The Tenacity of Bondage:
An Anthropological History of Slavery and Unfree Labor in Sierra Leone
by
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Por Mi Amor, my editor, my partner, my love. Without you this dream would never have happened.
Acknowledgements

This project was born as a series of news articles written in the 1990s. Along the way to becoming a doctoral dissertation it has, by necessity, been transformed and reconfigured; first into essays and articles and then into chapters. I am grateful for the support and encouragement from so many people along the way. It was these people who saw the value and import of my scholarship, not just in the classroom, but in the larger world where human rights—particularly the rights of children—are increasingly in peril, and labor conditions in many parts of the world are slowly moving back toward the exploitive arrangements of slave and master.

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On Sunday January 10, 1999 a child soldier unloaded the clip of his AK-47 into the backseat of my SUV in downtown Freetown, Sierra Leone. Myles Tierney, a cameraman for the Associated Press was killed instantly and photographer David Guttenfelder’s face was lacerated by flying glass. One of the bullets punched through the center of my forehead, lodging in my brain at the back of my skull. On the street, the boy who had shot at our car and three of his armed comrades lay dead, killed in a hail of return gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades.

The following study is my own personal attempt to make sense of the tragedy that befell these Sierra Leonean boys, who were all about 13 or 14 years old. It is a critical inquiry into what factors transformed Sierra Leone—which at independence held tremendous economic and political prospects—into a deeply troubled, splintered and war-ravaged state. In the course of writing this study I have aimed to make sense of Myles’ death and the deaths of four young boys on a dusty and sweltering Freetown street.

The shooting that took place on that hot, sunny day back in 1999 marked the end of my career as a foreign correspondent. But as with so many endings, it resulted in new opportunities—opportunities to examine Sierra Leone’s war and child soldiery from an Anthropologist’s perspective. I have been remarkably fortunate to have recovered as thoroughly as I have since my shooting.

However, as a result of the somewhat unorthodox way in which I came both to graduate school and more specifically to this dissertation, I felt that it was important to acknowledge and recognize my background in order to clarify my interest in this topic as well as to explain the
disjointed nature of my informant/source base in the ethnographic portions of this work. From mid-1996 through the beginning of 1999 I was a news correspondent working for The Associated Press in West Africa. One of my primary responsibilities was the coverage of the civil war in Sierra Leone, which began years before my first assignment in the region.

As a journalist I had numerous opportunities to interview child soldiers and former child soldiers\(^1\) while the war was still being fought. In the following dissertation, I make use of interview material gleaned during reporting trips to Freetown, Makeni, Kenema, Port Loko and elsewhere during lulls in the fighting. I salvaged much of this material and reuse it now with full acknowledgement of the fact that I did not then possess the interpretive or analytical skills required of contemporary historical anthropology to delve deeper into the issue of child soldiery. As a war correspondent, my concern in the 1990s was simply to report on the human atrocity of mass bloodshed and the widespread campaign of mutilations and amputations that was gripping the country at the time; journalists work under very constrained deadlines and so my concern was neither centered on concepts of childhood, nor how the forced recruitment practices of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) could be analyzed and construed as a form of contemporary slavery instigated through a *quasi-*ceremonial initiation.

Today, as an Anthro-historian I have tried to find answers to Sierra Leone’s crisis in the 1990s by looking more closely at the country’s colonial past, and likewise have analyzed the present use of children as soldier-slaves within the context of Sierra Leone’s historic ties to abolitionism and the rising British anti-slavery efforts of the nineteenth century.

– I.D.S.

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\(^1\) The very term *former* child soldier in and of itself is problematic as it raises the question as to what the former refers to child or soldier?
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

AFRC – Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APU – Africa Progress Union
CAST – Consolidated African Selection Trust
CDF – Civil Defense Force
CEA – Committee of Educated Aborigines
CRBP – Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor
CRC – Convention for the Rights of the Child
DELCO – Sierra Leone Development Company, Ltd.
FBC – Fourah Bay College
IDM – Illicit Diamond Mining
IMF – International Monetary Fund
KPM – Kono Progressive Movement
LON – League of Nations
MAK – Maktab al-Khidamat
MP – Member of Parliament
NCBWA – National Congress of British West Africa
NCSL – National Council for the Colony of Sierra Leone
NDMC – National Diamond Mining Company
NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC – National Provisional Ruling Council
RAC – Royal African Company
RN – Royal Navy
RSLMF – Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force
RUF – Revolutionary United Front
RUFU – Revolutionary United Front Party
SAP – Structural Adjustment Program
SIEROMCO – Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company
SLLP – Sierra Leone Labor Party
SLPM – Sierra Leone Progressive Independent Movement
SLPP – Sierra Leone People’s Party
SLC – Sierra Leone Company (founded as the St. George’s Bay Company)
SLST – Sierra Leone Selection Trust (Subsidiary of DeBeers’ CAST
SLWM – Sierra Leone Women’s Movement
SEAST – Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade
UDP – United Democratic Party
UELHS – United Empire Loyalists Heritage Society
UNAMSIL – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNF – United National Front
UNIA – Universal Negro Improvement Association
UPP – United Peoples Party
WAFF – West African Frontier Force
WAYL – West African Youth League
ABBREVIATION GUIDE FOR MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

AAS – American Antiquarian Society, Chester, VT
AHN – America’s Historical Newspapers, Chester, VT
BLY – Beinecke Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
BLHS – Black Loyalist Heritage Society, Birchtown, NS.
BPL – Boston Public Library Special Collections, Boston, MA.
BL – British Library, London, UK.
CanNA – Canadian National Archives, Ottawa, Canada.
CDC – Canadian Digital Collections, Ottawa, Canada.
CPR – Colonial and Provincial Reporter, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
CU – Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, UK.
GL – Goldsmiths’ Library, University of London, UK.
HUA – Hull University Archives, Hull, UK.
HU – Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
HI – Hoover Institution Library, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
MHS – Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.
NJHS – New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, NJ.
NYPL – New York Public Library, New York, NY.
NCAH – North Carolina Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, NC.
NSARM – Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, Halifax, NS.
OC – Oberlin College Library, Oberlin, OH.
OX – Oxford University Libraries, Oxford, UK.
PS – Pennsylvania State University Libraries, University Park, PA.
PU – Princeton University Libraires, Princeton, NJ.
PHN – ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
PANB – Provincial Archives of New Brunswick, Fredericton, NB.
PANS – Public Archives of Nova Scotia, Halifax, NS.
SLNA – Sierra Leone National Archives, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
SLGFM – Sierra Leone Guardian and Foreign Mails, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
SLT – Sierra Leone Times, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
SLWN – Sierra Leone Weekly News, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
SCSL – Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
SU – Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, CA.
UC – University of California Libraries, Berkeley, CA.
UICSL – University of Illinois at Chicago (Sierra Leone Collection), Chicago, IL.
UM – University of Michigan Libraries, Ann Arbor, MI.
UNBSCA – University of New Brunswick Special Collections and Archives
UV – University of Virginia Libraries, Richmond, VA.
UWd – University of Wisconsin Digital Library Collections, Madison, WI.
VHS – Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, VA.
WCL – William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
WNA – World Newspaper Archive, Chester, VT.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Sierra Leone and the Tenacity of Bondage

_We yu men lepet, yu no fọ veeks we i de it yu got/When you raise a leopard, you shouldn't be upset when it eats your goat._
– Sherbro proverb

TRAVELLING ALONG CLINE TOWN’S congested and smoggy Kissy Road on the East side of Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown, motorists are greeted by a commanding welcome sign [Figure 1-1]. Stained with the residue and soot of diesel fumes and roadside cook fires, the weather worn sign is styled after Sierra Leone’s national coat of arms, in which two lions are holding aloft a shield emblazoned with the country’s motto: “Unity, Freedom, Justice” (Appendix A). However, given the inequity and abject suffering that exist throughout this impoverished and violence-riddled nation, _Unity, Freedom, and Justice_ are clearly little better than prescriptive concepts (Weber 2011[1949]). This is certainly the case given Sierra Leone’s colonial and post-colonial record of violence, corruption, economic decline and general structural disrepair. Situated on the crumbling median of a jutted and potholed thoroughfare, the sign testifies to the country’s struggle with the humanitarian ideals of the country’s British abolitionist founders.

In _Colonialism in Question_ (2005), Frederick Cooper critiques the ubiquitous and inaccurate use of _modern_ as a Eurocentric notion pointing to vague concepts of progress and change, be they artistic, political, economic or philosophical. He implores scholars to adopt a spatially- and temporally-specific approach to the use of terms like modern.
[A] historically located approach contrasts with the metahistorical one, where the specificity of claims, representations, and ideological positioning disappears into a three-hundred-year history that is named (capitalism, bureaucratization, modernity) rather than analyzed. (Cooper 2005:132)

Heeding Cooper’s caveat, I will be using the term “humanitarian ideals” only insomuch as they refer specifically to the ideals held by those late eighteenth century British abolitionists who sought to establish Sierra Leone as a haven for freed slaves. Otherwise, the relevance and meaning of humanitarian is lost in the muddled vastness of the various uses of the term over time and locale.

The origins of the abolitionist’s humanitarian ideals have also been closely associated with John Locke’s Enlightenment-oriented musings on human rights and individual freedoms (Ward 2010; Grant 2010). In its simplest form, writes Ruth Grant, Locke envisioned freedom, as a “power to think or act according to your preference” (2010:192). For the purposes of this study, that freedom must be thought of as the power to choose wage over unfree labor or slavery. Given the breadth of Locke’s canon and its far-reaching philosophical influence it is neither practical, nor the aim of this work to embark on a comprehensive review of his writings and career. There are, however, a few key points that are worth underscoring. By elevating individual freedom and agency above “tradition, custom and conventional inequality” (Ward 2010:4), Locke transformed the ways in which individuals perceived their own rights and freedoms (or, in fact, that, as individuals, they even had rights and freedoms). Locke’s canon is the end product of a “consuming preoccupation with examining and defending human freedom” (17).

If Locke’s extensive musings on individual freedom became an integral part of an abolitionist ideology based on liberty, then it stands to reason that slavery—as a principal means to deprive individual liberty (from a Western perspective)—represents the veritable antithesis of humanitarian ideals from the abolitionists’ point of view. Those humanitarian ideals were an
essential ingredient in the rise of British abolitionism in the 1780s and the closely related founding in 1787 of the Province of Freedom as a Back-to-Africa settlement established for emancipated slaves.¹

It should come as no surprise that Sierra Leone’s national motto resonates with the humanitarian fervor of Enlightenment idealism. It was that same idealism, after all, that gave birth to Libérté, Egalité, Fraternité, the credo of the French Revolution of 1789; or the similarly humanistic triumvirate of “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness”—principles articulated in 1776 as “unalienable rights” in the U.S. Declaration of Independence. In fact, Sierra Leone was a product of an emerging Enlightenment dialogue on human rights and freedoms, which eventually gave birth to the antislavery movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Sierra Leone’s earliest origins can be traced to Europe’s growing discourse of human rights and its concomitant critique of slave labor for economic gain from the colonial production of sugar, cotton and other cash crops in the New World. However, Sierra Leone never fully realized its anti-slavery and abolitionist mandate. Instead, it became something of a laboratory for post-emancipation labor regimes—labor that was “free” in name, but fell nonetheless within the spectrum of what Peter Kolchin (1987) termed “unfree” labor (cf Léonie Archer’s edited volume, 1988 and Stephan Palmié’s edited volume, 1995).

*     *     *

THIS DISSERTATION CONSTITUTES AN anthropological history of the commercial, legislative and moral processes that allowed exploitive and unfree forms of labor to persist in Sierra Leone. These processes also nurtured the divisive socio-economic, cultural and political

¹ The Province of Freedom was established in 1787, but razed two years later and re-established in 1791 by the merchant capitalist Sierra Leone Company; The Province of Freedom is frequently called Sierra Leone because of its geographic proximity to the Sierra Leone River. Except when expressly necessary to differentiate between the two I will typically refer to the settlement as Sierra Leone.
institutions that set the stage for a new brand of forced servitude that I term **terrorist slavery**, which emerged during Sierra Leone’s brutal civil war in the 1990s and early twenty-first century.

By the late twentieth century, Sierra Leone was embroiled in a civil war that employed contemporary slavery in the form of child soldiery\(^2\) for economic gain from illicit diamond-smuggling. In March 1991, a small band of rebels—the genesis of the Revolutionary United Front, or RUF—launched its insurgency in the Kailahun District of Eastern Sierra Leone. In effect, their rebellion constituted what I term a **ParaRevolution**. By **ParaRevolution**, I mean to suggest a paradoxical insurrection that ran contrary to the Enlightenment’s ideals of extending greater rights and freedoms through the overthrow of a government or authority (Williams 1976; Arendt 1963).\(^3\) As this study will explore, the fleeting platform for social change that the RUF professed at its outset quickly eroded as the armed movement degenerated into a war against the people and not for the people.

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\(^2\) According to UNICEF’s Capetown Principles of 2003 the term *child soldier* refers to any person under 18 years of age who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity; it does not, therefore, refer only to those children who carried a gun or fought in battle (UNICEF 2003:13-14).

\(^3\) Contrary to my own use of the term, Alan Knight (1986) and Takahashi Mamoru (2006) use “para-revolution” to indicate an auxiliary or ancillary effort acting in support of a larger military movement such as those in the Mexican Revolution or World War II-era Japan.
The RUF began as a movement purportedly invested in national progress and public welfare. However, its actions were soon in complete contravention to their pledges. Thus, adding *para* to revolution foregrounds the contradictory nature of the RUF’s actions and ideology. Indeed, in the course of its 11-year civil war, the RUF revolution became little better than a socio-political paradox-in-arms.

The RUF’s stated aim was to topple the oppressive presidency of Joseph Saidu Momoh and the All People’s Congress (APC), which had ruled Sierra Leone for 23 years—thirteen of which under one-party rule (Richards 1996a; Musa and Musa 1993). In doing so they professed a desire to cleanse the country of corruption and introduce a regime of equal rights among citizens. The RUF also pledged to socialize both education and healthcare. Idealistic platitudes aside, one of the most notorious features of the RUF was its wholesale use of children as enslaved combat soldiers, indentured servants and sex slaves. Over the course of the ensuing eleven-year civil war, thousands of boys and girls were kidnapped, drugged and forcibly initiated into the RUF in a bid to bolster the insurgency’s ranks (Singer 2006a; Stewart 2002; *cf* Honwana 2006). I hold that this use of children for suicidal frontline combat or for coerced labor to extract diamonds from rebel-held mines in the Kono District is just the latest iteration of slavery in Sierra Leone’s troubling history of labor exploitation. Most of the minors fighting for the RUF were themselves victims—kidnapped as spoils of war after the rebel movement swept through the villages and hamlets of the country’s southeastern region. While working as a news correspondent in the final years of the war I had the opportunity to meet and interview several former child soldiers after they escaped from or been freed from the RUF.

In keeping with Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff’s (1977) effort to refine the vast category of slavery into type-specific brands of coerced servitude and unfree labor, I have chosen
to designate the RUF’s use of child soldiers as *terrorist slavery*. In broad terms, *terrorist slavery* is the coerced use of an individual’s labor to produce violence toward an insurrectionary political idea. Of course, *terrorist slavery* is not unique to Sierra Leone. Similar forms of “ultra-violent” servitude are evident in other revolutionary or terrorist groups such as Colombia’s FARC,\(^4\) Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge of the 1970s, Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO),\(^5\) and Peru’s Shining Path to name just a few.

Sierra Leone’s *terrorist slaves* are intriguing for two distinct reasons: i) along with the aforementioned role *terrorist slavery* played in the production of violence, these slaves also exhibit the more classical mode of slavery for economic production through illicit diamond mining and smuggling, and ii) they arose in a region purportedly established to curtail slavery in accordance with Britain’s Enlightenment-inspired anti-slavery philosophy in the 1780s. In fact, because of this second reason that I hold that *terrorist slavery* must be defined contextually within the framework of the Enlightenment’s humanitarian ideals. Thus, I exclude the use of child soldiers in antiquity—such as in Greco-Roman societies, Mesopotamia or ancient Egypt—since the exploitation of slaves and children in these cases occurred prior to the mobilization of the late eighteenth century abolitionist movement with which I am concerned.

Similarly, I do not consider the use of children to produce violence by other more recent groups such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers (LTTE), and even Germany’s Nazi Party to be *terrorist slavery*. Although these groups exemplify traits similar to the ideological terror of the RUF, these groups relied on recruitment and volunteerism for their membership (Cragin 2007; *cf* Asad 1997; Guest 2005). That said, it is important to recognize arguments that which cast legitimate doubt as to whether such conscripts were willing or coerced.

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4 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

5 Mozambican National Resistance.
volunteers. For example, Claudia Seymour (2009) and Corinne Dufka (2005) have argued that economic desperation and the structural violence of deprivation often create a set of socio-economic conditions, which deprive a child of an option. Joining a rebel group in many cases is a child’s only choice for self-preservation.

During the war in Sierra Leone, several of the belligerents, including the pro-government kamajors (kamajo; pl. kamajɔsia),6 the rebel “West Side Boys” and even the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF), resorted to the use of child soldiers. However, as the instigator of the conflict, the RUF is the primary focus group of this study; particularly since “as much as 80 percent of all [its] fighters were aged seven to fourteen” (Singer 2006:15).

Moreover, the RUF’s use of child soldiers has an intriguing secondary aspect of enslavement, what I term the *liminal mode of social death*, per Orlando Patterson’s notion of slavery and social death (1982). For example, the RUF’s *terrorist slaves* were forced to undergo an initiation process that incorporated them into the rebel movement, but left them in a *liminal* state of marginality in society as a whole (Honwana 2006, 2005). In post-war Sierra Leone, *terrorist slavery* lingers insomuch as the former child soldiers remain on the fringes of society, unable to find employment or enroll in school; post-war *terrorist slaves* are structurally enslaved, if you will, as outsiders consigned to a life of poverty, petty crime and stigmatization.

This study will also examine the conditions that existed and were created in Sierra Leone to facilitate the emergence of *terrorist slavery*. For example, I examine how British colonial rule reified and augmented divisive and exploitive relations within the Sierra Leone colony and the surrounding hinterland (later protectorate), while simultaneously undermining the abolitionist’s original mandate through mercantilist exploitation of the region. Ultimately, I argue that Britain outlawed the term “slavery,” but not exploitive labor, which persisted by virtue of socio-

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6 Kamajo is the traditional Mende term for hunter.
economic adaptations throughout Sierra Leone’s history in accordance with Britain’s commercial objectives. Indeed, economic gain and religious conquest have long been the primary motivators behind European interest in sub-Saharan Africa since the mid-1400s. Moreover, Britain’s colonial rule created the conditions of post-colonial decay and corruption, which spurred on the Revolutionary United Front.

In essence, these child soldiers were the agents of an ill-fated perpetual revolution that was born of a millenarian desire to revert Sierra Leone back to a past of perceived grandeur; a time before European contact and exploitation or at least Western-fueled post-colonial corruption (Richards 1996a; Zack-Williams 1999). It was a revolution founded on the ideological aim of culling Sierra Leone of the ethno-political cleavages that were exacerbated by two centuries of Britain’s colonial and mercantilist rule. The RUF’s abortive (i.e., failed) ParaRevolution, however, ignored the empirical reality that Sierra Leone’s ethno-regional fissures\(^7\) pre-dated the arrival of Britain’s colonizers. Moreover, fomented by Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi’s terroristic anti-West agenda, Sierra Leone’s civil war devolved into a revolution of terror in which kidnapped child slaves were indoctrinated through blood rites, constituting what I term \textit{rites of rupture}, in contrast to Van Gennep’s \textit{rites of passage}. These indoctrinated terrorist slaves were then unleashed on the civilian population in a Jacobin-like reign of indiscriminant violence and bloodletting, which lasted for more than a decade.

On the surface, the motives, means and methods of Sierra Leone’s abortive revolutionary civil war appear to be a wholesale abandonment of the antislavery principles upon which the country was established more than 200 years earlier. In this study, however, I contend that the

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\(^7\) The dominant ethnic populations of Sierra Leone—the Mende and Temne—developed as regionally and ethnically divided populations from around the mid-sixteenth century. The rise of the Atlantic Slave Trade exacerbated the tensions between the two groups as they preyed on one another as sources of slaves to sell to European slavers operating in the Sierra Leone River region.
corrupted implementation of British abolitionism was the first event in a longue durée of
exploitation that allowed slavery to persist and evolve in a region settled under the auspices of an
Enlightenment-inspired abolitionist regime. Herein I trace the modifications to slavery—from
late 18th century revolutionary Virginia and colonial Nova Scotia to late 20th century
revolutionary West Africa. I examine the ways in which transregional merchant capitalism (both
during and after the colonial epoch) undermined the abolitionist agenda in Sierra Leone through
unfree labor practices.

Building on Seymour Drescher’s work (2002), I examine how the British used the colony
of Sierra Leone and its surrounding hinterland as a quasi-laboratory for unfree labor; a place to
test the efficacy and limits of the “mighty experiment” of free labor over slavery. For example,
prominent and celebrated British abolitionists, including Henry Thornton, William Wilberforce
and Zachary Macaulay, used Sierra Leone’s settlers and subsequently freed slaves as unpaid
apprentices, indented servants, military recruits and sharecroppers to build the burgeoning
colony and harvest export crops for the benefit of the Crown. Paradoxically, these freed slaves
became known as “recaptives” (Fyfe 1962, 1964, 1987; July 1967; Everill 2013; Northrup 2006,
etc.).8 Furthermore, the use of pawnship and other forms of exploitive agricultural labor in Sierra
Leone’s hinterland continued into the 1920s, perpetuating the region’s ethnic tensions and
closely related economic disparities.9 These socio-geographic divisions were maintained
throughout the twentieth century and then exacerbated by neoliberal reform in post-colonial
Sierra Leone. These cleavages helped ignite the country’s civil war—a post-Cold War conflict

8 British politicians and abolitionists began adjectivally referred to the liberated African slaves as “re-captured” Negroes or “re-captured” slaves as early as the 1820s. By the 1880s, however, the modifier was transformed into the noun “recaptives.” See chapter six for a discussion on the possible interpretations and implications of the term;
under the mandate of the British Slave Trade Act of 1807, slaves who were rescued from slave ships by the Royal Navy’s West African Squadron were settled in Sierra Leone during much of the nineteenth century.
9 Pawnship was typically a form of debt bondage in which a younger relative is pledged for labor or other service as a guarantee against monies owned.
that resurrected notions of war without restrictions (moral, or otherwise) reminiscent of “total war” (Preston and Wise 1979). It was in this context of an unfettered conflict that violent and coerced servitude was reconstituted in the form of *terrorist slavery*.

Although Britain’s abolitionists successfully outlawed slavery and the slave trade in the nineteenth century, it was a paper victory. Labor exploitation has continued through the decades in Sierra Leone, and the country’s past connection with the slave trade is indelibly written into its present, more so perhaps than its role in the abolition of slavery. In her ethnographic study of contemporary Sierra Leone, Rosalind Shaw (2002) recognizes the presence of the slave trade, or at least memories of the slave trade in non-discursive manifestations. For example, Shaw contends that in the Makeni and Magburka region of the hinterland’s Northern Province, fear of spirit abduction is a form of remembering the slave trade vis-à-vis the disappearance of villagers to slave raiders.

In Freetown, the country’s connection to the slave trade and abolition is inescapably apparent, resident in the living archive of archeological sites and monuments, including the national motto and constitution of 1991, which states: “No person shall be held in slavery or servitude or be required to perform forced labour or traffic or deal in human beings.” The legacy of the slave trade is also evident in the form of communal friction as observed by John Reader (1998). As with Shaw’s more esoteric search for non-discursive memories of the slave trade, these examples point to a post-colonial country that remains defined in the present by its slavery past.

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10 Chapter 3, paragraph 19(1). The anti-slavery language of Sierra Leone’s late twentieth century constitution is almost identical to the late eighteenth century wording used in the Sierra Leone Company’s initial annual report; *Sierra Leone Company Report 1791, 51*; (Hereafter Company Report 1791).
The Past in the Present

TUCKED OFF OF CENTRAL Freetown’s Wallace Johnson Street is an inconspicuous cement gate leading to a charity medical clinic. To the unfamiliar eye it is just another gateway entrance among many in this congested, but relatively upscale shopping district near Freetown’s waterfront. Upon closer inspection, however, the marble slab perched atop the gate reveals a few faded words etched in an old English-style gothic script [Figure 1-2]. The inscription reads: “Roday, Hospital and Asylum for Africans Rescued from Slavery, By British Valour and Philanthropy, Erected AD MDCCCXVII, His Excellency Lieut.¹ Col.¹ MacCarthy GOV.”

From 1817 and into the first years of the twentieth century the gates were the entryway to the Court of the Vice-Admiralty where captured Africans rescued from slave ships by the Royal Navy were brought for a physical exam and to register for asylum and freedom in the newly established Sierra Leone colony. The court’s gateway is located less than half a mile southeast of the Government Wharf steps where those rescued slaves first set foot in Britain’s abolitionist asylum. And, just a few hundred paces in the opposite direction is the teeming King Jimmy (Jemmy) market where today squatters subsist amidst a throng of food stalls and textile vendors.
On one busy market day the blistering sun is mercifully covered by a drifting bank of clouds. Soon after, a light drizzle gives way to a monsoonal downpour that brings forth languid wisps of steam, which rise up from the cracked and uneven walkway that leads down to the “dungeons” of a former slave market. The footing is precarious on the slick, centuries-old brick; raw sewage rushes down open gutters, overflowing onto the steps and along a wall built more than two hundred years ago. Secured to the wall are rusting iron rings [Figure 1-3], relics of Sierra Leone’s slaving past. These physical reminders of a slave-trading heritage somehow anchor Sierra Leone to a past many would prefer to forget (or ignore); falling in line with what Bayo Holsey refers to as a “sequestered history.” For Holsey, who studied the legacy of slavery in Ghana, sequestering their country’s slave history is a strategy used by many Ghanaians who wish to distance themselves from a European-written history that “made Africa into a savage continent that therefore needed European guidance to emerge from this dark past” of enslaving its own people (2008:58). In the case of Sierra Leone, however, the sequestered history may in fact be that of Britain’s extensive connection to the Atlantic Slave Trade. It is a history sequestered to preserve Sierra Leone’s indelible connection to the British abolitionists who helped found Sierra Leone and end slavery (in its trans-Atlantic iteration of the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries). Many Sierra Leoneans prefer to reshape the country’s national narrative to champion the country’s place as a principle locus of the anti-slavery and abolitionist campaigns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In The King Jimmy market, the iron rings once used to hold slaves are today used to hang laundry, or for a children’s game of jump rope with a chain of rubber bands, the iron rings have seemingly lost their historical significance within the local community. After
speaking to several local residents and vendors it quickly became apparent that few people were aware of or had been taught that those rings once shackled slaves who were later canoed out to Dutch, Portuguese, French and British slave ships moored in the deeper waters of the Bay (Rommelse 2006; Fyfe 1962, 1964). 11 Sierra Leone’s past(s)—whether its muted place in the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade or its championed role in the British anti-slavery campaigns—are interwoven in the country’s present; these competing interests are thematic of post-colonial scholarship on Sierra Leone. Anthropologists such as Shaw and Mariane Ferme have interpreted how these pasts are articulated in the present or how the disconnect between the post-colonial goal of progress has been made “captive by the past” of slavery and slave-trading (2001:23).

Although Sierra Leone’s slaving heritage is evident in the day-to-day structures of Freetown, the legacy of slavery is perhaps best exemplified by the crumbling ruins of once-thriving coastal slave fortresses. Most notable is the slave fortress on Bunce Island (Figures 1-4, 1-5), which

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resonates as a distant cry of slavery’s anguish echoing into Sierra Leone’s landscape of the postcolony.

The Bunce Island slave depot and fortress was established by the British around 1672 and was controlled by the “Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa”—later known as the Royal African Company, or RAC (Opala 2004). For a time in the 1690s Bunce Island became a joint slaving venture between the RAC and the Gambia Adventurers. In fact, under exclusive charter of the British Crown, the RAC exported slaves from both Bunce Island and York Island in the mouth of the Sherbro River further south along Sierra Leone’s coastline (Davies 1999).

![Figure 1-4 Map of Bunce (also Bance or Bense) Island c. 1727 (National Maritime Museum).](image)

Bunce remained in British hands until the 1720s when it was seized and plundered by a Luso-African tangomau named José Lopez da Moura, the grandson of a Mane king who wished to break up the European monopoly of slave exports (Ogot 1992; Fyfe 1962). Da Moura’s efforts were soon thereafter abandoned and the island remained vacant until 1750 when

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12 Founded in 1663 by King Charles II, it was later named the Royal African Company.
13 Descendants of Luso-African unions; Rodney (1965) notes that tangomas may also be referred to as lançados.
the London-based firm of Grant, Oswald & Co. began operating from a rebuilt “slave factory” and turned it into a thriving commercial success (Opala 2004).

During the Grant, Oswald & Co. period Bunce Island became renowned in the New World colonies of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida for its slaves’ mastery of rice cultivation (Opala 1987, 2004). In fact, during the 1750s Richard Oswald, then the principal owner of the island’s facilities, forged strong ties with South Carolinian plantation magnate Henry Laurens. Together they began exporting slaves almost exclusively to Laurens’ plantations near Charleston. Although it is impossible to know the exact number of slaves that passed through the gates of the Bunce fortress, historian James Campbell contends that it was “certainly fifty thousand, probably more” (2007:426). Slaving operations continued at Bunce Island right up until the early 1800s—that is, right up until the British Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act of

\[ \text{Figure 1-5 Ruins of Bunce Island fortress inner walls (photo 2011).} \]

\[ ^{14} \text{Joseph Opala (2004) has documented the fascinating connection between Oswald and Laurens and their unlikely ties to the cause of U.S. Independence. Laurens served on the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War and later as the U.S. envoy to Holland. However, while en route to Holland he was captured by the British and imprisoned in the Tower of London on charges of high treason. Oswald secured Laurens’ release by posting bail for his business partner. Laurens would later serve on the American Peace Commission after the capitulation of the Crown; interestingly, Oswald headed the British negotiating team during the peace talks in Paris.} \]
1807,\textsuperscript{15} banning the slave trade within the British Empire, though not slavery itself, \textit{per se}. This act ushered in the age of abolitionism, albeit a selective abolitionism that did little to disrupt Great Britain’s economic interests in the Sierra Leone colony and protectorate.

What remains at issue is the place of Bunce Island in Sierra Leone’s collective imagination, or socially-constructed memory (Halbwachs 1992, ed. Lewis Cosner; Connerton 1989; Cosner 1992). Just as many in France repressed or reconfigured the Algerian War against colonial French rule to remember it as an internal civil war and not a war of national liberation (McCormack 2007), I believe successive generations of Sierra Leoneans have sequestered their memory or knowledge of the country’s ancestral role in the Atlantic Slave Trade. This sequestration allows for the country’s preferred image (as an anti-slavery haven) to emerge more prominently in the collective memory. Edward Ball (1999) notes the distinct reluctance of Sierra Leoneans to discuss their country’s ties to the slave trade. Quoting Peter Karefa-Smart, the descendant of a local slaver, Ball notes: “‘Bunce Island is a place that a lot of Sierra Leoneans would like to forget about.’” (422). And yet, for many it remains an undeniable reality that is not so much forgotten as perhaps strategically misremembered (Patterson 2010; \textit{cf} Cohen 2009). I believe Bunce is the physical embodiment of the rupture between history and memory, which Pierre Nora (1989) identifies as “sites of memory” (\textit{lieux de mémoire}). Nora defines a \textit{lieu de mémoire} as “any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community” (Nora 1996:xvii). Furthermore Nora observes that:

\begin{quote}
Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies […] it remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{15} At the behest of William Wilberforce.
appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. (Nora 1989:8)

More importantly, for our examination of Sierra Leone and the slavery/anti-slavery dichotomy is the fact that the abolitionist and anti-slavery side resides in a presentist memory, absent, or perhaps negligent, of a slavery history that is “no longer.” In this volume I will address the question of child soldier as terrorist slave, thus problematizing the “no longer” status of slavery and coerced unfree labor in Sierra Leone.

Structure of the Dissertation

Sierra Leone’s history—dating to the arrival of the first “Back-to-Africa” settlers from London in 1787—has so far been punctuated by intense and definitive decades every centennial (1790s, 1890s and 1990s). For this reason I have structured this dissertation to optimize the historiography of these periods. This volume is thus divided into three discrete parts, each of which offers a focused study respectively on the 1790s, 1890s or 1990s and how that decade perpetuated slavery and unfree labor in Sierra Leone, despite the country’s anti-slavery narrative.

This approach situates key events in a larger temporal-linear perspective while leaving room for a socio-cultural analysis and critique of those underlying themes that defined Sierra Leone from the 1790s and onward into the postcolony. This study, then, relies on the disciplinary merger of historiography and anthropology’s critical social and cultural analysis. Critical anthropological theory and insight serves to inform the historical narrative by framing subjective aspects of this study within a socio-cultural context. This method is particularly fitting for the study of Sierra Leone, which is not only populated by people on the margins, but is itself what Lakshmi Arya (2008; cf Larsen 2001; Lyons 2010) would call a “subaltern nation” even within
the framework of sub-Saharan Africa and the larger developing world.\textsuperscript{16} It is my aim to construct a subaltern historiography, which “challenges the very categories through which colonial pasts have been made” (John and Jean Comaroff 1992:15). In this case, the narrative and categories to be challenged are slavery and abolition, which in the past have been constructed almost exclusively from the Metropole’s perspective to engender “an element of national triumphalism in British historiography” (Drescher 2002:4).

Given that this history focuses on the borderland between Imperial Britain and its non-Western subaltern periphery it is important to adopt an interdisciplinary approach in order to interrogate the self/other binary that subsumes Metropole-colony perspectives. My goal is to nurture an analysis of socially-constructed and interpreted concepts such as slavery, liberty and freedom from within the historicized contexts that concern this study. Furthermore, this research offers several new contributions to the history of post-emancipation labor schemes in colonial and post-colonial Sierra Leone, noting that slavery and unfree labor persisted and evolved to suit the specific colonial and imperial needs of Britain and the post-colonial ambitions of an insurgent army’s aim to wrest control of the government from corrupt politicians.

* * *

**PART ONE OF THIS** study begins with **chapter two**, which offers a theoretical overview of the History and Anthropology of Slavery. in this overview I explore foundational concepts such as unfreedom and unfree labor. I also explicate various characteristic traits of slavery from antiquity to contemporary iterations. This chapter lays the framework for my claim that child soldiery in Sierra Leone constituted a unique form of forced servitude born of both old and new

\textsuperscript{16} Since the late 1990s, Sierra Leone has consistently ranked among the world’s worst places to live, according to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI); it has one of the lowest life expectancies (47.8 years), and education rates (2.9 years per person) in the world. In 2011, Sierra Leone ranked 180\textsuperscript{th} out 187 nations rated in the HDI.
slaveries (Bales 2004a, 2004b, 2005). Furthermore, I interrogate the symbiotic relationship between the deprivation and discrimination of structural violence with that of unfree labor (Galtung 1969). This theoretical foundation of slavery and unfree labor is then applied in chapter three to Sierra Leone’s genesis as a byproduct of the American Revolution. I examine the rationale behind, and consequences of Britain’s first act of emancipation—the Dunmore Proclamation of 1775.

It was, I believe, the outbreak of revolution in the Americas—a war for man’s claim to life, liberty and happiness—that marked the earliest origin of Sierra Leone as an organized polity by virtue of British efforts in 1775 to incite a slave insurrection and raise an army of runaway slaves in colonial Virginia. I examine how the Dunmore Proclamation resulted in the creation of Dunmore’s Ethiopian Regiment. Comprised of about 500 runaway slaves from Virginia and North Carolina, the Ethiopian Regiment represented the first instance of an adaptive process wherein slavery was abolished in name, but not necessarily in practice. Indeed, it is my contention that Dunmore’s runaway slaves remained captive by virtue of their circumstances. As fugitive slaves they faced severe corporal punishment and potentially death at the hands of their former masters. Dunmore’s runaways remained enslaved by their choice to flee slavery. That is to say, those members of the Ethiopian Regiment could opt for the lesser of two evils: remain in bondage as field slaves for their Patriot owners or become soldier-slaves in which they remained completely dependent subalterns in a white man’s military hierarchy. Importantly, the second option offered no guarantee of long-term freedom. Poorly armed and discriminated against, the Ethiopian Regiment were conspicuous targets of revenge. Moreover, Dunmore’s Proclamation had the effect of galvanizing anti-British sentiment among more moderate colonists in the Americas.
In the end, when the British capitulated and evacuated the runaway slave population—known as the “Black Loyalists”—to the West Indies, England, or the Canadian Maritimes, the former slaves encountered a largely hostile world of “structural violence” through discrimination, deprivation and neglect (Galtung 1969; cf Barak 2003; Farmer 1997, 2004). Chapter three further tracks the servile trajectory of the “Black Loyalists” as they go from being slaves in Britain’s U.S. colonies to unfree laborers in British-controlled Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Denied the land grants they were promised in the Crown colonies of the Canadian Maritimes, the “Black Loyalists” in the 1780s were forced into various inequitable sharecropping arrangements with white loyalist farmers (Wilson 1976). The Dunmore Proclamation and Britain’s loss to the American Patriots created something of a moral conundrum for London and its anti-slavery abolitionists. In the first place they had promised freedom to those former slaves who had risked their lives to fight for the Crown. But in the second place they faced a hostile and resistant host community in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which took on the burden of tens of thousands of white loyalists who also fled the fallen American colonies. This influx of war refugees (black and white) was defined by the racialized hierarchy of the late eighteenth century colonial Americas.

**Chapter four** shifts the focus of servile institutions and freedom in revolutionary America to the socio-economic landscape of West Africa where the Province of Freedom was established in 1787. It was created as a consequence of bigotry and structural violence encountered by the many destitute Black Loyalists who began to crowd the streets of London in the years after Britain’s defeat in the American War of Independence. This chapter surveys the place of the Black Loyalists in a part of Africa still very active as a prominent slaving outpost on the West African coastline. Moreover, chapter four critiques the Province of Freedom as a
nascent “Back-to-Africa” project and examines Britain’s ethnocentric view that former slaves ought to seamlessly reintegrate into African society. This underscores the reductive notion held by many Europeans that Africa was a homogeneous and simplistic social and cultural landscape. Many Britons ignored the vastly diverse populations of the continent as well as the ethnic origins of the former slaves. This is clearly evident within the Province of Freedom where ethno-regional biases flourished through the nineteenth century and ultimately undermined the colony’s success after independence.

Britain’s failure in the 1780s to account for the socio-cultural differences of the Black Loyalists and their indigenous Mende and Temne neighbors was repeated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This chapter ends by examining how these tensions resulted in the destruction in 1789 of the Province of Freedom by neighboring Temne inhabitants. From out of the ashes of the Province of Freedom, however, British merchant capitalists were able to realize an economic opportunity they hoped would replace export revenues lost from the secessionist American states. This new opportunity was made possible through the use of a readily available labor source: the Black Loyalists. Part One of this dissertation concludes with chapter five, which comprises a focused history of the 1790s when the Province of Freedom was resurrected under the auspices of the Sierra Leone Company. The Company was a merchant capitalist firm with a Crown charter and mandate that ran contrary to the sentiments of the original abolitionist founders, including Granville Sharp, John Clarkson and Olaudah Equiano.

Using primary source data I argue the Black Loyalists (or Nova Scotian blacks) were ultimately imported from Nova Scotia not to rescue them from discrimination in Canada as has often been claimed, but instead as a new unfree labor force for the resuscitated West African settlement. Under the watchful eye of Henry Thornton, the cousin of arch-abolitionist William
Wilberforce, Sierra Leone began to betray its anti-slavery origins by using the Canadian Black Loyalists as bonded debt laborers in a feudal-type system of manorialism (Bloch 1961).

The second part of this dissertation begins with chapter six and a detailed account of the Nova Scotian rebellion of 1800—a nascent labor action against the exploitation of unfree labor—and the Sierra Leone Company’s suppressive response by using fugitive Maroon slaves from Jamaica to put down the uprising. This represents the first instance of a pattern of divide-and-conquer politics in which the British exploited ethnic divisions to wield greater political and economic lordship over the territory (Kandeh 1992). This strategy persisted through the nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries.

Chapter six marks the period during which the Sierra Leone Company succumbs to years of failed crops, mismanagement and economic decline, relying on government loans to continue operating until the Crown ultimately assumed control of Sierra Leone and designated it a Crown colony. However, to render Sierra Leone profitable, several Crown governors exploited unfree forms of labor, including apprenticeships, sharecropping and indentured servitude to optimize the colony’s commercial value. Yet, chapter six also examines the contradictory acceleration of the Crown’s use of colony as a West African epicenter for Britain’s anti-slavery and abolitionist ideologies. I argue that the advent of anti-Slave Trade legislation in 1807 and then anti-slavery legislation in 1833 offered Sierra Leone and Britain’s African Institution opportunities to experiment with different permutations of unfree labor on the thousands of slaves rescued by the Royal Navy along the Atlantic coastline.

Like the Nova Scotians, these “recaptives” were used by Britain as unfree apprenticed labor. Chapter six moves on to explore the impact that Europe’s Scramble for Africa had on Sierra Leone. The imperial land grab prompted Britain to extend its reach from the tiny Sierra
Leone colony into the surrounding hinterland. For more than a half century the Crown had exploited both the exportable produce of the up-country regions and the people of Sierra Leone. But with increasing pressure from the French in the 1870s and 1880s, Britain opted to formally claim control over a 30,000-square mile swath of the hinterland. It did so in such a way as to deliberately keep the region outside of British legal jurisdiction. In other words, anti-slavery legislation was not applied or enforced in the hinterland where British trade merchants (or their agents) continued to capitalize on slave labor in collaboration with various paramount chiefs until after World War I. British legislators and colonial trade agents justified this practice by arguing that “domestic slavery” in the hinterland (as opposed to export slavery) was a milder form of slavery, despite the abolitionists original aim to ban all forms of slavery and servitude within the Empire.

Chapter seven returns to a more narrow historical focus in order to identify the ethno-political impact of Britain’s attempt in 1896 to declare a protectorate over the hinterland. The imposition of protectorate status, however, was coupled with Governor Frederic Cardew’s fledgling effort to formally eliminate slavery in the hinterland and impose a house (or “hut”) tax on each dwelling. Revenues from the tax were to be allocated to the colony not the protectorate. Cardew’s push to formally incorporate the protectorate into the Crown’s imperial fold exposed longstanding resentments and enmities between the Mende-dominated Southern and Eastern regions of the hinterland and the Temne-dominated Northern regions. Meanwhile, both groups collectively exhibited their resentment toward the colony’s Krio population—descendants of the Nova Scotian and Maroon settlers from the 1790s and early 1800s. In 1898 these tensions erupted into a proto-nationalist rebellion that left hundreds of protectorate and colony inhabitants dead. The 1890s and the rebellion exposed the Crown’s inability to stamp out slavery and/or
unfree labor in the protectorate and demonstrated the persistence of ethnic cleavages in both the protectorate and colony. The final part of this dissertation opens with chapter eight, which proceeds to examine ongoing slave and unfree labor exploitation into the twentieth century. With the onset of World War I, Britain once again turned a blind eye on slave labor, enlisting thousands of protectorate slaves to serve in both the East and West African war fronts. In the wake of World War I, however, slavery came to the attention of the newly established League of Nations, which formally banned the use of slaves in both Liberia and hinterland Sierra Leone.

Additionally, chapter eight offers an examination of growing nationalist sentiments in Sierra Leone, which were born in part from many Sierra Leoneans’ experience in World War I and the emerging pan-Africanist ideas of Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois. In the run-up to independence, Sierra Leone became a hotbed of ethno-political and labor strife. This chapter, then, explores the socio-economic and political conditions nurtured by Britain’s colonial authorities. These conditions ultimately festered in postcolonial Sierra Leone. This chapter represents a departure from previous chapters in that it does not simply look at adaptations of slavery and unfree labor. Instead, this chapter explores the lasting consequences of racial, ethnic, economic and political divisions in the postcolony; these conditions constitute a post-colonial inheritance that coalesced into a decade long revolutionary war that resulted in the latest iteration of slavery in a country founded on the premise that it would abolish slavery and free Africa of servitude. Indeed, use of terrorist slavery by the RUF is indicative of the country’s slaving past and the persistence of slavery in Sierra Leone more than 150 years after Britain outlawed its practice. This inheritance became particularly poignant after the death of Milton Margai, Sierra Leone’s ethnically and politically inclusive first prime minister.
Chapter eight explores how in the wake of Margai’s death, Sierra Leone became rife with corruption born of deep ethno-regional and political fissures as Southern and Eastern Mende politicians and voters aligned with the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the Northern and Western Temne backed the All People’s Congress (APC). This chapter examines how a weak, inefficient and divisive political system (inherited from colonial rule) culminated in the authoritarian APC regime under Siaka Stevens and then Joseph Momoh. The ouster of the APC oligarchy was, in fact, the RUF’s original aim. Britain’s legacy of labor exploitation and ethno-regional political ruptures was further exacerbated in the late twentieth century with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the consequent return of “total war” that was exploited by anti-West ideologue Muammar al-Qaddafi and his trained minions Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh.

These factors all served as antecedents to Sierra Leone’s ParaRevolutionary civil war, which is examined in chapter nine’s focused history of the RUF revolution and protracted civil war of the 1990s. Herein I explicate the socio-economic, ideological and geopolitical precursors to the revolution—a revolution that ushered in the use of terrorist slavery as a result of war whose roots can be traced to Sierra Leone’s long history of labor exploitation and ethno-political divisions linked to Britain’s ambitious abolitionist and merchant capitalism agendas in the region. Finally, chapter ten is dedicated to the study of terrorist slavery from a theoretical standpoint. I aim to place the RUF and terrorist slavery within the larger historical construct of Sierra Leone’s colonial past. Moreover, I further explicate the notion of a liminal mode of social death, expanding on Orlando Patterson’s construct of intrusive and extrusive modes of social death (1982), which he posits are prerequisites for slavery. This chapter includes several brief ethnographic sketches of terrorist slaves drawn from interviews conducted during and after the 1991-2002 civil war.
In chapter eleven, I conclude this study by addressing both the challenges and virtues of interrogating a two hundred year stretch of history. Beginning in the Age of Revolution in the Americas and ending with the revolution in Sierra Leone has afforded me the opportunity to survey the tenacity of bondage through various points in time. Finally, in this chapter I will revisit the contributions that this dissertation makes to the History of Sierra Leone, as well as the Anthropology and History of slavery and unfree labor in the context of abolition in the Atlantic World.

Methodology

On a bright Sunday morning in March of 1998 I sat under the shade of a looming Cotton Tree inside the walled compound of the Pastoral Center in Makeni, the capital of Sierra Leone’s Northern Province. Largely deserted in the late 1990s, for years Makeni served as the RUF’s operating headquarters. Listening to the choral music echoing from the Catholic Mission’s central chapel I spotted a young girl sitting with her mother. As tears streamed down her face, the girl—whom I’ve named Maria—held up her handless arms. The bandages at the wrists were stained a rusty reddish brown. She asked:

“Mama, will they grow back?”

Her mother paused, thinking, and then finally offered:

“We’ll see what the doctors say.”

Later that same day I met Ahmed, a young boy who had been abducted by RUF rebels after his nearby village was attacked and his family killed. At just nine years of age, Ahmed already had the muscular arms of a teenager. Staring at his dusty feet, the shy boy would not (or could not) look up as he retold his story—a story of drugs, torture and murder. By appearance alone, I would never have known this nervous young boy was a former child soldier of the RUF.

17 Throughout this study I use pseudonyms for the privacy and protection of all my informants.
When I met Ahmed he had just been freed from rebel captivity. Already he’d killed, maimed and terrorized friends, neighbors and even family members throughout the villages surrounding Makeni; Ahmed explained that as a small child he had been abducted by the RUF, drugged, and taught by his commanding officers (themselves teenagers) how to hack off the limbs of his victims with a machete knife in three or four blows. Ahmed, who spoke only in Krio,\(^\text{18}\) softly related his story to Father Franco Aloysius, his counselor and translator. He explained that he would ask his victims:

“Do you want a long-sleeved or a short-sleeved shirt?”

The response, Aloysius explained, determined whether Ahmed would cut the victim’s limb off at the wrist or the elbow. That campaign of amputations became a macabre calling card of the RUF rebels. As the fighting wore on through the years, more and more amputee survivors—like Maria, seated just a few hundred paces away—began to appear on the streets of Freetown and in the refugee camps of neighboring Guinea.

* * *

For years as a journalist I witnessed the human carnage of Sierra Leone’s war, but it was these two children—both victims of the war—that haunted me, and propelled me in my search for understanding. What factors in Sierra Leone’s past led to this war and its seemingly anarchic violence? Wherein lay the roots of this violence, the willingness of one group of people to enslave others in this age of UN “mandated” humanitarianism, individual rights and freedoms?

The theoretical construction of Sierra Leone’s child soldiers as terrorist slaves was instigated by a life-altering event: in 1999 a bullet from a child soldier’s assault rifle ended my journalistic career. More importantly, however, it led me to ask how and why the boy who shot

\(^{18}\) Krio is the locally blended dialect of English, French, Portuguese, Yoruba and several other African languages.
me and thousands of others like him became the kidnapped, drugged and exploited slaves of the RUF. Unlike anthropologist Paul Richards (1995; cf Peters 2011) who termed Sierra Leone’s civil war a “Crisis of Youth,” I felt there was more to child soldiery than an upsurge in revolutionary fervor among young people to wrest control of their country from corrupt politicians in the capital Freetown. In fact, given Sierra Leone’s historic connection to both slavery and abolitionism (albeit European-instigated), I began looking for patterns of unfreedom since the country’s eighteenth century origin. What resulted was the overarching premise of this dissertation: that slavery never disappeared from Sierra Leone; instead, it persisted through the decades, adapting and evolving to emerge in a variety of post-emancipation labor regimes within a framework of what Stephan Palmié called “socially institutionalized unfreedom,” (1995c:41).

I have returned to Africa on three separate occasions (2006, 2008, and 2011) to conduct ethnographic and archival research. Over the course of my post-war fieldwork, I have collected the narratives of dozens of former child soldiers, government officials, aid workers and former war refugees in Sierra Leone’s interior provinces and at rehabilitation centers in the greater Freetown region. Of course, supplementing my scholarly research is the extensive data I gathered as a correspondent in the 1990s. This juxtaposition of war-time and post-war interviews has offered me important comparative insights into the requisite and changing conditions for slavery and unfree labor in post-Cold War Sierra Leone. Furthermore, I have worked with primary source collections in New York City, the Library of Congress, Canada’s National Archives, the provincial archives of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the Anti-Slavery society’s digitized “Recovered Histories” collection, the Black Loyalist Heritage Society’s digitized collection, the University of Wisconsin’s digital Africana collection, and the University of
Illinois digital Sierra Leone collection. Additionally, I have conducted extensive research in Sierra Leone’s National Archives (housed at Fourah Bay College in Freetown).

I am extremely fortunate to have the opportunity—these 14 years after leaving Sierra Leone—to return and augment my past reporting with new interviews with former child soldiers. Together the old and new have helped me to fashion an argument that I believe helps to situate the seemingly inexplicable phenomenon of using children in combat in a dialectic framework of slavery. It is a framework upon which I hope others will further build and analyze. Moving forward now, let us precede to chapter two and a theoretical review of slavery over time and space.
PART I
CHAPTER TWO

A Historical Anthropology of Slavery and Unfree Labor

What is a Negro slave? [...] Only under certain conditions does he become a slave.
– Karl Marx, 1847

Racing in low above the surf and white beaches of Sierra Leone’s picturesque Atlantic coastline, a military helicopter banks up high over Western Freetown’s Aberdeen peninsula then heads East toward Congo Cross in the city’s center on a sultry day back in March 1998. In many parts of West Africa, March is typically welcomed as a time of transition or transformation; a time when the dusty Harmattan winds give way to the coming rainy season. Arriving at its destination, the aircraft’s blades thump against the dense humid air. The thudding reverberates like war drums through the bowl-like Siaka Stevens National Stadium as the helicopter slowly descends, heralding the triumphant return of the country’s deposed President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Adorned in a traditional flowing white gown, Kabbah is flanked by dignitaries from throughout West Africa, including the high command of Nigeria’s military, which led the fight against Sierra Leone’s rebel movement and failed ruling junta. Despite a punishing tropical sun and temperatures hovering near 100°F (38°C) tens of thousands of Freetown residents packed the stadium to welcome Kabbah—back one year after he had been ousted by disaffected army officer Johnny Paul Koroma in league with insurgent fighters from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

Back in the spring of 1998, many city residents hoped and prayed that Kabbah’s return would bring peace to this country; a country that had hobbled its way into independence from
Great Britain in 1961, stumbling along the way over military coups, rampant corruption, dictatorial rule and staggering poverty. And now, as the twentieth century was nearing its close, the country appeared to be at the end of a civil war that had raged in the countryside and capital since 1991—almost one-fourth of Sierra Leone’s interval as an independent country. For months I had been reporting on the war for the Associated Press (AP) with the assistance of Sierra Leonean journalist Clarence Roy-Macaulay.

Addressing the throng in the stadium, Kabbah declared: “We will make this a new beginning; we will make this a new beginning for Sierra Leone. The people of Sierra Leone have suffered for too long” (Stewart 1998b:1). Although the city was jubilant, the countryside continued to be terrorized by RUF rebels receding into the bush and plundering through provincial towns. Just days earlier, dozens of RUF fighters had stormed the outskirts of Magburka, the second largest city in Sierra Leone’s Northern Province. In a pre-dawn attack, insurgents killed eight people and destroyed at least 19 homes, burning them to the ground. In addition to the casualties, they kidnapped two young boys from their homes after killing their families (Stewart 1998a).

When I arrived later that morning, gentle wisps of grey and white smoke swirled up from the charred homes, curling through the dappled sunlight that penetrated the canopy of tropical foliage. Standing in front of the ruins, several town elders bitterly complained that this was not the first time Magburka had been attacked. Speaking in Krio one of the elders said, “Di rebelman bifo ḏon bin na yaso; naw ḏon kam Makeni. I ḏon tif di chikin en chop, i ḏon done kil di fambul.”/ “The rebels have been here before; this time they came from Makeni. They stole our chickens and food, then they killed this family.”
In early March 1998, heavily armed soldiers from the Nigerian-led West African peacekeeping force known as ECOMOG\(^1\) drove thousands of RUF rebels out of Freetown and into the bush. In retaliation, the rebels regrouped and attacked several communities near the provincial capital, Makeni, including Magburka. Along the way, the rebels looted food, killed anyone refusing to support their revolution and kidnapped scores of young boys—and in some instances girls. Megan MacKenzie (2012) observed, that the ubiquitous image of the bedraggled boy soldier presents an uncomplicated view of Sierra Leone’s so-called “Crisis of Youth” (Richards 1995; Hoffman 2003, 2011; Peters 2011); a view in which the female role in Sierra Leone’s revolution and civil war has been excluded and silenced. Admittedly, the subject of female soldier-slaves in the RUF is not thoroughly addressed in this study, though I hope to return to that subject in subsequent research. At the moment, my ethnographic data is insufficient for any substantive conclusions.\(^2\)

Following the model of insurgents in neighboring Liberia, Sierra Leone’s rebels turned to “youth conscription” from the outset of their war (Richards 1996a:5) as a way to expand their ranks and create the illusion of popular support akin to the grassroots Sandinista movement in Nicaragua in the late 1970s (Booth 1985; Cabezas 1986). However, in the context of the civil war in both Liberia and Sierra Leone—together known as the Mano River Wars—youth conscription consisted not of ideological conversion, but of kidnapping children (some as young as seven) and drugging them with cocaine, heroin or \textit{brown-brown}\(^3\) (Stewart 2002, 1998c; Beah 2007, \textit{etc.}). In Mozambique and Angola, Alcinda Honwana (2005) observed that insurgent

\(^{1}\) Economic Community of West African States (Military Observer Group).
\(^{2}\) There exists a growing body of literature on the subject of girls in the RUF, including Myriam Denov (2006); Denov and Maclure (2006); Dyan Mazurana and Kristopher Carlson (2004); Mazurana and Susan McKay (2003); Dara Kay Cohen (2007); Megan Mackenzie (2009, 2012); and Chris Coulter (2006, 2008). Harry West (2000) and Alcinda Honwana (2005, 2006) offer comparative studies on female fighters in Mozambique’s FRELIMO and RENAMO as well as Angola’s UNITA. Peter Singer (2006a) touches on female exploitation in rebel movements around the world.
\(^{3}\) Cocaine, heroin or both mixed with gun powder.
groups used drugs as part of an elaborate initiation process designed to “alienate and isolate recruits,” disconnecting them from their past and cutting their ties with society—family, friends, and community alike (42; cf Honwana 2006; Young 1990; Wilson 1992).

Despite Richards’ claim of patriotic or revolutionary fervor (cf Bangura 2004), it is my belief that the child soldiers of the Mano River Wars were manifestly slaves; not the slaves of antiquity nor of the Antebellum South and Caribbean plantations, but slaves nonetheless with many of the same (or similar) requisite traits of enslavement from the past (Patterson 1982, Lovejoy 1983, Finley 1968). These new slaves, however, were altered by, and adapted for the ruptured lines of knowledge and standards of the post-Cold War era. I call Sierra Leone’s kidnapped rebels terrorist slaves—slaves who were forced into a violent and contemporary iteration of slavery that was born specifically of the RUF’s misplaced revolutionary zeal during the country’s 1991-2002 civil war. My use of the term terrorist slavery should not be mistaken with that of Russian General Valerii Manilov (2000), who uses the term to indicate the enslavement of the Chechen population by terrorist groups and their supporters in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Instead, I wish hold that certain individuals in Sierra Leone were captured and enslaved for the purpose of carrying out terroristic acts of violence on civilian populations. Over the course of this chapter I will present an anthropological history of slavery in order to establish a framework into which I will insert and explicate my notion of terrorist slavery and its affiliated liminal mode of social death, which builds on Orlando Patterson’s intrusive and extrusive modes (1982). Let us first briefly survey the socio-cultural conditions of the post-Cold War period, the period during which terrorist slavery flourished in Sierra Leone.

The post-Cold War period represents a marked rupture with accepted cultural and moral norms, eroding the many of the legal structures and social limitations that molded societal rules
and decorum since the Age of Enlightenment and its concomitant idea of progress (Ahmed 1992). Arthur Versluis (2006) observes that many scholars link the late twentieth century with the belief that progress could be linked to social erosion, leading led to moral and cultural decay. It is my belief that this decay of moral, intellectual and philosophical beliefs, when combined with demographic and economic changes since 1945 has facilitated the emergence of those characteristics outlined in Kevin Bales’ notion of “New Slavery” (2004a, 2004b, 2005; cf Miers 2003).

For example, where ancient or New World plantation slavery was tied to long-term slave 

*ownership* and its requisite “investment” in slave maintenance and upkeep, New Slavery does not entail the same investment-oriented commitment to slaves (Genovese 1976, 1989; Bales 2004a; cf Ransom 1989). New Slavery no longer speaks of *slaveowners*, but rather of 

*slaveholders* (Bales 2004a, 2004b). In fact, slaveholding has become the norm in New Slavery in part by legal necessity. Ownership of slaves was not only the expected norm in Old Slavery, it was legally sanctioned (Davis 1966; cf Stampp 1956); in colonial America the purchase of a slave was typically verified with a bill of sale or deed of ownership. Today, however, various international treaties and labor laws have outlawed slavery and slave ownership, transforming slavery into an illicit and hidden practice that occurs predominantly—though not exclusively—in the form of illegal North-South human trafficking (Ruggiero 1997).

Another characteristic trait of New Slavery, which is closely tied to the *owner-holder-*

*ship* binary is the temporal commitment made to slaves. In Old Slavery, slaves were often expected to be a part of a household workforce for the lifetime of the slave—and in many

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4 Marx argued that slaves were not unlike other capital investments of production, requiring maintenance and upkeep. Just as a tractor requires oil and fuel to function properly, so too does a slave require food, water and shelter in order to stay healthy and productive in the fields.

5 See for example the Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society (NJHS), Vol. VII 1922, 40; reporting the acquisition of a 1724 bill of sale for a slave.
instances the terms of servitude were handed down through generations (Stampp 1956; Klein 2002; Burnard and Heuman 2010; Watson 1980). In New Slavery the holder-slave relationship is short-term and of relatively minor importance to the holder.

Buying a slave is no longer a major investment, like buying a car or a house (as it was in the Old Slavery); it is more like buying an inexpensive bicycle or a cheap computer. Slaveholders get all the work they can out of their slaves, and then throw them away. (Bales 2004a:14)

As noted above, in old slave systems, the cost of a slave and his or her upkeep was a relatively sizeable investment. As a result, the cost-benefit ratio was lower, encouraging some slaveowners in the Antebellum South to “breed” slaves rather than purchase them. At that time, those slaves who were bred were either sent to work for a master or in some instances sold for pure profit (Stampp 1956). Indeed, under the old slave systems, “slaves were like valuable livestock” (Bales 2004a:15). By contrast, the widening North-South economic divide and the proliferation of populations migrating north from poorer nations (Wallerstein 1995) has created a glut of potential slaves, dropping their relative cost while simultaneously increasing their availability and expendability.

Finally, in old slave systems, slave and master were differentiated in large measure by the distinction of societal insider versus outsider. Slaves were the alienated ethnic other, the convict or the war captive. The primary distinguishing factor between slave and master in New Slavery, however, is not ethnicity, or caste or social hierarchy. It is wealth (Bales 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Miers 2003). The shift to New Slavery can be traced to the end of World War II and the post-war global population explosion. Those regions with the greatest net population increase have

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6 Roger Ransom (1989) observes that plantation or field laborers in the mid-1800s sold for between $1,000 and $1,800, for a prime field hand in New Orleans—equivalent to between $40,000 to $80,000 today.  
7 According to the U.S. Census Bureau (International Division) and the World Bank, the global population from 1959-1999 doubled from three billion to six billion; although the rate of growth is expected to slow, their projections still estimate the world population will top 9 billion by 2046.
typically been located in the socio-economic South of the planet (i.e., the developing world). Sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian subcontinent and many countries in the Arab world have experienced exponential population growth, producing populations of children who, according to Bales, are most at risk in the new regimes of servitude and enslavement (2004a).

Concurrent with the population explosion has been disproportionate wealth accumulation and development in the Northern hemisphere of the planet, creating, in Marxian terms, bourgeois populations of new slave consumers (i.e., masters). Further worsening the plight of the planet’s poorest nations and people has been a paternalistic neoliberal regime driven by the World Bank’s lending agency, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Articulated by the World Bank’s structural adjustment regime, neoliberal reform has led to increased poverty, unemployment and urbanization. The IMF has imposed austerity measures in developing world countries, where governments were mandated to eliminate jobs and state-supported educational institutions as a condition to receive development loans (Stein 2008). In short, poor populations were ripe for the picking by new slavers from within their countries and from abroad.

Over the course of this chapter I will explore these various characteristic traits of New Slavery in relation to the use of child soldiers in the Mano River Wars, allowing me to develop and explicate my notion of terrorist slavery. Moreover, I will examine terrorist slavery as a hybridized form of servitude born of both Old and New Slavery(ies). As noted in chapter one, terrorist slavery constitutes two phases of enslavement. The wartime (or first phase) includes the forced extraction of an individual’s labor to produce violence, which is then directed at achieving a political idea, or objective. In Sierra Leone’s case, the objective was the ouster of the country’s corrupt, repressive and ethnically-oriented post-colonial government by the RUF rebels. The

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8 See also Abdullah 2004 and 1998 for specifics on the impact of structural adjustments on Sierra Leone’s educational sector.
post-war (or second phase) of terrorist slavery is the direct result of the child soldier’s inability to fully reintegrate into his or her home community or the nation as a whole. Rendered liminal after their wartime enslavement, these ex-combatants are further enslaved by economic and societal exclusion, consigning them to a life of structural marginalization. In chapter ten I explore the details of their post-war stigmatization.

Sierra Leone’s child soldiers were slaves during the RUF ParaRevolution because, as will be examined, in many cases they were abducted youths who were coerced to commit atrocities on the civilian population at the behest of their RUF masters. Moreover, they underwent an initiation process that rendered them socially outcast by virtue of liminality. This liminality was manufactured through various blood rites, which served to symbolically strip them of past ancestral and kin affiliations (Van Gennep 1960; cf Turner 1967, 1969). Trapped in a nether world between adult- and childhood, these young warrior/slaves were kept in bondage through the violence of warfare, strict corporal—and at times capital—punishment, or the ongoing perceived threat of violence. Furthermore, they were dominated and controlled through psychological coercion enhanced by involuntary drug use. The child soldiers of Sierra Leone were slaves adapted for warfare and labor.

Finally, I hold that terrorist slavery is a contextual form of forced servitude. Just as slavery in the New World must be interpreted as unfree labor for economic production in the context of rapid colonial and mercantile expansion, I believe the child soldiers of the Mano River Wars were slaves of a ParaRevolution, which emerged within the post-Cold War context of unfettered conflict and social erosion. I am amending the term revolution vis-à-vis the RUF’s insurgency by employing the Greek usage of para from paradoxus, meaning: “contrary to
expectation,” In chapter ten I explore my application of the term ParaRevolution to the RUF, but for the purposes of understanding terrorist slavery in a revolutionary context, I will now provide a brief definition of ParaRevolution. In effect, the RUF were pledging and promising vague notions of progress and public welfare as part of their “people’s war.” In practice, however, their actions were in complete contravention to their pledges. Thus adding para to revolution foregrounds the contradictory nature of the RUF’s ideology and armed action.

In the following pages of this chapter I will examine key scholarship on slavery from antiquity and the early modern era’s Atlantic slave trade. I use this theoretical foundation to address the question of child soldiers as New Slavery in the post-colonial/post-Cold War context of Sierra Leone’s civil war.

**Slavery: Ancient and Atlantic Worlds**

SERVITUDE AND SERVILE INSTITUTIONS have been part of human civilization since the beginning of written records (Palmié 1995). In Fact, Jack Goody (1980) records that “references to slavery come […] right at the beginning of written history.” He notes that “the earliest known legal documents concern not the sale of land, houses, animals, boats, and such like, but the sale of slaves” (18). The ancient Mesopotamian legal code, documented on the Ur-Nammu Tablet, refers to the problem of slave escape attempts (Oppenheim 1964). In addition to slavery’s temporal longevity there is both historical and anthropological data supporting the fact that human bondage has also been geographically prolific. In fact, evidence bears out that most societies at one time or another have incorporated some form of involuntary servitude (Dal Lago and Kastari 2008). In some rare instances slavery has been so predominant that it has even

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9 From Greek paradoxus: pará past, beyond, contrary to + dó ca opinion; Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition online, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/o/oed/oed-idx?type=entry&byte=306386497

10 The Ur-Nammu Tablet or Code of the Ur-Nammu contains the oldest known legal code, dating to between 2100 BC and 2050 BC.
transformed the socio-economic order into full-blown “slave societies”\(^{11}\) (Finley 1980; Hopkins 1978).

In his extensive and impressive work on slavery Moses Finley has observed that only a few examples of genuine “slave societies” have ever developed, including in classical Greece and the Roman Empire of the ancient Mediterranean world, and in the United States, Caribbean and Brazil as a result of the Atlantic Slave Trade from the sixteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries. Given the global and temporal resiliency of slavery, it would be naïve to believe that slavery has been abolished in the world today, despite multiple international treaties aimed at legally ending the trade (Bales 2004a). Moreover, as Igor Kopytoff (1988) reminds us, slavery is a culturally relative and contextually-interpreted concept. Any effort to define slavery and indeed the broader category of unfree labor must be done along flexible and culturally inclusive lines.

For more than two centuries, humanitarians have spearheaded efforts to abolish the slave trade, beginning most notably perhaps with British abolitionist Granville Sharp’s legal support and counsel for runaway slave James Somerset in the 1770s (Carretta 2003a; Hoare 1820a, 1820b; Stuart 1836).\(^{12}\) But true multinational efforts to abolish slavery began about a century later at the Berlin Conference of 1884, during which a treaty was signed prohibiting the slave trade. That treaty, however, was a virtual afterthought; the Berlin Conference’s primary focus was to “carve” up the African continent into European “spheres of influence” amongst the principal colonial powers in Africa.\(^{13}\) The Berlin Conference was followed shortly thereafter with the signing of the more comprehensive “Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and

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\(^{11}\) In Marxist terms slave societies are those societies built around a class formulation of just two dominant classes: master and slave.

\(^{12}\) Although Quaker and other evangelical religious groups began condemning slavery as “unchristian” in the late 1600s (see Cunningham 1897), Vincent Carretta (2003a) argues that the Somerset case is widely seen by abolitionists in Europe as the first judicial ruling on the legality of slavery.

\(^{13}\) Among the 14 nations invited to attend the Berlin conference, Portugal, Germany, France and Britain were the most influential, controlling the majority of the African continent.
Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and Spiritous Liquor” at the Brussels Conference in 1890 (Miers 1975). Known more commonly as the Brussels Conference Act of 1890, that multilateral treaty paved the way for the League of Nations’ (LON) Slavery Convention of 1926, (Appendix B), which was reinforced by the findings of the “Temporary Commission on Slavery” established in 1924 (Allain 2008).

With the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, however, the United Nations (UN) inherited the League’s work against slavery by adapting and adopting the 1926 convention.14 It is important to note that slavery as an institution has differed through time and space, due in large part to varying socio-cultural and economic practices as well as evolving modes-of-production at various times in history (Watson 1980). Modification and adaptation to slavery as a servile institution are evident by ongoing efforts to alter and update the UN anti-slavery pact to include and prohibit new forms of slavery, including human trafficking, sex slavery, child labor and generally forced or compulsory labor (Rauschning, et al. 1997). It should come as no surprise that the UN has had to scramble to keep up with evolving forms of slavery. For that reason it behooves today’s scholars of slavery and unfree labor to adopt an interdisciplinary approach. Indeed, this approach situates various institutions of forced servitude within the historiography of specific societies while simultaneously applying the theoretical analysis of cultural relativism. As Boas might have said: slavery “is not something absolute […] it is relative, and our ideas and conceptions [of slavery] are true only so far as our civilization goes” (2012[1887]:128).

In the past, some institutions labeled as slavery differed so greatly between Asia, Africa and elsewhere, or from antiquity to early modernity and through to today that James Watson (1980) questions whether it is appropriate to classify all in the same category of servile

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14 See chapter five for a more detailed account of Granville Sharp and the genesis of Anglo-American anti-slavery and abolitionist ideologies.
institution. For this reason, scholars such as David Eltis (2003), suggest that slavery be situated on a continuum of various forms of labor and servitude, ranging from the extremes of slavery to free wage labor with subtle gradations between the two. It was not, in fact, uncommon for slavery to differ within a single society over time and based on specific variables. Take, for example, the Merina in Madagascar. Anthropologist Maurice Bloch (1980) explains that most slaves in nineteenth century Madagascar were captives acquired either by warfare, slave-raiding or simple kidnapping. Regardless, all fell under the generic classification of andevō (slave). However, he notes that they were subsequently classified by “specific words which indicated somewhat different legal status” (106). That differing status determined the exact details of servitude such as the slave’s terms of service, manumission and the fate of their descendants (i.e., would the offspring of these slaves likewise be passed down for servitude or could they expect to become free men or women?). Elsewhere in Africa and indeed in parts of Asia, slavery has been cast within the scope of kinship and lineage (Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Watson 1976; Grace 1975; Miller 1977, etc.).

Slaves in some parts of West Africa were (and are) incorporated into households to perform a wide variety of chores and duties. Among the Mende of Sierra Leone, for example, slaves were primarily used in agricultural labor, or to clear woodlands for plantation tracts (Little 1951). The Mende word ndūwō (pl. ndūwonga) has been translated in various ways, including “slave” according to Frederick Schön’s Vocabulary of the Mende Language published in 1884 (cf Ferme 2001); ndūwō stands in contrast to ŋēŋgē, with a meaning closer to free, voluntary or communal labor (or ŋēŋgē-mo—laborer).

Interestingly, the socio-cultural interpretation of ndūwō shifted, I believe, to suit the needs of conversion-minded Christian missionaries in Sierra Leone’s first decades of the
twentieth century. Reverend Raymond Lerouge in his theologically-influenced reading of Mende slavery contends that *ndūwɔ* means “‘body’ or ‘bodies,’” leading him to hypothesize that “a slave in the estimation of our ferocious Mendes is only a body—a sort of animal without soul” (1920:230). I will return to Larouge in the coming pages to critically examine his religio-cultural interpretation of Mende slavery. Read today against the backdrop of Orlando Patterson’s ground-breaking scholarship on slavery, this religiously-charged concept of a slave as having no soul resonates with the contemporary idea of what Patterson terms the “secular excommunication” or “natal alienation” of slaves as a requisite trait for enslavement (1982:5). Patterson notes that:

> Not only was the slave denied all claims on, and obligations to, his parents and living blood relations but, by extension, all such claims and obligations on his more remote ancestors and on his descendants. He was truly a genealogical isolate. (Patterson 1982:5)

In the case of slavery in Africa, Miers and Kopytoff (1977) frowned on the use of the term slavery to identify a universal typology. Instead they advise the specified classification of slaveries to precisely identify the specific context of servitude under examination. They suggest, for example *lineage slavery, office slavery, palace slavery, individual slavery, etc.* (77ff). I propose adding *terrorist slavery* to their list, in order to designate child soldiery as a case-specific form of slavery. Although by no means exhaustive, Miers and Kopytoff’s list opens the way for a more critical analysis of a mode of production and labor practice that in recent decades has otherwise been reduced to simplistic *Hollywood* depictions of slavery.

For instance, Alex Haley’s controversial and celebrated familial saga *Roots* (1976) and the subsequent 1977 television miniseries exposed a generation of Americans to powerful and disturbing images of slave abduction in West Africa, the nightmarish Middle Passage, rape of female slaves in the Americas, and sadistic corporal punishment by slave overseers—punishment that was torture in all but name. Two decades later Stephen Spielberg (1997) weighed in on the
subject of slavery with his film version of the 1839 slave revolt aboard the Spanish schooner *La Amistad*. As with *Roots*, Speilberg’s audiences saw slavery through a narrow aperture. Slaves were little more than a dehumanized commodity, in which rape, torture and the haphazard execution of slaves was commonplace during their journey from the notorious Lomboko slave factory in Sierra Leone to Cuba and onward to the newly independent American colonies. To his credit, Spielberg did hint at the complex socio-cultural dynamics of slaves and slavery by introducing the troubled and tense relationship between Mende and Temne ethnic groups from Sierra Leone. And later, in 2007, Ioan Gruffudd glorified English efforts to end slavery. In “Amazing Grace” (directed by Michael Apted) Gruffudd portrays British abolitionist and parliamentarian William Wilberforce, who is haunted by tortured dreams and visions of enchained black slaves during their passage to the Americas. Haley, Spielberg and Gruffudd’s depictions of slavery are not wrong. But by the same token, neither are they a complete picture of slavery with its myriad manifestations.

The power of Hollywood and the reach of the West’s mainstream media and publishing industry has served to homogenize the idea of slavery, silencing various other permutations and typologies of human bondage through time and space. The export of Africans for slavery is rife with images and examples of physical violence. Consider, for example, chained and shackled human cargo packed into the dank and fetid holds of Portuguese, Spanish and English caravels bound for the New World. Furthermore, it is in the New World where slavery conjures up the darkest chapters of colonialism’s unfettered expansion; a 400-year span during which tens of millions of Africans were enslaved as the primary mode of production for Europe’s burgeoning New World empires from the fifteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries (Davidson 1980).

iconic impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade, observes Paul Lovejoy (1991) has—for better or worse—elevated the black slave of the Antebellum American South to a virtual synonym for slavery on the whole (cf Miers and Kopytoff 1977).

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In order to bridge the temporal chasm that divides slavery of the past—be it from antiquity or the colonial New World—it is requisite to first lay down some basic defining parameters of the terms “slave” and “slavery.” This, as noted previously is no simple task. Complicated by a multitude of cultural interpretations, “slave” is extremely difficult to define from one place to the next and indeed one time to another. In his work on Hellenic society Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1998) notes that even the word “slave” is in and of itself problematic given varied and inconsistent translations of the term. By way of example, Moses Finley notes that the ancient Greek word *latris* could be interpreted as “‘hired man’ and ‘servant’ as well as ‘slave’” (1964:234). This ambiguity is likewise evident in ancient Roman and Egyptian translations of “slave” (Westermann 1955). And in African “domestic slavery” the *uncertainty* of the term “slave” in the case of Sierra Leone’s Mende is underpinned (as will been seen) by cultural, moral and ideological considerations.

David Brion Davis (1966) offers a solid entry point for this study by identifying three generally accepted characteristics of slaves. He notes that a slave is i) the property of another man; ii) subject to the will of his owner; and iii) forced to provide free labor through coercion. However, Davis also notes that these traits may also apply to wives and children in certain patriarchal settings. Decades earlier Herman Nieboer (1900) addressed this contradiction by adding that slavery must fall “beyond the limits of the family proper” (29). Paul Lovejoy (1983), on the other hand, conflates Davis’s three characteristics of a slave under the singular category of
exploitation. As I will explore, the mechanisms by which a slave becomes the property of another man, is subject to his master’s will and is coerced to provide free labor take different forms in different settings. I plan to examine Davis’ three points under the following subheadings:

i) **slavery of the “Margins”/slavery of the whip**, by which I mean the mechanisms of authority and control over slaves. Note that my use of the term “margins” is intended to define not a specific peripheral locality, but instead identifies those occupants of the social periphery—not unlike members of a subaltern group;¹⁶

ii) **slavery as production/production of slavery**, wherein I will differentiate between slave labor for production and profit and the acquisition, trade and sale of slaves as a mode of economic profit in and of itself; and

iii) **rights, freedoms and slavery**, which examines various concepts of rights, including rights in-persons, property rights and the more ambiguous concept of freedom within the rubric of various slaveries.

At the outset, however, it is important to remain cognizant of the fact that aspects of Davis’ criteria often replicate, overlap and merge into one another. For example, the notion of coerced labor invokes questions of violence—be it physical, structural, symbolic or psychological. And all of these manifestations of violence are evident in the acquisition and subjugation of the slave (*i.e.*, slavery of the “Margins”/slavery of the whip). Likewise, this can be said of the suppression and control of the rights and freedoms of slaves. Violence is also present in the extraction of labor from slaves or their initial acquisition (*i.e.*, production of slavery/slavery as production). Indeed, observes Paul Lovejoy:

¹⁶ Antonio Gramsci (1971) defines subaltern as classes or groups of people who are excluded from any meaningful role in a regime of power.
Slavery was virtually always initiated through violence that reduced the status of a person from a condition of freedom and citizenship to a condition of slavery […] variations in the organization of such violence—including raids whose purpose was to acquire slaves, banditry, and kidnapping—indicate that violent enslavement can be thought of as falling on a continuum from large-scale political action, to small-scale criminal activity. (Lovejoy 1983:3)

In the following section I will examine the mechanisms of authority used to create the requisite conditions for enslavement.

Slavery of the “Margins”/Slavery of the Whip

The concept of slave as a marginalized or alienated individual appears frequently throughout the vast body of literature on involuntary labor and servile institutions. This alienation, then, raises the logical question as to how one comes to inhabit those margins, begging the obvious, as noted by Igor Kopytoff, that “slavery is a matter of becoming rather than being” (1982:221). There are a variety of theoretical suggestions regarding marginality and slaves. The most overt one is offered by Barbara Isaacman and Allen Isaacman (1977) who remind us that slaves are typically drawn from the lower echelons of a socially stratified society, leading to the conclusion (a hasty one, perhaps) that the denizens of those lower echelons had already (and exclusively) inhabited the fringes of society. However, the Isaacmans caution that scholarship on “domestic slavery” in Africa has too often limited candidacy for enslavement to individuals of a so-called “deprived-status” (i.e., economically, socially or politically marginalized individuals are most apt to become slaves). Contrast this with Victor Uchendu’s notion of “status disabilities,” among the Igbo in southeastern Nigeria (1977). For Uchendu, status is connected to the control of rights—not individuals—sold off as commodities. For example, in eighteenth century Iboland inter-village fighting resulted in the capture and enslavement of higher status individuals from rival villages. It was the parceling out of rights, then, that diminished and enslaved the higher status captives. This commoditization of rights was
particularly evident as “slavery became a profitable business […] in the New World” (1977:125), which will be explored at length in the coming pages. Thus, whether classed as inferior, subordinate or deprived, this lower status can be acquired. Indeed, the sale of rights per Uchendu’s contention serves to diminish one’s status. This commoditization of rights is a form of structural violence or social injustice through poverty, deprivation, institutional or societal discrimination (Galtung 1969; cf Farmer 1997, 2004, etc. and Schepers-Hughes 1993).

In the case of unfree labor, I contend that structural violence, which is to say the psycho-social violence(s) that exacerbate social stratification, can leave entire sectors of some societies (such as women, children or youths, and ethnic minorities) subject to the exploitive conditions of unfree labor. Andrees and Belser (2009) point out that vulnerability is typically the common thread in cases of unfree labor extracted through coercion. In chapters four and five, for example, I will explore how Sierra Leone’s settlers (former slaves) were free in name, but nonetheless forced into an exploitive labor arrangement with British colonial authorities by way of debt bondage. That effectively coerced labor, however, benefited the Crown and simultaneously kept the settlers dependent on the white European merchant capitalists who established the Sierra Leone Company in a bid to resurrect Granville Sharp’s failed Province of Freedom. The landlessness and economic vulnerability of the settlers left them devoid of rights and dependent on the British landholders, rendering the settlers unfree laborers, despite their much heralded emancipation from slavery. It is the loss of sovereignty over one’s rights, then, that marginalize the individual, making him or her subordinate and subject to enslavement and other forms of unfree or forced labor by more dominant individuals or groups. Marginalization, however, can result from myriad factors, including, but not limited to such variables as economic or social status, race, age or gender.
In examining slavery’s many forms through time and space, Orlando Patterson (1982) concluded that exclusion from society was synonymous with alienation and thus marginality. For Patterson it was possible to be enslaved only under circumstances of marginalization, whether that was by virtue of social status or race—which became the case in colonial-era slavery in the New World. In fact, he contends that “natal alienation” renders an individual “socially dead” and thus enslavable. Likewise, alienation can be manufactured as was the case with Sierra Leone’s child soldiers whose communities and families were destroyed by the rebels, leaving the children community-less and in Patterson’s view socially dead.

If the slave no longer belonged to a community, if he had no social existence outside his master, then what was he? The initial response in almost all slaveholding societies was to define the slave as a socially dead person. (Patterson 1982:38)

As socially dead, slaves or unfree laborers inhabit a realm separate from the rest of a society. Similarly, many unfree laborers, inhabit a stigmatized realm by virtue of the kind of work in which they are forced to engage (e.g., prostitution, child pornography, child soldiery, or involuntary drug smuggling/trafficking). As with slavery, these underground or illegal labor markets are stigmatized by virtue of socio-cultural norms, attitudes and mores. This stigmatization (or marginalization) renders the slave/unfree laborers socially powerless and disconnected from the “living” or legitimate society (cf Bolten 2012). By a variety of methods, including ritual initiation, fiscal acquisition, or social stratification a would-be slave is deprived of “all rights’ or claims of birth” and isolated from their religious, kin and ancestral ties (1982:5). In so doing the slave becomes a genealogical outcast, severed from his or her past and deprived of a familial future.

In the 1990s, the child soldiers of the RUF were frequently forced to execute a family member, constituting an extreme (and often irreparable) rupture between the child, his or her kin
network and their natal community. Catherine Bolten has recorded the ongoing struggles of child combatants to reintegrate into their home community of Makeni in Sierra Leone’s Northern Province. In part, Bolten notes, these “ex-combatants threatened the return to the idealized prewar ‘normal’” of social and political statuses and structures (2012:497). 17

Finley reminds us that in classical Greek society slaves were excluded from religious practices and political life owing to the ethnically and hierarchically exclusive nature of Greek religion and politics (1959, 1968). In addition to social isolation, slaves of old and contemporary unfree laborers were are civically deprived; they have no claim to labor rights or other legal rights and protections (Patterson 1977, 1982). The concepts of natal alienation and social death are key elements of slavery that continue to undergird New Slavery or unfree labor. Let us now take a closer look at Patterson’s modes of social death.

* * *

The intrusive mode of social death is imposed on the slave who is an outsider to a given community. Note, for example, that Romans were restricted by law from selling other Romans as slaves within the empire (Lévy-Bruhl 1960; cf Buckland 1908 and Westermann 1955). Similarly, although slavery was permitted and indeed common in parts of the Muslim world, the Qur’an—Islam’s principal religious text—forbids the enslavement of free born Muslims (Finley 1968). And in ancient Greece the vast majority of slaves were foreigners (Finley 1959). Consider also African slaves in pre-Civil War America who comprised one third of the U.S. population—essentially a population of outsider slaves beholden to a small but economically and socially powerful population of masters (Meltzer 1971). Outsider status not only permitted enslavement, it allowed the “host” community to other the slave (Said 1978, 1985; cf Coronil 1996) reducing

him or her to an object that can be owned (Kloosterboer 1960). In the case of unfree laborers, ownership is not at issue, but rather the exploitation of the other is of concern. In many instances, as Lovejoy (1983) observed, the intrusive mode applies to slaves who were acquired as war captives, by kidnapping or by slave-raiding.

By way of example, consider the impact outsider status had on the Bella Coola Native Americans, whose connection to their land was paramount to their social status and identity. As with the Romans and Muslims, the Bella Coola “considered [it] improper for a man to hold a member of his own tribe in servitude” (McIlwraith 1948:159). In the mid-twentieth century Thomas McIlwraith wrote that for the most part slaves were acquired through trade or war with other tribes. As “foreigners” these slaves were considered to be void of the honor and rights the Bella Coola believed to be tied to a person’s ancestral lands. In McIlwraith’s words, “a slave was a stranger in a strange land, unsupported by a chain of ancestors reaching back to the beginning of time” (159). In this sense the outsider is akin to Georg Simmel’s stranger who is fixed within a spatial group to which “he has not belonged to from the beginning” (1950:402).

In light of Patterson’s conceptualization of social death and slavery, recall missionary Raymond Lerouge’s interpretation of the Mende term ndūwɔ as body or bodies is not so much wrong as perhaps culturally skewed— informed by his deep-seated and sacred beliefs along with a vehement opposition to slavery. Within the scope of Patterson’s framework, ndūwɔ for Mende slaves and slave masters may—from their socio-cultural perspective— be literally interpreted as bodies, but not soul-less bodies from a Christian standpoint but community-less bodies, alienated from all ties to society. This is particularly important as I continue to explore the RUF’s capture and induction of terrorist slaves during the rebel group’s abortive-revolution. The induction process severed the child soldier-slave’s ties to his or her natal community, but incorporated
them into a manufactured *coterie* or social grouping. In fact, in many African societies, slavery was not perceived as the absence of freedom, but as the absence of *belonging* (Palmié 1995). To remedy this question of belonging, slavery in many instances, including among Sierra Leone’s Mende, was fixed within the context of kinship networks (Grace, 1975, 1977).

However, Miers and Kopytoff (1977) advise that it is important to distinguish between *belonging in* versus *belonging to* a kin group. A slave could be incorporated to a kin group though he may never belong in that group as a full member. In fact, the slavery-to-kinship continuum, as Miers and Kopytoff term it, actually served the purpose of institutional marginalization; recall Patterson’s view that marginalization, or natal alienation, stands as a requisite to slavery. In Sierra Leone, slaves of the Mende were “adopted” by kin groups, but in so doing they were also formally relegated to an inferior status. The Mende’s kinship-slavery connection is strikingly similar to northern Nigeria’s *Margi* form of enslavement (*mafakur*) in which slaves (*mafa*) are incorporated as subordinates into *Margi* kin lineages (Vaughan 1977).

Of the *Mende*, John Grace (1977) finds they were “minors who would never grow up and who would never receive the respect due a mature adult” (420). The *Imbangala* of northwestern Angola likewise incorporated slaves into kin lineages, but always within a hierarchical framework in which slaves were always lower in status than the *mbanza* (free people) who enjoy maximum personal autonomy (Miller 1977:211, 1988). Consider, as James Watson points out, the similarity to status ranking among slaves in southern China’s San Tin district. Slaves were referred to as *hsi min*, meaning “little people” or “minor people” (1976:364). This demarcation of slave as inferior or minor in social rank goes a long way to help explain the longstanding stereotype of slaves as childlike and indolent in American Literature (Elkins 1976).
Slaves from antiquity onward were often held on the margins by ritually marking them as the property of a master. For example, in the case of the Kachin of the Burmese highlands a slave’s head was shaved; a symbolic gesture to leave the slave visibly shorn from his past. Ashes from the master’s hearth were then rubbed on the slave’s scalp, connecting him to the master’s ancestors (Leach 2004). Similarly, branding in the Antebellum South served not only to mark a slave as the property of his or her owner,\textsuperscript{18} it also symbolically fixed the slave to his plantation in the New World, notably away from his or her origins in Africa (Stampp 1956). In chapter ten I will apply this idea of slave integration and affiliation to the incorporation of child soldiers as slaves in Sierra Leone’s revolutionary civil war.

As with the Mende, incorporating slaves into kin groups—be it in southern China or West Africa—served the function of diminishing social rank to situate slaves at a lower status than that of the master or other members of the kin group. For Miers and Kopytoff, then, the polar opposite of slavery was not necessarily freedom. Under certain cultural contexts it was not a matter of freedom over slavery; it was a question of inclusion over exclusion. In some pre-colonial African societies, inclusion—even within the diminished stature of slave—was preferable to exclusion from the safety and security of a community. In many African societies, freedom was not found in “meaningless and dangerous autonomy but in attachment to a kin group, to a patron, to power” (1977:17).

Patterson’s second mode of social death, the extrusive mode, focuses on the insider (i.e., a member of a society) who has “fallen,” and “ceased to belong,” resulting in his or her expulsion “from normal participation in the community because of a failure to meet certain legal or socioeconomic norms of behavior” (1982:41). To illustrate the extrusive mode of social death,
Patterson points to ancient Aztec society. He notes that slavery among the Aztecs was predominantly an internal affair reserved for individuals who had “fallen as a result of destitution or criminality” (42; cf. Biart 1887). Consider this in the context of more contemporary unfree labor regimes; it is often individuals on the economic or social margins who wind up in exploited slave-like unfree labor arrangements. Moreover, in various parts of West Africa slavery was frequently used as a punishment for a variety of crimes, including theft, adultery and witchcraft in particular. In the Mano River region numerous eighteenth and nineteenth century European travelers—abolitionists, missionaries and colonists—recorded the common use of enslavement by Temne chiefs and elders as punishment for witchcraft. For example, after living in and traveling throughout the Sierra Leone River region in the 1780s, Lt. John Matthews, an unemployed British naval officer-turned slave agent, observed that:

If an alligator destroys any body [sic] when washing or swimming, or a leopard commits depredations on their flocks or poultry; if any person is taken suddenly ill or dies suddenly [...] it is immediately attributed to witchcraft: and it rarely happens that some person or other is not pointed out [...] as the witch and sold.19

Charging an enemy or rival with witchcraft was an important strategy used by Temne villagers and chiefs to alienate, enslave and expel rivals in the region.

Along with Patterson’s two modes of social death, I propose a third—which I term the liminal mode—to be applied specifically to the case of Sierra Leone’s terrorist slaves of the Mano River Wars. I will examine this third mode in greater detail in chapter ten, but briefly, the liminal mode incorporates elements of both the extrusive and intrusive modes. For instance, I believe the child soldier-slaves—who were kidnapped from their home villages—were “outsiders” per Patterson’s intrusive mode. The RUF vanguard, however, performed a ritualized

initiation to transform these children into hardened, subservient killers and members of the insurgent community. The legacy of the child soldier-slave’s wartime atrocities resulted in their post-war stigmatization upon their return (or attempted return) to their natal communities (Bolten 2012), thereby making them fallen “insiders” after the extrusive mode of social death.

Furthermore, their capture and initiation by the RUF disrupted the slave-soldier’s rite of passage from childhood to adulthood, rendering them socially outcast (i.e., figuratively dead), in a perpetually liminal state of childhood within their larger kin or clan network, and even in the larger context of the Sierra Leone nation. In effect, then, the RUF’s initiation process fell beyond the boundaries of the Van Gennep’s classic model of separation, transformation and reintegration, but instead represented a new case-specific model that might best be termed a rite of rupture, falling more closely in line with Max Gluckman’s observation that Van Gennep’s work—as important as it was—was limited by a failure to account for a greater variety of initiations in different societies. Indeed, Gluckman noted that Van Gennep was focused more on the role “which whole ceremonies and specific rites play in the ordering and re-ordering of social relations” (1962:4; see also 1954, 1965). There was little examination of the failure of those rituals under circumstances of social upheaval. Hence, the terrorist slave was an incorporated member of the RUF only during the societal rupture of the country’s civil war. Afterward, in the eyes of post-war Sierra Leonean society, the former slave-soldier was no longer a full member of the community by virtue of his violent past and liminal status. In chapter ten I further explicate the liminal mode of social death by analyzing several ethnographic examples of child soldiers during the war and the condition of those former combatants in post-war Sierra Leone, for the moment let us conceive of the liminal mode as another form of hierarchical stratification that
marginalizes slave from master through the various praxes of age, estrangement and vulnerability.

*     *     *

WHETHER BY DINT OF social status and stratification/hierarchy or by outright physical violence and coercion, slavery and other forms of unfree labor are at their core about power relations; an asymmetrical pairing of subordinate and dominant players. According to classical Roman law, slavery was defined as a condition under which one individual is “subject to the dominium of another.” Dominium in this context, Finley contends, can be read as “power” (1968:307). Given our present study it may be recalled that for Weber power can be simplified to a relationship in which one individual or group imposes his or her will over another (1978). “Power (Macht),” observed Weber, “is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (1964:152). The ability to wield power over another person is often—but not exclusively—contingent on the use of violence or at least the threat of violence (Weber 1978, 1964; cf Burnard and Heuman 2010). The use of violence under certain circumstances may be justified, but “it never will be legitimate” (Arendt 1970:52). Indeed, the use of violence undermines Weber’s notion of legitimate domination, or herrschaft (as distinct from macht).

Finley reminds us that “all forms of labor on behalf of another […] place the man who labors in the power of another” (1968:307; cf Cooper, et al 2000; Eltis 2003). The essential difference between slave/unfree laborer and free or legitimate laborer is the seeming powerlessness of the former. As I have shown, in some instances this dynamic was prescribed in society through social hierarchy and kinship stratification (Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Isaacman and Isaacman 1977). In others it prevailed by means of physical force and control. In both cases,
however, authority was achieved by force; either by the force of tradition and belief (i.e. honor), which Elisabeth Welskopf (1957) referred to as “spiritual force” (cf Campbell 1973), or through the stinging crack of a whip and constraint by chain or shackle. Though, recall that in many traditional African societies, masters have held power over their slaves simply by virtue of social status and the slave’s position as a societal outsider—this status may include the slave’s own perception of self and his or her circumstances. However in instances of passive resistance the whip was the desired instrument of authority and domination (Turner 1995; Genovese 1976, 1989).

In fact, just as there is no known slave system in which the whip was not used, whether in antiquity, colonial New World or African slave systems (Patterson 1982; Finley 1968), so too it is hard to imagine a horse society in which whips were not used to wield control. Yet, in both slave and horse society the raw power of the whip was not the sole mode of control. Take for example the symbolic power of “mounting,” which J. Lorand Matory posits is “an extreme form of control” (1994:7, cf 1993). In Matory’s study of gendered power relations in Oyo-Yoruba religion, he notes that marriage and mounting serve to establish a symbolic, gendered hierarchy of male above female. Likewise, in horse societies mounting obviously establishes the rider’s physical and symbolic domination over the animal.

The idea of hierarchical power is particularly apt with regard to Africa, where the existence of two parallel forms of slavery existed. The first form being “domestic slavery,” which will be examined in greater depth in the coming pages, and the second being export slavery—a hybrid of the first, blended with expanding capitalist interests in the colonial New World. Indeed, “domestic slavery” in Africa, was transformed with the arrival of European traders and colonists in the mid-fifteenth century. More and more slaves were captured—
regardless of their social stature—for the sole purpose of export as a trade commodity to Europe
and the New World. Historian Walter Rodney (1966) argued that the impact of the Atlantic Slave
Trade on West Africa’s Senegambia region was so dramatic that it led to chronic depopulation and a
consequent inability to compete on the global stage. He later expanded his thesis, arguing that “the
capitalist class in Europe used their control of international trade to ensure that Africa specialized in
exporting captives” (1982:78). In other words, Europe’s participation in the African slave trade played
a critical role in creating a social stratum and a macroeconomic model of demand-oriented trade based
primarily on the supply of humans as an unpaid labor force with which to build the New World colonies.

Rodney’s theories spawned a wide range of critiques and alternative contentions, including Patrick
Manning’s (1990) proposal that while slavery certainly contributed to depopulating the African
continent, census data must also be surveyed in relation to the expansion of populations elsewhere in the
world. If Africa’s potential workforce was shrinking, the rest of the world by contrast had an expanding
surplus of potential laborers. John Iliiffe (1995) suggests that depopulation must also be attributed to
geo"cological, climatic and agricultural limitations, along with epidemiological hindrances.

The debate triggered by Rodney’s work is, in and of itself, worthy of a full volume, thus I will close with the following: In the years since its publication, Rodney’s scholarship in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) has been criticized as too general and flawed in its methodology. Stephan Palmié (1995) notes, however, that several prominent scholars of slavery, including Claude Meillasoux (1982, 1991) and Emmanuel Terray (1974), contend that such critiques miss the more important issue at hand: namely that the value of Rodney’s work resides

20 Thomas Peters—a central figure in the creation of Sierra Leone in the late eighteenth century—was purportedly of royal lineage in the Egba clan of the Yoruba of today’s Nigeria.
in the taxonomic recognition of *domestic* slavery versus *export* slavery in Africa. This dichotomy underscores an essential point of focus. As Palmié observed, West African states “were based—economically as well as politically—not only on productive activities performed by slaves but on the production of slaves for export” (1995:xiv, italics in original); I will return to this point in the *slavery as production/production of slavery* section. On the question of violence, I contend that export with its consequent disruption and alteration of African societies, economic models and demographics represent perhaps the most significant violence of all. How the continent of Africa was or was not irreversibly changed and developmentally stunted is still up for debate. On the micro or individual scale, export slavery represents the extreme of physical subjugation, recalling Lovejoy’s evaluation that all slavery is initiated through violence (1983:3).

**Slavery as Production/Production of Slavery**

**Although it began with** the transport of just a few hundred African slaves to Europe and the Americas, by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries colonial and indeed imperial fortunes were made or lost in the cotton, sugar and tobacco fields of the Americas where tens of thousands of Africans were delivered every year (Davidson 1980). It is little wonder then that Karl Marx (1935[1847]) and later Marx with Frederick Engels (1996[1852])—writing in the midst of the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade’s unfettered expansion—were quick to formulate their perception of slavery on economic and philosophical models oriented toward class struggle between proletarian wage-laborers and capital-owning bourgeoisie. Indeed, turn-of-the-twentieth century efforts to define slavery tended to foreground concepts such as capital, ownership and property. Consider two influential and commonly cited works on slavery from the late 1800s and early 1900s. John Kells Ingram finds “the essential character of slavery” situated in the fact that “the master was owner of the person of the slave” (1895:262); just as the farmer owns a hoe or a
tracker, so too does the master own the slave. Similarly, Nieboer (1900) locates slavery within the rubric of industry, meaning the slave is a tool of industrial production.

An oft-cited defense-*cum*-rationale for the Atlantic Slave Trade lies in the notion that Africa “possessed a class of slaves who formed the initial reservoir” of slaves for exportation (Davidson 1969). Moreover, Rodney held that “the [African] ruling class joined hands with the Europeans in exploiting the African masses” (1966:434) wreaking havoc on the framework of social stratification and Patterson’s intrusive and extrusive modes of social death. This headlong rush to acquire marketable slaves underscores what Paul Lovejoy referred to as the transformation in slavery in Africa, which is to say the “increase in the ability to enslave people” (1983:66) to satisfy the proliferating European demand for export slaves.\(^{21}\) In the wake of this transformation, the majority of slave institutions and practices—from West Africa to the central Kongo region—became associated with economic production in the more classic Marxist sense. The demand for slaves became so influential on traditional African society that groups such as the *Vai* pressed beyond their customary boundaries in search of slaves to sell (Holsoe 1977). In Sierra Leone, some Temne villagers—adept traders and merchants who descended from the Mane invaders—saw the rising commercial prospects in selling humans to European slavers (Shaw 2000, 2002; Ijagbemi 1968). In essence, then, slaves became a source of economic profit on two levels. First, slaves were captured in raids and sold for economic gain by African middlemen such as the *Temne, Vai* and *Duala* of the Cameroonian hinterland (Austen and Derrick 1999; Austen 1977). And second, slaves in the New World were the production machinery by which plantation owners reaped their crops for sale and profit. In chapter six I will explore how this second level of profit becomes increasingly important in Africa after the

\(^{21}\) This transformation began in the 1600s and reached an apex between 1700 and the mid-1800s (Lovejoy 1983).
abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century and the increased use by Britain and other colonial powers of adapted forms of unfree labor to plant, harvest and extract agricultural produce from the hinterland regions surrounding various colonies, including Sierra Leone.

Before proceeding, I offer a word of caution when approaching slavery from a reductive Marxian evaluation of slave as commodity/capital. Taken within the wider scope of Eltis’ labor continuum, Marx’s way of looking at slavery fails to examine the wider world of slave or servile institutions that pre-date the capitalist mode of production. To grasp the true nature and scope of slavery it is crucial to investigate other motives and manifestations of slavery such as those evident in some pre-capitalist West African kingdoms. For example, the Mane invasion(s) into the Sierra Leone River region in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries led to the widespread enslavement of the coastal Sape populations.22

Initially, Mane slaves were part of their politico-military strategy to incorporate indigenous populations into the Mane socio-political fold (Alie 1990). It was only when resident Portuguese colonists began buying slaves that the motive was transformed (Rodney 1970). Indeed, the intersection of the Mane invasions and European contact led to an economic reconfiguration of slavery, which helps to explain the proliferation of slavery in the region during that period. Walter Rodney contends that the Mane invasions “sparked off a period of unprecedented slaving” (1970:102). Wars ignited by the Mane’s arrival led to vast numbers of captives who were sold off to the Portuguese. He writes:

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22 The Mane invasion(s) of the Sierra Leone region took place in the mid-1400s when exiles from the Mali Empire began capturing the inland waterways for greater trade with the area. Over time, the invaders conquered many of the indigenous populations of the area, which were eventually assimilated into the two distinct and dominant ethnic groups of contemporary Sierra Leone, the Temne and Mende. In 1920, Northcote Thomas wrote one of the first extensive studies of the Mane invasions in the Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. 19, no. 75 and vol. 20, no. 77. For more contemporary studies, see Rodney 1967, 1970; Kup 1960; Person 1962, 1971; Hair 1967 and Jones 1981; these scholars differ on the date of the invasion and indeed on whether there was a single invasion or a group of invasions that spanned several decades. Sape is the Portuguese term for Temne, Bullom, Baga, Vai and Landuma populations who lived along Sierra Leone’s coastline and inland waterways (Alie 1990; Shaw 2002).
The Portuguese seized the opportunity […] Ocean-going slavers remained in the coastal bays and estuaries, while the boats of the lançados hovered like vultures in every river, waiting to take hold of the victims of the struggles. (Rodney 1970:102)\textsuperscript{23}

It is significant to note that although the arrival of the Europeans on the Upper Guinea Coast was completely independent of the Mane invasion(s) and wars, the Europeans profited from the spoils of the wars’, “which filled the holds of the slave ships.” Rodney further observes that “inevitably the Manes came to look upon the supply of slaves to the Europeans as an end in itself” (102).

As the Mane extended their hold on the region and seized territory along the Rokel River, the Mane replaced the lançados and began to assume the role of middlemen, acquiring and selling slaves to the Europeans (Shaw 2002). For, as Wylie notes, control of Sierra Leone’s rivers and estuaries offered easy trade access to the European slave forts in the larger Sierra Leone River.

Slave traders recognized the strategic value of controlling the estuaries, and some of the earliest “slave factories” were built right in the Sierra Leone River. The infamous “Bunce Island” factory was the most important. (Wylie 1973:203; cf Brooks 1993)

The presence of the European slavers and their seemingly unquenchable thirst for human cargo transformed the many wars of invasion and conquest into wars of production.

Elsewhere, there are cases of pre-contact African slavery that resemble something more akin to an Asiatic mode of production (Marx 1993[1953]). Material evidence excavated and analyzed by archeologist J. Cameron Monroe (2005, 2007) coupled with ethnographic and economic data from economic anthropologist and sociologist Karl Polanyi (1966) suggest that Dahomeyan slavery may have been motivated by communal welfare and self-preservation by

\textsuperscript{23} Lançados were Portuguese or Luso-Tenne traders who served as middlemen to European slavers in the Sierra Leone region.
using slaves i) as a source of exchange currency with which to procure firearms for tributary payments to Dahomey’s aggressive neighboring *Oyo* kingdom; ii) in military service to defend against neighboring rivals, including the *Oyo*; iii) in sacrificial ceremonies at the “Annual Customs” rites;\(^{24}\) and iv) as a source of labor for massive construction projects such as a string of palaces that secured a corridor to the coastline for the otherwise landlocked Dahomey kingdom. Three of these four motives of Dahomeyan slavery were in the interests of defense and economic gain in a capitalistic sense.

One final note, a Eurocentric approach that couples slavery exclusively with capitalism assumes a western assumption concerning wealth, which may distort the ways in which social systems, such as slavery are interpreted. For example, Svend Holsoe (1977, 1974) points out that among the *Gola* of western Liberia and the *Vai* of southern Sierra Leone, a person’s wealth was not calculated strictly in terms of material goods or property, but was also defined “by the number of individuals whose services they could control” (1977:287). He records that control of individuals was achieved by three methods: “indentured servitude,” wherein labor is provided for a period of time to pay a debt, “domestic slavery” and “pawns” or *pawnship*. Individuals among the *Vai* who were considered to be in servitude—including pawns—fell under the generic category of *jɔŋ* (pl. *jɔŋnu*) as opposed to free born individuals who were referred to as *manja deŋ* (pl. *manja deŋnu*). This interpretation of wealth was common in many traditional African societies and can be closely tied to the importance of kinship networks and social stratification as a source of power (*cf* Isaacman and Isaacman 1977).

In parts of West Africa one of the more common methods of building wealth in the form of human resources was *pawnship*, wherein a youth or child is taken into the custody of another

\(^{24}\) Known also as *Xwetanu*, the Annual Customs involved the mass execution of captives who were sacrificed to royal ancestors. The blood from the victims was then used in the preparation of mud for royal palaces and fortifications (Monroe 2007).
family to perform household chores, care for younger siblings and aid in agricultural work, *etc.* This was typically offered in lieu of an outstanding debt (Lovejoy 1983; Lovejoy and Falola 2003; Lovejoy and Richardson 2001). Victor Uchendu (1977) argues pawnship was (is) not slavery *per se*, but is more akin to indentured servitude.²⁵ Among the *Igbo* in southwestern Nigeria it is seen as a form of debt or bond slavery—a term I will return to in chapter five with regards to the Black Loyalists and their servitude to the Sierra Leone Company in the 1790s.

In the final section of this chapter, I will shift to “Rights and Freedoms” as a key element of slavery in antiquity and the colonial New World. To interrogate slavery it seems only logical to understand its presumed opposite: freedom. In the case of slavery in the American South, Turner (1995) points out that slave labor gradually was replaced by workers who increasingly held agency over their own person and were able to sell their labor for wages. This, she says was designated by the legal status of freedom. However, as Cooper, Holt and Scott (2000) point out, free labor in many societies was never realized as an ideal-type antithesis of slave labor. For the purposes of our examination of slavery, it must be asked whether freedom is truly antithetical to slavery?

**Rights, Freedoms and Slavery**

*In Nineteen-Eighty-Four*, the classic Orwellian novel of totalitarianism and perpetual war, George Orwell (1949) created the dystopian society of Oceania, led by the enigmatic leader Big Brother. Oceania’s ruling party *Ingsoc*²⁶ is built on three contradictory tenents: “War is Peace,” “Freedom is Slavery” and “Ignorance is Strength.” I open this section on rights, freedoms and slavery with the Orwellian dictum “Freedom is Slavery” as a gateway to problematize the otherwise binary view of freedom and slavery as opposites. Harri Englund

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²⁵ Pawnship is still practiced throughout many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in rural areas.

²⁶ Orwell’s Newspeak for English Socialism.
(2006) observes that freedom—in a contemporary geo-political context—is widely contested and interpreted. Adding historical perspective to Englund’s contention, Finley finds that in certain contexts men like the *helots* in Sparta or the *penestae* in Thessaly stood somewhere “between free men and slaves” (1964:233). This ambiguity resides primarily in the social status (as opposed to the political status) of individuals, offering the possibility of a spectrum of social statuses. As with the cultural chasm dividing British missionary and Mende interpretations of the meaning behind *ndūwɔ*, or body, so too exist differing understandings and interpretations of freedom from one society at a given time and place to another.

Furthermore, Patterson argues that “freedom” was just one of “five great revolutions […] that were to transform the history of the West and, by extension, that of the world” (1992:47). As one of those five great revolutions, “freedom” has indeed transformed the world, though not necessarily in a universal or homogeneous manner. Many attempts have been made to situate freedom within the rubric of servile practices, placing freedom and slavery as distinct bookends on a shelf containing myriad interpretations and applications of both concepts. In one sweeping and perhaps overly reductive definition, John Grace (1975) identifies slavery simply as the deprivation of one group’s freedom for the benefit of another group. Yet, ‘free’ clearly has indefinite and varied meanings, challenging the desire to define freedom as the opposite of enslaved. The distinction between free and enslaved became further blurred in many post-emancipation societies, where David Eltis suggests that ‘free’ and ‘slave’ ought to be situated as points on a sliding scale rather than as polar opposites (2003).

Early Greek philosophical musings about freedom influenced a great many Enlightenment ideals of early modern European thinkers, including advocates for and against

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27 The other four revolutions include the creation of a pre-industrial economic complex; a social revolution regarding the demographic composition of slave and free populations; the invention of a democratic state; and the discovery of the philosophical concept of rationality.
slavery. Thomas Hobbes and Thomas Paine argued for increasing recognition of the political and human rights of individuals, disconnecting human rights and freedoms from Christian natural law. In so doing, however, they were approaching human rights and freedoms from a distinctly Eurocentric perspective (Holt 1992). If the ideal for Europe’s philosophical radicals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw individual autonomy as the height of freedom, others elsewhere in the world sought freedom from peril, insecurity and privation.

Life’s goals for most of humans who have walked the earth are [best] described in terms of [...] the full achievement of satisfaction and security. Given those circumstances, the modern ideal of individual autonomy might be a dysfunctional, if not alien notion. For most of humankind throughout most of human history the highest value or good has been to achieve a sense, not of autonomy, but of belonging, that psychic and physical security of incorporation into the group. (Holt 1992:5)

The Age of Enlightenment introduced “a radical change in the way people were accustomed to thinking of themselves—indeed, in the way most people in the rest of the world continued to think of themselves” (1992:5, italics added for emphasis).

Decades, if not centuries would pass before “the rest of the world” began to seriously incorporate those Enlightenment ideals of individual rights and freedoms. Take, for example, Africa’s twentieth century struggle for independence from colonial rule. Englund (2006) observes that Uhuru, the Kiswahili term for “freedom” was repeatedly invoked across Africa in discussions of national liberation. Yet, it was still decades after independence before many African leaders began to incorporate individualized configurations of personal rights and

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28 See Davis (1966, 1999) for a thorough discussion of how early Greek and Christian beliefs were employed by both proponents and opponents of slavery in the 18th century.
29 In Leviathan 1904[1651] Hobbes rejects the Christian notion of a monarch’s assent to the throne by virtue of a Divine right.
30 Paine’s Common Sense (1776) was a veritable roadmap for the American Revolution; in Rights of Man (1791) Paine defended the French Revolution.
freedoms to *Uhuru*, underscoring the cultural divide between traditional African conceptions of collective freedom and Europe’s ideal-type of individual rights and freedoms.

The evaluation of freedom as a variable determined by the *perceived* needs of an individual offers an intriguing lens through which to deconstruct Eltis’ slavery-freedom range as non-linear. It is essential that concepts such as freedom and slavery be defined within the specific social, political and economic contexts of those cultures under investigation. To truly understand slavery as a temporally- and spatially-articulated institution it is first necessary to abandon the idea that freedom and slavery are diametrically opposed. Instead, one must envision the continuum as a multi-faceted system; a network of changing, and, at times, intersecting beliefs, cultural practices and societal norms.

* * *

**OUT OF THE ASHES** of Old slavery was born the phoenix of New slavery, an outlawed practice of equally violent human exploitation in which the poor and disenfranchised populations of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are vulnerable to bourgeois elites in the form of consumers and corporations alike. Among this breed of new slaves are the child soldiers of the Mano River Wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They are the *terrorist slaves* of that region’s late modern social erosion. Unlike Old slavery or domestic slavery in Sierra Leone, this *terrorist slavery* was born specifically of a misplaced revolutionary zeal, a zeal that catalyzed the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone. It is my contention that the Revolutionary United Front—weakened by government counter-offensives in the mid-1990s—enslaved portions of the country’s youth in order to wage its war. *Terrorist slavery* flourished in Sierra Leone under the increasingly lawless and corrupt governments of the post-colonial (and more precisely post-Cold War) era. I contend that child soldiery, with its penchant for kidnapping and forced initiation, as
well as the influence of commercial productivity, retained many of the same or similar requisite traits of Old slavery. But the disposability of these young slaves, the illicit nature of child soldiery\(^{31}\) and the impact of transnational factors\(^{32}\) coalesced to create a hybrid of Old and New Slaveries.

Through the following chapters I will demonstrate the tenacity of slavery in adapted forms in Sierra Leone from its earliest British colonial beginnings in the late eighteenth century, through the nineteenth century and the height of abolitionism; and into the twentieth century where I explore the legacy of these previous unfree labor regimes and how they contributed to an unstable and weakened post-colonial state. Finally, I examine how *terrorist slavery*—as the most recent iteration of servile exploitation to be used in the region—was born of this inheritance. In chapter three I will trace the ethno-history of Sierra Leone to its earliest origins in the American Revolution and Britain’s attempt in 1775 to incite a slave insurrection against the Patriot uprising, representing the first misrepresentation of a seemingly altruistic abolitionist policy.

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\(^{31}\) Outlawed, like slavery, by numerous international treaties to which Sierra Leone itself is a signatory.

\(^{32}\) Such as neoliberal reform, arms dealing, diamond and drug smuggling.
CHAPTER THREE

The Black Loyalists: Revolution and Slavery in Colonial America

I do hereby further declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or others, free that are able and willing to bear arms.
– Lord Dunmore, Nov. 7, 1775.

THE STORY OF SIERRA LEONE as a site of abolitionism, an outpost of the British Empire or a post-colonial metaphor for what Robert Rotberg (2002; cf Chomsky 2007; Kaplan 1994) termed a “failed state”\(^1\) begins neither in West Africa, nor in the contemporary events of the post-Cold War late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This study of Sierra Leone spans two centuries and is woven across three continents (North America, Europe and Africa), culminating with the invention of the anti-slavery haven of Sierra Leone.\(^2\) Toby Dodge (2003) examines British efforts to invent Iraq as an envisioned sovereign state at the end of the First World War. For Dodge the state is envisioned, but not realized as a functional polity. For Sierra Leone I have borrowed Dodge’s concept of invention rather than creation. In my view, Sierra Leone—as a locus for anti-slavery efforts—was invented or envisioned as an illusory act of abolitionist idealism. It was not, by contrast, created as a functioning entity. Sierra Leone in its role as an anti-slavery haven is an ideal type in the Weberian sense (Weber 2011[1949]). Although the abolitionist mandate was never truly realized, as this study argues, Sierra Leone

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\(^1\) Rotberg argues a failed state is unable to deliver “positive political goods to the people” and is ruled by a government that has no legitimacy in the “eyes and hearts” of the general population.


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remains inextricably associated with abolitionism and the fight to end slavery on the African continent and throughout the British Empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I contend that the perception of Sierra Leone as an anti-slavery haven is a product of historical fiction created and nurtured within the archive’s margins—silenced margins that proffer an altogether different history, contradicting the country’s national narrative. In this sense it is important to consider, in Natalie Zemon Davis’ words, “the relation between the ‘real’ and the ‘historical’ to the ‘fictional,’” which is contingent upon the choices made by scholars in crafting their narratives (1987:3). My concern, here is to re-evaluate the archival record in order to examine that relation between ‘real’ and ‘historical’ as a way to cull the fiction from Sierra Leone’s national narrative.

This chapter dissects and questions the long-held account that Sierra Leone was a “successful” abolitionist experiment. It is my aim to show that from the outset Sierra Leone was not the dividend of humanistic desires to free enslaved Africans, but rather was an accidental byproduct spawned from Imperial greed and revolutionary fervor, which became entangled in the emerging Enlightenment ideals of liberty and freedom. To construct my argument, this chapter interrogates two important precursors to Sierra Leone’s inception, which arose from the American Revolution. They are i) the motivation behind Britain’s manumission of tens of thousands of slaves held by Patriotic American slave-owning revolutionaries, and ii) the stark reality of racism and discrimination against the newly freed Afro-American slaves (dubbed the Black Loyalists) in Canada. I hold that together these two factors established the pre-conditions that left Sierra Leone exposed and vulnerable to adapted forms of unfree labor throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Replete with heroism, villainy and betrayal, Sierra Leone is, at its core, a Shakespearean tragedy resonating with themes of clan rivalry (Romeo and Juliet), racism (Othello), revenge (Hamlet; Titus Andronicus) and avarice (King Lear; Macbeth). For the purposes of this study our tragedy begins some 4,600 miles (7,403 kilometers) away from the slave fortresses of the Sierra Leone River. Act One, scene one begins off the coast of Virginia in the autumn of 1775—the Opening of the American Revolution and the eve of the American Declaration of Independence. It was a time when colonial governors loyal to King George III increasingly feared the rising tide of unrest from Massachusetts to Virginia. In fact, Sierra Leone’s genealogical roots can arguably be traced to eighteenth century Virginia and its colonial governor, John Murray—a reviled scoundrel to Independence-minded Patriots, but tragic hero to British Loyalists and the former slaves he liberated. Outnumbered by Patriots and cut off from reinforcements and military support, Murray—the fourth Earl of Dunmore—designed a plan to instigate an African slave revolt in the hopes of terrorizing the insurgent American Patriots into quitting their rebellion against the Crown.

**Dunmore’s Proclamation in the time of Revolution and Slavery**

On the afternoon of Saturday, September 2, 1775 the inhabitants of coastal Virginia looked on as the skies darkened under towering black thunderheads. Powerful winds relentlessly battered the region; today we might describe the sound as akin to a locomotive plowing through the countryside, but to the colonial Virginians there was no comparable sound—locomotive technology as we know it today was still decades into the future. The winds howled through the night, whipping up a deadly surf. The following morning, the residents of Hampton, York and

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3 Aspinwall Papers; MHS; As the Earl of Dunmore, Murray was typically referred to by his Scottish peerage title of Lord Dunmore.
Norfolk awoke to a scene of devastation. According to the diaries of Landon Carter, it was not until after midnight that the hurricane force winds and storm surges began to ebb (Schwartz 2007; cf Williams 2008).

Having already pummeled the Outer Banks of North Carolina, this powerful storm—later to be dubbed the “Independence Hurricane”—swept across southeastern Virginia, killing dozens of fishermen out at sea. The hurricane destroyed corn and tobacco crops, destroying many of Virginia’s wealthy farms and plantations. In his meticulous journals, diarist, farmer and lay scientist, Landon Carter noted:

The violent gust began to abate about two in the night [Sunday morning]. It cost me my mill dam […] in all a vast damage. It carried every terror with it that could be conceived. And without a most Merciful God to preserve us, it made me doubtful whether anything would have stood.5

Root cellars lay exposed where whole buildings had been plucked up and tossed from foundations. Trees, shingles and fence posts littered the lanes and by-ways of Virginia.6 The Independence Hurricane—alternatively known in loyalist Canada as the Newfoundland Hurricane—wrested the HMS Mercury from her moorings, inflicting extensive damage to the riggings and armaments of the Royal Navy’s 20-gun frigate.7 The Hurricane then turned back out to sea and headed north to the British colony of Newfoundland, which was pounded from the 9th until the 12th of September. In all, an estimated 4,000 people lost their lives, making it one of the deadliest Atlantic storms in recorded history.8 Today, the violent tempest somehow seems a

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7 Virginia Gazette, Sept. 9, 1775; AHN; in keeping with the style of many eighteenth century newspapers in colonial America, there was no headline associated with this article. However, it can be found at the top of the third column of page three. The article begins: “The shocking accounts of damage done by the rains last week are numerous: …”; Virginia Gazette, Sept. 14, 1775, 3, column 1.
fitting allegory for the political climate of colonial America in the 1770s; particularly as tensions between London and its possessions escalated.

On April 19, 1775 secessionist Patriot battles at Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts sent anti-British reverberations throughout the original thirteen colonies, including in the increasingly tense “Province of Virginia,” where just one month earlier on March 23 Patriot and militia Captain Patrick Henry implored his fellow Sons of Liberty to: “Give me Freedom, or give me death.” It was that speech, in fact, that spurred Virginia’s increasingly nervous 33-year-old governor—to preempt a rebellion against the Crown and limit the Patriots’ ability to take up arms against the Crown. On April 20, 1775, Murray [Figure 3-1] confiscated the gunpowder from the Williamsburg “magazine” and stowed it safely aboard the HMS Fowey off the coast of Yorktown.

Official correspondence between Lord Dunmore and William Legge, the Secretary of State of Colonies at Whitehall confirms that Dunmore was anxious for his own personal safety and the future of Virginia as a Crown colony. Legge (known as Lord Dartmouth) noted:

Owing to the hostile temper of the people [Lord Dunmore] has judged it proper to remove some gunpowder from a magazine at Williamsburg […] and to check further violence [he] threatened [the people] with liberating the negroes in case they proceeded to any acts of hostility.11

An unpopular governor with questionable diplomatic skills, the so-called “gunpowder affair” galvanized Patriot public opinion against Dunmore (Clifford 1999; Quarles 1958; Schama 2006, etc.). The incident not only left Dunmore’s reputation tarnished, it also pitted the royal governor

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9 Dunmore’s decision to confiscate the gunpowder had nothing to do with the April 19 battles in Lexington and Concord Massachusetts, which are typically accepted as the starting point of the American War of Independence. In fact, given the speed that news was disseminated in the late eighteenth century, it would likely have been days after the Massachusetts battle before news of the skirmishes reached Virginia.

10 The street in the Westminster district of London where many principal government buildings are located; Whitehall is synonymous with UK government.

11 Excerpts of correspondence between the Earls of Dunmore and Dartmouth were taken from the Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth, vol. I (compiled and published in 1877 by the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. 391-392; Hereafter Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth.
directly against Patrick Henry—a future Founding Father and one of Virginia’s most prominent Patriots. Henry rallied his militia to Williamsburg in an attempt to retake the gunpowder or insist on financial compensation. In response, Dunmore charged Henry with “rebellious acts.” Instead of siding with Dunmore, however, the judicial committee presiding over the case in Williamsburg unanimously exonerated Henry and resolved that he was justified in his actions, saying that “the thanks of [the] committee [were] justly due to captain Patrick Henry and the Gentlemen Volunteers who attended him.”¹² By contrast Dunmore was ridiculed in the press. A dispatch in the June 3, 1775 edition of the *Virginia Gazette* proclaimed that by ordering the removal of the gunpowder Lord Dunmore “has highly forfeited all title to the confidence of the good people of Virginia.”¹³

![Figure 3-1 John Murray, Fourth Earl of Dunmore; The last colonial governor of Virginia.](image)

The Gunpowder Affair ignited unrest and ongoing disputes in Williamsburg and throughout the colony of Virginia during the summer of 1775. Much of the hostility was directed

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¹² *Virginia Gazette*, June 1, 1775, 1, column 1; AHN.
¹³ *Virginia Gazette*, June 3, 1775, 3, column 3; AHN.
toward Dunmore who had only a skeletal force of about 300 loyal British soldiers, sailors and volunteers by his side (Quarles 1958; Schama 2006). As a precaution Dunmore garrisoned himself in his house, retreating later to the royal hunting lodge in York County. Finally, on Thursday June 8, 1775 Dunmore fled the colony altogether, taking refuge alongside the gunpowder aboard the *Fowey*. Patriot propagandists wasted little time, declaring his withdrawal an “abdication” of office. Although Lord Dunmore was, in fact, the last colonial governor to set foot on Virginian soil, for months he continued to rule *in absentia*, conducting business from a fleet of about 100 ships in the Chesapeake Bay (Quarles 1958).

By the autumn of 1775 as Patriot ranks were expanding and Virginia was rapidly descending into a state of chaos, Dunmore saw little hope of restoring “peace and good order” to the colony. In a last ditch effort he mounted several attempts in October to regain control of the colony by landing British troops near Norfolk. All the while, he continued to threaten the Patriots with a slave revolt; something he had been contemplating since as early as March of 1775 (Quarles 1958). It is important to recall that in eighteenth century Virginia the threat to unleash the African slave population on the white masters of that colony was no trivial matter. Although exact census figures are not available, it is estimated that one in every two residents of Virginia was a slave. Contrary to the popular narratives that have canonized Dunmore as a heroic liberator of slaves (Quarles 1958), I hold that Dunmore’s threat was neither heroic, nor motivated by humanitarian altruism or anti-slavery sentiment. In fact, Dunmore himself owned slaves, and, did not intend to liberate slaves owned by other loyalists, and as governor had previously refused to sign a bill banning the slave trade (Quarles 1961; Sutton 2010; Kaplan and Kaplan 1989).

Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth. 391-392.
Dunmore Proclamation, Nov. 7, 1775. BLHS/PANS.
Based on census figures from 1750 and 1790; about 44 percent of the Virginian population in 1750 was enslaved, compared with about 39 percent in 1790. See http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/wahl.slavery.us
The threat of a slave insurrection was a maneuver of psychological warfare, calculated to frighten reluctant Patriots into standing down from the rebellion. At the risk of assigning contemporary values to eighteenth century notions of morality, I hold that Dunmore may simply have been confronting the “potential evil” of an insurrection against the King “by doing evil” with the threat of a slave revolt to terrorize white loyalists (Asad 2007:18). The welfare of slaves likely played little if any role in Dunmore’s strategic calculus. “Callousness was the hallmark,” historian Ellen Gibson Wilson observes, of “policy toward the black population on both sides and throughout the war” (1976:21). Indeed, it was certainly questionable whether the slaves who fled their masters ever perceived joining Dunmore as an act of liberation.

Blacks could understand the hollowness of Dunmore’s libertarian pretenses—he offered freedom only to the ‘able and willing’ slaves of rebels and helped Tory masters retrieve their runaways—and knew that he had blocked the colony’s effort to halt the slave trade. (Kaplan and Kaplan 1989:77)

For many who joined Dunmore, the decision was simply a pragmatic act to flee from the violence and tyranny they faced at the hands of their overseers. Yet, escaping from their Patriot owners was an extremely perilous act that put the fugitive slaves at great risk from combat on the battlefield, where they were poorly equipped (and often unarmed), and from recapture by their owners who meted out harsh punishment to any slave that fled to join the British. The Dunmore Proclamation was less a proclamation of emancipation than an offer to alter the terms of the escaped slaves’ service. They were not free from servitude, but were instead enlisted into an alternative form of bondage for which they were falsely promised “freedom” as compensation for supporting the British ideology of empire. “The question for Africans, enslaved for a century and a half, was clear enough: in which camp was there a better future for black freedom?” (Kaplan and Kaplan 1989:71). Far from liberated, the runaway slaves who joined Dunmore were free only insomuch as they had escaped from their unpaid plantation labor duties. However, they
remained marginalized and captive in a hostile land. Like the *terrorist slaves* of the RUF’s *Para*Revolution, Dunmore’s legions of runaway slaves were unsupported outsiders who had little choice but to become incorporated as subaltern members of an alternative community—the white British military infrastructure.

In response to Dunmore’s efforts to retake Virginia, the *Virginia Gazette* painted the governor as a traitor and enemy of the King’s subjects; a move intended to persuade Virginian loyalists to side with the Patriots. In a page one article the Norfolk Safety Committee charged that:

> Whereas Lord Dunmore, not contented with […] withdrawing himself unnecessarily from the administration of government, and exciting an insurrection of our slaves, hath lately […] proceeded to commence hostilities against his majesty’s subjects in Norfolk and seized the property of others, particularly slaves, who are detained from their owners.  

The Norfolk Safety Committee responded to Dunmore’s aggression by limiting restricted travel to Norfolk and the town of Portsmouth “without a permit from the [Safety Committee].”

By early November, Dunmore finally followed through on his oft-uttered threat and imposed martial law on the colony of Virginia and attempted to incite a “servile insurrection” by pledging freedom to any slave who fought on behalf of the Crown (Quarles 1958:495). On Tuesday, November 7, 1775, Dunmore issued from the deck of the HMS *William*—one of the ships of his flotilla—what has now become known simply as the Dunmore Proclamation [Figure 3-2; for full text see Appendix C]. In it he proclaimed, “I do hereby declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or others (appertaining to Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear Arms.” Of course, that pledge of freedom for slaves was directed only at the slaves owned by Patriot colonists—as indicated by the qualifying phrase “appertaining to Rebels” and not loyalist-owned

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17 *Virginia Gazette*, Nov. 3, 1775, 1, column 1; AHN.
18 *Virginia Gazette*, Nov. 3, 1775, 1, column 1; AHN.
slaves; at the time of the Dunmore Proclamation many British loyalists owned black slaves, though they were not the target of Dunmore’s offer, which, in the end, was a military strategy and not a humanitarian gesture. The loyalty of their masters was of little concern to many slaves. Droves fled their masters—both loyalist and Patriot—to cross over to the British side, creating confusion, anger and irritation toward Dunmore (Walker 1976; Wilson 1976).

Certainly, Dunmore and the other colonial governors expected to defeat the Patriots, as Lord George Germain advocated, with “a decisive blow” (McCullough 2005:19); many expected to swiftly crush the rebellion in a matter of weeks or months. And, after dispatching with the uprising the British planned to “reward such freed [slaves] with unlimited land on the frontier,”

Figure 3.2 Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation of Nov. 7, 1775.
out of sight of the white loyalist populations while maintaining the Crown’s honor by fulfilling the pledge of freedom to slaves.\textsuperscript{19}

Dunmore’s Proclamation did not, however, dissuade many neutral colonists away from the Patriot cause. On the contrary, it incited rage among radical Patriots and pushed those more neutral plantation owners, including Landon Carter toward the secessionist Patriot position. With regard to the impact of the Proclamation, Carter’s biographer Walter Wineman wrote:

\begin{quote}
The specter of a servile insurrection threw the slaveholding population into a panic and, whether they liked the idea or not, they saw their only hope lay in joining forces with the radicals. All the conservatives could do from that time on was to temporize and delay the course of events. (Wineman 1962:69)
\end{quote}

In essence, then, Dunmore’s Proclamation potentially did more to sustain and bolster the “peculiar institution” of slavery in America. The Proclamation transformed the Revolution in the southern colonies into a fight to protect slavery, which was the backbone of the South’s economy (Schama 2006). In the days and weeks following the Proclamation its resonant impact was starkly apparent. Dunmore boasted that hundreds of slaves had joined his ranks, while newspapers throughout Virginia and North Carolina were filled with advertisements offering rewards for the return of runaway slaves (Pybus 2006; Frey 1983).

Within just weeks of the Proclamation, slaves were reported to have fled from Stafford County as well as the towns of Hampton, Northumberland, Alexandria and Yorktown.\textsuperscript{20} Landon Carter, the so-called “reluctant rebel” (Wineman 1962) also reportedly lost slaves to Dunmore. On the Night of June 25, 1776, twelve “negroes” from Carter’s “Sabine Hall” estate ran away to join Dunmore, taking with them guns and ammunition.\textsuperscript{21} During the years of the American War

\textsuperscript{19} In a retrospective essay on the creation of Sierra Leone, the abolitionist Thomas Clarkson notes the role of honor in keeping the freed slaves free. See “Some account of the new colony of Sierra Leona, on the coast of Africa” in \textit{The American Museum, or Universal Magazine}, 1792 vol. 11, issues 4 and 5.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Virginia Gazette}, Nov. 18, Nov, 24, Dec. 2, 1775. Various pages; AHN.

\textsuperscript{21} LC Diaries. 1752-1778. June 26, 1776, 50.
of Independence news of Dunmore’s offer spread throughout the colonies and “runaway slave” advertisements appeared in newspapers from Maryland to Massachusetts; slaves escaping or rebelling against their masters was certainly not unique to the Dunmore Proclamation, but the prospect of safety behind British lines undoubtedly increased the incidence of slaves running away after 1775.\footnote{The archival record is filled with pre-revolutionary and revolutionary era newspaper ads for runaway slaves. Here is but a sampling from the American Historical Newspaper (AHN) archive: \textit{The New Hampshire Gazette} Nov. 8, 1775, 2; \textit{The New England Chronicle} Nov. 16, 1775, 4 & Jan. 11, 1776, 2; \textit{The Pennsylvania Ledger} Nov. 11, 1775, 4; \textit{The York Gazette} Nov. 20, 1775, p. 20 & Dec. 4, 1775, 4; \textit{Virginia Gazette} Nov. 24, 1775, 4 & May 2, 1777, 7; \textit{Boston Gazette} March 4, 1776, 4 & March 18, 1776, 4; \textit{Connecticut Current} April 8, 1776, 3 & April 15, 1776, 4; \textit{Newport Mercury} Sept. 2, 1776, 4; \textit{Norwich Packet} Aug. 4, 1777, 2; \textit{Maryland Journal} July 6, 1779, 3; \textit{New Jersey Gazette} Nov. 23 1780, 4 & Aug. 1, 1781, 4; \textit{Pennsylvania Packet} Nov. 29, 1781, 3; AHN.}

By the time the American Patriots had issued their Declaration of Independence in July 1776, Dunmore’s strategy to recruit black slaves as loyalist troops had proliferated and become standard practice throughout the colonies. Several notable regiments of Black Loyalist troops were established, including Dunmore’s “Ethiopian Regiment,” whose uniforms had “liberty to slaves” emblazoned on the chest, and the subsequent New York-based Black Pioneers and Scouts. Inspired by Dunmore’s Proclamation, Henry Clinton, the British Commander-in-Chief in North America issued the Philipsburg Proclamation in which he extended refuge to “every Negro who shall desert the Rebel Standard.”

As a result, as many as 100,000 slaves made their way to the safety of the British lines (Walker 1976:2) At the same time, the Philipsburg Proclamation warned that any black fighting on the side of the Patriots would be “sold for the benefit of their captors” (\textit{i.e.} the British loyalists). In other words, freed slaves were worthy of freedom only as long as their loyalty was to \textit{British} manumission and freedom. Emancipation and liberty in the revolutionary age was drawn up along national loyalties and not philosophical considerations such as Thomas Paine’s “Rights of Man” (2009[1791]). This offers a good illustration that the blacks who fought for the
British in the American Revolution were far from free along the lines of the abolitionist’s humanitarian ideals. In fact, the Philipsburg Proclamation carried no moral or philosophical convictions. Its real purpose was to simply counteract the American “practice of enrolling Negroes Among their Troops” (Frey 1992:113-114). In the end, black slaves lined up on both sides of a war in which they themselves were essentially chattel pawns. For the slaves, the American Revolution was little more than an opportunity to escape bondage. The black slaves of the revolutionary age had to choose from the lesser of two evils with no guarantee of the deliverance they sought. In late 1775 and early 1776 newspapers in North Carolina and Virginia were among the scores to print ads from exasperated slave owners in search of their runaway slaves [Figure 3-3]. One such runaway was Thomas Peters,23 a millwright from Wilmington, North Carolina, who was owned by Scots-Irish Patriot William Campbell, a member of the North Carolina chapter of Patrick Henry’s pro-revolutionary Sons of Liberty (Millett 1996; Schama 2006; see also Nash 1998).

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23 A name given by his slave master in North Carolina. In varying documents it is Spelled “Petters” or “Potters; in the 1783 Book of Negroes he is listed as Thomas Petters.
**The Black Loyalists**

Despite his crucial place in history as one of the first advocates for racial parity in the Americas and as a founding settler and architect of Sierra Leone, Thomas Peters has been reduced to something of a footnote in the historiography of the American Revolution, British abolitionism and the birth of Sierra Leone. Apart from the very occasional reference to Peters in the archives and a few painfully brief essays on his life, Peters’ story is enigmatic, the details having been lost over the centuries (or more likely never recorded). Despite, or perhaps because of this limited detail, Peters’ biography tends to blur the lines between history and legend (Fyfe 1953). While some consider him to be a principal founder of Sierra Leone (Alie 1990; Nash 1998; Quarles 1961), others emphasize Peters’ ill-fated rivalry with Sierra Leone’s first governor, the Royal Navy’s John Clarkson (see Fyfe 1953; Wilson 1976). In chapter five I will explore this conflict between Peters and the British white settlers in Sierra Leone.

As for his life before Sierra Leone, Peters was a slave in colonial America, a fact that has muted his biographical details, leaving him in relative obscurity where Sierra Leone’s history is concerned. More noteworthy is the fact that Peters was a black slave who fought on the losing side of the American Revolution, leaving his story in the hands of patriotic American historians, who, in the words of Christopher Fyfe, “tend to gloss over the [black] loyalist activities of the majority and concentrate on the few [slaves] who were allowed to join the American rebel forces” (1953:4). As a consequence, historians have been left to piece together Peters’ biography from the few surviving fragments of his life. Until his self-emancipation in 1776, it was highly unlikely that Peters could either read or write.  

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24 Some later documents show that Peters “signed” his correspondence, which were written on his behalf, were with only the letter ‘P’. See for example correspondence from Peters to Granville Sharp and John Clarkson. BLHS/PANS, Clarkson Papers.
or alien, warranting little notice except when he tried to escape from his various masters. Some rudimentary details of Peters’ life have, however, been unearthed in British colonial records, Nova Scotia’s Provincial Archives and correspondence from military commanders and abolitionists in the late eighteenth century.

It is believed that Peters was of royal descent from the *Egba* clan of the Yoruba in present-day Nigeria (Walker 2000; Nash 1998). He was born sometime around 1738, captured and sold to French slavers who then transported him aboard the *Henri Quatre* slave ship to French Louisiana. He was sold at a New Orleans slave market to work on a sugar plantation. Historian Gary Nash (1998) notes that multiple failed attempts to escape left Peters with a latticework of welts from floggings on his back. Finally he was branded with hot irons, marking his status as “property.”

By 1760 the first reliable records of the man we call Thomas Peters begin to appear after he was sold to an unidentified Englishman in the Southern colonies. By 1770 he was sold again, this time to the Patriot William Campbell in Wilmington, North Carolina, along the Cape Fear River. In Wilmington, Peters most likely worked as a millwright, laboring in the region’s predominant lumber industry. Slaves in Wilmington, who comprised about three-fifths of the population often worked as sawyers, tar burners, stevedores, carters or carpenters (Nash 1998). Compared with his numerous attempts at escape in the 1760s, life was settled for Peters during the first years of the 1770s. But by 1774 mounting fear of slave revolts was sweeping through the southern colonies from Virginia to Georgia.

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25 See chapter two for a discussion on Orlando Patterson’s notion of slavery and marginalization.
26 Based on his listed age (45) in the Book of Negroes (hereafter BON) of 1783 (Book II); BLHS/PANS. Peters’ listing appears as following: “Thomas Potters, 45, ordinary fellow. (Black Pioneers). Formerly slave to William Campbell, Wilmington, North Carolina; left him in 1776.”
Following the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, panic of a full scale British retaliation spread throughout the thirteen colonies. Those fears were fanned in the Cape Fear region of North Carolina when the Wilmington Safety Committee investigated rumors of war as citizen spies began to report British troop movements. On August 17, 1775 the Committee heard testimony from a Patriot named Richard Quince who claimed that a slave named Nicholas had been in possession of a “quantity of gunpowder,” which he then sold.27 One subsequent committee report noted, “it is imagined that the [King’s] Men of War [sic], now at Fort Johnson, have an intention to attempt burning Brunswick, and afterwards, proceed to [Wilmington].”28 Furthermore, the fear of a slave rebellion in Dunmore’s neighboring Virginia had spread and North Carolinians became alarmed at reports of a scheme to set the slaves free and “arm them against us.” This was coupled with reports that the British were enlisting the support of “Indians to fall upon our frontiers.”29 The fear of a slave revolt ran deep in North Carolina where the year before delegates at the first Provincial Congress banned the importation of additional slaves30 who, it was thought, would further incite revolt (Nash 1998).

In the spring of 1776—just months before the formal Declaration of Independence was issued—about 20 British war ships began patrolling the North Carolina coastline near Cape Fear, once again intensifying concern that an attack and invasion of the area was imminent (Schama 2006). As a result, in March, William Campbell and many leading Patriots from Wilmington fled after learning the British planned to bombard the city from the HMS Cruizer. In Campbell’s absence Peters escaped to the loyalist lines in Virginia (Nash 1986). From there he made his way North to New York. Historian Benjamin Quarles writes, “during the war, [Peters] served as a

27 Proceedings of the Safety Committee, for the town of Wilmington 1774-1776; NCAH; (hereafter Wilmington Safety Committee), 47.
28 Wilmington Safety Committee (NCAH), 55-56.
29 Iredell papers, 313.
sergeant in a Negro arms bearing pioneer company, being twice wounded in battle” (1961:177). British Muster rolls confirm he served in the Black Pioneers under the command of Captain George Martin. He also served alongside his longtime friend and future Sierra Leone settler Murphy Still (alternatively Steel or Steele).  

Peters later earned the praise of General Henry Clinton. *In 1778, before Britain’s defeat was a foregone conclusion, the fears of William Campbell and other Patriots in the southern colonies were realized when General Henry Clinton launched a surprise attack on Savannah, Georgia and later expanded loyalist control in the South. Along with the Crown’s victory in Savannah (and later Charleston) came new opportunities for slaves to escape and cross into the safety of British lines.*

Another instrumental “Black Loyalist” was David George. In contrast to Peters, however, George was born in the Americas—or a plantation in Essex County, Virginia around 1743.  

Like Peters, he suffered at the hands of cruel slave owners, but eventually escaped from Virginia to North Carolina and later to Georgia. Before escaping he was married to a woman named Phillis and together they had three children. George was a devoutly religious man driven by the idea of finding the so-called Promised Land. In the years before the American Revolution, he began attending black prayer groups, and later, notes Mary Louise Clifford (1999), to preach in place of his white master who had fled British advances.

George soon experienced his first compulsion to preach and was encouraged to begin praying with his friends and singing hymns from Watt’s *Psalms and Hymns*

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31 PANS; Commissioner of Public Records NSARM, vol. 359 no. 65 (microfilm no. 15428).  
32 Letter from Clinton to Grenville Dec. 26, 1790, as cited in Walker 1999; see also Byrd 2008.  
33 Letter from George to Rev. John Rippon (PANS); see also *Baptist Annual Register*, 1 (1790-1793): 473-484; In 1793 George visited England and related many of the details of his life to fellow Baptists, entitled An Account of the Life of Mr. David George from Sierra Leone given by himself in a conversation with Brother Rippon of London and Brother Pearce in Birmingham (Hereafter Letter to Rippon).  
34 Marriage between slaves was generally forbidden by slave owners, although some allowed slaves to perform ceremonies to mark their partnership and the desire to build a family together.
by the time the American Revolution began, George’s little congregation had grown to 30 members. (Clifford 1999:21)

As a Baptist lay preacher, George eventually would play a key role in the spiritual leadership of Sierra Leone.

Safely behind British lines Phillis George was hired to wash General Henry Clinton’s laundry while David ran a butcher’s stall, supplying British troops with their field rations; both received British certificates verifying that they were “good subjects to King George III” (Clifford 1999:19). In 1782 David George and his family sailed from the war-wracked United States to Halifax, Nova Scotia with British General James Paterson, who was ordered to command the Halifax military district (1999:19ff). By the time the Georges hoisted anchor from Charleston, British defeat seemed imminent. David, Phillis and their children Jesse, Ginny and David landed in Halifax, later migrating to the Black Loyalist enclave of Birchtown on the outskirts of Shelburne [Figure 3-4]. Eventually, George became the Baptist minister to the Black Loyalists in Birchtown.  

![Figure 3-4](image) Nova Scotia circa 1755, locating provincial capital Halifax, Port Roseway (Shelburne) and the Annapolis Basin.

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35 Letter to Rippon (PANS); Baptist Annual Register.
The Crown, of course, did not prevail in the American War of Independence. On Wednesday, September 3, 1783 representatives from the newly formed United States, the Crown’s parliament and their respective allies signed both the Treaty of Paris and Treaty of Versailles, formally ending the Revolutionary War and temporarily suspending the larger international conflicts it had spawned. Enmities between Europe’s colonial powers flared frequently, however, spilling over into the Caribbean, Asia and elsewhere. In chapter five I will examine one such flare up when French warships flying the British flag bombarded Sierra Leone in 1794.

For the American Patriots the end of the war was a welcome relief, but Peters, George and those former slaves who sided with the British, it was just the beginning of an epic and often harrowing odyssey. Although now free, they were still well within grasp of their former masters who demanded their “property” be returned. As a safeguard and in preparation to evacuate New York, Britain’s military commanders issued certificates of manumission [Figure 3-5] to those former slaves now living within their ranks. However, in his ambitious history of the American Revolution, Supreme Court Justice Thomas Jones (1879) suggests the protection of the slaves had more to do with national virtue than abolitionist ideology. Echoing Thomas Clarkson from a century earlier, Jones noted:

The Honor of a nation was pledged. The protection promised them could not be withdrawn. To deliver them up to their former masters would have been an infamous, scandalous breach of public faith. Sir Guy Carleton considered it in this light, and took his steps accordingly. (Jones 1879:256)

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36 France formally joined the war to weaken its rival Britain, while Britain enlisted the support and aid of Hessian Mercenaries from Germany. Dutch traders continued doing business with the American colonists in contravention of British embargoes. The inclusion of these European rivals widened the American Revolution into a conflict over colonial possessions in the West Indies, Africa and India.
37 Carleton was the final British commander who oversaw the evacuation of loyalists both black and white from New York City.
In the fall of 1783 throngs of loyalists—both black and white—took refuge on the lower East side of Manhattan island, where they faced housing, fuel and food shortages along with deadly outbreaks of smallpox (Barck 1931; cf Moore 1994). Those British Loyalists trapped in New York during the final months of the Revolution clamored to quit the colonies. Many loyalists—collectively known as the United Empire Loyalists—returned to England\textsuperscript{38} or settled in one of the other nearby British possessions in the West Indies or the Canadian maritime provinces of Nova Scotia and the newly created New Brunswick, where they were to receive parcels of land and provisions for their service to the King.\textsuperscript{39} In the midst of the throng of white loyalists trying to escape New York were several thousand Black Loyalists—which for clarity I will henceforth identify as either Nova Scotia Black Loyalists or London Black Loyalists—who had sought refuge behind British lines and in many cases served in the King’s armies.\textsuperscript{40}

Figure 3-5 Certificate of Manumission, 1783.

It was a harrowing and perilous time for many of the former slaves as slaveholders—both American and British—patrolled the streets with the goal of retrieving what to them was their fugitive property. Despite the dangers and frenzy, the first 409 Black Loyalists (men, women and

\textsuperscript{38} Despite the British military’s early offerings of emancipation, slavery was still commonplace among many white loyalists who returned to England with their slaves in tow (Braidwood 1982).

\textsuperscript{39} New Brunswick was carved out of the western extreme of Nova Scotia in order to accommodate the influx of United Empire Loyalists.

\textsuperscript{40} A loyalist population of 40,000 bloated the southern tip of Manhattan Island by the end of the war; Wilson, p. 63.
their children) departed New York for Canada aboard the ship *L’Abondance* in the summer of 1783. The journey held the promise of a new life of liberty and freedom (or so they hoped).\(^{41}\) By the time New York had been evacuated at the end of 1783, more than 3,000 Black Loyalists\(^ {42}\) were issued certificates of manumission and transported to the cold and bleak land of Nova Scotia (Frey 1992). It was cold, bleak and evidently barren. In fact, the vast majority of the land holdings parceled out to the blacks—if, in fact, they received their promised parcels of land—proved to be sandy and rocky acreage. In Nova Scotia the former slaves found that loyalty to the King, including military service, did not necessarily translate in kind. Many in the first waves of loyalist migration arrived in Port Roseway,\(^ {43}\) Nova Scotia—later renamed Shelburne.

The influx of United Empire Loyalists (UEL) had a profound and unsavory impact on the whole of Nova Scotia, and one that hinted at betrayal for the former slaves. Consider that in 1767—sixteen years before the arrival of the UEL refugees—Nova Scotia’s population stood at around 13,500. But by the end of 1783, some 35,000 loyalists had flooded into the province, taxing the government’s limited resources and eliciting bigoted attitudes from the provincial administration and the white loyalists toward the black immigrants; despite the fact that it was *both* white and black who were straining the system. Soon, many of the white loyalists began to exploit the black settlers in Nova Scotia, returning them to a state of *quasi*-slavery or indentured servitude. In an essay on the history of Sierra Leone, abolitionist Thomas Clarkson recalled:

> It was not long till these industrious [white] loyalists […] began to harass and oppress the industrious black settlers, and even wantonly to deprive them of the fruits of their labor, expelling them from the lands they had cleared and, without any compensation, appropriating these to their own use.\(^ {44}\)

\(^{41}\) Book of Negroes 1783 (BLHS/PANS).
\(^{42}\) 1,336 men, 940 women and 740 children; BON.
\(^{43}\) Renamed Shelburne in July 1784 to honor William Petty (the second Earl of Shelburne), the British Secretary of State who oversaw peace negotiations to end the American War of Independence.
\(^{44}\) Clarkson, “Some account of the New Colony at Sierra Leona,” in *The American Museum or, Universal Magazine*, 1792, p 229.
This racial divide between uprooted white loyalists—many of whom had until recently owned slaves—Nova Scotia’s white authorities, and the former slaves was poignantly marked in Shelburne, where the influx of loyalists had by early 1784 inflated the town’s population to 10,000, making it larger even than the colonial capital of Halifax. Governor John Parr’s remedy was to create a racially partitioned enclave on the outskirts of Shelburne, specifically for the former slaves. The result was the institutionalization of what Gregg Barak (2003) would today term structural violence born of racism, discrimination and privation (cf Farmer 2004 and Schepet-Hughes 1993; Schepet-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). It is my contention that this structural violence followed the Nova Scotian Black Loyalists in their migration back to Africa, remaining a tragic hallmark of contemporary Sierra Leone, albeit in evolved and altered forms.

In his journal entries of 1783, Benjamin Marston notes that the Black Loyalists were to be “settled on the North-West side” of the Shelburne Harbor. The settlement was called Birchtown in honor of General Samuel Birch, commandant of New York City, and the British officer who most notably worked to protect the Black Loyalists from falling back into slavery (Grant 1973). Life was hard for all loyalist refugees. The provincial government struggled to fulfill Whitehall’s pledge to support its dislodged subjects, whether black or white. Initially, food, housing and other essential provisions were in short supply, including basic tools to clear land for farming and build rudimentary shelters. Moreover, employment in the region—to supplement the meager government assistance—was hard to come by and, as it would turn out, a major source of tension between black and white refugees in the Shelburne/Birchtown area.

In July of 1784 white loyalist soldiers turned on their black comrades-in-arms, angry that they were willing to work for lower wages. The white soldiers attempted to drive the Black

45 Winslow Papers Vol. 22, 110; UNBSCA.
loyalists out of Shelburne and their Birchtown enclave. On Tuesday July 27, the disbanded white soldiers “force[d] the free negroes to quit the Town;” they also razed houses in the area. The rioters also attempted to halt David George from performing baptisms and beat him when he was at the pulpit. Far worse than low wages, however, were no wages. A number of white Shelburne loyalists hired Black Loyalists “as servants, and, at the end of the stipulated time, refused payment of their wages, insisting that they were slaves” (Clarkson 1792:229).

And, writes Thomas Clarkson, there were cases in which the “Africans were taken on board vessels, carried to the West Indies, and there sold for the benefit of their plunderers” (1792:229-230). For the majority, however, it was simply the failure of the Nova Scotian administration to fulfill the obligations of the British Crown and military high command, whose promises and pledges of land grants were often either not upheld, were smaller than promised or were on virtually uninhabitable land. Furthermore, they certainly came only after white loyalists were first given their acreage (Walker 1976). Governor Parr seemed unwilling or incapable of carrying out the task at least where the black refugees were concerned.

Indeed, given resource and land limitations, an implicit policy seemed to unfold under Parr’s tutelage. He was expected to accommodate those who had “suffered most,” which in the eyes of the white loyalists meant—those who had lost the most land in the American Revolution. White colonists, for example, expected to receive land parcels comparable to what they lost in the Revolution. Military personnel were to receive land holdings based on their rank. In correspondence between Lord North and Parr it was determined that field officers would

47 Letter to Rippon.
48 Memorial of Thomas Peters and others to the Right Honorable W.W. Grenville, 1790 (Hereafter Peters’ Memorial), in Clarkson’s Mission to America 1791-1792, 2-6; Narrative of David George to Brother Rippon in Baptist Annual Register, 1793, 473-488.
49 Frederick North, or Lord North was British Prime Minister from 1770-1782 and served as Home Secretary in 1783.
receive 1,000 acres; captains 700 acres; subalterns 500 acres; non-commissioned officers 200 acres and privates would receive 100 acres of land in Nova Scotia (Walker 1976:33, note 7). This, of course, left the Black Loyalists as the last priority when it came to land claims (Walker 1976:19ff). Some Black Loyalists were able to subsist on the land they were awarded by shifting their place along the spectrum of unfreedom from outright slavery to a sharecropping arrangement with white landholders in Shelburne or in the Annapolis Valley region (Fyfe 1962; Wilson 1976).\footnote{Although sharecropping is often associated with the post-Civil War Reconstruction in the U.S. South, Terence Byres (1983) reminds us that like slavery, sharecropping dates to antiquity and has been utilized as a form of unfree labor throughout the world.} For those former slaves who risked everything for freedom, Nova Scotia was little better than a move to keep them in a state of dependence, despite their sacrifice for King George III. Historian John Grant notes the black settlers of Nova Scotia “became disillusioned within a few years with what they believed would be a land of freedom” (1973:256).

Later arrivals, including Thomas Peters settled in the Annapolis Basin of Nova Scotia’s more sheltered Bay of Fundy on the North Shore.\footnote{BON: Books I, II, III; PANS.} Further complicating the issue of land claims for the newly arriving Black Loyalists on the North Shore was the fact that the Annapolis Basin had long been a site of contention between British, French and Acadian settlers. Moreover, it was the ancestral homeland for many Mi’kmaq Native Americans, who relied on the land for their survival.\footnote{Annapolis Heritage Society.}

On both the South and North shores of Nova Scotia (as well as the newly formed New Brunswick) the black settlers felt cheated. For years this sense of betrayal grew, particularly since repeated appeals to Parr’s representatives went unanswered.\footnote{Peters’ Memorial; PANS.} In response to the inequity, the Black Loyalists coalesced into a tight knit community, held together in many instances by
their religious convictions and the guidance of local black church leaders, including the lay preachers David George and Moses Wilkinson, who was aboard that original voyage on *L’Abondance*.

As Walker notes, “the social environment of the 1780s set the conditions for their development as a distinct and separate community.” Walker continues:

> Dominant among [the] social influences was a fundamentalist religious revival and its inevitable clash with the entrenched interests of established religion. The free blacks were thrust into a crackling atmosphere in the 1780s which accounted, on the one hand, for their conversion to Christianity and the subsequent central importance of religion in their character and their lives. (Walker 1976:64)

The fact that religion became a quintessential trait to the free blacks’ identity, I contend, is an important factor in defining their experience in Africa and undermining Sierra Leone’s stability. In chapter five I will further explore how religion played an important role in helping the Nova Scotia Black Loyalists forge a complex notion of identity in which they were no longer fully African and yet not European nor American.

Relief from the injustice, inequity and discrimination of life in white Nova Scotia would eventually arrive for the Black Loyalists in the form of rumors of a settlement for former slaves in West Africa. Sometime in the latter half of the 1780s a black servant working at a dinner party overheard a conversation regarding a plan by Granville Sharp, “a name revered among the negroes,” to establish a settlement in Africa for the relief of the so-called ‘black poor’ of London (Clarkson 1792:230). The servant quickly spread word of the settlement among his countrymen. And, as Thomas Clarkson recorded:

> the hope of relief animated them, and they resolved to send their agent, one Thomas Peters, a respectable, intelligent African, to wait upon the company, and learn if they might expect encouragement to go to the new colony.

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54 BON (Book I); PANS. Listed as Moses Wilkinson, 36, blind & lame. Formerly the property of Miles Wilkinson of Nancymond, Virginia; left him 7 years ago.

The overheard dinner conversation was reinforced by accounts of the settlement published in newspapers and magazines, as well as by word-of-mouth reports from travelers and seamen (Wilson 1976).

* * *

IN THE PROCEEDING PAGES I have laid out Sierra Leone’s pre-colonial origins as a backdrop to help us later examine the enduring narrative that Sierra Leone was a successful abolitionist experiment. My aim here was to establish the genesis of Sierra Leone as a byproduct of the American Revolution. Using primary source documents from the late eighteenth century I have traced the history of some of Sierra Leone’s original Black Loyalist settlers to show that from its outset Sierra Leone was not, in and of itself, the product of Enlightenment-inspired desires to free African slaves, but rather, it was an unlikely epiphenomenon, which resulted when the threads of Imperial ambition interwove with revolutionary fervor. In building my argument, I considered several facets of Sierra Leone’s inception in Revolutionary America, and its emancipated slave diaspora in the Canadian Maritimes.

At issue in the fledgling United States were the true motives behind Britain’s manumission of tens of thousands of slaves held by Patriot American revolutionaries. This chapter has shown that the Dunmore and Philipsburg Proclamations had less to do with the emancipation and welfare of slaves as it did with a last ditch effort by the British to stem the tide of revolution in its American colonies. This reality was further underscored by evidence of the conditions the emancipated Black Loyalists faced in Nova Scotia, where racial bigotry contributed to institutionalized violence through deprivation and discrimination. Moreover, I believe that while all the loyalist refugees in Nova Scotia comprised a subaltern class of limited or no authority, the Black Loyalists, by virtue of the color of their skin—which perpetually
evoked their past status as slave—rendered them as something of a subaltern’s subaltern. Given these circumstances, I believe it is worth questioning the rationale behind the British abolitionist’s interest in offering to send the Black Loyalists to Sierra Leone’s predecessor the Province of Freedom, which, as I will explicate in chapter four, was a settlement rife with problems and in ruins by the time the Nova Scotian Black Loyalists set sail for West Africa in 1791.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PROVINCE OF FREEDOM – UTOPIA OR ABDIATIONIST WEAPON?

*I have had but melancholy accounts of my poor little ill-thriven swarthy daughter, the unfortunate colony of Sierra Leone.*
– Granville Sharp, Oct. 31, 1787.

THE NOUN “ASYLUM” IS DERIVED FROM the Greek *asyllos* or *asulon*, meaning “inviolable,” or “safe from violence.”¹ Yet, as this chapter and chapter five will explore, neither Sierra Leone nor its founding anti-slavery principles were inviolable. In fact, Sierra Leone was far from a “happy Asylum for the liberated Negroes of America and the West Indies as well as of the black poor sent from England.”² Almost from the outset, Sierra Leone, its future Black Loyalist settlers and its ideals of creating a refuge against slavery were at peril. This chapter will identify and analyze the most salient points in Sierra Leone’s genesis, which support my contention that despite its abolitionist mandate, Sierra Leone became a space for adapted forms of unfree labor after the emancipation of slaves. In fact, Sierra Leone became a space of rebellion and failed abolition in large measure because of i) the physical location chosen for the settlement (in the heart of a slave-trading region at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River); and ii) competing merchant capitalist interests that comprised an underlying motivation to create the settlement in the first place.

¹ *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the Greek origin of asylum means “refuge or sanctuary”; Sierra Leone’s founder Granville Sharp and its first governor John Clarkson frequently referred to Sierra Leone as an asylum.
Many excellent works on Sierra Leone’s origins focus on various aspects of the country’s creation in the 1780s and early 1790s. It is not the aim of this chapter to simply recreate their thorough and insightful research, but rather to isolate keys aspects of this period. In revisiting many closely scrutinized archival documents I found evidence that the late eighteenth century’s juxtaposition of abolitionist and merchant capitalist aims brought forth an abolitionist “asylum” destined for failure. This was brought about by the creation of a space where the legacy of slavery and unfree labor could and did continue by virtue of Britain’s economic and imperial interest in the region. This chapter will focus on how Sierra Leone’s earliest articulation had a direct bearing on the country’s socio-political trajectory; a trajectory that into the late-twentieth century created and nurtured the conditions for post-colonial failure, war and slavery in the form of unfree child labor and terrorist slavery.

**Plan of a Settlement**

**CHAPTER THREE** FOLLOWED THE Black Loyalists when in 1783 they evacuated Manhattan to Britain, the West Indies and Nova Scotia. Little could the former slaves have known that as they set sail from New York events that would alter their lives were simultaneously unfolding on the other side of the Atlantic. In the summer of 1783 British physician and amateur botanist Henry Smeathman wrote and posted a series of letters to his friend, the Quaker abolitionist Dr. Thomas Knowles. The letters were written not long after Knowles had met with the Quaker Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade—the anti-slavery group which later collaborated with prominent Anglican abolitionists, including the rising Cambridge star Thomas 

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In his letters, Smeathman laid out plans to establish a colony on the western coast of Africa near the mouth of the Sierra Leone River to relocate London’s growing population of unemployed and impoverished Afro-Britons. Those letters would later form the basis for a formal proposal in 1786, which was adopted and put into place by London’s Anti-slavery Quaker community in conjunction with the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor (CFRBP) along with logistical and financial support from the Crown. It is critical to recognize some glaring differences and perhaps strategic omissions between Smeathman’s plan of 1783 and the one that was adopted in 1786.

Smeathman’s first letters to Knowles candidly portrayed the inhabitants of the Sierra Leone River region as “indolent” alcoholics willing to sell their kin and brethren to Europeans in exchange for rum, tobacco or firearms. He clearly conveyed the message that the commerce in human beings (i.e. slavery) was thriving in this portion of the Upper Guinea coast. In fact, Smeathman noted that the local African populations live in “continual fear” of slavery and of being forced into servitude at the behest of a local paramount chief. Illustrating his belief that slavery continued to be a vibrant practice in the Sierra Leone region, Smeathman wrote: “the subjects of many black chieftains have been mostly enslaved in the inland or neighbouring countries, by purchase, fraud or violence.”

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4 The number of black poor on London’s streets in the 1780s was estimated to be in the thousands, particularly after the evacuation of the Black Loyalists from New York in 1783; see Coleman 2005.

5 Smeathman’s 1786 proposal simply became known as the Plan of a Settlement.

6 Smeathman to Knowles [n.d.] 1783, printed in full as an Appendix in Carl Wädstrom’s An Essay on Colonization, particularly applied to the Western Coast of Africa, 1794, v. II, 199-211 (Hereafter An Essay on Colonization), 200; BL.

7 Smeathman to Knowles, 1783, in An Essay on Colonization, Wadström, 199.
indigenous Africans was “precarious” due both to domestic African slavery and the presence of European slave traders. Nonetheless, Smeathman depicted the region as a land of plenty, ripe for the enrichment of the empire’s coffers.

From Smeathman’s words it would appear as though the abolition of slavery was something that *might* come as a residual byproduct from settling this land for commerce. He was content to gradually achieve abolition simply by reducing the supply of slaves from the area. This, he argued, would inflate the price for slaves in the West Indies. The goal would be to “at least meliorate [the slaves’] situation.” In fact, “The stopping of some source [of slaves],” he argued, “would not only encrease [sic] the price of slaves, but alarm the W. India planters, lest they should soon have no fresh supply.”

In hindsight, it’s surprising that the Quaker abolitionists would have been attracted to Smeathman’s plan since their objective was to eliminate the slave trade as quickly as possible and to “civilize” or spread “European light, knowledge, and improvement” in Africa. It does, however, offer an apt illustration that anti-slavery ideals and mercantile trade became strange and perhaps incompatible bedfellows in late eighteenth century Anglo-African relations.

In his painstaking study of eighteenth century records from the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor and other primary sources, Alexander Byrd (2008) argues that Smeathman’s 1786 plan intentionally silenced the ongoing perils of slavery in Sierra Leone. Instead, Smeathman emphasized the benefits of a free settlement for the ‘black poor.’ In actual fact, however, he seems to have been less interested in establishing a settlement for freed blacks than building a British agro-colony with an eye on harvesting exportable produce to replace those that

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8 Smeathman to Knowles, 1783, in An Essay on Colonization, Wadström, 198. My italics for emphasis.
9 Sierra Leone Company Report 1795, 23, 25, 35, 65, 74ff (Hereafter Company Report); WCL; Company Report 1791, 50; CoU.
disappeared with the secession of Britain’s thirteen colonies in continental America. To create this mercantile colony, Smeathman first needed to secure funding; one possible benefactor was the abolitionist-minded Quakers and the Committee for the Relief of the Poor Black, whose chairman, Jonas Hanway, was in search of ways to alleviate the suffering of London’s destitute free blacks. As Hanway began to consider Smeathman’s plan, he quickly found he would first need to negotiate around the competing interests and concerns of his constituent population of ‘black poor’ (Byrd 2008; cf Brown 2006).

Following their 1783 evacuation from New York, the Black Loyalists who arrived in London (not to be confused with the Nova Scotia-bound Black Loyalists) altered the socio-political dynamic of London’s ‘black poor.’ As Byrd observed, the former slaves from the United States were protective of their freedom—a freedom gained, in many cases, through combat in the Revolutionary War and by risking recapture and harsh corporal punishment from their Patriot masters (2008; cf Coleman 2005). Smeathman’s proposed plan to resettle London’s ‘black poor’ in West Africa as a site did not sit well with the incoming Black Loyalists who feared the prospect of recapture and enslavement in a region known as a trans-Atlantic slaving hub. Those fears, as we will see, were not unfounded. Indeed, a number of the settlement’s earliest founders were captured and sold back into slavery.10 These concerns became so pronounced and prevalent that Hanway met with an assembled gathering of prospective emigrants and declared of himself that “he must be the worst of all the wicked on earth” if he and

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10 See for example Anna Marie Falconbridge’s *Two Voyages to Sierra Leone, During the Years 1791-2-3, In a Series of Letters* (Hereafter Two Voyages), 1794, 20; NYPL; Company Report, 1791, 36, 39; Sharp to Lettsom, Oct 13, 1788 in Hoare 1820b, 315; Reid to Sharp, Sept. 1788 in Hoare 1820b, 322-323; Sharp to Pitt, June (or July) 1788 in Hoare 1820b, 328; Sharp to Steele, [n.d.] in Hoare 1820b, 338; Sharp to Settlers, Nov. 11, 1789 in Hoare 1820b, 344-347.
the committee were conspiring to send London’s ‘black poor’ back into slavery.\footnote{Proceedings of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor; 7 June 1786. Cited in Byrd 2008, 133.} Hanway further offered each emigrant a writ guaranteeing them their liberty; it remains unclear, however, what good this writ would have done outside of British legal jurisdiction?

Smeathman responded by promoting his settlement with “utopian vagueness,” which, Anne Stott argues, became a “powerful weapon in the abolitionist armoury” (2012:54). In the end, Smeathman’s 1786 \textit{Plan of a Settlement} became entangled in the larger debate over how to end slavery. The fate of London’s ‘black poor’ who were destined for West Africa became a secondary consideration behind the symbolic and ideological victory to be won by settling liberated African slaves back in Africa. In today’s political parlance, Smeathman was spinning his plan to keep from losing the support of London’s ‘black poor’ and consequently the funding of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor. But even as he sold his plan to Hanway, Smeathman’s credibility as an abolitionist was eroding under close scrutiny, which followed when it was learned that much of his botanical research from 1771 onward took place while he was based on the Banana Islands—a notorious slave port off the southwestern coast of the Sierra Leone peninsula (Byrd 2008; Coleman 2005, \textit{etc.}). More damning to the botanist’s reputation was the fact that in a separate letter to Knowles, Smeathman itemizes his material requirements for an exploratory trip to the Sierra Leone River region. Included in his proposed provisions was a plan to “purchase a few slaves at Senegal as well as at Goree and Gambia.” These slaves, he contended would serve as able and knowledgeable guides. Smeathman justified the purchase, arguing that slaves do not have the same “sense of the value of liberty, as either Britons or Americans.”\footnote{Smeathman to Knowles, July 21, 1783, reprinted in \textit{New-Jerusalem Magazine}, 1790, 281-294.}
While Smeathman emphasized the benefits of creating a colony for freed blacks, in both the 1783 letters and the 1786 published *Plan of a Settlement*, it was clearly the commercial and export prospects—to cultivate and sell rice, cotton, tobacco, sugar and indigo, *etc.*—that was of foremost interest to the would-be entrepreneur. As early as 1773, Smeathman was in search of commercial possibilities around the Sierra Leone region. In June of that year he wrote to the pro-abolition philanthropist John Lettsom, saying he was disappointed he had not found a “mineral kingdom” in Sierra Leone. Smeathman’s commercial hand would continue to influence Sierra Leone’s colonial aims and agenda long after his death in 1786.

By no means am I suggesting that humanitarianism was/is incompatible with economic and commercial development. However, in the case of pre-colonial Sierra Leone the two interests do represent rival motives insomuch as the settlement for the ‘poor black’ is concerned. Given the extant threat of capture and re-enslavement to the free black settlers of Sierra Leone, and Smeathman’s strategic omission of these conditions in his bid to secure financial support, it would seem that the black settlers’ interest for safety and the freedom to prosper were more likely to be undermined than prioritized in his agenda. Indeed, I hold that within the territory’s first few decades merchant capitalism came to dominate Sierra Leone’s mandate, creating a rupture that inhibited the successful execution of the moral ideology that inspired the Quaker-Anglican aim of abolition. It was within the crevices of this rupture where slavery (or unfree labor) was permitted to continue—albeit in creatively altered forms—as a necessary evil to enable and increase resource extraction, thereby justifying the Crown’s acquisition of Sierra Leone as a colony in the first decade of the 1800s. Smeathman was crucial in instigating this clash between abolitionist and merchant capitalist interests in Sierra Leone.
By revisiting and reinterpreting many eighteenth and nineteenth century primary source documents—letters, diaries and travel journals—I have formulated the argument that Sierra Leone’s humanitarian mission was undermined as early as 1792. This trend accelerated in the second half of the nineteenth century during Europe’s scramble to exploit the African continent (chapter six). This phenomenon was foreshadowed by Henry Smeathman’s emphasis on extraction, exploitation and trade for empire. In fact, Smeathman’s objective to replace export commodities lost from Britain’s American colonies puts an interesting spin on Eric Williams’ “Decline Thesis” insofar as Smeathman envisioned abolition and economic opportunity as concomitant possibilities—possibilities he never realized.¹³

In April of 1786 before funding for the journey from England to Sierra Leone could be arranged, Smeathman fell ill; he died later that summer, leaving his plan in jeopardy and his abolitionist credibility under even closer scrutiny.¹⁴ Although historically lionized as a champion of British abolitionism, there is enough contradictory evidence in Smeathman’s background to suggest he was an opportunist seizing upon abolitionism for his own benefit (Braidwood 1994; Byrd 2008).

Joseph Irwin and Granville Sharp stepped into Smeathman’s place to keep his Plan of a Settlement on course. Sharp, whose abolitionist record was spotless, endeavored to turn Smeathman’s vagaries of utopia into a concrete reality in part by basing the social structure of the African settlement on the medieval system of communal governance known as

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¹³ Eric Williams (1944) rejected claims that humanitarianism was the impetus for abolition, arguing instead that abolition was simply a pragmatic eventuality based on the supply and demand realities of macroeconomic theory.

¹⁴ Letter to Sharp from Smeathman’s secretary, April 12, 1786 in Hoare 1820b, 268; See also Byrd 2008.
Frankpledge. Just days after Smeathman’s death, however, Jonas Hanway voiced reservations on behalf of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor. He shied away from the botanist’s West African site for the settlement. In essence, Hanway said the committee could not guarantee the prospective settlers’ safety and liberty. He is recorded as having said to the settlers that there was “no place on the whole coast of Africa where there can be any solid security against Slavery.” Moreover, Hanway began to feel as though Smeathman had “misled” the committee with regards to his intentions in Africa (Byrd 2008:294, note 41). Hanway suspected that Smeathman intended to begin “trafficking in men” (Coleman 2005:14; cf Braidwood 1994).

Rather than abandon the more noble aspects of Smeathman’s plan, however, Hanway and the Committee identified an alternate site. It was proposed that the settlement be located on the Great Inagua Island in the Bahaman archipelago. But rather than assure the prospective migrants, this alternative site reignited debate regarding the best location for the settlement; suspicion orbited around both options. In a 1788 letter to his brother James, Granville Sharp recalled that many of the prospective emigrants defended the African site. Sharp wrote that many claimed to have been in the area. Moreover, he said that one man had assured him that “there was much fine wood-land unoccupied in that part of the coast.” This account was confirmed “by a native of Sierra Leone” whom Sharp claimed to have rescued from slavery.

By Christmas 1786—after West Africa was chosen as the settlement’s location—more than 700 people signed on to make the trip to Sierra Leone; however, in the wake of unsavory rumors claiming the settlers were actually slated for deportation to the British penal colony of

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15 In essence, this was an early system of mutual security established through a “peace-pledge” of all residents. The “peace-pledge” relied on governance and judicial oversight of elected Tythingmen (all male residents over the age of twelve); for an excellent study on the Frankpledge system see The Frankpledge System, Morris 1910.
17 Sharp to James Sharp, January 1788 in Hoare 1820b, 261.
Botany Bay, the number dwindled to fewer than 420. Furthermore, the number of willing passengers was in all likelihood additionally reduced by the alleged actions of the project’s financial agent Joseph Irwin, who was accused of embezzling funds from the expedition’s limited coffers. Olaudah Equiano (aka Gustavus Vassa), the former slave-turned abolitionist and author was serving as the mission’s commissary when he leveled harsh charges against Irwin, claiming he was treating the would-be migrants as poorly as slaves. Rather than investigate the charges, however, Hanway and other members of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor dismissed Equiano for disloyalty and inciting unrest among the passengers (Shyllon 1977b).18

Poor weather delayed the sailing and “fatally postponed their arrival on the coast.” Sharp insisted that it was this delay that resulted in “dreadful fevers and a great mortality” when the expedition reached the shores of Sierra Leone at the height of the rainy season.19 Finally, on April 8, 1787, 411 settlers sailed from Portsmouth Sound aboard the Nautilus to establish the Province of Freedom near the Sierra Leone River. Upon their arrival in West Africa, the expedition’s captain Thomas Thompson negotiated the purchase of a tract of land from the “Native Chiefs for the service of His Britannic Majesty” (George 1968:20).20 In all likelihood the land was purchased from a Koyo Temne sub-chief whom the British referred to as King Tom. The purchased land fell within the larger territory of Nemgbana (often written as Naimgbana or Naimbana), the regent or paramount chief of the larger Koyo Temne Kingdom.21 Often at odds

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18 Equiano’s dismissal was based in large measure on charges leveled by Thomas Thompson the captain of the expedition’s lead ship the Nautilus. Thompson wrote that “Mr. Gustavus Vasa […] has been turbulent, and discontented.” And that he was trying to “incite discord” Thompson advised that “unless some means are taken to quell his spirit of sedition, it will be fatal to the peace of the settlement, & dangerous to those intrusted with the guiding it.”; Thompson to CRBP, March 21, 1787. BA-Kew. Document T1/643, no. 681, f. 87.
19 Extract from Sharp to unidentified of New York, Jan. 12, 1788 in Hoare 1820b, 313.
21 In the history of The Sierra Leone Company, the 1791 Company Report records that the land was granted by King Tom, but in a private journal, John Clarkson the future governor of Sierra Leone noted that it was “Prince” Nemgbana “from whom the Company purchased the considerable tract of land for colonization,” Clarkson papers,
with his sub-chiefs Naimbana was a progressive leader, according to Sharp, who agreed with British abolitionist efforts to eliminate slavery. In fact, he also was eager to introduce Christianity to the region and sent his son to London to attend a Christian academy. 

Months after the Nautilus’ arrival in West Africa it soon became apparent with the onset of the annual rains that the timing of the expedition was indeed disastrous. Thirty-four settlers died in April and May “before they had made any settlement on the coast,” and another 15 were “discharged or ran away.” In fact, by the time the Nautilus weighed anchor on September 16, 1787, for its return trip to England, only 276 settlers were left struggling to maintain the seemingly doomed settlement. Sharp concluded that “ninety-six must have died at Sierra Leone” between June and September.

Despite the settlement’s high death toll, Sharp remained adamant that Sierra Leone and its climate were not to blame for the 1:3 mortality rate. Rather, he claimed alcohol and a shortage of “fresh provisions” undermined the health of many passengers who “did not recover of the distempers they carried with them.” Alarm was further raised for the settlement when Sharp received a dire letter written by one of the settlers. Dated July 20, 1787, the letter was written by an A. Elliot who attempted to explain the loss of life in the fledgling settlement. Elliot wrote, “without a very sudden change, I do not think there will be one of us left at the end of a

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Saturday, March 10, 1792; BL-Manuscript Collections; legend records that when the British asked his name the Obai (or King) replied “name Ghana,” which was ultimately recorded as “Nemghana” (Turay, ed. 1987).

22 Falconbridge, A.M. Letter III, May 13, 1791 in Two Voyages, 1794, 60; A Young African Prince: Memoirs of Naimbanna, etc. 1793 in Company Report 1799; AAS; Clarkson’s Mission to America 1791-1792, v. II, 316 (Hereafter Clarkson’s Mission), NYHS.


24 ibid.

25 ibid.
twelvemonth [...] it was really a great pity ever we came to the country after the death of Mr. Smeathman.”

Given the historian’s luxury of hindsight, Elliot’s letter and others like it read like harbingers of things to come. For months rumors continued to circulate concerning whether a number of free black settlers had quit the settlement to enter into the slave-trade as middlemen like the Portuguese-descended lançados or tangomaus, working to capture and deliver potential slaves to Europeans. Despite the calamities that had beset the Province of Freedom, there was little effort to understand the high death rate in the new settlement, particularly in light of Equiano’s earlier allegations against Irwin. Nowhere in the archival documentation of the period was I able to locate any evidence that Equiano’s charges against Irwin were investigated as a possible explanation for the high death toll. Equiano claimed that Irwin pilfered supplies from the expedition’s provisions, which arguably could have left the settlers in a weakened and compromised state before making landfall in Africa. Moreover, according to Equiano, the passengers under Irwin’s charge were “subjected to treatment and controul [sic], little short of the discipline of Guinea-men.”

Irwin’s case offers compelling evidence to support claims that despite the good will of many abolitionists, their efforts were often at the mercy of a mainstream mindset of racist discrimination that failed to consider the humanity of Britain’s black subjects. This lack of regard for the settlers becomes evident once again in the spring of 1788 when Sharp tried to mount a resupply mission for the surviving settlers. Using his own money and some donated

26 Elliot to Sharp, July 20, 1787 in Hoare 1820b, 320-321.
27 Sharp to James Sharp, March 22, 1788, in Hoare 1820b, 316.
28 Olaudah Equiano letter to the editor published in the London Morning Herald in early January 1787; in The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings, Vincent Carretta, ed. 228, 300, note 646; Guinea-men was a common eighteenth century term for a West Indies-bound merchant ships (i.e. slave ships).
funds from like-minded philanthropists, Sharp charted the brig *Myro* to travel to the Province of Freedom with additional settlers and provisions. However, the *Myro’s captain* John Taylor failed to stop at the Cape Verde Islands—per Sharp’s directive—to purchase a prescribed number of small breeding cattle, fowl, cow and two bulls for the settlement.\(^\text{29}\) Instead, Taylor proceeded directly to Sierra Leone; thirteen of the additional settlers died during the *Myro’s* journey. Later, Sharp was thoroughly disheartened to learn that not only had he been deceived by Taylor, but that the settlers had provided the unscrupulous captain with a receipt for the Cape Verde livestock, which he never purchased.\(^\text{30}\) Sharp scolded the settlers in a letter, saying “I had great disappointment by Captain Taylor’s not fulfilling his contract for supplying live cattle.” He continued, adding that he was equally dismayed to learn that they gave Taylor a “certificate” verifying that the settlers had “received from him goods to the value of forty-seven bullocks for which I thought myself obliged to pay him.”\(^\text{31}\) This episode raises questions concerning the coercive nature of relations between the settlers and the British merchants upon whom they relied. It also represents a souring in the relationship between Sharp and the clearly subordinate inhabitants of the Province of Freedom, his co-called “swarthy daughter.”\(^\text{32}\)

Indeed, it is around this time that Sharp begins to financially distance himself from the settlement. In the same letter, Sharp informs the settlers that he had approached “several respectable merchants and gentlemen to form a Company in order to carry on an *honorable trade* with the coast of Africa.”\(^\text{33}\) The company to which Sharp is referring is the St. George’s Bay

\(^\text{29}\) Sharp Letter to Samuel Whitbread, June 5, 1788; Sharp letter to Settlers, September 4, 1788; Sharp letter Settlers, November 11 1789 in Hoare 1820b, 324, 329, 344-347 respectively.
\(^\text{30}\) Sharp to John Jay (President of the Society at New York for Promoting the Manumission of Slaves), March 7, 1789, in Hoare 1820b, 335; Sharp to Settlers, November 11, 1789 in Hoare 1820b, 347.
\(^\text{31}\) Sharp letter to Settlers, November 11, 1789 in Hoare 1920b, 347.
\(^\text{32}\) Sharp to James Sharp, October 31, 1787 in Hoare 1820b, 313; see epigraph at the start of this chapter for full quote.
\(^\text{33}\) Sharp to Settlers, November 11, 1789 in Hoare 1820b, 344-347 (italics in original).
Company, (later incorporated as the Sierra Leone Company). In his thoroughly comprehensive study of the Black loyalists and the origins of Sierra Leone, Christopher Fyfe argues that the troubles of the first settlement meant investors would in all likelihood demand “security for their investment.” He continues:

Though the Treasury had poured out public money in 1786 without inquiring how the settlers would spend it, private investors inevitably demanded some control. Control of expenditure implied control of government and the end of the self-governing freedom Sharp envisioned. (Fyfe 1962:26)

Simon Schama similarly contends that Sharp anguished over “the avowedly commercial character of the St. George’s Bay Company,” fearing it would mean “sacrificing his Frankpledge utopia” (2006:219). Fyfe and Schama have identified the stark reality that confronted Sharp, however, in revisiting the question of the abolitionist’s anxiety that new investors would exert undue control over the settlement, it appears to me as though his overriding worry lay more in keeping the settlement afloat, regardless of who was at the helm. Sharp’s correspondence through the summer of 1790 seem to be single-mindedly focused on establishing the Company lest his settlement fail.

In a series of letters to Prime Minister William Pitt and George Rose the Secretary of the Treasury, Sharp’s anxieties seem fixated on the government’s delay to grant a charter to the St. George’s Bay Company. Moreover, Sharp bitterly laments his own financial losses, saying he had “sunk 1,400£” of his “own private fortune in endeavouring to promote [the] welfare” of the

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34 Efforts to incorporate the St. George’s Bay Company by Royal charter failed due to opposition from attorney General Archibald MacDonald; subsequent efforts to incorporate focused on Parliament, but drew strong opposition from pro-slavery merchants from London, Liverpool and Lancaster as well as the West Indies, who feared competition to its sugar-cane supply. In the end, however, on June 6, 1791, the St. George’s Bay Company was incorporated as the Sierra Leone Company due to a clerical error. See Braidwood 1994; Fyfe 1962; when the draft bill came up for its first reading in March of 1971 it was listed as the ‘Sierra Leone Settlement’ petition, but the proposed company name was left blank. When the bill was passed, it was passed as the Sierra Leone Company Act (31 Geo. Cap. 55). See Fyfe, 1962, 27.
settlers. Had Sharp truly been concerned about the commercial nature of the Sierra Leone Company, why would he have relentlessly pushed for the Company to be chartered under an act of parliament?

It is not my intention to assign guilt on Sharp, nor disregard his previous heroic efforts to establish the settlement, but I contend that at this juncture Smeathman’s mercantile vision for Sierra Leone was realized (if in its nascency). From this point forward British abolitionism became inextricably tied to the economic interests of merchant capitalists and later colonial mercantilist trade in Sierra Leone. By persuading investors—even pro-abolition investors—to underwrite the settlement, Sharp unwittingly steered Sierra Leone toward the upcoming era’s more traditional path of Imperial expansion. Historically, Britain’s colonial acquisitions—whether in Asia, North America or Africa—began as mercantile enterprises established to export (or extract commodity goods) for the strategic and economic good of the Metropole. These nascent trading companies also frequently served as de facto governments, particularly in the case of the fur-trading Hudson’s Bay Company in British North America or the East India Company in South and East Asia, whose salt and spice interests spanned from Lahore to Hong Kong.

The commercialization of the Sierra Leone settlement would, as we will explore in chapter five, have profound implications on the administration of an abolitionist and anti-slavery agenda. The Crown eventually even turned a blind eye on domestic slavery in the hinterland regions outside of Sierra Leone to facilitate increased extraction. Furthermore, this domestic

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35 Sharp to Pitt, April 26, 1790; Sharp to Pitt, June [n.d.] 1790; Sharp to Pitt August 28, 1790; Sharp to Rose August [n.d.] 1790; Sharp to Settlers, September 27, 1790, in Hoare 1820b, 351-360.
36 A few other notable examples include the Imperial East Africa Trading Company, which initially administered the future British colonies of Kenya and Uganda; and the British South Africa Trading Company, which initially oversaw present-day Zambia, Zimbabwe, parts of South Africa and Botswana.
slavery had the unintended consequence of setting the region’s ethnic Koyo Temne against the hinterland Mende—an ethnic rift that continued to play out into Sierra Leone’s post-colonial politics and influence the civil war of the late twentieth century. In the next portion of this chapter I will examine how the location of Sierra Leone (as originally dictated by Henry Smeathman and maintained by the merchant interests of the Sierra Leone Company) contributed to creating an environment of uncertainty and exploitation that imperiled Sierra Leone’s success and ultimately required the intervention of the Crown to protect Britain’s economic interests in the face of growing imperial competition in Africa.

Melancholy Accounts

The Province of Freedom lived on beyond Elliot’s ominous twelve month prediction, but nevertheless, it was, a doomed enterprise, razed by the neighboring Temne just 33 months after it was established. Although sketchy, the details of the events leading to the destruction of the Province of Freetown are as follows:

Sometime toward the end of 1789, a Temne village about half a mile from the settlement was attacked by crew members from an American slave ship en route to Bunce Island. Two Temne villagers were killed, prompting their chief—known to the Europeans as King Jimmy (Jemmy or Jammy in various documents)—to call for restitution. 37 Although there is no conclusive evidence to prove or disprove whether settlers from the Province of Freedom were involved in the attack, the following excerpt from the 1794 Sierra Leone Company Directors’ Report confirms they were implicated. After meeting to discuss the incident, the neighboring

\[37\] King Jimmy’s village has since been incorporated into contemporary Freetown; it is a sprawling open air market and shantytown near the waterfront.
chiefs believing that “two individuals” from the Province of Freedom “were among the hostile party” then decided “that the whole town of free settlers should be burned.”

King Jimmy decreed that the Province of Freedom be destroyed and gave the settlers three days to evacuate. The settlement was set aflame and its inhabitants fled into the nearby forests and islands in the Sierra Leone River. At issue here is not whether the Province of Freedom was destroyed under false pretenses; what is relevant is the peril with which the settlers were confronted on a tract of land at the epicenter of Sierra Leone’s slaving industry, which was purchased at the behest of Granville Sharp and the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor.

Clearly, in the late eighteenth century, Sierra Leone was a less-than-ideal locale to achieve the abolitionists’ mandate. Moreover, the Sierra Leone Company and later the Crown quickly complicated that mandate by merging it with other colonial aims. Sierra Leone rapidly became a point of confluence for economic, humanitarian and religious aims to convert and “civilize” Africa “through the medium of this company.” These competing agendas of merchant capitalist progress, the propagation of Christian-inspired civilization and social reform via abolition were inspired by no single factor. Indeed a careful reading of Britain’s anti-slavery agenda must incorporate Europe’s growing sense that Africa was ripe for the taking, so to speak. Building on Smeathman’s initiative, it appears as though the Sierra Leone Company’s focus on commerce and trade with Africa, reflects an emergent view that West Africa ought to be the focus of empire-building within a European sphere of economic influence in a post-revolutionary Atlantic World.

38 Company Report 1794, 103; CoU.
39 Company Report 1791, 50; CoU.
40 Although I am borrowing the Cold War terminology “Sphere of Influence,” which points to the way in which the United States and Soviet Union perceived the planet in a “two camps” sense by the 1960s. Africa as a European sphere of influence quickly degenerated a no-holds-bar scramble for territory in Africa after the 1870s in which
Whatever it was that ultimately determined where the Province of Freedom would be situated, the welfare of the settlers apparently did not figure prominently into the calculus. Perhaps Britain’s merchant capitalists and Christian missionaries considered the settlement’s location useful as a transit point to the New World or a base from which to halt the spread of Islam in West Africa. And the abolitionists—in their zeal to stamp out slavery—believed the Sierra Leone River was ideally situated to confront Europe’s slave traders. But as history has shown, Sierra Leone was not an “asylum” or refuge for those ‘black poor’ and Black Loyalists hoping to rebuild their lives away from the risk of recapture and enslavement.

News of King Jimmy’s attacks slowly reached Sharp in London. And although it is unclear why, he not only resolved to give the settlement another try, he kept it in the same perilous location, where he had received ongoing reports that many of his original settlers had either been captured and enslaved or had become slavers working with the Europeans at Bunce Island. Increasingly, Sharp expressed grave concern for the safety of the settlement and its inhabitants, noting that if neglected the settlers will “perish and fall into the snares of their enemies, the neighbouring slave-dealers.”

Sharp presents historians with a vexing puzzle: why, on the one hand, does he express concern for the safety of the imperiled settlers while simultaneously proposing a solution that would keep them within sight of their neighboring enemies? Perhaps he already had recruited enough investors to rebuild, or perhaps his personal involvement in the settlement made it too

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41 In a letter to the settlers dated November 11, 1789, Sharp writes that “it gives me great concern to find […] that Mr. Facitus (or Tacitus; Sharp uses both spellings in the same letter, Captain Estwick and Mr. Collins, have deserted the Province of Freedom, in order to enter into the Slave Trade.”; moreover, Sharp seems particularly betrayed to learn that Henry Demane, whom Sharp personally rescued from slavery had become a “dealer in Slaves”; Sharp attempts to appeal to the emotions and recollections how they felt as slaves. He writes, for example, “Remind Mr. Henry Demane of his own feelings under the horrors of slavery” In Hoare 1820b, 344-345 (italics in original)

42 Sharp to Pitt, June 10, 1790, in Hoare 1820b, 353 (italics in original).
difficult to abandon. In either case, it is worth asking, or perhaps re-asking: Why did Sharp go along with Smeathman’s West African locale for the settlement in the first place? And, after such a disastrous outcome for the Province of Freedom, why did he re-build it so close to European slaving operations at Bunce Island? Was it simply a matter that the land was paid for or that he was under a contractual lease agreement with the local Temne elders? That would seem doubtful since in correspondence to the settlement’s inhabitants and later to Prime Minister William Pitt, Sharp proposes to “re-purchase” the land “for a very trifling sum laid out in English manufactures,” equivalent, he notes, to about 100£. 43 Perhaps future research or additional archival material will surface to answer these questions, but I intend to train the focus of this inquiry on the consequences of those actions taken by Sharp and his newly chartered Sierra Leone Company particularly when their paths met with Nova Scotia’s tenacious Thomas Peters (chapter three) who arrived in London in 1790 to inquire as to whether Sharp’s settlement was more suitable for his cohort of Black Loyalist followers than the Canadian Maritimes.

In chapter five I construct a focused history of the 1790s to examine the consequences of the arrival of the Nova Scotia Black Loyalists in conjunction with the emerging mercantilist agenda of the Sierra Leone Company. Indeed, slaves emancipated for their wartime loyalty to the Crown wound up in a hostile environment of slave-trading and labor exploitation, albeit under a variety of different monikers.

43 Sharp to Settlers, November 11, 1789, in Hoare 1820b, 347; Sharp to Pitt June [n.d.] 1790, in Hoare 1820b, 355. Moreover, his public announcement of the Free Territory in Africa Sharp emphasizes “the new District of Sierra Leona has been actually purchased, and given up by the native Chiefs. 1790, 9 (italics in original); SoF.
CHAPTER FIVE

1790s – Freed Slaves and (Un)free Labor

We have not the education which white men have, yet we have feeling the same as other human beings and would do everything we can to make our children free and happy.

– Nova Scotia Settlers to Sierra Leone Co. Directors, n.d.¹

BY LATE SUMMER 1790, after more than seven years of struggling to eke out a meager existence on Nova Scotia’s hardscrabble land, Thomas Peters and his cohort of Black Loyalists determined that they had not yet realized their dream of freedom from servitude—both literally and metaphorically (Walker 1976). Now, however, aware of Sharp’s settlement in West Africa, Peters was selected by hundreds of his followers to be their envoy to England. His mission was to petition the Crown’s representatives to permit the Nova Scotian free blacks to migrate from the Canadian Maritimes to the Province of Freedom. Although little was documented about Peters’ voyage, it was surely a harrowing and risky mission in which he braved the dangers of capture by unscrupulous ship captains who might well have sold him back into slavery for their own profit. Peters’ sponsors from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are believed to have helped raise the £17 fare for the voyage.² On board, Peters worked as a ship hand to pay for his food during the four- to eight-week journey (Butt-Thompson 1926; Clifford 1999; cf Wilson 1976,

² Equivalent to approximately £1,600 or $1,700 today.
etc.). The timing of Peters’ trip was indeed fortuitous, coinciding with Sharp’s efforts to revive his ruined settlement in West Africa.

In fact, at just about the same time that Peters embarked from Nova Scotia, the newly formed and as yet unchartered St. George’s Bay Company dispatched abolitionist Alexander Falconbridge to West Africa, “with a commission to examine and report [on] the state of the colony” and to offer relief to the survivors until the company was granted a parliamentary charter, which it was believed would provide “effective and permanent measures for the prosperity of the settlement.”

Arriving a full year after King Jimmy’s attack, Falconbridge’s party found 48 survivors—they were later joined by 16 more (who had been hiding in the mountains). He assembled the 64 survivors at a new town about two-and-a-half miles from the ruins of the old Province of Freedom’s principal settlement. This new “colony” was christened Granville Town in honor of Sharp’s ongoing efforts and dedication to the ‘black poor’ of London. However, after learning of their few numbers, the directors of the Sierra Leone Company determined that the long-term survival of the new settlement and hence the well-being of their investments would depend on an “increase in the number of settlers” (Hoare 1820b:274).

Enter Thomas Peters and the Nova Scotians.

It’s unlikely that Peters or any of the Nova Scotian Black Loyalists were privy to the embezzlement intrigues and other problems associated with the foundation of the Province of Freedom. Furthermore, the minutia regarding Sharp’s failed efforts in 1788 to resupply the colony with a shipment from the Myro would in all likelihood not have been disclosed to Peters,

3 Falconbridge, a former slave ship surgeon became an ardent abolitionist after meeting with Thomas Clarkson and other “Saints” back in England. His narratives collected in An Account of the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa, 1788, became a powerful source of propaganda for the Quaker and Anglican abolitionists; Company Report 1792; 6ff.

4 Company Report 1791, 8ff; CoU; According to Prince Hoare’s Memoirs of Granville Sharp (1820b); the primary town of the Province of Freedom was also called Granville Town.
who by chance, suddenly appeared to be just the man the abolitionists wanted/needed to satisfy the Sierra Leone Company Directors’ requirement. It is likewise doubtful whether Peters would have risked re-capture and enslavement by crossing the Atlantic if he had been aware that the Province of Freedom was no more than “overgrown ruins” and ashes; its few remaining inhabitants dispersed into the nearby forests.\(^5\) News of such violence and the destruction of their prospective new home would quite possibly have dissuaded the Nova Scotians from moving to West Africa, extinguishing Sharp’s hope of, and the Company Directors’ stipulation for resurrecting the settlement. In a letter to John Clarkson, Henry Thornton wrote that he concealed the history of the colony and the “hardships” the Nova Scotians would likely face in Sierra Leone. For if, as he writes, he had disclosed the truth, “who do you think […] would have gone out?”\(^6\) No, Peters was an unwitting beacon of hope for the abolitionists. Warmly welcomed in Great Britain he quite literally was the toast of the town as he toured through London.\(^7\)

Although few details of Peters’ time in Great Britain were recorded, it is known that upon his arrival in the autumn of 1790 Peters was received and hosted by his wartime commander and comrade, Captain George Martin. Martin wrote a letter of reference attesting to Peters’ honesty and character, which served as an entrée to London’s elite.\(^8\) Martin further presented Peters to General Henry Clinton, who had served as the British Commander-in-Chief in North America from 1778-1782 and issued the Philipsburg Proclamation in 1779, offering freedom to all black slaves who sought refuge behind British lines. Like Martin, Clinton endorsed the now greying

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\(^5\) Company Report 1791, 7ff; cf Walker 1976.
\(^6\) Thornton to Clarkson, September 14, 1792, Clarkson papers Add MSS 41262a, BL.
\(^7\) A London newspaper reported that Peters was included in a round of toasts over dinner at the Tontine Tavern in Glasgow. Other toasts were made to “the speedy abolition of the slave trade;” Granville Sharp; William Wilberforce; several pro-abolition members of Parliament; the Sierra Leone Company; Henry Thornton.
\(^8\) Martin’s certificate, in Wilson 1976, 179, 194 note 8.

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and middle-aged Black Loyalist veteran. In a December 26 letter to Lord William Grenville, Clinton wrote, in part:  

I wish to present to you a memorial of certain poor blacks who […] seem to be the only Loyalists that have been neglected […] perhaps you will suffer the poor Black who is the bearer of this to tell his own melancholy tale. He is deputed by others in similar situation; I remember this man a very active [sergeant] in a very useful Corps. 

Prior to writing Grenville, Clinton introduced Peters to a number of London’s preeminent abolitionists, including Sharp, Thomas Clarkson, William Wilberforce and Henry Thornton (the chairman of the newly established St. George’s Bay Company, a.k.a. Sierra Leone Company). It is believed Sharp and the other abolitionists helped Peters draft his petition and memorial to the Crown in which he itemizes the grievances of the Nova Scotian free blacks and seeks to: 

Procure for himself and his fellow-suffers some establishment where they may attain a competent settlement for themselves, and be enabled by their industrious exertions to become useful subjects to his Majesty (see Appendix D for full text of memorial). 

If the abolitionists did indeed aid Peters in composing his memorial the terminology “become useful subjects to his Majesty” takes on an interesting and important connotation given the Sierra Leone Company’s mandate foregrounding cultivation, commerce and trade over freedom and abolitionism. 

When the Crown assented to Peters’ request he could not have known that for all intents and purposes they were going to be transferred to Africa to comprise a small corps of laborers tasked with cultivating agricultural produce, which the Sierra Leone Company intended to harvest and trade to Britain. Given the silences in the record regarding Peters’ visit to London it

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9 Grenville was the Home Secretary at the time and a close confidant of his cousin Prime Minister William Pitt (the younger); Grenville would later become Prime Minister from 1806-1807; see Grenville in DNB, v. 23, 133-138. 
10 Clinton to Grenville, Dec. 26 1790, in Wilson 1976, 179. 
11 Petition of Thomas Peters (Hereafter Peters’ Petition) in Clarkson’s Mission to America 1791-1792, v. I, 2-6 (Hereafter Clarkson’s Mission); NYHS.
is impossible to know what he was or was not told of the Company’s plans for the rebuilt
settlement. But at the same time, it is worth asking: how much did Peters know? And, as a
subaltern black in the late eighteenth century could he have said no at this point? Keep in mind
how little weight Olaudah Equiano’s words were given in the Irwin case even though Equiano
was a successful and relatively respected writer and abolitionist in London’s white circles.

Peters most certainly would not have been apprised of the fact that in order to keep the
settlement afloat, Sharp’s vision for the Province of Freedom went commercial at the behest of
the Company’s new objective to “cultivate the soils by means of free labor,” as stated in the
company charter; indeed, the new settlement’s mission echoed of the late Henry Smeathman’s
mercantilist vision, which was, “capable of being turned to great national advantage.”12 It is
important to recall from chapter two that definitions of free and unfree labor do not exist as a
simple dichotomy of slave versus wage labor. As Miers and Kopytoff (1977) and Kopytoff
(1988) remind us, definitions of slavery and freedom are cultural constructs determined by the
society within which they are articulated. Once enlisted, the investors who made up the Sierra
Leone Company’s primary benefactors did not hesitate to make their economic interests (i.e.
investments) a priority worth protecting (Fyfe 1962). They did so, however, at the expense of the
stable development of the settlement, the colony, and ultimately the future sovereign state of
Sierra Leone.

The Company moved swiftly to make agricultural cultivation the settlement’s top
priority; one that superseded Sharp’s original utopian ideal of a self-governing, self-reliant
society.13 When Alexander Falconbridge was dispatched to West Africa in the autumn of 1790,

12 From Sharp’s request for a Royal Charter. In Hoare 1820b, 273; Smeathman to Lettsom, October 15, 1785, in
13 Company Report 1791, 5.
for example, he had two objectives: i) to assess and to salvage the remnants of the Province of Freedom; and ii) to collect specimens of woods, iron ore, gum copal, pepper, rice, cotton, and sugar-cane, “which afford the most favourable hopes to the Company.”Ironically both Sharp and the Company appeared to be taking their cue from John Matthews, the unemployed naval officer-\textit{cum}-slave agent who had resided in the Sierra Leone region in the 1780s. In a series of letters that resembled Smeathman’s ambitious commercial aspirations for Sierra Leone, Matthews trumpeted the area’s trade prospects. In early 1786 Matthews wrote that “if properly cleared and cultivated,” Sierra Leone would “be equal in salubrity and superior in productions to any of the West India islands.”

In the end, the fire that destroyed the Province of Freedom did far more than just burn down its huts and supplies; it reconfigured Sharp’s abolitionist dream of an anti-slavery haven into the commerce-oriented \textit{Free English Territory in Africa}, as he publicized it to attract investors in 1790. The territory now had less to do with the anti-slavery ideology of abolitionism than the Company’s primary objective of “commerce and trade.” In fact, a 69-page handwritten letter to John Clarkson, the Sierra Leone Company’s first Superintendent (later to become Governor) outlined the “Rules and Instructions” he was to follow [Appendix E]. On page two, the Company’s objective is unmistakably clear: “the establishment of a trade with Africa,” which necessarily required cultivation and production conceived within the Christian ethos of hard

\footnote{Company Report 1791, 26; Gum copal is an amber resin drawn from tropical trees; used for a variety of products such as incense and varnish.}

\footnote{Matthews Letter II, February 20, 1786, in \textit{A voyage to the River Sierre-Leone [sic], on the coast of Africa ....} 1788, 21-22 (Hereafter Matthews’ Voyage); HU; Matthews extensive description of Sierra Leone and its produce were quoted by Sharp in his public notice about the \textit{Free English Territory in Africa} (1790), and in the Sierra Leone Company’s first investors’ report in London for the year 1791.}
work, diligence, and perseverance (Weber 1958). The result, the investors argued, would “furnish commodities for the support of an extensive and increasing commerce.”  

The Sierra Leone Company Directors did not wholly abandon the Province of Freedom’s original mission as a refuge for former slaves. Indeed, in the opening pages of Clarkson’s directions, the Company states that the desired commerce with Africa was to be achieved without “resorting to the miserable activity of selling the inhabitants as slaves”  

However, the expressed priority of the settlement was no longer the freedom of its inhabitants; rather, I believe that the “increase of the exportable African produce” meant that those inhabitants would best serve the Company through their free labor—in whatever form that might take. In fact, as will be seen, free labor in Sierra Leone was tantamount to sharecropping and debt bondage arrangements between the Company’s white London-based landholders and this new labor pool from Nova Scotia. This recalibration has loomed over the territory, informing the ways in which both colonial and post-colonial government policy was established and implemented. The consequences of this compromised new mandate in the short term prevented Sierra Leone from fully achieving Sharp’s abolitionist objective. In the long-term, the Sierra Leone Company’s directive laid the foundation for an untenable colony, rife with economic, ethnic and resource disparities that would inhibit efforts to transform Sierra Leone into a viable post-colonial polity.

In chapters six through eight I will examine how various forms of unfree labor were used to build the colony and exploit resources—both agricultural and mineral—from the surrounding hinterland, reifying Britain’s commercial purpose in Sierra Leone and helping to support the Metropole while undermining the ethno-political and economic stability of the colony and

16 Manuscript Journal of Lt. John Clarkson, R.N. Governor of Sierra Leone (Hereafter Manuscript Journal of Clarkson); 1792, 2; SLNA.  
17 *ibid.*  
18 Manuscript Journal of Clarkson, 3.
independent state in the postcolony. The imperiled future of Sierra Leone began with Britain’s late eighteenth century Back-to-Africa scheme that was hailed as a move to resettle former black slaves in Africa, but in practice was little better than an exercise to exploit migrant laborers who had been rendered landless war refugees. Furthermore, as I will explore in the coming pages, the Sierra Leone Company exhibited little regard for the welfare of the freed slaves by settling them in a region that was rife with danger, both real and perceived, from ongoing European slaving and slave trade operations.

*Back to Africa – Land of Promise or Peril?*

*After the Sierra Leone Company received its charter in June 1791, one of its first acts was to solicit funding from the Crown in order to transport the Nova Scotian Black Loyalists to Africa. Having received the grant, the Company appointed a British representative to oversee the settlement’s reconstruction, development and repopulation. Thomas Clarkson’s younger brother, the quiet, but affable 27-year-old Lt. John Clarkson was enlisted with the assistance of Lawrence Hawthorn, who was based in Halifax. The younger Clarkson, who was deeply moved by the plight of the Black Loyalists, spent months in Nova Scotia, spreading the word about Sierra Leone and recruiting as many free blacks as possible who were willing to embark on a new life in Africa (Schama 2006; Wilson 1976; Clifford 1999, *etc*).*19 If Clarkson was moved by the tragedy and betrayal of the Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia, he must have been equally uncertain of the Sierra Leone Company’s plan to help them; for as is now know, within the remodeled objectives of the Company, the status of the Nova Scotians was altered from refuge-seeking former slave to *quasi-*colonist charged with the task of settling and cultivating the West African

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19 For an excellent account of Clarkson’s efforts to recruit the Nova Scotian Black Loyalists for Sierra Leone see Wilson’s, *John Clarkson and the African Adventure*, 1980; and Charles Ferguson’s Introduction in *Clarkson’s Mission to America 1791-1792*, 1971.
colony on behalf of British entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, Clarkson’s concern must have been heightened when he inadvertently learned of the Province of Freedom’s destruction at the hands of the Koyo Temne’s King Jimmy.

One evening, while dining at Governor John Parr’s residence Clarkson heard for the first time of the attack and fire that razed the Province of Freedom. And, according to a letter he wrote to Sierra Leone Company Chairman Henry Thornton, John Clarkson was dismayed that his brother Thomas was aware of the attack, yet he failed to alert the younger Clarkson before he set out for Africa. Why was John Clarkson not informed of such a critical piece of information regarding the settlement he was working to repopulate? Did the older Clarkson fear this information could undermine the rejuvenation of the abolitionist settlement? Whatever the cause, this news left the younger Clarkson unsettled about the mission and ultimately at odds with the company.

Moreover, misinformation surrounded the cause of the attack as seen in a series of letters Granville Sharp wrote to Prime Minister William Pitt in the summer of 1790.\textsuperscript{21} Throughout his efforts to recruit the free blacks of Nova Scotia Clarkson must have been wondering what lay ahead in Africa. Was he sailing toward an ambush? Perhaps he envisioned leading his flotilla toward a hostile and frightening unknown.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the disquieting news, Clarkson retained a sense of mission to help the Nova Scotians in whatever way he could. Indeed, Christopher Fyfe records that in his extensive meetings with the former slaves, Clarkson became aware that freedom for the Nova Scotians “consisted above all in a secure title to a piece of land” (1991:4,

\textsuperscript{20} Unlike Sharp’s language of settlers for the Province of Freedom’s émigrés, The directors of the Sierra Leone Company refer to the Nova Scotian migrants as colonists; see Company Report 1794, 8.
\textsuperscript{21} Sharp to Pitt, June 10 1790; Sharp to Pitt [n.d.] 1790 in Hoare 1820b, 353-354; 354-355 (respectively).
\textsuperscript{22} On arrival at Sierra Leone, Clarkson made note in the March 6, 1792 entry of his diary about the “hostile disposition of the Natives at Sierra Leone”; Clarkson’s Mission, v. I, 436.
On at least one occasion Clarkson’s emotions got the better of him when he proclaimed to a church filled with prospective settlers that they would receive free land grants in Africa as redress for Parr’s failure to fulfill the Crown’s pledge for farm plots in Nova Scotia (chapter three). Furthermore, he also represented the African settlement as a colony where black and white would have an equal hand in shaping and affecting government rule (Schama 2006). And even though the company had indeed intended that each free black settler should receive “not less than Twenty Acres of Land for himself ten for his wife and five for every child,” Clarkston had gone beyond the reach of his authority.

In their first annual report, the Sierra Leone Company directors noted that an important line of anticipated income was expected to arise “out of a land revenue, derived partly from quit-rents” of about two shillings per acre for the first two years, followed by an annual land tax. Thinking them unjust, John Clarkson never enforced the quit-rent payments. Later under a subsequent governorship the company did enforce the quit-rent and tax payments. Additionally, the company intended to purchase any surplus produce cultivated by the colonists, technically elevating the Nova Scotians from slave to free wage laborer within the Eurocentric binary of slavery and freedom (chapter two). However, the paltry wages the company intended to pay the Nova Scotians would have made them little better than wage slaves (Eltis 2003), and more importantly, the company’s quit-rents and land taxes tied the colonists to the land in a form of debt bondage (Pybus 2006; Drescher 2002). The Nova Scotians may no longer have been slaves in the sense they were not the property of a master, but neither were they free at least insomuch as they remained subservient to a dominant mercantile hierarchy.

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23 Terms of the Sierra Leone Company, Nov. 3, 1791; UICSL
Marc Bloch’s study of what he terms “Feudal Society” explores the place of manorialism within the larger scope of feudalism. “A manor,” he wrote, “was first and foremost a community of dependents who were by turns protected, commanded, and oppressed by their lord” (1961:279). In Sierra Leone, the Black Loyalists finally got their plot of land, but they were far from free; their dependence may no longer have been tethered to a master, but it was to a lord insomuch as the Sierra Leone Company constituted a conglomeration of lords to whom they were systematically indebted. It’s unlikely that Clarkson, Sharp or the Sierra Leone Company Directors would have conceived of their plan as anything other than an effort to help Nova Scotia’s Black Loyalists. After all, the Nova Scotians were heading back to Africa—irrespective of whether it was in fact the Africa from whence they came; they had been emancipated from slavery and were now free to develop their own community, or so they had been told.

In the preceding chapter I examined the competing economic and humanitarian interests that led to the creation of the Province of Freedom in 1787 within the vicinity of European slave-trading operations, and, as a consequence, the settlement’s demise and dispersion less than three years later. In the remaining pages of this chapter I will examine the socio-cultural implications that were inherent of the Sierra Leone Company’s drive to resurrect the settlement; doing so by recruiting a diasporic population of former slaves who would ultimately comprise an unfree labor force captive to its white benefactors in Metropolitan London. Moreover, in Africa the Nova Scotians would encounter a variety of obstacles, which would inhibit the successful economic development of Sierra Leone. In fact, the Sierra Leone Company’s commercial drive nurtured a hostile ethno-cultural atmosphere in a region where former slaves, European slavers and various indigenous African populations who had participated in the slave trade were expected to sustainably live in close proximity.
AT FIRST LIGHT ON January 15, 1792 John Clarkson stood on deck of the flagship
Lucretia, squinting against the light glinting off the dark icy waters of the Halifax Harbor.
Preparing to cast off, the young officer surveyed his small fleet until around nine that bright
Sunday morning, when he gave the signal for his fifteen ships to weigh anchor under a fair North
by Northwest wind. It was a journey, Clarkson wrote, in which the 1190 passengers were “in
good spirits, properly equipped and I hope destined to be happy.”25 Within a week of departing
Halifax, however, rough seas of “heavy gales with rain, hail and very heavy claps of thunder and
lightning” damaged the main top sail of Clarkson’s ship. For sixteen days the ships were buffeted
in the high seas; one man was lost overboard, leaving his wife and four children behind.26 The
rough seas broke up the flotilla. Later, about ten days into the journey, illness and “fever” began
to take hold of the passengers, claiming the first life on January 25, 1792.27

Finally, one by one the ships staggered into Sierra Leone’s St. George’s Bay between
February 28 and March 9.28 Tainting the expedition’s arrival was the morbidity and mortality
that accompanied them. By the time of their landing, 67 passengers had died of fever, including
Clarkson’s personal valet Peter Peters, and Jonathan Coffin, the captain of the Lucretia. Clarkson
himself became gravely ill during the voyage, passing many of his duties over to the captains of
various ships in the small fleet.29 His illness, from which he suffered on and off through his
tenure in the colony, reflected an inauspicious start to the settlement’s resurrection, and, as it
would turn out, Sierra Leone’s troubled future.

HU.
27 Clarkson’s Mission, v. I, 409-410; Clarkson noted that Christopher Pratt died of fever, but gave no more details
regarding his identity.
29 Clarkson’s Mission, v. I, 417, 423; London Evening Mail, May 23, 1792, [n. pag.].; WNA.
Despite the travails of the journey, when the ships reached the outlying waters of Sierra Leone’s coastline the overjoyed colonists “gave up three cheers and fired vollies [sic]” into the air. Later, as they prepared to go ashore, many noted upon closer inspection that the peninsula appeared pleasing to the eye, lush, bucolic and full of possibility. For Clarkson, who kept a meticulous diary of the odyssey, Sierra Leone was “the Land of Promise,” which, he wrote, “exhibits a most rich and beautiful prospect.”

Amidst the rosy and optimistic predictions, however, trouble of one sort or another foretold a more menacing experience for the colonists. For instance, as a grim reminder that slavery and slave-trading remained a principal European preoccupation in West Africa, Clarkson had recorded days before their arrival an encounter on the evening of March 4, 1792 with the Mary a slaving ship from Bristol, which was in the region to collect slaves. This was just the first of many reminders that slave-trading was a robust industry well within reach of the Nova Scotians’ so-called asylum. As will be seen, various reminders of the trade became fixtures in the settlers’ daily lives.

Within the first days of making landfall, the Nova Scotians encountered insistent drumming accompanied by gunfire and “shrill shouting” echoing through the dark forest walls. These sounds came from the direction of “King Jemmy’s town”; the home of those same neighbors who had razed the Province of Freedom in 1789. For this group of de facto war
refugees of the American Revolution—who had suffered and survived countless traumatic scenarios in their own given contexts of slavery and combat in the American Colonies and the trauma of deprivation they faced in Nova Scotia—these sounds would have seemed all the more threatening.\textsuperscript{34} Of course, given our temporal and spatial dislocation from the event one cannot know the exact purpose of the drums—a comprehensive historical ethnography on drumming in Temne rituals would be required for that. The drumming may well have been part of a harmless ceremony. My intention here is not to decipher the intent of the Temne villagers living within earshot of the Nova Scotians’ new settlement; instead, I am concerned with exploring those factors that may have undermined the confidence and security of the new free black colonists.

In addition to beating drums, the Nova Scotians would perhaps have encountered rumors and rumblings of were-creatures—human alligators, leopards or chimpanzees—and other such accounts of witchcraft and sorcery practiced by the Temne. In 1786 Lt. John Matthews wrote of the dangers of witchcraft along the riverbanks “from whence” the women and children are “frequently taken”—taken, he cautioned, by witches that assumed the form of alligators or sharks.\textsuperscript{35} It was not uncommon in the 1790s to hear rumors of “witchcraft” among the Temne villagers who lived adjacent to Sierra Leone’s new colonists. Indeed, Matthews’ accounts were echoed in the early 1790s by Anna Marie Falconbridge—the intrepid wife of Sierra Leone agent Alexander Falconbridge.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Although I refrain from the use of the contemporary term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (see Young 1995), I do believe it is reasonable to expect the traumas experienced by the Nova Scotians would have left them wary and trepidatious—typical symptoms of PTSD.

\textsuperscript{35} Matthews Letter IV, July 29, 1786, in Matthews’ Voyage 1788, 50; similar reports indicated witchcraft was used to transform humans into leopards to steal or kill livestock; see Company Report 1794, 86.

\textsuperscript{36} Falconbridge Letter IV, June 8, 1791; Freetown Journal, Jan. 1, 1793; both in Two Voyages, 1794, 83, 197 respectively.
Surely it was a daunting and perhaps horrifying prospect to confront the threat of witchcraft in this new and unfamiliar home.\footnote{Witchcraft in the late Renaissance to the early modern era was a powerful tool used to hold sway over enemies, rivals and subordinates in Europe, colonial America and Africa. Historian Elizabeth Reis (1998) observes from archival material and contemporary literature that the mere allegation of witchcraft was often used in some parts of colonial America as a means of wielding power and control over disobedient or rebellious slaves, or slaves who had forgotten their place in society, such as Salem’s Tituba in 1692; for details on witchcraft and slavery in colonial America I relied primarily on Reis’ Spellbound: Women and witchcraft in America (1998) and the various essays in the edited volume Documenting American Violence, edited by Christopher Waldrep and Michael Belleiles and Elaine Breslaw’s Tituba, Reluctant Witch of Salem: Devilish Indians and Puritan Fantasies (1997).} For Freetown’s black colonists the fear invoked by witchcraft in the late eighteenth century was perhaps a mosaic of past traumas, religious conviction and the persistent threat of re-enslavement. Witchcraft posed a threat to the settlers on two footings: from a religio-spiritual outlook as well as witchcraft’s affiliation with the production of slaves (chapter two).\footnote{Matthews, Letter VI, November 20, 1786, in Matthews’ Voyage, 1788, 131-132; Falconbridge Letter IV, June 8, 1791 in Two Voyages, 1794, 83.}

Recall from chapter three that Christianity was an essential social component in uniting many of the disparate Black Loyalists in Nova Scotia who had come not only from different parts of Africa, but who were socialized to New World customs in different parts of colonial America. The tenets of Christianity and the concept of salvation were crucial aspects of Black Loyalist unity, interpretations of freedom and emancipation. In her study of the Black Loyalists, Mary Louise Clifford observed that the promise of salvation “resonated among the blacks as solace against oppression and the indignities of slavery” (1999:15). Moreover, Christianity was a symbol of their connection to the white British abolitionists who had brought them to West Africa.

Of course our understanding of witchcraft today has largely been divorced from the superstitious beliefs of demonic possession and supernatural powers. Witchcraft is more commonly interpreted through rational and analytical frameworks as a manifestation power
through symbolism (Turner 1967). But within the context of the history of Sierra Leone in the 1790s it is important to consider the impact witchcraft—or the threat thereof—would have had on deeply religious free black colonists and their white Christian sponsors.

Anthropologist Peter Geschiere (1995) notes that witchcraft derives and yields its power by way of psychological subterfuge. The real power of witchcraft lies in its ambiguity and the elusive nature of proof in either the affirmative or negative. Rosalind Shaw observes that in the twentieth century spirit possession was a common explanation for misfortune in Sierra Leone, including the destruction of livestock or crops. Charges of witchcraft are easily leveled, but exceedingly difficult to disprove since witchcraft occurs when a witch’s “spirit (ŋyina) or shadow (ŋmɔŋpǝl) leaves its body during dreams to go on invisible nocturnal predations” (1997:858, cf 1992).

The power of the unseen, the unknown and the whispered rumor was, I contend, an immense power of control over the Nova Scotians. It was rivaled, perhaps, only by the fear of those consequences associated with an accusation of being a witch or practicing witchcraft. The sentence of being accused of witchcraft in eighteenth century West Africa was inevitable: slavery. 39 If the fear of witchcraft seems irrational from a twenty-first century Western perspective, then it must be said that for the former slaves from Nova Scotia in the eighteenth century the fear of witchcraft for its association with slavery is wholly pragmatic, rational and founded on fact. Based on textual evidence in the archives, African witchcraft (or allegations thereof) in the late eighteenth century was often (although not exclusively) associated with the production of slaves (chapter two). For the Nova Scotians in Sierra Leone, the threat of slavery by accusation of witchcraft loomed large by virtue of the “leveling” function of witchcraft,

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particularly when examined in the context of the vast socio-economic and cultural disparity between the black colonists and their neighboring Temne villagers.

Fear of witchcraft’s affiliation with slavery was further heightened by the presence and open hostility of European slavers at Bunce Island. The Europeans, like their African middlemen (often of Temne extraction), bristled at the idea of the Sierra Leone Company’s mission to end slavery by cultivating alternative forms of trade and commerce with Africa. For years, tensions simmered between the opposing objectives of the Sierra Leone Company and the Bunce Island slavers, though it was the free black settlers and their predecessors from the Province of Freedom who suffered the consequences of these strained relations. For example, in a statement before the British House of Commons Bunce Island agent James Bowie testified that in the early months of the Province of Freedom experiment, five “Grumetters” were caught “plundering” the Bunce Island store after breaking in through a window. “The new settlers at Sierra Leone,” testified Bowie, “prove to be a very dangerous and bad set of people.” The five would later stand trial after which they were sentenced to banishment from the island. Instead, however, they were, in fact, sold to a slaver leaving for the French West Indies.

The persisting menace of the slave trade most certainly cast a pallor over the whole of Freetown, serving as a constant reminder that they were both unwelcome and at risk in this part of the Upper Guinea coast. In notation after notation, the Directors of the Sierra Leone Company identified the enduring threat the slavers and their middlemen posed to the Nova Scotians. This threat was confirmed in the travelogues of eighteenth century visitors to the region; in the years following the creation of Freetown, several European abolitionists journeyed along the West

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40 Slang for free blacks.
41 Minutes of the Evidence taken before a Committee of the Whole House, to whom it was referred to consider of the Slave Trade, June 22, 1789, 271-280; GL.
African coast and into the region’s hinterland. For example, in his 1794 study on cultivation, trade and the promotion of civilization in West Africa, Carl Wadström recognized the threat slavery posed to the success and development of Sierra Leone. “The slave-trade,” he wrote, “will prove the grand obstacle to their improvement and civilization.” And just two years after Wadström published his treatise, the Sierra Leone Company Directors likewise noted the threat to the Nova Scotians, observing that “the inhabitants all go armed; they carry both guns and a number of large knives for defence; even the women carry knives also.” In 1790—the year before Sharp’s St. George’s Bay Company was chartered as the Sierra Leone Company—Alexander Falconbridge recorded several instances when colonists and other local inhabitants were seized and taken off to be sold into slavery. On one occasion he witnessed “three Mandingo men, with two other persons, all armed, in the act of tying the hands of a man.” That man had crossed through the territory of a rival group and would have been sold had Falconbridge not intervened. On a separate occasion Falconbridge reported that before its destruction, a 16-year-old boy from the free settlement was wandering on his own when he was “seized by King Jammy,” to be sold as a slave. A second settler from the Province of Freedom alerted the rest of the settlement’s inhabitants who “seized one of Jammy's people in return.” A dispute “ensued in which one man was killed.”

Finally, the Sierra Leone Company directors warned the colonists to travel in groups since local slave raiders “lie in wait in the woods for any straggling people.” A lengthy passage of the company’s 1795 annual report notes that many:

Atrocious acts have happened in Sierra Leone in consequence of the slave trade […] the kings and headmen in the neighborhood of Sierra Leone universally deal

42 Wadström 1794, 4 (italics in original).
43 Company Report, 1791, 33.
44 Company Report, 1791, 35-36.
in slaves. Many private slave-traders have raised themselves into chiefs by means of this traffic, and all the more regular chiefs have become more or less dealers in slaves also.\(^45\)

Slavery was clearly an imminent threat at this time and in this place; and yet there was no discussion—apart from Jonas Hanway’s suggestion back in 1786—of locating the settlement elsewhere. It appears as though the prospect of non-slave related commerce had won out, albeit at the expense of those settlers who themselves had been kidnapped and sold back into slavery. Worsening the risk of recapture for the Nova Scotian colonists was their highly conspicuous appearance (Western dress, language, religion, etc.), making them obvious “outsiders” and thus susceptible to enslavement by virtue of Orlando Patterson’s intrusive mode of social death (1982).\(^46\)

**African or Other?**

If, as I propose, witchcraft and slavery in West Africa served to set the Temne villagers apart from the free black settlers of London and Nova Scotia, it is equally apparent that the free black colonists constituted a culturally transformed and distinct diaspora that had been socialized within a very different context than their indigenous neighbors in Sierra Leone. For example, William Wilberforce, the Parliamentary champion of anti-slavery legislation, suggested calling the former slaves “Africans,” as a tactful way to avoid the “odium which every other name” such as black or Negro seems to be associated. But once in Africa, the Black Loyalists preferred the term Nova Scotians to distinguish themselves from the indigenous African populations.\(^47\) Ellen Gibson Wilson notes:

\(^{45}\) Thornton to Clarkson, December 30, 1791; Clarkson Add MS 41262a; Company Report 1795, 106-107; 112-120; WCL.

\(^{46}\) For a complete discussion of Patterson’s modes of Social Death see chapter two, this volume.

Like the American loyalists who streamed to Britain as the mother country after the Revolution, [the Black Loyalists] were a different breed now: British North Americans of African ancestry […] They spoke of the Britain most of them had never seen as ‘home.’ (Wilson 1976:241)

The free blacks—who in some instances were generations removed from their Africa roots—arrived at the Freetown settlement as more than just asylum-seekers, but also as missionaries charged with carrying what Clarkson called the “business of colonizing Africa from the purest and best of motives,” which he said was “to civilize and Christianize this large continent.”

No longer connected to the ritual and ceremonial practices of their animist and Muslim ancestors, the Christian free blacks looked upon their African counterparts as though they were in need of salvation. Whether by design or default this civilizing mission resulted in a perception on the part of Nova Scotians that the Temne and other indigenous Africans were somehow inferior and in need of “civilizing” or saving. In this sense, the free black colonists had taken up the White Man’s Burden by some diasporic twist of fate.

This civilizing mission would continue to differentiate the colonists from the indigenous Africans while simultaneously exacerbating ethnic tensions in the region well into the nineteenth century. Slavery had not only robbed the free blacks of their liberty, but it had also forged a deep-seated identity crisis that remains today as a lasting legacy of the country’s origins. The colonists were indeed black, but no longer African and yet also black existing on the margins of a European identity. Who were the Nova Scotians now that they were back in Africa?

Moreover, their alienation would have been dramatically exacerbated by the geographic rupture that resulted from creating a single colony for the ex-slaves whose ancestral ties originated from all over the African continent. This diaspora of former slaves (a diasporas’ diaspora, if you will) was comprised of people (or their descendants) from throughout West, East

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and Central Africa. Thus, Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba Africans along with Wolof, and ethnic groups from Angola and the Belgian Congo were blended into a quasi-pan African community in Freetown. They had little if anything in common with the Temne, or other local Africans in the Sierra Leone area. Chapter six will look at how the creation of this forced African melting pot was accelerated by British legislation in 1807 to outlaw the slave trade. Despite the ethnic diversity and disparity, what the Nova Scotians did have was a shared sense of experience, fortified by violent trauma; this experience bound them together as a unified group, something akin to Liisa Malkki’s notion that inhabitants of refugee camps comprise an “accidental community” (1997). Whereas the Temne had communal ceremonies and rituals upon which to forge an identity, the Nova Scotians had slavery, emancipation, escape and reconstitution in Africa to become, in later generations, the Krio of Sierra Leone.

Put most simply, the free blacks—having been exposed to European customs and habits—were no longer African, at least not from a socio-cultural perspective. But neither were they European; the free blacks dressed as whites, ate like whites and even prayed like whites, albeit predominantly in churches established by black preachers. Indeed as historians Christopher Fyfe and Leo Spitzer observed, cultural assimilation was afoot in this West African colony of whites and blacks, creating a hybrid of creoles (or Krio) who had somehow to negotiate their way between these two identities (Spitzer 1974; Fyfe 1987). However, the Krio became adept at toeing the line. They ultimately earned the label “Black English,” which for many Krio meant:

Living, dressing, speaking and acting like Englishmen—or as they believed the English to do these things—was the “inevitable outcome of the civilization and enlightenment” which was brought to bear on the Sierra Leone colony since its inception. (Spitzer 1974:39-40)
In the years to come after the creation of Freetown in 1792 the free blacks reified their distinct identity from the surrounding African communities. It would be a trend that would have political and societal repercussions by driving a greater wedge between *Krio* and villager. “Inevitably,” writes Fyfe, “the humble barefoot villagers were despised by their prosperous relatives in Freetown” (Fyfe 1987:414). From the outset, Sierra Leone was fraught with problems of miscommunicated mission and mismanagement between the company officials and loyal blacks of London and then Nova Scotia.

For one thing, the Company Directors clearly viewed the Nova Scotians as little more than the workforce that would cultivate the land to deliver profits to the investors under various arrangements of unfree labor that were tantamount to debt bondage. For the most part, the free blacks were—like the slaves of the Bella Coola—strangers in a strange land and disconnected from their ancestral ties. For the Sierra Leone Company, this state of disconnection made the Nova Scotians ideal candidates for new labor schemes. In fact, in exchange for their ocean passage and initial provisions, the colonists would be given “a garden lot of one acre” for their own subsistence farming along with a land grant of significantly more acreage which they were expected to cultivate for the company.\(^{49}\) Moreover, the company dispatched about 100 white salaried “servants” (*i.e.* employees) who would govern and manage the day-to-day affairs of the colony.\(^{50}\) By contrast, the black colonists were effectively excluded from the affairs of colony, except insomuch as their muscle was required. This flew in the face of their understanding from John Clarkson that the colony was to be mutually governed by black and white inhabitants.

\(^{49}\) Terms of the Sierra Leone Company (Hereafter Terms), November 3, 1791, 1; UICSL.
\(^{50}\) The directors anticipated needing, a salaried “superintendent or Chief, and his secretary; a commercial Agent, a surveyor, a store-keeper, a medical person, a surgeon and assistant surgeon, a book-keeper and clerk, a clergyman, a school-master and school-mistress,” 1791, 48.
A committee of seven white councilors from London was to run the colony under the leadership of Clarkson, who was informed on Wednesday March 7 that the intended Governor Henry Hew Dalrymple, a decommissioned naval officer, had resigned. It appears, however, that Dalrymple was, in fact, dismissed in the wake of a disagreement with the company over how to run the colony. On the evening of Saturday, March 10, Clarkson jotted the day’s events into a private journal he kept at the request of his brother, Thomas. The first words of the entry were simple and humble: “Took the oaths and my seat as a member of the council” and the “Superintendent or Governor.”

The formulation of the council and governorship was in breach of one of the company’s guiding principles, that “black and white settlers will all be equally governed.” There was no indication as to how the company expected a small and clearly elite group of white Londoners to “equally” govern the vast majority of the colony’s black population without equal representation, or any representation for that matter. Moreover, the appointment of Clarkson as governor did not sit well with Thomas Peters, who in hindsight had unwittingly provided the company with the human resources it needed to credibly resurrect the Province of Freedom and transform it into a viable (or so they hoped) business concern. Peters had been bitter back in Nova Scotia when he first learned that it would be a white Briton rather than himself to organize and recruit the Black Loyalists for the expedition to Africa. Shortly after their arrival in Sierra Leone, Peters’ frustration manifested into an outright rivalry with Clarkson.

On the evening of March 22, Clarkson recorded, that a violent and indiscreet Peters confronted him with “many complaints.” Over the coming weeks Clarkson grew suspicious and

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51 Clarkson’s Mission, 441; A.M. Falconbridge Letter IX in Two Voyages, 1794, 156ff; Thornton to Clarkson, December 28, 1791; Thornton to Clarkson, December 30, 1791; Clarkson Papers Add MS 41262a; BL.
52 Clarkson Papers, March 10, 1792, BL.
53 Company Report 1791, 52.
wary of the fact that Peters was “alarming and disheartening the people.” On Easter Sunday, Clarkson was warned in letter from two free black settlers that “the people are raising up divisions and factions to elect Mr. Peters as their governor.” For a time in the spring of 1792, the colony of Sierra Leone was splintered into camps supporting Peters or Clarkson. Clarkson took no action against Peters believing he had no true intention of unseating the government. But when Peters was accused by colonist Laury White of stealing some belongings that black colonist John Salter had bequeathed to her, Clarkson arranged for a trial by Peters’ peers. A trial took place May 1 and the jurors found that Peters “had no right to the property.” He was ordered to return it “to the lawful owner.” As the presiding magistrate, Clarkson delivered a light, but for Peters, disgracing sentence. That same evening, Peters appealed the sentence to Clarkson, but still reported that the property had been returned.

Beyond just a campaign for the “hearts and minds” of the Nova Scotians, historian Ellen Gibson Wilson contends that the power struggle between Peters and Clarkson was symptomatic of discontent among the Nova Scotians who expected to have their land allocations upon arrival in March. Indeed, many of the Nova Scotians believed that the Sierra Leone Company would live up to its promise to treat both whites and blacks equally. However, “neither had yet come true” (1976:252). On June 15, Peters joined with Elliott Griffith in an attempt to install a Frankpledge-styled system of governance. Clarkson agreed to the proposal, taking the company directors at their word for egalitarian rule in Freetown, but Clarkson insisted that only the Nova Scotians who had served as captains during the expedition could serve as elected peace constables. Clarkson was rebuked by Thornton in a lengthy letter. Thornton said Clarkson’s

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54 Clarkson’s Mission, v. II, March 22, 18-21; April 7, 77-79.
55 Clarkson’s Mission, v. II April 8, 80-88.
56 Clarkson’s Mission, v. II. April 24, 125; April 25, 126-147; May 1, 156-158.
move would create a “more free but less efficient government,” indicating a growing ideological rift between the company in London and Clarkson in Africa. Moreover, Thornton reminded Clarkson that he was not the company’s first choice for superintendent. 57 Before the plan could progress, Peters fell gravely ill, and on the morning of June 26 Clarkson received an unsigned letter informing him of his rival’s death. 58

With the death of Thomas Peters, Governor Clarkson had withstood the colony’s first power struggle. Still, Clarkson’s remaining months in Freetown were marked by the black colonists’ growing dissatisfaction and suspicion of white motives and government. It is important here to note that these suspicions ought to have been directed more at the London directors than Clarkson. It was increasingly clear that the intention of the company was to establish a cultivating colony that exploited what was tantamount to black bonded labor under the watchful eye of white administrators. This was no asylum from slavery as envisioned by the black colonists and tacitly promised by the Sierra Leone Company. It was a disappointment for both groups and Clarkson was caught somewhere between the two. In practical terms, Sierra Leone was a semi-regulated settler plantation where creative forms of unfree labor could be employed to fulfill the economic aspirations of the company investors and offer a modicum of liberty for the former slaves within the contextual framework of the white directors’ and councilors’ vision of freedom. However, the black colonists believed they had been promised a colony in Africa where they would govern in tandem with the European whites; chalk this up perhaps to Clarkson’s overzealous recruiting techniques back in Nova Scotia.

57 Clarkson’s Mission v. II, 292-299; Thornton to Clarkson, September 14, 1792, Clarkson Papers Add MSS 41262a, BL.
If the black colonists were disillusioned with Governor Clarkson, they would soon learn that their situation could get much more difficult. In December of 1792 Clarkson boarded the company ship *Felicity* and sailed for London on sick leave with the intention of returning early in the new year. In London, the Sierra Leone Company Chairman Henry Thornton had different plans. He offered Clarkson a stipend if he would resign. Clarkson refused and instead was dismissed (Fyfe 1991; Wilson 1976; Clifford 1999).

*A Specimen Less Favorable*

In early September 1792, the Union Jack snapped in the breeze as the *York*, a 1,000-ton brig owned by the Sierra Leone Company sailed into the deep waters of St. George’s Bay. Marine Lieutenant William Dawes stood at the rail, gazing out at a fledgling colony that had been cut into a swath of lush coastal rainforest. The 30-year-old Dawes arrived in Sierra Leone with impressive credentials. Historians today almost universally praise Dawes for humanitarianism, good character and his display of moral adroitness while serving the Royal Navy at the Botany Bay penal colony in Australia. Tim Flannery contends that while in Australia, Dawes was possibly “the most morally upright man in the colony” (1999:36). In New South Wales Dawes was defiant, refusing to participate in a “punitive expedition” against the indigenous *Eora* in retaliation for the murder of a British game-keeper. His stance earned the young lieutenant the title of conscientious objector in matters both military and moral (Clendinnen 2005:156).

Months earlier, in the spring of 1792 Dawes returned to England—around the same time that Clarkson’s flotilla was arriving at the coast of West Africa. In London, Dawes met with Wilberforce, the preeminent abolitionist voice in the British House of Commons. A decidedly

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59 Thornton to Clarkson, July 12, 1792; Thomas Clarkson to John Clarkson, July 17, 1792; both in Clarkson Papers Add MSS 41262a, BL.
conservative evangelical Christian, Wilberforce also served as a director for the Sierra Leone Company. Dawes impressed the anti-slavery campaigner, who in turn used his considerable influence to have the lieutenant appointed to Sierra Leone’s governing council, which had been whittled down from seven to just three councilors who were handpicked from England. A move that Thornton told Clarkson was “necessary for securing with tolerable certainty, that there shall be always one effective” councilor.  

Once in West Africa, the veneer of Dawes’ magnanimous morality quickly eroded. He arrived at Sierra Leone during the waning days of Clarkson’s governorship. Clarkson’s insubordination over the quit-rents had been duly noted by Henry Thornton back in London. The arrival of William Dawes and later Zachary Macaulay, a devout evangelical disciplinarian whose only work experience was “in that most trying and dangerous of all occupations—the [slave] overseer of an estate in Jamaica,” represents a significant turning point for the Sierra Leone colony. In London, the Sierra Leone Company directors continued to pin their hopes on creating a grandiose West African agro-colony. They anticipated profitable returns from Caribbean-styled plantations, which would substitute slave-based farming with “free” labor. However, as noted, free, is a culturally relative term.

For the duration of the decade, Dawes and Macaulay alternated as governor of Sierra Leone, in turn raising eyebrows that they themselves were using the colony’s Nova Scotian colonists and additional emancipated slaves as unfree laborers, “domestic slaves,” indentured

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60 Thornton to Clarkson, September 14, 1792, Clarkson Papers Add MSS 41262a, BL.
61 Macaulay was appointed the second councilor of Sierra Leone and arrived in Sierra Leone in January 1793, shortly after Clarkson’s departure; *Life and Letters of Zachary Macaulay*, 1900, edited by Margaret Jean Knutsford, 1900 (hereafter *Life and Letters*).
servants and as involuntary military recruits in the Royal African Corps. Moreover, some of the colony’s “women or girls were selected for the basest of purposes” as concubines or sex slaves.\textsuperscript{63}

Just weeks into Dawes’ tenure in Sierra Leone Anna Marie Falconbridge noted the “universal discontent” the Nova Scotians felt toward Dawes, whom she described as “ridiculously despotic” after he reneged on the company’s original land allocation plan (drawn up by Clarkson). Although ostensibly just the interim governor, Dawes redrew the settlement’s map, re-allocating land in order to reserve coveted waterfront property for the sole use of the company.\textsuperscript{64} Falconbridge also observed that in his first months as governor, Dawes had a knack for “displeasing the blacks and rendering them uneasy.”\textsuperscript{65} Matters soon got worse when Dawes was selected to permanently replace Clarkson.

In the winter of 1793, during the scorching months of Sierra Leone’s dry season, the \textit{African Queen}\textsuperscript{66} on a routine run to West Africa delivered the Royal Mail to Sierra Leone. A dispatch from Clarkson was read aloud to the delight of a gathering of Nova Scotians. Clarkson wrote to say he was “coming out immediately.” The celebrations, however, were short-lived; the same sack of mail contained a missive from the company directors stating that Clarkson had been “\textit{dismissed} and was to be succeeded by Mr. Dawes.”\textsuperscript{67} Company/colonist relations quickly degenerated under the heavy-handed and controversial reign of the alternating governorships of Dawes and Macaulay. The permanent change in leadership was the ultimate realization of Clarkson’s earlier prediction that the Nova Scotians would continue to be “dissatisfied and suspicious of the intentions of the Sierra Leone Company.” An air of tension and mutual

\textsuperscript{63} Thorpe to Wilberforce, February 1, 1815, 12f, 23f; WCL.  
\textsuperscript{64} Falconbridge Letter XII, June 5, 1793 in \textit{Two Voyages}, 1794.  
\textsuperscript{65} Falconbridge Freetown Journal, January 1, 1793, in \textit{Two Voyages}, 1794, 216.  
\textsuperscript{66} The \textit{African Queen} was a Bristol-based merchant ship chartered by the Sierra Leone Company. When not in the service of the Company it served both as a slave ship to the West Indies and as a bilateral trade ship between England and Africa.  
\textsuperscript{67} Falconbridge Letter XII, June 5, 1793 in \textit{Two Voyages}, 1794; italics in original.
suspicion pervaded Freetown as the Nova Scotians began harassing Dawes “with insults” and even threatened his life, suggesting he might meet with a fate similar to that of France’s recently beheaded King Louis XVI. Some of the Methodist colonists took to calling Dawes the “Pharaoh,”—a biblical inference to the oppression of Jewish slaves in ancient Egypt.68

Worse still, Falconbridge observed that during his first stint as governor,69 Dawes was strongly suspected of violating the anti-slavery principles of the colony and the company’s own charter. On at least one occasion he purchased from a French ship “some articles of provision” for the colony. The supplies, Falconbridge wrote, were paid for “in slaves.” These suspicions were corroborated years later by Sierra Leone’s first Crown governor, Thomas Perronet Thompson, and the colony’s Chief Justice Robert Thorpe.70 No punitive action was taken against Dawes.

A chasm was quickly growing between the authoritarian Dawes and the Nova Scotians. In a letter asking Clarkson to return to Sierra Leone, Luke Jordan and several other settlers complained that in Clarkson’s time “we wance [once] did call [the colony] Free Town, but since your absence we have a reason to call it a Town of Slavery.”71 The settlers felt they had no freedom under the company’s labor-for-land and crop-for-credit (i.e., pay) schemes. After Clarkson’s departure, Dawes and later Macaulay held the Nova Scotians more strictly to the letter of their agreement with the Sierra Leone Company. It was an agreement that was qualified

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68 Clarkson’s Mission, July 30, 1792, v. II, 400; Louis XVI was executed on January 21, 1793; Macaulay Journal, September 17, 1793 in Life and Letters, 1900, 50; Hutcherson and Murray to Clarkson, May 24, 1796, document 29 in Fyfe 1991, 51.
69 Dawes first served as the Sierra Leone Company governor from December 1792 until March 1794, and again from May 1795 until March 1796
70 Falconbridge Freetown Journal, January 11, 1793 in Two Voyages, 1794; similar charges were later leveled by Thomas Perronet Thompson, Sierra Leone’s first Crown Governor, in an letter to William Wilberforce (Thompson to Wilberforce August 23, 1808, Thomas Perronet Thompson Papers DTH 1/61; HUA; Thorpe to Wilberforce, 1815.
71 Jordan and others to Clarkson, Nov. 19, 1794 in Free and Happy, 1991, 43-45.
in the fine print. When the settlers signed on to quit Nova Scotia and move to Sierra Leone, they did so after having been given a “Certificate of Character” that guaranteed them upon arrival in Africa a specified amount of land “free of Expense.”
(See Appendix F for a sample certificate). However, the company’s “Terms of Service” spelled out an arrangement in which the settlers’ land was far from free. Indeed, the company wrote in a number of stipulations that assured the settlers would clear and cultivate the land for the company. The lots of land “shall be forfeited to the company” if “one-third of the said lots shall not be cleared and cultivated within two years” of their arrival. Later, the same stipulation was made if two-thirds of the lots were not cleared and cultivated by the third year. As for remuneration, the company’s terms stated that the settlers would have access to provisions “on credit from the company’s stores.” Finally, that line of credit was to be earned through selling their harvested produce to the company.

In effect, then, the settlers’ survival was beholden to the company. Their land—land promised them by the Crown—was still not truly theirs and their labors were required in order not to lose the land that was ostensibly theirs, but not. Furthermore, some Nova Scotians noted that the store credit scarcely covered the cost of tools and food for the settlers. Just before Clarkson left in December 1792, a number of settlers asked for a raise and that as “work men [we] ought to have our wages to be half in hard cash and the other part in colony mony [sic] (i.e., credit).” Clarkson did not act on the request before leaving the following month.

Finally in 1793, Cato Perkins and Isaac Anderson travelled to London to deliver a petition from the colonists to the directors of the Sierra Leone Company. In the petition they expressed frustration that their land allotments had neither been surveyed nor distributed.

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72 Certificate of Character, 1791, UICSL.
73 Terms of Service, 1791, UICSL.
74 Petition of John Duncome (and others), November 19, 1792 in Happy and Free, 1991, 29.
Blaming Dawes’ plan to change the settlement’s land distribution, they argued that without free landholdings they would remain slaves to the company. Moreover, Anderson and Perkins said the settlers feared that without their land allotments, and with no option but to work for the company, the Nova Scotians argued their children were at risk of returning to a state of “bondage after us.” Although diplomatic and courteous to the London directors, the petition charged that “Mr. Dawes seems to wish to rule us just as bad as if we were all slaves which we cannot bear.”\textsuperscript{75} The Nova Scotians suggested that they should play an active part in governing the settlement and its laws, as they had hoped they would have under Clarkson’s leadership.

The company’s directors, including both Henry Thornton and his cousin William Wilberforce, did nothing to address the Nova Scotians’ complaints. Instead, the petition established in their minds that as self-emancipated slaves, “the Nova Scotians may be said to furnish a less favourable specimen of the character to be expected in emancipated slaves, than may be commonly hoped for in other cases.”\textsuperscript{76} They complained that the nova Scotians were not grateful and obedient emissaries of the Anglican Church in Africa. The directors’ response to the settlers’ petition spoke volumes about their attitudes toward the former slaves, who, although emancipated from slavery, were clearly still subject to the social stratification that had enabled slavery since antiquity (Finley 1959, 1968; Orlando 1982, \textit{etc.}; chapter two this volume). Henry Thornton interpreted the petition as an act of defiance by a group of ungrateful, disobedient and disrespectful former slaves. An account of the petition chronicled in the 1795 Company Report is rife with racist and disparaging overtones about the Nova Scotians, who were expected to “pay respect and obedience” to the company administration. The report reads like a hierarchical

\textsuperscript{75} Settlers’ Petition, \textit{[n.d.]}, in \textit{Free and Happy}, Fyfe, ed. 1991, 35-40; 38.
\textsuperscript{76} Company Report, 1795, 88; by self-emancipated slaves, Thornton and Wilberforce were referring to slaves who had fled from their masters (even those who fled under the auspices of the Dunmore or Philipsburg Proclamations in the 1770s) as opposed to slaves who had purchased or been granted their freedom from their master.
roadmap, dismissing the grievances of the petitioners as “absurd” insomuch as they represent the self-aggrandized expectations “concerning their rights as freemen.” 77

Although emancipated, the Nova Scotians—in the eyes of the company directors—were clearly subaltern to the white company directors and their salaried white servants in West Africa. This tiered system of social status is something of a harbinger of Jim Crow sensibilities in the Reconstruction-era United States, which situated black people as inferior and childlike by comparison to their white counterparts (Kennedy 2011). Within the first year after Clarkson’s departure it appeared as though Freetown was bound, in the words of Anna Marie Falconbridge, for “anarchy and discord.” 78

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FALCONBRIDGE COULD NOT HAVE chosen better words to describe the final years of the eighteenth century for Freetown, the Sierra Leone Company and indeed Britain’s ongoing effort to abolish slavery and the slave trade. I will briefly touch on a few of the key events that shaped Sierra Leone as it prepared to enter the nineteenth century; events that further reified the anti-slavery settlement as a site of exploitive unfree labor for the benefit of the Company and Crown, even in the face of Wilberforce’s anti-slavery efforts in Parliament. In fact, in many respects it is nothing short of miraculous that Freetown survived to see the nineteenth century as it became a pawn in the larger geopolitical dispute between France and England.

Tensions between Prime Minister William Pitt’s England and the Jacobins who came to terrorize post-revolutionary France reached a fevered pitch in 1793 in the wake of Louis XVI’s trip to the guillotine on January 21 of that year. And Sierra Leone—like many colonial

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77 Company Report 1795, 31, 81
possessions at the time—bore the brunt of the hostilities when the two European rivals went to war in February 1793.

Under the cover of night on Sunday, September 28, 1794 a fleet of French warships approached the Sierra Leone coastline. By eight that morning the French sailors readied their cannons to ambush the colony. Striking the colors of the British Royal Navy, the French ships came “abreast of the town” and without warning attacked the settlement with a barrage of cannon fire that lasted about 90 minutes. The settlers fled into the mountains—the second time in six years the colony was forced to evacuate. The French set the town ablaze, destroying most buildings and stealing the settlers’ possessions.

The Baptist preacher David George (chapter three) set the scene in a lengthy letter to Reverend John Rippon writing, “They burned the company’s stores,” he wrote, “and every house that the company had in the colony.” Furthermore, the French “killed all the cattle, hogs, goats, sheep and fowls” and “left us in a bad condition.” The attack killed one settler (a second died later of his wounds). In their growing frustration and suspicion of the company directors, several Nova Scotians wrote to John Clarkson in England, claiming the company was the real enemy for refusing to arm the colonists and allowing the French to “come in broadside of the town and fire upon us.” Angry at what they saw as a betrayal by the company, some of the Nova Scotians joined the French in looting company property. The attack delayed the progress of the settlement and furthered impeded the company’s cultivation plans, which already seemed questionable, at best.

79 George to Rippon, November 12, 1794; published as a postscript in the Sierra Leone Company Report of February 26, 1795 (Philadelphia reprint), 22-23; Jordan, et al. to Clarkson, November 19, 1794 in Fyfe 1991 (document 24), 43; see also Macaulay to Mills, May 24, 1796 in Life and Letters, 1900, 137.
The land that Smeathman and others had so effusively described as rich, fertile and as
good as any in the West Indies was, in fact, rocky and situated at the base of the coastal
mountains, making it prone to soil erosion from the heavy annual monsoonal rains (Fyfe 1962, 1991). Revenues were far from what the company had anticipated; the directors acknowledged in
their 1797 summary to Parliament that the plan to cultivate the region was unrealistic in part
because their model of cultivation was drawn up along the lines of “large W. Indian estates,
cultivated by slaves” which yielded much more than “a small plantation, or farm, worked by free
people.”

Free labor, or at least the brand of servile labor the company defined as free, was falling
far short of what the directors had hoped for. They insisted, however, that external factors such
as the French attack and high mortality rates during the rainy seasons limited the success of the
settlement’s cultivation efforts. To make up for the revenue shortfall, the directors looked back
to their original economic plan for Freetown. By 1796, Zachary Macaulay—who had become
governor in place of Dawes—moved to enforce the directors’ original plan to collect quit-rent
revenues, which Clarkson had refused to impose. Macaulay first attempted to collect the original
two shillings per 100 acres, but later reduced it to one shilling per acre. In return for the
concession he expected conciliatory gratitude from the Nova Scotians when the collections were
to begin in July 1797. Instead of gratitude, however, Macaulay reported back to the directors
that he continued to face “unreasonable opposition to the moderate, not to say, trifling, quit-rents
required for the lands [the Nova Scotians] hold of the company.” The Quit-rents, along with the

80 Known today as the Peninsula Mountains.
81 Company Report 1798, 8, OX.
82 Company Report 1794, 4, 8, 9, 11, 21, 33.
83 Company Report 1798, 44-45.
84 ibid.
composition of the government and judicial system—which were administered by salaried white officials—fueled tension and distrust between the Nova Scotians and the company.\footnote{For an excellent detailed account of the mounting tensions and their underlying roots see Pybus 2007, chapter 12; and Wilson 1976, chapter 19.}

In the Meantime, back across the Atlantic in Canada, John Wentworth, the man who succeeded John Parr as the Governor of Nova Scotia was about to receive about 550 unexpected immigrants—fugitive slaves, known as Maroons, from Jamaica.\footnote{From the Spanish cimarron and French maroon, which initially referred to escaped domestic animals and later to fugitive slaves.} Whereas Nova Scotia was a purported refuge for the Black Loyalists of the American Revolution, it was a land of banishment for the rebellious Maroons from Trelawney Town, Jamaica.\footnote{The mountain stronghold on the northwest of the island where a community of escaped slaves lived since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Many insightful books and articles have been written on the Jamaican Maroons. For this chapter I relied primarily on Richard Hart’s Slaves who Abolished Slavery: Blacks in Rebellion, 1985; James Lockett’s The Deportation of the Maroons of Trelawny Town to Nova Scotia, then back to Africa, 1999; Mavis C. Campbell’s Back to Africa: George Ross and the Maroons: From Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone, 1993; and John Grant’s The Maroons in Nova Scotia, 2002.} The insurgent slaves were renowned for their military prowess, hunting and survival skills\footnote{Maroon mercenaries were often employed as bounty hunters, used to track and capture runaway slaves. See Hart 2002, chapter 7.} (Grant 2002; Lockett 1999; Rodriguez 2007). The Jamaican Maroons had resumed hostilities against plantation owners and British authorities in 1795 after two of their comrades were flogged, a perceived violation of a peace treaty between the British and Maroon leaders after the First Maroon War—long a thorn in colonial Jamaica’s side—almost 50 years earlier (Hart 2002).

In April of 1797 Wentworth wrote to the Duke of Portland, Sir William Cavendish-Bentinck, to report the safe arrival of the Maroons. Anticipating difficulties with his new subaltern residents, Wentworth wrote that they expected an “exemption for labour.” He continued to report on the Maroons, writing to Lord Portland in June that the former slaves had behaved “orderly, peaceably and quietly since their arrival,” affording “great hopes of happy success.” However, by January of 1800 it appeared as though efforts to resettle the Maroons in...
Nova Scotia had failed. In a candid letter to his friend Richard Molesworth, Wentworth noted that the *Asia*, a 64-gun ship-of-line\(^{89}\) owned by the Sierra Leone Company had arrived and was preparing to transport the “deluded, deceived people” to Sierra Leone. In a somewhat dejected note he added, “their civilization is not to be perfected here.”\(^{90}\) George Ross, a clerk with the Sierra Leone Company back in London was dispatched with the *Asia* to convey the Maroons to West Africa (Campbell 1993; Fyfe 1962). Much like the Black Loyalists a decade earlier, the Maroons had found Nova Scotia inhospitable due both to racist attitudes and the region’s climatic extremes. Also like the Black Loyalists, the Maroons’ presence in the Maritime province was anticipated as a boon to be exploited by many white landowners who saw their arrival as an opportunity for cheap (if not free) labor for their farms. It was not long before the Maroons were once again ocean-bound, this time headed for Sierra Leone, where relations between Macaulay and the Nova Scotians continued to deteriorate.

Fed up with their refusal to submit to the company’s dictates, Macaulay began referring to the Nova Scotians as “Jacobins” and wrote to Thornton that they were reverting into “the wretched state of barbarism in which their African forefathers were sunk.”\(^{91}\) In his private journals Macaulay leveled charges against the settlers, claiming they “were gradually contracting a more friendly disposition to the Slave Trade.”\(^{92}\) Indeed, this charge was not altogether unfounded. Sometime between 1796 and 1797 the Baptist preacher Hector Peters fled the colony, going up the Rokel River where, Mary Louise Clifford records, he “began to trade in slaves” (1999:188). In response to what he perceived as the degeneracy and obstinate defiance of

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89 A popular seventeenth through mid-nineteenth century warship.
90 Wentworth to Portland, June 29, 1797; Wentworth to Portland April 21, 1797, June 29, 1797; Wentworth to Molesworth January 15, 1800; NSARM.
the Nova Scotians, Macaulay tried to break their resolve; he put curbs on their churches, questioned their interpretation and teachings of the Bible. Additionally, he forbade the black ministers of Nova Scotia to perform marriage ceremonies. Moreover, Macaulay instructed the colony’s Anglican minister John Clarke to dissuade the colonists from their Methodist and Baptist branches of Christianity. The settlers responded with anger, threatening Clarke who soon refused to meet with the Nova Scotians by himself.

In the early months of 1797 many of the colonists met to denounce Macaulay while plotting to subvert his quit-rent plan, elect their own government and appoint black judges to the colony’s courts. Isaac Anderson, who with Cato Perkins, had in 1793 delivered the settlers’ petition to London, continued to act as a community leader, rallying the colonists against the quit-rents. The mounting discontent of the Nova Scotians was increased when the cash-strapped directors in London began looking for ways to cut costs. The quit-rent issue offered a solution, although, in effect, it only exacerbated the worsening relations. Fyfe notes:

The directors, cutting down expenses, wanted to reduce the cost of education. In January 1799 it was announced that only children whose parents had paid quit-rent would be educated free, the rest [would] be charged a dollar and a quarter. At once, almost all children were withdrawn. (Fyfe 1962:77)

The standoff continued into the spring of 1799 when Macaulay left Freetown, “a colony not in open opposition, but discontented and mistrustful” (77). Soon, however, the colony would in fact be in open opposition to British rule, thanks in part to Macaulay’s continued service to the Sierra Leone Company. When Macaulay sailed on April 4, 1799 he left the company settlement in the hands of 23-year-old Thomas Ludlam who was meek in stature and resolve by comparison to both Dawes and Macaulay. Ludlam had experience in neither government nor in Africa.

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93 Macaulay Journal, July 8-10, 1796, in Life and Letters, 1900, 143-144.
Sensing their advantage, the Nova Scotians began exerting their collective strength against Ludlam, creating their own *de facto* parliament and passing legislative acts to regulate day-to-day company affairs; they established their own court, which was to be presided over by a black judge. Others, more disillusioned with what they saw as the company’s unjust and racist administration, began exploring the possibility of establishing a separate settlement on land acquired from King Tom away from the company (Pybus 2007). In London, Macaulay continued to monitor developments in the colony. Now, however, he did so with added clout as a permanent secretary for the Sierra Leone Company. It was under these auspices that Macaulay began applying to the Crown for a royal charter for the company. Under a royal charter, the settlers’ legislative and judicial efforts could be construed as treasonous under British law (Pybus 2007).

In early 1800 a “grant was made to the company by Letters Patent.” The grant was significant for the company in two ways. First, the Letters Patent empowered the company to “appoint a governor and council” which together had the exclusive “power to enact laws” on behalf of the Crown; and second, the Letters Patent significantly extended British authority to the length of the Sierra Leone Peninsula, well beyond the frontiers of the original settlement. The expanded territory created a zone of inclusion wherein British law was theoretically absolute. Beyond this zone lay a vast expanse of ambiguity, a region where moral flexibility—British morality, that is—often trumped the rule of law on matters dealing with slavery or unfree labor through much of the nineteenth century. In fact, the 1800 Letters Patent was issued in such a way as to “definitely” grant “the peninsula of Sierra Leone so far as was in the power of the Crown,

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95 Company Report 1801, in Pybus 2007, 107 note 50; see also *Life and Letters*, 1900, 235.
Moreover, the Letters of Patent extended exclusive rights to the company to govern the colony on behalf of the Crown. As anticipated, the Letters Patent rendered illegal the Nova Scotians’ efforts at asserting autonomy and authority over the territory they believed was theirs. Ludlam, the new governor, knew full well that the settlers were now treading in perilous waters fraught with potential charges of treason or sedition against the British Monarchy. Despite the risks, on September 3, 1800, nearly all of the heads of black households met to establish their own laws.

* * *

THIS CHAPTER HAS EXAMINED how the failure of the original Province of Freedom was exploited for the commercial interests of the Sierra Leone Company, which elevated the importance of economic gain over the welfare of those for whom the settlement was ostensibly created. Moreover, I examined how the colonists from Nova Scotia were exploited through debt bondage labor in a feudal-type manorial relationship between the Sierra Leone Company (lord) and the dependent colonists (manor). I contend this is the seminal moment in Sierra Leone’s history. From the outset it establishes a pattern in which economic concerns for the British Metropole determined those foundationally important decisions in government. In this case the abolitionists put the economic interests of Britain ahead of their constituent Black Loyalist population—the ‘black poor’ of London and free blacks of Nova Scotia. The choice of money over human welfare established a pattern of unfree labor practices that I will explore in chapter six, were used through the nineteenth century and beyond. Chapter six will explore the next phase of the Freetown settlement’s development into a nineteenth century colony during which anti-slavery legislation and imperial expansion in Africa came to dictate the ways in which

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London and Sierra Leone’s colonial administrators continued to manipulate unfree labor for the economic well-being of empire.

By the end of the eighteenth century Sierra Leone’s fate had become inextricably tied to the fortunes of Britain’s abolitionists—those philanthropic humanitarians including Henry Thornton and his parliamentarian cousin William Wilberforce. In fact, Stephen Drescher contends that “parliamentary approval” for the Sierra Leone Company, “was directly related to the debate over the slave trade” (2002:92). This is evident in the fact that Wilberforce’s first piece of anti-slavery legislation was introduced to the House of Commons in April 1791, just weeks before Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Company’s charter.97

In chapter six I will examine the consequences abolitionism had on Sierra Leone and its future. Although logic and Sierra Leone’s national narrative dictate that British abolitionism and a settlement for freed slaves ought to go hand-in-hand, chapter six will consider several key factors that suggest Sierra Leone’s prospects and aims were, in fact, worsened and undermined by abolitionist legislation. In fact, Sierra Leone in the first decade of the nineteenth century became both a burden and an opportunity for the Crown as it sought to uphold the abolitionist doctrine in the face of growing colonial and mercantile competition from France in West Africa.

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97 The conservative vote won the day. After two days of debate, Wilberforce’s motion For the Abolition of the Slave Trade was soundly defeated 88-163; see Hague 2009, 198 and The Life of William Wilberforce, 1838, v. 1, 299.
PART II
CHAPTER SIX

A Mighty Experiment:¹ (Un)Free Labor after Slavery?

Will his condition be the better because you tell him
that he is no longer a slave, but his name is ‘an
apprentice’

FROM THE NOVA SCOTIANS’ perspective, notes Cassandra Pybus, “the governor’s
authority was deemed to extend no further than the company’s business” (2007:108). Still, on
September 3, 1800, Governor Thomas Ludlam responded to the defiance of the gathering Nova
Scotians. He sent several loyal company members to disperse the exclusive meeting that the
black settlers called, at which they had intended to establish their own laws. Three men were
arrested while about 40 others fled to the outskirts of town where they established a camp.² From
their camp at the edge of Freetown the dissident Nova Scotians staged a sit-in protest continuing
their call for self-rule.

To the great relief of Ludlam, the Sierra Leone Company’s ship, Asia, which had
departed from Nova Scotia in August 1800, sailed into port at Sierra Leone in late September
with its 550 Jamaican Maroons on board (Grant 2002). Ludlam dispatched the Maroons to the

¹ On Tuesday May 14, 1833 Edward Stanley introduced the “Abolition of Slavery Act” to Britain’s House of
Commons. In his introductory remarks he referred to the measure as the “mighty experiment” (see Debates in
Parliament, session 1833, published 1834, 45ff.) The term has since become synonymous with abolitionism and
efforts to replace slave labor in Britain’s colonies with so-called free labor, including Sierra Leone. See, for
example, Aspden 1877; Drescher 2002.
² Report from the Committee on the Petition of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company (hereafter
so-called rebel encampment in order to break up the protest and arrest the dissident Nova Scotians—not an exceedingly difficult task given the fact that many of the disaffected Nova Scotians were unarmed, middle-aged “rebels,” as Ludlam and the company directors thereafter labeled them (Pybus 2010:114). The “insurrection” of 1800, as the anti-company demonstration came to be called, was in fact little more than a protest against the Sierra Leone Company’s economic policies and governance.

The Nova Scotians’ non-violent protest was perhaps the first physical manifestation and outward expression of anti-colonial sentiment in West Africa—decades before the wholesale colonization of the region would begin. James Walker suggests that the rebellion was tantamount to “a declaration of Nova Scotian independence from the company government” (1976:232). Moreover, P.E.H. Hair suggests the rebellion represents not just a revolt against white supremacy, but a rational attempt to claim power using the rhetoric of the company directors and administrators:

For the first time in Africa, there emerged a […] first step towards “nègritude” and black “African” nationalism. Using the moralistic slogans of the whites—Christian equality, British Liberty, the Rights of Man—the Nova Scotians claimed power in the Freetown community, power for themselves as civilized Africans in their own continent. (Hair 1963:285-286)

Relevant to this study, however, is evidence suggesting the rebellion was not born simply of anti-imperial, racial or nationalistic motives, but instead was a nascent labor action against the company’s use of quit-rent fees to extract labor from the so-called free blacks (Campbell 1993; cf Curtin 1973). Consider, for example, the recollections of Eli Ackim and Elizabeth Melville, the wife of acting governor Michael Melville. Years after the event, Ackim, a Nova Scotian

3 Directors Report 1802, 738.
colonist, referred to the rebellion of 1800 as the “quit-rent commotion.” Likewise, Elizabeth Melville, in a somewhat patronizing tone, wrote in her letters and journals that the Nova Scotians “rose in rebellion against the government owing to a small quit-rent having been levied on [their] little farms.” Although certainly not definitive, I hold there is enough evidence to suggest that the rebellion was significantly influenced by the quit-rent and land tax, which effectively kept the Nova Scotians dependent on and thus indebted to the company. If so, the “insurrection” of 1800 by unarmed “rebels” was in fact a defiant and self-conscious demonstration against exploitive labor practices; perhaps the first organized labor protest occurring within the context of Sierra Leone’s proto-colonial racial hierarchy.

In the end, two men were killed when the Maroons rounded up the Nova Scotians, and, of those conspirators captured, six were banished for life from Freetown—sent to the British slave fort of Gorée, which, in all likelihood, was a direct route back to slavery in the West Indies. Twenty-four others were banished temporarily from the colony to the nearby Bullom shore. All those involved in the uprising, including Henry (“Harry”) Washington, a former slave owned by U.S. founding father, George Washington, lost all claim to their lands. These lands were later distributed to the Maroons, who were now lionized by the British in contrast to the upstart Nova Scotians. And finally, Isaac Anderson, Frank Patrick and a third unnamed co-leader of the protest were tried for threatening the governor, who presided as the judge in the trial. On December 22, 1800, all three were hanged. Pybus wrote of the “dubious and draconian” punishments:

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4 Eli Ackim cited in F. Harrison Rankin, White Man’s Grave: A Visit to Sierra Leone in 1834, 1836, 95; Elizabeth Melville Letter XXIX, Jan. 12, 1846 in A Residence in Sierra Leone, 1849, 236 Here after A Residence).
5 Directors Report, 1802, 738.
Forty of the colony’s most respected settlers dead or banished was of no consequence to the directors of the company. They believed that Sierra Leone was much better off without these men and ‘the crude notions they had formed of their own rights. (Pybus 2010:114).

The rebellion (or protest) of 1800 foretold the fate of the company in the years to come: attacks by neighboring Koyo Temne, ethnic strife between Maroon and Nova Scotian settlers, exploitive and unfree labor in the form of sharecropping, diminished cultivation, crop failure, and the near bankruptcy of the company.

As the dust had settled in Freetown in early 1801 the company lifted its quit-rent and land tax requirements on the Nova Scotians. In that same year, the colony began to build and expand as more local Africans began migrating to the territory in search of temporary employment with various traders, merchants or as migrant laborers in the fledgling plantations. Ironically, however, with much of the farmland still in the hands of the Nova Scotians, many migrant laborers, and grumettas found themselves the exploited subject of an intricately stratified hierarchy of unfree labor, larded over by the company, the Nova Scotians and the Maroons, who relied on sharecropping and apprenticeships to extract unfree labor without having to dole out wages.

Less than a decade after its foundation as a settlement for freed slaves, Sierra Leone had become a stratified hub of servile institutions in which one dominant group preyed on its subordinate neighbor to exploit and coerce unfree labor. This labor hierarchy was encouraged by the Sierra Leone Company’s growing discrimination against the Nova Scotians and promotion of the Maroons; the company’s method of ethno-preferential treatment in the early nineteenth century represents the start of a divide-and-conquer strategy that defined Sierra Leone’s approach to colonial development through the remainder of the century and into the twentieth
century. The residue of this strategy can be seen in the postcolony and is, I believe, a catalyst to the country’s civil war in the late twentieth century.

Following their uprising, the Nova Scotians’ actions figure prominently in subsequent company petitions and reports to Parliament, which were delivered annually to the House of Commons. Despite the fact that they were the principal body of laborers upon which the company would rely to revive and expand the erstwhile Province of Freedom, their “insurrection” of 1800 and the perceived insolence of the Isaac Anderson and Cato Perkins’ petition of 1793 transformed the Nova Scotians from worthy settlers to easy scapegoats for all the ills of the colony in its troubled first decade. However, whereas the Nova Scotians were depicted as “idle, turbulent and unreasonable,” the Maroons, who saved the day, were equally “active and intrepid.” The directors did not mince words: they hoped the Maroons “might form a counterpoise to the Nova Scotians.” As such, the Maroons were targeted by the directors as the better candidates for the labor needed to grow the colony.

Examining the directors’ petition from a historian’s perspective, 1801 appears to be a watershed for the Sierra Leone Company, a time in which new, broadly defined interpretations of free labor begin to emerge, allowing for a flexible interpretation of coming British abolitionist legislation. In fact, the directors appear to condone sharecropping as a legitimate form of labor, despite the inequitable nature of the practice which essentially leaves the laborer in a dependent landlord-tenancy relationship of debt bondage that Frederick Cooper, Rebecca Scott and Thomas Holt (2000) suggest was depicted as an ideal-type form of post-slavery exploitive labor.

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6 Directors Report, 1802, 739, 741, 738.
Post-rebellion reports to Parliament tended to gush over the Maroons, calling them heroic and industrious. However, their industriousness was lauded within the context of a sharecropping arrangement. In one particular instance, the company praised “Captain Smith, who is the principal [Maroon]” who cleared and cultivated ground for both the Nova Scotians and the company. The land he cleared was lent to him in exchange for an unspecified percentage of his crop yield. Sharecropping kept many Maroons like Smith in a state of dependence by permitting them access to cultivatable land only if they continued to produce crops that could be sold by the company, which maintained a monopoly on trade in the colony. In essence, then, Sierra Leone’s imported inhabitants became rungs on a figurative ladder of unfree labor in which one exploited group passed its burden upon another to meet the company’s original stipulation that the colony’s land be either cultivated or forfeit.

Recall from chapter five that the Nova Scotians were expected to clear the lands the company had granted them “free of expense” with tools they were to buy exclusively from the company store on credit earned from their cultivation labors. Now, many Nova Scotians were passing the heavy lifting over to the Maroons so that the company’s original terms of service would be met. Later, the Maroons began taking on apprentices as laborers to fulfill their work obligations to the Nova Scotians. Within the first decade of Sierra Leone’s creation, three distinct groups had been pressed into service all in the name of cultivating export crops on land that was difficult to farm even for the subsistence of its inhabitants. The growing use of unfree labor by Sierra Leone’s Nova Scotian and Maroon populations further represents a socio-cultural inheritance from the European founders of the settlement regarding labor, freedom and slavery.

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7 Report from the Committee on the Petition of the Court of Directors of the Sierra Leone Company (hereafter Directors Report), 1804, 103; PP.
In their 1804 report to the House of Commons, the Sierra Leone Company Directors hinted at their economic troubles by asking for government monies to buoy their operations. In doing so, they also began to publicly reveal the fatal flaw with the colony, or at least the colony Smeathman had envisioned back in 1786. It was increasingly clear that large-scale plantation-style cultivation by free labor was simply not a profitable mode of business for the colony. Indeed, read carefully, it appears as though the first directors’ reports of the nineteenth century are a blueprint for the colony’s new economic direction. It was a new direction that that diminished the import of cultivation within company lands in favor of the potential to trade existing produce harvested from the hinterland to be channeled to the Metropole through Freetown.

Consider, for example, the marked shift in the directors’ tone on the slave trade. It appears as though by the turn of the century the directors were less concerned with what in 1795 they called the “moral evil” or the “injustice, cruelty and oppression” of the slave trade. In their report of 1801, the company’s primary concern was no longer moral or religious humanitarianism. By contrast, the company now focused on the obstacle the slave trade presented to the success of so-called “legitimate” trade into and out of Sierra Leone. The slave factories undercut the Sierra Leone Company’s trade potential by supplying local “chiefs with the means of acquiring British articles” in exchange for slaves without “the trouble of collecting produce or cultivating the soil.” The turpitude of slavery was no longer the company’s focus, replaced instead by the pragmatic economic challenges it posed for the success of the company. For example, the report claimed European slavers were economically positioned to succeed over

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8 Company Report, 1795, 160; Company Report, 1794, 91.
the company because of what amounted to product diversification. The directors noted that the slave trade:

Gives to the slave factories a great superiority over the company, even in the traffic of produce, inasmuch as they are able to conduct a trade in both produce and slaves at nearly the same expense at which a trade in produce alone can be carried on.\(^9\)

Based on the Directors petition to Parliament, the slave trade appeared to be more of a competitive economic nuisance in the face of the Sierra Leone Company’s commercial woes, rather than “an abominable violation” of “the laws of God and the common rights of man,” in the words of Reverend Peter Peckard, the mentor of abolitionist Thomas Clarkson at Cambridge in the 1780s.\(^10\) In fact, the anti-slavery principles outlined in the Sierra Leone Company’s original directives to John Clarkson appeared to be crumbling under the weight of commercial and economic failure.

In her work on the foundations of the British abolitionist movement, Cassandra Pybus notes that for at least some of the Sierra Leone Company’s directors—most notably William Wilberforce, Thomas Clarkson and Henry Thornton—the mission of abolitionism had more to do with the souls of those Africans who had not found Christ. Indeed, corporeal salvation from the “brutally enforced labour” of slavery was secondary to eternal redemption for the soul (2007:111). Thornton and Wilberforce—both members of the influential Clapham Sect—were principal founders of the Sierra Leone Company which was established above all, according to the Directors Report of 1801, to introduce “civilization into Africa.”\(^11\) The gap between saving

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\(^9\) Directors Report, 1802, 740.
\(^11\) The Clapham Sect was an elite circle of like-minded evangelical Anglicans from the Clapham area of southwestern London. The more prominent members including Wilberforce, Thornton, Hannah More, Granville
bodies in the here and now as opposed to souls in the hereafter helps, as will be explored, to explain the somewhat glib approach the directors began to take toward the “advantage” that slave traders had over the company with regard to collecting debts. There even seems to be a hint of jealousy that the slave traders had “only to seize and sell his debtor, or the family, or even townsmen of the debtor.”¹²

A bureaucratic luxury the company could no longer avail to offset monies owed, the directors’ seeming flexibility on the issue of debt resonates with their growing angst over the Nova Scotians and their refusal to pay their quit-rent fees under Macaulay’s governorship in the final years of the 1790s.

In the pious mind of the British abolitionist-cum-merchant capitalist the minutia of labor exploitation was negotiable. What mattered most was that slavery was being eradicated, even if just in name. In their insightful study of post-emancipation labor regimes, Cooper, Scott and Holt observe that the nuances of exploitive labor were lost within the Eurocentric rubric of liberty. “Slave labor,” they write, “could be analyzed in economic, social, and political terms, but free labor was often defined as simply the ending of coercion” (2000:3). In less than a decade, Sierra Leone had become a veritable testing ground for innovative forms of unfree labor. Recall that Dawes and Macaulay enforced debt bondage and indentured servitude, along with involuntary military service and sharecropping. Moreover, Sierra Leone had become an enclave of tiered exploitation as discussed above, in which the Nova Scotians, Maroons and apprentices labored, each in turn, to meet the company’s terms of service. It was not slavery, of course, but the exploitation of labor within the colony set the precedent for adaptation of unfree labor that would

¹² Directors Report, 1802, 740.
arise in the region after Britain outlawed the trade in slaves and eventually slavery within the empire.

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THE FIRST DECADE OF the nineteenth century was a period of both expansion and contraction for the colony. In terms of population, construction and development the colony was quickly becoming a presence in the region—something King Tom, the neighboring Koyo Temne leader would not readily accept, as the colony continued to encroach on his territory and authority. Recall that the royal charter of 1800 allowed the Sierra Leone Company to reinforce its presence and authority over the entire peninsula. Moreover, the British Parliament authorized the construction of a fort and the deployment of a permanent detachment of royal troops to project an image of colonial strength to both the upstart Nova Scotians and neighboring Temne leaders. The company directors believed the Temne leaders were harboring “designs against the colony”\(^\text{13}\) because the company posed a threat to the Temne’s established economic relations with slave traders at Bunce Island and other slave factories in the vicinity of the settlement. Furthermore, the company entrenched its place in the colony by expanding the Crown’s presence with a more comprehensive civil service of salaried white Britons.

Growth, however, did not come without a cost. Additional servants were assigned to the colony, including a mayor and three aldermen for Freetown, a sheriff and deputy sheriff, jailor, accountant and school teachers. The estimated annual expense for supplies and salaries for the expanded colony was put at £5,920. These additional measures (forts, armed troops, expanded civil service) were designed to exhibit a formidable presence. In the words of company chairman

\(^{13}\) Directors Report 1802, 740.
Henry Thornton the past “weakness of the colonial government” led to the insurrection of 1800 and “lowered the colony in the eyes of the natives.” However, the vast cost of building up this imposing colony was scarcely matched by cultivation revenues. As will be seen, however, the dividend of this development would manifest in coming decades when the company and later Crown began exploiting slave and unfree labor beyond the colony and into the surrounding hinterland.

In the first years of the nineteenth century the elusive dream of Sierra Leone was further slipping from everybody’s grasp—humanitarian and merchant capitalist alike. The colony of Freetown was neither immune from slavery, nor commercially viable. The first decade of the 1800s was also a tumultuous time of economic stagnation and decline for Freetown. Cultivation ground to a virtual standstill in 1801 and remained that way in 1802 after King Tom launched two attacks in November 1801 and April 1802, which were led by Nathaniel Wansey. Wansey, one of the rebellious Nova Scotians who had evaded the Maroons in 1800, had befriended the Koyo Temne and took up refuge in one of their villages. In retaliation for the attacks the Temne were driven out of the peninsula and their farmlands given to the Maroons. This redistribution of lands exclusively to the Maroons further demarcated the colony along ethnic lines—physically delineating Maroon from Nova Scotian, who for the most part, remained hostile cohabitants of the colony.

And then in 1803, economic disaster hit; the rice harvest—the only profitable cash crop in the region—failed. Not surprisingly, the colony was not only unable to supply export crops,

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14 Directors Report, 1802, 739.
15 Directors Report, 1802, 738; Directors Report 1804, 49ff.
it was struggling to support itself; testimony given by company administrators indicate acute shortages of all staple products, including flour and rice within the colony. In December 1803 the value of the Sierra Leone Company—a company which had expended approximately £350,000 since 1791—was estimated to be worth just £30,000. The Sierra Leone Company was still in business, but only at the behest of parliamentary grant money. Growing concern over the viability of the company and indeed its mission led Parliament to closely examine future support. Henry Thornton, himself now a Member of Parliament for the Southwark District of London, recommended ceding control of the company to the Crown. William Pitt’s government, however, was busy fighting Napoleon and was thus “unwilling to annoy the slave-trading interest” in Parliament. For the time being, Sierra Leone would remain in the hands of the company with the support of an annual subsidy from the British government.

Laboratory for Unfree ‘Free’ Labor

For several years more the colony staggered along as little more than a charity case, when in 1806 Thomas Ludlam—after a hiatus from the colony—returned to the governorship to serve as the company’s last governor until 1808. In the interim, William Wilberforce’s legislative efforts to abolish the slave trade finally paid off in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. In June 1806 both Houses of Parliament passed a resolution stating that the slave trade was found to be contrary “to the principles of justice, humanity and sound policy.” Parliament therefore recommended to the King that the slave trade “should be forthwith

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17 Directors Report, 1804, 79.
18 The Sierra Leone Company Report of 1795 (page 6) indicates the £235,280 was raised to establish the colony; another £111,500 was raised to support the Nova Scotians and rebuild after the French attack of 1794 (Directors Report, 1802, 737)
19 Thornton to Parliament, May 12, 1806; PP.
abolished and prohibited and declared to be unlawful” (Appendix G).20 The law was scheduled to take effect on May 1, 1807, a momentous occasion and seeming victory for Britain’s anti-slavery abolitionists, although scarcely a victory without its share of unintended consequences.

Setting aside the extremely subjective nature of the legal language, which was wholly contingent on European perceptions of “slave” and “slavery,” the Slave Trade Act of 1807 and later the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833 resulted in a number of formative consequences with regard to labor in the colony. Those consequences would shape the nature of Sierra Leone’s development and the ongoing process of adapting unfree labor to suit the commercial needs of a settlement originally envisioned as an asylum for ‘free blacks.’ In addition to outlawing the slave trade and slavery, British anti-slavery legislation in 1807 and 1833 resulted in an influx of unfree labor into the colony in the form of rescued slaves who were settled in Sierra Leone. Additionally, these two acts of British legislation reinvigorated “domestic slavery” to meet growing European demand for labor in Africa in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Together, this influx along with the use of “domestic slavery” accelerated the transformation of the colony’s primary mandate. During the nineteenth century, the Province of Freedom which was reconstituted by the Sierra Leone Company as a model for commercial cultivation via “free” labor was transformed into a West African trade hub wherein produce from beyond the colony’s boundary was collected and traded with the Metropole. Together, these significant developments strained Britain’s humanitarian vision of liberty by provoking colonial administrators to be more flexible in their interpretations of coercive labor, including “domestic slavery,” in order to meet the colony’s trade objectives. The ambiguous approach taken in colonial Sierra Leone to what is

20 An act for the abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 1; (Hereafter Slave Trade Act).
now often viewed as unfree labor was certainly a consequence of colonial greed for the economic benefit of empire. In the remaining pages of this chapter I will address the aforementioned consequences.

The ink on the new anti-slave trade legislation was scarcely dry when Sierra Leone was pulled into a controversy that redefined the nomenclature of slavery and further transformed the territory into what I term a post-emancipation laboratory for unfree labor. In this laboratory, servile institutions that once may have been labeled “slavery” evolved or adapted alongside the malleable strictures of abolitionism in order to satisfy the West’s demand for cheap labor; it is a process of change that has been ongoing ever since Sharp’s abolitionist utopia was first compromised by commercial interest in 1790.

One stipulation of the Slave Trade Act in 1807 was that slaves rescued from slave ships were to be resettled in Sierra Leone; an unspecified benefit to the Crown being that such relocation would provide the burgeoning colony with an ongoing influx of potential laborers. For example, in November of that year an American slave ship from Newport, Rhode Island had anchored in Fourah Bay to conduct business as usual. However, it was boarded by a team of Maroon volunteers who successfully freed ten slaves. The ship’s captain, identified in colonial records only as Bradford was fined £500. The slaves were not liberated, mind you; instead they were indentured as “apprentices for fourteen years,” to “any respectable colonist who would pay to the native chiefs [from whom they were kidnapped] their customary value” of about $100.21 Months later, in early 1808, after the Crown had assumed control of the colony, Captain Frederick Parker of the HMS Derwent was assigned to patrol the waterways around Sierra

21 Special Report of the African Institution, 1815a, 43ff.
Leone. On one occasion he captured and brought in two American slave ships containing a collective cargo of 167 slaves. According to the Slave Trade Act of 1807 the slaves were to be surrendered to the Court of the Vice-Admiralty. However, Governor Ludlam—who was kept on as governor during this transitional period—had no authority to convene the court. Ludlam was left to his own devices regarding the fate of the “liberated” slaves. He simply followed the example of the previous case; he apprenticed them, but at the reduced price of $20 per slave/apprentice. Some of the ex-slaves were apprenticed to the government (for the same price) to create a “Corps of Laborers.”

In July of 1808 Ludlam was replaced by the Crown’s first governor, Thomas Perronet Thompson. Governor Thompson construed the apprenticeships as egregious breeches of the colony’s anti-slavery mandate and more importantly as a violation of the Sierra Leone Company Transfer Act of 1807, which stated that it “shall be unlawful” for anybody living “within the peninsula or colony of Sierra Leone” to be “dealing, or trafficking in, the buying or selling of slaves, either within said peninsulas or elsewhere.” Thompson declared null and void “every such direct or indirect sale or purchase” of an apprentice.

During the two years that Thompson served as governor of colonial Sierra Leone his numerous protests to Lord Castlereagh, then the Secretary of State for war and colonies went largely unaddressed. However, his charges were resurrected in 1815 by Sierra Leone’s Chief

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22 Company Report 1808, 4; Thomas Perronet Thompson, Governor’s Declaration, 1808(hereafter Governor’s Declaration), 1-3 in Exercises, Political and others, 1843; Draft dispatches to Castlereagh [n.d.], Thomas Perronet Thompson Papers DTH 1/23; Special Report of the African Institution, 1815a, 106.
23 Quoted in Company Report 1808, 3-4.
24 Governor’s Declaration 1808, 2.
Justice Robert Thorpe, who published extensive letters to the Duke of Gloucester and William Wilberforce—both of whom were prominent members of the African Institution. 

Thorpe’s letters echoed Thompson’s original charges, along with a host of other accusations of abuse of power by Charles Maxwell, who had assumed the governorship in 1811. During the company era, for instance, Thorpe wrote that company employees “purchased the natives” and worked them “without pay, or “hired them to others.” In Thorpe’s view the colony was morally and religiously “debased.” His letter leveled sweeping charges against colonial officials and the Royal African Corps for enlisting and exploiting the growing number of so-called “recaptives” in the colony.

The British and *Krio* use of the term “recaptive” offers a glimpse into the hypocritical perspectives both British colonial administrators and *Krio* settlers held toward the liberated slaves they professed to help. As early as the 1820s, British Missionaries working in Sierra Leone began referring to the freed slaves as “re-captured” Negroes, raising the overriding question as to whether the liberated slaves had been freed, or were in fact still captives of a new authority. For example, in 1821, the Church Missionary Society wrote generically of the “re-captured Negroes of Sierra Leone.” Later, in his proto-ethnographic description of Sierra Leone, Thomas Poole made reference to a “poor lad [who] had been captured and re-captured

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25 With the demise of the Sierra Leone Company, the Crown established the African Institution in 1807 to oversee anti-slavery efforts in Africa, the Christian civilizing mission in Africa and the supervision of Sierra Leone’s progress. The Duke of Gloucester was appointed the Institution’s first president with Wilberforce, Sharp, Thornton and Macaulay serving as directors.
26 Maxwell served from 1811 to 1815.
27 Thorpe to Wilberforce, 1815, 5, 6.
28 *Some Remarkable Particulars Concerning the Rapid Civilization of the Negroes in Sierra Leone.* Church Missionary Society, 1821, 3. Original at Oxford University Libraries. See also *Present State of Christianity, and of the Missionary Establishments for Its Propagation in All Parts of the World* by Frederic Shoberl, 1828, 164; original at Harvard University Libraries; and *The History and Origin of the Missionary Societies* by Thomas Smith, 1825, 420.
several times, and at last found his way to Sierra Leone.”29 By the 1808s, the Krio press began derogatorily referring to the “re-captured” slaves as “recaptives” to emphasize the ambiguous status of autonomy held by the liberated slaves.30 The term “recaptive was also often used in the local press to differentiate between the original Krio settlers and the new arrivals. For example, in a December 26 article of 1913, a correspondent wrote that “the Sierra Leonean is a pure Negro. Even if Afro-Americans and West Indians had to any appreciable extent entered into matrimonial alliances with the recaptives, their descendants would not be other than Negro.”31 This effort to demarcate Krio from “recaptive” was largely due to the perception that Sierra Leone was subject to a “large influx of recaptives” who rapidly were coming to outnumber the Nova Scotians and Maroons.32 The rapid increase of Sierra Leone’s “recaptive” population provided ample fuel for Thorpe’s charges. In his fiery letter to Wilberforce, Thorpe detailed the unfree fate of the freed slaves once inside the colony:

As soon as the captured Negroes were landed […] a party from the African Corps was sent to examine them; and as many as they found […] fit to be made soldiers, were marched to [Fort Thornton], and as it is termed enlisted […] The remainder were dispatched to what was called an hospital […] where the whole were huddled together […] the recruiting party for the West Indian regiments were afterwards allowed to select the men and boys that were fit, or might shortly become fit for military service.33

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29 Life, Scenery and Customs in Sierra Leone and the Gambia, by Thomas Poole, 1850, 144; original at Oxford University Libraries.
30 See for example the SLWN August 6, 1887, 3; August 10, 1895, 8; the SLT June 9, 1894, 3; January 12, 1895, 3; CPR September 27, 1913, 9.
31 SLGFM December 26, 1913, 11.
32 SLWN August 10, 1895, 8; In his report of July 9, 1814, Kenneth Macaulay, the “Superintendent for Captured Negroes” noted that more than 5,900 “Captured Negroes” had been brought into the colony, of which approximately 3,100 had been settled in Sierra Leone; the remainder rejoined their ethnic groups in the area, were assigned to military service elsewhere or died; General Statement of the Disposal of the Captured Negroes received into the colony of Sierra Leone, to the 9th July, 1814, in the Ninth Report to the Directors of the African Institution, 1815b, 63.
33 Thorpe to Wilberforce, 1815, 23.
From the inspections to marching the recaptives off to the fort, Thorpe’s description was hauntingly reminiscent of the manner by which slaves were treated after they were captured in the African interior and marched to the coast for waiting European slave ships. It must have seemed baffling to the “recaptives,” who had just been liberated from such base and dehumanizing treatment. Thorpe further observed that the Nova Scotians and Maroons were permitted to select from the remaining “refuse” of humanity and take them as “apprentices for 14 years.”

Wilberforce never replied directly to Thorpe, leaving the African Institution to take up the rebuttal along with a number of heated missives from Zachary Macaulay. Macaulay took particular offense to Thorpe’s insinuations that the former governor and company secretary had manipulated circumstances to personally benefit from trade with Africa for produce that was procured through slave labor. Although the directors of the African Institution did not deny Thorpe’s most damning accusations—those that reiterate Governor Thompson’s charges of 1808 against his predecessor, Ludlam—they did attempt to defend Governor Ludlam’s motives, saying he had no precedent to follow on how to deal with Sierra Leone’s first installment of “recaptives.” Indeed, the African Institution’s Special Report of 1815 states that of the 167 slaves liberated by Captain Parker in 1808, “Governor Ludlum took forty of the ablest men into the service of Government, providing them with proper food and clothing, and promising them their full liberty at the end of three years.” The special report continued:

The remainder, consisting of eighteen men, fourteen women, and ninety-five children, he proposed to place as apprentices among the colonists of Sierra Leone […] persons of eighteen years old and upwards being bound only for three years,

34 Thorpe to Wilberforce, 1815, 24.
35 Thorpe to Wilberforce, 1815, 29ff.
and those who were less than eighteen being bound for a proportionally [sic] longer time.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, the African Institution asserted that Ludlam had protected the “recaptives,” ensuring they became apprentices only with reputable colonists. In their defense against Thorpe’s charges the African Institution emphasized the overarching virtue of the fact that they were “rescuing [recaptives] from the miseries of the Middle Passage.”\textsuperscript{37} While it is certainly true that Ludlam spared the “recaptives” from the horrors and potentially fatal torments of crossing the Atlantic in the holds of slave ships, it cannot be said that Ludlam advanced the propagation of free labor in British West Africa.

At best, Ludlam and Sierra Leone’s other accused colonial administrators rebranded as apprentices this newfound windfall of slaves delivered to their shores as a manifestation of the Slave Trade Act of 1807. The lexicon of slavery may have changed, but in spirit, the practice of buying and selling people for their labor was alive and well in the very place established as a refuge for former slaves. Anti-slavery activist Daniel O’Connell captured this sentiment when he wrote:

\begin{quote}
It is true, the Negro is not to be a slave, but he is to be, forsooth, an apprentice. What signifies it to change his name? Will his condition be the better because you tell him that he is no longer a slave, but his name is ‘an apprentice.’\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

Through most of the nineteenth century, the Royal African Squadron [Figure 6-1] patrolled the coastal waters of Africa, rescuing tens of thousands of “recaptives” from the holds of would-be slave ships. A cursory glance into Sierra Leone’s national archives reveals hundreds of colonial registers, logging and identifying the growing influx of “recaptives” who were accepted into the

\textsuperscript{36} Special Report of the African Institution, 1815, 50.
\textsuperscript{37} Special Report of the African Institution, 1815, 51, 44.
\textsuperscript{38} O’Connell speech at Anti-Colonization Meeting, London, July 13, 1833.
colony and ultimately apprenticed to the settlers—Nova Scotian, Maroon, and by 1827 to other “recaptives” whose terms of apprenticeship had terminated (Walker 1976). In doing so, Freetown and the colony grew rapidly, expanding to the city’s contemporary limits at the northern tip of the Sierra Leone peninsula.

If Thomas Peters, Isaac Anderson and the other Nova Scotians were Sierra Leone’s first wave of laborers to be exploited by debt bondage and the Maroons from Jamaica the second wave of unfree labor in the age of emancipation, then those slaves rescued by the Slave Trade Act of 1807 provided a virtually limitless source of labor with which to build Britain’s first colonial outpost in Africa. Sierra Leone may have professed itself to be an asylum for former slaves, but that did not foreclose it from capitalizing on the labor of those former slaves, albeit in forms more palatable to Europe’s post-emancipation sensibilities—sensibilities that were drawn up along the lines of an increasing moral flexibility where labor was concerned.

The practice of indenting “recaptives” and runaway slaves who sought refuge from “domestic slavery” in the hinterland continued well into the 1840s and perhaps beyond, after the
practice of apprenticeships was to have legally ended according to Britain’s Act for the Abolition of Slavery enacted in 1833 (see below). In his 1846 annual report on missionary activities and observations in the outlying colony communities of Bathurst, Gloucester and Regent’s Town, the Rev. Samuel A. Walker echoed the concern of his missionaries who reported that, “liberated African children” were being “bound out as apprentices. Many of them [...] as soon as they arrived from the slave ships.” Moreover, many apprenticed former slaves were taken upriver into the hinterland where they were sold back into slavery. The system of Apprenticing liberated slaves in Sierra Leone did not end until 1847 (Fyfe 1962; Drescher 2010). However, even if the practice of indenting liberated slaves as apprentices ended in the mid-nineteenth century, the exploitation of laborers continued right up until the 1890s as will be examined later in this chapter.

In the Age of Emancipation?

On Wednesday May 15, 1833, Zachary Macaulay wrote his long-time Sierra Leone Company and African Institution colleague, William Wilberforce [Figure 6-2] to inform him that anti-slavery legislation had been introduced for debate in the House of Commons. With his health failing, Wilberforce was no longer active in Parliament, but Macaulay kept him abreast of the abolition debates. Ailing since about 1812, Wilberforce never did see the fruits of his life’s struggle. He died on July 29, 1833, thirty days before a bill for the “abolition of slavery throughout the British colonies” received the assent of King William IV. In accordance with Wilberforce’s ongoing campaign to gradually introduce universal emancipation, the bill [Appendix H] had more to do with transforming the British Empire’s system of forced servitude

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40 Testimony of Reverend J. F. Schön given to a parliamentary Select Committee on the Slave Trade, April 11, 1848, 181-191; PP.: cf Howard 2006.
than abolishing slavery outright. The aim was to create a kinder and perhaps more palatable form of labor to replace slavery, a move designed to allay widespread concerns that the abrupt abolition of slavery would have “dire, even catastrophic,

Figure 6.2 William Wilberforce in 1828. By Sir Thomas Lawrence (National Portrait Gallery, London).

consequences” on the availability of labor (Kopytoff 1988:485). In most cases this crisis never materialized, but Igor Kopytoff notes that the threat loomed large to Europeans whose sensibilities about African slavery rendered emancipation a prospect rife with production, cultivation and commercial problems. To ease the anticipated economic shock, the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833 adopted Sierra Leone’s approach to abolishing slavery (at least in name). The Act provided for an extensive unfree labor force in the form of indentured apprenticeships. To the abolitionist, apprenticeships were a temporary period during which former slave laborers could adjust to “free” labor while simultaneously reassuring plantation owners that their labor force would not suddenly flee and leave acres of crops to whither. Historian Charles Wesley noted:
This system of apprenticeship was in fact established and promoted as a transitional phase to help Britain’s agricultural industry wean off of slave labor, while gradually moving slaves into a “period of semi-dependence […] during which they were to have some of the rights of freemen.” (Wesley 1938:155; cf Gross 1981).

According to The Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833, “slaves” and “slavery” would theoretically no longer exist as of June 1, 1834; in practical terms, however, this measure only applied to slaves under the age of six. Slaves six years and older became “apprentices” for a term commensurate with their status. Apprentices were to be categorized as agricultural laborers or non-agricultural laborers.\(^\text{41}\) Non-agricultural apprenticeships were scheduled to expire after four years of service on June 1, 1838. Agricultural apprenticeships went until June 1, 1840. Note from above that there is evidence that “recaptives” were apprenticed in Sierra Leone at least until 1847.

Equally important in the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833 was the scope of its language. Both in the title and preamble, the Bill clearly stipulates that the legislation was intended for the abolition of slavery within “the British Colonies” or “His Majesty’s Colonies.” Concomitant to this is the absence of legislation prohibiting trade with regions that continued to deploy slave labor. It was this particular language of exclusion that allowed Britain to continue exploiting slave labor in Sierra Leone’s hinterland just beyond the boundaries of the colony and empire proper.

Slavery flourished in the hinterland even after the Bill to abolish slavery was passed in July 1833; or at least the African brand of “domestic slavery,” also sometimes referred to as “household slavery.” Fage described “domestic slavery” as “the possession of relatively small

\(^{41}\) Termed prædial and non-prædial in the actual bill wording.
numbers of slaves within the households of free men” (1962:78). Not to be confused with the more contemporary connotation of human trafficking and the New slavery of unpaid domestic servants in European or North American households, “domestic slavery [was] an accepted feature of society in West Africa” (78). In fact, when discussing slaves within Africa (in contrast to slaves for export) Suzanne Miers (1975) prefers the term “African Slavery,” since domestic does not adequately capture the diverse nature of involuntary servitude within an African context. For expedience sake, however, I will use “domestic slavery” when appropriate since it was the nineteenth century terminology of choice among European abolitionists and pro-slavery advocates alike; moreover it appears frequently within abolitionist archival documents. Bear in mind, then, that archival references to “domestic slavery” are in effect references to African slavery as opposed to export or plantation slavery.

By “domestic slavery,” Miers observes, the British “meant the slavery that was practiced by Africans” (118) in contrast to the enslavement of people to be sold and exported to the New World. This distinction was important as it allowed the British to justify and rationalize the continued use of slavery in Sierra Leone’s hinterland as a cost effective manner to maintain and even increase economic extraction from the region after slavery had been abolished. As I will explore, the British exploited “domestic slavery,” thinking it benign as compared with export slavery.

In 1783 when Henry Smeathman wrote that Sierra Leone was a region of “large, unoccupied and fertile tracts of land” it was very unlikely that he could have anticipated that the

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42 It is important to note that from an anthropological standpoint the very idea of a singularly fashioned African slavery is reductive and essentializing to the point of absurdity (chapter two). There is no more one African culture than there is a single European culture, and thus it is equally absurd to contemplate a uniform mode of slavery that spans the whole of the African continent.
abundance of arable, uninhabited land would diminish the value of that same land, while simultaneously assigning a premium value for slaves needed to work the land. 43 At the start of the twentieth century Herman Nieboer noted that “in those countries where there is an abundance of fertile soil and capital is of little value free labourers cannot be had” (1900:302). Grace echoes this sentiment by applying Nieboer’s work to the use of “domestic slaves” in post-Slave Trade West Africa.

In West Africa during the nineteenth century there was still a shortage of people and a surplus of land. Because a man could leave his village and clear and cultivate some virgin bush for his own use, there had to be some form of inducement or compulsion to make him work for another person. Domestic slavery provided the compulsion. (Grace 1975:11).

Within many West African cultures this compulsion came from the perceived advantage of inclusion that came with being a slave. Unlike Eurocentric notions that defined slave as the polar opposite of free, Africa’s “domestic slaves” often enjoyed a kin-like status that offered them the security of belonging to a group, albeit at an inferior social status than masters and non-slave members of the kin group (Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Palmié 1995, etc.).

In chapter two I examined this slave-as-kin dynamic in Nigeria, wherein slaves (mafa) are incorporated into Margi kin lineages (Vaughan 1977). Similarly, in Sierra Leone’s hinterland, Carol MacCormack recorded that slaves among the Bullom in the Southern Sherbro were “universally initiated into Poro, the men’s secret society, and Bondo, the women’s” (1977:190). 44 Their place within these societies was analogous to a child’s status relative to their parents; the Bullom terms used to address a slave ta and wa (son and daughter) further illustrate the kin-slave hierarchy. Despite the slave’s inferior rank in the Poro or Bondo, they were

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44 Known alternatively as Bundu in Krio or Temne and Sande in Mende.
nonetheless incorporated as members into these groups; this was important in a cultural environment where inclusion was prized over the western value of individuality and personal freedom (Holt 1982).

Further compulsion to submit to “domestic slavery” may reside, in some instances, in the fact that “domestic slaves” enjoyed certain privileges. Grace noted, for example, that in some parts of West Africa a slave’s master usually would “look after him and protect him better than he could do so himself” (Grace 1975:15). Furthermore, “domestic slaves” within Africa were not subjected to the punitive, violent, cruel and racist treatment encountered by slaves sold into the slave trade (Rodney 1966; Fage 1962).

Advantages or privileges accorded to “domestic slaves” certainly did not negate the reality that life as a “domestic slave” was arduous. Labor was hard, living conditions austere and rudimentary, and it was undoubtedly an extremely subjugating form of unfree labor. However, the British—in justifying the use of “domestic slavery” in the hinterland—glossed over these negative aspects of this servile institution. Attitudes towards “domestic slavery” in the nineteenth century indicate a strong belief that it was benign. An editorial in the Times of London opined that, “the system of negro deportation and plantation servitude” is a system with which “domestic slavery […] cannot for a moment be compared.” Earlier, Henry Venn, of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), wrote in a letter to the Times that domestic slavery was “by no means so calamitous as the ‘Middle Passage’ and foreign slavery.” And finally, in his study of sub-Saharan Africa, Henry Drummond refers to the continent’s “mild domestic slavery.” 45

Moreover, by the 1870s, a new ethnographic strain of British Africanist began calling for greater respect for African traditions, including “domestic slavery.” This school of African “conservationists” was led by Mary Kingsley among others, whose independent travels in West Africa inspired great respect and led her to champion the integrity of African customs (Grace 1975). In one sardonic passage she wrote about efforts to abolish slavery and introduce “civilization” to Africa:

I do not believe that the white race will ever drag the black up their own particular summit in the mountain range of civilization. Both polygamy and slavery are for divers[e] reasons essential to the well-being of Africa [...] these two institutions will necessitate the African having a summit to himself.46

It was views like this and the sense that “domestic slavery” was a milder form of slavery that contributed to British hypocrisy vis-à-vis “domestic slavery” in the Sierra Leone hinterland, which colonial authorities in Freetown both recognized and exploited for their own benefit through much of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.

The economic reality of banning the slave trade and slavery suggests that the British inadvertently stood to gain from the Slave Trade Act of 1807 and later the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833. For example, with the end of the Transatlantic slave trade, slavery and phased-out apprenticeships, plantation owners in the West Indies were forced to resort to other forms of labor, most of which bore some additional cost to the farmer, which was then passed on through the retail price in British markets. Sierra Leone’s hinterland, by contrast, lay outside the reach of British law and was thus still able to harvest, via slave labor, the tropical produce, which was in greater demand than ever in Europe. With the slave trade outlawed, middlemen—who once supplied human cargo to European merchants—now turned their attention to the popular produce

46 Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, 1897, 680.
of the hinterland—palm oils, coffee, sugar and indigo, for example; now they negotiated trade deals in produce not people. They established themselves at key transit points, such as Port Loko, Kambia, Senehun, Magbeli and along river routes “where various peoples of the hinterland brought their produce” to exchange for European manufactured goods (Ijagbemi 1970:245).

However, the produce to be sold to the Europeans had been sowed, harvested and transported by the “domestic slaves” of the hinterland. Ijagbemi contends that during the nineteenth century the demands of agrarian production and extraction for so-called “legitimate” commerce actually encouraged the expansion of slavery in the hinterland.47 Similarly, Grace notes that “the increasing European demand for West African produce also meant more work for the slave” (1975:12) This finally brings us to perhaps the most important function of “domestic slaves” in Sierra Leone’s hinterland: agrarian laborer and porter. A Methodist missionary working in the southern regions of the hinterland marveled in the late 1800s at both the bounty of produce available in the area and the continued reliance upon slavery to transport it to key river ports.

There can be no question as to the [rich] resources and greater fertility of the southern region of the Sierra Leone hinterland. Up to the present every bushel of palm kernels we have had from the country has been brought to the riverain towns by slave labour.48

Slave labor was, in fact, an economic necessity. To maintain low market prices for West Africa’s produce, Sierra Leone’s hinterland farmers had little choice but to resort to slave labor. Wage labor, argues Grace, would have priced Sierra Leone’s produce “right out of the European market” (1975:41).

47 The slave trade was dubbed by many abolitionists to be illegitimate commerce.
In essence, then, the Slave Trade Act of 1807 made Freetown the focal point for legitimate commerce; never mind that the price was artificially low and thus competitive only by virtue of slavery, or what the abolitionists might term “illegitimate labor.” Furthermore, Britain’s reliance on the hinterland’s “domestic slavery” became entrenched in the later years of the century as competition for Africa and its spoils began to drive Britain’s colonial policy toward the Sierra Leone hinterland; a policy that once again put commerce first behind abolitionist idealism. By the 1860s, Britain’s vested interest in the hinterland’s produce was so entrenched that maintaining order in the hinterland became one of the colony’s top priorities. Wars and skirmishes between rival groups blocked key trade routes into the colony, inhibiting the flow of produce to Freetown and the Metropole’s markets. Moreover, London and Freetown grew increasingly wary of France and its expansion into what Britain considered its rightful territory—the produce-rich hinterland, which eclipsed the size of the relatively tiny colony of Sierra Leone.

The dank and mildewed pages of Britain’s colonial administration housed at the National Archives in Freetown’s Fourah Bay College reveal volumes about the duality of British policy toward slavery after the slave trade was abolished in 1807 and later when slavery itself was outlawed in 1833. For example, in 1862, the acting governor, William Hill wrote to William Tucker “chief of the Bullom and Seabar” to warn him against the “wars which are continually being carried on in the Sherbro country.” Hill makes no mention in protest against the use of “domestic slaves” by Tucker’s people, only that the wars were hindering “the free access of persons wishing to trade with this colony.”49 Hill wrote similar letters to other chiefs in the hinterland, including “Sorie Matott and the chiefs of the Yonnie,” as well as “the chiefs of

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49 Hill to Tucker, October 3, 1862 in Native Affairs Department (Letters Book 1862-1867), (hereafter Letters Book 1862-1867).
Mouray Sherbro.” At this time, Samuel Blackall was more overt regarding the motive of his peace-making efforts. In a letter to chief Mouray Beamah he offers congratulations for ending the war with the “Locos and Timmanees [Temne],” adding moreover that he was “glad to hear you have made roads. It will be good for trade, and if your people will trade and not go to war, they will become rich.” Blackall also acted as an intermediary, negotiating the release of Soosoo prisoners captured by the Kofoos “in the late war.” In May of 1865, Blackall warned rival chiefs in “Moriah Country” that their war was interrupting the flow of “produce from Fouricariah and other towns.”

From the middle of the nineteenth century until the first decades of the twentieth century, runaway or escaped “domestic slaves” from the hinterland were welcomed in the colony as refugees who could be apprenticed as laborers in the colony. The presence of escaped slaves in the colony, however, resulted in attempts by masters to reclaim the runaway slaves who were “forcibly carried from the colony.” This dynamic fueled mounting tensions between colonial administrators and hinterland chiefs. Within the British territory, the runaway slaves from the hinterland created ethnic tension in the fast-growing colony of about 45,000 people. Krio descendants of the Nova Scotian and Maroon settlers complained that crime rates had risen with the increase in “native” inhabitants (i.e., Temne villagers) in the colony. Ethnic fighting in the hinterland, crime in the colony and increasing competition from the French were all blamed for

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50 Hill to Chiefs of Yonnie, September 29, 1862; Hill to Chiefs of Mouray Sherbro, September 27, 1862 in Letters Book 1862-1867.
51 Blackall to Chief – Mouray Beamah/Boomah, December 27, 1862 in Letters Book 1862-1867).
52 Blackall to Chief Bamyah of the Kofoos, November 24, 1862 in Letters Book 1862-1867; Blackall to Chiefs Maligee Bailey and Bockary [sic], May 24, 1865 in Letters Book 1862-1867.
53 See for example, Blackall to Chief at Sherbro, February 4, 1863, Blackall to Chief Ansumanu Sanmafio [sic], June 24, 1864 in Letters Books 1862-1867.
54 Sierra Leone Annual Report for 1896, Colonial Reports, No. 208, 1897, 16.
Sierra Leone’s dramatic economic decline in the colony in the 1870s and 1880s (Fyle 2006). Residents, colonial authorities, and officials in London debated the best course of action to take. Sir Samuel Lewis, a colonial politician and Freetown’s first mayor advocated that Britain annex the hinterland in order to bring order to the territories just beyond the colony. Lewis’ proposal became the rallying cry of many Krio elite who argued that “with annexation we shall see a thriving and contented, and not as now a poverty stricken and dissatisfied population.” Others, voicing their opinions in the Sierra Leone Weekly News argued that annexation would curtail slaving in the hinterland and diminish trade. However, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, inter-ethnic rivalry and war in the hinterland was only one problem in the Sierra Leone colony. Of much greater concern to the colonial officials in London was Britain’s longstanding rival France.

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SINCE AS EARLY AS 1865, the Colonial Secretariat had become increasingly concerned with French incursions into the Sierra Leone hinterland; by this time, France had become the dominant imperial power in the Western Sudan. Competition for influence and territorial dominance in West Africa remained intense between Paris and London throughout the 1870s, with both trying to test the limits of the other’s so-called “sphere of influence.” Finally, on June 28, 1882, Commissioners from Britain and France signed a convention to demarcate the territory between Great Britain’s Sierra Leone hinterland and the French Guinea, which later would become part of the Federation of French West Africa or Afrique Occidentale

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55 “My View of Things,” Sierra Leone Weekly News July 1, 1887, 2 (Hereafter SLWN); “The Annexation question” SLWN, August 29, 1885, 2; Letter from “Looker-on,” Sierra Leone Independent, April 16, 1875; “Alleged Slave- Trading by Europeans,” SLWN, June 27, 1885, 2;
Français [Figure 6-3]. In the convention for “the Settlement of Territorial Limits to the North of Sierra Leone,” the colonial commissioners agreed the Great Scrarcies and Melikhoure rivers would delimit the northern extent of Britain’s territorial claim, though no point east in the interior was identified, leaving the issue unresolved. Moreover, the convention of 1882 was never ratified by the governments of either France of Great Britain. The treaty, however, opened the way for a series of territorial agreements (in 1889, 1891, 1892, 1895, 1896 and 1898). None of the treaties paid heed to the ethnic or national composition of the indigenous Africans whose villages and “country” straddled the French-British frontiers. Thus was the way of the European Scramble for Africa. Despite the various bilateral treaties, uncertainty stemming from France’s domination of West Africa and Britain’s jurisdiction over the Sierra Leone hinterland sustained the ongoing debate over annexation into the 1880s and 1890s. John Grace suggests colonial officials feared that the Sierra Leone colony would soon become an “isolated enclave” amidst the encroaching French (Grace 1975:68). Unsatisfied with the scope of the treaties with Paris, the Colonial Secretariat directed Governor Samuel Rowe to take steps to increase prosperous trade in the hinterland in order to solidify the colony’s economic stability and allegiance to Britain. It is at this time that London begins to consider formally laying claim to the hinterland; although that move drew debate among politicians and colonial administrators as that prospect would legally oblige Britain to the hinterland. As early as 1865, Governor Samuel Blackall testified before a parliamentary Select Committee on Africa, noting that “the

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56 British and Foreign State Paper, v. 77, 1007 (Hereafter State Papers).
57 Limits of British and French Jurisdiction in the Territories of Sierra Leone; CO 879/35 and CO 879/31.
58 Rowe served as a governor on five separate occasions, 1875-1876, 1877-1880, 1881, 1885-1886, 1887-1888.
cost [of annexation] is greater than the result, generally speaking; and it is very difficult.”

Blackall goes on to elaborate on the complications of merging British governmental systems with those of the various African groups in the hinterland.

![Map of West Africa showing France's dominance and surrounding territories](image)

Figure 6-3 France dominates West Africa, surrounding Sierra Leone and Gold Coast and independent Liberia (1936).

What is not explicated is that annexation would require the Crown to enforce British law in the hinterland, including the Slave Trade Act of 1807 and the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833. In this scenario, “domestic slavery” in the hinterland—the Crown’s ticket to inexpensive tropical produce—would have been rendered illegal.

**From Slave Trade to Exploited Labor Trade**

The debate over annexation and the implied cost of then being obliged to outlaw “domestic slavery” in the hinterland continued into the 1890s. And in the interim, more and more “domestic slaves” from the hinterland flooded into the colony in search of “freedom” and to find

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59 Blackall testimony before Select Committee on Africa (Western Coast), June 12, 1865 in Reports from Committees, vol. 5 Africa (Western Coast), 307.
work as migrant laborers. Amidst this debate, Krio merchant Arthur Thomas Porter added yet another layer to the colony’s manifold of adapted post-emancipation unfree labor. Documents in Sierra Leone’s National Archives at Freetown indicate that hundreds (perhaps thousands) of “mechanics and labourers” were shipped off to the Congo Free State in the 1890s [Figure 6-4].

In the spring of 1891 Arthur Thomas Porter, a government contractor in Freetown entered into a deal with A.E. Verberckt, an agent with the Chemin de Fer du Congo company to supply laborers—either “recapatives” or migrant workers from the hinterland—for the construction of the Congo Free State (soon to become the Belgian Congo). However, based on an extended exchange of correspondence between Porter and the Colonial Secretariat in London, it appears that hundreds of men and women were sent via mail steamer to the Congo without government permission, nor any stipulation concerning “food, work, wages, punishments, if any, and return passages” for the laborers. Porter later protested, claiming, “I was never aware at the time I applied for leave to ship the men that I would be required to give security before shipping [them].”

Porter apparently feigned ignorance regarding the Colonial Secretariat’s regulations, writing that on numerous occasions he had requested clarification on the “nature of security [his Excellency] requires to be given” to his laborers. However, the Colonial Secretariat later reported that Porter had shipped laborers to the Congo “by a German steamer” and was preparing

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60 Schön testimony to Parliament, April 11, 1848; Alldridge 1910, 47ff and 1901, 13, 14, 342.
62 The great-grandfather of prominent Sierra Leonean scholar Arthur Thomas Porter III.
63 Porter to Colonial Secretariat, April 30, 1891 in Governor’s Despatches to Secretary of State, SLNA-Kennedy Annex (hereafter Governor’s Despatches).
64 Faulkner to Porter May 1, 1891 in Governor’s Despatches [n.d.], SLNA-Kennedy Annex.
65 Porter to Colonial Secretary, July 9, 1891 in Governor’s Despatches [n.d.], SLNA-Kennedy Annex.
66 Porter to Colonial Secretariat, July 16, 1891; Porter to Colonial Secretariat, July 17, 1891 in Governor’s Despatches [n.d.], SLNA-Kennedy Annex.
to send more aboard the “S.S. Akassa” “without applying for permission. Moreover, Porter seems to have expanded his enterprise by providing “recaptives” and hinterland workers as cheap (if not free) labor elsewhere in Africa. Writing to the Colonial Secretariat, Porter acknowledges that 200 men had been loaded aboard the S.S. Gaboon and were bound not for Congo, but for the Spanish colony of Fernando Pó (today’s Bioko) off the coast of west-central Africa. In the same letter Porter once again denied knowledge of the government’s regulations for permission and security.

By the middle of the decade, Porter was no longer providing labor to other parts of Africa or elsewhere. Still, laborers continued to be sent from Sierra Leone through other agents for construction of the Congo Railway until the middle of 1896; this, despite the fact that work conditions were wretched and closely resembled the slavery that had been outlawed in British

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67 Porter to Colonial Secretariat July 17, 1891; Faulkner to Porter August 3, 1891 in Governor’s Despatches [n.d.], SLNA-Kennedy Annex.
territories, but not in Congo, which was largely controlled by Belgium. The mistreatment of these laborers, which included flogging, forced labor, robbery and murder, was certainly not unknown to the British public and government. For example, in the run-up to an anti-slavery conference to be held in Brussels, English humanitarian Verney Lovett Cameron referenced reports of “slavery and the Slave Trade in the Congo Free State and the ill-treatment of natives by the officials of that state.” Moreover, in 1896 the Journal of the Aborigines’ Protection Society noted that workers for the Congo Railway company were “cruelly flogged, and in some cases shot.” The following year, the Times of London reported “many crimes against humanity” in the Congo Free State, stating that “slavery still flourished within the boundaries of that state” and that “civilization had hardly taken any sort of root whatever.” The brutal and inhumane treatment of laborers and indeed the Congolese population in general was later confirmed in an extensive and graphic report delivered to British Parliament by Roger Casement in 1904. Based on information dating back to 1886 just after Belgium’s King Leopold assumed control of the Congo, Casement detailed examples of slavery and forced labor along with repressive punishments imposed on people who refused or could not pay Belgian tax collectors. Moreover, Casement’s report detailed incidents of flogging, plundering and “generally maltreating the natives.” In comparing the regions of the Bas Congo, which he had visited in 1887, Casement noted the “wholesale diminution of human life.”

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69 Cameron to Salisbury (Marquis of), November 15, 1889 in Correspondence Respecting the Conference Relating to the Slave Trade Held at Brussels, Part I, 1889, 115.; The Aborigines’ Friend: Journal of the Aborigines Protection Society, 1896, v. 5, no. 1, 55; The Treatment of the Native Races, in the Times of London, Tuesday April 8, 1897, 12.

70 Correspondence and Report from His Majesty’s consul at Boma respecting the administration of the Independent State of the Congo, 1904, 12, 21.
Yet, the brutal and inhumane labor conditions that existed in the Congo Free State for those laborers sent from 1891-1896 to work on the railway do not appear to have been the reason the Colonial Secretariat put a halt to sending laborers to Congo. In fact, a transcription of an 1896 telegram sent to Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, stated the reason the “Congo consignation” of laborers was being stopped was “on account of depopulation of colony.”\textsuperscript{71}

As previously noted, labor—from share-cropping to debt bondage and indentured apprenticeships to unregulated migrant labor for profit—was far from free in the Sierra Leone colony and hinterland. The litany of experimental alternatives to slave labor smacked of hypocrisy born of a moral flexibility, which enabled Sierra Leone to benefit from slavery while retaining its status as a refuge for former slaves and iconic symbol of “civilized” Europe’s battle to enlighten “heathen” Africa. However, Sierra Leone’s status as a refuge against slavery took the spotlight when unrest erupted in the hinterland as Britain formally pushed its authority onto the various chiefs of the vast region and attempted to redress its previous policy on “domestic slavery”—to the chagrin of many paramount chiefs who felt their own authority and way of life was being threatened by the British and the Krio.

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\textbf{The Nineteenth Century was} a crucial period for Sierra Leone and Great Britain; it was a time of reckoning the value of moral capital against material extraction in a tiny colonial possession and protectorate (together about the size of the Republic of Ireland). It was a time of imperial ambition and abolitionist concession. But perhaps most interesting for the Anthro-

\textsuperscript{71} Bayley to Chamberlain, July 24, 1896, in Governor’s Despatches 1895-1897, 263.
historian, the nineteenth century was a time of cultural clash, misunderstanding and merger. Indeed, as a borderland, the colony of Sierra Leone was a locality of European cultural and economic values as embodied by the white colonial administration and the Krío descendants of the former slave settlers.

This chapter surveyed the role of commerce from the earliest days of the Sierra Leone experiment and how it defined both company and Crown policy toward labor and colonial priorities; priorities which in some instances led to an outright dismissal of Sierra Leone’s abolitionist and anti-slavery mandate. From Company governors Dawes and McCauley in the 1790s and well into the 1800s I have examined how free labor was flexibly defined and how unfree labor practices, including share-cropping, debt bondage, apprenticeships and “domestic slavery” were encouraged and fostered in the name of extractive ambition during an era when Africa was little more than a treasure trove to Europe’s colonial powers, and Africans—slave, free or unfree—constituted a vast labor pool by which to harvest the continent’s bounty for the Metropole. Colonial administrators twisted their mandate to rescue and settle “recaptive” slaves by exploiting them to shore up the colony’s military ranks or labor corps.

In chapter seven I will narrow the focus on the final decade of the nineteenth century. It is in this decade that Britain formally declares a protectorate over the Sierra Leone hinterland. I will explore the impact this declaration had on the ethnic identification of various groups. Including the Krío, Mende and Temne. Moreover, I will delve into the ongoing unrest in the hinterland, exacerbated by a house tax imposed on the protectorate to support the economically faltering colony. The house tax ignited the “Hut Tax Wars” which arguably represent a nascent nationalist expression against British rule. Understanding the ethnic dynamics of Britain’s
approach to the rebellion helps to inform an understanding of these tensions and the inheritance left behind by the British. Ethno-political tensions continued to percolate into the twentieth century, influencing post-colonial affairs in Sierra Leone until they ultimately served to undermine a cohesive republic in the postcolony until the country’s civil war in which terrorist slaves were exploited for wealth, military power and an elusive bid to pursue a symbolic return to an idealized pre-colonial Sierra Leone.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1890s – British Expansion and the Sierra Leone Protectorate

_Di San de kɔɔmɔ tu tu/The sun comes out twice_
– Kono Proverb

Building on Chapter Six, I will use these pages to examine the effect that one century of British rule—under both the Sierra Leone Company’s mandate and as a Crown colony—had on the people of the region and their political and economic development. As I will explore, Britain’s presence in Sierra Leone exacerbated those ethnic tensions that date back to the Mane Invasions of the mid-fifteenth century (or mid-sixteenth century). Those invasions pared the hinterland up into discrete spheres of the Mende-dominated Southern and Eastern regions and the Temne-dominated Northern and Western Areas near the peninsula. As this chapter will find, those cleavages intensified in the hinterland as the British pushed to exert greater authority over the region.

Ever since the Sierra Leone Company’s failure at “free” labor cultivation in the colony, the hinterland took on an increasingly important role for the economic survival and prosperity of the colony. This chapter will explore the ramifications of formalized British authority in the hinterland. This point in the dissertation represents a shift in approach to the study of Sierra

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1 Generally interpreted to mean what goes around comes around, or if you do something bad to me today, tomorrow it will be my turn.

2 Although differing theories exist concerning the arrival of the Mane, it is generally believed that the Mende and Temne—the two dominant ethnic groups of the region—are descendants of conquering Mande-speaking peoples who swept into Sierra Leone River region in a series of invasions during either the mid-fifteenth or mid-sixteenth centuries from either the Mali Empire of Northern West Africa or central Africa’s Kongo Kingdoms. The invaders sought access to the transportation network of rivers and estuaries in the area. For more on the Mane invasions, see Hair 1967; Kup 1960; Jones 1981; Rodney 1967, 1970; and Thomas 1920, v. 19 & 20.

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Leone. If chapters three through six presented a study of labor adaptation that was concomitant to the rise of British abolitionism in the Atlantic World and more precisely Sierra Leone, then this chapter along with chapters eight and nine will examine the impact that ethnic, economic and political segregation had on the character of post-colonial Sierra Leone. In the 1890s Sierra Leone was rocked by rebellion after the British moved to formally extend its authority over 30,000-square miles of the hinterland [Figure 7-1]. It was a move that included an abortive effort to end slavery. That effort not only failed, but it poignantly underscored British perceptions of the inhabitants of the colony and Protectorate, most notably the *Krio*, who dominated the colony and Temne and Mende who split up the Protectorate.

![Figure 7-1 Colonial Sierra Leone’s boundaries as of 1800 relative to the Sierra Protectorate established in 1896.](image)

This chapter, then, is the beginning of the ethno-regional politicization of Sierra Leone as a result of British imperial ambition. I will explore the ethno-political consequences of Britain’s presence in the region in order to later link this period back up with the country’s late twentieth
century revolutionary war, which erupted in the hinterland nearly one hundred years after Britain proclaimed a Protectorate over the region.

* * *

IT WAS NOT LONG after noon on Monday, March 6, 1893 when the skies darkened over the village of Bandasuma in a remote southeastern corner of Sierra Leone’s hinterland. For several hours the area was inundated by torrents of rain. Although a typical seasonal storm, the inclement weather was just one more issue with which Thomas Joshua (T.J.) Alldridge had to contend. Alldridge, the British commercial agent and travelling trade commissioner in the hinterland had spent the first weeks of 1893 crisscrossing the Barri Country (in today’s Southern Province), inviting as many paramount chiefs (or their representatives) as possible to meet with Governor Sir Francis Fleming. Fleming, in accordance with the Colonial Secretariat in London, was pushing to secure and expand trade treaties in the hinterland—a forerunner to creating the Protectorate three years later under Governor Frederic Cardew.

It was “a work of almost insuperable difficulty,” Aldridge wrote, requiring “a very great deal of careful manipulation” because many chiefs were reluctant to travel such a great distance or because rivalries persisted between various chieftaincies. Now, after months of preparation, Alldridge had to contend with the risk of leaky accommodations for Fleming, a sickly and diminutive man who was far more at home in his newly remodeled governor’s mansion in Freetown than in the rustic lodgings available in Bandasuma. Even though, the “bush quarters,” as Alldridge described them, “were the best I think I have ever seen,” they were far beyond

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3 In his memoir of the Sherbro region of Sierra Leone’s hinterland, Alldridge recorded that a “tornado” had hit the area; in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, 1901, 260 (hereafter The Sherbro). In all likelihood, the weather pattern Alldridge was describing was a severe squall with heavy rain. Joan Kenworthy (2000) records that “tornado” has been used from the sixteenth century to the present in West Africa as a generic term for any tropical storm.

4 Alldridge in The Sherbro, 1901, 252-253.
Fleming’s comfort zone. Although “every possible arrangement had been made” to console the finicky governor, including the construction of a “gigantic shed” for the meeting and “a house for the governor,” the rains still gave Alldridge pause to ensure that the house was “water-tight.” In Alldridge’s lodgings, as a point of reference, “the rain came through the thatching like water through a colander.” On the morning of Fleming’s arrival, Alldridge had the governor’s quarters adorned with “feathery palm leaves and mossy fern” in order to have the house “elaborately decorated.” Finally, at 2 in the afternoon on Monday March 13, 1893, an elaborate procession of smartly uniformed Frontier Police officers, colonial functionaries and aides entered Bandasuma in advance of Fleming.

Alldridge fussed over the disposition of the gathered chiefs who were eager to return home ahead of farming season. He advised Fleming that “uncertainty and unrest” was growing within the ranks of the chiefs concerning the purpose of the meeting. He dismissed the uncertainty as nothing more than “superstitious fear,” which he told Fleming was “always present in the minds of the chiefs.” To allay the chiefs’ concerns, Fleming agreed to meet briefly with several of them that very afternoon, two days before the full summit, which was scheduled for Wednesday, March 15. The short meeting helped to ensure the success of the larger summit.

At some point during the Wednesday meeting, Alldridge arranged to have Fleming’s picture taken with the assembled chiefs. The resulting photograph [Figure 7-2] speaks volumes about the social hierarchy of Britain, colonial Sierra Leone and the hinterland in the final years before the Protectorate was proclaimed over the inland region. A festooned and glum-eyed Fleming is pictured on a wooden chair, legs crossed in polished boots. A leopard skin had been spread out at his feet, though it is unclear whether this is a gift or the photographer’s attempt to

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5 Alldridge in *The Sherbro*, 1901, 261.
exoticize (i.e., Orientalize) the interior of Sierra Leone’s hinterland for audiences back in Britain. Dozens of Mende chiefs and their attendants who had assembled to meet with Fleming can be seen standing yards behind the governor. Why does this picture show such a stark physical divide between an envoy of the white colonial Metropole and the West African inhabitants of the imperial periphery? Were they told to stand so far back? Did they themselves prefer to stand clear of the photograph? Of course there are many possible explanations for the composition of the photograph, but the image is a stark visual representation of the distance that continued to segregate imperial Britain from its subaltern colony and the surrounding hinterland into the twentieth century. After independence, this divide continued to grow and ultimately manifest in the form of corruption, elitism and political exclusion born of what Sierra Leone scholar Jimmy Kandeh refers to as “mediated hegemony” (1992:85). This form of hegemony exacerbated ethno-regional loyalties and fed a yawning chasm of economic disparity that still hounds post-colonial Sierra Leone. Many of these twentieth century problems can trace their origins to Frederic Cardew, who became governor in 1894, and proclaimed a Protectorate over the hinterland in August 1896.

Cardew, the Protectorate and the ‘Hut Tax Wars’

Where Fleming, frail and faltering in health, was tentative in his governorship, Cardew was a robust leader, ready and willing to venture into the hinterland in the interest of Empire. (Deveneaux 1987; Fyle 2006). A commanding presence [Figure 7-2], he was a military veteran with service in British India’s North-West Frontier and in South Africa’s Zulu War of 1879. Historian Gustav Deveneaux observed that Cardew was of “towering importance” to Sierra Leone and the extension of British colonial rule over the hinterland (1987:573). Indeed, in

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7 Although historically referred to as the “Hut Tax” and “Hut Tax Wars,” I prefer to call the levy a House Tax to avoid the ethnocentric and pejorative connotations of the term ‘hut.’
a period of increasing imperial competition for African territory (chapter nine), Cardew was just the man to convey an image of unwavering British authority and leadership. It was a marked change from London’s recent colonial policy of “vacillation and indecision” (574). Most important to this chapter is the fact that Cardew ushered in the new century, a century that was marked by increasing ethno-regional fissures and economic inequity aggravated by Cardew’s policies in both the Colony and Protectorate. This chapter will explore Cardew’s leadership as a reflection of Britain’s exploitive imperial policy for Sierra Leone at the end of the nineteenth century and carried forward through the twentieth century until independence in 1961.

On March 27, 1894, shortly after he arrived in Freetown, Cardew set out on a 600-mile, 51-day tour of the hinterland. His aim was to evaluate how best to transform the vast region into a British Protectorate.\footnote{Colonial Annual Report No. 160, 1895, 11.} While traveling in the vicinity of the Small Scarcies River, where no
fixed boundary between French and British territory had yet been established, Cardew learned that Bai Bureh [Figure 7-3], the Temne chief and warrior—who had been deemed an enemy and was a persistent thorn in colonial Britain’s side—was resident in the region. Cardew dispatched a party of Frontier Police constables to arrest Bai Bureh, who escaped by fleeing into French territory. The fugitive chief dispatched a “polite but indignant letter disclaiming hostility to the British” (Fyfe 1962: 522). Years later, Bai Bureh was granted safe passage to Port Loko, where he met with Cardew, who ordered him to surrender fifty guns as punishment for defying the British. Bai Bureh handed over the weapons, thus foiling Cardew’s plan to establish a pretext to arrest, deport and banish Bai Bureh from Sierra Leone. Before long, Cardew would once again be contending with this powerful and enigmatic Temne chief.

Apart from his cat-and-mouse intrigues with Bai Bureh, during his tour of the hinterland, Cardew found evidence of an “increase” in the “slave trade” as a result of “disturbances” in the hinterland. Captives taken in the Sanda Lokkoh region, he contended, were taken as slaves. In a dispatch to the Colonial Secretariat, Cardew wrote that “slavery was rife.” He said “there were many natives who never left towns for the nearest village for fear of being kidnapped.” Cardew concluded that the slave trade was the driving force behind the ongoing conflicts and the colony’s hindered access to exportable crops via the established trade routes. Up to now, Britain

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9 There are several excellent studies on Bai Bureh, including Arthur Abraham’s “Bai Bureh, The British and the Hut Tax War” (1974); Michael Crowder and LaRay Denzer’s “Bai Bureh and the Sierra Leone Hut Tax War of 1898,” in Colonial West Africa: Collected Essays. 1978.
10 Historian Arthur Abraham records that although he was ostensibly supportive of the British in the region, Bai Bureh inadvertently became entangled in the French-Anglo territorial disputes from as early as the 1870s. Frontier skirmishes continued on and off for decades as both sides pushed to extend their hold on the lucrative trade prospects of the area. However, when the British moved to end the dispute, Bai Bureh resented the peace effort and vowed to keep fighting. British Travelling Commissioner George H. Garrett ordered Bai Bureh’s arrest. He escaped from captivity and fled to the interior of his territory. The arrest was a blow to Bai Bureh who “thought he was fighting the Colony’s wars” (Abraham 1974: 100). From that point forward British officials in Freetown and London remained suspicious of Bai Bureh and used many of his actions thereafter as an act of hostility against the Colony. 11 Colonial Annual Report No. 160, 1895, 11; Cardew to Chamberlain September 20, 1898, in Cardew’s Reply to Chalmers’ Report, 1899, part II, 138.
had been content to allow “domestic slavery” to continue in the hinterland because it provided an abundant supply of cheap produce from the region to satisfy European consumer demands.

Now, the British recognized that inter-ethnic fighting over slaves was hindering access to that produce. Unlike in the 1860s, the cost of the fighting outweighed the benefit of permitting “domestic slavery.” Ending slavery in the hinterland, Cardew reasoned, would logically end the inter-ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts, assuring unfettered access to trade routes in the interior. To counteract the disturbances, then, Cardew moved swiftly to expand the police presence in the hinterland, establishing additional police posts to support the larger district stations. In fact, by 1896, the year Britain proclaimed its Protectorate over the interior, “eleven European officers and 505 non-commissioned officers and men” had been assigned for duty in various parts of the hinterland.¹²

¹² Sir David P. Chalmers in Report by Her Majesty’s Commissioner and correspondence on the subject of the insurrection in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, 1898, 1899, 12 (hereafter Chalmers’ Report).
The increase in Frontier Police personnel was intended to signal to the ruling chiefs that the British were moving in to assume greater autonomy over the hinterland. It was a preparatory move to enforce Cardew’s hope for an absolute moratorium on slavery and slave trading. In the weeks and months before the Protectorate was proclaimed, Cardew—with the tacit approval of Secretary of the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain—began devising a scheme to collect more revenue from the hinterland in the form of a dwelling tax (Jeyes 1904). Each individual residence in the Protectorate was to be taxed based on the number of inhabitants living in the residence.

In 1896, Cardew began notifying the chiefs and sub-chiefs of the Queen’s plan to establish the Protectorate, eliminate slavery, and in January 1898 enforce the dwelling tax on every chiefdom. Critical of Cardew’s approach to the Protectorate, Queen’s advocate Sir David Chalmers, who was sent to Sierra Leone to investigate the rebellion, wrote, “the governor would have acted more prudently” if he had “taken much more deliberate and effective measures […] for familiarizing the minds of the chiefs” with the legislative plans for the hinterland.13 Of course, Chalmers’ counsel was in hindsight of the debacle that ensued after August 31, 1896 when the proclamation was published and later in 1898 when the house tax triggered wide spread rebellions that came to be known as the “Hut Tax Wars.” Many chiefs issued petitions against the Protectorate, warning of dire consequences to their economies, local authority and the labor force. Cardew ignored the petitions that protested against the ordinances, which unilaterally created the Protectorate and imposed British authority on more than a million people living in about 30,000-square miles.14

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14 Colonial Annual Report for 1986, No. 208 Sierra Leone, 1897, 19; PP.
In his 800-page report on the causes of the so-called “Hut Tax Wars”, Chalmers wrote, “Cardew does not himself seem to have attached importance to the consent of the Chiefs [for the Protectorate].”  One of the first written petitions to reach Cardew in October 1896 came from Bai Simera—a paramount chief from the Yoni Country in today’s Southern Province. Bai Simera expressed concern that the Protectorate ordinances would encourage slaves to flee to various District Commissioners and that individual chiefs’ judicial authority would be replaced by British courts and “worst of all, in 1898” the taxes that must be paid would “bring a heavy burden on us, when we consider [the] poor state in which we live.” Similar petitions were delivered by Bai Kompeh, the paramount chief of Kwaia and from many chiefs in the Bumpe country of Mendeland. Madam Yoko [Figure 7-4], the paramount chief of the Moyamba region in the Lower Mende country and an ally of the British in the region was one of the few chiefs who wrote the governor (in November of 1896), expressing conditional approval of the ordinances. According to Chalmers’ report, Madam Yoko wrote “we shall make a trial of it, for we do not know what it is like yet.” Hers was the only of dozens of petitions that did not disparage the ordinances or protest the creation of the Protectorate.  Creating the Protectorate was a galling disregard for the people of the hinterland and their ruling chiefs’ objections.

However, the chiefs—many of whom have been courted by the British for trade agreements—were most incensed by Cardew’s decision to levy a tax on every dwelling in the Protectorate in order to alleviate the Colony’s ongoing economic woes. Cardew, already somewhat intolerant of the Colony’s Krio residents blamed their newspapers for inciting opposition among the hinterland chiefs regarding the creation of the Protectorate. He believed

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15 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 15.
the publishers of the Sierra Leone Weekly News and other prominent Krio-owned newspapers were fomenting discontent among different ethnic groups, including the Temne and the Mende. The charge itself was deemed groundless by Sir David Chalmers, but the damage had been done. Cardew’s accusations dramatically undermined Anglo-Krio relations for years into the twentieth century (Fyfe 1962).

These increased tensions came about despite the fact that the Krio—as business traders and trade middlemen—were, along with the British, equally dependent on the hinterland for their economic development and prosperity. In 1899 Chalmers wrote that, “The trade and revenue of the Colony depend almost entirely on the hinterland.”17 This growing sense that Britain and the Krio were simply exploiting the various chiefdoms of the hinterland for the benefit of London and the Colony, was accentuated on November 7, 1895 with the arrival of W. Bradford and his staff, who immediately set about surveying plans to lay a narrow gauge railway from Freetown

17 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 10.
to Songo Town, just inside the hinterland in today’s Western Area.\footnote{Colonial Annual Report No. 170, 1896, 13.} Construction on the railway began in January 1896 with an initial 3.5 miles completed and 6.5 miles laid out by year’s end.\footnote{Colonial Annual Report No. 208, 1897, 17; and No. 234, 1898, 21.} The following year, the railway extended 11.5 miles and opened for the transport of construction materials. It was projected that the railway would span 20 miles by March of 1898 and open for passenger transit from Freetown to Waterloo. By 1907, the line ultimately extended through the town of Bo and deep into Mende country in what today is the Eastern Province, terminating at Pendembu near the Liberian frontier. A second branch line ran from Bauya to Makeni in the Northern Province.\footnote{The Sierra Leone Railway ended service in 1974 when economic crises limited the government’s ability to maintain the system. All that remains today are a few stretches of rusted, overgrown rail lines and several locomotives and other artifacts housed at the National Railway Museum of Sierra Leone in Freetown.}

Back in London, Chamberlain reconsidered the house tax and cautioned Cardew that it was premature and would meet with resistance similar to other efforts at taxation without representation. To address this concern, Cardew did not back away from the tax plan, but instead once again increased the Frontier Police force [Figure 7-5]; the paramilitary units were now reaching significant levels with 600 non-commissioned officers and men (largely Krio from the Colony) and 17 European officers across the five districts—up from its initial 280 men, four officers and four non-commissioned officers.\footnote{Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 12.} Indeed, it was not unlike an army bolstering its ranks in anticipation of a war. The District Commissioners had a staff of two clerks and an interpreter to collect tax in vast expanses of about 5,000-square miles (Fyfe 1962). To address the concern of collecting tax over such a vast terrain, 22 chiefs were recruited to share jurisdiction with the District Commissioners in those regions where collecting the tax was expected to face strong resistance.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item[19] Colonial Annual Report No. 208, 1897, 17; and No. 234, 1898, 21.
  \item[20] The Sierra Leone Railway ended service in 1974 when economic crises limited the government’s ability to maintain the system. All that remains today are a few stretches of rusted, overgrown rail lines and several locomotives and other artifacts housed at the National Railway Museum of Sierra Leone in Freetown.
  \item[21] Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 12.
\end{itemize}
The British hoped this nascent step at indirect rule would enlist the chiefs to quell any unrest among his or her people and likewise create a sense of solidarity with the Crown.

Even as Cardew prepared for an increase of violence against the Colony and moved to ensure that the taxes would be collected, several chiefs from the northern Temne lands and southern Mende lands of the hinterland attempted to persuade the governor to delay the tax implementation. The governor refused, saying the “subject had been so thoroughly discussed […] that he could not alter the decision”\textsuperscript{22} of the previously arranged timetable for the house tax collection. Once again, in late 1897 or early 1898 a delegation from the Imperi, Boom and Kittum countries of the southern hinterland met with Cardew. They voiced their objection to the tax, but were dismissed without a satisfactory resolution. Later, Madam Yoko and Nancy Tucker both Mende chiefs who were strong “adherents of the English government” said they had been

\textsuperscript{22} Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 23.
threatened by insurgents opposing the tax plan. A third chief Thomas Neale Caulker had been killed. Yoko and Tucker were given protection at the English garrison near Kwalu.\(^{23}\)

Finally, in January of 1898, Cardew issued directives to his District Commissioners, ordering them to begin collecting the house tax. Efforts to collect the levy began in Port Loko, where an estimated 40-60 Krio traders from the Colony were “occupying stores and houses which they [rented] from the aboriginal inhabitants.”\(^{24}\) By February, reports of angry opposition to the tax collection were reaching Freetown. In the Temne-dominated northern districts, Bai Bureh helped organize strong resistance to the British. The Krio traders likewise protested the tax, claiming it was not their tax to pay, but was in fact the landlords’ obligation. And while it should have come as no surprise to Cardew, he responded aggressively by deploying Frontier Force troops to assist in collecting the taxes.

Captain Wilfred Stanley Sharpe, the District Commissioner for Karene tried to mediate the situation. He met with Bokari Bamp the acting chief of Port Loko to inquire into the tenant-landlord dispute over the taxes. Although the archival record is not clear on what happened, it appears that Bamp requested permission to consult with his superior Bai Forki, the chief of the Maforki chiefdom, a chiefdom that dates as far back as the Mane invasions of the sixteenth century and the conquests of Bai Farma Tami (Wylie 1977; Reed and Robinson 2012). Chalmers’ Report records that Sharpe misunderstood Bamp as a result of poor communications through an interpreter and took him to be uncooperative. Sharpe had him arrested along with four other chiefs; all were charged with “refusing to pay the Hut Tax.” The following day, Sharpe likewise had a number of the Krio traders arrested for refusing to pay the tax, although they

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\(^{24}\) Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 30.
insisted that they had been threatened by the local chiefs not to pay. Similar confusion ensued between the British and Temne chiefs in other parts of Karene.

The British attempted to arrest Bai Bureh, the chief of the Kasseh (or Kassi) chiefdom, primarily because of the long-standing British suspicion against the Temne warrior chief who had assembled a military force of what the British refer to as “war-boys.” According to testimony given as part of Chalmers’ inquiry, Sharpe said: “I wrote him a very civil letter saying I was now in Port Lokko collecting tax, and that my intention was to visit him next.” The letter, Sharpe says, was “sent back with a message that said he wished to have nothing to do with me” and, if Sharpe were to “set foot in [Bai Bureh’s] town,” that Sharpe would be a “dead man.” In his inquiry report, however, Chalmers suggests that Sharpe’s testimony was only partially true and that the letter never reached Bai Bureh; the chief’s threat was a fabrication of Lance Corporal Stephen Williams who was the envoy sent to deliver Sharpe’s message to the chief. It is “conceivable that […] Williams might have been unable to resist the impulse to invent an inflated message as coming from Bai Bureh.” Though Chalmers believed it “more probable that Captain Sharpe misapprehended Williams” who repeated the words of Bai Bureh’s “war-boys […] as being the answer [directly from] Bai Bureh.” Moreover, it appears that Sharpe’s ego had been bruised by the Karene chief’s refusal to pay the house tax. Sharpe wrote that “they made a laughing stock of the [District Commissioner’s] authority and of the dignity of his court.” The misunderstanding led Sharpe to call for “at least twenty” reinforcements in anticipation of Bai Bureh’s arrest. Efforts to actually arrest the chief led to clashes between his

27 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 36.
28 Extract from Sharpe’s Report to Governor Cardew, March 8, 1898, in Governor Cardew’s reply to Chalmers’ Report, 1899, Appendix C, 138.
fighters and Frontier Force soldiers. Bai Bureh’s fighters were soon joined by “other chiefs with their war contingents, who recognized that [Bai Bureh] was fighting their battle against the much-detested Hut Tax.”

The end result of the house tax in the Northern districts was the alienation of the British from the Krio traders in Karene, and more importantly from the powerful chiefs of the Temne regions. In Chalmers’ words this was the “beginning of the war, so far as the Timini tribes were concerned.” A coalition of Koyo Temne chiefs banded together to blockade all British trade into their territory. For much of 1898, skirmishes continued between British forces and Temne fighters until finally, on November 11 Bai Bureh and his Temne coalition surrendered, ending the conflict in the northern and western Temne lands. “The colonial forces’ victory,” notes historian Joe Alie, “had been achieved at the cost of the complete destruction of Kasseh country” (1990:141). Bai Bureh was banished from Sierra Leone in July 1899, although he returned in 1905 to resume his chieftaincy of the Kasseh country, after his coalition was dismantled by the British and he was no longer deemed a threat.

*     *     *

ALTHOUGH FIGHTING IN THE Temne lands ended in November, unrest in the Mende-dominated Southern and Eastern districts, which had begun in the Spring, continued to spread and increase in intensity. In Ronietta there appears to have been limited willingness to pay the house tax, suggesting the British may have had greater success with tactful negotiations than the violent course they actually took. Indeed, it appears that hostilities were again provoked by excessive British reactions to refusals to pay. Early on in the house tax scheme, Dr. Thomas Hood, the Acting District Commissioner for Ronietta reported some success in collecting taxes

31 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 35; in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Temne was often written as Timini, Timmanee or Timmaney.
from two paramount chiefs, Madam Yoko and Madam Nancy Tucker, as well as Charles Smart, a sub-chief in Kwaia. Smart agreed to the taxes despite the objection of his paramount chief Bai Kompeh, who was arrested with his aide-de-camp Pa Nembana for their intransigence. To send a strong signal to the Mende people, Cardew abruptly replaced Hood with Captain Samuel Moore, who, like Sharpe, was an inspector with the paramilitary Frontier Force first, and civil administrator second. Moore assumed the commissionership of Ronietta on (or around) January 21, 1898, ready for a fight, *per se*. He testified that he was appointed to replace Hood in anticipation that the “tax would have to be collected by force,” due to suspicions that the people of Ronietta were arming.32

Moore presided over the trial of Pa Nembana and Bai Kompeh. He found both guilty of intimidating Charles Smart to prevent him from paying “his lawful dues, ‘the House Tax.’”33 Although acting beyond his authority, Moore handed down sentences that deprived Bai Kompeh and Pa Nembana of the “chieftaincy.” Furthermore, he gave them a twelve-month prison term with hard labor, and “thirty-six lashes”; although, Cardew stepped in and overturned the corporal punishment.34 Later, on January 24 or 25 of 1898, Moore assembled about “sixty or seventy paramount and sub-chiefs” at Kwalu, the district headquarters of Ronietta. Moore insisted that the chiefs collect the house tax from their constituencies, but he was informed by Chief Foula Mansa of the Yoni chiefdom that “the chiefs had taken an oath […] that they would stand together to resist the government in collection of the hut tax.” The oath, or *ngo-yila*, was taken in accordance with the edicts of *Poro* secrecy (Alie 1990). Violation of such an oath meant certain death for the offender. In response, Moore had “ten or twelve” paramount chiefs arrested and

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32 Testimony given by Moore, November 12, 1898, in Chalmers’ Report, 1899, part II, 467.
33 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 27.
34 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 26-27.
summarily imprisoned, except for Bai Sherbro who at the last moment indicated he was willing to pay the house tax and disavowed claims that he had orchestrated the oath.\footnote{Moore’s testimony, November 12, 1898, in Chalmers’ Report, 1899, part II, 468.}

In the Bandajuma District, meanwhile, many chiefs—both paramount and sub-chief—agreed to pay the tax, but at a public meeting with District Commissioner Charles Ernest Carr they said five shillings per house was “too much and that they could not pay.”\footnote{ibid.} Carr had the chiefs arrested and held for several days, raising concern and resentment among the people of the district. Increasingly, the Mende of Bandajuma District worried that “paying the tax meant the country was (being) taken away, and they would rather die than allow this.”\footnote{Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 28.} In the northern portion of Bandajuma, many Krio traders from the Colony began to worry for their safety. A number of resident Krio businessmen in the town of Mafwe, for example, appealed to Carr, asking that he release the chiefs in the face of rumors that the Krio’s lives were in danger “if the chiefs were not released.”\footnote{ibid.} The events following the Krio appeal are not altogether clear from the surviving archival documents and accounts, but the Krio press fanned the crisis, further expanding the social gap that was developing between Colony and Protectorate. On May 14, 1898 the headline of the Sierra Leone Weekly News read: “Whole Butchery and Slaughter of Sierra Leone Traders.”\footnote{SLWN, May 14, 1898, 5.}

Although the newspaper report was short on details, the Chalmers Report wrote that a messenger was sent to Mafwe carrying a burnt leaf, “which is a symbol of war.”\footnote{ibid.} Governor Cardew responded by ordering a garrison of Frontier Force troops to deploy at Bandajuma in anticipation of violence. For weeks an uneasy peace held in Bandajuma until efforts were
stepped up by Frontier Force troops to collect the taxes. Chalmers’ inquiry report indicates the troops were recklessly violent in their efforts to extract the house taxes for the colony. Finally, on April 26, 1898, the people of Bandajuma struck back with random violence and rioting. Within less than a week all “the male British subjects (i.e. Krio) in Bandajuma, Kwalu and the Sulima [regions], with a few exceptions, were murdered.” A number of women were also killed until the chiefs put a halt to murdering women. After that, women seized were kept alive but “treated as captive slaves.”

Angry mobs plundered the towns, destroying or stealing anything they could carry away. Fyfe records that the “conventional boundary of colony and Protectorate was no protection.” Krio traders trying to escape to the colony along Turner’s Peninsula along the Bandajuma coastline “were set upon, and their murdered bodies thrown into the sea” (1962:573). The ultimate cost in lives and property is difficult to tally, but as J.D. Hargreaves notes, “The figure generally given—1,000—is too high; it does not seem to have originated in any authoritative contemporary estimate, for none was made” (1956:71, note 52). He suggests a far lower death toll based on the numbers compiled for the month of May 1898, which indicates 136 people died in violence that gripped 76 towns at the height of the uprising in Mende country. In the words of historian Leo Spitzer, the “Hut Tax War” of 1898 was “the single most detrimental event in the relationship between [the Krio] and up-countrymen,” as Spitzer termed the inhabitants of the Protectorate (1974:89).

The “Hut Tax War” is typically explained away as a simple rebellion against an unjust levy imposed on the people of the Protectorate who had no representation in colonial government. Testimony taken by Sir David Chalmers suggests the tax was simply the breaking point of the Protectorate populations’ tolerance of British exploitation. In a May 1898 letter to

\[41\] Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 46.
Sir Joseph Chamberlain, Cardew wrote that the house tax was only a pretext. Cardew instead claimed that, “the true causes […] lie far deeper down; and they are the desire for independence and for a reversion to the old order of things, such as fetish customs and slave dealing and raiding.” Chalmers goes on to cite the testimony of numerous British, Krio, Temne and Mende leaders who identify the cause of the conflict as either “the prevention of the slave-trade,” or the ouster of “foreign influence,” including “political, commercial (and) religious.”

And finally, the British inquiry into the “Hut Tax War” offers a fascinating and illustrative glimpse into the pre-conceived bigotry that would define colonial Britain’s ongoing relationship with the two dominant ethnic groups of the hinterland. For example, Bai Bureh and the Temne are depicted as worthy, albeit, inferior opponents who were fighting a “defensive” war of “resistance,” against the British. By contrast, Mende fighters are cast as unorganized and opportunistic owing to their “traditions of predatory raids.” In essence, the Mende are “more relentless and revengeful than the (Temne).” Views such as these foretell the kind of ethnic tensions that subsumed much of Sierra Leone’s strained relations between the colony and the Protectorate and indeed the various people’s within the Protectorate as Sierra Leone moved into the twentieth century.

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AND SO ENDED SIERRA Leone’s first full century; in violence, just as it had begun in 1800 with the Nova Scotians’ labor uprising. Tragically, Governor Cardew ignored the lessons from the past. In his reply to Sir David Chalmers’ scathing report, Cardew underscores two important points: i) he viewed the imposition of British control over the hinterland as essential to curtailing

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42 Cardew to Chamberlain, May 28, 1898, quoted in Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 54.
43 Madam Yoko; Rev. J. A. Evans, an American Missionary; T.J. Alldridge; all cited in Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 54-60.
44 Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 39, 74.
the ongoing trade in slaves, particularly in the Mende regions of the southern hinterland; and ii) the house tax was necessary to raise “additional revenue (which) was imperative in view of the railway.” Indeed, by Cardew’s estimation, it was the railway—which ultimately stretched from Freetown far into the southeastern-most reaches of the Protectorate—that would replace the slave labor that hitherto had delivered the hinterland’s produce to Freetown for the benefit of the Crown. Much like Henry Thornton of the 1790s, Frederic Cardew sought to maximize commerce and profit from Sierra Leone at the expense of the people. In 1793 when Black Loyalists Cato Perkins and Isaac Anderson delivered their petition of grievances to Thornton in London he dismissed their concerns and continued with the Sierra Leone Company’s agenda. Likewise, when petitions poured in from the hinterland chiefs in 1896 against the Protectorate Ordinances (particularly the house tax provision), Cardew disregarded their concerns and forged ahead by exerting increased military backing to enforce the tax plan. On the surface, Cardew’s effort to end slavery in the hinterland may appear to be in keeping with the abolitionist mandate that purportedly led to the settlement and colony’s creation in the 1780s.

Upon closer consideration, however, this move is little different from Britain’s well-established track record of exploiting Sierra Leone under a Western-framed moralistic rubric of abolitionist freedom. At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain adapted its economic agenda for Sierra Leone. At Cardew’s behest the Crown curtailed unfree labor and domestic slavery as a mode for exploiting the economic wealth of the hinterland. Although slavery was not formally outlawed until 1928, the Mende and Temne were culturally coerced to foreswear slavery in order to live up to a European perception of modern liberty. In doing so, they were economically exploited insomuch as they were expected to take on the economic burden in the form of a house tax that proved exorbitant by local standards.

45 Cardew’s reply to Chalmers, in Chalmers’ Report, 1899, 92.
However, as will be examined, Cardew did not unseat slavery from the hinterland. In fact, during World War I, the British used domestic slaves from the Protectorate for service as part of auxiliary military units and “Carrier Corps” troops in East Africa, Togoland and the Cameroons. Thus, Cardew did not end slavery, but he did fan the fire of ethnic animosities that had pre-dated his arrival and would define the political economy of twentieth century Sierra Leone. In chapter eight, I will begin to look at the ramifications this inheritance would have on Sierra Leone as an independent nation steeped in a history of labor exploitation and ethnic cleavages, which continued to deepen as independence approaches.
PART III
CHAPTER EIGHT

The Long Twentieth Century – Independence and Inheritance

This ornament is but the gilded shore, to a most
Dangerous Sea.
– William Shakespeare

A DIVIDED SIERRA LEONE stumbled into the twentieth century on the heels of a rebellion that had accentuated ethnic cleavages born of “long centuries” of economic and labor exploitation (Braudel 1992:26; cf Giovanni 1994). Indeed, for Sierra Leone, they were long centuries of failed abolitionism and emergent labor adaptations; they were constituted during ages of contested ideologies over freedom and slavery. As I will explore in this chapter, the long twentieth century was a transformative period for Sierra Leone. It is during this long century that the colony and Protectorate’s had to face the consequences of their inheritance of British economic exploitation, hierarchical labor abuse and diasporic labor importation. These inheritances set the stage for the rise of Sierra Leone’s latest iteration of slavery in the form of terrorist soldier-slaves; this mode of slavery is indicative of the country’s tenacity for bondage, which followed from a legacy of weak colonial governance and increasing ethnic-politicization of the region’s inhabitants.

In the wake of the 1898 rebellion in the Protectorate, British authorities began examining ways to improve relations with indigenous chiefs in both the Temne and Mende populations in the northern and southern hinterland. Drawing on Sir David Chalmers’ recommendations, governors in Sierra Leone after Cardew’s departure in 1900 looked to include the local Africans
in governing Freetown, the Protectorate and portions of the colony where Mende and Temne villages had been established.

In 1905, Governor Leslie Probyn\(^1\) began restructuring the legislative system in the colony, allowing, for instance, limited self-government within Freetown’s Municipal Council. Furthermore, in Ordinance No. 19 he recognized the authority of a local “headman” for each village in the colony settled by Protectorate Africans who had migrated from the hinterland during the previous several decades.\(^2\) In effect, the law gave a degree of governmental authority to the local Africans ahead of the Krio, perhaps accentuating the persistent mistrust that subsumed relations between the British and descendants of the former slave settler population. Ordinance No. 19 was issued in conjunction with Ordinance No. 16, or, the Protectorate Native Law Ordinance. Together, both laws established the foundations of indirect rule in the colony and the Protectorate, which incidentally were maintained as distinct territories right until independence in April 1961.

It is also worth noting that within Ordinance No. 16, the British allowed the chiefs of the Protectorate to raise a labor force as they deemed necessary. The labor recruited under this provision, noted Krijn Peters, “was little distinguishable in some aspects of domestic slavery” (2011:39). Interestingly, after passing labor jurisdiction over to the Protectorate chiefs, the language of slavery in official British correspondence changed. “Domestic slavery” suddenly became “domestic servitude.” For example, when questioned about slavery in the Protectorate by the League of Nations in 1923, Governor Alexander Ransford Slater\(^3\) replied that “legislation […] has certainly suppressed slave dealing.” However, he also noted that “Domestic servitude in

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\(^1\) Probyn served as Sierra Leone’s colonial governor from 1904 until 1910.


\(^3\) Slater served as governor from 1922 until 1927.
a very mild form admittedly still exists to a considerable extent.” In his reply, Slater does not refer to slavery, *per se*. He talks about the “transfer of slaves,” the “redemption of slaves,” and of “slave dealing,” but not of slavery.  

Once again, the British employed flexibly interpretable legislation to manipulate the question of slavery in order to extend their access to free labor.

Furthermore, the ordinances served to divide the rival ethnic communities. Ordinance No. 19 effectively segregated the various ethnic groups and ensured they remained a divided population. “The principal function of tribal rulers,” wrote Kandeh, “was to serve as intermediaries in the colonial state’s quest for social order and mediated hegemony” (1992:84). Indeed, like the Maroons and Nova Scotians of the early 1800s, the Mendes, Fulas, Mandingos and Kru all lived in distinct ethno-exclusive villages within peninsular Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, the *Krio* remained ensconced in Freetown with their white administrators symbolically looking down at them from on high from their recently built Hill Station bungalows. Persistently, the British appear to have employed a policy of divide and conquer. A policy that would indeed have long-term consequences on political unity in the post-colonial era and perhaps in fostering an environment conducive to slavery through Patterson’s *intrusive* mode of social death (1982).

“Rather than foster the assimilation and integration of disparate communities,” writes Kandeh, ethnocultural differences between natives and nonnatives, as well as *among* natives, were fetishized and politicized by the colonial administration. Not only were native intra-ethnic affairs handled separately […]. In Freetown, ethnic communities lived in largely segregated settlements. (Kandeh 1992: 85, italics added for emphasis)

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4 PP – Slater to Drummond, April 30, 1924, 5-6, in *Correspondence relating to domestic slavery in the Sierra Leone Protectorate*, January 1928.

5 In 1899, Ronald Ross, an expert in tropical medicine was sent to Freetown to study ways to decrease the incidence of malaria outbreaks in the colony. Arguing that mosquitoes “are probably attracted by dark skin,” he recommended segregating the white Europeans from the black *Krio* and African populations. By 1904 workmen had built twenty bungalows and a residence for the governor in an exclusive enclave on the hills overlooking Freetown’s *Krio* population. See, Sir Ronald Ross, *et al.*, *Report of the Malaria Expedition of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and Medical Parasitology*, 1902. For an excellent assessment of European conceptions (myth and reality) of tropical diseases in colonial Africa, see Curtin 1961.
Over the previous two decades, the Krio had endured: widespread arrests during the “Hut Tax War,” a systematic campaign to limit their role in local government, the encroachment of the Lebanese on their economic predominance, their racial segregation from the white colonists, and now the diminishment of their political authority relative to the Protectorate Africans. These factors all served to galvanize an emerging Krio political consciousness that was no longer wholly tethered to British patronage.

A variety of groups emerged to lobby for the welfare of their members’ interests. No longer were many of the Krio elite willing to blindly wave the Union Jack. For example, the Negro Progressive Society (NPS) founded in 1908 became a vocal advocate for the rights of the descendants of the Nova Scotian and Maroon settlers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For instance, as Great Britain prepared to erect a monument in Freetown commemorating the centenary of the abolition of the slave trade—the purported cornerstone of Britain’s West African colonization efforts—the NPS lobbied against the commemoration, arguing that the black people of Sierra Leone are “inly aware” that they are “still in slavery.” This was indeed an act of solidarity with the Protectorate Africans who were still at risk of “domestic servitude.” The NPS publicly argued, therefore, that they “consider an abolition monument highly unnecessary and a mockery of fact.” In a commentary published in *The Sierra Leone Guardian and Foreign Mail*, members of the NPS steering committee stated that “Equal Rights is a pitiful fiction in its application to the darker race.” The commentary lamented that “Colour and not ability is a criterion of worth.” It was indeed an ironic stance to take given that

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6 Lebanese traders—economic refugees from the declining Ottoman Empire—began arriving in West Africa in the 1890s and quickly established small communities in both Senegal and Sierra Leone. Their presence in Sierra Leone and business acumen challenged the Krio’s place as the colony’s preeminent business and merchant class (Gberie 2002).

for years so many Krio traders were the beneficiaries of Protectorate slave labor (chapter six). Taken in that light, it would seem that Krio stance had more to do with opposing the British rather than taking an ideological stance on forced servitude.

In the years that followed, Freetown’s Krio continued to become politicized in a variety of ways. Rate payers associations became strong advocates for better infrastructure and public safety in their respective districts. In early 1912, the West Ward Ratepayers Association began pushing for electric lines to be extended into its ward for electric street lights. That move was followed by similar demands from the South Central Ward Ratepayers Association. And, toward the end of 1913, members of the East End Ratepayers Association began actively campaigning for the election of Alhusaini Nicol to Freetown’s City Council. His successful election made him the first Muslim to sit on the City Council or Municipal Corporation.\(^8\) The efforts of these various groups moved to further assert a Krio sense of agency and situate them as real and credible players within the evolving political landscape of twentieth century Sierra Leone. However, the Krio continued to be politically, culturally and socially marginalized.

**Ethnicity, War and Pan-Africanism**

When Britain entered World War I in 1914, Sierra Leone, it would appear, stood steadfastly behind London’s war effort. “Our loyalty to the British throne,” wrote the Krio editors of the *Colonial and Provincial Reporter* in Freetown, “is proverbial and universal; we appreciate and are grateful for the protection of our lives and property under the Union Jack.”\(^9\) However, behind this patriotic rhetoric, tensions between the Crown and the Krio continued to evolve. Despite the wartime endorsement by the Krio dominated press in Sierra Leone, Governor Sir

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8 WNA – SLWN, January 27, 1912, 8; *The Sierra Leone Guardian and Foreign Mail*, May 31, 1912, 5; *The Colony and Provincial Reporter*, November 29, 1913, 19, hereafter CPR.

9 WNA – Editorial in the CPR, August 8, 1914, 10.
Edward Merewether\textsuperscript{10} saw the \textit{Krio} as untrustworthy. And, like Cardew, he otherwise saw their newspapers and publishers to be subversive. Merewether’s skepticism towards the \textit{Krio} led him to widely bar them from enlisting in either auxiliary military units or in the Carrier Corps; denying them their share of perceived patriotic prestige. Although a few working class \textit{Krio} men did manage to join the Carrier Corps, including the future nationalist hero Isaac Theophilus Akunna (I.T.A.) Wallace-Johnson—whose career I will examine in the coming pages.

Instead of allowing the \textit{Krio} to enlist, Merewether found it preferable to disregard Britain’s public anti-slavery platform by using slaves from the Protectorate in the Carrier Corps [Figure 8-1]. Once again, Britain put the needs of the Empire over its publically professed mission to end slavery within its territories. Slaves, then, constituted the bulk of the Sierra Leone military forces sent to support Nigerian and Gold Coast troops who fought in German Cameroon (Cole 2005; Fisher 1999; Farwell 1989). In fact, as Festus Cole observed, for all intents and purposes Merewether singlehandedly reversed (or retarded) Cardew’s efforts to curtail domestic slavery in the Protectorate by using domestic slaves for military service in both the West and East African war campaigns against German-held territory (Grace 1975:198). David Killingray and James Matthews record that many of the almost 12,000 transport carriers recruited from the Sierra Leone Protectorate “were domestic slaves lent to the government by chiefs on the understanding that they would be returned to their masters when the war was over” (1979:20).

Britain was not alone in these wartime military labor exploitations. Myron Echenberg (1975) suggests that military service in Africa under French rule was, in its own right, akin to\textit{ corvée} (unfree) labor. And, in fact, resistance and revolts against extreme coercive recruitment was a significant challenge to the stability of French West Africa during the war (particularly in contemporary Mali and Senegal). Nonetheless, allied forces swiftly captured Germany’s small

\textsuperscript{10} Merewether served as governor from 1910-1913 and again from 1913-1916.
Protectorate of Togoland.\textsuperscript{11} Despite the military successes of the joint forces, dissent, especially against the French methods of recruitment, were not stifled. This in turn reified imperial suspicions, which ran deep not only in Sierra Leone, but throughout much of colonized Africa.

This was increasingly the case as nationalist ideals began finding various outlets through activism, pamphleteering, newspapers and political organization. Mind you, nationalism in the context of World War I Africa was interpreted as disloyalty since many commanders and military governors feared that African forces might constitute something of a fifth column against their imperial masters. Unlike overt French resistance, however, the impact of World War I in British West Africa was more subtle. Whereas the French were confronted with violent resistance, the British encountered non-violent forms of anti-imperial nationalism. Over the long run, though, the effect was no less devastating to the Empire. Just as the “Hut Tax War” arguably ignited simmering anti-colonial sentiment in the Sierra Leone Protectorate,

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{A British Expeditionary Force from the Protectorate prepares to ship out to the Cameroons. Photo c. 1914 (Source Library of Congress).}
\end{figure}

World War I is a logical point from which to measure the rise of nationalism in colonial Sierra Leone and indeed the whole of British West Africa. In the following pages, I will explore how the Protectorate’s anti-colonial mood coalesced with growing anti-Anglo ideologies among the

\textsuperscript{11} Togoland is now today’s Togo.
Krio elite and how African nationalism and Pan-Africanist ideologies were rapidly propagated between the various diasporic communities in the wake of the war.

In *The First World War in Africa* (2004), military historian Hew Strachan argued that the Great War was generally counter-intuitive to the interests of the European colonists in Africa, regardless of their nationalities. Furthermore, their respective governments’ participation served to undermine their authority on the African continent. War World I exposed many Africans to the fact that the European whites were not a monolithic and unified block. For example, James Matthews (1982) noted that Nigerians who fought in the war acquired “a knowledge of European weaknesses and an understanding of what it meant to be colonized” (502). Strachan likewise added, “The spectacle of white fighting white would reduce the status of the European” (2004:2).

More significantly (insofar as our study of Sierra Leone is concerned) was the war’s role in introducing otherwise isolated parts of West Africa to the political ideas, beliefs and technologies from other parts of Europe, the Near East and elsewhere in Africa. Members of Sierra Leone’s Carrier Corps, for example, served in both the West African and East African campaigns. According to Colonial Office records compiled by Killingray and Matthews, about 5,888 Sierra Leoneans served as carriers in the Cameroons and another 4,952 in the East Africa campaigns.¹² While in East Africa, the carriers from Sierra Leone were introduced to a vast array of ideas and cultures from throughout the British Empire.¹³ By way of example, Frederick W. H. Migeod, a Royal Navy Officer who served throughout British West Africa observed after the war that a music instrument of East African origin had been fashioned in Sierra Leone from a

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¹² The East African campaign began in German East Africa (post-colonial Burundi, Rwanda and Tanganyika, which later became part of Tanzania), but fighting ultimately spread to the boundaries of present-day Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

¹³ Troops from India, British East Africa, South Africa, Belgium and Portugal participated in the military campaigns that spanned all the way until the end of the war in 1918.
discarded tin box and knife blades.\textsuperscript{14} “This instrument,” he wrote, “does not belong to (this) country. It is the common form of music in the Congo region” (1926:82). This form of diffusion was by no means limited to musical innovation. Indeed, political ideas flourished throughout the African diaspora in the post-war Americas, continental Europe and Africa.

In Sierra Leone, the bruised Anglo-Krio relations, as Cole (2005) termed them, manifested into a fast emerging post-war Pan-Africanist ideology. Historian Barbara Bush suggests that “Pan-Africanism was a direct response to the imperialist annexation of Africa and Eurocentricism, and thus represented an exercise in consciousness and resistance.” (1999:14). Although Pan-Africanism is a multi-layered topic, its scholarship too vast to be studied in any depth in this manuscript, William Watkins offers a succinct summation of the movement that captures the meaning I wish to employ here:

> While strains of Pan-Africanist thought and practice range from identificationist to armed movements of national liberation, the central concepts remain to promote the interests that African people, regardless of their locus, have in common. In general those interests are against colonialism, for national liberation, for a united Africa, for the revitalization and promotion of African cultural ideals and for the betterment and uplift of Black people. (1994:223)

Perhaps most indicative of Sierra Leone’s growing involvement with Pan-Africanism and the drive for national independence was the increasing recognition and coverage in the Krio press of prominent early twentieth century Pan-Africanist advocates, including W.E.B. Du Bois and the African Progress Union (APU). Freetown’s Krio newspapers reported on Du Bois’ participation in the Second Pan-African Congress sessions held in London, Paris and Brussels in 1921. A commentary in The Sierra Leone Weekly News echoed Du Bois’ critique of the usurpatory abuse

\textsuperscript{14} Known by many names, Migeod was likely referring to an instrument known as the Mbira.
of Africa, saying that “the wealth of Africa leads to a common lust for conquest and exploitation of the native population.”\textsuperscript{15}

Similarly, the \textit{Weekly News} the \textit{Colonial and Provincial Reporter} dedicated much space on their pages to Marcus Garvey’s growing Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and his “Back-to-Africa” campaigning in the United States. In coverage of his envisioned “African Negro Republic.” He was quoted as saying, “I have a determined and abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the Negro.”\textsuperscript{16}

These Pan-Africanist ideologues had a profound impact on many of the coming generations’ leaders, including the elitist and conservative \textit{Krio} leader Dr. Herbert C. Bankole-Bright who promoted the \textit{pseudo}-nationalist National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) and the populist \textit{Krio} labor unionist I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson.

Albeit a nationalist movement in name, the NCBWA pursued something more akin to a pan-West Africanist agenda, aiming to incorporate Nigeria the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia into a confederacy “within the framework of the colonial system” (Spitzer 1974: 172). Indeed, the leaders of all four NCBWA colonies were particularly representative of the privileged, western-educated elite strata of society (Eluwa 1971). In Sierra Leone, this meant an exclusive rather than inclusive approach to nationalization (\textit{i.e.} Colony, but not Protectorate). In this respect the \textit{Krio} mirrored British colonial aspirations to keep colonial Sierra Leone distinct from Protectorate Sierra Leone. In essence, the NCBWA’s agenda in Sierra Leone was threefold: political representation for the elite \textit{Krio} within colonial parameters; protection and expansion of the newspapers they owned; and the expulsion of the Lebanese traders who had cut into their profits. Membership in the NCBWA was almost exclusively comprised of \textit{Krio} elite, many of

\textsuperscript{15} WNA – SLWN, October 22, 1922, 9; SLWN, April 5, 1919, 12.
\textsuperscript{16} WNA – CPR, October 9, 1920, 10; SLWN, January, 7, 1922, 19
whom were also affiliated with the influential Sierra Leone Bar Association. The Protectorate was represented only briefly by Rev. Max Gorvie and the linguist A.T. Sumner (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

Founded in 1920, the NCBWA was quickly overtaken by more radical and inclusive Sierra Leone nationalist movements during the 1920s (Wyse 1985). In fact, much like the Krios’ eventual fate, the NCBWA itself was quickly marginalized. By 1930, it had been reduced, notes Spitzer, into what was tantamount to “a social club, with a ladies auxiliary” that hosted dances and entertainment (1974: 178). However, its primary supporters, including Bankole-Bright and the influential attorney E. S. Beoku-Betts continued to promote Kriocentric interests through various political offices during the 1930s. One of the more significant ramifications of the NCBWA was its contribution toward colonial Britain’s irritation with the Krio. As noted earlier, since the 1880s, various colonial officials had expressed bigoted exasperation toward the Krio. The NCBWA’s fledgling attempt at confederacy within colonial constraints led some officials to blame the Krio for the Colony’s slow economic progress following the war. In response, colonial policy slowly began to favor the people of the Protectorate (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

Despite its population of more than 1.3 million people, Slater observed in May 1922 that the Protectorate did not have a single representative in the Colony’s Legislative Council, which hitherto had been the domain of British colonial administrators or members of the Krio intelligentsia. To rectify the lack of representation from the Protectorate, Slater moved to identify various paramount chiefs or sub-chiefs to sit on an expanded Legislative Council. Fierce opponents to such a move argued that representatives from the Protectorate would not have the education required to follow the complex legal proceedings. The NCBWA opposed the move
and stipulated that “literacy” must be a requirement for a chief to sit on the council. However, during a tour of the Temne Regions—now redistricted as the Northern Province—a Committee of Educated Aborigines (CEA) addressed the aforementioned concerns and presented the governor with a defense regarding the intellectual abilities “of the native mind.” It also raised attention regarding race consciousness in the Protectorate and colony.\(^{17}\) Offering his tacit support, A.E. Tuboku Metzger, a moderate member of the Krio-dominated NCBWA extended an olive branch to the CEA, backing Slater’s call to include their representative in the Legislative Council. He also invited the so-called educated elite of the Protectorate to join the NCBWA. The offer, however, was never taken seriously, particularly since the governor had already recognized the validity of the CEA’s claims.

Thus in the second decade of the twentieth century, the stage was set for the gulf between colony and Protectorate to widen. Krio elites attempted to undermine Slater’s inclusion of the chiefs on the Legislative Council by instead pushing for the inclusion only of elite members of the Protectorate; elite, that is, based solely on an educationally-selective class system. One prime candidate was Milton Margai, the son of an affluent Mende businessman from the Bonthe District of the Southern Province. Educated first at the Evangelical United Brethren School in Bonthe, Margai went on to attend secondary school in Freetown and in 1921 became the first person from the Protectorate to graduate from the prestigious Fourah Bay College. Moreover, Margai attended Medical School at King’s College in England, graduating in 1926.\(^ {18}\) Given his educational pedigree, Margai was eventually adopted as a favorite of Bankole-Bright, who repeatedly called for the young doctor’s inclusion on the Legislative Council.

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In a 1990 study of Bankole-Bright’s life and career, Krio historian Akintola Wyse attempted to downplay Bankole-Bright’s image as an elitist and Kriocentric politician. Wyse, for example, minimized the import of Bankole-Bright’s “stamp of rigidity on Krio politics” (Dixon-Fyle and Cole 2005: 18). Wyse argued that Bankole-Bright was concerned with the Protectorate as exemplified by his patronage of Margai in the 1920s. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, however, contend that it was no great departure from Bankole-Bright’s elitism to support Margai, who himself “was no commoner.” They write of Margai that:

He was highly educated and of (Bankole-Bright’s) class, and it made good political sense to be in his corner if hopes of co-opting the educated of the Protectorate against the chiefs (a popular thought in some Krio circles) were to be kept alive. (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:62)

Still, Bankole-Bright’s efforts failed. Particularly since in 1924, Governor Slater introduced a new constitution for Sierra Leone, providing for an expanded Legislative Council with three chiefs from the Protectorate. The Krio objected, arguing the Legislative Council was intended for British subjects, whereas the people of the Protectorate were designated as “British protected persons.” In addition to evoking the Krio’s predictable objections, Slater had inadvertently played into the ethno-politics of the region when he recognized that the CEA ought to represent the interests of the whole Protectorate, despite the fact that its membership was really only drawn from the Temne-dominated Northern Province. In effect, then, the Protectorate was becoming politicized along Temne and Mende lines, given Britain’s Temne-biased support of the Northern-dominated CEA and the Krio elite’s (via Bankole-Bright) support for the Mende of the Southern regions. Over time, the CEA became more active and vocal, demanding a greater share in the colony’s wealth and an end to the Krio political dominance (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999). Meanwhile, amid the disputes between the Krio and Protectorate chiefs, Britain was dealing with post-war economic malaise.
**FOR SIERRA LEONE, THE 1920s ARE A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SIGNIFICANCE,**

ushering in a new era of concomitant labor unrest in West Africa. Although one of Britain’s first and oldest African colonies, Sierra Leone had been relegated behind Nigeria and the Gold Coast during World War I; but Sierra Leone’s strategic and commercial value to Britain rose exponentially with the discovery of significant mineral deposits in the first decades of the twentieth century.

In 1918, Royal geologist Frank Dixey was sent to Sierra Leone to conduct the first mineral survey of the region. Although Dixey did discover some deposits of iron-ore, it was deemed that they “contained too much phosphorous to be suitable for use in the production of high-grade nonphosphoric pig iron.” Governor Slater stood steadfast, insisting that mining was the future of Sierra Leone. Eight years later, Dr. N. R. Junner arrived in Sierra Leone to begin a second, more extensive mineralogical survey. In late 1929 he wrote, “during the past three years the Geological Survey has discovered deposits of gold, platinum, hematite, chromite, ilmenite, and other minerals.” As an afterthought, Junner added, “it is believed that the exploitation of the mineral resources will soon become an important factor in the economic development of the country.”

In the 1920s and 1930s, iron ore, gold and diamonds, and the presence of bauxite, rutile (or titanium dioxide), platinum and chromite made Sierra Leone a prize catch for the British empire, which increasingly exploited the mineral wealth of its West African colony. Ironically, however, it was neither the glitter of gold nor the glitz of diamonds that proved to be the

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20 N.R. Junner, “Geology and Mineral Resources of Sierra Leone,” in The Mining Magazine, v. 42, February 1930, 77-78; it is worth noting that in Junner’s time of imperial expansion in Africa, “development of the country most certainly referred not to Sierra Leone’s development, but Great Britain’s.
economic boon for Britain. Iron ore, in fact, was the geological windfall for London. The discoveries came at a critical time for Sierra Leone, once again elevating the colony as a principal reservoir of raw materials over which the metropolitan Britons could lord. The timing of the mineralogical find was fortuitous since “domestic slavery” in the Protectorate was legally abolished at the start of 1928.21

In the face of this new stricture against slave labor, the availability and profitability of exportable cash crops would change dramatically. As with Thomas Peters visit to London in 1790 (chapter five), Sierra Leone had once again been saved by an exploitable commodity (i.e., subordinate human labor in the first case, minerals in the second). The legislation to abolish slavery in the Protectorate came only after ongoing pressure from the League of Nations put a spotlight on Sierra Leone’s hypocritical exploitation of labor in its purported anti-slavery asylum.

Later, a second mineralogical find would proffer a ticket to Sierra Leone’s fortunes through much of the twentieth century, but simultaneously pave its path to the rampant ethnopolitical corruption that led to war in the 1990s. In 1930, Junner’s assistant J.D. Pollet was panning the waters of the Gboraba stream in the Kono District of what today is Sierra Leone’s Mende-dominated Eastern Province. Junner and Pollet were in search of more heavy mineral deposits; what they found instead was a diamond. The next day they found a second one. It was a mineralogical bombshell that foretold of Sierra Leone’s tragic future (Morel 1979; Smillie et al. 2000; Gberie 2002, 2005). By way of an interesting aside, there is evidence to suggest that Henry Smeathman (chapter four) in his quest to establish Sierra Leone as a West African

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21 Ordinance No. 24 of 1927 legally abolished “domestic slavery” in the Protectorate beginning January 1, 1928; see Luke to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 23, 1927, in Correspondence Relating to domestic slavery in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, 1928, 73-75; PP.
commercial hub may have, unbeknownst to himself and others, stumbled across a diamond more than 150 years before the Pollet discovery was confirmed.

In some of his earliest available correspondence to the philanthropist John Lettsom, Smeathman states that he had met a “Black Trader” in possession of a hard white crystal that did not splinter or break, but that “cuts glass like a diamond.”22 While Smeathman makes numerous references to other minerals of interest, including iron ore and bauxite, he did not realize or pursue Sierra Leone’s abundant supply of diamonds. Of course, it is next to impossible to know for sure what kind of crystal Smeathman found back in the 1770s, but a diamond is certainly not beyond the scope of possibilities. A century-and-a-half later in the 1920s and 1930s, the discovery of precious metals and diamonds ought to have been a blessing for the impoverished and oft-exploited British colony; but instead, it would prove to be a source of conflict and instability for the soon-to-be independent state.

Despite lean economic times during the 1919-1939 inter-war years, colonial authorities paid little attention to the smuggling of gold and diamonds in the Bandajuma District. Instead, the discovery was seen as a way to placate the paramount chiefs of the region, who were still harboring animosities from the “Hut Tax Wars.” British administrators gave the chiefs authority over the diamond fields, authorizing them to prospect and harvest the mines in return for tributary payments of gold and diamonds (Hirsch 2001). At this point in time, however, the stakes were not very high and the move was seen by the British as a cost-effective way to essentially bribe the Kono region’s chiefs into peaceful co-existence. Indeed, in 1932, less than 1,000 metric carats in diamonds were collected in Sierra Leone.23 In fact, for years after, diamonds were less important to Sierra Leone than the vast iron ore deposits that had been

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discovered near Lunsar in the Port Loko District. A 52-mile private railway was built by the Scottish-owned Sierra Leone Development Company (Delco) to facilitate the extraction of raw iron ore to Pepel, a port on the Sierra Leone River dedicated almost exclusively to iron ore shipments. By 1933—less than a decade after it was discovered—the total tonnage of iron ore shipped from the Lunsar mines reached 24,550.

In the end, Governor Slater’s earlier effort to expand indirect rule in the Protectorate and the discovery of mineral wealth coalesced to undermine the colony’s central authority by creating what William Reno (2008) terms a “shadow state.” John Hirsch, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone from 1995-1998, elaborates:

These dual arrangements progressively degraded the state’s control and thwarted the development of strong legitimate government institutions to prevent corruption […] this parallel structure with no responsibility or accountability dominated the mineral sector. (Hirsch 2001:26)

Matters would soon become far more unruly after Junner informed the DeBeers’ Gold Coast-based Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST) of the diamond find. CAST surveyed the region. By the mid-1930s, CAST prospectors had learned of the widespread nature of the diamond reserves in Sierra Leone.24

Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazelton (2000) record that colonial authorities in 1935 established the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) as a subsidiary of CAST. The British signed a 99-year exclusive contract with the SLST, allowing the DeBeers Company to monopolize the industry throughout the country. Afterward, mining yields began to soar. Consider that in 1934, 68,000 metric carats were taken from the mines; by contrast, in 1935, the year SLST took over mining operations, an impressive 295,000 metric carats were extracted.25 In

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24 The diamond fields were estimated in 1968 to cover approximately 7,700 square miles.
return, the SLST was obliged to pay income tax—first set at 27 percent and later hiked to 45 percent.

While the exclusive contract was an economic boon for the Crown, in the hinterland it served to complicate notions and methods of legitimate production. The mining conducted under the auspices of paramount chiefs before 1935 was sanctioned by the Crown’s colonial authorities; however, after the SLST contract was signed the chiefs’ mining practices—previously considered legitimate—were rendered illicit. The change in the legal parameters of mining in the region did not impede the paramount chiefs’ mining efforts. For decades to come, the persistent and uncomfortable trend of legitimate and illegitimate diamond extraction occurring simultaneously, would ultimately engender the “shadow-state” that Reno would later describe, since it set a precedent for the hinterland chiefs’ disregard for Freetown’s authority. Along with the mining sector split between Crown and Protectorate, the 1930s were witness to the rise of I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, perhaps Sierra Leone’s most revered nationalist and populist leader.

**Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League**

**BORN IN 1894 OR 1895** to poor **Krio** parents in the village of Wilberforce adjacent to Freetown, Wallace-Johnson was raised in a modest household and consequently found himself near the bottom of the **Krio** social pecking order. He was educated primarily in Methodist schools, where he quickly exhibited a zeal for leadership and activism at the United Methodist Collegiate School beginning in 1911. Early on, Wallace-Johnson demonstrated his

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26 Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood place Wallace-Johnson’s birth at February 4, 1894 whereas Leo Spitzer and LaRay Denzer put his birth in early 1895; the village of Wilberforce has long since been incorporated into the greater Freetown metropolitan area. LaRay Denzer’s unpublished dissertation on Wallace-Johnson explains that February 4, 1894 is noted on his tombstone in the Wilberforce Village graveyard. Wallace-Johnson himself often cited 1895 as the year of his birth; see Denzer 1977: 1, note 2.

27 Wallace-Johnson’s life is a fascinating and important part of Sierra Leone’s development and drive toward independence. For a more detailed account of his life, see Spitzer and Denzer 1973, parts I & II.
acumen for writing and publishing—skills that would serve him throughout his career as a nationalist political leader and labor activist. He wrote in numerous newspapers and periodicals and founded the pro-labor *West African Sentinel* (later the *African sentinel*). The timing of Wallace-Johnson’s birth, just prior to Cardew’s declaration of a Protectorate over the hinterland and the related unrest of the “Hut Tax Wars,” was ideal for his ultimate rise as the voice of labor rights and political agitation.

Indeed, historian H. E. Conway reminds us that wage labor began to expand in the final decade of the nineteenth century. “This growth,” he notes, “inevitably made demands upon the colonial administration for effective recruitment, supervision and control of the emerging wage labour force” (1968:49). The growing pool of wage laborers also meant increased demand for the collective rights and fair wages for workers.

Those demands began to take shape in 1898 when railway workers walked off the job during construction of Cardew’s Freetown-Songo Town railway line. Their strike had larger implications for Colony-Protectorate affairs during the “Hut Tax Wars” (chapter seven). Many rail workers—drawn from *lumpen* proletariat of *Krio* society and not the *Krio* elite—sympathized with the Protectorate chiefs’ complaints that the house tax imposed a heavy economic burden on their constituents (Luke 1985, part I). In 1911, the railway workers held a similar general strike in which “working conditions and (dissatisfaction) with existing wage rates” were at issue (1985:427). The *Krio* workforce was in need of leadership, which would eventually come from Wallace-Johnson in the 1930s. His labor leadership was informed by experiences overseas with the military.

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28 Although limited extensive scholarship on Wallace-Johnson’s life has been published, I relied on the work of Leo Spitzer and LaRay Denzer, who published a two-part study in the *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* in 1973 6(3 & 4). That work later became part of Denzer’s doctoral dissertation in 1977.
During World War I, Wallace-Johnson served in the Carrier Corps, travelling to East Africa, the Camerons and the Middle East. In East Africa, he and the other members of the West African contingent “endured great privations at the front, marching barefoot and subsisting on limited rations” (Spitzer and Denzer 1973:416). As noted, World War I was a watershed for Sierra Leonean notions of nationalism. Likewise, it was a time of emerging class consciousness and ideological polarization.

Illiterate and semiliterate soldiers, having seen something of the attractions of other civilizations, were reluctant to settle back in their villages. Many never did, preferring instead to stay in the towns and become part of the growing working class, or join the ranks of the unemployed. (Spitzer and Denzer 1973:416)

In kind with this trend, Wallace-Johnson drifted from one job to another after he was demobilized in 1920. Most significantly, he worked in various capacities for the Freetown Municipal Council. It was during this time when Wallace-Johnson became increasingly aware of political and economic corruption within the colonial establishment. Wallace-Johnson accused various officials, including Freetown’s mayor, of misappropriating funds from the city’s coffers. The government handed down a swift and punitive response to the allegations, ultimately sentencing some of the accused officials to prison terms. According to Spitzer and Denzer, “the Freetown scandal reconfirmed the British in their belief that no African, no matter how educated or ‘civilized,’ was ready for self-government” (1973:417).

The British revoked the Municipal Council’s right to self-government, which was not restored until the 1940s (Denzer 1977). A move that was particularly poignant since the various Protectorate populations continued to live under their own limited indirect rule via Ordinance No. 19—commonly termed the “Headman Ordinance”—of 1905. This two policy approach to the colonial Krio and Protectorate Africans exacerbated the storied rift that began in the 1780s with the arrival in Sierra Leone of the ‘poor black’ of London and later the Nova Scotians. In
1926, just as the colony’s railway workers were again about to strike, Wallace-Johnson was dismissed from his position in city government (Wyse 1981; Denzer 1977). He departed Sierra Leone against the backdrop of simmering labor unrest. Akintola Wyse argues that the strike of 1926 refutes the “myth” that Sierra Leone was “politically quiescent before the Wallace Johnson era” (1981:95). In fact, Wyse holds that the strike of 1926:

Demonstrates that the Krio elite, the intelligentsia, who of course had their own grievances against the colonial authorities, could identify with the common people as fellow sufferers under a foreign power. (Wyse 1981: 95)

In other words, nationalism among the Krio was lining up as a contest not only against British rule, but over who would lead the population. Increasingly, as nationalism moved to the top of the political agenda, it became apparent that it would be a battle for hearts and minds between the populist Wallace-Johnson and the elitist Krio.

Wallace-Johnson’s activities become harder to track after his departure from Sierra Leone in the mid-1920s; in part because of his clandestine involvement with the Communist Party. Operating under a series of assumed aliases, he travelled to Germany and Moscow, becoming increasingly involved in trade union issues and adhering more to Marxist-Leninist ideologies. Although he occasionally surfaced in West Africa, it was not until 1934 that he remained on the continent to help establish the West African Youth League (WAYL), which championed the cause of workers and the poor in the Gold Coast Colony. Soon, Wallace-Johnson’s published anti-capitalist rhetoric alarmed the British colonial officialdom in Accra, where Gold Coast Governor Sir Shenton Thomas coincidentally proposed a sedition bill. In the Gold Coast Gazette, Thomas defended his bill, writing: “Everyone knows that there are in the
world certain seditious organisations, whose aim appears to be the destruction of law and order"²⁹

Increasingly during this period, Wallace-Johnson nurtured his image as a radical advocate for workers’ rights and the end of imperial oppression. In the Gold Coast, he helped to foster this cache through articles he published in the *West African Sentinel*. Quickly, however, he made powerful enemies among the Gold Coast elite and colonial administration. Deportation was discussed, but international events in the pre-war 1930s offered Britain a solution to the Wallace-Johnson problem.

After Musollini’s Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Wallace-Johnson castigated Britain for failing to take a stronger stand against imperial aggression against Ethiopia—one of the only African states never to be colonized. Within days of publishing a scathing commentary in Accra’s *Morning Post*, Wallace-Johnson and his Youth League colleague Nnamdi Azikiwe were arrested and charged with sedition (Asante 1974; Spitzer and Denzer 1973; Denzer 1977). Wallace-Johnson stood trial in the Gold Coast; he was quickly found guilty and fined £50. He vowed, however, to appeal the conviction, but believed he would not get a fair hearing in Accra. So in 1937 he departed Accra to take his case to London. His limited funds were quickly depleted, despite the contributions and strong support of WAYL members. His appeal went unresolved and in 1938 he returned to Sierra Leone, where he established a WAYL branch in Freetown. With the stark social and economic disparity between the colony and Protectorate, Sierra Leone made an ideal place to expand the Youth League. Indeed, with its populist political leanings, the League was met with great support and popularity among a new generation of future anti-colonial nationalists, including Constance Cummings-John who became a protégé of Wallace-Johnson and pioneering advocate for women’s rights in colonial Africa. In the early

1950s, Cummings-John founded the Sierra Leone Women’s Movement (SLWM). In fact, in 1966, Cummings-John became the mayor of Freetown—making her the first African woman elected mayor of a major African city (Cummings-John 1995; Fyfe 2000).

With the infusion of energy from people like Cummings-John, the WAYL began expanded its political platform, calling for greater unity between the colony and the Protectorate. For his part, Wallace-Johnson agitated for greater African representation in the colony’s Legislative and Executive Councils. He also called for universal adult suffrage. For Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, it was this political agenda that resulted in the Youth League’s “overwhelming victory in the city council elections in 1938” (1999:57). Indeed, Cummings-John won a seat for the Central Ward with 231 votes.

The success of the WAYL unnerved many of Sierra Leone’s European and African elites, including the conservative Bankole-Bright, who was apparently ready for a showdown when in January of 1939 a general strike was declared in Freetown’s War Department and the Mabella Coaling Company. That labor action was joined by members of the West African Frontier Force stationed in Murray Town (in the heart of today’s central Freetown). The strike was encouraged by Wallace-Johnson, who used his African Standard to disseminate pro-labor, anti-colonial propaganda. The colonial administration scrambled to suppress the labor action by issuing a series of bills “designed to suppress anticolonial opposition and contain the labor movement.” The bills were drafted in collaboration with Bankole-Bright and other conservative Krio elite and were rushed through the Legislative Council even as the strike spread (Denzer 1982:159). The new legislation allowed for Wallace-Johnson’s arrest and “detention in 1939 and throughout the war” (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:58).
When Wallace-Johnson was released at the end of World War II, the West African Youth League in Sierra Leone was in disarray, never again to recapture the energy of its earlier years. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle record that this episode in Sierra Leone’s political history represents a major setback in the bid for a unified colony-Protectorate nationalist effort.

The first sustained effort at creating a nationalist movement that would embrace both colony and Protectorate, and address the privations of the urban poor and the disadvantaged, had failed to win elite support. This had made it all the easier for government to question its legitimacy. (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:58)

The demise of the WAYL cleared the way for a future Sierra Leone wrought with divisive ethno-regional politics. Indeed, as much of the so-called Third World was rallying in unison behind a post-war movement for decolonization, Sierra Leone was locked in the disunity spawned from Great Britain’s hierarchical structure of colony and Protectorate.

**World War II and Decolonization**

World War II left much of Europe decimated, its overseas possessions energized with a new sense of nationalist zeal. Historian John Flint writes:

Western Europe, the historical fountainhead of imperialism, lay in ruins, with France and Britain, the ‘greatest’ imperial powers, exhausted and weak, dependent on the financial generosity of the USA. The era of European domination had ended. (Flint 1983:390)

Moreover, given the symbolism of having beaten back Axis-power imperialism, Britain and the other Western European powers scarcely had a moral leg to justify maintaining their own colonial possessions. With the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations, “the moral and physical bases for pre-war imperialism collapsed” (389).

In Sierra Leone, the Crown began introducing a number of initiatives to establish a roadmap for Sierra Leone’s independence. In 1946, the Legislative Council introduced District Councils in the Protectorate to advance local governance and promote regional development. A Protectorate Assembly was also established, which was comprised of paramount chiefs and members of the
Protectorate’s educated elite. In 1947, Governor Sir Hubert Craddock Stevenson introduced a series of constitutional reforms, which for the first time broached the subject of independence. The Legislative Council was expanded to twenty-three members—comprised of seven officials, two unofficial members to be nominated by the governor, four unofficial members to be directly elected by the colony population and ten Protectorate members, indirectly elected by the newly formed District Councils.

The recommended constitutional proposals of 1947 set off a firestorm, polarizing both colony and Protectorate as various ethnic groups scrambled to establish political parties in the interests of their own communities. Indeed, various groups positioned themselves to take up the colonial practice of what historian Fred Cooper (2002) calls “gatekeeping.” In effect, the post-colonial state was left to inherit “institutions—bureaucracies, militaries, post offices and (initially) legislatures” which were weak mechanisms through which African states, such as Sierra Leone, were expected to emerge on the global stage as sovereign nations (2002:156). Sierra Leone, and many other newly independent states, however, were unable to “keep the gate” (157).

Moreover, London’s efforts to prepare Sierra Leone only reified the growing rift between rival ethnic Mende and Temne populations in the Protectorate, and Krio and Temne populations in the colony; this served to exacerbate the divide between colony and Protectorate. By 1949, the Protectorate became further politicized with the creation of the Sierra Leone People’s Party

31 Served as governor from 1941-1947.
32 By gatekeeping, Cooper contends that the colonial powers in the waning years of African colonialism (i.e. 1940 forward) took on a guardianship of the colony’s resources in order to maximize the Metropole’s economic gain. The colony in effect became a conduit through which resources flowed.
(SLPP), which under the leadership of future Prime Minister Milton Margai [Figure 8-2] stood for “greater co-operation between the Colony and the Protectorate.”

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 8-2** Prime Minister Milton Margai (right), pictured next to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir during the 1961 United Nations General Assembly.

In the early 1950s, Sierra Leone’s expanded local representation on the Legislative Council approved of Stevenson’s constitutional amendments, despite rancorous debate between the *Krio* elite and Protectorate representatives. Elections were held in October and November of 1951 in which the SLPP stood opposed primarily by the National Council for the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCSL). The NCSL was initially founded to oppose Stevenson’s constitutional reforms, but soon morphed into a political party with a colony-centric agenda. The NCSL was soundly defeated by the SLPP, which won 15 of 21 seats on the reformed Legislative Council. The significant margin of victory for the SLPP “was the final blow on the waning political fortunes of the *Krio*” (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:63).

The remainder of the 1950s was politically-dominated by Milton Margai and the SLPP. Margai, who was once described as “the mildest and most unexpected nationalist leader Africa

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33 Colonial Territories Report, Colonial Office (CO), 1952, 27.
has produced,” was named Minister for Health, Agriculture and Forests in 1952 and two years later became Sierra Leone’s Chief Minister. However, in the midst of Margai’s political ascension, Britain’s mismanagement of the Protectorate and diamond wealth in the Kono region was coming home to roost.

By the early 1950s, a huge influx of illicit miners—attracted by internal SLST theft—had nearly overrun the company’s holdings. By 1956, there were an estimated 75,000 illicit miners in the Kono District, leading to smuggling on a vast scale and causing a general breakdown of law and order (Smillie et al 2000:38). Despite mining corruption, which was bleeding Sierra Leone’s public of its mineral wealth, the British continued to push forward with plans for sovereignty. In the run-up to independence, elections were scheduled for 1957. They were elections, which were to incorporate a range of electoral reforms, including the expansion of the franchise in the Protectorate to include female tax payers who were either literate or property owners. It also extended the vote to all colony residents over the age of 21 who had been living in the colony for more than six months.

The 1957 elections featured the distinctly ethno-regional polarization of political parties, including the Protectorate’s SLPP, Bankole-Bright’s Krio NCSL, which was challenged by the Sierra Leone Independent Movement (SLIM), established by the Fourah Bay College lecturer Edward Blyden. Some parties, including the colony-based United Peoples Party (UPP), founded by Cyril Rogers-Wright (with Wallace-Johnson’s support) tried to attract support from both Protectorate and colony voters by appealing to class (rather than ethnic) concerns and loyalties. Likewise, Marcus Grant established the Sierra Leone Labor Party (SLLP) for the 1957 elections, but subsequently joined the SLPP and ran on a labor rights platform. And, in the increasingly

influential Kono diamond-mining region, a coalition of elders established the Kono Progressive Movement (KPM). Tamba M’Briwa—who would later become a paramount chief—was invited to lead the new party (Hayward 1972). According to Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle:

> The elections of 1957 underscored the regional and ethnic polarizations that would bedevil Sierra Leone’s politics for several years to come. Krio candidates found little support outside the Colony, and candidates from the Protectorate were conspicuous in Freetown and its environs by their lack of electoral appeal, no matter how spirited their campaigning. (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:67)

In the end, ethnicity and regional loyalty defined the outcome of the 1957 election. Under Milton Margai’s direction, the SLPP won a decisive victory. The NCSL was routed. However, the Protectorate turned out not to be the exclusive domain of the SLPP; the KPM had won all the parliamentary seats for the Kono region and later merged with SLIM to establish the Sierra Leone Progressive Independent Movement (SLPIM). As a united force, the SLPIM pushed “to prosecute more vigorously a political campaign for national unity and independence.”

> Although ostensibly a party of the Protectorate, the SLPP was clearly dominated by the southern Mende peoples, while the people of the North felt neglected in the face of Margai’s conservative style and penchant for political alliances with chiefs of the southern districts. Siaka Probyn Stevens, a trade unionist and former police inspector, began to rally for stronger representation of the Northern and Eastern districts of the Protectorate. He joined forces with Margai’s younger and “less tradition-bound” half-brother Albert (1999:68). In September 1958 Stevens and Albert Margai founded the Peoples National Party (PNP). On the cusp of independence, Sierra Leone was rife with multi-party energy. And even while the parties were ideologically homogenous concerning their shared aim for independence, it was their ethnic constituencies that set them apart.

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In an attempt to avoid what appeared to be Sierra Leone’s inevitable descent into ethnic sectarianism, Margai in 1960 began reaching out to the various rival parties. He established the coalition United National Front (UNF) to bring the disparate groups together. Indeed, notes Fred Hayward:

SLPP had a broad base of support throughout the country, and although its leader, Sir Milton Margai, was a Mende, this did not signal Mende ethnic domination. In fact, the leadership of the party was ethnically quite diverse. While some Creole elements objected to non-Creole control of the political process, this was not a significant problem. (Hayward 1984:22)

Margai offered ministerial posts to the various parties’ respective leaders, including his half-brother Albert who initially assumed the portfolio of Agriculture and later the Ministry of Finance. Similarly, Milton Margai offered Rogers-Wright of the United People’s Party the Ministry of Housing and Country Planning; later he became Minister for External Affairs.

The ease with which these party leaders and their associates accepted [Milton Margai’s] offers clearly reflected the absence of deep-seated ideological differences between national parties at the time […] the concern was to win political power, and then perhaps assemble some ideas for economic development. (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:69)

Despite the diverse and seemingly harmonious composition of Margai’s United National Front, ethnic cleavages and rivalries persisted in Sierra Leone’s pre-independence political landscape.

For instance, Margai’s political maneuvering led to further factional competition in Sierra Leone just before independence. Siaka Stevens formally broke with Albert Margai in July 1960—less than year before independence—to found the All Peoples Congress (APC), which appealed largely to the Northern Protectorate populations and working class Krio. By the time of independence in April 1961, the APC had become the principal opposition party to the SLPP.

With that, the stage was set for a future of ethnically- and regionally-oriented political standoffs
between the rival Protectorate groups who would in turn vie for the support and loyalty of the 
*Krio* in post-colonial Sierra Leone.

Despite the ethnic divisiveness of Sierra Leone’s political landscape and the persistence of rampant illicit diamond mining, Sierra Leone was cut free from its colonial reigns in April 1961.

*Africa’s Mildest Nationalist: Margai and post-colonial Sierra Leone*

CROWDS GATHERED IN CENTRAL Freetown’s Brookfields Playground on the evening of April 26, 1961. At the stroke of midnight the colonial flag was lowered from the flagpole for the last time, replaced by the green, white and blue flag of independent Sierra Leone. The crowds broke out into tumultuous cheering. Later in the day, the Newsreel footage and BBC reports show the Queen’s envoy, Prince Edward (the Duke of Kent), formally opening parliament and handing “over (the) royal instruments, recognising Sierra Leone as an independent nation.”

Unlike in other former British colonies in Africa, the transition to independence was absent of strife and protests in Sierra Leone. In fact, during the week preceding the hand-over, Freetown took on a carnival-like atmosphere to mark the event. Young men participated in canoe races for Prince Edward and young women from the Protectorate performed dance ceremonies. Moreover, during Sunday services blessings were offered for Sierra Leone’s success as an independent nation.

Despite the blessings, harmony was short-lived in post-independence Sierra Leone, which apparently did not have plans for Margai’s succession. On April 28, 1964, the Reuters news agency flashed the bulletin around the world: “Milton Margai was dead at 68.” Although he had been in ill health for several months, Sir Milton was still in office when he died, throwing the

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36 BBC report, April 27, 1961
37 DO 20 1/15, National Archives, Kew, Correspondence Respecting Commonwealth Relations, 1964, 399.
country into a leadership crisis. With no clear-cut successor identified, the prime minister’s death was a key precursor to radicalized ethno-political rivalry in post-colonial Sierra Leone.

With the support of Mende politicians from the Southern Province, Albert Margai was able to use ethnic allegiance to outmaneuver John Karefa-Smart, his Northern counterpart. Despite the brief protests of some Northern Province members of parliament, Albert Margai was sworn in as Sierra Leone’s second Prime Minister by Governor-General Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston. The ascension of Albert Margai [Figure 8-3] catalyzed the ethno-regional fissures that would ultimately undermine Sierra Leone’s post-colonial success by militarizing politics and enfeebling the economy. In the end, it was these two factors that led to an attempted RUF revolution and civil war, involving the terrorist slavery of child soldiers.

![Figure 8-3 Albert Margai, Sierra Leone’s Second Prime Minister.](image)

Unlike the late Sir Milton, Albert (later Sir Albert) came to power by virtue of the ethno-political loyalty of Southern Province Mende members of parliament. In turn, he repaid their loyalty by systematically Mendenizing the civil service. Systematically Albert Margai replaced the Krio elite civil servants with loyal Mende from the Southern province. This move alienated the Krio, who shifted their political loyalties to the APC. Perhaps more significantly, Albert

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38 The term Mendenizing is borrowed from Arthur Abraham’s notion of mendenization (1978b, 2003).
39 With their strong educational background, the Krio elite had long served within the civil service of the British colonial administration. They continued to do so during Sir Milton’s pro-British administration.
Margai also began Mendenizing the military. Sierra Leone historian Joe Alie notes that Margai’s appointments were justifiable since “in terms of qualification and experience,” the appointees “merited their positions” (2006: 24).

Merit and qualifications aside, in the ethnically divisive political landscape of post-Milton Margai Sierra Leone, the Northern-dominated APC took issue with the appearance of ethno-favoritism by Albert Margai. This was accentuated by the legacy of socio-economic disparity between the North and South. Developmentally, the North lagged far behind the South, which APC politicians blamed on Albert Margai. This was in spite of the fact that the North-South economic divide can be traced to the colonial era when Britain poured far more resources into the South in order to exploit cash crops, and more so to exploit the diamond fields near the Liberian border. APC politicians became more vocal in their opposition to Albert Margai, who in turn clamped down on their ability to dissent. In late 1964 he barred the national broadcasting service from publicizing APC candidates or their political initiatives. Furthermore, under Albert Margai’s direction an absenteeism bill was rushed through parliament, stipulating that any Member of Parliament (MP) who was absent from Parliament for 30 consecutive days without excuse would lose his or her seat.

The measure forced four APC politicians—serving time in prison—out of parliament, effectively bolstering the strength of the SLPP. Christopher Allen explains that:

Since imprisonment was not a reasonable excuse, the four lost their seats, as did Karefa-Smart, absent teaching in America, and now an APC MP. Although the seats became vacant in September 1965, they were not filled until the next election. The APC representation fell to 11, against the SLPP’s 58. (Allen 1968:313)

40 Alie sites as examples, John Kallon who was made Establishment Secretary, Peter Tucker, Secretary to the Prime Minister, S.B. Daramy Finance Minister, and perhaps most importantly David Lansana, who became Brigadier-General in charge of the Sierra Leone Army.
In late 1965, Margai attempted to extend his advantage by pushing for a one-party state. However, he faced strong opposition in Freetown as well as from members within his own party, who feared he would use the provision to stay in power. Margai’s gambit was a glimpse into the very near future of Sierra Leonean politics.

**A Coups D'états Culture**

The ethno-regional tension that Albert Margai rekindled continued to mount through 1965 and 1966 until it came to a head in February 1967 when he had the army’s second-in-command, John Bangura (a Temne-Loko) and eight other Temne officers arrested on apparently trumped up charges of plotting a coup. The arrests cleared the way for Margai to pack the military’s command structure with Mende officers (Horowitz 1985).

And then on St. Patrick’s Day, 1967, Sierra Leoneans from the colony and Former Protectorate went to the polls. The 1967 election underscored the increasing political polarization of the country. Indeed, ballots fell in line with ethno-regional voting Blocs: Temne and allies of the North versus Mende and allies of the South. The final tally was so close that it fell upon Governor-General Henry Lightfoot Boston to establish the government; he called upon Siaka Stevens and the APC to form the government. Four days later, Brigadier-General David Lansana, an ethnic Gola, with strong ties to Margai staged a bloodless coup and placed Stevens under arrest. Two days after Lansana assumed power, a group of lower-ranking Mende officers overthrew him and established the Mende-dominated National Reformation Council (NRC).

The Mende-led NRC—Sierra Leone’s first military junta—survived only a year. In April of 1968 a group of Temne enlisted men staged a counter-coups; they brought Bangura back, who was suspected to have orchestrated the putsch, from exile and installed Stevens [Figure 8-4] back to power “in the guise of an APC-SLPP coalition” (Horowitz 1985:476). Prospects were good for Sierra Leone to emerge as a model of post-colonial success in these early days of Stevens’ prime ministership:

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41 The Colony and Protectorate were unified as a single country upon independence in 1961.
Sierra Leoneans appeared to be united behind Siaka Stevens. There was broadly based
grass roots support for the government among farmers, students, professionals, and
workers, in most parts of the country. The APC seemed able to attract talented
professionals to its ranks and to positions in government. The political elite were held in
high esteem. (Hayward 1984:25)

Over the long-term, however, Sierra Leone experienced dramatic economic decline, rampant corruption
and political authoritarianism over the course of Stevens’ 17-year career. The 1970s and early 1980s was
a period of APC domination as an ever-tightening noose on the country’s politics and economy wreaked
havoc with development and the standard of living for all but Stevens’ inner circle.

Stevens systematically strengthened his political stature by building a network of patron-client
relationships with powerful paramount chiefs in the diamond mining regions of the Protectorate while
consolidating power. Furthermore, Stevens gave Lebanese and Afro-Lebanese business leaders access to
lucrative IDM regions (Reno 2003). Indeed, The Stevens regime was the culmination of centuries of
British exploitation, marked by ‘divide and conquer’ politics in both Peninsular Sierra Leone and in the
Protectorate. Post-colonial Sierra Leone was strikingly divided along ethnic lines; ethnic lines with which
Sierra Leoneans self-identified and the British

![Figure 8-4 Siaka Stevens c. 1970.](image)
magnified through its narrow Eurocentric lens. Moreover, Stevens exploited APC youth loyalists as a way
to enforce his draconian policies and intimidate SLPP and other opponents (Abdullah 1998; Gberie
2005). After a relatively peaceful and harmonious multi-ethnic beginning to independent nationhood under
Milton Margai, his half-brother Albert and Siaka Stevens steered the country onto a hostile and divisive track by co-opting ethnicity for personal gain.

Those decades and centuries of British ethno-political and geographic partition—over time pitting Nova Scotian against Maroons, Mende against Temne, North against South, *Krio* (i.e., non-indigenous) against indigenous African, and Colony against Protectorate—was coming to a head in the final decades of the twentieth century. Just as the British had done, Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens pursued ethno- and regional-centric political agendas. In the coming pages let us explore the methods and economic, social and political consequences of Stevens’ iron-fisted leadership.

* * *

**Siaka Stevens’ APC Regime** was marked by economic nepotism, cronyism and neo-patrimonial rule that resembled the African “Big Man” politics of many of his contemporaries, including Zaïre’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, Sékou Touré of neighboring Guinea, and Uganda’s Idi Amin in the 1970s.\(^\text{42}\) Like the regimes of many of Africa’s early post-colonial “Big Men,” Stevens’ was a corrupt and increasingly authoritarian bid that scrambled to consolidate personal power over the whole of the country. In the end, Stevens, the former labor leader, transformed Milton Margai’s multi-ethnic democracy into a dictatorial one-party system that teetered on becoming a police state (Abdullah 1998; Gberie 1998, 2005).

From 1970 […] the [APC] did all it could to stifle the opposition and consolidate power. By 1978 when the one-party state was declared, the SLPP had been disabled by the arrest and detention of its members. The atmosphere of violence against any form of organised opposition or dissent, and the centralisation of power in the hands of the party and the Pa, as President Stevens was normally referred to, transformed the state and by implication politics into an affair for and by APC members and supporters. (Abdullah 1998:206)

The mechanism through which Stevens often exerted repressive power and at times exacted revenge was the country’s disenfranchised youth. As I will examine in chapter nine, much like the RUF in the 1990s, Stevens’ APC drew from Freetown’s *lumpen* youth to enforce his policies.

\(^{42}\) Zaïre was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo after Laurent Désiré Kabila ousted Mobutu in 1997.
and intimidate his rivals. Before proceeding, let us briefly look at the origins of Freetown’s lumpen youth population.

Our contemporary notion of Sierra Leone’s urban lumpen youth can be traced to the 1940s. During this period, scores of “rarray boy” gangs—unemployed and disenfranchised youths—began to coalesce into cohesive communities, which lingered in potes (Abdullah 1998:209; Abdullah and Muana 1998). Although persistently present in working class neighborhoods of Freetown, the “rarray boy” street population began to rise in the 1970s as unemployment soared and the country’s economy collapsed under the weight of APC corruption during the Stevens years; additionally, Sierra Leone’s economy was plagued by its failure to diversify and its dependence on the mining sector. At this time, the lumpen youth of Freetown included many student radicals and marginally educated high school drop-outs or unemployed Fourah Bay College graduates. This rise in unemployment in Stevens’ era, then, created a lumpen population that the APC was able to exploit in order to threaten and violently intimidate its political rivals, enabling Stevens to stay in power and reconfigure democratic Sierra Leone into a African “Big Man” dictatorship (Abdullah 1998).

At independence, Sierra Leone remained heavily reliant on the mining sector, leaving the country dangerously susceptible to global market fluctuations; dips in diamond and iron ore prices in the mid-1970s had a devastating impact on the economy (Hayward 1984). Moreover, in 1950 and 1972. But Zack-Williams (1990) notes that much of the country’s boom economy was built on the single sector foundation of mining, which since the mid-1950s was wracked with labor unrest and illicit mining. Observers at the time of independence encouraged Sir Milton Margai to diversify the economy in the hope that multi-sector development would foster stronger, more sustainable long-term growth and raise the general standard of living in both the Protectorate and Colony in the post-independence era (Luke and Riley 1989).

For an excellent overview and analysis of Freetown’s “rarray boy” population see Abdullah 1998; Abdullah and Muana 1998; and Rashid 2004, 2005.

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43 Further back, the emergence of this lumpen population can locate its roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when escaped and freed slaves migrated into Freetown in search of employment (Rashid 2005).
44 Ismail Rashid identifies a pote as “a place for the pursuit of unacceptable social activities, a forum for political discussion and exchange of ideas, and a meeting point for student radicals and the urban lumpen youth” (2004:71).
45 With an annual average growth rate of about seven percent, Sierra Leone was one of the fastest growing economies in West Africa between 1950 and 1972. But Zack-Williams (1990) notes that much of the country’s boom economy was built on the single sector foundation of mining, which since the mid-1950s was wracked with labor unrest and illicit mining. Observers at the time of independence encouraged Sir Milton Margai to diversify the economy in the hope that multi-sector development would foster stronger, more sustainable long-term growth and raise the general standard of living in both the Protectorate and Colony in the post-independence era (Luke and Riley 1989).
46 For an excellent overview and analysis of Freetown’s “rarray boy” population see Abdullah 1998; Abdullah and Muana 1998; and Rashid 2004, 2005.
1975 Delco—after having expanded the ranks of its local workforce through a policy of “indigenization”—voluntarily closed its operations due to the drop in the world iron ore prices. The liquidation of Delco resulted in the loss of 164 supervisory jobs and work for 2,317 manual laborers—a loss of $1,031,165.94 in local wages to the economy (Hoogvelt and Tinker 1978). And finally, Sierra Leone was also hurt by “defective and inadequate governmental actions on public expenditure, investment, credit, exchange rate, inflation, debt management, diamond, gold and commodity smuggling, as well as a thriving ‘parallel’ or ‘black market’” (Luke and Riley 1989:136).

Although Sierra Leone was a poor country, Stevens inherited a “a sound if poor economy based on diamond, iron ore, food, coffee, and cocoa production that was expanding at a reasonable annual rate of 4 percent between 1965 and 1973 against an annual population growth rate of 1.9 percent” (Chege 2002:151). However, in 1971, as the country’s economy remained predominantly tethered to mining, Stevens introduced a republican constitution, paving the way for his ascension to the presidency—a post that the APC would control for 21 years through dictatorial, authoritarian and patrimonial rule. Stevens, followed by his successor Joseph Momoh, personally exploited the mineral wealth of the nation—their own personal fiefdom, for all intents and purposes—as a way to buy the loyalty of their adversaries, reward their allies and bloat their personal coffers (Hayward 1984; Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999). According to Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, Stevens built his political empire through patronage. This systemic “politics of distribution” was based on a “relationship of reciprocity between unequals” but bolstered by outright hegemonic domination and coercion by Stevens (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999:83). More damaging, however, was the fact that the widespread corruption had depleted Sierra Leone ability to meet its own financial
commitments and the APC’s patron-client obligations. For example, in 1971, Stevens created the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC), which effectively meant the nationalization of the SLST. The NDMC took over 51 percent of SLST’s shares.

The impact of the NDMC was devastating. Run in part by Stevens’ corrupt business partners, including Jamil Said Mohammed, who in 1959 had been sentenced to six months in jail for illegal possession of diamonds. With Mohammed’s appointment, Sierra Leone’s most lucrative export was overtaken by illicit diamond mining operatives. In 1970, Sierra Leone exported a staggering two million carats. By 1980, legitimate diamond exports dwindled to 595,000 carats. In 1988 it further fell to 48,000 (Smillie, et al 2000). Reno (2003) notes that Stevens extended his style of privatization to other key industry sectors, including agriculture, national infrastructure development and energy (specifically oil refining). Stevens had split the economy in two, unequally divided between the legal or formal economy and his own informal (or clandestine) economy. Moreover, the APC was becoming beholden to Lebanese and elite Krio investors at the expense of Sierra Leone’s population:

Far from transforming the economy and society, the Sierra Leone bourgeoisie has held on to the colonial production structures, whilst maintaining a subservient role to dominant Lebanese capital. The failure to transform itself into the hegemonic class of capital, thereby producing a unity of formal political power and economic domination, accounts for the de-construction of democracy and the construction of kleptocracy, fuelled by patron-clientism. (Zack-Williams 1990:22)

With its own principal source of job and income generation siphoned away from the formal economy, Sierra Leone fell increasingly dependent on external sources of support.

Diamond-rich Sierra Leone suddenly found itself at the mercy of international lenders. Freetown began borrowing from any source willing to give: China, the United States, the Arab Gulf States, the Soviet Union, etc. At the height of the Cold War, ideology for Sierra Leone fell a

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47 These illicit diamond mining operatives were elite Krio, Lebanese and Afro-Lebanese merchants.
distant second behind economic need, except, that is, when the lenders insisted that the loan be used for specific development projects. Canada, Sweden and other Nordic countries fell into this category of lender (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999).

The dissolution of multi-party democracy eliminated organized and open political opposition. But banned opposition parties such as the SLPP and the United Democratic Party (UDP) continued to function with the aid of so-called “youth wings,” drawn from the loitering ranks of the politicized lumpen. This tradition of political “youth wing” deployment stemmed back to the initial years of independence. Abdullah notes:

The immediate post-colonial period, from independence in 1961 to 1968, was characterized by a tussle for power between the two organized political machines: the SLPP and the APC. If youths were involved their role was simply as foot soldiers. Their marginalization was expressed in the form of party youth wings, an arm of the party always peripheral to where real power was located […] their mobilization was thus to do the dirty work. (Abdullah 1998:208)

In chapters nine and ten I will examine the legacy of youth wing politics, the lumpen youth and the rise of the Revolutionary United Front. First however, let us examine the impact of economic decline on radical youth politics in the APC’s 1970s and 1980s. As noted above, Sierra Leone’s worsening economic prospects combined with student radicals to coalesce into a potent and often violent counter-culture that Stevens ably deployed against his opponents. Given the reality of Sierra Leone’s deteriorating economy and worsening kleptocracy at the hands of the APC, I hold that the 1968-1992 period of Stevens-Momoh patrimony represents an important point of departure to understand the genesis of lumpen youth violence and the Revolutionary United Front.

The economic impact of the Stevens-Momoh years was catastrophic. Indeed it appears that the economy during this time was not just sinking, but was plummeting. The impact of

48 Founded by APC defectors and cabinet ministers Mohammed Forna (Finance Minister), Mohammed Bash-Taqui (Minister for Development, and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs John Karefa-Smart.
Stevens’ economic patronage to his political allies and his illicit diamond mining partners was apparent in Sierra Leone’s chronic balance-of-payment problems in the 1970s and the imposition of strict austerity measures demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1979. For example, the vast wealth Stevens amassed for himself and his illicit mining partners denied funding to the government, resulting in spending cuts on education, health and other social services.

During the 1974-75 fiscal year, for example, spending on education accounted for about 15.6 percent of the federal budget. But by 1988-89 education spending had been pared back to about 8.5 percent of the budget (Abdullah 1998). Moreover, it was during this time that the relationship between the IMF and the APC regime was acrimonious at best. External funding was difficult to secure for the failing one-party state, particularly during an era of heightened emphasis on neo-liberal reform within the World Bank/IMF. Economist John Weeks recorded that three times in the 1980s Structural Adjustment programs (SAP) resulted in more problems than solutions. In 1981, for instance, a three-year SAP issued by the IMF failed to run its course. Then, a 1983 SAP was cancelled outright by IMF officials after the disbursement of just one tranche when Sierra Leone failed to meet the IMF’s loan conditions.

During the IMF’s efforts to regulate and stabilize Sierra Leone’s economy, the Stevens regime retained its unwavering grip on power through the continued use of economic and political patronage. Indeed, those patronage benefits were either distributed or denied depending on the “disposition” of various paramount chiefs. Those who toed the Stevens line were rewarded, while those who failed or refused to cooperate were removed from office and punished (Zack-Williams 1990). Stevens’ economic stratagems drove the country into an ongoing cycle of fiscal deficits, which devalued the national currency (Leone) and heightened
inflation. Between the second quarter of 1986 and April 1987, the Consumer Price Index showed a 213 percent increase in the price of all commodities (Longhurst, *et al* 1988).

In November 1985 Stevens successfully orchestrated and implemented the peaceful transfer of power to his handpicked successor Major General Joseph Momoh [Figure 8-5], a military commander-*cum*-politician. But by all measures, the Momoh presidency was economically crippled from the outset thanks to Stevens’ rampant cronyism, mismanagement, corruption and avarice.

![Figure 8-5 Sierra Leone President Joseph Saidu Momoh c. 1985.](image)

Momoh inherited an economy plagued by industrial stagnation. At the same time, he encountered fiscal deficits and accelerated inflation. Moreover, Momoh faced the legacy of Stevens’ efforts to divert funds “on a massive—and possibly unprecedented scale—within the civil service,” which was the result of many officials trying to restore the diminishing value of their salaries (Luke and Riley 1989:138).

This economic quagmire was exacerbated by a 1986 IMF Structural Adjustment Program in which Momoh agreed to specific recovery projects to be coordinated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In return, Momoh’s government received Special Drawing
Rights funds to the tune of 50.18 million. The end result of that SAP was an overall reduction in wages (primarily for public sector employees) and the elimination of private sector jobs. Most damaging, however, the 1986 SAP had a punitive effect on the poor. Longhurst, Kamara and Mensurah argue that this SAP limited the “availability of consumption items important to low-income families, especially food.” Moreover, it slashed government spending “in the social sectors affecting vulnerable groups” (Longhurst et al. 1988:25). Additionally, the 1986 SAP stipulated the removal of government subsidies on staple consumer products such as rice, petrol and kerosene; at the same time, the IMG loan was based on the condition that Sierra Leone hike the price for major export crops, including cocoa, palm kernels, ginger and rice. The IMF ordered the wholesale privatization of rice imports, tightened monetary and fiscal policies and “major reductions in daily paid labor in the Ministries of Works, Agriculture and Health” (1988:26).

In the end, the IMF did little to resolve the mess that Stevens had crested and Momoh inherited. In fact, the conditions on SAP loans in the mid-1980s exacerbated unemployment and poverty, further deepening the pool of discontented youths who began to consider taking matters into their own hands. Ibrahim Abdullah observed:

> The entry of middle-class youth and others into their pote as participants […] transformed the culture as well as the nature of the pote from an area for social misfits into one of political socialization and counter-culture activities. (Abdullah 1998:209)

It was as though the IMF—in its zeal to impose the fashionable neo-liberal economic philosophies of the day—was blind to the suffering it caused on the ground to the ordinary

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49 According to the IMF, the SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’ official reserves. Its value is based on four key international currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies; see International Monetary Fund Factsheet – Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), August 24, 2012 – http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm

50 Sierra Leone’s government was one of the largest employers in the mid-1980s; about 60,000 in 1985 and 96,709 in 1990 as cited by Abdullah.
“vulnerable groups.” In Sierra Leone’s case the impact was to create a sub-section of poor, disillusioned and impoverished people. A population that had already endured more than a decade of mismanagement and indulgent corruption under Stevens.

In 1987 the IMF cancelled the November 1986 program. In March of 1987, however, the IMF introduced a “shadow program” for Sierra Leone, which meant conditions but no credit. However, compliance without credit was not enough for the IMF. To keep up with its arrears, the Momoh government was forced to borrow $33 million from Standard-Chartered Bank (Weeks: 1992). The debts continued to mount while the IMF continued to push for subsidy and import price cuts along with reduced government spending on education and other important ministries.

After centuries of British favoritism and ethno-political partition, the socio-cultural fabric of Sierra Leone was further unraveling at the behest of corrupt APC leadership and IMF economists who had an eye on the nation’s macro-economic picture, but not on the impact its policies would have on the people; indeed, those most vulnerable to the effects of SAP were the poor—women and children to be precise. In and of itself, this had far-reaching consequences that only now, with the luxury of hindsight are starkly visible.

Although back in 1988—three years before RUF rebels launched their first attack in 1991—Longhurst, Kamara and Mensurah foretold the outcome of IMF loan conditionality on Sierra Leonean society. The impact on the poor, they wrote, would have a devastating effect on issues such as production, healthcare and education. “Insufficient attention to primary school education,” they wrote, “seriously reduces the effectiveness of schooling at higher levels.” Moreover, primary schooling is critical to labor productivity in both rural and urban sectors (Longhurst et al. 1988: 26-27). In other words, reduced primary education could (and did) result
in higher levels of unemployment in Sierra Leone, which, as will be explored in chapter nine, played a crucial role in the successful expansion of the RUF’s volunteer ranks or vanguard.

The conflation of several other crucial events during Momoh’s tenure in office contributed to the start of the civil war, which left Sierra Leone with the notorious title in 1999 as the “world’s worst place on Earth.”

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IN THE PRECEDING PAGES of this chapter, I have established an analytical framework to understand how Great Britain’s eighteenth and nineteenth century colonial policies (policies I call Sierra Leone’s inheritance) were transformed into the ‘effects’ of twentieth century post-colonial policies. From the outset, this chapter has examined Britain’s turn-of-the-century push to isolate and marginalize the Krio in the colony, while simultaneously expanding the franchise of Protectorate Africans by augmenting their role in the Legislative Council—a move that opened the way for the Protectorate population to exert greater influence in post-colonial politics. This chapter has also surveyed the British ‘divide-and-conquer’ approach to increased indigenous rule whereby ethnic groups were segregated into small manageable political units, but were also kept from integrating into a cohesive body politic. The resultant ruptures of these policies quickly become apparent with the emergence of ethno-regionally aligned political parties in the 1950s.

With independence, Sierra Leone stepped onto the world stage with the prospect of a flourishing economy. However, that glimmer of potential prosperity was quickly snuffed out with the 1964 death of Sir Milton Margai and the deterioration of multi-ethnic civilian politics, which was first undermined by Albert Margai’s effort to mendenize, southernize and then militarize post-colonial Sierra Leone. Margai’s ethnocentric approach to politics was outdone

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52 Although the British moved to limit the influence of the Krio in the colony, that did not foreclose on their importance as a commercial and intellectual class through the twentieth century and indeed after independence.
only by Siaka Stevens and the APC’s neo-patrimonial brand of politics that put northern Protectorate Sierra Leoneans, and elite *Krio* and Lebanese diamond-mining interests above the concerns of the nation. Indeed, by the late 1980s, the impact of Sierra Leone’s failed politics of greed and ethnocentrism created the ideal conditions for revolution and the use of *terrorist slaves* to impose chaos, terror and revolutionary dogma on the already battered country.

Increasing poverty, unemployment (from public sector cuts) and diminishing prospects for a timely recovery were important contributing factors to the rise of the Revolutionary United Front. In addition to these domestic variables, in chapter nine I will go on to examine the impact regional and international issues—war in neighboring Liberia, Muammar al-Qaddafi’s terroristic anti-Western agenda and the end of the Cold War—had on Sierra Leone and the return of slavery to this bastion of British abolitionism.
CHAPTER NINE

1990s – Revolution in Twentieth Century West Africa

We can no longer leave the destiny of our country in the hands of a generation of crooked politicians and military adventurists.
— Foday Sankoh, 1995

LEANING BACK AGAINST a white plastic lawn chair on the verandah of his clapboard and brick house, Issouf Ali listens intently to the BBC World Service on his small transistor radio. During the sports bulletin he explains that he knows what’s in the broadcast, having heard it earlier in the day. But Issouf—a young and dynamic village councilor from Newton in Sierra Leone’s Northern Province—wants to confirm the news. It’s May of 2012—ten years since the rebel guns of the Revolutionary United Front fell silent. As the news broadcast resumes, Issouf stoops down to the speaker, listening carefully to the headline. In a snappy British accent the broadcaster announces: “It’s 50 years for Liberia’s Charles Taylor.” [Figure 9-1] Issouf nods, but says nothing.

Charles Taylor—the former President of Liberia and a ruthless warlord who helped to orchestrate the Mano River Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone from 1989 until the early twenty-first century—is the first head of state to be convicted in an international court since the Nuremberg trials of World War II. He is also the only high-ranking official to be held accountable for the atrocities carried out on the civilian population of Sierra Leone.
Most of the other senior commanders, including Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), his second in command Sam “Maskita” Bockarie, and Samuel Norman Hinga, the leader of the pro-government Kamajor Civil Defense Force (CDC), all died before or during their trials. Sankoh died in custody while awaiting the proceedings to begin in 2003, Hinga died in 2007 while awaiting the verdict of his trial, and Bockarie, who fled to Liberia, was killed in an alleged shootout with Liberian forces. Taylor’s conviction and sentencing was a gesture of symbolic justice for many Mano River War survivors. But for many, including Issouf, symbolic justice will do little to ease the pain and suffering he and his fellow villagers endured at the height of the war in the late 1990s.

I first met Issouf in 2011 during a visit to meet with former child soldiers in Newton. During several visits I noted a conspicuous absence of young men in Newton; men in their 20s, who a decade earlier would have been boy soldiers during the war. Issouf walked me through his small village. For perhaps half a mile we strolled down a dirt road that he said is “haunted” for him. In December of 1998, small bands of RUF rebels—like armed gangs—marched along this stretch of road, advancing on Freetown to unleash “Operation No Living Thing.”

“Most of the families left before the RUF got here,” Issouf told me in Temne. “We knew they were coming. We were warned by people in the next village.” Most of Newton’s residents
made their way to Freetown’s congested Cline Town ahead of the rebel advance. Cline Town, in Freetown’s East end, rapidly bloated with thousands of internally displaced refugees from Newton and elsewhere who sought shelter during the offensive. Issouf continued, explaining that anyone who didn’t escape Newton, including the elderly and the disabled were killed or maimed. Moreover, the lanky village councilor recalled solemnly, “[the RUF] took every boy they found.” I asked what happened to them since the end of the war. “We haven’t seen any of them since,” he answered while gazing down the road. Many were killed, but others became the ostracized and stigmatized terrorist slaves of the RUF.

Unable or unwilling to return to Newton, many of these former child soldiers live on the streets of Freetown or in nearby towns and villages (Hastings and Waterloo, for example) that line Bai Bureh Road, which leads to Freetown’s East End. Indeed, the RUF manufactured a kind of societal insecurity, rupturing the notion of belonging for many of the children whom they kidnapped and transformed into soldier-slaves. Years after the war, many former child soldiers remained ostracized, or, as Catherine Bolten observed of the ex-combatants in Makeni, they were, at best, tolerated by the civilian population even while their “essential humanity” was questioned (2012:506). I will return to this question of child soldier marginalization in post-war Sierra Leone in the coming pages. First, however, let us continue with the RUF offensive on Freetown in the late 1990s.

Weeks after the RUF had stormed Freetown, Nigerian-led Peacekeeping forces known as ECOMOG pushed the rebels out of the capital in early 1999, driving them back into the former Protectorate. Issouf remembers the rebels took their defeat out on anyone they encountered along their escape route. “They cut off people’s hands and feet for not supporting them,” he said. But what happened to the boys taken by the RUF during their December advance? In this chapter I
will explore the rampant use of child soldiery by Sierra Leone’s RUF within the rubric of revolution, ideology and slavery in late twentieth century West Africa.

Over the course of this chapter I will construct a brief historiography of the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone. I will argue that the civil war was not simply a rebel grab for power, but was in fact part of a continuous revolution; albeit scarcely within the West’s modern understanding of revolutions that pairs revolution with an ideology of liberty and freedom. Abortive and waged instead on a ruinous ideology of destruction, the RUF’s revolution was the veritable antithesis of “the modern concept of revolution,” which Hannah Arendt reminds us is founded on the “idea of freedom” (1963:21). Moreover, I will examine the RUF’s seemingly perpetual revolution as a product of the destructive, violent and anti-Western dogma fomented by Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi. Later, in chapter ten I will pick up on the theme of terrorist slavery, which I began to investigate in chapter two, situating terrorist slavery into the historiography of Sierra Leone’s storied connection to labor exploitation and unfree labor. I will argue that the RUF’s slaves became agents of a violent, inhumane ideological revolution of terror.

**Sierra Leone, Total War and New Barbarism**

Between December 1989 and August 2003 an estimated 300,000 people in Sierra Leone and Liberia were killed\(^1\) in three episodes of civil war—collectively known as the Mano River Wars. During those wars at least as many people were maimed or wounded and millions more were driven from their homes (Abass 2010; Guy 2009; Fisman and Miguel 2009). Moreover, the Mano River Wars were notoriously marked for their widespread use and abuse of

\(^1\) Of the many different estimates on the number of people killed in Sierra Leone, the 20th Century Atlas of Death Tolls sets the median at 75,000, with a low estimate of more than 3,000 by the Stockholm International Peace research Institute (SIPRI) and press reports typically ranging between 50,000 and 100,000 - http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat4.htm
children and, as I argue, enslavement as underage soldiers.\textsuperscript{2} Children took part in these conflicts not only as military porters and cooks, but in many instances as kidnapped and coerced frontline combatants—witnesses of, and participants in the mortality and morbidity of warfare (Stewart 2002; \textit{cf} Singer 2006).

The Mano River Wars began just as the Berlin Wall was falling and the world was embracing the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe (Darnton 1991).\textsuperscript{3} It is my contention, then, that the Mano River Wars were one of the first post-Cold War conflicts (\textit{cf} Richards 2005, 1996a). As such, they were also among the first conflicts since 1949 that were unencumbered of the specter of Global Thermal Nuclear War.\textsuperscript{4} The Mano River Wars were unshackled from those limitations that constrained the proxy wars, which defined almost every geopolitical battle from 1949 until the 1990s (Richards 1995). Indeed, the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia with their wholesale attacks on unarmed civilian men, women and children represent a departure from the Cold War notion of “limited war,” allowing for the return of a qualified form of “total war” and its concomitant “decline in moral standards” (Preston and Wise 1979:329). In their informative and insightful \textit{Men in Arms}, Richard Preston and Sydney Wise observe that the terms “limited” and “total” must both be qualified when discussing war. For example, they note:

Total warfare in the complete sense would mean fighting with all resources and all kinds of weapons without any restrictions on humanity […] disregarding completely the rights of neutrals […] Absolute totality in warfare can only mean a return to barbarism. Hence, when we speak of total warfare, we really mean an approximation to totality. (Preston and Wise 1979:11)

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{2} Underage insofar as the United Nations Convention for the Rights of the Child (CRC) is concerned. Article 38, paragraph 3 notes that “Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.”

\textsuperscript{3} The first portion of the Berlin Wall to be demolished was torn down on November 9, 1989. Addition sections were removed in the weeks to follow. A border crossing was opened between East and West Berlin was opened on December 22, 1989 at the historic Brandenburg Gate.

\textsuperscript{4} On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear weapon, raising the possibility of an atomic war between the rival United States and Soviet Union.
\end{footnotesize}
If the Mano River Wars were indeed the first post-Cold War conflicts and thus more likely to resemble “a return to barbarism,” or what Richards (1996a) calls “New Barbarism,” from a Eurocentric cultural perspective, then one must tread carefully to avoid the pitfall of what Dag Tuastad (2003) calls Neo-Orientalism with regards to the Mano River Wars.

In 1994, after an extended visit to West Africa, including Sierra Leone, influential journalist and author Robert Kaplan published “The Coming Anarchy” in The Atlantic Monthly. The article was a harsh critique that argued that deteriorating governance and increasing scarcity of resources in the developing world was nurturing a generation of people “to whom the comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly unknown” and who “find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down” (Kaplan 1994:71). Kaplan writes of the “intense savagery of fighting” in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia (71) and of “tribal” domains (48).

Responding to Kaplan’s article, Paul Richards formulated his “New Barbarism Thesis,” which critiques reductive and ethnocentric analyses of war and violence in Africa as “savage” and “anarchic” (1996a:xx, 139; cf Atkinson 1999). Richards held that the RUF war was driven by a political objective, although he concedes that it is difficult to justify the “levels of violence [employed] in pursuit of these [political] aims” (1996a:xvii).

In an effort to explain the opportunistic and at times seemingly random acts of violence by the Revolutionary United Front in the 1990s (violence that rightly deserves the label “ultra-violence” from Anthony Burgess’ 1962 classic A Clockwork Orange), I propose the framework of terrorist slavery—a brand of violently forced servitude in Sierra Leone that has been facilitated by such temporal and spatial factors as: i) the supremacy of commerce and economic gain over humanitarianism; ii) Muammar al-Qaddafi’s ideological Revolution of Terror in the
1980s and 1990s, and, iii) weak and ethnically-divisive systems of governance inherited from British colonial rule.

In my historiography of Sierra Leone (chapters three through nine) I have presented studies of Sierra Leone’s late eighteenth through early twentieth century connection to slavery, British abolitionism, and post-emancipation labor in the context of the Atlantic Slave Trade. This historiography was presented at length to better situate the late twentieth century’s terrorist slavery as a function of both past and contemporary factors, which inform the Mano River Wars—a brutal conflict that falls within the rubric of “total war” in a post-Cold War context. Bearing our qualified notion of “total war” in mind, I will now examine the origins and trajectory of the Mano River Wars which stem back to the height of the Reagan-Thatcher-era of the second Cold War, as Fred Halliday (1989) terms it.

**From Cold War to Mano River War**

In 1984 CHARLES TAYLOR, a young Americo-Liberian bureaucrat in the government of dictator Samuel K. Doe fled Liberia’s capital Monrovia for the United States when he was accused of embezzling approximately $900,000 (Huband 1998; Williams 2002). While awaiting extradition back to Liberia he escaped from the Plymouth County House of Corrections in Massachusetts and returned to Africa, where he was recruited for training at Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi’s World Revolutionary Council (WRC) terrorist camp near Benghazi (Ellis 1999). In 2004, David Crane, the chief prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone presented evidence to the court that pointed to Qaddafi’s detailed plan to “destabilize Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire while systematically targeting other key nations in the region” (Solomon and Swart 2005:472). Taylor played directly into that plan.

The terrorist camps where Taylor (and later Foday Sankoh) trained, noted Stephen Ellis, were the “Harvard and Yale of a whole generation of revolutionaries” (1999:72). Ellis’ choice of
the word “revolutionaries” is a curious one, for as Hannah Arendt reminds us “the word revolutionary can be applied only to revolutions whose aim is freedom” (1963:21). The objective of Taylor and others from his cohort at Qaddafi’s camps was anything but freedom; at least not freedom as envisioned by the Enlightenment thinkers who tied revolution to liberty. An argument can certainly be made for the fact that Qaddafi was fighting to free his country and Africa from Western influence and perceived exploitation. However, as I will explore, revolution of another kind was afoot in Sierra Leone’s Eastern Province; as observed in chapter one, The RUF had instigated a ParaRevolution, replete with the dogma of revolutionary change and progress for the people, but implemented in such a way that the people and not the repressive APC were the targets of violent upheaval and the rebellion’s subsequent war.

It’s important to note that the RUF’s ParaRevolution began in the Eastern Province—home to the vast diamond fields that padded British coffers from the 1930s through the 1950s, lined the pockets of Siaka Stevens and his illicit diamond mining partners during the 1970s and 1980s, and then underwrote much of Taylor’s rebel war during the 1990s. Revolution was emerging in Sierra Leone, but not an emancipatory revolution of humanitarian ideals (chapter one). Sierra Leone’s revolution was, in fact, a Machiavellian affair in which Qaddafi in Tripoli sought to engineer a revolutionary insurgency by using two relatively insignificant West African actors (Taylor and Sankoh) to realize unfettered violence on two of the West’s most significant West African allies (Farah 2011). It was a Machiavellian affair since as Arendt observes:

Machiavelli was the first to visualize the rise of a purely secular realm whose laws and principles of action were independent of the teachings of the Church in particular, and of moral standards, transcending the sphere of human affairs, in general. (Arendt 1963:29)
I hold that it is this transcendency of humanity’s moral standards (i.e., social erosion) that enabled the use of child soldiers as terrorist slaves in Sierra Leone. I will return to this in greater detail in chapter ten.

In 1989, Taylor put the militant training he received in Libya to work when he founded the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF). Initially based inside of Côte d’Ivoire near Liberia’s border, Taylor’s NPLF—a fledgling mercenary army of Liberians, Burkinabé’s and Ivoirians—made no secret of its opposition to Samuel Doe. According to Douglas Farah, Qaddafi methodically began a worldwide plot to sow terrorist seeds in the 1980s; a time when Qaddafi was “regarded as one of the premier terrorist threats in the world” (2011: n. pag.). Politically unstable, strategically situated and ridden with socio-economic rifts from the inequity of Cold War exploitation by the West and the legacy of “Back-to-Africa” ethno-political cleavages, Liberia and Sierra Leone were logical targets.

James Campbell sheds additional light on Qaddafi’s interest in Liberia when he writes that Doe “became Washington’s man in Africa” and Monrovia was transformed into a high-tech listening post on the continent from whence Washington could monitor Cold War proxy battles such as UNITA’s struggle in Angola against the Soviet-backed MPLA (2007:415). Unable to take his grievances directly to Reagan, Qaddafi instead took aim on Washington’s premier allies in West Africa. The enmities between Qaddafi and Reagan only worsened in the mid-1980s with the Mano River nations caught in the middle. For example, as Farrah observed:

Liberia, the U.S. stronghold in West Africa in the Cold War, was of particular interest to Qaddafi, especially after President Ronald Reagan ordered a bombing attack in 1986 against Libya that killed one of his daughters. (Farah 2011: n. pag.)
This Cold War friction was the genesis of Qaddafi’s effort to destabilize Liberia and Sierra Leone by training terrorist rebels in his camps. Taylor was first used as a pawn to unseat the U.S.-backed Doe and rock Liberia’s alliance with the United States.

A member of Liberia’s minority Krahn ethnic group and the first indigenous president in the country’s history, Doe became a natural enemy of Taylor’s when in 1980 Doe deposed and murdered the Americo-Liberian President William Tolbert, Jr. (Williams 2002). Taylor bore the animosity, while Qaddafi provided the means by which to realize enmity into war.

On Christmas Eve 1989—nine years after Tolbert’s murder—Taylor launched a full-scale revolt against Doe, quickly gaining control of much of the countryside. On December 18, 1990, NPFL rebels “attacked and looted the village of Kissy-Tongay” in Sierra Leone’s Kailahun District [Figure 9-2]. NPFL rebels staged a second attack in Kailahun later that same month (Gberie 2005:59). Many scholars, including Lansana Gberie and Paul Richards suggest that these early attacks support the theory that the RUF was little better than an extension of the NPFL. Indeed, the December attacks came just weeks before Foday Sankoh [Figure 9-3] announced in March that Joseph Momoh had 90 days to quit his office. Speaking on the BBC World Service from inside Liberia, Sankoh warned he would lead a rebellion to overthrow the APC regime (Gberie 2005).

A semi-literate corporal in the Signal Corps of the Sierra Leone Army, Foday Saybana Sankoh was a bitter outcast from Freetown’s corrupt military establishment. He spent six years in the notorious Pademba Road Prison (now Freetown Central Prison) following his conviction in a 1971 plot to overthrow Siaka Stevens (Fyle 2006:168). After his release, Sankoh ran a small

5 Having been founded in 1824 by freed slaves from the United States, Liberia’s politics and culture has been heavily influenced and dominated by descendants of the U.S. slaves known as Americo-Liberians; local indigenous groups have been largely marginalized in the affairs of the state, fostering bitter resentment toward the minority Americo-Liberians.
photography shop in Bo, the capital of the Mende-dominated Southern Province. But like Taylor, he too was swept up into Qaddafi’s elaborate plan to exact revenge on the United States by undermining and exploiting Washington’s Cold War allies in West Africa.

Ibrahim Abdullah astutely observes that in Freetown, Joseph Momoh’s government was quick to capitalize on Taylor’s involvement in the initial attacks by NPFL forces. Momoh used the NPFL’s early role in the RUF as a propaganda tool, arguing that unrest in Kailahun and Kono Districts was the product of foreign agitation and not domestic discontent stemming from rising poverty and unemployment. It’s a trope that has endured, particularly with Taylor’s 2012 conviction by the UN’s Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).

Many analyses of the Liberian warlord’s involvement in Sierra Leone’s nascent revolution echo Momoh’s contention that Taylor was maneuvering to expand his war to Sierra Leone in order to secure access to the alluvial diamond mines in the Kono District on the Sierra

Figure 9-2 Sierra Leone’s Districts – Kailahun and Kono are at the East of the country, bordering Liberia.
Leone side of the Mano River. Sierra Leone Historian Cecil Magbaily Fyle referred to the Liberian involvement in Sierra Leone as a border war (1994).

An alternative theory to Momoh’s foreign incursion thesis holds that after decades of corrupt and authoritarian APC rule, Sierra Leone was in and of itself ripe for a revolutionary uprising (Abdullah 1998). This by no means should be taken to suggest that Taylor did not play a significant role in Sierra Leone’s war. However, it is crucial to understand the part Taylor played in Sierra Leone within the larger framework of that country’s own socio-political and economic conditions; as well as Qaddafi’s agenda to destabilize and exploit West Africa.

Taylor capitalized on the emerging anti-Momoh unrest. On March 23, 1991, the RUF revolution/war began in earnest when a combined unit of exiled Sierra Leoneans, plus Liberian and Burkinabé mercenaries staged their first attacks under the RUF banner and Sankoh’s leadership (Richards 1996a).

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Sierra Leone’s protracted civil war was a two-pronged revolution born of disaffection and unrest that first erupted in the Eastern Province’s Kailahun District in 1991. At this stage it was Taylor’s NPFL that facilitated the uprising (Gberie 2005). However, within a year unrest spread to Freetown—more than 270 miles (437 km) away (Abdullah 1998).
In 1991, Captain Valentine Strasser—a 24-year-old junior officer in the poorly equipped, trained and infrequently paid Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF)—was serving in Kailahun District during the first NPFL-RUF attacks. Fed up with the conditions of the military and the corrupt Momoh regime, Strasser staged coups d’états in April 1992. “It was relatively bloodless and disorganised” (Zack-Williams and Riley 1993). Strasser and a group of young officers took control of the President’s Mansion and a local radio station. Momoh and his family fled into exile in neighboring Guinea. After 24 years of authoritarian rule, the APC was out of power. Strasser, the world’s youngest dictator, installed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)—a group of junior military officers and civilian advisers—to run the country. For Foday Sankoh, the ouster of Momoh and the APC—the purported primary objective of the RUF revolution at this time—was cause only to shift the objective of his war.

Yet, even with Momoh and the APC out of the picture, Sankoh’s revolution had only just begun. In 1993, the RUF continued to wage war in eastern and southern Sierra Leone, capturing the towns of Kailahun, Pendembu and Koindu (Richards 1996). Strasser’s NPRC had simply replaced the APC as the new “people’s enemy.” In a rambling manifesto entitled Footpaths to Democracy, which was purportedly written by Sankoh, the RUF leader clearly cast the NPRC as the new enemy with designs to undermine the RUF’s mission:

It has become quite clear now, even in Freetown, that the NPRC was “introduced” to hijack the revolution and betray the cause of the uprising against a rotten plantation system which impoverished Sierra Leone while at the same time enriched its slave masters. (Sankoh 1995: n. pag.)

For the duration of the war this was Sankoh’s modus operandi, shifting the objective of his revolution of terror to justify continued fighting and violence; all the while facilitating his control

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6 In a rebel video clip Sankoh is heard telling the villagers of Koidu town in Kailahun that the “APC is rotten and oppressive, and it is time to oust them and institute ‘peoples power’” (Gberie 2005: 61); Sankoh’s words are paraphrased by Historian Lansana Gberie.

7 Although Sankoh signed the manifesto, it is widely believed that he is not the sole author.
of the diamond mines in Kono. Moreover, In Sankoh’s view, Strasser’s inept management of the military, corruption and abuse of power justified the RUF’s continued battle. Of course, the RUF’s obstinate military posture evoked a response in kind from Strasser. The NPRC attempted to expand the RSLMF from 2,500 soldiers to approximately 15,000 soldiers—recruited in large measure from the vast population of under or unemployed youths in Freetown (Abdullah 1998). However, hasty recruiting and poor training meant the country’s armed forces were little better prepared to take on the RUF than the military under Momoh and the APC. In fact, many frontline soldiers were so poorly paid (or not paid at all) that they themselves began mining for diamonds in the Kono regions. Many soldiers also took to looting the local villages, earning them the title “sobel.” The derelict soldiers had essentially broken ranks with the RSLMF and cooperated with the RUF. In effect, they were soldiers by day (for appearance) and rebels by night (Richards 1996a; Peters and Richards 1998; Zack-Williams 1997). Some soldiers even mimicked rebel attacks to scare off villagers and loot their residences unimpeded (Keen 1995).

A contingent of loyal and regular RSLMF troops did manage to inflict heavy damage to the RUF and push the insurgent movement back toward the Liberian border in late 1993, but the drive to defeat the RUF had stretched the RSLMF thin. It was around this time that much of the civilian population in southern and eastern Sierra Leone began organizing their own civil defense forces such as the kamajors (kamajo; pl. kamajɔsia). Kamajo militias later became a key defense force used by the government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Responding to a string of military defeats in the mid-1990s, the RUF began expanding its ranks by kidnapping and terrorizing village children and young teens in 1994 and 1995. With their increased numbers the RUF established bases in the interior of the country (away from the Liberian border). Peters and Richards note:
In late 1994, [the RUF began] developing forward bases and launching hit-and-run raids on all parts of the country, aiming to cause economic devastation (especially to the mining economy), to advertise its political program and to abduct new recruits. (Peters and Richards 1998:185)

During this period the RUF became increasingly dependent on the forced “recruitment” of children as soldier-slaves. Indeed, Krijn Peters and Paul Richards record that during one raid on the town of Kambia in the northwest of the country, about 100 “schoolchildren—boys and girls” were kidnapped and inducted into the rebel movement (185). As the situation deteriorated and Freetown began to feel the pressure of rebel attacks, Strasser’s number two, Julius Maada Bio opened peace negotiations with Sankoh, exposing a significant divide between Bio and Strasser, who objected to peace talks. In the end, the rift would undermine the short-lived NPRC.

In early 1996, Bio staged a palace coup that deposed Strasser and established a framework for general elections —the first genuine and legitimate elections since the 1970s. Voting installed a coalition government in Parliament, while SLPP candidate Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah was elected president. Kabbah pressed ahead with the peace talks initiated by Bio. Although shaky at first, by the end of November 1996, the RUF and Kabbah’s government signed the Abidjan Peace Accord—so called because the talks were held in the Ivorian cities of Yamoussoukro and Abidjan. The accord was based on a foundation of power-sharing.

UN researcher and analyst Yusuf Bangura observed that the accord was flawed and heavily biased in the RUF’s favor. For instance, the RUF was offered immunity and not held accountable for the widespread atrocities it committed in the countryside. And, at the same time, the RUF was legitimized as a political entity. At the time, Bangura critiqued that the public

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8 Bio later joined the SLPP and stood as its presidential candidate in Sierra Leone’s 2012 elections; *Awareness Times*, January 13, 2013. http://news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_200521812.shtml. Strasser, who was just 25 when he seized power, left Sierra Leone briefly to attend law school at Warwick University in the UK. He dropped out and since the end of the RUF revolution he has been living in Freetown with his mother; *New Statesman*, February 2, 2012. http://www.newstatesman.com/africa/2012/01/sierra-leone-strasser-war
deserved some degree of reconciliation to make peace with the RUF’s battlefield crimes against civilians. “Article 14,” he wrote, “gives the RUF absolute immunity from any prosecution for its war activities” (Bangura 1997:76). To reconcile this imbalance, the Abidjan Peace Accord ought to have included a provision for a ‘truth commission.” (1997:76).

Our society cannot make progress in the area of human rights if we do not squarely face these atrocities and try to understand why people who claim to be liberating or defending society from oppression and exploitation had to slit the throats of innocent villagers, sever their heads, cut their hands, pluck their eyes off, disembowel pregnant women, abduct and rape women, burn down whole villages and enlist children as young as ten into war. (Bangura 1997:76)

The peace accord was never successfully implemented, stalling over the number of observers to be deployed to monitor the execution of the accord’s provisions. Moreover, internal cleavages within the RUF threatened the accord’s success. After an alleged attempt to unseat Sankoh, while he was in Nigeria (reportedly to buy arms). Upon his return to Sierra Leone, Sankoh responded by consolidating power within his ranks and purging Fayia Musa, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh and Philip Palmer from the RUF (Peters and Richards 1998; Bangura 1997).

The events of the mid-1990s and into the early twenty-first century are thoroughly covered by previous scholarship, particularly in Lansana Gberie’s A Dirty War in West Africa (2005), John Hirsch’s Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (1999) and the volume of collected essays in Between Democracy and Terror, edited by Ibrahim Abdullah (2004). It is not my aim to replicate the work of these excellent volumes. However, I would like to provide a broad chronological overview of events following the adoption of the Abidjan Peace Accord on November 30, 1996.

In the field, RUF cadres continued to clash with kamajor militia fighters, who had become the primary line of defense for Kabbah’s government, which was dubious of the army’s duplicitous “sobel” role. Kabbah had a number of officers, including, Major Johnny Paul
Koroma, jailed on suspicion of a coup plot (Abraham 2001). In response, a group of disenchanted enlisted soldiers freed the jailed officers in May 1997 by blasting the prison open. Kabbah fled the country to Guinea, where he established a government in exile. Koroma installed himself as the chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which promptly invited the RUF into Freetown to form a coalition *junta*. Sankoh was named second in command of the governing *junta*; although Arthur Abraham argues the power structure was actually the reverse. Citing a 1997 newspaper article, he says the RUF were in fact calling shots and that the AFRC were the rebel group’s ticket into the capital (Abraham 2001).

One year later, Nigerian, Guinean and Ghanaian soldiers assigned to the West African Peacekeeping force known as ECOMOG launched a major offensive on Freetown, dislodging the RUF-AFRC *junta* from power. Kabbah returned to Freetown to resume his presidency in March 1998. A splinter faction of the AFRC, known as the West Side Boys, fled into the hinterland and linked up with the RUF. The methods and tactics of the West Side Boys—violence against civilians, forced recruitment of children, *etc.*—were almost indistinguishable from the RUF’s rank and file (Reno 2003). In Freetown, Kabbah took swift revenge on both military personnel and civilians who were alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC/RUF. In August of that year, 16 civilians were sentenced to death, followed by another 11 in October. The military meanwhile court martialed 34 soldiers; 23 were executed by firing squad (Kabbah commuted the sentences of the other 11 to life in prison). Moreover, Sankoh had been captured during the melee to oust the *junta* in the spring. In the summer and autumn he stood trial for treason and was sentenced to death, a move that chagrined many of his loyal followers in the hinterland.
By late 1998, the RUF had managed to regroup with its ranks bolstered by enslaving children who had been captured in the countryside. By November the RUF once again began advancing on Freetown to launch “Operation No Living Thing.” In December, RUF units stormed through Newton in the Northern Province, forcing Issouf Ali and hundreds of other villagers to seek refuge in Freetown’s congested East End. Finally, on January 6, 1999, the RUF launched a devastating assault on the capital. The scale of the violence shocked the world and surprisingly caught ECOMOG forces off-guard, allowing the rebel army to make significant inroads into the capital by using the civilian population as human shields against counter-attacks. In July 1999 Human Rights Watch recorded that a government pathologist registered the burial of 7,335 people who were killed as a result of the January 6 rebel incursion. The report further noted that at least half of the dead were civilian and one local human rights group “documented 2,215 civilian killings” (Human Rights Watch 1999, n. pag.).

In addition to the widespread bloodshed, at least 3,000 children were abducted and destined to become terrorist slaves during the first ten days of the offensive (Abraham 2001). Fighting continued in the capital for several weeks until ECOMOG forces gained the upper hand and drove the rebels out of the city and back into the hinterland where they continued to torture and kill the civilian population for not supporting the RUF movement.

Exhausted from almost a decade of fighting, coups and wholesale bloodshed, Kabbah, a former UN bureaucrat, once again pursued a negotiated end to the war. In May of 1999, Sankoh and other rebel leaders met with President Kabbah and a team of negotiators in Lomé, Togo. After several weeks, the two sides signed what became known as the Lomé, Peace Accord in July. However, the RUF agreed to sign only if Sankoh’s conviction was overturned and their leader released. In the end, the accord did offer an “absolute and free pardon” for Sankoh, who
was later named a vice president in a transitional government of national unity (Abraham 2001:220). Abraham elaborated, noting that

The agreement also provided for disarmament of all combatants including pro-government militias under the supervision of a neutral UN peace-keeping force, the restructuring of the army, and the transformation of the RUF into a political movement. (Abraham 2001:220)

Mass protests against the power-sharing deal with the RUF brought Freetown to a standstill. Although the Lomé Accord appeared to be the beginning of the end of fighting in Sierra Leone, trouble began before the articles of the agreement could be put into effect.

In October, the United Nations authorized an 8,700-man peacekeeping force to join with ECOMOG troops to begin disarming the estimated 45,000 combatants on all sides. However, in the end, only about 1,100 peacekeepers were actually deployed to Sierra Leone due to financial constraints. Sankoh immediately protested that the UN was never supposed to be part of the demobilization effort. Sam Bockarie—Sankoh’s second in command lashed out at the UN, saying it was jeopardizing the peace process. Bockarie was accusing the UN of derailing the peace effort, although Abraham suggests the RUF’s true agenda was to return to the battlefield. Meanwhile, “Sankoh proceeded to register the RUF party (RUFP) as a diplomatic cover-up” (222).  

By December the accord was unraveling as squabbling increased between Kabbah and Sankoh who exchanged accusations about undermining the Lomé Accord. Despite early hopes for the Lomé Accord, Sierra Leone entered the new millennium facing the prospect of more war. RUF fighters under Sankoh’s direction obstructed disarmament efforts by UN peacekeepers;

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9 The RUFP received only marginal support in Sierra Leone’s 2002 general elections, receiving about two percent of the popular vote and failing to win a single seat in parliament. Its presidential candidate Alimamy Pallo Bangura won 1.73 percent of the vote (33,074 votes out of 1.9 million votes cast. Even in the RUF stronghold district of Kailahun, the RUFP got 7.3 percent of the vote, second to the SLPP, which swept both the presidential and parliamentary elections. For a detailed account of the RUFP and the 2002 election, see Kandeh 2003.
soon thereafter, RUF rebels took bolder moves, kidnapping UN personnel, and seizing their weapons.

The UN failed to respond with any conviction; a tepid response that emboldened Sankoh, who by the spring of 2000 became increasingly belligerent, particularly with the impending withdrawal of the ECOMOG soldiers. In the first days of May, RUF fighters took 50 UN peacekeepers hostage, triggering a swift and definite response from the international community. The UN increased its force to the full 8,700 contingent while Britain deployed warships and about 1,600 Royal Marines to secure the airport. Disregarding the international force mounting against them, the RUF staged another abortive attack on Freetown. They failed and were once again driven away. Eleven British paratroopers were kidnapped by the West Side Boys. During the latest fighting in Freetown Sankoh was again captured and the RUF slowly began to disband under UN supervision. The UN expanded its mandate in Sierra Leone and by March 2001 disarmament efforts in the hinterland proved increasingly successful. In January of 2002, Kabbah declared the war over by telling a crowd of about 3,000 people that “Di War Don Don.” Kabbah later that year won a landslide election. In some circles he was hailed as the man who brought the war to an end.

A ParaRevolution – Sierra Leone, and the RUF

If Foday Sankoh’s revolution was in fact a “people’s war” started in order to “liberate the masses” from “the corruption and oppression of the APC government,” then it is impingent on the critical observer to ask why his revolution for the people continued for more than a decade after Strasser’s ouster of Momoh and the APC in 1992? Note, I refer to Sankoh’s rebellion as being for the people and not by the people since as Arthur Abraham recalls, the people were by far and away more victim than benefactor in this conflict.
This war took on an unusual character. It was not directed against its target, the APC as an organisation or as the government [...] The main targets were chiefs, traditional office-holders, local traders, prosperous farmers and even imams. The people were subjected to public beheadings, open floggings, forced labour and other forms of humiliation, including rape of women and girls. (Abraham 2001:207)

This, however, does not mean that the RUF revolution was not a “people’s war”; it was a war against the people and not for the people. In scholarly terms, then, how does one define this revolution? Many scholars and analysts of the 1991-2002 conflict contend that this was no revolution, they argue that it was simply a brutally violent insurgency carried out by Foday Sankoh, a one-time ideologue turned delusional would-be despot. On the face of it that is certainly true; I hold, however, that to truly understand the seemingly inexplicable violence of the war, it is useful to examine Sierra Leone’s eleven-year conflict as a revolution (or part of a revolution), though one not wholly under the direction of Sankoh’s RUF.

What kind of revolution was it? I believe that Sierra Leone’s revolution may best be described as a ParaRevolution, which exhibited and incorporated characteristics of at least three possible paradigms: i) a millenarian revolution, or revolution of reversion; ii) a perpetual or permanent revolution, and; iii) a revolution of ideological terror. Allow me to briefly survey each possibility, noting first, however, that aspects of each revolutionary form are often duplicated between one another. For example, all forms of revolution invoke social change through violence, in contrast to non-violent revolutions such as the People Power Revolution in the Philippines from 1983-1986, which deposed strongman Ferdinand Marcos, or Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution in late 1989, which ended almost 40 years of communist rule.

As an assault on the people, Sierra Leone’s revolution is far from what might be viewed as a classic Enlightenment-era revolution where humanitarian ideals (chapter one) are a principal objective. With the notable exception of France’s post-revolutionary Jacobin Reign of Terror
(1793-1794), Enlightenment-era revolutionaries typically did not set upon the general public in the way that the Jacobins did following the collapse of the House of Bourbon and the French Monarchy. It may be a tantalizing prospect to think of the RUF cadres in Jacobin terms, which Horatio Newton Moore defined as “ultra-revolutionists” (1846:44). However, it is important to remember that unlike the Jacobins, the RUF’s “brutalisation of rural people and other obnoxious acts of war” began before the collapse of the APC regime (Bangura 1997:65; cf Richards 1996a; Gberie 2005). It stands to reason, then, that the RUF was not striving for a revolution of freedom (Arendt 1963); instead, perhaps it was aiming to revert the country to an imagined “pre-ordained order” along the lines of the seventeenth century understanding of the term revolution, whose meaning was more akin to restoration and renewal than upheaval and the creation of a new order.

In many respects, the RUF’s vaguely articulated political agenda raises serious questions with regard to what exactly it had in mind for the country after the ouster of the APC. Perhaps Foday Sankoh—under the influence of Charles Taylor and their mutual overseer Muammar al-Qaddafi—was aiming to subvert the West’s influence in the Mano River region by “revolving [it] back to some pre-established point” (Arendt 1963:35).\(^\text{10}\) Perhaps Sankoh, in some distortion of Qaddafi’s anti-West agenda—was aiming to achieve the unachievable through an apocalyptic and untenable vision wherein the RUF would figuratively turn the clock back on Africa to a time when the West had not overrun and exploited Africa in the mid-fifteenth century; a time before the West’s demand for slaves had not decimated the demographic composition of the continent and its prospect for development (Iliffe 1995; Rodney 1966, 1970, 1972, \textit{etc.}); a time before Eurocentric notions of liberty, abolition, commerce, education and politics were imposed on the continent.

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\(^{10}\) Note my use of the term overseer to describe Qaddafi since in many respects his political aims and objectives resulted in the enslavement of much of Africa by propping up dictators such as Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, Idriss Déby of Chad, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, Laurent Désiré Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as Liberia’s Taylor and Sierra Leone’s Sankoh. For more see Douglas Farah 2011, Solomon and Swart 2005, Chapter 20 of Martin Meredith’s \textit{Fate of Africa} (2011) and Huliaras 2001.
cultural norms of the continent. This harkening to an idealized past resonates with the notion of the RUF pursing a Millenarianist war in line with Qaddafi’s Green Book teachings (Richards 1996a; cf Zack-Williams 1999).

The concept is certainly not unprecedented in the late modern era. If turning the clock back for Sierra Leone was the RUF’s objective, it would be reminiscent of the Khmer Rouge’s idealistically catastrophic rejection of all things and people Western and its desire to take Cambodia back to a symbolic “Year Zero” (Ponchaud 1978; Horvitz and Catherwood 2006). This approach to Sierra Leone’s revolution might go a long way toward explaining why the RUF persisted in its war even after the ouster of Momoh and the APC. Indeed, the RUF successively took aim at: i) the APC; ii) the NPRC; iii) the elected government of Kabbah’s SLPP; iv) the ECOMOG’s peacekeeping force; and iv) the United Nations. It was a mind-boggling continuation of war that went far beyond the unitary objective of regime change, but instead sought a comprehensive structural reconfiguration of the country, and in a symbolic sense, a return to a pre-contact existence. By the same token, the RUF’s ongoing pursuit of violence and conflict may also be explained within the framework of something more akin to a Maoist drive toward permanent or perpetual revolution. Qaddafi’s professed socialist and nationalist leanings were inspired, after all, by China’s Mao Tse-tung11 and Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser (Davis 1990; Pal 2011).

Like Mao’s use of his Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, Sankoh appears to have used his RUF cadres to mete out violence and terror as a means to keep the country’s bourgeois elite—be they APC, NPRC, SLPP or the international community (embodied in the

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11 The Green Book was modeled after Mao’s Little Red Book as a mode of mass political indoctrination.
UN)—off-balance to inhibit their ability to reorganize and return to power. However, in the classic Marxist notion of permanent revolution, the objective is not wholesale war on society, but rather on a clearly identified class-based enemy; for example proletariat versus bourgeois (Marx & Engels 1850). Evidence from the RUF’s revolution suggests that Sankoh had no intention of surrendering, but rather in creating the tectonics of permanent revolution. Consider, for example, that when the RUF’s troop strength was significantly reduced in the mid-1990s, it did not result in its demobilization, but rather in Foday Sankoh’s increased use of child soldiers as terrorist slaves for the production of destabilizing violence. Child soldiers were also enslaved for the production of wealth through illicit diamond-mining, which was then used to purchase weapons from arms dealers associated with Qaddafi (Murphy 2003; Smillie 2000; Farah 2011). Additionally, Sankoh used his slaves to produce ultra-violence and terror, evoking a “clash of classes” in the form of a violent, retaliatory response from his various and alternating enemies.

Finally, the widespread attacks, torture and a campaign of amputations and the mutilation of civilians by the RUF, suggests the revolution of the rebel movement was inspired by an “ideology of terror,” which adheres to the characteristics of terrorist violence to strike out against both civilian and military enemies. This violence is designed to achieve political and economic objectives. While testifying to a US Senate Select Committee on intelligence in 2007, Rand Corporation analyst Kim Cragin noted that for adherents of ideological terror, “political and economic grievances justify the use of violence to resolve problems” such as corruption, injustice and poor governance. Cragin traces the origins of ideological terror to Maktab al-

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12 Since coming to power in 1949, Mao endeavored to keep China in an ongoing state of revolution: first with the 1958-1961 “Great Leap Forward” to industrialize the countryside and then the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) to purge the party of bourgeois elite who he believed aimed to undermine the Communist Party’s hegemony of power. For more on Mao’s use of permanent or perpetual revolution, see Schram 1971, Spence 1990 and Spitz 1968.

13 Cragin’s June 12, 2007 testimony can be found online at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT283.pdf
Khidamat (MAK), which was founded in 1984 by Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam who was supported by Osama bin Laden’s fortune. MAK was initially founded to support Arab jihadists who planned to travel to Afghanistan in support of the local anti-Soviet mujahedeen. MAK published the magazine *al-Jihad*, which “was distributed throughout the Muslim world in an effort to raise the awareness of jihad in the minds of Muslim youth” (Cragin testimony 2007: n. pag.). This was also around the time when Ronald Reagan famously labeled Qaddafi the “mad dog of the Middle East” with an agenda for world revolution.\(^{14}\) Less than three years after Reagan’s comment, Qaddafi appeared content to confirm Reagan’s moniker when on December 21, 1988 Libyan operatives successfully destroyed Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. That terrorist attack killed all 259 people aboard the Boeing 747.

During their training in Libya, Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were in all likelihood imbued with this total lack of regard for civilian life as part of Qaddafi’s ideology of terror. Similarly, Bin Laden’s terrorist movement exhibited an ability and willingness to target and kill civilians during the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Three years later, the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center towers and Pentagon exhibited a chilling disregard for human life; nearly 3,000 people were killed in those attacks. Dozens of other terrorist attacks affiliated with al-Qaeda have targeted civilians in train and bus terminals in Europe, at tourist resorts in Asia, and throughout the Middle East. Qaddafi, bin Laden and other copycat terrorists have shown that in the case of ideological terror, civilians casualties are no longer “collateral damage,” they have become an expendable resource. In a revolution of ideological terror, “the people” are of concern to the revolutionaries only insomuch as they can be deployed as human shields or as targets of horrific violence and attack.

I have briefly introduced these three possible manifestations of revolution—millenarian, permanent and ideological terror—to help evaluate what kind of revolution the RUF was pursuing from 1991 until 2002. In my view, the Revolutionary United Front was waging a revolution that possessed elements of all three strains of revolution at once. Together, I propose they constitute what I call a ParaRevolution.

* * *

AS NOTED IN CHAPTER TWO, a ParaRevolution is the juxtaposition of professed ideals over realized action and outcome; it is a revolution that touts all the rhetoric and dogma of progressive revolutionary change in the form of a “people’s war.” However, the ParaRevolution not only fails to deliver on its ideological objectives of post-eighteenth century revolutions (e.g., liberty, freedom, justice, equality) but methodically undermines the movement into the veritable antithesis of those idealized aims. When Sankoh launched his rebellion in Kailahun back in March 1991, Sierra Leone was undoubtedly ripe for revolution. As seen in chapter eight, Sierra Leone was clearly in a state of decline—a veritable economic free fall, in fact. As such, it was a prime candidate to pursue a millenarian upheaval of the established socio-political and economic structure in order to pursue “futuristic idealism and populism” based on an idealized past (Zack-Williams 1999:148).

Moral decay, elitist society and corrupt politics certainly informed Sankoh’s drive to reform Sierra Leonean society. Indeed, in its manifesto statement, the RUF articulated vaguely Millenarianist motives (Richards 1996a; Zack-Williams 1999). Consider, for example the RUF’s ideas expressed in Footpaths to Democracy:

The only way to stop [the] corruption of power is for the people to take up arms in order to take back their power and use this power to create wealth for themselves and generations to come by reconstructing a new African society in Sierra Leone
consistent with the highest ideals of our glorious past and the challenges of the
modern world we live in. (Sankoh 1995: n. pag.)

This notion of “reconstructing” a new African society is a conflation of both the seventeenth
century idea of returning to a previous order and the contemporary concept of formulating a new
order (Williams 1976; Arendt 1963). Somehow this jumbled pursuit seems to constitute the aim
of Sankoh’s ParaRevolutionary drive. If Sankoh’s objective, for example, was to use the RUF to
symbolically liberate the country from its history of colonial (i.e., foreign) oppression, he instead
paradoxically consigned the people of his country to a present and perhaps future of utter
dependence on foreign and multinational aid in order for the country to rebuild its devastated
economy and infrastructure.

If in the beginning Sankoh sought to redress the wrongs of Britain’s exploitation of Sierra
Leone’s people and resources, over the course of the war he instead created a new form of elitist
resource exploitation by commandeering the country’s diamond wealth for the expansion and
continual re-armament of his RUF cadres. Moreover, if Sankoh was pursuing his own brand of
permanent revolution to destabilize society (perpetuating clear class-based divisions), he instead
unified the country’s disparate class and ethnic groups—from urban petty bourgeois to rural
peasantry—under a blanket of indiscriminant violence and victimization. Thus, as noted
previously, the RUF revolution in its origins exhibited the philosophical traits of permanent and
millenarian revolution, with class conscious and humanitarian objectives. However, Sankoh and
the RUF paradoxically veered off path and achieved the opposite.

I believe that one of the principal elements which render the RUF’s revolution
paradoxical was Sankoh’s exploitation of children as slaves (terrorist slaves) who were both
agents and victims of terror. Sankoh, in his own words, professes his movement’s desire to rid
the country of its “slave master” class. However, by forcing kidnapped and drugged children into
combat and coerced labor, Sankoh and many of his “volunteer” vanguard commanders paradoxically became a new class of master who lorded over their terrorist slaves.

The vanguard of the RUF was split into two sub-categories. Historian Ibrahim Abdullah contends that the original “volunteer” vanguard consisted of the Libyan-trained revolutionary-cum-terrorists such as Sankoh and his aides-de-camp, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray. Together they formed the RUF’s war council. The vanguard’s second group consisted of lumpen Sierra Leonean youth who had migrated to Liberia before the war and then returned to lead their abortive revolution. This lumpen youth was later reinforced by numerous under- or unpaid foot soldiers from the RSLMF. It was these disenchanted enlisted men who turned to a “sobel’s” life simply to subsist, while holding up appearances of fighting the RUF in the hinterland (Abudullah and Mulana 1998). In 1991 they were supported by Taylor’s NPFL and Burkinabé mercenaries, which were known as the “special forces” (Abdullah 1998, 2004). As previously indicated, in the context of Sierra Leone’s dire economic straits and youth unemployment, the term volunteer must be considered with some degree of skepticism.

Corinne Dufka (2005) and Claudia Seymour (2009) urge scholars to take the notion of youth volunteering for armed conflict with a contextualizing grain of salt. Based on her work with youth in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s North Kivu region, Seymour argues that youth volunteering must be seen in a context of “limited choices.” Indeed, she observes that the choices youth “may have to make in conflict contexts are only the least worst of a series of harsh possibilities” (5). Given the rates of unemployment, poverty, limited educational opportunities and complete disenfranchisement, the same argument holds true in places such as the Mano River Region. Whether coerced or free volunteers, these vanguard insurgents took on the
contemporary role of slave-raider, acquiring their *terrorist slaves* through military conquest and kidnapping.

Recall that during the Atlantic Slave Trade, the predominant source of slaves came from kidnapping and through capture in war (Law 1989; Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Lovejoy 1983, *etc.*). War captives were by their nature alien to their captors (and thus enslaveable), but kidnapping required that the victim be taken “far from his home, where he could not be claimed by kinsmen or find his way back” (Miers and Kopytoff 1977:13). In the next chapter I will explore how the RUF’s vanguard slave raiders deployed a similar tactic of kidnapping coupled with the murder of the slave’s immediate family members, rendering these child soldiers both captives of war and victims of kidnapping. In the final section of this chapter, I will examine child soldiery within the framework of slavery based on the accounts of several former combatants whom I interviewed as a journalist during the war in the 1990s and later while conducting field research in Sierra Leone in 2008 and 2010. I will also explore the notion of the liminal mode of social death for these former combatants and its long-term implications.

Aside from the semantics of volunteerism, it is important to note that it was the blend of *lumpen* or *rarray* boy “thuggery” and emerging revolutionary discourse that led to the early creation and expansion (on a purportedly voluntary basis) of the Revolutionary United Front in the late 1980s. In fact, it is important to recall that a small, but crucial cross-section of educated youth intellectually transformed *rarray* boy street gangs from *potes* into a political vanguard that drove the RUF’s revolutionary agenda. Abdullah notes:

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15 In this instance, I mean a captive of war in metaphysical sense insomuch as the children were not enemies of the RUF, but nonetheless became captives of the violence of war.

16 Ibrahim Abdullah identifies *rarray* boy as a pejorative term for ‘underclass’ youth (*i.e.*, subalternt); a pote, as noted in chapter eight, is essentially a place to pursue unacceptable social activities (*e.g.*, drinking, smoking, gambling, *etc.*)
Pote discourse was spiced with generous quotes from Marcus Garvey, Bob Marley, Kwame Nkrumah, Wallace-Johnson, and at times Haile Selassie. Some of these pote types had read Kwame Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon, a bit of Che Guavara and Fidel Castro, and some undigested Marx and Lenin. (Abdullah 1998:209)

It is indeed ironic that such seminal literature that emphasized anti-imperial notions of liberation and equality played an early and important role in shaping the RUF—a role that later was so absolutely jettisoned by the RUF that the rebel movement degenerated into a contemporary slave raiding insurgency.

In the previous pages I have established the contextual framework—the Mano River Wars and the RUF’s ParaRevolution—which allowed for the dramatic and devastating return of slavery to Sierra Leone in the late twentieth century. In chapter ten I will take a more detailed look at terrorist slavery as the latest iteration of slavery in Sierra Leone’s history and ongoing development of the country that was established in the late eighteenth century as an asylum for freed slaves and later a haven for tens of thousands of “re-captured” slaves through the nineteenth century.
CHAPTER TEN

Terrorist Slavery: A Case Study

The best way to protect children from wars is to prevent conflict [...] Once war erupts, all efforts to protect children can only mitigate, not prevent, children's suffering.

—Graça Macel, 2001

ONE OF THE PRIMARY objectives of this study has been to connect Sierra Leone’s distant past of slavery and slave-trading with its most contemporary iteration of slavery as manifest in the form of child soldiery. In this final chapter, I aim to examine terrorist slavery more closely within the confines of the Post-Cold War setting. Although not a part of the country’s distant past, I contend that terrorist slavery must be included in the larger historiography of the country since it is a product of the Sierra Leone’s inheritance from British colonial rule and it represents yet another example of labor exploitation in a country founded on the principle of eradicating slavery, a principle that allowed for an influx of “recaptives” who were in turn used as unfree laborers in a colony that became a laboratory for unfree labor schemes. Although not directly connected to Sierra Leone’s slaving past, terrorist slavery is a product of the larger whole of the country’s ongoing historical trajectory away from the principles upon which it was founded.

DURING SIERRA LEONE’S REVOLUTIONARY civil war an estimated 5,000 to 10,0001 children or youth were “volunteer” or enslaved participants in the RUF; they were exploited in a

variety of ways: as porters or cooks, as sex slaves, war brides and of course, combatants. Peter Singer observed that when old and strong enough, most children were expected to become full-fledged rebel fighters trained for close quarter combat and goaded or threatened into terrorizing their countrymen and women (2006a). Today, throughout the country, many former child war veterans and victims struggle to move on with their lives. No longer children, but not yet “adults” in a socially recognized way, they linger in “liminality”—that ambiguously marginal state in which an individual “does not occupy a recognized social category” (Honwana 2006:114, cf Turner 1967).

In the remainder of this chapter I aim to explicate my theoretical formulation of child soldiers as terrorist slaves and their affiliation with violent and coercive social upheaval. Moreover, I will argue that biological age in wartime Sierra Leone was, for all intents and purposes, rendered meaningless by virtue of the fact that children were being initiated into the insurgent RUF through ceremonial and ritual practices that replicated the transformative rites commonly used by various ethnic groups in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. However, as previously noted, these rites created a rupture with society rather than a passage into society as a transformed and productive member of community à la Van Gennep (1960) or Victor Turner (1967, 1969). Indeed, I will examine and analyze the fact that Sankoh’s RUF was not simply replicating these transformative rites, but distorting them to help create the conditions for terrorist slavery. The RUF created ruptures in the initiation system; ruptures that left initiates in a permanent state of liminality: no longer child, but neither adult. Take for example the case of Emmanuel, a young former RUF fighter who was taken from his home village near Makeni in the Northern Province in the mid-1990s and eventually transformed into a child soldier, or terrorist slave of Sankoh’s ParaRevolution.
With small geckos skittering near his feet, Emmanuel sat on a rusting lawn chair under the sagging branches of a mango tree. In 2008, more than six years after the UN brokered a ceasefire in Sierra Leone, Emmanuel was still without a job. Like many former child soldiers he lived near Hastings about 12 miles (19 km) from Freetown. The roundtrip journey can take hours along congested roads in a *poda-poda* (public mini bus). In Hastings, Emmanuel ekes out a living on the streets selling cocaine, stolen cigarettes, or marijuana. In post-war Sierra Leone, he’s a pariah; uneducated and unattached to a family, he has few hopes for employment and his violent past makes him too great a risk to re-enter a classroom.

Tucked away in the shady undergrowth of a backstreet alley, Emmanuel sought shelter from both the unrelenting summer sun and from the prying eyes of curious onlookers on a bustling road in Western Freetown’s Aberdeen District. Beads of perspiration formed on his brow even as he used a weathered beige baseball cap to mop away the sweat. He recalled the day he was pressed into military duty for the RUF: “They came to my village,” he said apprehensively, eyes constantly scanning his environs. He recounted that when they came to his home village in Northern Sierra Leone in 1997 he was only fifteen.

They killed my mother; they killed my father. They injected my arm. I was not by myself when they injected me; I was with a group of other people. They gave me [a] gun to fight. I attacked villages when we had no food. We shoot into the air to scare people away and take their food.²

Emmanuel pulled up his torn grey t-shirt to reveal the raised scars that spelled out the letters RUF on his chest. Recall from chapter two that during the war it was not uncommon for these kidnapped soldier-slaves to be separated from their families, tortured and “branded” in such a way as to permanently associate them with the rebel group. Not unlike the Kachin in Burma and

² 2008 interview with author; translated from Temne. It was common practice for the RUF rebels to inject cocaine, morphine or brown-brown—a potent blend of either of the two with gunpowder into the arms, legs or chest of kidnapped children in order to reduce their resistance to joining the group and ultimately going through a series of initiation rites.
other groups, including plantation slaves in the Antebellum South, the RUF’s terrorist slaves were branded as a form of both inclusion and exclusion. Branding of RUF initiates is also akin to initiation practices for the Pororo secret societies of the Mende and Temne or the Belli of the Vai (Little 1951, 1965, 1966; Dorjahn 1959, 1960, 1961).³

The results, however, are dramatically different. In Pororo rituals, young “boys” between the age of seven and twenty are selected for initiation. They are taken from their natal community to a secluded “Bush School” where they receive their name after having been symbolically pulled into a ceremonial ring. Part of the initiation also includes a marking ceremony in which the candidates are “thrown roughly to the ground” and given “marks of membership” with the use of a hook, “which raises the skin, or by a razor” (Little 1951:119-120, cf 1965, 1966).

The steps of the Pororo initiation are remarkably akin to the RUF initiation rituals, which follow closely along the lines of what Orlando Patterson termed the ritual of enslavement. This ritual incorporates at least one and often several of the following basic features: i) a symbolic rejection of the initiate or slave’s past; ii) change of name; iii) imposition of a visible mark of membership or servitude; iv) assumption of a new social or economic status within the Pororo or the master’s household or economic organization. This is not to suggest that Pororo members were themselves bound for slavery, instead, I am interested in the similarities in the initiation procedures into these Sierra Leonean secret societies and slavery, be it as domestic slaves within a Mende kin lineage in the nineteenth century context or as a terrorist slave in the late twentieth century.

³ Vernon Dorjahn (1959, 1960) has identified that in addition to the Pororo, Temne secret societies also include the Ramena and Regbenle; for an excellent overview of secret societies in Sierra Leone and West Africa, see Frederick W. Butt-Thompson 1929.
Although not universally applied, many of Sierra Leone’s *terrorist slaves* were renamed, branded and, as I will show, forced to sever ties with their past by killing or maiming a family member as part of an initiation ritual. I contend these markings of membership within the RUF consigned these child soldier slaves into a perpetual state of liminality in their post-war natal communities. “Branding” comprised a primary *rite of rupture* through which young RUF fighters had to pass in order for them to be deemed—in the eyes of their rebel commanders—adult warriors ready for battle regardless of their biological immaturity.

This perception of the child soldiers as adult warriors led them to become incorporated members of the RUF, just as young initiates were incorporated into the various Mende and Temne *Poro* (and into adulthood). Jean La Fountaine observed, the “purpose of rites of passage is to change individuals” (1977:421). The question here is: change into what? In the context of war-time Sierra Leone these rites functioned to transform outsider free civilian into incorporated and enslaved warrior. I believe the RUF’s initiation mimicked the ceremonial passage into adulthood for many children. Indeed, these rites, whether or not intentionally invoked by the RUF, functioned as what Arnold Van Gennep described as a transitory threshold (1960:21) from one state to another (*i.e.*, *preliminal to liminal*). However, the RUF’s ritual process served two functions – to incorporate terrorist slaves within the rebel movement’s folds, and to rupture the child’s ability to re-integrate into their natal community following the war. In this sense, the RUF was creating a bifurcated individual—one incorporated into the rebel group and the other perpetually *liminal* and rejected. This phenomenon points to Max Gluckman’s (1962) observation that Van Gennep’s study of rites was incomplete. In fact, my construction of the duality of a *rite of rupture* draws more on the model proposed by Meyer Fortes (1962). Fortes

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4 Paul Richards, Khadija Bah and James Vincent 2011 also drew comparisons between traditional induction rites and the initiation function of the kamajor, or Mende traditional hunter societies during their period as the Civil Defense Force (CDF) allied to Ahmed Tejan Kabbah’s government.
noted that Van Gennep envisioned rites to be a “means of marking and organizing the transition from childhood to socially recognized adulthood.” By contrast, Fortes proposed that rites “are the means of divesting a person of his status as a child and investing him with the status of actual or potential citizen in the politico-jural domain” (87). It is in this sense of stripping an individual of their childhood in order to imbue them with a new status, though not necessarily only as an adult that helps to illuminate my construction of rites of rupture.

Moreover, under the circumstance of Sierra Leone’s disrupted and dysfunctional national economy, the RUF may be seen as serving to partially replace the eroding system of traditional rites in the post-colony. Mamadou Diouf has drawn a link between economic decay and the erosion of customary practices in post-colonial Africa.

As national models of economic development proved to be inadequate or irrelevant, so did customary rites of socialization through work or education [...] At the same time, traditional rites of initiation increasingly were associated with, or characterized by, surveillance, harassment, and repression, which foreshadowed new forms of both public and domestic violence. (Diouf 2003:4)

However tempting it may be to associate the RUF’s actions with Van Gennep and Victor Turner’s notions of initiation, it is equally important to recognize the points where the RUF’s actions deviate from their theoretical frameworks. For that reason I will chart out the limits of linking RUF initiation with other systems of traditional rites. First, however, I will outline the similarities.

As previously noted, the RUF and Poro initiation involved physical branding or scarring, a practice that can be observed in many African initiation rituals such as those for a Nuer boy as part of his transformation into manhood (Evans-Pritchard 1940). Van Gennep records that “mutilations” are not uncommon as part of many initiation rites in which “mutilating any part of the body [modifies] the individual in a manner visible to all” (Van Gennep 1960:71). During
Sierra Leone’s ParaRevolutionary period, the effect of the scarring was indeed visible and terrifying for the civilian population that was victimized by these terrorist slaves. The mark of the RUF constituted a profound and permanent rupture with society; rendering inclusion in the rebel group permanent and visible, while simultaneously excluding the marked from society at large. In post-war Sierra Leone the mark of the RUF is not unlike a permanent Scarlet Letter.\(^5\)

During the war, deserters were easily identified by the brand and summarily executed by RUF loyalists, and/or quickly spotted by fearful civilians who would either flee from them or kill them as presumed rebels. The purpose and effect of the RUF branding is echoed by Ishmael Beah, a former child soldier from Sierra Leone. In his memoir *A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier*, Beah described the rationale behind the scarring:

> The initials RUF were carved wherever it pleased the rebels, with a hot bayonet. This not only meant that you were scarred for life but that you could never escape from them, because escaping with the carving of the rebels’ initials was asking for death, as soldiers would kill you without questions and militant civilians would do the same. (Beah 2007:24; cf Richards 1994)

Over the years, kidnapped ideological soldier-slaves increased the ranks of the rebel movement, making the RUF brand a more common sight throughout the country.

As I strolled away from my interview with Emmanuel a young woman selling cold water and soda from a clapboard shack discreetly beckoned me over with a “sssst.” She sat me down and earnestly cautioned. “That boy you were just speaking with,” she said in clearly articulated English. “That boy is trouble” (my emphasis). In Sierra Leone today, hers is a common lament and caution. Yet it was her use of the word *boy* that most struck and troubled me. When I interviewed him, the “boy” Emmanuel was a 26-year-old adult, who during the war was a 15-year-old “man,” fighting for a rebel army.

\(^5\) Nathaniel Hawthorne’s *Scarlet Letter* tells of a woman who is ostracized from society by having to wear the letter ‘A’ on her dress to identify her as an adulterer in puritan New England.
Now an adult in a time of peace he appeared to be locked within a socially perceived space of childhood. His developmental trajectory had been disrupted—altered and reversed by war and its wholesale rupture of the country’s system of traditional rites and socio-cultural norms. Much has been written on the notion of childhood in various cultures and societies, yet the juxtaposition of Emmanuel as boy-adult and man-child compels me to further explore the idea of childhood, particularly within the context of violent war and forced servitude. Given the exploitation, enslavement and exposure of “children” to the extreme circumstances of wartime violence and trauma it is imperative to reconsider our conceptual understanding of childhood as a developmental life stage based on mere chronological categories such as age.

*Childhood, Liminality and Social Death*

Childhood is a taxonomic enigma, subject to both spatial and temporal variations and alterations. Although seemingly self-evident, childhood has been and remains a difficult concept to pin down. This is truer now in our contemporary world, particularly as accelerated globalization and transnationalism has brought more cultures into conflicting and contrasting contact (Honwana and De Boeck 2005). The end result of shrinking spatial boundaries is an often unsatisfactory attempt to situate concepts such as childhood into artificially constructed categories. These overly generalized characterizations foreground universality, particularly by international and multinational organizations such as the United Nations and relief groups including Save the Children and Oxfam. For example, the UN declared 1979 the *International Year of the Child* to promote children’s rights. To achieve its international objective, however, the *International Year of the Child* obliged the UN and its affiliated agencies to define childhood in an inclusive manner for all cultures and societies.

Arguably, one of the unintended consequences of the *International Year of the Child* was the reduction of childhood into an easily packaged and consumed notion of chronological
markers (i.e., biological age), which defined childhood in a way that theoretically allowed it to seamlessly migrate over cultural boundaries with little disruption. A decade later, the UN moved to further codify childhood within the Convention for the Rights of the Child (CRC). These absolutist boundaries, however, are best reserved for the legal world—a world in which chronological age is requisite to establish permissible age categories into which one must pass in order to legally partake in certain activities such as drinking, driving, military service, consensual sex, etc. Otherwise, the UN’s acultural approach to a concept as imprecise as childhood simply acts to negate very real heritages of local custom and tradition.

Depending on the socio-cultural and historical frameworks from whence it is examined, childhood varies enormously and in many instances may not resemble previous attempts at description and classification. Thus, when one speaks of childhood, it cannot be simplified to a singular notion. This Boasian concept of cultural and indeed temporal relativism is widely accepted and cited in the literature on childhood as exemplified by Allison James and Alan Prout. In their seminal work, *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood*, they argue that:

> Childhood is a variable of social analysis. As such it provides an interpretive frame for contextualizing the early years of human life […] Comparative and cross-cultural analysis reveals a variety of childhoods rather than a single and universal phenomenon. (James and Prout 1997:8)

Many excellent studies have been written on children and childhood(s). From a socio-cultural perspective, Jill Korbin (2003) offers a thorough review of the subject, examining how childhood is defined within various cultural settings and then altered when exposed to violence and violent settings. Demonstrative of Korbin’s work is Alcinda Honwana’s scholarship on child soldiers in Mozambique and Angola. Honwana notes that the “institution of childhood provides an interpretative frame for understanding the early years of human life.” However, she advises, “it is biological immaturity rather than childhood which is a universal and natural feature of human
groups” (2005:35). In a later study on the use of child soldiers in the anti-colonial struggles and civil wars of Angola and Mozambique, Honwana observed that:

Efforts to theorize the place occupied by child soldiers are not entirely satisfactory, however, for this position is inherently unstable, without sanctioned cultural definition, embodying a societal contradiction, and entirely embedded in conflict. (Honwana 2006:3)

As a “societal contradiction,” I hold that child soldiers—with one foot in a world of so-called innocence and the other in a world of violence and conflict—requires further examination.

Sharon Stephens (1995) helps us to analyze this complication of childhood and child soldiery in her work that examines childhood not only as a cultural construct, but as a category in flux within an increasingly transnational and globalized world. Stephens boils the issue down to a poignant question: “What is a child?” (7). In many instances, moving from child- to adulthood is not simply a process of passing through various biological “ages of life” (Ariès 1962:15). Instead, Ronald Grimes (2002) argues that the passage from childhood to adulthood is tied to commemorative rites. In fact, as Grimes notes, “a single rite of passage can divide a person’s life into ‘before’ and ‘after’” (5). It is this notion of before and after that is of most interest in my interrogation of child as “incorporated soldier” and adult as ruptured or “excluded civilian,” for as we have seen, the RUF’s initiation constituted a disrupted transformation, leaving the initiate neither in the before status of child nor fully realized in the after state of adult, yet during the war they existed in a tentative state of inclusion as rebel combatants.

To further problematize the already subjective question of “what is a child?” I ask: is a child who habitually is forced to take narcotics, drink alcohol, murder, rape, torture and commit other violent acts—which customarily may be associated with the darker aspects of life for some
adults—still a child? The answer, of course, is culturally ascribed. Mamadou Diouf further narrows the focus to Africa, asking: “How can one be young in today’s Africa? Is it possible, and at what price?” (2005:232).

In wartime Sierra Leone acts of violence were commonly expected of the RUF’s child soldiers. In January 1999, during ‘Operation No Living Thing,’ child soldiers were the primary combatants; they were expected to mete out ultra-violence on Freetown’s largely civilian population. The child soldiers’ ability to commit extreme acts of violence—albeit under severe duress, coercion or the influence of drugs and/or alcohol—leads me to simultaneously consider the child soldier as terrorist slaves. Moreover, as a terrorist slave, the willingness (and ability) to inflict such horrific acts of violence on their neighbors and fellow citizens may be viewed also as acts of self-preservation since their ability to produce violence defined their usefulness to the RUF; in many cases, RUF commanders killed or abandoned their child soldiers who were not productive.

For the RUF’s terrorist slaves, I maintain: (i) that the narrative of a childhood “age of innocence” is a fiction, and (ii) that human beings are constrained or limited in their actions—violent or otherwise—only by physical strength, pubescent maturation, or cognitive processing skills (I will return to this with regard to the RUF’s recruiting selection process). Furthermore, the use of young individuals as terrorist slaves tends to result in “obedient killers, willing to carry out the most dangerous assignments” (Singer 2006a:80; cf Maguire 2011). This resonates with the eighteenth and nineteenth century practices in the Merina Empire of Madagascar where children were preferred as slaves because they were more easily controlled than their adult counterparts (Campbell 2011).

I am grateful to Mamadou Diouf who drew my attention to this line of inquiry during a conversation at the University of Michigan in 2006.
From a historical perspective, childhood as a concept is no less static. In *A History of Childhood*, Colin Heywood (2001) examines shifting conceptualizations of childhood from the Middle Ages up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Heywood critiques the idea of childhood as a universalized “life stage,” arguing that childhood is an individualized phenomenon through which one passes. In *Forgotten Children*, Linda Pollock (1983) looks at childhood over a similar timeframe, but focuses on the processes that changed children from objects of abuse and neglect to subjects of filial love and affection. Neil Postman (1994) bridges culture and history to argue that childhood is fast disappearing in the face of proliferating technology—television, cell phones, computers and Internet—and the affiliated spread of knowledge about violence and sex; information he terms “adult secrets.” In fact, Postman holds that the modern view of childhood is defined by the efforts to shelter children from this adult knowledge.

My work on the RUF’s *terrorist slaves* problematizes the child-/adulthood binary by suggesting that in the process of initiating new “recruits,” the RUF created a liminal space into which would-be soldier-slaves were consigned. No longer children, but not yet “adults” in a socially recognized way, former child soldiers lingered in “liminality”—that ambiguously marginal state in which an individual “does not occupy a recognized social category” (Honwana 2006:114, *cf* Turner 1967). Given the exploitation, use and exposure of “children” to the extreme circumstances of wartime violence and trauma it is imperative to reconsider our conceptual understanding of childhood as a developmental life stage based on mere chronological categories such as age. Moreover, the liminal mode of social death is a useful way to envision another hierarchical layer, which served to set slave apart from master.
Terrorist Slave Narratives

For “Rambo,” life as a terrorist slave began when he was 12. After his capture, he occasionally cleaned his commanders’ clothes, hauled sacks of rice and cooked their meals until he graduated to combat. In his study of a former child soldier-slave named Foday, anthropologist Doug Henry (2011) observed that the young rebels were referred to as “standbys” at this stage. While on a research trip during the summer of 2008 I met and spoke with Rambo along with several other former child soldiers during frequent visits to the offices of “Children Affected by War” or CAW—the only local support and rehabilitation center for child soldiers still operating in Sierra Leone at that time.⁷

Inside CAW’s dank and mildewed offices Rambo was seated at a heavy wooden table with an antiquated cast-iron sewing machine bolted to its top. A 24-year-old man when I spoke with him, Rambo said he came from a small village near Kailahun; although he could not remember the village’s name. Using his assigned nom de guerre Rambo related the series of events that took place in 1996 when RUF insurgents raided his town, killing his family and dragging him off to an undisclosed location. Since he was just 12 at the time he readily acknowledges that many of the details are unclear and distant. “It was like an army camp […] lots of guns and rebels walking around.”⁸ After a short period of time in the camp (exact time was unknown), he was moved to another location and assembled with a gathering of other boys about his size. Lowering his head he distractedly spun the machine’s thread wheel while recounting how he came to be a member of the RUF: “In the bush they took us to shoot the guns […] at monkeys or birds for food,” he said. When his captors had determined the best marksmen they separated them from the other boys. “The smaller boys were chased away deeper into the

⁷ Many of the international agencies that had been working with child soldiers in Sierra Leone had withdrawn their programs due to limited funding, competing priorities and lack of public interest or financial support.
⁸ Translated from Mende.
bush, I think one was shot; I don’t know what happened to the others.” The smaller boys who were presumably freed were first adorned with white bandanas, the symbol of allegiance with the RUF.

It was not long after Rambo had been selected from the other boys when he was awoken in the middle of the night and moved to another location where he was again merged into another group of boys, most of them noticeably stronger and carrying either machete knives or assault rifles. The boys were gathered inside an abandoned home. “Three of the large boys grabbed me and held me down […] a man with a knife took my arm and cut.” The scars—forming the letters R-U-F—labeled and thus stigmatized Rambo as a rebel. “When I was bleeding the man took a bullet [casing] and rubbed a gray powder9 over the cuts and blew some at my face […] I felt dizzy and went to sleep.” When he awoke, he was alone in a clearing behind the abandoned home. The other boys watched from a distance as the man with the knife approached Rambo and handed him a rifle, blew more gray powder in his face and tied a white bandana around his forehead. He looked at the 12-year-old and said only: “Our Rambo.”

According to Johnson Koroma, a CAW child rehabilitation expert, Rambo’s experience was by no means universal, but neither was it uncommon. Initiation rituals are known to have varied slightly from region to region, faction to faction, and field commander to field commander. But, Rambo’s case, for the purposes of this study, is exemplary of the RUF’s means of incorporating new slaves into the insurgency. As noted previously, basics tenets of the initiation are not unlike ceremonial rituals of enslavement performed to incorporate slaves into a community, kin network or economic organization.

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9 It was not uncommon for rebels to use a narcotic concoction of either cocaine or heroin mixed with gunpowder to help initiate new recruits as well as induce a sense of invincibility and fearlessness before battle.
In the late nineteenth century, T. J. Alldridge met with *Poro* initiates in the Sherbro region and recorded details of their initiation ceremony. In *The Sherbro and its Hinterland* (1901), Alldridge noted the use of “medicines” after a candidate has completed his initiation.

The first is a medicine which deprives [the initiate] of his nose, as it is a snuff taken into the nostrils; the second is supposed to [symbolically] kill not only the person, but also any members of his family who may upon his death cry for him; and the third, *Boru-Boreh*, kills the person only, but has no effect upon his relatives. (Alldridge 1901:128)

Kenneth Little likewise records that medicines “are used for promoting society business, including the initiation of new members” (1951:355). Similarly the RUF employed narcotics as a way to symbolically sever ties with old relations which were to be replaced with relations to the rebel movement.

Let us look at Rambo’s experience within the framework of Arnold Van Gennep’s requisite “Separation, transition and incorporation” triumvirate (1960:106). Rambo was “separated” from his normal existence of childhood when his family was killed. He was further separated by virtue of being relocated to a remote venue not once but twice in what appears to be a period to size up the potential recruits.

As with slave-raiding during the Atlantic Slave Trade period, this physical separation ensured that the would-be slave could not be rescued by members of his kin or clan (Kopytoff and Miers 1977). Moreover, during this period of separation, the RUF was able to measure Rambo’s value to the insurgency by testing his strength with the sack of rice and then his skill with a gun. With each passed “test” Rambo was advanced toward the actual initiation, including the “marking ceremony,” which at once served as a ritual test of endurance (against the pain) and the ability to withstand an “ordeal,” thus propelling the initiate from boyhood to manhood (La Fountaine 1977:425). And second, the marking ceremony served as a social marker of inclusion.
and status, as is evidenced by groups like the Nuer in the Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 1940), the Yoruba and Igbo of southwestern and southeastern Nigeria, and initiated members of Poro or other secret societies of Sierra Leone. It is through the process of branding and the ceremonial use of the narcotic mixture that a recruit is transformed into a member (albeit at an inferior hierarchical rank).

The RUF’s practice of branding their soldier-slaves resonates with slaveholding practices of the past, whether in the Antebellum South, the colonial era West Indies, nineteenth century France or ancient Greco-Roman society. In old slave systems, when slavery was a legal practice, slaveowners and slaveholders readily used visible marks to both incorporate slaves as property and exclude them as someone or (thing) other than a member of the free society (Stampp 1956; Genovese 1976; Donoghue 2006; Sellin 1976; Jones 1987; Weiner, et al, 1988). In fact, the RUF branding and use of gunpowder is strikingly similar to branding practices of public slaves (katorshniki) in the Siberian penal system who had ‘KAT’ cut into their cheeks and gunpowder rubbed into the wounds. That practice was comparable to French galley slaves who had ‘GAL’ burned onto their shoulders in the sixteenth century; and then, when slavery—but not forced penal labor—was abolished by the nineteenth century, convicts sentenced to forced labor has ‘TP’ (travaux perpétuels) branded onto their arms (Sellin 1976; Patterson 1982; Anderson 2004).

Interestingly, the practice of branding as a visible display of enslavement links terrorist slavery more with old slavery practices than with Kevin Bales’ New Slavery, which was made illegal by multiple international treaties, and thus kept as clandestine as possible. There is no indication that the RUF’s practices were influenced either by the Siberian or French branding practices for slaves, nor by the Poro marking ceremony. However, it is well worth noting the
similarities of these various institutions when compared with the RUF’s contemporary enslavement rituals.

With regard to the use of perception-altering substances, Joseph Miller observes that the Imbangla of Angola incorporated non-lineage slaves into their communities in part through a “cleansing” ceremony, which included administering a medicine called *yisaba ya kukuleka,*10 which “theoretically eliminated all knowledge of the person’s origins” (1977:212). Of course, the use of narcotics by the RUF served different purposes. For instance, the use of cocaine and/or heroin may have been a deliberate choice to render the children “virtual slave[s] to the drug” (Schumacher 2001:128; cf Maguire 2011). In other words, the RUF was deliberately addicting their young soldier-slaves to drugs or alcohol as a tactic to keep them from running away (Singer 2006a; Bass 2004; Campbell, et al, 2011).

Indeed, Luiji Zoja recognizes the linguistic connection between addiction and slavery, stemming back to antiquity when the word addict—coming from the Latin *addictus*—meant “handed over (to someone) as a slave” (Zoja 1989:29). Thus, the original connotation of addiction had a meaning closer to surrendering oneself over rather than our contemporary use of the words as applied specifically to drugs. Additionally, it has been suggested that the RUF’s use of drugs on its young *terrorist slaves* may have been designed to achieve a number of goals, such as assuaging their fear by inducing a frenzied (or euphoric) state before battle; drugs may also have been used to instill them with a sense of invincibility, or to create the conditions for moral flexibility and loyalty to specific commanders who would order them to commit horrendous acts of violence that otherwise may well have gone against the young combatants sense of moral right and wrong (Singer 2006a).

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10 A bundle of leaves and branches (of unknown origin).
In other instances, the ritual enslavement of some RUF recruits included a test of their courage and mettle by staging both mock and real executions; in extreme cases they were forced to “sacrifice” a family member by killing them and destroying their home (Beah 2007, Stewart 2002). This was the ultimate break with ancestral ties. These extreme measures echo Jean La Fontaine’s contention that certain ritual actions were essentially intended to separate the “boys from the men” (1977:423).

Recall Ahmed from chapter one. Like Rambo, he too was abducted by the rebels after his village had been attacked and his family killed. I met Ahmed when he was just nine years old while the war was still raging in the countryside. Unlike Rambo and Emmanuel who I met after the war, I interviewed Ahmed during the war in 1998 just weeks after he escaped from rebel captivity and sought shelter at the Pastoral Center Catholic Mission in central Makeni. Although still just a boy—from the standpoint of Honwana’s biological immaturity—Ahmed nonetheless had been forced to kill; he had mutilated friends and neighbors, inflicting both physical and mental anguish on the people he used to call family. Like both Rambo and Emmanuel, Ahmed had been abducted by the RUF, drugged and taught by his commanders how to hack off the limbs of his victims with a machete knife in three or four blows. During the war, that campaign of amputations terrorized the country, becoming the calling card of the rebels’ wanton crusade of ideological terror.

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THE SHORT TEN KILOMETER (approx. six mile) drive from Freetown to the coastal town of Lakka ought to take no more than 20 minutes, but in July—the height of the country’s rainy season—the journey along the remote Lumley Beach Highway takes more than two hours over rutted and crumbling roads. Jonathan, my driver, deftly maneuvers his battered brown Renault
in, over and delicately through the pond-sized potholes. Like an artist’s watercolor palette, thick with reds and browns, the pools refill with the red water as soon as our tires splash through. Our destination on this steamy, rain-drenched day is the Lakka Center, a former Catholic orphanage that for years has been offering safe haven and rehabilitation services for hundreds of children who fought during the country’s 11-year civil war.

On a visit in 2008, our car passed through the rusting and long-neglected gates of the Lakka Center (formerly St. Michael’s orphanage) where we were met by about half a dozen curious residents and neighbors ranging in age from five or six to their early 20s. A dozen or so of them are full-time residents at the center—their families are unknown and home villages lost by virtue of the RUF’s slave-raiding tactics.

Sheltering under the corrugated steel roof of a beach hut Kamal, a 23-year-old former child soldier sat with the other residents of the center. Shouting to be heard over the constant thunder of the surf, rain and offshore winds, Kamal recounted his time in the rebel force of the RUF. “It was in 1997. I was in the fields with my parents when [the rebels] came,’’ he said, shifting back and forth on the hut’s rain-soaked cement floor. He continued:

I was in my village of Bou bou ma [Boma in the Southern Province]. I was taken and blindfolded and moved to somewhere so that I would not understand the language. I was given drugs and a gun and was forced to steal the people’s food for the older rebels. I carried weapons and guns for the rebels […] until we attacked Freetown […] after I was in Freetown I escaped to a church and the priest brought me here.

Unable to locate his parents, who are presumed to have died after his abduction, Kamal has lived at the Lakka Center since he escaped the RUF in 1998.

“Kamal has been going to school, learning new skills, cooking and helping teach the younger children at the center,’’ said Issa Turay, the associate director of the center. A layman, Issa is the only full time Sierra Leonean employee of the center; the director and associate
director are a Jesuit priest and Nun from Ireland and Italy, respectively. Issa explained the daring process he and the other Lakka Center staff undertook to save the children during the war:

I used to go to the conflict areas with money to take to the rebel commanders in [Boma], Kambia and Freetown to exchange for these children. Then we started to try and find these children’s families […] those [whose families we] couldn’t find just stayed here. We needed to give the rebels an incentive to exchange their children and give them a way out.

Just as in the days of the Atlantic Slave Trade, slave-raiding for the RUF was in effect a mode of economic production, albeit on a miniscule scale by comparison to the number of slaves bought and sold by European slavers in Africa from the sixteenth century until abolition in the nineteenth century. The freedom of dozens of children who wound up at Lakka were “bought” by staff members while others, like Kamal managed to escape during the confusion of battle.

Kamal was spared much of what I contend became the RUF’s ritual of enslavement—including having to kill or maim a member of his family or village, the RUF brand on his body, and the use of drugs to alter his perception of and resistance to the rebel group. However, the process of kidnapping Kamal did disrupt the familial habits and customs of his childhood. Indeed, his abduction was exemplary of the first state of Van Gennep’s ritual transformation (cf Turner 1967, 1969).

The system of initiation ritual used by the RUF mimicked other coming of age initiation rituals in order to “transform” biologically immature people into individuals who would then be expected to function as adult warriors. The RUF’s initiation served as both a rite of rupture and a ritual of enslavement, transforming youth civilian into unfree adult combatant. This then ruptured their ability to reintegrate into post-war society, leaving them enslaved in the second phase of terrorist slavery.
A ritual of enslavement constitutes a rite of passage insomuch as it serves to transform the inductee by separating him from his ancestral past and visibly distinguishing him or her from other free sectors of a community (Van Gennep 1960). Victor Turner in his study of symbolic acts associated with the rituals of the Ndembu of Zambia, elaborated on Van Gennep’s notion of ‘life-crisis rituals.’ Turner noted the following:

There are a number of ceremonies or rituals designed to mark the transition from one phase of life or social status to another […] These ‘crisis’ ceremonies not only concern the individuals on whom they are centered, but also mark changes in the relationships of all people connected with them by ties of blood, marriage, cash, political control, and in many other ways. (Turner 1967:7)

It is the crisis ritual that most concerns my conception of terrorist slavery and the rituals used to enslave these young combatants and rupture their way back into society. When the RUF commanders abducted perspective child soldiers, they created a life crisis by transforming the previously rooted civilian youth into a wandering warrior bent on fomenting ideological terror throughout the countryside. During the war, the RUF achieved this transformation through a continuous process that kept initiates spatially removed from kinship networks and other grounding organizations such as schools and religious institutions. The RUF maintained a network of encampments throughout the territories it controlled, allowing it to keep their recruits perpetually displaced by moving them between camps, but always within the auspices of RUF control. This spatial segregation maintained these slaves in a constant liminal state of transformation and transition. This system of displacement can be seen in the narratives of Rambo and Kamal, who were frequently moved.

The most glaring deviation between legitimate rituals of initiation and the RUF’s induction process lie in the absence of the positive re-incorporation of the initiate into his society as a new entity. Applying this notion to the Mende secret societies of Poro, Kenneth Little
observed that the initiates are marched back to town and greeted by “family, kin and well-wishers.” The initiates are housed in a specially built lodge, offered palm wine and prayed over as a new member of society (1951:125). It is in this fashion that *Poro* rites of passage are productive for a community.

However, this runs completely contrary to the practices of the RUF. Initiates are indeed separated from their societies (note the case studies of Rambo, Emmanuel, Ahmed and Kamal); they are likewise transformed into something new (in this case fearsome “adult” fighters), but by virtual of the RUF *rites of rupture* they are not reincorporated into their former community. Instead it appears that the process of induction as carried out by the RUF is the antithesis of productive; it is destructive, creating a tool of ruin that is then unleashed on the initiate’s former community. It is here that I contend that the RUF’s initiation process so diverges from the Van Gennep model that one must view the RUF induction methods as a rupture cycle. It is a cycle that not only removed the initiate from his community, but, in fact, locked him or her into a seemingly permanent state of alienation rather than incorporation.

Without productive reintegration into the recruit’s old community the RUF *rite of rupture* served not as a segue from childhood to adulthood, but rather served to fix the recruit in a permanent state of childhood. Unable to complete the passage out of its *liminal* immaturity into a fully developed (*i.e.*, transformed) member of society, the *terrorist slave* remains a “child” in the eyes of his community; or worse, an ostracized non-person trapped in the ether of *liminality*. Consider again Emmanuel, the boy-adult soldier in war and man-child in peace.

Finally, the creation of the *terrorist slave* through the RUF’s distorted *rite of rupture* reminds us that slavery has not been successfully abolished from Sierra Leone. Just as eighteenth century British abolitionists manipulated their terms of service to transform the Nova Scotians
into a body of unfree laborers, slaves in all but name; and nineteenth century colonial administrators altered the nomenclature of slavery to reassign slaves as apprentices, the RUF used a ritual process of sorts to transform civilian children into militarized adults, constituting the most recent iteration of slavery in Sierra Leone—the exploited anti-slavery asylum of the Upper Guinea coast.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

Conclusion

The human spirit preserves the mortal remains of history, empty narratives and chronicles, and the same spirit collects traces of past life, remains and documents, striving as far as possible to preserve them unchanged and to restore them as they deteriorate.

— Benedetto Croce, 1921

As an academic exercise to explore Sierra Leone’s contemporary use of terrorist slavery within the context of the country’s long and often harrowing history of labor coercion and exploitation, the Tenacity of Bondage has proven to be an ambitious undertaking. Indeed, any historical project that spans two centuries is bound to be a challenging endeavor. In this case, for example, both chapters six and eight, which respectively span from 1800 to 1880 and 1900 to 1990 presented me with a significant challenge—but a challenge rich with prospects.

Clearly no single volume, let alone chapter, can adequately do justice to the span of eight decades, but that was not the aim of this project. Indeed, this is not a historiography of Sierra Leone in its totality. It is a historiography of the interplay between slavery, abolition and post-emancipation unfree labor that occurred in Sierra Leone between 1792 and 2002. Additionally, this project has been an examination of the socio-ethnic, economic and political conditions that independent Sierra Leone inherited from Britain in the post-colony; it was this inheritance that laid the foundations for Sierra Leone’s ParaRevolution, which was initially imbued with the humanitarian drive for life, liberty and happiness, but rapidly degenerated into a paradoxical rebellion that defied the very tenets of revolutions from the Enlightenment. Indeed, the very act
of enslaving children to serve as agents of terror runs in stark contrast to the RUF’s initial ideal of a revolutionary “people’s war.” Moreover, this revolution was meant to free Sierra Leone from the All People’s Congress corruption and tyranny. Yet, it instead ushered in a new age of slavery in Sierra Leone—more than six decades after William Wilberforce’s Act to Abolition Slavery was finally enforced in the hinterland in 1928.

The challenges that I confronted in chapters six and eight reaped an important opportunity—to regularly revisit the focus of this project. Aware of my ever-increasing page count, I was obliged to restrict the historiography of these centuries to the most relevant episodes at hand—namely the persistence of unfree labor in Sierra Leone even after slavery had been abolished (at least in name) in the mid-nineteenth century.

This study offers a number of important contributions to the interdisciplinary scholarship of Sierra Leone, slavery, British abolitionism and post-emancipation unfree labor and revolution. Indeed, as a study of the contemporary use of child soldiers in the late twentieth century I felt it imperative to delve into those seminal factors in history that informed the rationale behind Britain’s creation of Sierra Leone; more importantly, however was how Britain’s hand in this colonial project worked to formulate conditions that would erupt into revolutionary war three decades after Britain had quit the continent. It is this inter-change of the past’s influence on the present and conversely the present’s analytical framing of the past that made this a fascinating and exciting project for a new scholar and former journalist.

For example, this study offers a new way of looking at the false pretense upon which Sierra Leone’s earliest settlers—the Black Loyalists—were “freed” during the American Revolution. Rather than view of this population as freedom-seeking slaves, I have argued that the Black Loyalists were, in fact, never “freed” as promised by the Dunmore and Philipsburg
Proclamations. Instead, their “terms of service” or servitude were simply altered. Consider, in particular those several thousand Black Loyalists who opted to join the British military ranks in the Ethiopia Regiment or the Black Pioneers—they were certainly were not elevated to a status of free. Rather, their willingness to fight for the Crown was tantamount to a trade in status and master. They substituted their subordinate status as slave to disenfranchised subaltern foot soldier (and a highly conspicuous one, at that) within the legions of British white soldiers. The Black Loyalists who joined the British military would have found themselves trapped in a liminal space between social death and the threat of corporeal death at least until after the war. It was this threat of bodily harm—either from the battlefield or from the consequences they might face if recaptured by their former patriot master—that kept them in servitude to the military. And later, with Britain’s defeat in the revolutionary war, the Black Loyalists’ freedom was certainly not theirs for the taking. Instead the prospect of freedom was held hostage as their status went from fugitive slave to unfree refugee. In the Canadian Maritimes the Black loyalists found themselves trapped within the racially segregated enclave of Birchtown, which I contend constituted one of the earliest refugee camps of the revolutionary age—a subject I intend to explore at greater length in future research.

The Black Loyalists of revolutionary America should not be envisioned as the human manifestation of Britain’s moral capital, but rather ought to be seen as an exploited and disenfranchised population of war refugees. In fact, given that they were perceived and resented as a financial liability by the people charged with their protection and care, it stands to reason—as archival documentation bears out—that the Black Loyalists were seen as an opportunity for cheap (if not free) labor by the white populations of Britain’s maritime colonies in Canada.
Moreover, the perceived burden created by the Black Loyalists was alleviated not by assisting this refugee community, but rather by transforming this group of newly liberated slaves into a population of quasi-colonists and unfree laborers to help build Britain’s mercantilist colony in West Africa.

This, then, raises the second scholarly contribution presented in this dissertation, namely, that Sierra Leone as the ex-slave asylum Province of Freedom was quickly co-opted and reverted back to Henry Smeathman’s envisioned agro-colony to be worked by the unfree labor of its former slave population. This clash between humanitarian and mercantilist purpose for Sierra Leone establishes a theoretical framework that defines much of this entire study.

It is important to view Sierra Leone within the context of its true configuration. The settlement—one of the first “Back-to-Africa” schemes by either British or American abolitionists—was no simple asylum for freed slaves. With its destruction in 1789, the humanitarian mandate of Granville Sharp’s envisioned refuge was easily and rapidly co-opted by merchant capitalists who instead saw the “self-emancipated” slave inhabitants as an ideal source of easily manipulated and exploited labor; exploited not as slaves, but as dependent laborers. This hybrid of moral mandate and capitalist ambition resulted in reconfiguring Sierra Leone into a laboratory of post-emancipation unfree labor schemes, ranging from share-cropping to indentured apprenticeships, and the creation of Sierra Leone’s Labor Corps to the expansion of Britain’s colonial military ranks.

Sierra Leone was an unwitting testing ground for abolitionist legislators, including William Wilberforce, who framed his abolition legislation of 1833 in part on Sierra Leone’s transition from slavery to apprenticeship labor in the years preceding legislatively-mandated emancipation.
Furthermore, I hold that anti-slavery and slave trade legislation encouraged the creative configuration of unfree labor in Sierra Leone. Recall that the abolition of slavery in the West Indies rendered Sierra Leone’s tropical produce relatively inexpensive by virtue of the Crown’s hypocritical use of domestic slaves in the hinterland. Moreover, the end of the slave trade resulted in an influx of freed slaves who were promptly put to work as unfree laborers (share-croppers, apprentices) in the Sierra Leone colony during the nineteenth century. Despite its national narrative, Sierra Leone was never fully rid of slavery. Instead, colonial Sierra Leone just masked the use of slaves under the guise of a new nomenclature of labor.

Additionally, this study has examined how Sierra Leone’s colonial and exploitive past established a framework of contemporary ethno-regional politicization. That divisiveness resulted in a post-colonial rivalry, fueling the rampant corruption and cronyism by Albert Margai and the Sierra Leone People’s Party and later the All People’s Congress of Siaka Stevens. This corruption helped to create (or exacerbate) cleavages between the Protectorate and the colony, and between the Mende of the southern portions of the Protectorate and the Temne in the northern regions. The widespread economic and political abuses of power by Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh’s APC from the late 1960s until 1992 can be traced back to the country’s colonial past in the late eighteenth century; it can likewise be linked forward to the civil war of the late twentieth century and the Revolutionary United Front’s paradoxical use of slaves to produce violence. It is this period in the postcolony that provides an analytical axis—a focal point from which to survey both the colonial past and its influence on the contemporary postcolony.

In effect, Sierra Leone is replete with paradoxes, pitting rhetoric against practice. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries British abolitionists—including Granville Sharp, Henry
Thornton and Zachary Macaulay—professed their devoted belief in ending slavery, yet in practice their cultural blinders left them oblivious to the fact that they had not ended slavery, but reconfigured bondage as unfree labor. Likewise, but some two hundred years later, the RUF professed the aims of a “people’s” revolution, claiming the militant movement was going to liberate the people from corrupt “slave masters.” Yet, as with the British abolitionists, the RUF was blinded by their political ambition and economic forces (i.e., want of diamond wealth), factors that led them to usher in Sierra Leone’s most recent iteration of slavery—child soldiers charged with terrorizing the “people” who the RUF was purportedly trying to liberate. Finally, this study introduced the notion of rites of rupture, which created a liminal mode of Social Death, in which the RUF rendered their child soldiers enslavable by virtue of a ritual process that for all intents and purposes severed their ability to reintegrate back into mainstream society at the end of the war. These rites of rupture were the primary mechanism by which the RUF was able to create its body of terrorist slaves in the late twentieth century, despite worldwide efforts to outlaw slavery and servitude. Terrorist slavery is only the latest iteration of slavery in Sierra Leone, where centuries of persistence and adaptation has indeed made bondage a tenacious entity even in this so-called refuge against slavery.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

Coat of Arms of Sierra Leone; designed and adopted in 1960.
APPENDIX B

Text of the 1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention

Entry into force: 9 March 1927, in accordance with article 12. The Convention was amended by the Protocol done at the Headquarters of the United Nations, New York, on 7 December 1953; the amended Convention entered into force on 7 July 1955, the date on which the amendments, set forth in the annex to the Protocol of 7 December 1953, entered into force in accordance with article III of the Protocol.

Whereas the signatories of the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1889-90 declared that they were equally animated by the firm intention of putting an end to the traffic in African slaves,

Whereas the signatories of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919, to revise the General Act of Berlin of 1885 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels of 1890, affirmed their intention of securing the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea,

Taking into consideration the report of the Temporary Slavery Commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations on June 12th, 1924,

Desiring to complete and extend the work accomplished under the Brussels Act and to find a means of giving practical effect throughout the world to such intentions as were expressed in regard to slave trade and slavery by the signatories of the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and recognising that it is necessary to conclude to that end more detailed arrangements than are contained in that Convention,

Considering, moreover, that it is necessary to prevent forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery, Have decided to conclude a Convention and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries [names omitted] ...

... have agreed as follows:

Article I

For the purpose of the present Convention, the following definitions are agreed upon:

(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.

(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties undertake, each in respect of the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, so far as they have not already taken the necessary steps:
(a) To prevent and suppress the slave trade;
(b) To bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.

**Article III**

The High Contracting Parties undertake to adopt all appropriate measures with a view to preventing and suppressing the embarkation, disembarkation and transport of slaves in their territorial waters and upon all vessels flying their respective flags.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to negotiate as soon as possible a general Convention with regard to the slave trade which will give them rights and impose upon them duties of the same nature as those provided for in the Convention of June 17th, 1925, relative to the International Trade in Arms (Articles 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Section II of Annex II), with the necessary adaptations, it being understood that this general Convention will not place the ships (even of small tonnage) of any High Contracting Parties in a position different from that of the other High Contracting Parties.

It is also understood that, before or after the coming into force of this general Convention, the High Contracting Parties are entirely free to conclude between themselves, without, however, derogating from the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph, such special agreements as, by reason of their peculiar situation, might appear to be suitable in order to bring about as soon as possible the complete disappearance of the slave trade.

**Article IV**

The High Contracting Parties shall give to one another every assistance with the object of securing the abolition of slavery and the slave trade.

**Article V**

The High Contracting Parties recognise that recourse to compulsory or forced labour may have grave consequences and undertake, each in respect of the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage, to take all necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour from developing into conditions analogous to slavery.

It is agreed that:

(1) Subject to the transitional provisions laid down in paragraph (2) below, compulsory or forced labour may only be exacted for public purposes.

(2) In territories in which compulsory or forced labour for other than public purposes still survives, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour progressively and as soon as possible to put an end to the practice. So long as such forced or compulsory labour exists, this labour shall invariably be of an exceptional character, shall always receive adequate remuneration, and shall not involve the removal of the labourers from their usual place of residence.

(3) In all cases, the responsibility for any recourse to compulsory or forced labour shall rest with the competent central authorities of the territory concerned.

**Article VI**

Those of the High Contracting Parties whose laws do not at present make adequate provision for the punishment of infractions of laws and regulations enacted with a view to giving effect to the purposes of the present Convention
undertake to adopt the necessary measures in order that severe penalties may be imposed in respect of such infractions.

**Article VII**

The High Contracting Parties undertake to communicate to each other and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations any laws and regulations which they may enact with a view to the application of the provisions of the present Convention.

**Article VIII**

The High Contracting Parties agree that disputes arising between them relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall, if they cannot be settled by direct negotiation, be referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In case either or both of the States Parties to such a dispute should not be Parties to the Protocol of December 16th, 1920, relating to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute shall be referred, at the choice of the Parties and in accordance with the constitutional procedure of each State, either to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance with the Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, or to some other court of arbitration.

**Article IX**

At the time of signature or of ratification or of accession, any High Contracting Party may declare that its acceptance of the present Convention does not bind some or all of the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage in respect of all or any provisions of the Convention; it may subsequently accede separately on behalf of any one of them or in respect of any provision to which any one of them is not a Party.

**Article X**

In the event of a High Contracting Party wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who will at once communicate a certified true copy of the notification to all the other High Contracting Parties, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying State, and one year after the notification has reached the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

Denunciation may also be made separately in respect of any territory placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty or tutelage.

**Article XI**

The present Convention, which will bear this day's date and of which the French and English texts are both authentic, will remain open for signature by the States Members of the League of Nations until April 1st, 1927.

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations will subsequently bring the present Convention to the notice of States which have not signed it, including States which are not Members of the League of Nations, and invite them to accede thereto.

A State desiring to accede to the Convention shall notify its intention in writing to the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations and transmit to him the instrument of accession, which shall be deposited in the archives of the League.

The Secretary-General shall immediately transmit to all the other High Contracting Parties a certified true copy of the notification and of the instrument of accession, informing them of the date on which he received them.

**Article XII**

The present Convention will be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the office of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General will inform all the High Contracting Parties of such deposit.

The Convention will come into operation for each State on the date of the deposit of its ratification or of its accession.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries signed the present Convention.

Done at Geneva the twenty-fifth day of September, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six, in one copy, which will be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. A certified copy shall be forwarded to each signatory State.
APPENDIX C

Text of Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation

By His Excellency the Right Honorable JOHN Earl of DUNMORE, His Majesty's Lieutenant and Governor General of the Colony and Dominion of VIRGINIA, and Vice Admiral of the same.

A PROCLAMATION

As I have ever entertained Hopes, that an Accommodation might have taken Place between GREAT-BRITAIN and this Colony, without being compelled by my Duty to this most disagreeable but now absolutely necessary Step, rendered so by a Body of armed Men unlawfully assembled, firing on His MAJESTY’S Tenders, and the formation of an Army, and that Army now on their March to attack his MAJESTY’S Troops and destroy the well disposed subjects of the Colony. To defeat such treasonable Purposes, and that all such Traitors, and their Abettors, may be brought to Justice, and that the Peace, and good Order of this Colony may be again restored, which the ordinary Course of the Civil Law is unable to effect; I have thought fit to issue this my Proclamation, hereby declaring, that until the aforesaid good Purpose can be obtained, I do in Virtue of the Power and Authority to ME given, by His MAJESTY, determine to execute Martial Law, and cause the same to be executed throughout this Colony: and to the end that Peace and good Order may the sooner be restored, I do require every Person capable of bearing Arms, to resort to His MAJESTY’S STANDARD, or be looked upon as Traitors to His MAJESTY’S Crown and Government, and thereby become liable to the Penalty the Law inflicts upon such Offenses; such as forfeiture of Life, confiscation of Lands, &. &. And I do hereby further declare all indented Servants, Negroes, or others, (appertaining to Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear Arms, they joining His MAJESTY’S Troops as soon as may be, foe the more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper Sense of their Duty, to His MAJESTY’S Crown and Dignity. I do further order, and require, all His MAJESTY’S Liege Subjects, to retain their Quitrents, or any other Taxes due or that may become due, in the their Custody, till such a Time as Peace may be again restored to this at present most unhappy Country, or demanded of them for their former salutary Purposes, by Officers properly authorised to receive the same.

GIVEN under my Hand on board the Ship WILLIAM by Norfolk, the 7th Day of November in the SIXTEENTH Year of His MAJESTY’S Reign.

DUNMORE

(GOD save the KING.)

1 British National Archives
APPENDIX D

Memorial and Petition of Thomas Peters

The humble Memorial and Petition of Thomas Peters, a Free Negro and late a Sergeant in the Regiment of Guides and Pioneers, serving in North America under the command of General Sir Henry Clinton, on behalf of himself and others, the Black Pioneer and Loyal Black Refugees hereinafter described:

Sheweth

That your Memoralist and the said other Black Pioneers, having served in North America as aforesaid, for the space of seven years and upwards during the late war, afterwards went to Nova Scotia, under the promise of obtaining the usual Grants of land and provisions.

That notwithstanding they have made repeated applications to all persons in that country whom they conceived likely to put them into possession of their due allotments the said Pioneers, with their wives and children, amounting together in the whole, to the number of 102 people, now remaining at Annapolis Royal, having not yet obtained their Allotments of land, except one Single acre each for a Town lot and though a further proportion of 20 acres each private man, viz (a fifth part of the allowance of land that is due to them) is actually laid out and located for them, agreeable to the governors order it was afterwards taken from them on pretence that it had been included in some former Grant and they have never yet obtained other lands in lieu thereof and remain destitute and helpless; that besides the said 102 people at Annapolis who have deputed your Memoralist to represent their unhappy situation there are also a number of Free Black refugees, consisting of about 100 families or more at New Brunswick, in a like unprovided and destitute condition, for though some of them have had a part of their allowance of land offered to them, it is so far distant from their Town Lots (being 16 or 18 miles back) as to be entirely useless to them, and indeed worthless in itself from its remote situation.

That the said two descriptions of people, having authorized and impowered your Memoralist to act for them as their Attorney, he has at much trouble and risk, made his way into their country in hopes that he should be able to procure for himself and his fellow-sufferers some establishment where they may attain a competent settlement for themselves, and be enabled by their industrious exertions to become useful subjects to his Majesty-

That some part however of the said Black people are earnestly desirious of obtaining their due allotment of land and remaining in America, but others are ready and willing to go wherever the
wisdom of Government may think proper to provide for them as free subjects of the British Empire.

Your Memoralist therefore most Honored Sir, humbly prays that you will humanely consider the call of your Memoralist and the said other Black people, and by laying the same before his Majesty or otherwise as you shall deem most proper that they may be afforded such relief as shall appear to be best adapted to their circumstances and situation-And your Memoralist shall ever pray &c &c

The mark of X Thomas Peters
APPENDIX E

Excerpt from Manuscript Journal of Lt. John Clarkson

Manuscript Journal of Lt. John Clarkson, 1790, 1 – Introduction (Sierra Leone National Archives).
Manuscript Journal of Lt. John Clarkson, 1790, 2 – Article 2. Object of the Institution; Article 3. Trade (Sierra Leone National Archives).
Article 6. Cultivation.

6. It has, however, clearly appeared to the Directors that an increase of the exportable African produce is the basis on which the extension of Trade, proposed by the Act of Parliament, must ultimately rest; and since the food of the African has been both directly and indirectly discriminated against, it is prevented by the Slave Trade from availing itself of the natural advantages of soil and climate. It must be the leading object of the Company to turn their views to cultivation.
APPENDIX F

Sample Certificate of Character from December 31, 1791

Sierra Leone Company.

The Bearer Abraham Etch/Thiel//having produced to us a satisfactory Certificate of his Character as required by the Company, we do hereby certify, that upon his Arrival at Sierra Leone he shall receive, free of Expence, twenty Acres of Land, for himself and Family, consisting of twenty only, being the Proportion he is intitled to, agreeable to the printed Proposals of the Company.

John Stedman
Law. Hartshorne

Agents for Sierra Leone Company.
APPENDIX G

Text of 'An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade'

A
B I L L,
INTITULED,
An ACT for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

Note.—The Figures in the Margin denote the Number of the Prefixes in the Ingrossment.

1 Whereas the African Slave Trade is contrary to the Principles of Justice, Humanity, and sound Policy:

And whereas the Two Houses of Parliament did, by their Resolutions of the tenth and twenty-fourth days of June one thousand eight hundred and six, severally resolve, That they, considering the African Slave Trade to be contrary to the Principles of Justice, Humanity, and sound Policy, would, with all possible Expedition, take effectual Means for the Abolition of the said Trade, in such manner, and at such period as might be deemed advisable:

And whereas it is expedient and advisable that the same should be forthwith abolished and prohibited, and declared to be unlawful;

Be it therefore enacted by the KING's Most Excellent MAJESTY, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That from and after the first day of May one thousand eight hundred and seven, the African Slave Trade, and all and every manner of dealing and trading in the Purchase, Sale, Barter, or Transfer of Slaves, or of Persons intended to be sold, transferred, sold, or dealt with as Slaves, prohibited or carried on, in, at, to, or from any part of the Coast or Countries of Africa, shall be, and the same is hereby utterly abolished, prohibited, and declared to be unlawful; and also that all and every manner of dealing, either by way of Purchase, Sale, Barter, or Transfer, or by means of any other Contract or Agreement whatever, relating to any Slaves, or to any Persons intended to be sold or dealt with as Slaves, for the purpose of such Slaves or Persons being removed or transported from any Island, Country, Territory, or Place whatever, in Africa or the West Indies, or in any other part of America, not being in the Dominion of His Majesty, to any other Island, Country, Territory, or Place whatever, is hereby in like manner utterly abolished, prohibited, and declared to be unlawful.

68. And
And be it further Enacted, That from and after the said first day of May one thousand eight hundred and seven, it shall be unlawful for any Subject of this Realm to sell, or negotiate, or to procure to be sold, or negotiated, or to be concerned in the selling or negotiating, of any Ship or Vessel for the purpose of afflicting, in, or being employed in the carrying on of the African Slave Trade, or in any other the Dealing, Trading, or Concerns hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful; and that all Inducements whatsoever to be offered upon or in respect to any the Trading, Dealing, or Concerns, by this Act prohibited, shall be also from henceforth prohibited and declared to be unlawful.

And be it further Enacted, That from and after the said first day of May one thousand eight hundred and seven, it shall be unlawful for any Subject of this Realm to carry away or remove, or knowingly and wilfully to sell or afflict in the forcibly carrying away or removing, any Slaves, or for the purpose of being sold, transferred, used, or dealt with as Slaves, from any Island, Country, Territory, or Place, in Africa, the West Indies, or any other part of America, as being the Dominion, Possession, or Occupation of His Majesty, to any other Island, Country, Territory, or Place whatever, or to cause or procure to be so carried away or removed, or to detain or confine, or to cause or procure to be detained or confined, or in any manner to aid or assist in the detaining, or confining, for the purpose of being so carried away or removed, upon any Colour or Pretence whatever, of any of the Subjects or Inhabitants of any Island, Country, Territory, or Place in Africa, the West Indies, or any other part of America whatever, as being in the Dominion, Possession, or Occupation of His Majesty, and that it shall also be unlawful for any Subject of this Realm, knowingly and wilfully, to receive on board, or to be aiding, afflicting, or concerned in the receiving on board of any Ship or Vessel whatever, any such Subject or Inhabitant as aforesaid, for the purpose of his or her being so carried away or removed as aforesaid, or of his or her being sold, transferred, used, or dealt with as a Slave, in any other Place or Country whatever.

Provided always, That nothing herein contained shall extend, or be deemed or construed to extend, to prohibit or render unlawful the dealing or trading in the Purchase, Sale, Barter, or Transfer, or the carrying away or removing, for the purpose of being sold, transferred, used, or dealt with as Slaves, or the detaining or confining for the purpose of being so carried away or removed, of any Slaves which shall be exported, carried, or removed from Africa, in any Ship or Vessel which on or before the said first day of May one thousand eight hundred and seven, shall have been lawfully cleared out from Great Britain, according to the Law now in force for regulating the carrying of Slaves from Africa, or to prohibit or render unlawful the carrying or navigating any such Ship or Vessel, or to make void any Indentures thereunto, as the Slaves to be carried therein shall be finally landed in the West India on or before the said first day of January one thousand eight hundred and eight, unless prevented by Capture, the loss of the Vessel, or other unavoidable necessity, the proof whereof shall be shown to the Party charged; anything hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithstanding.

And be it further Enacted, That all Offences committed against this Act may be inquired of, tried, determined, and dealt with in Middlesex, and as if the same had been respectively committed within the body of the County of Middlesex.
APPENDIX H

Excerpt from ‘A Bill for the Abolition of Slavery’
(2)

One thousand eight hundred and Thirty-four shall be actually within any such Colony, and who shall by such Registries appear to be, on the said First day of June One Thousand eight hundred and Thirty-four, of the full age of Six Years or upwards, shall, by force and virtue of this Act, and without the previous execution of any Indenture of Apprenticeship, or other Deed or Instrument for that purpose, become and be apprenticed Labourers: Provided that, for the purposes aforesaid, every Slave engaged in his ordinary occupation on the Seas shall be deemed and taken to be within the Colony to which such Slave shall belong.

And be it further Enacted, That during the continuance of the Apprenticeship of any such apprenticed Labourer, such Person or Persons shall be entitled to the Services of such apprenticed Labourer as would for the time being have been entitled to his or her Services as a Slave, if this Act had not been made.

AND whereas it is expedient that all such apprenticed Labourers should, for the purposes hereinafter mentioned, be divided into three distinct Classes, the first of such Classes consisting of prudential apprenticed Labourers attached to the soil, and comprising all Persons who in their state of Slavery were usually employed in Agriculture, or in the manufacture of Colonial Produce or otherwise upon Lands belonging to their Owners; the second of such Classes consisting of prudential apprenticed Labourers not attached to the soil, and comprising all Persons who in their state of Slavery were usually employed in Agriculture, or in the manufacture of Colonial Produce or otherwise upon Lands not belonging to their Owners; and the third of such Classes consisting of non-prudential apprenticed Labourers, and comprising all Apprenticed Labourers not included within either of the two preceding Classes: BE it therefore Enacted, That such division as aforesaid of the said apprenticed Labourers into such Classes as aforesaid, shall be carried into effect in such manner and form, and subject to such Rules and Regulations as shall for that purpose be established under such authority, and in and by such Acts of Assembly, Ordinances, or Orders in Council as hereinafter mentioned.

And be it further Enacted, That no Person who by virtue of this Act, or of any such Act of Assembly, Ordinance, or Order in Council as aforesaid, shall become a prudential apprenticed Labourer, whether attached or not attached to the soil, shall continue in such Apprenticeship beyond the First day of June One thousand eight hundred and Forty; and that during such his or her Apprenticeship no such prudential apprenticed Labourer, whether attached or not attached to the soil, shall be bound or liable, by virtue of such Apprenticeship, to perform any labour in the service of his or her Employer or Employers for more than Forty-five Hours in the whole in any one Week.
(3)

And be it further Enacted, That no Person who by virtue of this Act or of any such Act of Assembly, Ordinance, or Order in Council as aforesaid, shall become a non-predial apprenticed Labourer, shall continue in such Apprenticeship beyond the First day of June One thousand eight hundred and Thirty-eight.

And be it further Enacted, That if before any such Apprenticeship shall have expired, the Person or Persons, entitled, for and during the remainder of any such term, to the Services of such apprenticed Labourer, shall be desirous to discharge him or her from such Apprenticeship, it shall be lawful for such Person or Persons so to do, by any Deed or Instrument, to be by him her or them for that purpose made and executed; which Deed or Instrument shall be in such form, and shall be executed and recorded in such manner, and with such solemnities, as shall for that purpose be prescribed under such authority, and in and by such Acts of Assembly, Ordinances, or Orders in Council, as hereinafter mentioned; Provided nevertheless, That if any Person so discharged from any such Apprenticeship by any such voluntary act as aforesaid, shall at that time be of the age of Fifty Years or upwards, or shall be then labouring under any such disease, or mental or bodily infirmity, as may render him or her incapable of earning his or her subsistence, then, and in every such case, the Person or Persons so discharging any such apprenticed Labourer as aforesaid, shall continue and be liable to provide for the support and maintenance of such apprenticed Labourer during the remaining term of such original Apprenticeship, as fully as if such apprenticed Labourer had not been discharged therefrom.

And be it further Enacted, That it shall be lawful for any such apprenticed Labourer to purchase his or her Discharge from such Apprenticeship, even without the consent, or in opposition, if necessary, to the will of the Person or Persons entitled to his or her Services, upon payment to such Person or Persons of the appraised Value of such Services; which appraisement shall be effected, and which Purchase-money shall be paid and applied, and which Discharge shall be given and executed, in such manner and form, and upon, under and subject to such conditions as shall be prescribed under such authority and by such Acts of Assembly, Ordinances or Orders in Council as are hereinafter mentioned.

And be it further Enacted, That no apprenticed Labourer shall be subject or liable to be removed from the Colony to which he or she may belong; and that no predial apprenticed Labourer, who may in manner aforesaid become attached to the soil, shall be subject or liable to perform any labour, in the service of his or her Employer or Employers, except upon or in or about the works and business of the Plantation or Estate to which such predial apprenticed Labourer shall have been attached, or on which he or she shall have been usually employed, on or previously to the said First day of June One thousand Five hundred and Thirty-eight.

The form of that Discharge, how to be regulated.

In each of the voluntary Discharge of aged or infirm apprenticed Labourers, the Employer to continue liable for their Support.

The apprenticed Labourer may purchase his Discharge against the will of his Employer, on an Apprenticeship.

How the Appraisement and involuntary Discharge are to be effected.

Apprenticed Labourers not remov-able from the Colony.

Predial Apprenticed Labourers not remov-able from the Plantation except by the written Consent of Two Special Justices.
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