as 1992 but reached its peak around 1998, and to this date no mining has yet taken place at the site. Another of these disputes was between the population of Tambogrande, an agricultural fruit-growing settlement on the northern coast, and a Canadian mining company that had received permission from the government to mine gold on the land. This conflict attracted national attention and reached its greatest intensity in the latter 1990s and early 2000s; by 2003 the mining company had had to abandon the project due to local opposition. Other disputes involving opposition to particular mining projects followed: Cerro Quilish (Yanacocha), Majaz/Rio Blanco, Tía María, Santa Ana, Conga and most recently Cañariaco. These confrontations have increased in intensity to the point that by late 2011 the Conga conflict had become a major force in national politics, precipitating the resignation of a government cabinet.

At the same time as these large conflicts involving opposition to open-pit projects, a series of smaller company-local community disputes have occurred at many if not most mines in operation, involving the terms and conditions of resource extraction. Such is the case of the conflicts and negotiations between the community of Huayllay and the local mining companies, as examined in Chapter 6, but this is by no means an isolated case. These latter kinds of conflicts do not usually threaten the viability of entire mining projects, but they bring up the specter of road blockades, temporary closures and takeovers of company installations. Companies respond to this through a mixture of limited concessions, which then double as Corporate Social Responsibility programs, as well as through local political manipulation (something for which the Volcan Company in Cerro de Paso in particular is locally notorious).




Figure 10 – Mining concessions in Peru, 2009. This includes all areas for which a concession had been granted by the Ministry of Mines by that year. Although most concessions are not in operation at any one time, they still often become sources of conflict with local populations that fear the imminent advent of mining activity.

Source: Cooperación, <http://www.cooperacion.org.pe/NACIONAL.html>.

To a large degree, the difference between the conflicts that seek to stop mines from developing and those that seek to negotiate the terms of operations has to do with the difference between open-pit and underground mining. Both kinds of mining are present in Peru, but since the 1990s open-pit mines have greatly increased as a proportion of the total capital invested, as has occurred throughout the world. All of the projects listed above that have been unable to start operations are open-pit. While some large open-pit mines have been able to proceed, both in the 1990s (Yanacocha, Antamina, Pierina) and in the last few years (Las Bambas, Toromocho, both still in the construction stage), the sentiment against new open-pit projects seems to be on the rise – not in every case, but as a general tendency. It is safe to say that open-pit mining has proven remarkably unpopular in Peru, compared to other types such as underground or small-scale artisanal mining. This is ironic given the image of modernity and responsibility that the mining companies try to project. As Salas (2008) has analyzed, the Peruvian mining industry's contemporary discourse of *minería moderna* relies on an opposition between a problematic past, when little attention was paid to environmental and social issues, and an enlightened present in which modern technology and a newfound sense of corporate responsibility have done away with whatever problems may have existed before. The high-tech nature of open-pit mining is an integral part of this discourse, both because technological developments are explicitly said to solve environmental problems, and because the large, powerful machines that operate in the open pits are iconic of technology and modernity more broadly.

Yet it is precisely the technological advancement of open-pit mining that generates opposition, through two main mechanisms. For one thing, although it is true that now there are environmental remediation programs and techniques, as a result of the 1990 Environmental Code – an adoption of international environmental standards that the Peruvian business sector initially opposed – what the mining industry fails to mention is that the technological leap of open-pit mining also results in much larger amounts of rock and ore processed and in much more waste generated. Tailings are often covered with clay and grass nowadays, and a geomembrane is sometimes used as lining for new tailings deposits, but there are more tailings being produced. It's possible that the generation of contaminants may have decreased as a proportion of output, but production has increased so much that this cancels out the effect. And while underground mining produces tailings (i.e. emissions from the concentrator plant) and only small amounts of

waste rock (i.e. rock discarded before the concentration process), open-pit mining generates large amounts of both.




Figure 11 - Current open-pit mines and open-pit mining projects in Peru (includes large-scale and better-known projects only).

More important, open-pit mining produces larger and more visible alterations upon the landscape, and also requires a greater movement of water both to and from the mine. In a conflict such as Conga, the *ronderos* (i.e. members of the self-organized rural patrols of Cajamarca, or

rondas) have sought to protect a visible local space of lakes, mountains and grasslands from suffering the same fate as the area where the Yanacocha company's five original open pits now sit. Underground mining is hard on the workers, but, although it does generate contamination, it has a smaller impact on the visible, surface environment. Another factor is of course at play here: the nature of the activity that local people engage in. Mining has tended to arouse more opposition in agricultural areas like Tambogrande, Majaz, and Cañaris than in a high-altitude plateau region like Pasco. Even when the proposed pits are situated high up, as in Conga, there is often agricultural activity not too far downstream (unlike in Peru's two large plateaus, the Pasco-Junín plateau and the Collao *altiplano* on the border with Bolivia). Although it is important to question the common discourse of the mining industry and the Peruvian government that tends to portray high-altitude *puna* regions as "uninhabited" or a "wasteland" (*eriazó*), it is true that the animal herding to which these regions are dedicated takes place over a much wider land area than does agriculture. The same number of hectares impacted by an open-pit mine in an agricultural as opposed to a herding area naturally has greater immediate consequences for the livelihoods of a larger number of people, as do any disruptions that may occur in the flow of water.

The other mechanism through which the technologically advanced nature of open-pit mining leads to greater opposition is the high degree of organic composition of capital – in other words, the ratio of non-labor (such as machinery) to labor costs. Open-pit mines require relatively little labor to operate. Labor needs are low both in relation to those of underground mining, and in relation to the much larger capital volumes and larger production that open-pit mining projects involve. Moreover, there is a greater need for qualified, skilled operators, who are often not found in the villages surrounding new mining operations, but rather in the cities or at most in traditional mining areas like Pasco (though even there people often feel they lack access to high-skill mining jobs too). This creates a sense of exclusion and disappointment that can be quite alienating as it constitutes the mining company as an entirely external entity rather than as a source of work. Although as we have seen the long-term tendency towards labor surplus (which is inherent to capitalism but takes a particular form in mining) is present even in underground mining areas like Huayllay, it is sharper around open-pit mines. I became aware of this during my first visit to a new open-pit mining project, the Las Bambas copper project in

Apurímac, southern Peru, in 2005. The President at the time had visited the area and promised a large number of jobs would be created as a result of the project, which quickly became a rumor of “20,000 jobs.” People assumed that this meant direct jobs at the company, but it was actually based on someone’s estimate of long-term, indirect job creation as a result of increased economic activity in the area. At the time of my visit, there were no more than 80 or 90 local people employed in the exploration phase, and the company officially expected that its total workforce during the operations phase would be around 1,000, including both local and non-local people. This had engendered significant malaise at the local level, even if the project eventually managed to surmount the initial protests and proceed with the exploration and construction phases. I believe this is an underemphasized dimension of mine-community conflicts. Certainly, the interest of local populations in mining employment varies greatly depending on the particular history and dynamics of each region; yet enough of a desire and need for jobs has been generated in the country as a whole as to constitute a significant factor in these conflicts.

This is a large part of the reason why not only underground but also artisanal, small-scale mining (usually of gold) does not generate as much local opposition. In recent years, the National Mining Society and its allies have tended to demonize small-scale and informal gold mining as environmentally destructive – in 2010, President Alan García called it “savage mining” (*minería salvaje*). The purpose of this campaign has been to deflect criticisms directed at large-scale mines and to portray critics of the latter as hypocrites, who claim to care about the environmental impacts of large open-pit mines but do not go around opposing artisanal miners, who dump mercury into the rivers as part of the process of extracting gold. While artisanal and informal gold-mining no doubt contaminates the rivers, and often leads to problematic social dynamics, the reason why environmental and social movements have not sought to shut it down is that this kind of mining generally arouses little local opposition in Peru (with some exceptions to be sure). Small-scale mining generates a lot of employment relative to production volumes and values transacted. Without idealizing it, it is a business where people can work and earn their livelihood – just like commerce, transportation or petty commodity production – and that includes their labor and life activity directly, even if it sometimes also exposes them to exploitation, violence and toxic substances such as mercury.

A response to the National Mining Society's arguments would thus need to be built on the affirmation of the fact that environmental issues also have a social dimension. More specifically, exclusion constitutes a central experience in the world today (Hoogvelt 2001), and in Peru this is as much behind the mine-community conflicts as are the issues of local space and environment, which are also no doubt crucial. And while in the last few years the large-scale mining industry has generated significant financial wealth for the national and also the regional and local governments, due to the combined effect of high metal prices and new mechanisms for the decentralization of tax revenue arising from the resource sector (i.e. the *canon minero*), people often still see this as something external to themselves, and not something for which they will necessarily sacrifice their local space. And although the *canon minero* does often stimulate the local economy in the short run, through the promotion of employment in the construction of public works, Arellano (2011) has shown that it has yet to result in any measurable improvement in living conditions or social indicators (relative to non-mining areas); rather, it often seems to generate more social conflict over the control of the resources and to promote the growth of mafias around municipalities.

Returning to underground mining, which has been the subject of the majority of this dissertation, here the dynamics of exclusion are less intense, but still present in a different way. Some Peruvian analysts had been quick to declare that this kind of mining belonged to the past and that it had become a relic in the new world of open-pit mines. Yet since 2003, the rise in metal prices, as a result of the industrialization of China, has again stimulated production in underground metal mines, even in some that had closed in the 1980s. Whether this is a short-term or long-term phenomenon, for the time being it is safe to say that the rumors of the demise of underground mining have been greatly exaggerated. In any case, open-pit methods are not necessarily applicable to all kinds of ore bodies, including some of the silver-lead-zinc veins found in much of Pasco Department. Thus, in the last few years, young men from the region have been working at the underground mines again. Although there is technological change that is ongoing, this is a continuation of the mechanization that began in the 1970s (i.e. trackless mining systems), not a new technical revolution.




Figure 12 – Underground mines in Peru, in operation during all or part of the post-2003 mining boom.

Yet although there is a demand for workers at the underground mines, this is not nearly enough to match the increased supply of labor; this has to do with the long-term emergence of a labor surplus discussed in the first chapter. Moreover, dramatic changes in the organization of labor took place in the 1990s, even if they had been germinating for a longer period of time. For

one thing, the adoption of aspects of the Long-Distance Commuting (LDC) model has meant that mining companies and their contractors can now bring more of the best-qualified operators from other regions and cities, by car or bus, even if they are not willing to move their families to the mine. This “annihilation of space” (Harvey 1991, 205) tends to reduce the access of local people to jobs even when these exist at the mine; this occurs particularly with the more high-skilled positions.

For local people who do find jobs at the mines, the most salient changes when compared to the past are the proliferation of contracting (as opposed to direct employment by the mines), the rise of temporary as opposed to stable contracts, and the shift to the “accumulated time systems” or *sistemas* that entail a certain number of 12-hour work days followed by a period of rest. In Peruvian legislation, these were initially called “atypical work days” (*jornadas atípicas*), but in the mines they have become the norm. The introduction of the 12-hour day in the 1990s and early 2000s often took place in a chaotic, abusive fashion - as one Human Resources officer explained to me, in some mines there were systems like 30x10 (i.e. 30 12-hour days followed by 10 rest days). By the time of my research, in mines like Huarón and Cerro de Pasco the “atypical work day” had stabilized into the 14x7 system, as mandated by national legislation and authorities. While certainly less abusive than what occurred in the late 1990s, this *sistema* still entails a higher exaction of labor than under the old 8-hour day.⁴⁰⁴ By and large, the attitude I have encountered regarding the *sistemas* is a mix of stoicism, resignation and ambivalence. I cannot claim that there is no unrest inside the workplace over the increase in labor exaction and

⁴⁰⁴ One mine official explained to me that the rationale of the 14x7 system is that, although the signs at the mine say that the two shifts are 8am-8pm and 8pm-8am, the new work day really includes only 10.4 hours of actual work – if lunchtime and changing and transit time are not taken into account. This thus results in 2.4 hours above the 8-hour day, which over the course of 14 days translates into a total of 33.6 accumulated hours, i.e. around four 8-hour days. When combined with the weekend days the worker has lost over the course of two weeks (two Saturdays, which used to be half-days, plus two Sundays), this yields the 7 days of rest to which the worker is then entitled. What this does not take into account is the fact that the old 8-hour day did usually include lunchtime and transit time within the company grounds and mine. As former workers have told me, the actual working time was not 8 hours but less – and labor discipline was lower in those days anyway. Thus, the old 8-hour shift would need to be compared with the full shift today, i.e. 12 hours, not with the 10.4 hours of “actual work.” By my calculations, this would then yield 10 rest days, not 7, for each 14 days of work (i.e. 7 days of accumulated time plus 3 weekend days). It should also be emphasized that, although the 12-hour period includes transit time within the mine and company grounds, it does not generally include commuting time from the home in the town to the company. When this is taken into account, it can be as much as 14 hours from the time the workers leave home to the time they return.

labor discipline in general, but in my interviews and conversations, and in public discourse, these issues were not seen as something that people could change or influence.

By contrast, there is significant and unambiguous bitterness over the contracting system and the lack of labor stability, as well as over the barriers to employment. More importantly, communities like Huayllay place the switching of workers from *contrata* to *planilla* (i.e. a mining company's payroll) among their central demands during negotiations over the use of communal lands. In this way, the community's hold over the land is used in an attempt, however limited, to partially overcome one aspect of capital's dominance in the organization of labor. While people generally do not see the *comunidad* as having the ability to interfere with what goes on inside the workplace, they do assert its right to intervene in the hiring process, and to demand jobs, especially *planilla* jobs, for *comuneros*. Additionally, they seek contracts for the communal company, with the latter seen above all as a mechanism to create job opportunities for the community's young people. This intersection of employment and contracting issues with those of land is not limited to Huayllay; it has also characterized, most markedly, the conflicts between the community of Huaraucaca (even more dependent on mining and on its communal company) and the Brocal Company. It is also present in Rancas, although to a lesser degree, given that community's lower degree of dependence on mining employment.

The ability of communities to affect the hiring practices of mining companies is real but very limited. However, as I showed in Chapter 6, there is another aspect that is central to the company-community *convenios*, especially in Huayllay. That is the transfer of the "social burden" from the labor relation to the mine-community relation based around land. For the most part, company compounds now only house the upper-level staff and the more skilled technicians. For the other workers, the camp has fused with the local town and to some degree with the *comunidad*. The kinds of benefits and programs that used to be negotiated through the labor relation are now obtained through the agreements over land. This is particularly the case around education, where the community obtains scholarships, training programs and support for local schools and, in the case of Huayllay, the local technical institute. Some of these education programs are meant to help with the access to employment also, since they provide training and skills required to obtain work at the mines nowadays. More broadly, the company-community

agreements have become a repository for people's expectations of progress and advancement, and for the defense of local dignity and self-respect against a powerful outside entity.

While the labor *convenios* have gone from being socially “thick” to being socially “thin,” the land *convenios* have gone from being socially “thin” to being socially “thick.” There has been a transfer in the relative strength of politically salient identities, from a community of workers and their families to a *comunidad* of communal landowners (many of whom happen to work in the mine). The latter existed before, but it has increased in importance and strength even as the former has declined, and it has come to include many of the same people. This strengthening of the *comunidad campesina* as a political actor has come about not only as a result of companies' increased need for land, but also as an outcome both of global processes and of the particular history of land recuperation in Peru in the second half of the 20th century. The failure of the occasional attempts by the neoliberal state since the 1990s to facilitate the alienation of land in highland and Amazonian Peru has also contributed to this process. Furthermore, I would argue there is a “surplus” that overflows the forms set by struggles over value – struggles in which capital reigned supreme in the last years of the 20th century, as it externalized its “frailty” (Kliman 2012, 2) towards workers and towards the poor. This surplus, which in a sense is the social itself, then expresses itself through other forms, which have their own lines of inclusion and exclusion – as in the case of the *comunidad campesina*.

I believe such a perspective may help us to highlight the ways in which identities in capitalism shift over time, how some become more salient and others less so. Although these identities and positions can sometimes enter into contradiction with one another, there is a common underlying social terrain that has its own logic and does not necessarily follow the dictates of capital, even if it is influenced by them. The changes described in this dissertation may be specific to some mining regions of Peru during particular periods of time, but they point to certain wider dynamics in global capitalism, as well as more broadly to the connections and continuities underlying social divisions and shifts. In the particular geographic and historical setting discussed here, dynamics and relations such as labor, land, community and contests over local space appear all together in one place. In other contexts, they may be more separate, involving different sets of individuals. Nevertheless, social analysis still needs to find a way to

bring them into dialogue with one another, because sooner or later they will come into contact, fusion or conflict in the social world, either through their presence or, as in the case of labor in open-pit mines, through their absence or scarcity. And, in so far as labor, land and other forms are “burdened” by the social, we need to better understand the relation between the social and the “economic” sphere that emerges from it but that increasingly asserts its own autonomy and “objective” laws, in turn shaping the constraints and partially limiting the options available in the social world.

Appendix A

Migration to the Huarón Mine: Long-term Trends

A. Migration to Huayllay District in 1940-42

The first set of data I present here, in Table 2, comes from one book of *actas* (minutes) from 1940-42. All 102 cases in that set of *actas* were examined. I have chosen to count each of the two parties to a dispute as a unit of analysis, resulting in a total of 204 individuals for whom location of origin is taken into account in my analysis.⁴⁰⁵ The litigants' places of origin are classified into seven categories: first, (1) Huayllay District itself (including both the villages of Huayllay and Huaychao as well as the outlying *estancias* and *haciendas*), followed by the outside locations from which people migrated: (2) the rest of the Pasco/Junín Plateau, on the edge of which Huayllay sits; (3) the broad, agricultural valley of the Mantaro River to the south; (4) the highlands of Lima Department, in particular the upper basins of the rivers Chancay, Huaura and Chillón; (5) the Chaupihuaranga Valley (Daniel Alcides Carrión Province) and other narrow mountain valleys (*quebradas*) in Pasco Department; (6) the department of Huánuco to the north; and finally (7) "other" locations which cannot easily be grouped with the others. Thus, rather than classify places of origin strictly according to provincial, departmental or other political divisions, I have grouped them into categories that combine political, geographical and cultural criteria. I believe these categories are more meaningful and useful for the analyst; they

⁴⁰⁵ In other words, if there were several family members accompanying the main litigant, they are not counted separately, even if their place of origin (which is almost always the same as the main litigant's) is given in the transcript. When a case consists of one spouse bringing a complaint against the other, I do count them separately, even if they are from the same location. It would have been too difficult and too speculative to attempt to delineate exact family or household units in the cases and take them as units of analysis; this would have been further complicated by the fact that many of the cases consist precisely of households in the process of dissolution.

also come closer to the ways in which people in the area of my research distinguish among spatial and geographical areas.⁴⁰⁶

Table 2: Migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1940-1942 cases, by geographical category

| Region of Origin | All parties to disputes | Parties to disputes with a stated connection (occupation or residence) to Huarón mine | Parties to disputes who were from outside district (i.e. migration only) |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|---|--|
| Huayllay District | 77 (45%) | 30 (28%) | ----- |
| Pasco/Junín Plateau | 33 (19%) | 23 (21%) | 33 (34%) |
| Mantaro Valley | 31 (18%) | 23 (21%) | 31 (32%) |
| Lima Highlands | 15 (9%) | 14 (13%) | 15 (16%) |
| Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys | 10 (6%) | 10 (9%) | 10 (10%) |
| Huánuco | 3 (2%) | 3 (3%) | 3 (3%) |
| Other | 4 (2%) | 4 (4%) | 4 (4%) |
| TOTAL STATED | 173 (100%) | 107 (100%) | 96 (100%) |
| Unstated/unclear place of origin | 31 | 11 | ---- |
| TOTAL | 204 | 118 | 96 |

The first column of Table 2 includes all 204 parties to disputes. Of those, 173 individuals had their place of origin listed, while for 31 individuals it was either unclear or not stated at all. The percentages given for each geographical category are proportions of this total of 173 locations. As we can see, 45% of litigants listed a location within Huayllay district – either the villages of Huayllay or Huaychao, one of the local *haciendas* or an outlying *estancia* – as their place of origin. Often, they were simply recorded as being “native to this locality” (*natural de este lugar*). The next most common locations were the Pasco/Junín plateau and the Mantaro Valley, with 19% and 18%, respectively, followed by the rest of the categories. It is possible, however, that this data does not accurately reflect the relative proportions between people native

⁴⁰⁶ Thus, I have included the Pasco/Junín plateau (also known as Bombón Plateau) as one unit that straddles both Pasco and Junín departments, while the Mantaro Valley further to the south, though belonging to the political jurisdiction of Junín department, stands alone as its own cultural/geographical unit. The non-plateau areas of Pasco Department – the narrow mountain valleys or *quebradas* – are grouped together in one unit that includes the Chaupihuaranga Valley (an area with its own regional identity) but also the Tingo River and other tributaries of the Upper Huallaga. On the other hand, the department of Huánuco appears as a single unit, coinciding with its political jurisdiction.

to Huayllay district versus individuals who had migrated from outside. Rather, it probably overestimates the former and underestimates the latter. It seems probable that native-born *huayllinos* would have been more likely than migrants to go to the *Juez de Paz*, since they would have recognized him as a local authority and might know him personally; migrants might have elected to resolve their disputes in their own towns, during their trips back home.

The second column takes a different approach by including only the 118 individuals (out of the total 204) who had a connection to the Huarón mining company that was explicitly stated. This was either through their occupation (most commonly *obrero*), their place of current residence (one of the Huarón workers' camps), or by being a spouse (married or *conviviente*) to someone who fit those categories. This information needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Some individuals have been excluded from Column 2 because they explicitly stated either an occupation not directly related to mining (such as shepherd or cattle-raiser) or a place of residence that would indicate a non-mining occupation (such as the *estancias* or the *haciendas*).⁴⁰⁷ Although this exclusion is certainly an oversimplification, since people often went back and forth between occupations and places of residence, it is of some limited use in distinguishing between those with a direct connection to mining at a particular moment in time and those without. However, there are also some individuals for whom neither place of residence nor occupation was recorded; in their case, they have been left out of Column 2 because of uncertainty – they may have worked or lived at the mine, but we do not know for sure. Thus, Column 2 likely excludes certain individuals who really should be included. Still, it provides a picture that is closer to being an accurate representation of the Huarón mining camps only, rather than the district as a whole. In this sense, it makes sense that the number of individuals native to Huayllay district would drop dramatically from Column 1 to Column 2 – the former included many people who simply lived in the district but were not working at the mine. Migrants from outside the district, on the other hand, usually came for the mine, and so for them the difference between Column 1 and Column 2 is not as dramatic. Whereas for people from Huayllay the number drops by over 60% from Column 1 to Column 2, for people from the Pasco/Junín

⁴⁰⁷ Or, in the case of 6 individuals, they have been left out of Column 2 because they lived in one of the other, more distant mining camps in the area, not in Huarón. Namely, there were 4 individuals in Río Pallanga (outside the district's boundaries, to the west) and 2 in Vanadium Corp.

Plateau and from the Mantaro Valley it drops by only 1/4, and for the other locations it hardly drops at all.⁴⁰⁸

Column 3 takes yet a different approach by excluding not those without a stated direct connection to the Huarón mine (as in Column 2) but rather all those who did not explicitly state a place of origin other than Huayllay district. The purpose of this is to leave aside the issue of the overrepresentation of locals vis-a-vis migrants referred to earlier; Column 3 focuses only on those who explicitly stated they were migrants, and gives the relative weights of the different locations of origin. It does not distinguish by place of residence or occupation as Column 2 does; rather, it simply reproduces the numbers from Column 1, but with the figures for Huayllay District and for the “uncertain” category left out, and the percentages for the other categories recalculated accordingly. Here we see the Mantaro Valley and the Pasco/Junín Plateau each account for almost 1/3 of migrants who came before the Huayllay *Juzgado*. The Lima Highlands follow with 16%, the Chaupihuaranga Valley and nearby *quebradas* with 10%, and Huánuco with only 3%.

To complement this analytical picture with a more impressionistic image, Table 3 provides the specific locations of origin recorded in the *Juzgado* minutes – i.e., the raw material from which the categories in Table 2 were derived. The documents list each location at varying degrees of specificity: some give the name of the town, some only the district, others only the province or general area, and yet others only the department. The locations given probably do

⁴⁰⁸ Also, the reasons for the drop are different in each case. Among the 47 individuals from Huayllay who were weeded out in the process of moving from Column 1 to Column 2, 29 (62%) were left out because they explicitly state an occupation or place of residence that indicates a lack of direct connection to the Huarón company. They are thus justifiably excluded from Column 2. Only in 18 individuals (38% of the 47 excluded) is there actual uncertainty – no place of residence or occupation is recorded (only place of origin), so their exclusion from Column 2 might not be justified. On the other hand, for the Mantaro Valley individuals, out of 8 who are excluded from Column 2, only 3 appear with occupations or places of residence disconnected from the mine; in 5 of the cases the information is simply not recorded, and it is likely that they did actually have a connection to the mine. This makes sense if we remember that the Mantaro Valley is distant from Huayllay and people would be unlikely to come for any reason other than the mine. Among the Plateau individuals, on the other hand, the picture is more similar to those from Huayllay: out of 9 individuals left out of Column 2, most of them (7) explicitly state occupations or places of residence not directly connected to the mine, and only 2 are cases of actual uncertainty. Again, this makes sense given that the category I have labeled as the “Pasco/Junín Plateau” is the closest to Huayllay district itself; the latter is actually part of the former geographically, and the distinction made here between the two is solely to differentiate between the strictly local (Huayllay) and close-range migration (the plateau). People from the plateau towns may easily have gone to Huayllay for purposes other than mining, such as trading or because their grazing lands actually straddled district boundaries. However, it should be noted that the numbers discussed here are quite small and thus these conclusions are partly speculative.

not get at all of the complexity of local geographies: someone may give the name of a district seat, but they may actually be from an *anexo* or sub-district jurisdiction, or they may maintain a base in more than one district at once. In the rest of the cases, where the specific town or district name was given, I have given the corresponding province in which it is located – using contemporary provincial divisions rather than those existing at the time (there have been significant shifts in provincial boundaries in the years since).

**Table 3 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón 1940-42 cases, specific locations of origin
(Migrants only)**

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| Pasco/Junín Plateau (33) | Cerro de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 6 Ninacaca (Pasco Prov.) – 4 Vicco (Pasco Prov.) – 2 Carhuamayo (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Pasco Prov. – 2* Ondores (Junín Prov.) – 5 Pari – (Ondores Dist. - Junín Prov.) - 5 Junín (Junín Prov.)– 4 Ulcumayo (Junín Prov.) – 1 Marcapomacocha (Yauli-La Oroya Prov.) – 1 Yauli (Yauli-La Oroya Prov.) – 1 La Oroya (Yauli-La Oroya Prov.) – 1 |
| Mantaro Valley (31) | Muquiyauyo (Jauja Prov.) – 4 Huamalí (Jauja Prov.) – 4 Masma-Chichhe (Jauja Prov.) -2 Huancaní (Jauja Prov.) – 2 Marco (Jauja Prov.) – 2 Julcán (Jauja Prov.) – 1 San Lorenzo (Jauja Prov.) – 1 Parco (Jauja Prov.) – 1 Masma (Jauja Prov.) - 1 Jauja Prov. – 5* Concepción Prov. – 4 San Jerónimo (Huancayo Prov.) – 3 Huancayo Prov. – 1* |
| Lima Highlands (15) | Oyón Prov. – 7 Vichaycocha (Huaral Prov.) - 3 Pacaraos (Huaral Prov.) – 1 San Lorenzo de Quinte (Huarochirí Prov.) – 1 Huarochirí Prov. – 1* Canta Prov. – 1 Yauyos Prov. – 1 |

| | |
|--|--|
| Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco Dept.) (10) | Tápuc (D.A.C. Prov. ⁴⁰⁹) – 5 Goyllarisquizga (D.A.C. Prov.) – 2 Yanahuanca (D.A.C. Prov.) – 1 Ticlacayán (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Huariaca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 |
| Huánuco (3) | Dos de Mayo Prov. – 2 Ambo – 1 |
| Other (4) | Palcamayo (Tarma Prov.) – 1 Puerto Bermúdez (Oxapampa Prov. – eastern lowlands) – 1 San Martín Dept. (eastern lowlands) - 1 Huancavelica Dept. (south-central Peru) – 1 |

*These cases, in which only the province name was given, are in addition to the cases which list a more specific location within the same province.

B. Migration to Huayllay District in 1969

We have already mentioned the limitations of this archive as a source of evidence on migration to the Huarón mine. It constitutes an indirect source, having been produced not as part of employment procedures but rather in the sorting out of interpersonal disputes within the domain of everyday life. However, if we can detect trends over time within the evidence provided by the archive – that is, compare sets of cases from different years, all of them presumably having more or less the same limitations as sources – then the results might be significant. Table 4 presents cases from one book of *Juzgado* minutes from 1969, about 27 years after the data presented earlier. As with the 1940-42 material, all cases in the 1969 book were reviewed; this amounted to 64 cases and a total of 127 parties to disputes.

⁴⁰⁹ Daniel Alcides Carrión Province, which more or less corresponds to the Chaupihuaranga Valley.

Table 4 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1969 cases, by geographical category

| Region of origin | All parties to disputes | | All parties to disputes who were from outside the district (i.e. migration only) | |
|---|-------------------------|---------------|--|---------------|
| Huayllay District | 50 | (50%) | --- | |
| Pasco/Junín Plateau | 21 | (21%) | 21 | (41%) |
| Huánuco | 13 | (13%) | 13 | (25%) |
| Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco Dept.) | 8 | (8%) | 8 | (16%) |
| Mantaro Valley | 6 | (6%) | 6 | (12%) |
| Lima Highlands | 1 | (1%) | 1 | (2%) |
| Other | 2 | (2%) | 2 | (4%) |
| TOTAL STATED | 101 | (100%) | 51 | (100%) |
| Unstated | 26 | | ---- | |
| TOTAL | 127 | | 51 | |

The categories for Region of Origin are the same as in Table 2. The data is presented in two columns that correspond to Columns 1 and 3 in the previous table. The former Column 2 – which isolated the individuals who explicitly stated they worked at and/or lived in the Huarón mining complex - does not find an equivalent in the 1969 cases, because for some reason residence and occupation were recorded much less consistently that year. Thus, Column 1 presents all parties to disputes, while Column 2 presents only those who had migrated from outside the district, with the percentages recalculated accordingly.

As we can see, people native to Huayllay District still account for around half of all parties to disputes, as in 1940-42. The Pasco/Junín plateau is still an important source of migrants, but the Mantaro Valley has decreased from around 1/3 of migrants to only 12%. The highlands of Lima have decreased from 16% to 2% of migrants. Huánuco, on the other hand, has emerged as an important region of origin, accounting for around ¼ of migrants. The decrease in migrants from the Mantaro Valley and the increase in those from Huánuco is thus the most important aspect that emerges in comparing the 1969 cases to those from 1940-42. Table 4 presents the specific locations listed in the 1969 cases.

**Table 5 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1969 cases, specific locations of origin
(Migrants only)**

| | |
|---|---|
| Pasco/Junín Plateau (21) | Ulcumayo (Junín Prov.) – 5 Pari (Ondores Dist., Junín Prov.) – 4 Ondores (Junín Prov.) – 2 Villa de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 2 Cerro de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Ninacaca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Colquijirca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Vicco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Cochamarca (Vicco Dist., Pasco Prov.) – 1 Carhuamayo (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Carhuacayán (Yauli La Oroya Prov.) – 1 Morococha (Yauli La Oroya Prov.) – 1 |
| Huánuco (13) | Llata (Huamalíes Prov.) – 2 La Libertad – Llata (Huamalíes Prov.) – 1 Miraflores (Huamalíes Prov.) – 1 Tantamayo (Huamalíes Prov.) – 1 Sillapata (Dos de Mayo Prov.) – 1 Dos de Mayo Prov. – 2* Cauri (Lauricocha Prov.) – 1 Baños (Lauricocha Prov.) – 1 Ambo Prov. – 1 Huánuco Dept. (unspecified) – 2 |
| Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco Dept.) (8) | Yanahuanca (D.A.C. Province) – 2 Goyllarisquizga (D.A.C. Province) – 1 Cajamarquilla (Yanacancha Dist. – Pasco Prov.) – 2 Quiparacra (Huachón Dist. – Pasco Prov.) – 2 Vinchos (Pallanchacra Dist. – Pasco Prov.) – 1 |
| Mantaro Valley (6) | Masma (Jauja Prov.) – 2 Tingo Paccha – Acolla (Jauja Prov.) – 1 Jauja Prov. – 1* San Jerónimo (Huancayo Prov.) – 1 Huancayo – 1 |
| Lima Highlands (1) | Santa Catalina – Santa Cruz de Andamarca Dist. (Huaral Prov.) – 1 |
| Others (2) | Azángaro Prov. (Puno Dept.) – 1 Ancash Dept. – 1 |

* These cases, in which only the province name was given, are in addition to the cases which list a more specific location within the same province.

C. Migration to Huayllay District in 1975-76

It could be argued that the 1969 cases are too few to make conclusions about trends. However, in Table 6 we give yet another set of data, close in time to that of Table 4: a book of *Juzgado de Paz* cases from 1975-76. Here every other case from the book has been recorded, resulting in a total of 52 cases. Note, however, that here the individuals are labeled as “parties to disputes present before judge” rather than simply “parties to disputes” as in the previous two tables. This is because the format of the cases is different— rather than both parties to each dispute being present and stating their location of origin, the 1975-76 book mostly consists of single individuals bringing a complaint against a person not present (often it is a woman bringing a complaint against her partner). Thus, here there is one person per case, rather than two as in the previous tables. Other than that, the columns in the table are the same as in Table 2: 1) all parties present before the judge); 2) people who explicitly mentioned either an occupation or a place of residence connected to the mine; 3) all people who were from outside Huayllay District – i.e., migrants only.

Table 6 – migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1975-1976 cases, by geographical category

| Region of Origin | All parties to disputes present before judge | All parties to disputes present before judge who mentioned a direct connection to mining in Huayllay | All parties to disputes present before judge who were from outside district (i.e. migration only) |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Huayllay District | 25 (48%) | 8 (28%) | --- |
| Huánuco | 11 (21%) | 9 (31%) | 11 (41%) |
| Pasco/Junín Plateau | 8 (15%) | 5 (17%) | 8 (30%) |
| Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys | 4 (8%) | 3 (10%) | 4 (15%) |
| Mantaro Valley | 3 (6%) | 3 (10%) | 3 (11%) |
| Lima Highlands | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 1 (2%) | 1 (3%) | 1 (4%) |
| TOTAL STATED | 52 (100%) | 29 (100%) | 27 (100%) |
| Unstated | 3 | 0 | ---- |
| TOTAL | 55 | 29 | 27 |

As we can see, the 1975-76 data confirm the trends seen in the 1969 table. The Mantaro Valley has decreased in importance as a source of migrants, while Huánuco has grown in importance. On the other hand, the Pasco/Junín plateau, as well as Huayllay District itself, have more or less stayed at the same level. Table 7 gives the specific locations of origin for the 1975-76 cases.

Table 7 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón - 1975-76 cases, specific locations of origin (migrants only)

| | |
|---|--|
| Huánuco (11) | Baños (Lauricocha Prov.) – 2 Marías (Dos de Mayo Prov.) – 2 Dos de Mayo Prov. – 2* Margos (Huánuco Prov.) – 1 Chupán (Yarowilca Prov.) – 1 Llata (Huamalíes Prov.) - 1 Marañón (Marañón Province?)– 1 Huánuco Dept. (unspecified) – 1 |
| Pasco/Junín Plateau (8) | Carhuamayo (Pasco Prov.) – 2 Ninacaca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Vicco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Villa de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Smelter (Tinyahuarco Dist. – Pasco Prov.) - 1 Racco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 Ulcumayo (Junín Prov.) – 1 |
| Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco Dept.) (4) | Yanahuanca (D.A.C. Prov.) – 2 Páucar (D.A.C. Prov.) - 1 Yarusyacán (Pasco Prov.) – 1 |
| Mantaro Valley (3) | Chupaca – 1 Huancayo – 1 Jauja Prov. – 1 |
| Others (1) | Puno Dept. – 1 |

* This case, in which only the province name was given, is in addition to the cases which list a more specific location within the same province.

The Mantaro Valley and Huánuco are both relatively far from the Huarón mine (albeit in opposite directions – to the south and north, respectively) while the plateau is relatively close, since it includes Huayllay itself. Thus, we can say that there was a shift from one relatively long-distance source of migrants to another (i.e. from the Mantaro Valley to Huánuco), while the areas at close-to-medium distance from the Huarón mine remained important sources of migrants throughout the periods examined here. This is the broad arch that the data analyzed in this

section presents. Even if the amount of data presented here is too small to draw definite arguments, the fact that the 1969 and the 1975-76 data independently reinforce each other serves to strengthen these conclusions.

Nevertheless, several additional complexities must be taken into account, in addition to the ones already mentioned. The type of migration from each place – short-term vs. long-term, or individual vs. family - might have made a difference in the degree to which it shows up in the documents from the *Juzgado*. This is not always easy to predict. Short-term migrants would have been less likely to have family with them, thus removing one potential source of disputes of the kind that could lead to appearing before the *Juez*. On the other hand, they might be more likely to form short-term relationships at the camp, which could easily lead to a type of dispute that appears very frequently in the documents: complaints from former *convivientes* (common-law spouses) seeking recognition of children as well as payment of child support. It is thus hard to say whether these factors would have led to either overestimating or underestimating the importance of particular groups within the population of the mining camps. Similarly, it is difficult to predict how the relative socioeconomic status of different groups of migrants, as well as their level of integration into the formal education system, would have affected the rate at which they appear in the documents examined here. On the one hand, Brandt's (1990) study of the institution of the *Juzgado de Paz* in Peru argues that it is visited most frequently by rural and working-class people rather than by the elite or the middle class, who tend instead to consult with professional lawyers and judges. In Huayllay, the near-absence of *hacendados* and of mining company engineers and officials from the *Juzgado* minutes (when we know they were present in the area) seems to confirm this for the local area. On the other hand, within the popular sector, differences in access to education and socioeconomic development might have played a role in ways we are unaware of. Would a mining worker with at least a few years of high school education be less likely to go to the *Juzgado* than one with only elementary education?⁴¹⁰ Would

⁴¹⁰ Sulmont and Valcárcel (1993) give data on years of schooling at several mines, including Huarón in 1986. That year, 34% of Huarón workers had attended elementary school but not completed it, 28% had complete elementary but no secondary education, 18% had started secondary school without finishing it, and another 18% had finished high school. It should be emphasized that in the latter half of the 20th century educational level at Huarón was strongly associated to generational change; this is evident not just in the history of the founding of the various schools in the area, but also in how people talk about the subject.

the more skilled workers from the Mantaro Valley have been more or less likely to seek the assistance of the *Juez de Paz* than those from the *quebradas* in Pasco and Huánuco?

Also, the geographical categories utilized here are not the only way that I could have chosen to organize the data. In particular, some of the categories could have been combined. Namely, as indicated earlier, the individuals from Huayllay district could have been included within the category for the Pasco/Junín plateau. Huayllay sits at the edge of this plateau, close to where the terrain shifts into a series of mountain peaks that mark the continental divide leading into the western slopes of the Andes and the Pacific Ocean. The reason for distinguishing between Huayllay District and the plateau is simply to differentiate between a strictly local population and one that had migrated even if only a limited distance. Also, the category for the Chaupihuaranga and other nearby valleys could have been combined with that for Huánuco, since both areas in a sense form a single agrarian region with deep historical interconnections – this is how Mayer's (2002, 147) map presents it. If this was done, then this combined region would account for 13% of migrants in the 1940-42 documents, 41% of migrants in 1969, and 56% of migrants in the 1975-76 documents (i.e. using the data in the rightmost column of Tables 2, 4 and 6). This thus highlights the increase in migration from this combined region even more.

Appendix B

The 1940-42 Juzgado de Paz documents as sources on the mining population and as sources on other sectors of local society

The discussion here pertains to the archival material from the Huayllay *Juzgado de Paz* for the years 1940-42 that is examined in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. As noted there, these documents pertain to Huayllay district as a whole, not just to the Huarón mine. Here I discuss the degree to which this material allows us to examine social dynamics at the mine, and the degree to which it concerns the rest of the surrounding locality; both are of interest here, but in different ways.

In the 1940-42 *actas* we have 98 cases⁴¹¹; of these, 62 cases (63.3%) have at least one party to the dispute (and usually both parties⁴¹²) with a direct connection to the Huarón mine – either because they stated that they worked there and/or resided in one of the company’s camps.⁴¹³ Specifically, 45 cases (45.9 % of the total 98 cases) had at least one party to the

⁴¹¹ Although most of the cases appear only once in the 1940-42 book of *actas*, a few (4 cases) stretch out over two or more dates, meaning that the parties to the dispute went back to the *Juez de Paz* because the issue had not been settled to their satisfaction. I do not count each appearance separately, but rather count them together as one case.

⁴¹² In a few of the cases, the two parties to the dispute state different places of residence. That is why in the analysis in this paragraph I try to say “at least one party to the dispute.” In the great majority of cases, however, both parties either state or imply (for example, by being *convivientes* or cohabitators) that they have the same place of residence. Most of the cases are between people living close to each other.

⁴¹³ There are a few cases where an individual lists his occupation as *obrero* but does not say explicitly that he is employed at the Huarón company. I do count these cases as “having a direct connection to the Huarón mine,” since it seems most likely that that is the case – i.e., it seems highly unlikely that such a person would be a worker in one of the other, more remote mines in the district at the time: Vanadium Company of America, which is named in only one case, and Río Pallanga, which is named in only two cases (as opposed to Huarón which is named in many if not the majority of cases). Hypothetically, this could result in an overestimation of people with a connection to the Huarón mine. On the other hand, however, there are a few other cases of individuals who had migrated to Huayllay from outside the district, and who most likely were there because of the Huarón mine, but they did not explicitly state an employer or place of residence or an occupation like *obrero*. I do not count them. This partly compensates for any overestimation that could result from the previous factor – i.e., from counting all *obreros* as Huarón workers even if they did not explicitly say which mine they worked at.

dispute (usually both) who listed one of the Huarón company's camps as their place of residence. By comparison, only 1 case included someone who listed as their place of residence one of the camps of the other mining company in the district, the Vanadium Corporation of America; 2 cases involved individuals living in the Río Pallanga mine from the adjacent district. In 27 cases (27.6% of the total 98), at least one party to the dispute (and usually both) gave a village or rural location in Huayllay District as their residence – either the villages of Huayllay, Huaychao, an estancia or one of the district's haciendas (Cónoc, El Diezmo, Huáscar), or simply stated that they were *vecino de este lugar* (a resident/citizen of this place). Although they may have lived outside the mine compound, a few of these individuals did list occupations related to the mine. Only five cases included parties to the dispute who resided outside the district – in places nearby like Vichaycocha, Pari or Ondores, or further away like La Oroya and Concepción; these were there because the other party to the dispute resided in Huayllay district. Finally, in 23 of the 98 cases (23.5% of the total) neither of the parties to the dispute listed their place of residence; they may have resided in the mine camp, or they may have lived in the villages, estancias or haciendas. Some of them do however list an occupation related to the mine.

Appendix C

Marriage and *convivencia* according to the Census: 1940 and 2007

Table 8 provides the figures for the different categories of marital status among individuals over 12 years old – single, married, *conviviente*, separated, divorced, and widowed – in Rancas, Huayllay, as well as their respective districts and the departmental and national figures, according to the 2007 National Census.

Given the general prestige attached to civil/church marriage, it's conceivable that the figure for that category might be overstated. Similarly, some of those who appear as "single" may simply have been indicating that they had not had a civil or church marriage. Both factors would tend to underestimate the number of *convivientes*. Nevertheless, these figures serve as a general illustration of the variation in terms of the relative weight of *convivencia*, on the one hand, and civil/church marriage, on the other, even among proximate locations. As we can see, Rancas has a significantly higher rate of marriage than Huayllay, and a similarly higher rate of "single" individuals, resulting in a lower rate of *convivencia*.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹⁴ The potential reasons for this difference are too many to know which to choose; one factor is Huayllay's status today as a place of residence for the Huarón and Animón mines (since the mine camps were demolished in the 1990s), which would lead to the presence of more people in their 20s and 30s – who tend to be married or *convivientes* – as opposed to individuals who are 12, 13 or 14 years old and who tend to be single. The figures for Simón Bolívar district as a whole – which includes, in addition to Rancas, part of the urban area of Cerro de Pasco, as well as several villages and rural areas dotted with *estancias* – are closer to those for Huayllay. The departmental and national figures are situated between Rancas and Huayllay – although somewhat closer to the latter.

Table 8: Marital Status, individuals ages 12 and over, according to 2007 Census

| | Single | <i>Conviviente</i> | Married | Separated | Divorced | Widowed | TOTAL |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------|
| Rancas (town) ⁴¹⁵ | 304 (42.16%) | 108 (14.98%) | 257 (35.64%) | 14 (1.94%) | --- | 38 (5.27%) | 721 |
| Simón Bolívar dist. (inc. Rancas) ⁴¹⁶ | 4,277 (40.8%) | 2,385 (22.8%) | 3,097 (29.6%) | 262 (2.5%) | 31 (0.3%) | 421 (4%) | 10,473 |
| Huayllay (town) | 1,744 (35.18%) | 1,670 (33.68%) | 1,277 (25.76%) | 106 (2.14%) | 7 (0.14%) | 154 (3.11%) | 4,958 |
| Huayllay dist. | 2,778 (33.86%) | 2,800 (34.13%) | 2,151 (26.22%) | 178 (2.17%) | 19 (0.23%) | 279 (3.40%) | 8,205 |
| Pasco Dept. (dept.-wide %) | (39.7%) | (26.7%) | (26.2%) | (3%) | (0.4%) | (4%) | |
| Peru (nat'l %) | (39%) | (24.6%) | (28.6%) | (3.4%) | (0.5%) | (3.9%) | |

Source: INEI, Censos 2007 de Población y Vivienda

Returning to the 1940s – the period of our archival material - we can similarly examine census data, this time from the 1940 Census. When it comes to marital status, the published results for that census are not broken up by nucleated settlement or district, but rather simply by province. In Table 9, rather than comparing different towns and districts near Huarón and Cerro de Pasco, I have selected several of the provinces from which people migrated to the Huarón mine, as discussed in the previous chapter. The category “Pasco Province” in 1940 actually corresponded to virtually the same geographical area as Pasco Department today (as used in the

⁴¹⁵ I use the term “town” here because, although Rancas and Huayllay are also *comunidades campesinas* (peasant communities), the 2007 Census does not use that as a geographical unit; rather, it gives figures for each nucleated settlement (in this case the main towns of Rancas and Huayllay) as a separate location. Since this is a pastoral, rather than agricultural region, the countryside is dotted with *estancias* that belong to a particular *comunidad campesina*, and whose inhabitants move back and forth from the towns, but these areas are not included in the figures for the “towns.”

⁴¹⁶ Rancas is part of Simón Bolívar District, just like Huayllay is part of Huayllay district. Simón Bolívar District includes not just Rancas but also other *comunidades campesinas* (both their central towns and the *estancias* in their outlying lands) and part of the urban radius of Cerro de Pasco. Huayllay district includes both Huayllay and Huaychao, and some smaller settlements.

previous table) – that is, it included the highland plateau region in which Huayllay and Cerro de Pasco are located as well as the Chaupimaranga Valley and the eastern lowlands of Oxapampa.⁴¹⁷ Also, the 1940 Census publications break down marital status according to gender (unlike the data I have from the 2007 census), and that is how it is presented in Table 9.

For Pasco, the proportion of *convivientes* in 1940 was roughly equivalent to that in 2007, but the percentage of married persons was higher and that of single individuals was lower back then. If we leave out “single,” widowed and divorced individuals, and look only at those involved in a marital union in Pasco province at the time of the 1940 census, we have that around 60% are listed as married, and about 40% are *convivientes*. However, the differences between regions are striking – the Mantaro Valley provinces have a very low rate of *convivencia* and a high rate of marriage, as does Canta Province in the Lima Highlands. Cajatambo (Lima Highlands) and Dos De Mayo (Huánuco), and to a lesser degree Huamalíes Province (Huánuco), have a *conviviente*/married proportion that looks more similar to that for Pasco. There are also a few important differences between genders, for example between the percentages of married men and married women in Huancayo Province. Again, though, these figures are meant only as a general illustration, and should be read with caution. The 1940 Census was the first attempt at a modern scientific census in twentieth-century Peru, and, although it was a serious project, the accuracy of its data cannot always be taken for granted. Moreover, as with the more recent censuses, the data is based on people’s answer’s to a questionnaire, and thus on their own perceptions of the difference between single, *conviviente* and married status, with the latter often carrying greater prestige and thus possibly overreported.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ In 1940, Pasco was still a province of Junín Department. Soon after, it was made into its own department, with the modern provinces of Pasco, Daniel Alcides Carrión, and Oxapampa.

⁴¹⁸ Christiansen makes the same argument regarding the older, less accurate 1876 Census: “I am not convinced that all individuals who were reported as formally married had actually married in church. It strikes me as quite probable that some priests or hacendados may have reported that their parishioners or tenants were married in an attempt to place themselves in a better light as moral supervisors. It is therefore possible that the incidence of marriage was actually overreported in the census” (Christiansen 2004, 58). She furthermore cites Susan Lobo’s study of squatter settlements in Lima to the effect that “official figures tend to overreport marriage and underreport free unions” (Ibid., 220).

Table 9: Marital status, individuals ages 15 and over, according to 1940 Census

| | Single | | <i>Conviviente</i> | | Married | | Divorced | | Widowed | | Undeclared | | Total | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | <i>M</i> | F | <i>M</i> | F | <i>M</i> | F | <i>M</i> | F | <i>M</i> | F | <i>M</i> | F | <i>M</i> | F |
| Pasco Prov. | <i>9,615</i> 36% | 6,766 26% | <i>5,971</i> 23% | 6,463 25% | <i>9,641</i> 36% | 9,213 35% | <i>28</i> 0.1% | 40 0.2% | <i>1,2</i> 5% | 3,547 14% | <i>5</i> | 7 | <i>26,5</i> 100% | 26,036 100% |
| Mantaro Valley: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Jauja Prov. | <i>10,108</i> 39% | 11,219 34% | <i>2,156</i> 8% | 2,603 8% | <i>12,214</i> 47% | 13,406 40% | <i>38</i> 0.1% | 72 0.2% | <i>1,4</i> 6% | 5,788 17% | <i>151</i> 0.6% | 72 0.2% | <i>26,140</i> 100% | 33,160 100% |
| Huan-cayo Prov. | <i>13,931</i> 44% | 24,373 60% | <i>1,327</i> 4% | 2,068 5% | <i>14,924</i> 47% | 7,819 19% | <i>69</i> 0.2% | 96 0.2% | <i>1,7</i> 6% | 6,477 16% | <i>14</i> | 15 | <i>32,025</i> 100% | 40,848 100% |
| Lima Dept. Highlands: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Canta Prov. | <i>2,572</i> 34% | 2,192 27% | <i>569</i> 8% | 608 8% | <i>3,939</i> 53% | 4,034 50% | <i>28</i> 0.4% | 38 0.5% | <i>390</i> 5% | 1162 14% | -- | 2 | <i>7,498</i> 100% | 8,036 100% |
| Cajatambo Prov. | <i>1,790</i> 33% | 2,302 34% | <i>1,728</i> 32% | 1,886 28% | <i>1,676</i> 31% | 1,690 25% | <i>20</i> 0.4% | 49 0.7% | <i>209</i> 4% | 888 13% | --- | 1 | <i>5,423</i> 100% | 6,816 100% |
| Huánuco Dept.: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dos de Mayo Prov. | <i>5,061</i> 34% | 5,176 30% | <i>4,096</i> 27% | 4,384 26% | <i>5,346</i> 35% | 5,435 32% | <i>23</i> 0.2% | 54 0.3% | <i>554</i> 4% | 2,075 12% | 2 | --- | <i>15,082</i> 100% | 17,124 100% |
| Huamalíes Prov. | <i>3,617</i> 39% | 3,282 34% | <i>1,635</i> 18% | 1,776 18% | <i>3,646</i> 39% | 3,509 36% | <i>2</i> | 4 | <i>406</i> 4% | 1,221 12% | <i>1</i> | --- | <i>9,307</i> 100% | 9,792 100% |

Note: For the sake of clarity, I have italicized all the columns that show data for men, and left the columns for women in regular font. The percentages indicate proportions out of the total for each gender, which appears in the rightmost column.

Source: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, *República del Perú: Censo Nacional de Población, 1940*, Vol. IV y V.

Appendix D

Measuring contamination in Cerro de Pasco

The contamination of the environment

Environmental measurements have long been made by companies themselves, both as part of their regular operations and safety guidelines and, increasingly, in response to environmental inspection and regulation from the government.⁴¹⁹ Carlos Alarcón's 1994 study was one of the first to publish environmental measurements obtained from Centromín company documents. It focused on two aspects: the contamination of the air in the smelter town of La Oroya with lead, sulfur and arsenic,⁴²⁰ and the pollution of Lake Junín, through the San Juan River, with mining wastes from Cerro de Pasco. Alarcón's study published company measurements of heavy metals in lake/tailings deposit of Quiulacocha and in the San Juan River. Originating in the lands of the community of Rancas, the San Juan is the most important river in the immediate vicinity of Cerro de Pasco and is the main tributary of Lake Junín, the second largest lake in Peru and the origin of the Mantaro River, which in turn is one of the most important rivers in the central highlands and a tributary of the Amazon basin. As a destination for the Cerro de Pasco mine's tailings for decades, Lake Quiulacocha showed abundant levels of iron, lead, manganese, as well as sulfur, zinc, copper and cadmium. Some of this filtered into the San Juan River, together with excess water from the mine itself, and was carried downstream into Lake Junín, where measurements showed extremely high levels of iron as well as elevated

⁴¹⁹ Such attention was first prompted by the "smoke damage affair" of La Oroya as well as complaints from communities affected by the mineral residue dumped into the San Juan River and Lake Chinchaycocha, though the latter were scarcely attended to.

⁴²⁰ For La Oroya, according to Alarcón, company figures revealed average yearly atmospheric lead levels in the neighborhood of Old Oroya for the period 1986-1991 to range from 5.5 ug/m³ (1375 times the World Bank's maximum permissible limit for outdoor exposure at the time of .004 ug/m³) in 1986 to 30.5 ug/m³ (7625 times the World Bank limit) in 1988 (Alarcón 1994, 33-34). Sulfur and arsenic levels were also found to be above World Bank limits in La Oroya.

levels of lead, manganese and nitrogen trioxide and, to a lesser degree, arsenic and copper (Alarcón 1994, 53-57).

In the 1980s and 90s, the state mining company implemented a number of projects aimed in part to reduce contamination: a new water treatment plant, a new, better-constructed tailings dam at Occroyoc to replace Quiulacocha, and systems for recirculating mine water and tailings runoff back into the concentrator plant (Alarcón 1994, 52-53; Volcan EIA P/S, 10). These projects have no doubt reduced the dumping of heavy metals into the San Juan River and other nearby bodies of water. However, they have by no means solved the problem entirely. No remediation project has been implemented for the Quiulacocha deposit, for which the current company, Volcan, takes no responsibility. That is also the case for the waste ore mounds that date from the Centromín period, though the currently produced waste ore deposits also lie uncovered and exposed, generating acid drainage as will be seen shortly. And some effluents are still being deposited into the San Juan River through a drainage canal, which contains waste not only from Volcan but also from the small Aurex gold mine as well as some urban sewage - , as is common knowledge locally and as Bianchini's⁴²¹ 2009 study also shows.

For the San Juan River, Bianchini took water samples at four points: upstream, near the source of part of the city's drinking water,⁴²² before the river meets the canal from the mine; the urban sewage/mine waste drainage canal itself; the San Juan River shortly after meeting with the canal, and the river 30 kilometers downstream where it flows into Lake Junín. Measurements were taken on 5 different dates and analyzed using UV/VIS spectroscopy to determine the presence of the metals aluminum (Al), iron (Fe), bromium (Br), manganese (Mn), copper (Cu)

⁴²¹ Bianchini, an Italian environmental scientist and chemist active in the environmental movement, took water measurements as well as blood samples from Cerro residents in early 2009. Having previously worked on similar mining issues in Guatemala and El Salvador, he was hired by a Peruvian organization to look at the case of Cerro de Pasco, and spent around four months in the area. His study sought to measure the presence of heavy metals and other substances, as well as pH and conductivity, in different bodies of water in Cerro and its surroundings: the San Juan, Tingo and Upper Huallaga rivers, the Quiulacocha lake, a mine water canal and the city's drinking water. In addition, as we will see later, he also examined blood levels for several metals in one Cerro neighborhood. I met Bianchini at the beginning of his study, since he was housed at a local NGO that I had contact with. I accompanied him one time to obtain a water sample, and wrote an introduction to the published version of his report (Bianchini 2009). In our conversations, he voiced concern that lead was overemphasized when it was probably not the metal most present, since it is produced to be sent out whereas other less useful byproducts remain in the area.

⁴²² The other part of the city's water comes from Lake Acococha; I describe this in detail in another chapter.

and zinc (Zn), as well as hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfate (SO4). The averages are shown below:

Table 10 – Bianchini (2009) measurements – San Juan River – UV/VIS

| | HCN | SO4 | Al | Fe | Br | Mn | Cu | Zn |
|------------------------------|------|--------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1. River upstream | 5.60 | 1.26 | 0.05 | 0.47 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 3.20 | 0.02 |
| 2. Canal from mines/sewage | 9.00 | 847.50 | 1.09 | 26.66 | 0.09 | 46.96 | 42.38 | 10.28 |
| 3. River shortly after canal | 8.00 | 539.38 | 0.67 | 18.82 | 0.09 | 28.82 | 21.97 | 6.38 |
| 4. River 30 kms. downstream | 7.00 | 118.20 | 0.29 | 6.00 | 0.15 | 1.76 | 5.01 | 1.78 |

Taken from: Bianchini 2009, 47. Temperature, ph levels and conductivity have been omitted. All measurements are in milligrams per liter (mg/L)

One additional sample was taken on one date and sent to Italy to be analyzed using an atomic absorption spectrophotometer (AAS). This allowed other metals to be measured in addition to the ones above, such as cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), vanadium (V), tin (Sn), arsenic (As) and nickel (Ni).

Table 11 – Bianchini (2009) measurements – San Juan River (AAS)

| | Al | Cd | Cr | Cu | Fe | Mn | Pb | V | Zn | Sn | As | Ni |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| 1. River up-stream | .368 | .0029 | .052 | .015 | .249 | .031 | .037 | .011 | .034 | .251 | .044 | .0079 |
| 2. Canal from mines/ Sewage | 5.955 | .046 | .016 | 4.310 | 41.181 | 20.9 | 4.451 | .033 | 9.5 | .352 | .304 | .027 |
| 3. River shortly after canal | 3.385 | .024 | .011 | 2.480 | 22.903 | 11.85 | 2.388 | .021 | 5.34 | .304 | .185 | .016 |
| 4. River 30 kms. down-stream | 3.004 | .0015 | .0052 | .022 | 3.623 | .275 | .085 | .01 | .175 | .17 | .037 | .0071 |

Taken from Bianchini 2009, 69. (Layout has been rearranged and the values for mercury have been omitted since said element is not present in significant quantities).

All values are in mg/L

The comparison between the data obtained through multiple analyses through UV/VIS spectroscopy with that generated through AAS on one single date shows how widely such numbers can vary depending on the day samples are taken (effluents from the mine need not be uniform across time) and on the method used. Nevertheless, the pattern is clear: the effluent canal (point 2) contains large amounts of sulfate, aluminum, iron, manganese, copper, zinc, aluminum, lead, zinc and arsenic. These metals are found in much higher concentrations there than in the river as it comes from its source away from the mine (point 1). This contrast highlights the relationship between anthropogenic (“man-made”) and non-anthropogenic (“natural”) processes of contamination. The metals are indeed the result of long-term geologic mechanisms that lead to higher concentrations of certain elements at certain locations rather than

at others; it is these processes that create mineral deposits in the first place.⁴²³ In its metabolism with the environment, however, human activity then produces much higher concentrations of these same elements. Rather than being radically opposed to or different from nature, the result of human action is in this case both similar to (same elements), and different from (different concentrations), the product of non-human activity.⁴²⁴

Thus, once it is joined by the canal from the mines, the river shows much higher concentrations than it did before (point 3). The metals from the canal are diluted somewhat by the cleaner water coming in from the river, but only partially.⁴²⁵ It should be noted that almost all of the metals noted above are found in point 3 at concentrations well above World Health Organization standards for drinking water: iron is between 6 and 7.6 times the maximum of 0.3 mg/L; manganese is 30 to 72 times the guideline of 0.4 mg/L. Even what might seem like a small figure for arsenic – a jump from .044 to .185 mg/L – actually signifies an increase from a level some 4 times the WHO standard for drinking water to one some 18 times that standard. The difference between 44 and 185 micrograms of arsenic per liter is actually treated in the literature on arsenic as very significant in terms of health effects on the human body. Arsenic is unusual among the elements discussed here in that non-anthropogenic, “natural” concentrations actually can be harmful to people. The level of 44 ug/L found in the San Juan River at point 1 – or, for that matter, the level of 43 ug/L found in the city’s drinking water – would seem to correspond to such a non-anthropogenic level of contamination that can be considered harmful though not

⁴²³ In turn, these deposits then become “reserves” through their interaction with social factors such as prices and technology.

⁴²⁴ Of course, the division between anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic processes is not always clear-cut. For example, surface water contaminated with metals concentrated by human activity can find their way into groundwater.

⁴²⁵ Thus, the concentration of iron in the San Juan River itself jumps from 0.47 mg/L at point 1 to 18.82 at point 3, according to the UV/VIS data, or from 0.249 to 22.903, according to the AAS data. The amount of manganese jumps from .09 to 28.82 (UV/VIS) or from .031 to 11.85 (AAS); copper increases from 3.20 to 21.97 (UV/VIS) or from .015 to 2.480⁴²⁵ (AAS); arsenic jumps from .044 to .185 (AAS); the amount of sulfates increases from 1.26 to 539.38 (UV/VIS); zinc increases from .02 at point 1 to 6.38 at point 3 (UV/VIS) or from .034 to 5.34 (AAS).

extreme.⁴²⁶ The level of 185 ug/L at point 3 corresponds to a higher level caused by human activity.⁴²⁷

By contrast to arsenic, and as mentioned earlier, lead is not usually present in the environment at high enough concentrations to be a significant risk to human health; lead poisoning has historically been closely associated with human manufacturing activities.⁴²⁸ At the San Juan River, according to the data presented above, lead jumps from .037 mg/L before the encounter with the mine residue canal to 2.388 mg/L after that encounter; this latter value is over 238 times the WHO's guideline for lead levels in drinking water.

Of course, point 3 on the San Juan River is not drinking water for people; the urban population of Cerro derives its drinking water from point 1 on the river as well as from Lake Acococha. The village of Rancas, where I did some of my fieldwork, is situated next to the San Juan River, but further upstream, and in any case derives its drinking water from a set of natural springs (*puquios*) using the river mainly to wash clothes. Generally, in communities with some mining experience, people know which rivers are contaminated and lifeless and obviously avoid drinking water from there. However, the metals are absorbed into the ground and may find their way into the grass, plants and the animals that consume them, thus re-circulating in the environment.⁴²⁹

The San Juan River data also show the spatial dimension of pollution: it decreases gradually as one moves down the river and away from the juncture with the mine waste, either

⁴²⁶ The level of arsenic found naturally in both the San Juan River and the city's drinking water is slightly above four times the WHO guideline level of 10 ug/L (see below).

⁴²⁷ As Bundschuh et al. write in connection with this relation between human and non-human processes, "Arsenic is present in water, mainly groundwater, due to natural processes and also due to many labor activities such as mining where As can be found at dangerously high concentrations" (Bundschuh et al. 2009, 4).

⁴²⁸ As Warren tells in his social history of lead poisoning (2000), in the 1960s geochemist Clair C. Patterson showed that the average American's blood-lead level was 100 times higher than was natural (204). This was during the high point of what Warren calls the United States' twentieth century "saturnine binge," namely the widespread use of lead in gasoline and paint as well as common household items. Also, according to one estimate (Smith and Fleegal 1992), blood-lead levels in pre-industrial humans were a mere 0.016 ug/dL (CDC 2005, 3).

⁴²⁹ As Cai et al (2009) write for the case of lead and cadmium, "the food chain is an important source of Cd and Pb accumulation, especially for plants grown on polluted soils... Significant amounts of Cd and Pb can be transferred from contaminated soil to plants and grass." (Cai et al. 2009, 3078). For the case of arsenic, the Blacksmith Institute's 2010 World's Worst Pollution Problems Report states that "arsenic cannot be destroyed, and thus remains in surface soil long after the event that released the arsenic has ceased. Because of this, many people do not realize that the soil near them contains high concentrations of the element." (Blacksmith Institute 2010, 45).

because the metals are deposited on the ground or because other, clean streams come into the river.⁴³⁰ Thus, at point 4 (where the river enters into Lake Junín, 30 kilometers downstream), measurements for the various metals are almost all lower than at point 3.⁴³¹ These measurements might have been significantly higher before the remediation projects undertaken by the state mining company in the 1980s and 90s, in particular the water treatment plant⁴³² and systems for recirculating mine water and tailings runoff. These projects were the result of new environmental regulation as well as years of pressure and complaints from the *comunidades* surrounding Lake Junín, which for decades had received massive amounts of tailings and other mine waste through the San Juan River.

Another aspect of contamination from mining in Cerro de Pasco is the waste ore deposits and stockpiles that ring the city on its northwest and northeast sides. These cause two main problems: the spread of mineral particles into the city air and soil, and the generation of acid drainage. This latter issue is acknowledged in the company's 2006 Closure Plan documents.⁴³³ On the one hand, this document claims that only those stockpiles situated to the northwest of the open pit show a tendency to generate acid drainage (because of their high pyrite content), whereas the Rumiallana deposit, located to the northeast, where the Tingo River⁴³⁴ is born, do not (Volcan 2006, Appendix 8, 17). On the other hand, elsewhere in the document (Appendix 9) it is affirmed even for the Rumiallana deposit that "the high permeability and porosity of the waste ore permits the filtration that appears at the base as acid waters by oxidation of iron sulfide (pyrite) contained in the ore" (Volcan 2006, App. 9, 3.4). The document claims that this acid

⁴³⁰ Communication with Flaviano Bianchini.

⁴³¹ For some, like copper and arsenic, they decrease almost to their original level (point 1). Others, like iron and total sulfate, remain at levels significantly higher than at point 1, though still substantially lower than at point 2.

⁴³² This plant had a decontaminating effect on the San Juan River but resulted in the contamination of Lake Yanamate, where its effluents were sent.

⁴³³ The data contained therein shows these piles of ore to be made up of different types of rock, with widely varying amounts of quartz and pyrite, and, to a lesser degree, dolomite, hematite, pyrolusite and others (Volcan 2006, App. 8, 1-14). In terms of the elements involved, analysis reveals above all iron, and, to a lesser degree, calcium, manganese, lead, zinc, copper, cadmium and arsenic (Ibid., 15).

⁴³⁴ The Tingo River is one of the two most important rivers that pass close to the city (the other being the San Juan). Unlike the San Juan, which flows south toward Lake Junín and the Mantaro River, the Tingo flows north towards the Huallaga River. Though both form part of the larger Amazon basin, their waters do not meet until much later, when the Ucayali and the Marañón Rivers meet to form the Amazon, next to the city of Iquitos in the Peruvian rain forest. Cerro de Pasco thus sits on a sort of hydrological divide between the two basins. The Tingo is born in a ravine right outside the city, behind the Rumiallana waste ore deposit as well as the city garbage dump.

water is now canalized and pumped up to the water treatment plant to avoid contamination of the Tingo River's headwaters. However, it also acknowledges that some of the acid waters "that filtrate into the fluvial-glacial deposit that constitutes the bog, follow the direction of the slope of the terrain, provoking a negative impact on the environment." (Ibid., 3.4).

Indeed, Bianchini (2009) also presents measurements taken at the headwaters of the Tingo River, where it is born right next to the Rumiallana waste ore deposit. This water shows a very high electrical conductivity as well as high levels of total sulfate (SO₄), iron, manganese, copper, aluminum and lead (Bianchini 2009, 39, 69). This would be due not only to the waste ore but also to the city's garbage dump, which lies next to it. Measurements taken at two points much further downstream in the Tingo's course show that these levels are gradually diluted as the river receives water from other streams. Thus, whereas the San Juan River is borne away from the mine and then receives high doses of metals when it passes close to Cerro de Pasco, the Tingo River is born contaminated just outside of the city. The pollution then gradually decreases as one moves away from the river's origin in the high plateau and downward towards the valleys.⁴³⁵ This is, of course, part of the problem of having a mining center at such high altitude as Cerro – gravity makes it hard to keep at least some of the metals and acid drainage from reaching the streams and rivers that form at many of the ravines in this region.⁴³⁶

The acid drainage problem also affects the waste ore deposits left behind by the old state mining company, for which the current company, Volcan, takes no responsibility. This deposit, named Excelsior, is located on the western edge of the city, surrounding the neighborhood of Champamarca and separating it from the Quiulacocha tailings deposit.⁴³⁷ In 2003, Wade et al. (2006) studied how the Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) problem operates on this side of the city.

⁴³⁵ Namely, UV/VIS analysis shows the average of 5 different days at the headwaters of the Tingo River to be 728.68 mg/L of SO₄, 14.03 of iron, 30.7 of manganese, 26.88 of copper and 11.22 of zinc (Bianchini 2009, 39). AAS analysis from Feb. 12, 2009 shows 8.376 mg/L of iron, 21.512 of manganese, 0.165 of lead and 2.001 of aluminum (Ibid., 69). Compare these figures to the values given in the table above for Point 1 of the San Juan River, which gives an idea of what the metal content in a "normal" river in the area might be. Also, while the Tingo River "cleans" itself gradually, the measurements taken downstream are still higher than normal.

⁴³⁶ Although Cerro is still part of the Bombón plateau – a vast expanse situated at 4,300 meters above sea level and the second largest *altiplano* or high plateau in Peru – it is not in the flattest, central part of the plateau but rather at its northeastern edge, precisely where it begins to drop down into the valleys and ravines.

⁴³⁷ The Excelsior waste-rock dump contains 26,400,000 m³ of ore covering 94 hectares and containing 60 wt% of pyrite. The Quiulacocha tailings deposit contains 79 Mt of tailings covering 114 hectares (Wade et al. 2006, 2199).

The Quiulacocha tailings deposit, situated in a former lake, is composed of two parts: a copper-rich area where tailings were deposited from the 1920s to the 1940s, and a larger zinc-and-lead-rich area used to deposit tailings between 1946 and 1992. The latter area, they found, was not itself generating significant amounts of AMD⁴³⁸, but the Excelsior waste-rock dump adjacent to it was. This AMD then infiltrated into the tailings deposit creating an underground acid plume rich in iron, zinc and to a lesser degree lead. Some of the AMD was also channeled on a surface canal. Both the underground plume and the surface canal emptied into what remains of Lake Quiulacocha – basically an AMD pond on top of the copper-rich section of the tailings, with a pH of 2.3 (Ibid., 2204). This acid liquid reacted with the copper-rich tailings to liberate arsenic from sulfide minerals such as enargite, arsenopyrite, and tennantite: “the arsenic content in this pond remained high (6.54 mg/L) and constituted a major pollutant” (Wade et al. 2006, 2204). Indeed, in 2009 Bianchini found a lower but still very high level of arsenic in a sample from Lake Quiulacocha: 4.65 mg/L (Bianchini 2009, 69).⁴³⁹ Some of the AMD collected in this pond was then pumped into the active tailings deposit at Occroyoc, where it caused further oxidation of sulfides there (Wade et al. 2006, 2205).⁴⁴⁰

Lastly, the CDC study (mentioned in the Volcan radio ad) also examined the contamination of the urban soil with metal particles, in particular with lead, in the neighborhoods of Ayapoto, Paragsha and Chaupimarca (centro). Of the homes examined, 79% had lead levels above the level recommended by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency – 400 parts per million (ppm) – 60% had levels above 1200 ppm (Conklin et al., 12).⁴⁴¹ The study also found a strong correlation between lead levels in the soil and dust in the home and blood lead levels, for

⁴³⁸ This, they concluded, was because of a particular geochemical situation: although the sulfidic minerals on top did generate AMD through their interaction with the oxygen in the atmosphere, this acidity was neutralized by the underlying carbonate minerals (dolomite and siderite).

⁴³⁹ These figures are somewhere between 100 and 145 times, respectively, the concentration of arsenic that seems to be found naturally in at least some of the region’s water, namely the San Juan River (at point 1 in the table above) and the city’s drinking water that comes from there. They are also 465 and 654 times the WHO standard for arsenic in drinking water. Again, of course, no one would drink water from the AMD pool that is Lake Quiulacocha, but still, it should be noted that this concentration of arsenic is located in the open air immediately next to the village of Quiulacocha.

⁴⁴⁰ For that reason, they advocated separating the hydrological separation of the three waste systems (the Excelsior waste ore dump, the inactive Quiulacocha tailings, and the active Occroyoc tailings).

⁴⁴¹ The researchers took 84 samples of soil and 99 samples of dust from 53 homes, as well as 32 soil samples from public areas (Conklin et al. 2008, 8).

both children and pregnant women (Ibid., 18).⁴⁴² In the public areas, 84% of the samples were above the 400 ppm guideline, and 66% were above 1200 ppm (Ibid., 13). The soccer field in the neighborhood of La Esperanza had a lead concentration of 7,700 ppm (Ibid., 17). Although the study found no clear geographical pattern in the degree of lead contamination of the soil, it did show a certain clustering of higher levels of lead in homes near the open pit and the waste rock deposits. Indeed, it would seem that these deposits are one important source of the spread of lead: the sample with the highest lead content – 20,000 ppm (50 times the EPA standard) – came from a dirt road close to one of the waste ore piles.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴² In its 1991 guideline statement, “Preventing lead poisoning in young children,” the CDC notes that “blood lead levels generally rise 3-7 ug/dL for every 1,000-ppm increase in soil or dust lead concentrations” (CDC 1991, “Soil and Dust”).

⁴⁴³ Again, the 1991 CDC statement affirms that “since lead does not dissipate, biodegrade, or decay, the lead deposited into dust and soil becomes a long-term source of lead exposure for children.”

Appendix E

Measurements of metals in blood – Cerro de Pasco

National and Regional Health Agency Studies

Over the last two decades, agencies from the Ministry of Health, such as the National Institute of Health (INS) and the Regional Health Office (DIRESA), have drawn and analyzed samples of the blood of residents of Cerro de Pasco. Because of lead's high public profile, these studies have focused exclusively on this metal. Furthermore, they concern children, since they are known to be more vulnerable to the effects of lead than are adults. Of these Health Ministry measurements, the most readily available results are those that were taken in 2005 and have been published in Astete et al. (2005). They do not concern all of the city, but rather only the neighborhoods of Champamarca and Quiulacocha.⁴⁴⁴ The study attempted to sample the blood of all children between 1 and 10 years old who had been living in these two neighborhoods for at least 1 year. All, in all, 236 children were examined. Using the World Health Organization's current guideline of 10 ug/dL (10 micrograms per deciliter of blood) as a "level of concern" for lead in blood, the study found that 85.8% of children sampled were above this level. The lowest value recorded was 6.17 ug/dL, and the highest was 34.53; the average was 15.79 ± 4.85 ug/dL (Astete et al. 2005, 15).⁴⁴⁵

At the time of my research, these results from 2005 had been made available to at least some of the families concerned as well as to the local health posts. The same national and regional health agencies that produced those results then conducted a similar study again in 2008, as mentioned in a 2008 planning document from the Regional Health Office (DIRESA-PASCO, 2008). Although these have not been published, I was able to obtain a copy of the 2008

⁴⁴⁴ Champamarca is surrounded on three sides by a waste ore deposit, whereas Quiulacocha sits next to the abandoned tailings pond of the same name.

⁴⁴⁵ Of the children examined, 14.2% had concentrations below 10 ug/dL, 36.1% had between 10 and 14.9, 27.5% were between 15 and 19.9, and 22.3% had levels above 20 ug/dL (Astete et al. 2005).

results distributed to parents, for one of the neighborhoods involved. As I was told by a local health post worker, there had been considerable unease among parents because the 2008 results were uniformly lower than the 2005 measurements, for each of the children examined, when little or no change had been made to the environment of the neighborhood. There was a widespread feeling that results like these could be easily manipulated by the mining company. These suspicions have to be understood in the context of a city like Cerro, which is populated by rumors and assertions that the mining company “buys” or otherwise exerts undue pressure on city officials and authorities to get them to do its bidding.⁴⁴⁶

Indeed, an examination of the results confirms that for the 88 individuals who are featured on both the 2005 and 2008 lists,⁴⁴⁷ there is an average drop of 5.04 ug/dL. Whereas the average for all individuals on the 2005 list is 15.67⁴⁴⁸ ug/dL, the average for all individuals on the 2008 list is 11.12 ug/dL.⁴⁴⁹ Of the 88 cases featured on both lists, 95% (84 cases) register a drop, whereas only 4 cases register an upward variation. We could presume that either there has been some change in the environment⁴⁵⁰ or in the population’s practices, or there could be either intentional manipulation at some level – as some people in the neighborhood seemed to feel – or a change in measurement techniques and methods.⁴⁵¹ These variations in the numbers highlight

⁴⁴⁶ I could cite many examples of these assertions as I encountered them in my fieldwork. It is widely assumed that the company has journalists on its payroll; one former employee of the company told me of how he had been in charge of these payments, in the time of the old state-owned company. The company is widely assumed to exert a powerful presence on all aspects of city life, as part of a broader system of corruption that also involves such institutions as the local government and the university.

⁴⁴⁷ The 2005 list contains 117 individuals; the 2008 list, 145 individuals. Some are featured only on one list or on the other, whereas 88 individuals are featured on both.

⁴⁴⁸ That is, for one of the two neighborhoods in the study, for which I have the results. For both neighborhoods together, the average was 15.79, as cited above and as listed in Astete et al. (2005).

⁴⁴⁹ The range also varies between both lists, though it actually becomes wider in the 2008 results. Whereas in 2005 it went from 6.17 to 34.53, on the 2008 list the range is from less than 3.3 to 47.18.

⁴⁵⁰ It is conceivable that there could indeed have been some environmental change unrelated to the mine. As will be seen shortly, the phasing out of leaded gasoline in the United States in the 1970s and 80s caused a dramatic decrease in average blood lead levels in the United States. While the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) states that the phase-out in Peru was completed as early as December 2004 (See <http://www.unep.org/pcfv/PDF/MatrixLACLeadjul06.pdf>), I do not know whether this actually took longer in the interior of Peru and whether the process extended into the 2005-2008 period. In any case, due to the much lower use of auto transportation, leaded gasoline was never as great a source of contamination in highland Peru as it was in the U.S.

⁴⁵¹ On the one hand, the average for the 2008 list is closer to the averages obtained in the other two significant sources we have for blood lead levels in other neighborhoods of Cerro – namely, the CDC study and Bianchini (2009). On the other hand, the 2005 results have been published in a Peruvian medical journal, whereas the 2008 results have not. We must therefore grant greater legitimacy to the 2005 results for the time being, while at the same

the importance of exercising caution when quoting figures such as blood lead levels, no matter the social prestige that their numerical form carries.

There are also other measurements which have not been published but which are referenced either in the above-mentioned publications or in information I was able to obtain from the local health authorities. Astete et al. (2005) mention a 1999 study by the National Health Office (DIGESA) that found an average blood lead level in children of 14.9 ug/dL, with the range being from 1.9 to 45.5. One document from the local health authorities mentions a 2006 study in the district of Yanacancha, which supposedly found 14 children with levels above 40 ug/dL and 6 children above 70 ug/dL (DIRESA-PASCO, 2008, 8); another document says that the same study found only 1 child (out of 340) with a level above 70 ug/dL, 10 children between 45 and 69.9, and 32 between 20 and 44.9 (DIRESA-PASCO, “Resumen Estudios Plomo”). There are also references to two studies in the neighborhood of Miraflores which show levels significantly higher than all the other the studies for the rest of the city.⁴⁵² This difference could be due to a number of factors: a distortion in sampling methods in these earlier studies, the fact that Environmental Remediation Plans (PAMAs) had not yet been put into effect, or a possible higher level of contamination in the particular neighborhood it examined. Miraflores, an area that once sat next to the open pit, no longer exists, as it was destroyed in mine expansion of the late 1990s.

The 2007 CDC Study

As mentioned earlier, in 2007, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, in collaboration with national health agencies and the Pan-American Health Organization, conducted a study of the degree of exposure to heavy metals in three areas of Cerro de Pasco (Conklin et al., 2008). The sample included 357 individuals from parts of the city that were

time acknowledging that such rumors and discrepancies highlight the ways in which these data are human constructions – which, again, does not mean that some may not be more accurate than others.

⁴⁵² According to DIRESA-PASCO (2008) a 1990 study in the Miraflores neighborhood supposedly found an average blood lead level of 45 ug/dL, with levels ranging from 28 to 60. According to information I obtained from DIRESA-PASCO (“Resumen Estudios Plomo”), a 1996 study in the same neighborhood had found an average level of 36.95 ug/dL, with levels ranging from 11 to 71. It could even be that these two studies are really one, and that one of my two sources has recorded the information erroneously.

different from those examined by the 2005 National Institute of Health study cited above whereas the latter had taken place in Quiulacocha and Champamarca, the CDC measurements sampled the neighborhoods of Ayapoto and Paragsha – both next to the open pit – and the larger area of Chaupimarca (the center of the city). Whereas the previous measurements had examined only children, this study also looked at women of fertile age (defined as 15 to 45 years), since fetuses are known to be at risk from lead ingested by their mothers. The CDC report found an average blood lead level for the 163 children of 10.5 ug/dL, ranging from a minimum of 1.8 to a maximum of 64 ug/dL. The percentage of children with levels above the WHO 10ug/dL “level of concern” was 53%. It was this result that the company’s Operations Manager was referring to when he spoke of the “low level” (under 10 ug) enjoyed by 47% of children (see above) – the fact that the majority was above 10 ug was not explicitly mentioned in his speech. For the 194 women in fertile age, the blood lead levels were found to be lower, as is common for adults.⁴⁵³

Unlike the studies from the national health authorities cited previously, the CDC did not limit itself to lead, but also tested the blood and urine samples for other metals, using mass spectrometry: blood was examined for cadmium and mercury, while urine samples were analyzed for antimony, arsenic (both organic and inorganic), barium, beryllium, cesium, cobalt, molybdenum, platinum, thallium, tungsten and uranium. Of these heavy metals, the two that were found to be present in significant quantities, besides lead, were cesium and thallium. Here, unlike with lead, the level of contamination in adults was similar to that for children.⁴⁵⁴ Compared to lead, the literature on the effects of cesium and thallium is much more limited, and there is no established standard of concern for these two metals. The CDC study determined

⁴⁵³ The average was 5.8 ug/dL, with the low and high extremes being 1.8 and 51 ug, respectively. The percentage with a blood lead level above 10 ug/dL was 9.4%.

⁴⁵⁴ Among children, the average level of cesium was 19.0 ug/L, ranging from a minimum of 2.56 to a high of 382 ug/L; 63.1% were considered to have an “elevated level” of this metal. For women of fertile age, the average level of cesium was 19.4, ranging from a minimum of 2.0 to a maximum of 489.0; 69.6% were judged to have an elevated level of the metal. In the case of thallium, the average for children was 0.65 ug/L, with a minimum of 0.015 and a maximum of 23.6, while 70.5% had elevated levels. For the women, the average thallium level was 0.77 ug/L, ranging from a minimum of 0.16 to a maximum of 33.30; the percentage of women with levels considered high was 70.7%.

whether values were “elevated” based on whether they were above the 95th percentile for the U.S. population.⁴⁵⁵

2009 measurements

Bianchini’s 2009 study, cited above for its measurements of water contamination, also included one set of blood measurements, taken on February 16 2009 and shipped to Italy to be analyzed using atomic absorption spectrometry. The blood was taken from 41 individuals – 24 children between the ages of 6 and 12, and 17 individuals over the age of 12 – from the neighborhood of Paragsha. Paragsha is where the mine’s offices and two concentrator plants are located, and was also one of the three neighborhoods examined by the CDC study. Bianchini’s analysis examined three of the same metals as the CDC report: lead, cadmium and arsenic. In addition to these, however, he also measured the presence of copper, aluminum, selenium, manganese, chromium, nickel and cadmium.⁴⁵⁶ In terms of lead, the study found a mean level of 8.257 ug/dL in the children examined and 6.194 ug/dL in the adults (Bianchini 2009, 79-81). The level for children is lower than that found by the CDC study for the same neighborhood (10.0 ug/dL); this variation could be due to a difference in the sample chosen or to other factors. The lowest level for children found by Bianchini was 2.61 ug/dL, and the highest was 23.25. The percentage of children with levels above 10 ug/dL was 25%.

As mentioned above, Bianchini was more interested in highlighting the presence of metals other than lead, since they are rarely talked about in Cerro. Among these other metals, the ones he found to be of greatest concern were arsenic, chromium, nickel and aluminum. According to the results, the average level of arsenic in blood was 15.73 ug/L, with individual levels ranging from a low of 9.00 to a high of 28.93 ug/L. Chromium levels ranged from a low of 0.32 ug/L to a high of 1.17 ug/L, the average being 0.56, which according to Bianchini is more than three times the allowed limit (Bianchini 2009, 82) – all cases except one were over twice the

⁴⁵⁵ In other words, in the U.S., less than 5% of the general population have levels of cesium and thallium as high as those considered “elevated” in this study. Thus, unlike the lead measurements, the classification of a level as “elevated” here is based on a comparison with the U.S. population rather than necessarily on a risk to health, even if peripheral neuropathy is a well-documented effect of both chronic and acute exposure to thallium (the effects of cesium are less well-known).

⁴⁵⁶ Whereas the CDC study used blood samples for lead, cadmium and mercury and urine samples for all the other metals it measured, Bianchini used only blood samples for all metals.

limit. For nickel, the average level was 6.00 ug/L, with a range from a low of 4.05 ug/L to a high of 9.90 ug/L. According to the study, the limit level for nickel is 1.00 ug/L, which means that the average in Cerro de Pasco is six times the allowed limit. All cases present blood nickel levels that are four times the allowed limit. Other metals that were found at high levels were aluminum, and to a lesser degree manganese and selenium.⁴⁵⁷

Final note – arsenic thresholds

In the text of Chapter 7 I discuss the changing construction of threshold levels for lead in blood. Similarly, for the case of arsenic, Smith et al.'s 1992 review argues that the available evidence does not support the idea of a threshold for inorganic arsenic carcinogenicity, below which no harm would occur (264-264). Like lead, the harmful effects of arsenic have been known since antiquity; unlike lead, it was explicitly used as a poison. This “king of poisons” (Nriagu 2002, 1) later also found other uses, as an ingredient in medicine, poison gas and pesticides, as well as being a by-product emitted by copper smelters, leading to what Nriagu calls the “golden age of arsenic poisoning” between 1850 and 1950 (Ibid., 10). In recent years, concern over arsenic poisoning has centered on its presence in groundwater; unlike in the case of lead, public health agencies tend to focus most on numbers related not to blood levels but rather to concentrations in drinking water.⁴⁵⁸ In 1942, the U.S. Public Health Service set an interim standard of 50 ug of arsenic per liter of drinking water; 10 years later, it set a goal of reducing arsenic in drinking water to 10 ug/L (Smith and Smith 2004, 39). This latter value became the WHO's guideline for drinking water in 1992 (Ibid., 39).

While countries like the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the European Union have adopted the 10 ug/L standard, Peru, like many developing nations, has maintained the former guideline of 50 ug/L (Castro de Esparza 2009, 21). As mentioned above, Bianchini (2009) found a level of arsenic in Cerro de Pasco's drinking water of 43 ug/L, and a similar measure of 44

⁴⁵⁷ Copper and cadmium, on the other hand, were found to be at much lower levels.

⁴⁵⁸ Again, the difference between lead and arsenic must be emphasized: while poisoning by the former is almost always due to anthropogenic sources, harmful concentrations of the latter can be due to either anthropogenic or “natural” factors. The greatest number of people affected by groundwater contaminated with arsenic appears to be in India, Nepal and Bangladesh (Blacksmith 2010, 44) as well as Taiwan and northern China; in the Americas, Argentina, northern Chile and Mexico have also been affected (Bundschuh et al 2009).

ug/L at the source of that drinking water, namely point 1 of the San Juan River,⁴⁵⁹ before the river receives the polluted stream from the mines and the city. If these measures are correct, it means that the city's drinking water is over four times the WHO guideline but just under the national limit. There would seem to be little doubt based on the evidence available in the literature that a level of 43 to 44 ug/L⁴⁶⁰ produces at least some serious health effects. While chronic exposure to arsenic has long been known to cause skin lesions and in particular skin cancer, in recent years it has been shown to cause more fatal internal cancers as well – particularly of the liver, lung, kidney and bladder – as well circulatory and peripheral nervous disorders (Smith and Smith 2004, ATSDR 2007, WHO 2008, Henke 2009). The health effects are obviously worse in a population with acutely contaminated water – according to Smith and Smith (2004), if the level of arsenic is 500 ug/L, 1 in 10 people drinking that water over many years may expect to die from internal cancers attributable to arsenic, with lung cancer the leading cause (39). At 50 ug/L, Smith et al. (1992) calculate the death rate from cancer caused by arsenic to be about 13.4 in a 1,000 (264), whereas the U.S. National Research Council, Subcommittee on Drinking Water, estimates a lifetime excess cancer risk at that arsenic level of between 1 in a 100 and 1 in a 1,000 (Hlavay et al. 2003, 492).⁴⁶¹ At the same time, although Smith and Smith (2004) argue that “reducing water concentrations from 50 [the Peruvian maximum limit and 7 points above Cerro's drinking water] to 10 ug/L might reduce long-term cancer risk from one in 100 to one in 500,” (43) they believe that 50 ug/L might be a more realistic short-term goal for

⁴⁵⁹ Cerro's drinking water used to come from Lake Yanamate, immediately to the south of the city. When the new Mine Water Treatment Plant was inaugurated in 1981, with the objective of reducing the amount of contaminants released into the San Juan River, the effluents from that plant began to be sent to Lake Yanamate – this arrangement lasted until 2003 and effectively destroyed the lake. Thereafter, the city's drinking water supply shifted to the San Juan River (upstream from where it receives pollution from the mine) and to a canal from the Quicay River and Lake Acococha to the west. (Information from Volcan Environmental Impact Assessment for Paragsha Expansion, and from Centromín Archive – Box 1263, Folder 21).

⁴⁶⁰ By comparison with this level in Cerro, estimates for the average level of arsenic in drinking water in the U.S. range from 2.0 to 2.5 ug/L (Smith et al., 1992, 264), though it is also estimated that 350,000 people in the U.S. drink water above 50 ug/L (Ibid., 259). In 2002 Smith and Smith calculated that in Bangladesh, West Bengal and parts of China, “millions of people have arsenic concentrations in their drinking water above 50 ug/L, with some exceeding 1000 ug/L” (Smith and Smith 2002, 42). The Blacksmith Institute (2010) has identified a population of 3.7 million people worldwide “at risk” of severe arsenic contamination, and estimates that its actual size is 5-9 million people (Blacksmith 2010, 44). In one community near a mine smelter in Mexico, people consumed arsenic-rich water (190-650 ug/L, with an average of 380 ug/L) over a span of 12 years (Bundschuh et al, 2009, 11). In the Chilean city of Antofagasta in 1958, arsenic levels rose sharply to around 800 ug/L when a new water supply began to be used; after an arsenic removal plant was built in the 1970s, concentrations decreased to 40 ug/L (Ibid., 6).

⁴⁶¹ Castro de Esparza (2009), on the other hand, argues that “exposure to 50 ug/L can cause 31.33 cases of skin cancer per 1000 inhabitants” (20).

developing countries with widespread arsenic pollution above this level, since “setting stringent drinking water standards will impair short term solutions” that are urgently needed in highly contaminated places (39). In any case, they argue, “even when the concentration in drinking water is reduced to 10 ug/L as the World Health Organization recommendation, potential cancer risks remain high” (Smith and Smith 2004, 39).

While the level of arsenic in drinking-water detected by Bianchini (2009) would seem to probably be due to non-anthropogenic contamination, his study also measured blood arsenic levels in the sample of 41 individuals from the neighborhood of Paragsha and found the average concentration to be 15.73 ug/L, with individuals ranging from 9.00 to 28.93 ug/L. Granted, this information comes from one single sample on a single date in one neighborhood, and the reliability of blood arsenic levels as an indicator of arsenic contamination seems to be disputed (more so than in the case of lead).⁴⁶² Nevertheless, and although the data on blood arsenic levels in the literature is very limited (unlike for blood lead concentrations), the levels found by Bianchini in Paragsha seem rather high⁴⁶³ if the only source is the 43 ug/L of arsenic found in the drinking water; places with higher water arsenic concentrations than Cerro seem to have lower blood arsenic concentrations than those found in Bianchini’s sample.⁴⁶⁴ If this is true, one

⁴⁶² Wu et al. (2001) argue that “Once digested as a water solution, arsenic is rapidly transported by the blood to such organs as the liver, kidneys, lungs, intestines and the skin within 24 hours. Although 90% of the bloodborne arsenic is rapidly cleared, blood arsenic level is still a useful indicator of continuous arsenic exposure. In contrast, urine arsenic is the best indicator of recent exposure of several days” (1012). While Wu et al. thus see blood and urine levels as useful indicators of different things, Castro de Esparza argues that “Studies have shown that urine is the best biomarker for measuring absorbed inorganic As, as blood, hair and nails are less sensitive to exposure.” (20) The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Toxicological Profile for Arsenic (2007) states that “measurements of blood arsenic reflect exposures only within the very recent past” but also that “blood levels do not appear to be reliable indicators of chronic exposure to low levels of arsenic... measurement of blood arsenic is not generally considered to be a reliable means of monitoring human populations for arsenic exposure... measurement of urinary arsenic levels is generally accepted as the most reliable indicator of recent arsenic exposure.” (258-259). On the whole, it would seem that blood arsenic levels can indicate continuous or very recent (1 to 24 hours) exposure to arsenic, but that it may also significantly underestimate such exposure. Urine arsenic levels, on the other hand, may be more useful at gauging exposure from the previous few days.

⁴⁶³ According to Le (2002) blood concentrations of arsenic in people with no excess exposure range between 0.3 and 2 ug/L. On the other hand, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry states that “a high blood arsenic level (normal being less than 7 ug/100 mL) might confirm a diagnosis of poisoning.” But, again “arsenic moves quickly out of the bloodstream (its initial half life in blood is 1 to 2 hours) and a normal value does not exclude poisoning.” (ATSDR, “Arsenic Trioxide,” 19).

⁴⁶⁴ I make this observation based on a comparison with the limited data on blood arsenic measurements available for other sites. Wu et al. (2001), in their study of a region of Taiwan (a country where arsenic contamination of well water is a significant public health problem), found an average blood arsenic concentration of 9.60 ug/L, and a range of 0 to 46.50 ug/L. For those who had levels of 10 to 50 ug/L in their drinking water, the blood concentration was

tentative explanation could be that arsenic contaminates city residents not only through drinking water but also through the soil and through the concentration of arsenic in the meat of animals that eat and drink in fields near sources of arsenic pollution. After all, as shown earlier, there are significant concentrations of arsenic in Lake Quiulacocha – liberated through the interaction between the copper-rich tailings and the AMD drainage from the waste ore deposits – and in the San Juan River after it receives the canal from the Volcan and Aurex mines (and from city sewage). Even if this arsenic does not make it into the drinking water system, it is still present in the environment.

8.1. Only those who had over 300 ug/L in their water (a very high level) had blood concentrations approaching the average in Bianchini's sample from Cerro, namely 11.4 (against 15.73 in Bianchini's sample) (Wu et al. 2001, 1012). Le (2002) compiles some of the data on blood arsenic levels. Women in Argentina exposed to high levels of arsenic in drinking water (200 ug/L) had an average of 8 ug/L. In areas of California and Nevada with water arsenic between 100 and 400 ug/L, the arsenic blood level for the population sample was 3-4. On the other hand, in a very arsenic-rich area of Taiwan, the average blood level was 22 ug/L, and individuals who had developed Blackfoot disease (a serious peripheral vascular disease caused by arsenic exposure in Taiwan) and their families had blood levels of 60 ug/dL. (Le 2002, 104-107).

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