Protecting civilians abroad: Why states participate in the liberal post-Cold War collective security system

Gary Julius Uzonyi

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science) in the University of Michigan 2013

Doctoral Committee:

Professor James D. Morrow, Chair
Professor Christian Davenport
Professor Allan C. Stam
Assistant Professor Sonja B. Starr
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my fellow graduate students whose feedback and support helped move this project forward. I would especially like to thank Vincent Arel-Bundock, Trevor Johnston, Lisa Koch, Shaun McGirr, Chinnu Parinandi, Paul Poast, Jessica Steinberg, Matthew Wells, and Alton Worthington for reading several drafts of this project at various stages of its progress.

Thank you to my loving wife, Thelma, whose strength and support kept me going through graduate school.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... ii  
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................... iv  
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... v  

CHAPTER

1. Introduction: The end of the Cold War and a new system of collective security .... 1  
2. A theory of why states protect foreign civilians outside their borders ............... 16  
3. An empirical analysis of state contributions to UN peacekeeping missions .......... 54  
4. Refugee inflows, capabilities, and unilateral or multilateral interventions .......... 70  
5. Costly contributions in the multilateral setting ......................................................... 87  
6. The decision between the use of troops and aid in establishing post-conflict peace ... 98  
7. An empirical analysis of refugee flows and foreign aid ......................................... 112  
8. Institutional design and the funding of post-war peacebuilding projects ............. 125  
9. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 143  

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 161
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. Effect of Expected Refugee Inflows as Strength Increases in Multinomial Logistic Regression ........................................................................................................... 78
2. Effect of Expected Refugee Inflows as Strength Increases in Negative Binomial Regression ........................................................................................................... 81
3. Effect of Expected Refugee Inflows as Strength Increases in Ordered Probit .......... 83
4. Comparison of Effect Sizes for Refugee Inflows and Democracy on Contribution Types ........................................................................................................... 93
5. Comparing the Effects of Refugee Inflows, Democracy, and Wealth on the Provision of Troops and Aid ................................................................. 106
6. Histogram of Deposits to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund ................................ 132
7. Histogram of Refugee Inflows per Country-Year .................................................. 134
8. Total Contributions to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund by regime type .......... 136
9. Total Deposits to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund since its Inception ............ 139
## LIST OF TABLES

**Tables**

1. Descriptive Statistics for Gravity Model of Refugee Inflows................................. 57
2. Who contributes to each UN Peacekeeping Mission? .................................................. 61
3. When do Leaders Contribute Troops? ...................................................................... 62
4. When do Leaders Alter Contributions? ..................................................................... 64
5. Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Decision to Join UN Peacekeeping Mission or Initiate a Unilateral MID.................................................................................. 80
6. Negative Binomial Model of Troops Contributed to each UN Peacekeeping Mission... 83
7. Ordered Probit Model of Highest MID Action......................................................... 84
8. Refugee Inflows, Democracy, and Peacekeeping Contributions............................. 91
9. Seemingly Unrelated Regression for State Contributions of Troops and Aid in Post-Conflict Areas................................................................................................. 107
10. SUR Estimates using Adjusted Troop Values............................................................. 109
11. Who Gives How Much to War-torn Countries? ....................................................... 118
12. Robustness Checks on the Amount of Aid Provided.............................................. 122
Chapter 1.

Introduction: The end of the Cold War and a new system of collective security

In the post-Cold War system, collective security is founded on the principles of protecting civilians, punishing human rights abuse, ending civil conflict, fighting terrorism, and stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Frederking 2003). These principles have been enshrined in the United Nations, in various international courts, and promoted as part of justified unilateral action. In the UN, for instance, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued, “All of us share a fundamental responsibility to do more to protect civilians caught up in the horrors of war” (UNNEWS 2011). The Security Council has explicitly called upon the international community to protect civilians and promote human rights in a number of its peacekeeping mandates, including missions MONUSCO, UNAMA, UNAMSIL, and UNMIS, amongst others. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has placed the protection of civilians and the promotion of human rights at the core of its mission. DPKO (2013a) states, the “challenging mandate [of civilian protection] is often the yardstick by which the international community, and those whom we endeavour to protect, judge our worth as peacekeepers”. Additionally, “Human rights is a core pillar of the United Nations. All staff in peace operations have the responsibility to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights through their work” (DPKO 2013b). In reaction to the fact “that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience
of humanity”, the International Criminal Court was founded to punish crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (ICC 1998). Similarly, domestic courts are beginning to try crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity with international backing, as with Guatemala’s trial of former dictator Efraín Rios Montt (Malkin 2013). Most recently, the international community has established the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. According to this principle, all states are responsible for the protection of all people, even if the suffering individuals are outside of their territories (UNGA 2005). In essence, R2P establishes a norm to legitimize unilateral military interventions to end abuses of civilians in the face of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes. Within six years, states have already used R2P to threaten or perpetrated interventions in neighboring states on three different occasions (France with Myanmar; NATO in Libya; and Russia against Georgia).

Despite a growing international rhetoric focused on the protection of civilians during times of peace and war, many obstacles exist to state participation. Interventions can be economically expensive, as the financial costs of military intervention, the enforcement of sanctions and the donation of foreign aid begin to mount. Japan, for example, has contributed $260 Billion in aid to war-torn countries since 1992. Interventions may be politically costly, as soldiers die during missions and the international community condemns some actions as overly aggressive. For instance, hundreds of soldiers have died in a number of peacekeeping missions, including MINUSTAH, MONUC, and UNAMID, among others. As the use of R2P increases, interventions can also establish a precedent against the norm of sovereignty, as states intervene against one another in the name of civilian protection. In relation to these costs, the benefits of protecting foreign civilians suffering abuse in other countries appear small. Leaders who participate in these humanitarian missions may garner prestige from activists and claim credit for
their actions to appease domestic humanitarian factions. Yet, it is unclear how these benefits can offset the large financial and political costs of intervention. Given the potentially high costs and low benefits to these humanitarian actions, why do leaders protect foreign civilians outside their borders?

Existing arguments claim that democracies provide protection to externalize their human rights norms (e.g., Huntington 1991), that strong humanitarian factions within democracies force leaders to stop abuses abroad (Jakobsen 1996; Western 2002), or that major powers protect noncombatants to ensure civil wars do not upset the status quo (e.g., Mueller 2004). However, these explanations, rather than clarifying the issue, actually highlight how little we know about humanitarian intervention and the protection of civilians.

By focusing on the behavior of democracies and major powers, these explanations overlook the fact that many autocratic states and minor powers provide most of the protection to foreign civilians. These autocratic states typically do so while simultaneously abusing their own people. A 2012 report by the UN Department of Peacekeeping lists only one liberal democracy- Ghana- amongst the top ten contributors to peacekeeping missions (UNDPKO 2012). Instead, illiberal states, such as Pakistan, primarily perform peacekeeping tasks. For example, Nigeria, which regularly ranks as one of the world’s worst violators of human rights, has participated in 32 United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the world, attempting to stabilize war torn countries and provide protection to non-combatants in the area.

Furthermore, existing arguments about civilian protection cannot explain where and when leaders send troops and money. Regime type and military strength may be able to describe aggregate levels of contribution, but they cannot explain where leaders focus their efforts. They simply expect that democracies and major powers will be more likely to participate. However,
contributions appear strategic. For example, while Ghana ranks amongst the top ten contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, it has not contributed troops to any missions outside of Africa (UNDPKO 2012). In addition, not all democracies behave similarly. For example, while France has committed nearly $3 million to the United Nations’ General Peacebuilding Fund since 2006, the United Kingdom has refused to contribute (UNPBF 2012).

**Existing scholarship**

Extant scholarship emphasizes three reasons leaders are willing to protect individuals outside of their country. The first focuses on democracies. In this account, democracies desire to promote their norms of behavior, which they believe to be the right way to govern and live, around the world. These norms include the belief that leaders should be responsible to their citizens and protect them (Huntington 1991; Rudolph 2001). We see this attempt to spread democracy and guarantee human rights in a number of circumstances. One frequent example of this behavior has been the design of peacekeeping missions. Twenty-five of the United Nations’ first thirty-three peacekeeping missions following the end of the Cold War contained explicit effort to promote liberal democracy (UN 1998). This trend has grown stronger through the twenty-first century.

The second story is that domestic humanitarian pressures force leaders to protect civilians and their human rights abroad. According to this argument, atrocities abroad outrage citizens in democratic societies. Disturbed by the acts they see, such individuals desire their leaders to put an end to these horrors. Because democratic institutions allow citizens to directly pressure the

---

1 The United Nations separates the contribution of money and troops into two mutually exclusive categories. States may donate financially to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund or they may contribute soldiers through the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The United Nations taxes all states according to their Gross Domestic Income to pay for the organization’s peacekeeping missions.
executive through the ballot box, democratic leaders pursue policies of good human rights abroad and push other states to protect civilians, as well (Jakobsen 1996; Western 2002). This effect is even stronger when the foreign state in question has abused the leader’s constituents directly (Bass 2000).

The third explanation for the protection of civilians abroad is based on major power interest. Following the First and Second World Wars, the major powers became wary of ever having to fight another global war. In response to their fears of future world wars, the major powers worked to construct a system to police low-level conflicts. In this account, the major powers work to provide protection to civilians and police human rights abuses, as to limit the possibility of civil wars that may attract outside intervention. Their goal is to avoid the possibility of such a conflict creating a chain of events that would draw them all back to the battlefield against one another (Mueller 2004). This view is consistent with the finding that strong, rich states shoulder a disproportionate amount of the policing and peacekeeping burden (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002). Further, it is the dominant states best served by the existing status quo that work the hardest to promote a collective security regime that includes the punishing of human rights abusers (Frederking 2003; Neack 1995).

It is clear from these accounts that leaders who routinely abuse their citizens, violate human rights and use violence at home should not work to maintain peace and protect civilians abroad. Yet they do. As we look more closely at these illiberal states, we find that none of the conventional explanations can fully account for this puzzling behavior. First, such violators do not respond to domestic humanitarians. While individuals in these states may have humanitarian leanings, they do not appear to have much influence or willingness to shift non-humanitarian domestic policy. Human rights abuses, such as torture and extrajudicial killings, are common in
these states. Second, the democratic norm diffusion story cannot explain the international behavior of domestically abusive leaders, as these regimes tend not to be liberal democracies. The abusive domestic practices of the leaders undermine democratic institutions within their state. Furthermore, even when abusive regimes are democracies, it is not believable that they wish to promote norms they do not abide by themselves because promotion of these norms threatens such regimes’ stability from domestic and international sources.

The third story, which focuses on major power interests, offers the most plausible account of why illiberal regimes promote civilian protection abroad, as it leaves open the possibility of autocratic and democratic states taking the same action. However, this account hinges on major power behavior. Most, if not all, of these abusive states are not major powers. The great power politics that help maintain a favorable status quo for the major powers cannot be the motivation behind weak state action. Together, these stories provide some explanation to why liberal democratic and powerful states work to protect civilians in other countries, but they leave open the question of why non-democratic, abusive, weak states pursue similar policies abroad.

These explanations expect that liberal democratic leaders will participate in upholding the current collective security system by offering protections to civilians abroad. However, many of these leaders free ride off the effort of other democracies and a large number of non-democracies. Numerous democracies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Monaco, and South Africa, for example, have failed to contribute to the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund since its inception in 2006. Similarly, Bolivia, Kenya, and Paraguay, among others, have refused to contribute any funds to UN refugee programs in the past decade. Peacekeeping contributions exhibit a parallel pattern with countries such as Argentina, Columbia and Venezuela declining to
provide peacekeeping troops since the beginning of the new millennium. Clearly, the extant literature can neither predict, nor explain, who contributes to civilian protection and who does not. In addition to not being able to explain who participates in civilian protection correctly, these theories do not illuminate when particular states become involved in humanitarian efforts, where they send their support, and through which methods they attempt to rectify abusive situations.

Thinking of civilian protection in terms of humanitarianism more broadly provides little help. The humanitarian literature also divides into three strands of thought. The first argues that a leader will intervene in the domestic affairs of others when such action is in her state’s interest. The scholars who promote this view, such as Morgenthau (1973), leave state interest broadly defined. In this literature, a state’s interest can range from protecting important waterways, to accessing resources like oil, to ensuring stability in the international system (e.g., Gibbs 2000). Without a concrete understanding of what classifies as a state’s interest, scholars are left without the ability to make \textit{ex ante} predictions of when and where leaders will intervene.

Second, leaders may take humanitarian action abroad in the pursuit of prestige. A leader will engage in these activities either to appear nobler in the eyes of her contemporaries or to maintain a consistent moral prestige on the international stage. Here, prestige defines a state’s interest (e.g., Lowenheim 2003). The prestige argument, however, does not explain the empirical pattern found in various areas of humanitarianism. As discussed above, there is significant variation in where and when leaders support foreign civilians. An account based on the maintenance of a consistent moral prestige cannot explain why Belgium has only sent troops to eight of the 51 post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions (UNDPKO 2012). Offering to protect only some civilians is not a consistent humanitarian pattern.
The final explanation mirrors some of the civilian protection literature in its focus on humanitarian advocates. Here, the international diffusion of principled ideas, furthered by transnational advocacy networks and domestic humanitarian activists, force leaders to take actions in the defense of people outside their country (Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Nadelmann 1990). Like the other two strains of the humanitarian literature, the argument about norm diffusion cannot explain why so much variation exists in who participates in these actions, or where and when leaders focus their attention abroad. Furthermore, as I detailed earlier, arguments focused on domestic humanitarian groups cannot explain why many illiberal leaders take actions abroad in defense of human rights, while they violate these same laws at home.

**Outlining an explanation**

I posit that a leader is willing to offer protection to foreign civilians outside her borders because of how violence against these noncombatants by another government could affect the leader’s domestic political survival. Specifically, I focus on why leaders are concerned with the creation and flow of refugees. If individuals flee their home and enter the leader’s territory, she must decide how to handle these newcomers and balance the tensions such arrivals can create. I argue that when facing large refugee inflows, a leader becomes willing to participate in the collective security regime and offer protection to these threatened individuals before they become refugees seeking asylum in her country.

Refugees can present myriad problems for their host countries. Money spent on the refugees can slow the economy (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler 2004), hurt the health system (e.g., Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003), and strain the food supply (Jenkins, Scanlan, and Peterson
These problems can create or exacerbate grievances amongst the population. When the government fails to provide public goods to its supporters, the aggravated public becomes more willing to remove the leader.

Regardless of regime type, leaders fearing large refugee inflows from crisis regions are more likely than other leaders to send financial and military support to guarantee peace and stability in the area. This explanation of civilian protection predicts who is most likely to send support (those fearing refugee inflows), where they send assistance (to the conflict area), and when they send aid (until the threat has subsided). Thus, I expect that illiberal and liberal leaders will participate in the protection of civilians abroad when such protection prevents those individuals from crossing into the leader’s territory as refugees.

**Methods of civilian protection**

A leader can offer protection to at-risk populations through several means. First, and perhaps most directly, a leader can send military troops into the conflict area to separate the civilians from the violence they face. Troops can monitor violence, provide safe havens to which the people can flee, and offer military support against the abuses face by the civilian population.

When considering whether to send military personnel into a conflict situation, a leader faces several decisions. She can act unilaterally or participate in a multilateral effort. If she collaborates with others, the leader must decide how much of the burden to carry. The manner in which refugee inflows create incentives for the leader should help her make these decisions. The greater the level of externality she faces from a conflict, the higher cost a leader will be willing to pay to prevent inflows. In terms of multilateral action, this suggests that leaders facing large refugee inflows should be more willing to provide armed peacekeepers and police to conflict
situations than to waste resources mobilizing unarmed observers to the area. As the externalities continue to increase, a leader may become more willing to take unilateral action in the conflict to avoid the coordination and principal-agent problems endemic to multilateral missions. Unilateral action allows the leader to pursue her policy goals unhindered. However, unilateral action also requires the state to pay all of the costs of intervention. Thus, only well-endowed states should pursue unilateral action in the face of refugee inflows.

The second manner in which a leader can intervene to protect potential refugees is through providing economic carrots, such as foreign aid, to the civilians’ home state. Aid may help alleviate the threat of refugee inflows in two manners. First, a leader can provide money directly to the civilians’ home government to induce policy change that would reduce the number of individuals fleeing their country. Second, a leader can provide aid to multilateral humanitarian organizations working within the country to protect displaced populations and rebuild destroyed infrastructure.

As when providing troops, a leader faces several decisions on how to best supply foreign aid. For instance, she must decide whether it is better to use troops or money to achieve her desired outcome. If she sends aid, the leader must choose whether to provide the aid bilaterally and directly to the country of interest or through multilateral international organizations. I argue that because troops can have a more direct effect on stopping refugee flows between borders, a leader facing externalities from a conflict will be more likely to commit soldiers than to send foreign aid to the area. Soldiers can protect civilians from abuse and police the border areas to ensure migration does not occur. When aid is given to the at-war country, the leader will face a principal-agent problem in ensuring that the recipient uses the money to stop the forced migration of refugees into her country. This principal-agent problem is exacerbated if a leader
provides funds through a multilateral agency or organization like the UN General Peacebuilding Fund. When the leader provides the agency funds, she cannot guarantee where or how the organization will use her contribution. For this reason, I posit that leaders who are facing externalities from a conflict will be less willing to contribute reconstruction funds to the country though a multilateral institution.

**Implications**

The theory and findings of this project provide several implications for our understanding of the post-Cold War collective security regime, peacekeeping and peacebuilding specifically, and broader topics in the study of international relations, such as how domestic politics structure international behavior, and how norms and laws diffuse and change state behavior. I will touch on some of these themes here in the introduction. In the conclusion, I will return to these implications in more depth.

Traditionally, scholars have argued that states participate in peacekeeping missions through the United Nations to reap monetary benefits for their contributions (Berman and Sams 2000; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Victor 2010). My work indicates that, on average, this is not the main motivation of contributing countries. I find that militarily needy states are far less likely to participate in any dimension of the post-Cold War collective security system than are their wealthier counterparts. Strong, wealthier countries are on the forefront of creating a system to police conflict, and protect civilians, throughout the world (Mueller 2004). However, the wealthier countries are not the only ones bearing the burden of peacekeeping. Rather, countries that are threatened by an ongoing conflict or unstable post-conflict situations are the ones most likely to support peacekeeping in the country. This implies that scholars are correct in arguing
that participants derive some benefit from their contributions. However, they have been mistaken in understanding what countries seek to obtain from their contributions.

From a policy perspective, these findings— that poor states contribute less and states receiving refugee inflows contribute more— suggest that the UN has implemented misguided programs. First, monies spent trying to buy international support from its members for peacekeeping missions are not having an effect on attracting more contributions. Second, attempting to dissuade states affected by the conflict from participating in peacekeeping hinders the UN’s ability to garner sufficient support for its missions. If the UN redesigned these policies to encourage participation by effected states, and use its funds to better monitor and police these contributors, then we may see more effective peacekeeping.

I also find that states provide aid to extract benefits from the recipients. In particular, states can use aid to help stem refugee inflows from the recipients’ conflicts. States are unlikely to contribute bilateral aid to at-war states or nearby states struggling to handle refugee inflows from the conflict. However, when refugees threaten a leader’s borders, she becomes willing to donate aid to the recipient. This suggests that bilateral foreign aid provision to war-torn countries and their neighbors is not altruistic (e.g., Lumsdaine 1993), but rather it is politically motivated (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). These results build on past research to suggest that both the decision whether to provide aid, and how much, are largely driven by the same realist calculations. The question of aid size is not an independently altruistic, or humanitarian, concern (e.g., Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005).

The idea that a state often seeks to extract policy concessions from the recipient of its aid, helps explain some of the patterns we see with post-conflict peacebuilding projects. Since the inception of its Peacebuilding Commission and General Peacebuilding Fund, the UN has
struggled to attract financial support to its peacebuilding projects. One reason for this difficulty lays in how the institutions are designed to prevent such policy extraction and undue influence from states affected by the conflict and contributing to the fund. By removing donors’ ability to stipulate where and how their money is used, the UN has exacerbated the underlying principal-agent problem states face in contributing foreign aid. Now, states not only risk the recipient reneging on its promise to change policy, but they also cannot control where the Peacebuilding Commission uses that money nor for what purpose. Since the United Nations has changed the manner in which peacebuilding funds are aggregated and dispensed, state contributions to peacebuilding projects have fallen by $100 million. This trend is concerning, as scholars have shown that without substantial international support for building peace, war-torn areas may be condemned to a perpetual cycle of instability, violence, and human rights abuse (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

These dynamics provide insight into the role of norms in international relations. I find that democracies are generally no more likely to provide civilian protection and externalize good human rights practices in other countries than are their non-democratic counterparts. Instead, the countries that shoulder the burden of promoting the norm of civilian protection are those that benefit from this behavior by legitimizing their actions to stop abuse against civilians and limit the number of refugees flooding their borders. While this behavior cuts across regime type, it is important to note than many of the largest contributors to these missions are non-democracies.

This does not mean that democracies do not help further the norm of civilian protection. Democracies participate the most when the political and military costs are low. In particular, democracies tend to supply large amounts of foreign aid to at-war and post-conflict countries, both through bilateral and multilateral channels. In addition, democracies tend to react, and
become involved, quicker in humanitarian crises. However, they leave the heavy lifting to non-democratic countries, whose leaders are not as sensitive to the political costs of lost troops. Here, we see the importance of domestic politics. Not only do the domestic tensions created by refugee inflows influence whether countries become involved in humanitarian actions, but regime type influences what policy options are feasible for particular countries.

These findings complicate our understanding of norm transmission. Democracies are quick to promote human rights and the norm of civilian protection. This is consistent with previous theory of norm transmission in that activists and norm entrepreneurs are more likely to find platforms in liberal states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, once the norm begins to gain international recognition, it is not these same democratic promoters who implement the behavior abroad. Instead, late joiners pay the costs of acting on the norm. I conclude that the promotion of norms is not driven by states that already possess the behavior, but by states on the fringe of the norm that lock in the practice for realpolitik reasons.

Lastly, this project explores the changing norm of sovereignty. Traditionally, states have regarded the domestic affairs of others as outside the grounds for intervention. However, as states work to protect foreign civilians abroad, this highlights an emerging pattern of behavior working to shift how leaders view sovereignty. It is especially interesting to understand these changes through the eyes of repressive leaders, as they adjust to a world in which all states have the responsibility to protect all civilians (Stahn 2007; UN 2005). This is an important area of research, as states have begun to operate under the notion of “Responsibility to Protect” increasingly.

Roadmap
The remainder of this book proceeds in eight chapters. In Chapter 2, I provide a general theory to why states are sometimes willing to participate in the protection of civilians outside their territory. Chapters 3-8 provide empirical studies of the 16 hypotheses I derive in my theory chapter. Chapter 3 investigates where, when, and for how long states participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Chapter 4 analyzes why some states utilize unilateral action to stem externalities from conflict zones, while other prefer multilateral missions. Chapter 5 examines the various manners in which a state can contribute militarily to multilateral missions. In Chapter 6, I begin to consider how a leader makes the decision to provide foreign aid or military personnel to war-torn areas. Chapter 7 focuses solely on foreign aid, as I unpack a leader’s motivations in contributing bilateral aid to countries at war. Chapter 8 analyzes how the institutional features of a multilateral organization can discourage states from participating in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in other countries. Lastly, I conclude this book in Chapter 9 by considering the implications my work has for our broader understanding of international relations and politics.
Chapter 2.

A theory of why states protect foreign civilians outside their borders.

“We have a particular interest in stopping brutality when it occurs so close to our shores... As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already spent $177 million to support them.” --- President William Jefferson Clinton on why the United States needed to intervene in the 1994 Haitian civil war.

Introduction

Chapter 1 presented the main themes of this book. I began by summarizing the change in the nature of the collective security system following the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, security is founded on the principles of punishing human rights abuse, protecting civilians, and stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (see Frederking 2003). This apparent shift in the priority of states has led many scholars to argue that liberal democratic states are promoting and shouldering the current collective security burden to guarantee their humanitarian norms are cemented in the international system. However, empirical evidence suggests that not all democracies are willing to participate in these humanitarian efforts. Furthermore, many leaders that do not shelter their own citizens participate in the protection of foreign civilians outside of their borders. It is these patterns of inconsistent support for civilian
protection and humanitarian projects that forms the basis of the question I propose to answer. Why do some states protect foreign civilians outside their borders?

My goal in this chapter is to construct a theory that explains why leaders, across regime types, are sometimes willing to involve their countries in the protection of foreign civilians in other lands. It is important that we have a unified theory of civilian protection, so that we can accurately explain who participates in these projects and why. In addition, my theory will not only explain why states join humanitarian projects broadly, but it will also be able to illuminate where and when leaders concentrate their efforts. These are two points in which the existing literature is deficient.

To construct my theory, I focus on how persecution and violence can drive individuals to flee their homes and become refugees. These refugees create tensions within their host states, and provide opportunity for dissidents to use violence against the government. In response, a leader will work to protect these foreign individuals before they become refugees entering the her country and creating the tensions she fears. I argue that it is this desire to prevent large inflows of refugees that induces leaders to offer protection to populations facing violence. However, since a state’s resources are scarce, a leader will be more likely to target this protection to populations nearby her country. Once the fear of these inflows has subsided, the leader will be unlikely to continue supporting these humanitarian efforts outside her borders.

The following chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by explaining how refugees can create grievance and tension within their host state. I then discuss how leaders form expectations about the size of refugee inflows they will face from a conflict area. I outline how a leader’s expectations about refugee inflows may induce her to take action to protect the abused
individuals before they enter her territory. I then consider the various methods a leader can use to protect the civilians.

**The effects of refugee inflows**

As Moore and Shellman (2004) discuss, in the face of violence, individuals confront a choice between staying in their homes and fleeing from the area. In abandoning one’s home, an individual can become a refugee by crossing an international border and declaring that he is unwilling or unable to avail himself of the protection of his home country. Individuals who flee their homes to avoid persecution and take refuge in another state’s territory become the responsibility of that state until the individual’s asylum status is determined.

Refugees present myriad problems for the states to which they flee. Upon their arrival, the state’s leadership must make a decision on how to deal with these newcomers. Will the state take an active role in protecting and providing for these refugees, or will the state leave them open to the elements and attacks by their persecutors?

Money diverted from the country’s economic policies to protecting the refugees can hurt the state’s economy. As more individuals enter the state, resources used to provide basic services to the population must be stretched to accommodate the new arrivals. When this money is removed from its traditional programs, these areas slow to adjust for the lack of funds available (Murdoch and Sandler 2002, 2004).

This influx of people also taxes the state’s health system. Refugees tend to bring disease to their new home, as they are exposed to poor living conditions and engage in more risky behaviors during their journey (Iqbal 2006; Iqbal and Zorn 2010; Reid 1998). In an effort to
accommodate the refugees and those who become sick from contact with them, state health systems often crack under the strain. Health resources must be spread to accommodate both the state’s citizens and the refugees. Additionally, the health system may need to handle new diseases or viruses it is not equipped to manage (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, 2004; Toole 1997, 2000).

The arrival of refugees similarly stresses a state’s food supply. Refugees are more mouths to feed. Assuming that states cannot instantaneously increase food production upon the arrival of the refugee population, as the number of refugees increases, the amount of food per person decreases. Additionally, many refugees live off the land as they seek a safe place to take shelter. Gathering from the fields before harvest lowers the state’s food production (Jenkins, Scanlan, and Peterson 2007).

In addition to straining a state’s resources, refugees can shift the host country’s demographics, creating tension with the local population in three ways. First, refugees tend to be poor. They were of a persecuted class in their home state and were forced to flee with only those possessions they could carry with them. Upon arriving in the new land, they are homeless and without a source of income. By increasing the number of poor petitioning the government for resources, refugee inflows can increase conflict within the country. Second, the refugees may be of a different ethnic group than the indigenous population. Shifting the ethnic composition of the state may exacerbate existing ethnic tensions, or create new cleavages within the state. Third, refugees can bring new religious ideas to the host country. While the religion itself may not call for aggressive proselytizing, the new religious ideas can create friction either by conflicting with the dominant religion in the area or by bringing in philosophies to which the government is opposed. Shifting the state’s demographics along any of these dimensions can create tension
amongst the country’s population and between the refugees and their hosts (Saideman and Ayres 2000).

Refugees also have the effect of creating animosity between their host and home states. As refugees enter the host state’s territory and create the strains detailed above, the government will begin to look to stop the inflows. The host state can intervene militarily in the civil war or abusive situation to end the hostilities, and thus end the refugee inflows, or it can begin a militarized dispute with the refugees’ home country over the closing of the border (Cooper and Berdal 1993; Khosla 1999; Mueller 2003; Regan 1998; Salehyan 2008). In either case, interstate violence places the leader’s political survival at risk. If the leader is unable to accomplish her objectives, she is likely to lose domestic support and be removed from office (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).

Expecting refugees

Depending on the situation creating the refugee outflows, leaders will form different beliefs about whether they will encounter any inflows from the area and the extent of these externalities. A leader bases her expectation about the size of the refugee spillover she will face on two factors. First, a leader is more likely to suspect that she will face a flood of refugees the closer she is to their home country. When individuals flee their country, they typically find shelter in nearby areas. Refugees are fleeing their homes and hoping to find a place to hide or rebuild their lives. They leave home without much money or provisions. This means they must find a place to settle quickly. Crossing into nearby countries allows the individuals to assert their inability to avail themselves of the protection of their government and claim special refugee
benefits under international law (e.g., Iqbal and Zorn 2007; Karemera, Oguledo, and Davis 2000; Schmeidl 1997).

Second, a leader will expect larger refugee spillover from the conflict area when the group under attack is populous. Refugees tend to flee their homes in groups because individuals within a population share similar sets of information and create common expectations about their future (e.g., Moore and Shellman 2004). This implies that as the size of the abused group grows, the number of individuals that flee their home will increase. Therefore, if a leader sees that a bigger population is facing violence, she should expect that a larger number of individuals from the area would flee to her border in search of safety. Leaders close to a large population that is encountering abuse should expect the possibility of larger spillovers from the violence than either leaders close to a small group facing persecution or leaders further away from a populous area.

**Stopping the problem before it starts**

The negative effect refugees have on a host country will induce a leader that is expecting inflows to take action to stop these externalities before they begin. My argument that preventing refugee inflows drives international humanitarian action can explain who will participate, where they will direct their efforts, when they are likely to become involved in such missions, and when their support will end. The answer to each of these questions—who, where, and when, should be determined by the leader’s motivation to prevent a large refugee population from entering her country.

Given the threat states face from large refugee inflows, leaders of these regimes should be more likely than other countries to work to protect foreign civilians in other states before they
become refugees in their own territory. If the leader can eliminate the source of the refugee problem before those inflows occur, she will be better off for not having to face the tensions created by these arrivals once they enter her territory. It is due to the fear of the consequences of these inflows, that leaders are willing to make efforts abroad to stop abuses by foreign leaders, even when they mistreat their own people.

This does not mean that all leaders are more likely to protect foreign civilians abroad. If a leader does not fear refugee inflows, then she will be unlikely to oppose domestic actions by a foreign leader. Without this fear, the leader has little motivation to reallocate troops, money, and other resources away from the provision of her domestic security to missions in other countries. It is when the leader believes she will be threatened by inflows, that she will act to protect foreign civilians, before they are harmed, flee their state, and become refugees crossing into her territory.

However, a leader must be strategic in how she distributes goods (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). She is unlikely to dedicate resources to situations in which she will not receive a return on her investment. Resources dedicated to low return projects are wasteful for the leader because she no longer has these goods at her service and she has not fortified her position of power. In terms of dispatching humanitarian aid, this implies that a leader will be unlikely to participate in projects that will not have an effect on preventing refugees from entering her territory. Troops sent to areas that are unlikely to produce refugees for the state cannot help the leader achieve her goal of stopping inflows. These soldiers will be unable to have an effect on the situation in the problem zone. Similarly, money spent on humanitarian projects not focused on the refugee-producing situation will be unable to alleviate the violence that is driving the refugees into the leader’s country. While these funds may help some civilians, from
the point of view of the leader and her concerns, these resources are not used in a beneficial manner. With the particular problem of preventing refugee inflows as motivation, and a strategy of directing her resources towards relieving this problem, a leader expecting high volumes of refugees from a specific conflict will focus her state’s resources on the actual area of concern.

*Hypothesis 1: A leader expecting high volumes of refugee inflows is more likely to protect foreign civilians in situations from which she expects high volumes of refugee inflows.*

Given her desire to prevent the problems associated with refugee inflows before they begin, a leader expecting large spillovers from a conflict area will need to act swiftly. Once refugees enter a country, it is difficult for the leader to remove them (Loescher and Milner 2005). This is evident by the length of time refugee camps tend to endure in their host countries. For example, the Dadaab camp established in Kenya during 1992 for refugees from the Somali civil war is still in place today. This camp appears to have developed into a semi-permanent destination for refugees, as thousands of individuals flee to the shelter yearly (UNHCR 1994, 2012a). Attacking refugees in an attempt to drive them out will bring scorn from Non-government Organizations and other leaders, and is a Crime against Humanity (ICC 2011). This limits a leader’s options in removing the refugees. Furthermore, rushing refugees through the asylum process costs the state money, labor, and time. Once rejecting an individual’s asylum, the leader must dedicate further resources to deport the refugee. To avoid these logistical issues, and the tensions she fears, a leader expecting a high volume of refugee inflows should work quickly to alleviate the foreign situation that is likely to cause these spillovers.
States far from a conflict occasionally participate in protection of civilians in the crisis zone. For example, Jordan sent personnel to assist UN operation MINUSTAH in Haiti following the 2004 revolt against Haitian President Bertrand Aristide. Several scholars contend that distant states make these contributions to collect on UN payments to participants (Berman and Sams 2000; Blum 2000). If leaders of these states are not personally invested in the protection of the at-risk population, then they should not respond as quickly to the call for help. They will be more willing to wait and observe the developing situation and who else is providing military and financial support. The threat of refugee inflows is not an immediate concern for such leaders. This gives them the luxury of time in deciding whether and to what degree to participate. In the Haitian example, Jordan waited five months before sending soldiers to the area and nearly a year before deploying a significant number of troops. Conversely, Caribbean and South American states, such as Brazil and Guatemala, who were likely to receive larger refugee inflows from the conflict, responded quickly and deployed large numbers of troops to Haiti.

The MINUSTAH case highlights my logic. Leaders concerned that a violent situation will force refugees into their country are likely to act swiftly in an attempt to stop the ongoing problem, protect civilians in the area, and keep individuals from fleeing the conflict and becoming refugees arriving in their territory. Leaders not facing direct negative externalities from the strife may also participate in providing humanitarian support to civilians in the area, but they are less likely to act rapidly in offering their assistance.

*Hypothesis 2: As the expected refugee inflows increase, leaders should commit sooner to protecting civilians in those areas.*
Previous theories concerning civilian protection predict that certain types of states will provide more protection than others will. Such arguments present a static view of this behavior. They do not allow for shifts in a leader’s support. However, leaders rarely maintain a constant level of involvement in humanitarian projects abroad. For example, Denmark deposited roughly $9 million in the United Nations’ General Peacebuilding Fund at the department’s creation in 2006, but failed to donate following its initial contribution. In peacekeeping, analogous patterns exist. Zambia contributed hundreds of troops to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the beginning of the mission, but dropped its contribution to a mere 15 soldiers by 1996. Similarly, Barbados’ contribution to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) stopped at the end of 1995, a year before the mission concluded. Countries also become more involved in projects once situations on the ground change. For instance, Malawi did not contribute military personnel to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 2005 when it experienced an uptick in refugees arriving from the DRC.

As conflicts develop and the situation on the battlefield evolves, leaders update their expectations on a host of elements, including the cost of the conflict, the potential for third party participation, and the likelihood of victory amongst other concerns (e.g., Slantchev 2004; Wagner 2000). Third parties also update their understanding of how the conflict will affect them. For example, third party states pay close attention to how a conflict affects their trading relations (e.g., Fordham 2007), whether other states plan to join the war (e.g., Morgenthau 1973; Shirkey 2009), and whether the conflict will create spillovers, including refugee and arms inflows (e.g., Danneman and Ritter 2012). As conditions in the trouble area change, both leaders involved in the conflict and observing as third parties will alter their conduct. Leaders providing
humanitarian assistance should also change their behavior in regards to the situation and in line with their updated expectations.

If concerns about refugee inflows drive participation in humanitarian missions, then as these fears wane, so should a leader’s willingness to contribute to these projects. Once a border is secured, or the foreign situation is pacified, a leader will expect fewer refugees to cross into her territory. With fewer refugees entering her country, a leader will not be as concerned with the tensions these arrivals bring. In such a situation, the leader can reallocate those resources she sent abroad back home to provide other domestic goods to her supporters. Troops deployed abroad can return home safely and financial commitments can transform into domestic spending programs on public goods like education or healthcare, or private goods for the leader’s support coalition.

_Hypothesis 3 (when do leaders stop): Having participated in protecting foreign civilians aboard, leaders no longer expecting high volumes of refugee inflows are more likely to withdraw support from the mission than are other leaders._

**Multilateral humanitarianism vs. unilateral militarized disputes**

Thus far, I have argued that leaders who are expecting high volumes of refugee inflows will respond to these externalities by intervening in the conflict to protect civilians in the area before these individuals flee their homes and enter the leader’s country. However, instead of engaging in a humanitarian mission dedicated to protecting civilians in the war stricken country, leaders may also respond by initiating a dispute with the refugee’s home country in an attempt to stem these flows (Cooper and Berdal 1993; Khosla 1999; Mueller 2003; Regan 1998; Salehyan...
When facing externalities from ongoing conflicts, why do some states respond by issuing militarized threats, while others react through multilateral humanitarian missions?

The decision whether to join a multilateral mission or begin a unilateral militarized dispute is informed by the costs and benefits of each action. Prevailing in a dispute, or war, requires a state to have sufficient military capabilities. Fighting requires a state to mobilize economic resources to equip troops and outfit war machines, like planes and tanks. Once mobilized, the state must be able to absorb the costs of war as money is diverted from the peacetime economy and potential workers are away on the battlefield. Having a larger military also allows a state to handle casualties and continue pushing forward despite the loss of personnel. For all of these reasons, stronger states are more likely to engage in militarized disputes and prevail against their enemy (Bennett and Stam 1998; Biddle 2004; Clark and Reed 2003; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Stam 1996).

In terms of initiating a dispute to stem refugee inflows, we should not be surprised when stronger states handle their troublesome neighbors’ externalities unilaterally. Strong states have frequently intervened in the conflicts of their weaker neighbors to prevent further externalities. For example, the United States used its power to intervene in Haiti in 1994 to prevent further refugee outflows (Newland 1995). However, resorting to war is not as realistic for weaker states. As discussed above, intervention requires a state to mobilize resources and dedicate them to the war effort. Many weaker states, who are experiencing refugee inflows, may not have the ability to both engage in war and maintain stability at home (Salehyan 2008).

Weaker states, however, are not without recourse in their desire to stop refugee inflows. These countries can turn to international organizations and multilateral efforts to alleviate the externalities they experience from nearby, ongoing conflicts. International organizations, like the
United Nations, are a useful tool for weaker states because they allow their members to aggregate their capabilities towards a common goal. By providing a stable structure through which to coordinate actions, and a supportive administrative apparatus to handle conflicts that arise as their members interact, international organizations help groups of states overcome their collective action problems in jointly pursuing their policy goals (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane and Nye 1974). By uniting the capabilities of their member states, and providing a centralized mechanism through which to operate, international organizations can help weaker states enhance the efficiency of their efforts in stemming refugee inflows from surrounding conflicts.

While humanitarian interventions operated by international organizations, like the United Nations or ECOWAS, may increase the efficiency of states in handling the externalities from a conflict, some states may be more willing to risk their own capabilities through a unilateral intervention, rather than take part in the operations of an international organization. In particular, stronger states, which have the means to unilaterally intervene in their neighbors’ conflicts, may operate outside of multilateral operations to avoid the principal-agent problem that countries often encounter when participating in an international organization. When a state operates through an international organization, it must surrender some of its foreign policy autonomy. By coordinating its efforts with other countries, the state’s ability to conduct its ideal intervention is limited by what the organization and other members will allow. If a state believes that it possesses the necessary capabilities to handle an intervention on its own, it may decide to operate outside of an organization to retain the ability to fully conduct its mission as it sees best (e.g., Voeten 2001).
Given these dynamics, I expect that states will determine whether to intervene multilaterally or unilaterally based on their military capabilities and their expected outcome from each course of action. I state this expectation explicitly in the following four hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 4: Conditional of having low capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows are more likely to join a humanitarian mission.*

*Hypothesis 5: Conditional of having low capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows are less likely to initiate a MID.*

*Hypothesis 6: Conditional of having high capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows are less likely to join a humanitarian mission.*

*Hypothesis 7: Conditional of having high capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows are more likely to initiate a MID.*

**Costly contributions in the multilateral setting**

When operating though a multilateral effort, like a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission, a leader can contribute various types of personnel. Generally, a leader can contribute military troops, police officers, or unarmed observers to conflict areas. Each of these personnel types performs a different role while in the conflict area, and provides leaders with various benefits and costs to deployment.
Troops perform the role most typically associated with peacekeeping. These individuals engage in a variety of tasks, such as monitoring a disputed border, monitoring and observing the peace processes in post-conflict areas, providing security across a conflict zone, assisting in-country military personnel with training and support, assisting combatants in implementing peace agreements, and protecting civilians, which since the end of the Cold War has become “the heart of UN mandates” (UNDPKO 2012b).

Police personnel do not engage with the combatants in the same manner as troops. Police officers tend to monitor and report on crimes and abuses amongst the local population. Since the end of the Cold War these service members are also often engaged in the training of local forces. Largely, the role of police officers in conflict situations is to reinforce and re-establish security amongst the local population by “patrolling communities, advising domestic police services, ensuring compliance with international human rights standards and restoring and promoting public safety and the rule of law” (UNDPKO 2012b). While both police officers and troops provide protection to the civil population, they differ in where their time and effort is spent. Troops spend the majority of their time amongst the belligerents, while police tend to interact with the local population.

Observers are unarmed personnel whose job is to report on the abuses of the civilian population to the international community. Unlike both troops and police forces, observers lack the ability to physically engage in the protection of civilians. Instead, their role in any international civilian assistance effort is limited to a monitoring function. While observers can bring attention to the violation of human rights or the laws of war, they can provide very little assistance on their own.
Each of these personnel types provide different levels of costs and benefits for contributing states. Troops, who are armed and deployed between combatants, have the highest likelihood of protecting civilians from armed violence and thus reducing the number of individuals fleeing the area to become refugees. Troops are better armed than both police personnel and observers, allowing them to more effectively engage in the active physical protection of civilians than other personnel types. In addition, their mandate is to separate combatants from civilians, lowering the probability of abuses against the non-combatants. Under the mandates of some multilateral organizations, like ECOWAS, these soldiers are also permitted to engage in offensive confrontation against belligerent groups (Olonisakin 2008). Due to their more advanced equipment, training, and rules of engagement, troops provide the largest deterrent effect on violence against civilians in conflict situations (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2012). Given the benefits troops provide contributors in stopping violence and reducing violations against the civilian population, I expect that those leaders most concerned with providing such protection will provide larger numbers of armed troops to multilateral efforts.

Police protection also offers benefits in the protection of civilians. While police forces do not engage in separating belligerents, they are responsible for controlling interactions between combatants and civilians behind the frontlines. During a ceasefire, factions may attempt to clear the civilian population of dissidents, use coercive acts to reinforce loyalty, or conscript civilians into service. Police personnel can thus protect civilians by patrolling vulnerable populations and ensuring violent actions are not taken against the people (Holt, Taylor, and Kelly 2009). In addition, officers can work with the local police personnel in training these forces, escorting humanitarian actors through the conflict area, and establishing the necessary domestic conditions to guarantee protection to the civilian population (Day and Freeman 2005). Since police forces
can also provide protection to civilians in the conflict zone, I expect that leaders concerned with preventing refugee outflows from the area will provide a significant number of police officers to multilateral efforts.

Observers provide the least benefit in the way of protecting civilians. As stated above, observers are not armed, nor do they possess the mandate to separate warring factions from one another or from the civilian population. While observers can report on abuses committed against non-combatants, they are powerless to intervene on their own. When faced with violence, observers are quickly pulled from the conflict area. For example, just four months after deploying observers to Syria, the United Nations recalled these personnel due to increased violence in the area (Mood 2012; UNSC 2012). Without the ability to engage either the combatants or the non-combatants directly, observers can do little to protect civilians and limit the number of refugees leaving the area. For this reason, leaders desiring to limit refugee inflows from the conflict area will be less willing to employ observers.

Hypothesis 8: Leaders expecting high volumes of refugee inflows should provide a larger number of troops than police or observers to situations from which she expects high volumes of refugee inflows.

Hypothesis 9: Leaders expecting high volumes of refugee inflows should provide a larger number of police officers than observers to situations from which she expects high volumes of refugee inflows.
In addition to the benefits of contributing different types of personnel to multilateral missions, a leader must also consider the costs associated with providing individuals to the humanitarian effort. If the costs of providing certain types of personnel outweigh their benefits, then a leader should look to substitute her efforts with less risky contributions.

While troops offer the largest benefit to those leaders interested in stopping abuses of the local population, they also provide the highest level of risk for contributing states. By interceding between the warring factions, and between combatants and civilians, troops are placed in a more dangerous position than other personnel types. They can become targets by belligerents desiring to drive the multilateral force out of the area. They may also be victims of collateral damage, as the separated factions attempt to reignite the conflict.

Police forces are less susceptible to these losses, as they are not tasked with preventing fighting between hostile factions. However, police officers still face some risk, as they are tasked with preventing abuses against civilians behind the frontlines. In these situations, international police personnel encounter many of the same risks as they do domestically. They may face violence from armed individuals as they conduct their patrols. This suggests that while police may face a lower level of risk than military soldiers, they are not risk free.

Observers are the least costly personnel type to contribute to a multilateral effort. Observers refrain from violent confrontation with either the various armed factions or the civilians. While observers may face cross-fire between the warring factions, or other forms of violence, their mandate does not require them to engage in hostilities. Rather, when faced with violence, observers are often removed from the conflict area, as in the Syria example provided previously.
For these reasons, I expect that troop contributions carry the highest level of potential cost, followed by police officers, and lastly unarmed observers. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), for example, had 169 troops killed compared to 2 observers and 1 police officer, while the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) had 11 troop casualties, along with the losses of 3 police officers and 1 observer (UNDPKO 2012a). Thus, while troops provide more benefits than police and police more benefits than observers, contributing troops should also carry more risk than police and police more risk than observers.

As the risk associated with contributing different types of personnel increases, a leader who is more sensitive to the political costs of lost military personnel will be less likely to provide those types of personnel that face the greatest danger of death. Specifically, because democratic leaders are more likely to be held accountable for troop deaths by their domestic publics (e.g., Koch and Gartner 2005), I expect that democratic leaders will provide a smaller number of troops and police to multilateral missions. I also expect that these leaders will substitute their lower contributions of troops and police with a greater provision of observers to multilateral missions.

Hypothesis 10: Democratic leaders should provide fewer troops than police officers and observers to peacekeeping missions.

Hypothesis 11: Democratic leaders should provide fewer police officers than observers to peacekeeping missions.
Troops versus money

Protecting foreign civilians does not mean the leader needs to invade her neighbors. While many scholars have argued that refugee inflows increase a state’s willingness to fight a neighboring country to curtail the refugee problem (e.g., Mueller 2003; Regan 1998, 2002; Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004), I expect that these leaders will be more likely to engage in acts that directly protect, or benefit, the foreign civilians so that they do not become refugees in the first place.

Leaders can protect civilians in two broad manners. First, they can send troops into the war torn area to monitor, and stop, violence directed towards the noncombatants. Troops allow for an explicit presence in the area. They are able to observe direct abuse against the population. Soldiers are also able to protect the civilians. They can offer protection by establishing safe zones to which persecuted individuals can flee, or by simply acting as a defensive force around the areas in which the civilians live or work. States can send troops as part of humanitarian interventions under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, as well as in support of less violent operations like peacekeeping missions. In the post-Cold War collective security system, troop deployment for the protection of civilians is typically done through UN peacekeeping operations.

The second general method that states can employ to stop the abuse of foreign civilians abroad is to fund projects directed at establishing peace and stability within the country. Leaders fund various projects dedicated to the protection of civilians. For instance, states fund the operation of courts to help bring justice and reconciliation to areas, they back projects dedicated to the protection and reintegration of refugees, and support the United Nations’ General Peacebuilding Fund, which covers projects ranging from the rebuilding of infrastructure to the staffing of administrative personnel. Sending money, or other non-human resources, has the
advantage of allowing the leader to retain personnel domestically, as well as not placing soldiers at risk in violent situations.

I posit that despite the higher risks of sending military personnel into situations of civilian abuse, leaders prefer to accomplish their goals with troops rather than pecuniary means. My argument is based on four benefits troop involvement provides over protection through monetary investment. First, boots on the ground allow for active monitoring of the situation. Soldiers can observe the civilian population and mark when and where abuses occur. Upon witnessing abuse, troops in the area can report to the leader. This is the second benefit of deploying soldiers. Through their personnel, leaders can receive continual updates and plan policy accordingly. The third benefit of troop deployment is that the leader can change policy quickly and see her new orders carried out on the ground. The constant monitoring, and steady reports back to the leader, allows the leader to update her strategy. With boots in the area, the leader can be sure that her wishes are followed and improvements can be made that will limit the inflows she fears. Lastly, as has been evident in this discussion of the on ground presence, the government is able to retain influence over the situation. Having control over the personnel in the area provides the leader with latitude in conducting operations to ensure her goals are met in participating in the protection of foreign civilians abroad. This is extremely important for a leader whose motivations may be far from humanitarian, and who cares exactly how the mission is conducted.

The funding of humanitarian projects does not afford the leader the same benefits. First, money itself cannot monitor. To observe the effects of her donation, a leader must send personnel to the location of interest, along with the resources. This is particularly difficult when the state makes its contribution in combination with larger efforts to fund humanitarian missions. When states fund projects through multilateral organizations, like the United Nations, monies are
typically aggregated and dispersed as the organization sees fit, obstructing the state’s ability to monitor precisely the effects of their contribution. Second, and similarly, reports on the effects of the contribution are not as direct. When leaders fund peacebuilding missions, reports are made on whether the project is successful- for example, whether the infrastructure is replaced- but it is difficult to determine whether these projects are directly stopping abuse and stemming refugee, arms, and weapons flows out of the territory. Third, rapid responses are difficult. While a state can quickly threaten, or actually, cut funding to a project, such abrupt shifts in policy are not able to handle the intricacies of the situation on the ground, as are the reorganizing of troops in the area. Additionally, once monies are contributed to an organization for a project, those resources cannot be recalled. All the state can do is refuse to fund future endeavors. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the leader does not have direct control over the resources. Once funds are contributed to an organization, or to the needy state, the leader loses much control over how the monies are actually used in the implementation of the peacebuilding project. As discussed, this principal-agent problem is not as severe when the leader contributed troops to end the abuses.

While troop deployment holds advantages over funding peacebuilding projects, there are costs associated with offering this type of protection. First, soldiers can die. For example, over 160 peacekeepers were killed during the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN 2012a). Lost troops are costly to a leader for two reasons. Domestic populations do not like the death of their soldiers conducting missions abroad (e.g., Baum 2003; Gartzke 2001; Koch and Gartner 2005; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Russett 1990). This domestic cost should not outweigh the benefits to most leaders for deploying troops in these circumstances. If the operation is able to end the inflows, the leader should be willing to accept the domestic cost of lost troops because the disapproval she faces for these losses will not be a
reoccurring theme for her constituents in the same manner problems from a semi-permanent refugee population are. In addition, while troops do die during humanitarian missions, the probability of casualties is much lower in humanitarian efforts, like peacekeeping missions, than in direct armed conflict. In the past 64 years, only 3,000 soldiers have died in connection to UN missions (UNDPKO 2012a) compared to the over 3,000 that have died in the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan just between 2001 and 2012 (icasualties 2012).

The second cost to deploying soldiers abroad is that those boots are no longer in the leader’s territory and available to defend the country from invasion or repress the domestic population. However, the benefit the leader gains from a successful mission abroad should also outweigh this concern. Leaders repress because they must to retain power. If the tensions created by the inflows can be alleviated, the leader will not need to repress in fear of an impending civil war (Danneman and Ritter 2012). Furthermore, soldiers are typically young males. This age and gender group is also most likely to engage in violence against the state. Sending individuals from these particular trouble groups out of the state also lowers the need for the leader to repress (Bobrow and Boyer 1997).

Hypothesis 12: Leaders expecting high volumes of refugee inflows are more likely to protect foreign civilians through contributions of troops rather than money.

Refugee flows and foreign aid

To this point, I have argued that leaders deploy troops and foreign aid to war-torn areas to help stem the externalities their countries face from this fighting. However, politicians and bureaucrats often discuss their decisions in altruistic terms. For example, the Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance contends that aid decisions are made based on the need of the population seeking relief, and not U.S. security issues. They resist the idea that America foreign aid is provided to allies of the United States, stating, “Our assistance is to suffering people, not governments” (OFDA 1990: 7). Some research also supports the notion that foreign aid is driven by more than national interest. For instance, Lumsdaine (1993: 3) argues, “Many converging lines of evidence show that economic foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of donor states’ political and economic interests, and that humanitarian concern in the donor countries formed the main basis of support for aid.”

In wartime and post-conflict situations, leaders can provide aid to care for the civilian victims of the conflict. Donors target aid to recipients to help those in need. In these circumstances, aid can act as a subsidy to provide relief to a needy population. A leader can use financial contributions to provide camps, food, and clean water to displaced populations. States receiving this support are better able to allocate resources to those in need, as well as continuing to provide for other constituencies (Hartigan 1992; Kang and Meernik 2004).

Observing how leaders allocate aid in the presence of refugee flows can help determine whether such contributions are done altruistically. If a leader decides to provide aid based on need, rather than political necessity, we should observe her providing aid to countries handling displaced populations, regardless of whether supplying this support strengthens her state’s interest. Refugees seek relief, find themselves in vulnerable positions, and strain the resources of their host state. In particular, an altruistic leader will provide aid to countries receiving refugees, regardless of whether the country is her ally, trade partner, or other supporter, to help care for the displaced population. In addition, a leader receiving refugee inflows should provide assistance to
the at-risk populations yet to leave a conflict situation in an effort to provide them assistance and ease the difficulties conflict can cause.

**Hypothesis 13a (humanitarianism):** A leader is more likely to provide aid to a country that is receiving refugee inflows than to other countries and more likely to provide aid to a war-torn country that is producing refugee flows into her own country.

Many leaders use aid to extract concessions from recipient countries. For example, aid may induce a recipient to form its security position in favor of the donor, support the donor in international organizations, provide the donor preferential trade agreements, or access to resources (see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Given this strategy, leaders tend to target aid to those recipients who have policies at odds with the donor’s desires and who may be willing to alter their current policy.

In addition to providing relief to displaced populations, state leaders can also use foreign aid to help stem refugee inflows from at-war or post-conflict countries (e.g., Roper and Barria 2007). In terms of refugees, a leader can supply aid to a country with the intent of providing a subsidy to help control the externalities of the recipient’s current policies. Aid can help halt externalities by providing the warring country support to control its borders or provide camps for internally displaced people so that they do not seek shelter outside of their home country. During civil conflicts, third parties can support humanitarian efforts to provide for individuals displaced by the war. Providing such aid helps keep the displaced populations from fleeing their country, or camps, and entering the territory of their neighbors. For example, during the 1980s and early 1990s, Malawi worked with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees and World
Food Program to care for displaced populations and prevent further externalities from Mozambique’s civil war from spreading into its borders (UNHCR 2000).

Providing aid to stop refugee inflows in this manner helps a leader obtain her desired policy change in the recipient state. Here, a donor provides aid to a recipient to realize its goal of limiting incoming externalities from the recipient country. This dynamic corresponds with the argument that states make decisions about to whom to grant aid based on their desire to see policy changes in potential recipients. Given this understanding, I expect that a leader will be more likely to contribute financial assistance to a country from which she is experiencing refugees than to other countries.

**Hypothesis 13b (realism):** A leader receiving refugees from a war-torn country is more likely to provide aid to that country than other countries, but is not more likely to provide aid to a country that is receiving refugee inflows than to other countries.

Scholars are not only divided on whether the decision to grant aid is politically motivated, but they also disagree about whether the decision of how much to give is driven by humanitarian or political concerns. Observing patterns of how leaders provide foreign aid in refugee situations can help us understand this dynamic by determining whether leaders provide more aid to all refugees or only those that threaten their borders. Again, there are two competing hypotheses we can examine.

First, leaders may provide a country aid if it is facing conflict in an attempt to alleviate the suffering of the population. Conflict affects the security of civilians in numerous ways. Amongst the most common damages, are those injuries inflicted upon the population as they are
either considered collateral damage to the ongoing fight or targeted by the belligerents (Downes 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Wood 2010). Conflict also harms the health of the population by cutting off food supplies or access to medical attention (e.g., Iqbal 2006). When individuals become displaced by the conflict, they carry these hardships with them. Refugees tend to possess a higher rate of HIV infection than non-displaced populations, as they are exposed to poverty, family disintegration, social disruption and increased sexual violence (UNAIDS 2008). Mortality rates in refugee camps are often 100 times higher than normal rates (Toole 1997). In addition to living in unsanitary camps, refugees are easy targets for abuse by government and rebels forces (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008) and often have their children abducted by groups seeking to replenish their ranks with child soldiers (Achvarina and Reich 2006).

Given the persecution and violence refugees are fleeing and the hardships they endure once leaving their home countries, these individuals are ideal candidates for humanitarian relief efforts. Extant research suggests that even if the decision whether to provide foreign aid to a country is based on political motivations, the amount of aid a recipient receives is determined by the level of suffering within the country. For example, countries with a large death toll following a disaster receive more financial assistance than others (e.g., Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005). From this argument, I expect that a leader is likely to contribute more financial assistance to a country from which she is experiencing refugees than to other countries and she is likely to provide increased aid to countries that are receiving refugee inflows. If a leader’s main concern is providing for the humanitarian needs of refugees, than she should not be discriminating in which refugee populations she is willing to protect. Instead, she should be willing to offer support to those stateless people who need help.
Hypothesis 14a (humanitarianism): A leader is likely to provide more aid to a country that is receiving refugee inflows than to other countries and likely to provide more aid to a war-torn country that is producing refugee flows into her own country.

Second, if a leader provides aid in refugee situations with the goal of stopping externalities into her state, rather than more altruistically for the good of the refugees, then we should expect that the leader provides more assistance when the refugees threaten her own borders but should not provide any more aid to other countries dealing with refugee inflows. According to this hypothesis, a leader is particularly interested in providing aid to those countries that are generating refugees who are entering her territory. Such aid can be used to provide for the displaced people before they leave their country and enter the leader’s. However, since a leader’s main concern is not the human security of these individuals, the leader will not be compelled to distribute aid to other countries that are receiving refugees because these inflows do not have a direct negative impact upon her country’s security.

Hypothesis 14b (realism): A leader receiving refugees from a war-torn country is likely to provide more aid to that country than other countries, but is not likely to provide more aid to a country that is receiving refugee inflows than to other countries.

Testing these four hypotheses will help adjudicate between the two theories of what determines where leaders send aid and how much they contribute. If leaders provide broadly in refugee situations, then we can be more certain that altruistic concerns drove their contributions
because they are willing to provide aid to those individuals who are not of strategic value to them. If leaders only provide for refugees when their boarders are threatened by this movement of people, then we can be more certain that a leader’s concern for the refugees is driven by a pragmatic interest in preventing the tensions and grievances refugees bring to their host states.

The disadvantages of untargeted multilateral aid

The ability to target aid is beneficial to a leader for two related reasons. First, when a leader can target her aid, she can guarantee who receives the money. In situations of direct bilateral aid, a donor can specify who receives their support. By rewarding supporters and punishing detractors through the provision or withholding of foreign aid, a leader is able to extract policy concessions from recipients (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009). Countries that take action in favor of the donor are given more aid, while those whose policies are at odds with the donor are cut off from financial support. For example, since the United States can target its bilateral aid to particular recipient countries, it can increase or decrease the aid it contributes to individual states on the United Nations Security Council depending on whether the recipient votes in line with U.S. interests. In 1991, Yemen refused to vote in favor of the Security Council authorizing the use of force against Iraq. In response, the United States promptly cut its aid to Yemen (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). In terms of peacebuilding, targeted aid allows the donor to ensure that its contributions are used for disarmament and reconstruction in the conflict area producing the refugees entering its territory. For instance, in an effort to limit refugee inflows from Haiti, the United States spent $1.6 Billion on peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in Haiti between 1992 and 1995 (GAO 1996). Directing aid to recipients in this manner allows a leader to guarantee that the specific target is altering behaviors as she sees fit.
Targetable aid is also beneficial for those leaders interested in furthering humanitarian causes outside their borders. As states respond differently to humanitarian aid based on their domestic situations, donor countries wanting to affect change abroad need to target their aid to situations in which the assistance is likely to lead to the desired change. For instance, insulated autocrats are far less likely to democratize than leaders of mixed regimes when receiving democratic assistance aid (e.g., Kono and Montinola 2009; Wright 2009). To effectively promote democratization, then, a state needs to direct aid to countries beginning the process of democratic reform or autocracies in which the leader faces some competition, rather than spreading democratic assistance broadly across countries.

The second benefit of targetable aid is that it allows the donor to specify what the aid is used for. Not only do states want to guarantee their aid is received by the correct recipient, but they also want to know that their aid is being used in the manner they desire. Since aid programs designed around specific goals are more successful in fulfilling their objective than general donations (e.g., Scott and Steele 2011), having control over their assets allows a donor to better guarantee change in the recipient country. For instance, as part of its aid to Haiti, the United States has specified portions of its aid to be used for developing democratic governance structures and political parties, as it believes such domestic institutions will lower the potential for civil conflict, and refugee outflows, in the future (USAID 2010). Targeted aid allows a leader to guarantee that the recipient is using the aid in the manner she deems best for accomplishing her objectives. If the recipient fails to use the aid as specified by the leader, she can remove support from the country.

Whether a leader provides aid to achieve humanitarian goals, as a tool to extract rents from the recipient, or to control externalities from another state, the ability to target the donation
to a particular recipient is important. Targeting the donation allows the leader to use her resources effectively in particular areas to achieve specific goals. However, while the ability to target one’s aid is a useful tool for states providing monetary assistance, leaders lack this ability in many institutional contexts. For example, leaders that provide monetary donations to the United Nations’ Population Fund or General Peacebuilding Fund are unable to dictate where their contribution is sent or how it is used. Despite the willingness of some leaders to use these multilateral venues, and forgo the benefits of giving bilaterally, we lack an understanding of why leaders are sometimes willing to supply non-targeted aid. In the next section, I will explain how institutional barriers to targeting aid can alter the usefulness of aid and who is willing to contribute under such circumstances.

**Multilateral institutions and non-targeted aid**

The institutional structure through which a leader can provide aid will condition which types of states are more likely to give in a particular circumstance. While leaders may find targeted aid beneficial for the reasons I have just discussed, many multilateral venues for providing aid strip donors of the ability to target where and how their aid is used. For example, several UN agencies require donors to contribute aid to their general budgets, and later decide how the contributions will be used. Scholars have noted how agencies that operate with little donor oversight, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), have had difficulty attracting international support (e.g., Nachmias 1997; Wijewardance 2007). I posit that when leaders are unable to target to whom their aid is given, a leader seeking to stop externalities from a particular post-conflict situation, will be less likely to contribute. Conversely, the inability to target one’s aid will not deter leaders from
contributing when such donations are done to promote human rights broadly or to assuage humanitarian factions.

The provision of post-conflict aid through non-targeted channels, such as multilateral institutions, does not afford the leader the same benefits as directed aid. More specifically, providing aid through a multilateral organization creates a principal-agent problem for the donor. Once the donor has contributed funds to the organization, the state is often removed from following the use and effects of the aid. First, money itself cannot monitor. To observe the effects of her donation, a leader must send personnel to the location of interest, along with the resources. This is particularly difficult when the state makes its contribution in combination with larger funding efforts. When states fund projects through multilateral organizations, like the United Nations, monies are typically aggregated and dispersed as the organization sees fit, obstructing the state’s ability to monitor precisely the effects of their contribution (e.g., UNPC 2012). Second, and similarly, reports on the effects of the contribution are not as direct. When leaders fund peacebuilding missions, reports are made on whether the project is successful- for example, whether the infrastructure is replaced- but it is difficult to determine whether these projects are directly stopping abuse and stemming refugee, arms, and weapons flows out of the territory. Third, rapid responses are difficult. While a state can quickly threaten, or actually, cut funding through an organization, such abrupt shifts in policy are not able to handle the intricacies of the situation on the ground. Additionally, once monies are contributed to an organization for a project, those resources cannot be recalled. All the state can do is refuse to fund future endeavors. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the leader does not have direct control over the resources. Once funds are contributed to an organization, the leader loses much control over how the monies are actually used in the implementation of any post-conflict projects. For example,
leaders funding the UN Population Fund cannot guarantee their contributions will be used for population and development missions, rather than reproductive health, women’s empowerment, or projects dedicated to fighting AIDS (UNPF 2007).

The institutional barriers donors face in controlling their aid in multilateral settings will undermine the usefulness of these venues for leaders seeking to extract policy concessions from their targets. To successfully change policy in a recipient, a leader must be able to guarantee that her donation reaches her intended target. Portions of these funds directed to other countries by an international organization will reduce the effectiveness of the leader’s contribution in her desired recipient. If only two-thirds, or half, of the leader’s contribution reaches her target, then her utility in providing aid is diminished in proportion, making such aid less useful. Additionally, the donor must be able to reward and punish the recipient with more or less aid in response to the level of success with which the recipient enacts the desired policy. Without the ability for the donor to further incentivize the recipient, there is little motivation for the recipient to uphold its promised policy concessions once it has received the financial support (e.g., Katz 1991).

However, international organizations act as a barrier between the donor and recipient. By controlling where and how funds are distributed, these institutions can lower a donor’s ability to control aid flows and influence the recipient’s domestic policies (Jenkins 2008). Since a state can neither control where a multilateral organization uses its contribution, nor directly reward and punish recipients through the organization, these venues are of lower utility for leaders interested in enacting change in another country.

For these reasons, state leaders interested in stopping negative externalities from a neighboring state should be less willing to contribute to multilateral post-conflict aid projects in which they will be unable to ensure where and how their aid will be used. They cannot be certain
that their contributions will be used in the locations they are most concerned with, nor do they have the ability to confirm that the money is used as they desire. Due to their inability to target their aid to specific areas or needs, they will be less able to extract the change in policy they desire from the recipient. This inability, then, makes such aid less useful for states seeking to end externalities, such as refugee flows, from a post-conflict situation.

Hypothesis 15: States experiencing refugee inflows will be less willing to provide aid through institutions that limit their ability to target their contributions than will other states.

The inability to target one’s donation can undermine a state’s ability to affect humanitarian causes, as well. Distributing aid broadly dilutes the possibility that a leader can target her aid to those regimes that are ripe for change. Conversely, carefully targeted aid can help provide human rights protection and relieve human suffering within the recipient, (e.g., Finkel, Linan, and Seligson 2007; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001; Scott and Steele 2011). However, in an institutional setting in which none of the donors are able to target their aid to any particular recipient, states seeking to appease domestic humanitarian factions by pursuing humanitarian causes outside their borders should not be as dissuaded from participating in these organizations as are other states. This is because such untargeted contributions to multilateral organizations may still allow the leader to accomplish her goals of pleasing the domestic factions and furthering norms of human rights and civilian protection abroad in a more general sense.

There are three reasons why leaders seeking to please humanitarian factions may find value in working through a multilateral organization. First, if a leader is concerned with appeasing humanitarian factions who desire the state to “do something,” then donations to
multilateral projects are a relatively cheap way to assuage these pressures without having to make the significant monetary contributions needed to enact change on their own. Leaders routinely substitute foreign policy strategies when a less costly method will achieve a similar result to a more resource intensive action (e.g., Morgan and Palmer 2000; Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan 2002). In terms of appeasing humanitarian factions and promoting human rights in post-conflict countries, a leader may be more willing to pass some of the burden off on others through multilateral institutions. Democracies have been criticized for this type of policy substitution in the past. During the Yugoslav Wars, many observers criticized the United States and other countries for seeking to establish a less costly war crimes court instead of militarily intervening (e.g., Rabkin 2005).

Not only does working through a multilateral organization allow a leader to aggregate her efforts with others, but it also allows her to send a signal to other states that her intentions are benign (Thompson 2006). This is the second reason a leader may pursue humanitarian goals in the multilateral context. Often, leaders are concerned with other states gaining excessive influence with post-conflict governments by providing substantial financial aid bilaterally to the country in return for policy concessions, such as access to natural resources or trade, in the future. For example, the United States has grown concerned with the level of aid China is providing to unstable African countries, fearing this aid will bolster corrupt governments and increase their reliance on the U.S.’s growing rival (e.g., Woods 2008). By providing her aid through a multilateral organization, and receiving the institution’s seal of approval, a leader can ease the fears of her peers. In utilizing the institutional barriers multilateral organizations establish between donors and recipients, the leader can signal that her intentions are not to gain influence in the recipient or to frustrate the interests of her peers. Her country is donating aid to provide
stability in war-torn areas and relieve human suffering. It is in search of this signal that U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. urged China to direct its aid through multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank (Paulson 2007).

Lastly, leaders may use multilateral institutions to promote humanitarian causes broadly. While donating to an organization keeps a leader from targeting a specific country for change, this aid can help further norms of human rights globally and help set an international precedent for contributing to such causes and institutions. In responding to domestic humanitarian pressures, a leader may find it useful to fund multilateral organizations to better promote change on a global scale, rather than bilaterally. For instance, a leader may make a contribution to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to help promote the global fight against human trafficking, rather than target a specific country, because human trafficking often occurs across many international borders. As more leaders work to promote these causes, their efforts may encourage others to also support the growing cause (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

For these reasons, I posit that leaders seeking to please humanitarian factions will be more likely to provide post-conflict aid to multilateral institutions that do not allow donors to target their aid at specific recipients than other leaders. I do not argue that these states are more likely to seek out these multilateral platforms over bilateral channels. Rather, the inability to direct their aid will have less of a deterrent effect on such regimes because they can derive certain benefits from these organizations that other states providing aid for other reasons cannot. As democratic leaders must be more responsive to domestic humanitarian pressures than other leaders (Busby 2007; Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Nadelmann 1990), I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 16: Democracies will be more likely to provide aid through institutions that limit their ability to target their contributions than will other states.

Summary

In this chapter, I provide a theory as to why states participate in humanitarian missions. I posit that a leader is more likely to provide both military troops and financial aid to war-torn areas when her country faces externalities from the conflict. In particular, I argue that an important focus of these missions is to stop refugee outflows from the conflict area. Leaders who are expecting a large volume of refugee flows into their territory will be those leaders who are most likely to contribute support, they will participate quickly, and they will remain committed to the mission until they no longer fear these inflows.

Given the costs associated with intervention, I argue that a leader will consider both her state’s capabilities and the threat she faces from the conflict. Leaders of strong states, who are facing larger externalities from the conflict, will prefer to avoid the principal-agent dynamics associated with multilateral missions in favor of unilateral action. These leaders are the ones most likely to initiate conflict with the refugees’ home country to stem the externalities of war (Salehyan 2008). However, leaders of weaker states will be more likely to use international organizations to aggregate their capabilities with those of other countries. These weak states will shoulder the burden of humanitarian efforts in war-torn countries. Furthermore, states experiencing larger volumes of refugee inflows will be more willing to contribute costly forms of personnel to these multilateral missions. I expect that these states will supply more military troops and police officers to peacekeeping missions than unarmed observers. However, democracies, who are more sensitive to the death of their soldiers, will seek to free ride on the
effort of other countries by preferring to send observers, who will remain off the front lines of the conflict.

When faced with externalities from a war, a leader is not constrained to only participating militarily in the conflict. She may contribute financial aid to the conflict country in an effort to help stabilize borders and provide security for the displaced population, so that they do not seek shelter in her territory. However, because a leader has relatively little control over how the recipient uses her money, she will prefer the military option to providing foreign aid. In addition, this principal-agent problem is exacerbated when she contributes this money through multilateral agencies, such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission. When participating through multilateral institutions, a leader not only has little control over how the recipient used her aid, but she also lacks the ability to control where the agency sends her contributions. Therefore, leaders facing refugee flows from a particular conflict, should avoid financial contributions to multilateral peacebuilding efforts. However, democracies, who may wish to promote human rights, peace, and security broadly, may still be willing to use these institutions to enshrine a focus on civilian protection in the international order.
Chapter 3.

An empirical analysis of state contributions to UN peacekeeping missions

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I presented a theory as to why leaders involve their states in the protection of foreign civilians abroad. I argue that leaders who are experiencing externalities from the conflict, and especially refugee inflows, are more likely to contribute military support and financial aid to the war-torn area than are other leaders. To test my general argument, I focus my empirical analysis of Hypotheses 1-3 on state contributions of troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions. I choose to concentrate on peacekeeping, rather than other forms of civilian protection, because when engaging in peacekeeping missions, states can direct their contributions to the troubled area of interest. Other forms of civilian protection, such as donations to the UN’s peacebuilding or refugee funds, are diffuse, requiring general commitments to noncombatants rather than targeted contributions to specific countries. The ability for leaders to target their efforts at particular areas allows me to explore the strategic relationship between the leader’s state and the other territory.

States do not need to conduct humanitarian efforts, like peacekeeping, through the United Nations. However, I restrict this analysis to UN missions to guard against threats to inference. Studying the behavior of states in regional organizations does not allow for comparison of members across regime types, as many such organizations are comprised of primarily all autocracies or all democracies. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
contains only democracies and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) counts only three democracies amongst its fifteen members. Similar problems exist for studying the behavior of individual states, such as Nigeria, who conduct their own peacekeeping missions, but have not transitioned to and from democracy. In addition, unlike these other actors, the UN clearly states its intention to protect civilians while constructing resolutions authorizing peacekeeping missions.²

This chapter proceeds in five sections. I begin by describing the econometric models and data I use to test the three hypotheses. I then present the results of these models, outlining which countries send troops to which conflict, how quickly these countries react to the humanitarian crisis, and their contributions overtime. Following the results, I discuss their significance for the literatures on humanitarian crises and forced migration. I then discuss their implications for our understanding of norms transmission. Lastly, I summarize the support of my general argument.

The model

Estimators

From my theory of civilian protection, I generate three testable hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 3 concern a leader’s likely level of participation. I operationalize level of participation using the total number of troops a leader contributes to a UN peacekeeping mission. These data were gathered from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO 2013). The yearly count of each state’s contributions is not distributed normally. Instead, it appears to follow a negative binominal distribution. For this reason, I employ a negative binominal model to estimate my parameters of interest.

² I am not claiming that peacekeeping is humanitarian intervention. Rather, I focus on post-Cold War peacekeeping because of its emphasis on protecting civilians.
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the duration of time before a leader participates in a peacekeeping mission. Evaluating this hypothesis requires a different class of estimator from the model used to test Hypotheses 1 and 3. Here, my dependent variable is not the count of troops contributed to a mission. Instead, it is the number of days between the beginning of the mission and the time at which a leader contributes soldiers. To test Hypothesis 2, I use a Cox proportional hazard model. I collect information on the timing of participation from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO 2013).

Each of these three models examines contributions to the United Nations’ post-Cold War peacekeeping missions from 1993-2007. Availability of data for the dependent variables and some independent variables determines this period of examination.

Measuring expectations

My theory is based on the expectations of a leader. The leader asks herself, “If I do not intervene, how many refugees will flood my border?” To test the hypotheses I derive from this theory, I need to capture the leader’s expectations about refugee inflows. A leader’s expectation about the future is an unobserved variable; however, this belief should be informed by past inflows of refugees from the conflict territory. Therefore, I use the pattern of past refugee inflows to create the variable Expected refugee inflows.

To compute the ex-ante predicted probability of refugee inflows in year \( t \), I construct a gravity model to predict the flow of refugees between states for all directed dyads from the year the dyad enters the data \( (t_e) \) to the year before the UN mission, \( t-1 \). I regress the natural log of refugee flows from State\(_A\) to State\(_B\) \( [ln(\text{Refugee flows}_{AB})] \) on several predictors of refugee flows. Data on refugee flows come from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2012b).
I draw on standard gravity models of refugee flows to build my model (e.g., Iqbal and Zorn 2007; Karemera, Oguledo, and Davis 2000; Schmeidl 1997). These models postulate that the (log of) refugee flows from the source country (State\textsubscript{A}) to the host country (State\textsubscript{B}) will be directly proportional to their respective populations, and inversely proportional to their distance from each other. Furthermore, refugees are likely to follow the previous pathways of their compatriots who had previously fled. This indicates that host states that have received refugees from a particular source country are more likely to receive additional inflows from that country in the future. I draw data on each state’s (logged) population from the World Bank (2012). Data on the natural log of the distance between States A and B are taken from Stinnett et al. (2002).

After estimating this model on the data from year $t\textsubscript{e}$ to year $t-1$, I compute the predicted probability of refugee inflows from State A to State B in year $t$. This predicted probability represents the likely size of refugee inflows from the source country to the host country, and thus, what the host country’s leader would expect inflows to be absent intervention. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the gravity model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugees)\textsubscript{AB}</td>
<td>3.421</td>
<td>2.895</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Population)\textsubscript{A}</td>
<td>9.520</td>
<td>1.453</td>
<td>2.197</td>
<td>14.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Population)\textsubscript{B}</td>
<td>9.760</td>
<td>1.436</td>
<td>3.497</td>
<td>14.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance\textsubscript{AB}</td>
<td>3262.188</td>
<td>2420.997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Expected refugee inflow* is my main variable of interest in the models examining contributions to peacekeeping missions. I expect that as the leader of State B becomes more certain that her country will experience a large inflow of refugees from State A, if the conflict is left unmanaged, she will become more likely to participate in the peacekeeping effort.

From *Expected refugee inflow*, I also construct the variable *Updated expectation*. Updated expectation is the difference in a leader’s expected refugee inflow from year $t$ to year
I measure a leader’s updated expectations as $Expected_{refugee\_inflow_t} - Expected_{refugee\_inflow_{t+1}}$. As a leader begins to expect a lower level of refugees will enter her territory from a particular conflict, she will be less likely to contribute troops to that mission. Conversely, if her expectations change such that she now believes she faces a larger flood of refugees, she will contribute more troops to the area.

Control variables

I include four control variables along with my main variable of interest. First, I include whether the state is a Democracy based on the -10 to 10 Polity IV scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). Extant explanations of civil protection posit that democracies will be more involved in civilian protection than other regimes. Democracies possess norms of human rights and civilian protection (Huntington 1991; Rudolph 2001). Participation in peacekeeping missions allows democracies to externalize these norms to the peacekept. In addition, democratic leaders must please humanitarian factions within their state. Through the media and ballot box, these groups will exert pressure on the leader to “do something” in response to atrocities abroad. Leaders who fail to respond face the potential of being electorally sanctioned with the help of these groups (Jakobsen 1996; Western 2002). If these explanations are correct, we should expect that as a state’s Polity score increases (the state becomes more democratic), the state will participate increasingly in the peacekeeping missions.

Second, I include a measure of state strength based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank 2012). Scholars argue that stronger states will be more likely to intervene in civil violence, and protect civilians, to snuff out smaller conflicts before they can expand and draw the major powers back into the battlefield against one another (e.g., Mueller 2004). In terms of
peacekeeping, Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu (1998) and Shimizu and Sandler (2002) show that larger states have disproportionately shouldered the peacekeeping burden since the end of the Cold War. Given the high rightward skew of GDP levels, I use the natural log of this variable in my model, $\text{Ln}(GDP)$.

Third, I include a variable to capture military need. Many peacekeeping practitioners and scholars assume that poor, illiberal states participate in peacekeeping to help fund their militaries (e.g., Berman and Sams 2000; Blum 2000). If this argument is correct, we should expect that a state that does not have enough money to fund its military will be more likely to participate in UN peacekeeping missions to collect the per solider per month reimbursement provided to participating countries. To test this theory, I include the variable $\text{Ln}(\text{Military Need})$. This variable is constructed as a state’s total number of military personnel divided by its military expenditures:

$$\text{Ln}\left(\frac{\text{military personnel}}{\text{military expenditures}}\right).$$

As the number of troops grows in relation to the state’s expenditures, and the ratio increases, a leader should become more willing to send troops to the peacekeeping mission in return for UN funding.

Lastly, when testing Hypotheses 1 and 3, I include the lagged dependent variable in my time-series models. Not only does including this variable help with problems of autocorrelation in the data, but it also controls for the possibility that some states may participate more in peacekeeping because they have already built up the infrastructure to do so in past missions.³

³I follow the advice of Achen (2005) and Clarke (2005) and use parsimonious models to test my argument. I have estimated a series of additional models including an extensive set of further control variables, including alliance, colonial ties, direct contiguity, joint ethnicity, mass killings, militarized disputes, oil production, population sizes, and trade relations, as well as bootstrap, fixed-effects and jackknife robustness checks. These models produce similar substantive results presented in the models below. I do not include these additional models for space concerns. These results are available upon request.
Results

Who sends troops to each conflict?

My theory suggests that leaders are strategic in where they send their money and military personnel. Leaders expecting large flows of refugees should be judicious in where they make their contributions. While these leaders may not contribute the largest number of troops in the aggregate, they should be more likely than other leaders to send troops to those areas producing the refugees they fear. In Model 1, I examine this argument. As the results in Table 2 indicate, strong support exists for this conjecture. Model 1 examines a leader’s willingness to contribute troops to all post-Cold War peacekeeping missions. I find that leaders expecting high volumes of refugee inflows from a particular conflict are more likely to protect civilians in that area than are other leaders. This indicates that a higher expectation about refugee inflows increases the number of troops a leader supplies to a UN mission in that conflict area. According to Model 1, as expected refugees increase by one standard deviation, leaders contribute 17% more troops to the mission.

The results of Model 1 only provide partial support for the existing scholarship on civilian protection. In this model, I find that stronger states are likely to contribute larger numbers of soldiers to these missions and the protection of foreign civilians than are their weaker peers. However, I find that democracies appear less likely to participate in any given mission.

Additionally, there is no evidence that militarily needy states contribute more to peacekeeping missions to subsidize their military budgets. Model 1 reveals that militarily needy states are actually less likely to supply soldiers to any given mission. As military need increases by a standard deviation, a country is 84% less likely to contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission. This finding contradicts the prevailing wisdom on why developing states, states from
the global south, and illiberal regimes are willing to help promote the post-Cold War collective security system. It suggests that rather than building general theory from idiosyncratic cases, such as Pakistan or Nepal, we need consider the universe of militarily needy countries when determining how the UN can encourage the participation of a wide variety of states.

Table 2. Who Contributes to each UN Peacekeeping Mission?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable= Mission contribution</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Percent Change in Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected refugee inflow</td>
<td>0.156*** (0.044)</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.033** (0.015)</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.288*** (0.054)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Military Need)</td>
<td>-1.833*** (0.234)</td>
<td>-84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag(DV)</td>
<td>0.008*** (0.001)</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.538*** (1.326)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 25094
Log Pseudolikelihood = -14077.039

When do leaders contribute troops?

My second hypothesis posits that not only will expectations about refugee volumes induce contribution to peacekeeping missions, but they should also dictate the speed at which leaders become involved with these projects. To test this hypothesis, I utilize a Cox proportional hazard model to determine what factors diminish the duration leaders wait before becoming involved with a given mission. Table 3 displays the results of my model.

Model 2 supports my second hypothesis. Leaders expecting high volumes of refugee inflows are likely to become involved in peacekeeping missions, and civilian protection, quicker than other leaders. In particular, as expected refugees increase by one standard deviation, leaders
respond 13% quicker to join a UN mission. Taken together, the results from Models 1 and 2 indicate that not only do states expecting to handle refugee inflows act fast, but they also respond with force.

Table 3. When do Leaders Contribute Troops?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 2: Hazard Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable= Duration until contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected refugee inflows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Military Need)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudolikelihood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democratic leaders and leaders from wealthy states are also likely to respond rapidly. Models 1 and 2 confirm the conclusion that stronger, wealthier states support the modern collective security system (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Muller 2004; Shimizu and Sandler 2002). Wealthy states are not only more likely to supply large portions of the UN’s peacekeeping forces, but they are also consistently among the first states into the fray. The findings in Model 2 add an additional layer of depth to the literature’s understanding of how the powers continue to uphold the status quo. Similarly, the compilation of these results suggests a more intricate picture of democracies’ role in civilian protection. While these states are quick to act, they tend to be very selective in where they send their soldiers.

The hazard model indicates that military need increases the duration of time a leader will remain uninvolved in a peacekeeping mission. While past work has only suggested that states like Bangladesh and Nepal contribute broadly to UN peacekeeping missions for the financial kickbacks such participation brings, my results show that not only do these states not donate as
many troops as their peers, but they are also much more hesitant in becoming involved militarily abroad. Together, these findings indicated that while we occasionally see states like Jordan involved in Haiti, these occurrences are not typical actions.

I also analyze the question of when leaders contribute to protecting foreign civilians abroad by evaluating the effect a change in expectation has on their willingness to stay involved in the project. In Hypothesis 3, I argue that a leader will adjust her contribution level based on how her beliefs about the threat of refugee inflows change over the course of the mission. A leader will withdraw support from a mission as her expectation about the impending threat of refugee inflows decreases. Conversely, a leader who becomes more certain she will soon face a flood of refugees at her border will increase participation. I test this hypothesis in Model 3.

In Model 3, I only analyze how changes in expectations affect a leader’s contribution. As the coefficient on the variable Updated expectations displays, as a leader’s expectation about the potential size of refugee inflows dwindles, so does her willingness to provide troops to a mission. When her expectations change by a standard deviation, her contributions levels decrease by 10%.

Model 3 also supports my previous findings concerning the role regime type and state capability play in shaping a leader’s response to ongoing peacekeeping missions. Democratic leaders tend to offer lower levels of support for these missions than their non-democratic counterparts. Similarly, I continue to find that states with large military needs do not contribute to these missions. Conversely, wealthier states provide a greater number of troops to each mission.
Table 4. When do Leaders Alter Contributions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Mission</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Percent Change in Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Updated expectations</td>
<td>-0.105*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.014)</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.328*** (0.053)</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Military Need)</td>
<td>-1.815*** (0.316)</td>
<td>-84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag(DV)</td>
<td>0.008*** (0.001)</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.239*** (1.339)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 25094
Log Pseudolikelihood = -14082.791
P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01*** Errors clustered on the mission

Discussion

The story I present here contrasts substantially with standard accounts for why leaders are willing to offer protection to civilians outside their territory. Traditionally, scholars have focused on democratic norm externalization (Huntington 1991; Rudolph 2001) or the influence of humanitarian groups (Jakobsen 1996; Western 2002) to explain a state’s international humanitarianism. I show that this decision is much more pragmatic. Leaders who fear the domestic grievances and unrest caused by refugee inflows will work to keep these individuals from entering their country. Taking a broader view of this practice allows me to identify several patterns missed by previous scholars, such as where and when leaders intervene.

I am not the first to suggest that humanitarian preferences do not always drive humanitarian action. Past research suggests that broadly defined state interests motivate humanitarianism. Participants in these missions may be concerned with goals as wide ranging as controlling territory of strategic value, accessing oil, or promoting a more nebulous concept of national interest (e.g., Gibbs 2000; Morgenthau 1973). More recently, scholars have worked to
identify how leaders can extract policy concessions from those states they aid (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). However, similar to its predecessors, this research defines the goals of aid donating leaders vaguely in terms of seeking policies that better their constituents. Unlike these works, I illuminate specifically how external pressures—here in the form of refugees, can induce a leader to react in humanitarian fashion. The value of defining a leader’s interest directly is that I can make predictions on who gives aid, where they send help, and when support is offered.

Much recent research has examined the actions leaders take in response to refugee inflows (e.g., Adamson 2006; Cooper and Berdal 1993; Dowty and Loescher 1996; Khosla 1999; Regan 2002; Salehyan 2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). A common response leaders take to refugee inflows is to initiate conflict with the refugees’ home country. A leader can either intervene directly into the situation causing the outflows or she can begin a distinct dispute with the refugees’ home country (Regan 1998; Salehyan 2008). I suggest that there is another approach available. She can join a multilateral, humanitarian mission aimed at controlling the situation producing the refugees. Such an action provides two benefits to the leader. First, actions taken within the home state to protect civilians from being abused allow participants to directly diffuse the violence that is causing the problem. This is beneficial to the leader because stopping the root problem will ultimately lead to lower levels of refugee spillover from the conflict areas. The second advantage of this non-violent intervention is that even if the leader is not interested in involving her state in ending the main source of strife within the home country, entering her neighbor’s territory allows her to better monitor and react to potential outflows. This information is useful to the leader in knowing where and when to tighten her border security.
Successfully initiating and prevailing in a dispute or joining an ongoing intrastate war requires that a state have significant capabilities. Weaker states that are experiencing conflict externalities do not realistically have the option of engaging in violent conflict. The threat of war to end refugee spillovers is not a credible tool for these states that lack military capacity. Intervening as part of a larger effort by an international organization, like the UN, allows these leaders to achieve their policy goals even when severely overmatched militarily on their own. For example, Trinidad and Tobago, whose military personnel number roughly 2,000, was able to intervene in Haiti on two occasions through UN missions- a feat it would be unlikely to accomplish on its own (see Heng 2012 for a similar account of Singapore). While recent work focuses on the legitimizing aspect of operating through international organizations (e.g., Hurd 1999; Thompson 2006, 2009), the involvement of weak states in UN peacekeeping missions underscores the continued importance of the ability for international organizations to aggregate the capabilities of their members (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1974).

This work highlights the importance of organizational design (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have worked to focus peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions on democratizing failing states (e.g., UN 1998). If participants in these missions are focused on their own aims of preventing refugee outflows, rather than the UN’s goal of establishing sustainable democratic governments, it is not surprising that many of these missions fail to establish long-lasting democracies. Furthermore, if international organizations are unable to effectively regulate the behavior of their members on the ground, then leaders will have an easier time extracting policy concessions from newly-formed states, severely threatening the democratic viability of the regime from the beginning (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006).
Implications for norm transmission

This behavior has implications for our understanding of norms transmission. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue, norm emergence is more likely to take place in situations in which norm entrepreneurs have organizational platforms through which they can influence a leader to adopt their practice. For humanitarian causes, these platforms are more likely to exist in democratic states where entrepreneurs have access to the media and political parties without fear of punishment. It is understandable, then, that democratic leaders are the ones that typically promote civilian protection and were instrumental in reshaping the post-Cold War collective security system (e.g., Frederking 2003).

However, while they promote these norms, it is not always these leaders that actively participate in solidifying the practice. Instead, many illiberal leaders, driven by an interest in preserving their political survival, participate in fulfilling these programs. I conclude from this behavior that the implementation of norms is not driven by states that already possess the behavior, but by states on the fringe of the norm that lock-in the practice for realpolitik reasons. In this sense, as a norm moves towards a tipping point and acceptance, states are not necessarily implementing the practice in search of legitimacy, reputation, or esteem. Instead, states that cement a norm do so inadvertently, as they pursue policies to address other pragmatic concerns. In the case I have explored, states implement civilian protection, not because they respect human rights, but because they desire to stop refugee inflows. This finding supports the argument that states follow norms when it is in their interest (Guzman 2008). My project builds on this basic argument by distinguishing between why some states create and promote norms, while others only assist in cementing and implementing the practice.
The willingness of leaders from illiberal regimes, like Egypt and Pakistan, to intervene humanitarianly in the domestic affairs of their peers also suggests that the norm of sovereignty is being eroded. Traditionally, states have regarded the domestic affairs of others as outside the grounds for intervention. While they might intrude to force leadership or foreign policy change, leaders would not intervene against each other in the name of human rights. However, as states work to protect foreign civilians in other countries, they highlight an emerging pattern of behavior shifting how leaders view sovereignty. Here, the erosion of sovereignty is not out of the states’ control (Sikkink 1993), but is the result of their strategic decisions. This development suggests that norms move from emergence to cascade not from states desiring legitimation, conformity, and esteem, but through leaders developing new strategies to maintain security. These leaders are not participating in the norm of civilian protection to camouflage their own behavior (Simmons 2009), but to suppress immediate threats to their tenure.

Summary

I argue that a leader’s efforts to protect civilians in war-torn areas are not humanitarian. Rather, regardless of the regime type or the liberalness of a state, leaders engage in efforts to protect foreign civilians abroad when abuses by those individuals’ governments threaten to turn the individuals into refugees crossing into the leader’s territory. By ending violence against these civilians, a leader hopes to stem the potential deluge of inflows before they arrive in her country.

My findings indicate that leaders facing large volumes of refugee inflows are more likely to dispatch higher levels of military personnel to those conflict areas generating the refugees. In addition, these leaders are more likely than their peers to provide swift support to peacekeeping
missions operating in the refugee generating areas. Once threats of refugee spillover from the conflict subside, these leaders are unlikely to remain committed to these projects.
Chapter 4.

Refugee inflows, capabilities, and unilateral or multilateral interventions

Introduction

In Chapter 3, I analyzed which states are likely to participate in UN multilateral peacekeeping efforts designed at protecting civilians in conflict areas. I found, that as expected, leaders facing larger refugee inflows from the conflict are likely to provide more troops to the multilateral effort in that area and to do so quickly. However, not all interventions into conflicts take place through multilateral channels. At the end of World War II, the international community attempted to outlaw war and institutionalize the ability to determine and initiate just-war in the hands of the United Nations. Despite these efforts, states routinely take unilateral military action outside the confines of the multilateral setting. Recently, the international community has established the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. According to this principle, all states are responsible for the protection of all people, even if the suffering individuals are outside of their territories (UNGA 2005). In essence, R2P establishes a norm in opposition to the outlawing of military force. Instead, it legitimizes unilateral military interventions to end abuses of civilians in the face of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes. R2P forces states to once more make a choice between unilateral and multilateral action- a choice the UN was established to prevent.

The Responsibility to Protect doctrine has grown out of the ever increasing need for states to handle refugee flows from conflict situations. Refugees can act as negative externalities
from ongoing conflicts. Large inflows can hurt economic growth, cripple health systems, strain food supplies, and lead to domestic strife for those states receiving the refugees. For these reasons, a growing literature on migration, refugees and international security has developed to understand the ways in which states react to the humanitarian crises that create these flows (e.g., Adamson 2006; Lischer 2005; Rudolph 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Weiner 1992). However, while this work has provided a solid foundation to understand the actions leaders take to stop such migration and handle inflows that arrive within their countries, no systematic analysis has examined how leaders substitute choices on how to handle refugee inflows.

While the United Nations Security Council has invoked its power on several occasions to help handle these inflows (e.g., Dowty and Loescher 1996), states often have to decide whether to join these efforts or take action on their own. In particular, leaders have two military options available when seeking to end refugee inflows. First, leaders who are expecting high volumes of refugee inflows can respond to these externalities by intervening in the conflict as part of a multilateral humanitarian mission to protect civilians in the area before these individuals flee their homes and enter the leader’s country. Second, instead of engaging in a humanitarian mission dedicated to protecting civilians in the war stricken country, leaders may also respond by initiating a dispute with the refugee’s home country in an attempt to stem these flows (Cooper and Berdal 1993; Khosla 1999; Mueller 2003; Regan 1998). This chapter empirically examines why, when facing externalities from ongoing conflicts, some leaders respond by issuing militarized threats, while others react through multilateral humanitarian missions.

Linking extant research on how leaders choose their foreign policies from an array of possible options (e.g., Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008; Most and Starr 1984, 1989) to an understanding of military effectiveness (e.g., Biddle 2004; Stam 1996) and the role of
international organizations (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane and Nye 1974), I argued that because weaker states face constrained foreign policy options, they must rely on international organizations to aggregate their capabilities with other members to react to refugee inflows. When leaders have the capacity to act alone, they prefer to use unilateral action to circumnavigate the principal-agent problems inherent to multilateral action (e.g., Voeten 2001).

The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. I begin by describing the two econometric tests I will use to evaluate Hypotheses 4-7. I then discuss the data I utilize in both portions of the research design. Next, I present the results of the models. I then discuss these findings in relation to the literatures on civilian protection, international organizations, and policy substitution. Lastly, I conclude with a summary of the support I provide here for my theory of civilian protection.

Two test research design

Test 1

To test Hypotheses 4-7, I begin by collecting data on state contributions to UN peacekeeping missions from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO 2013). UN peacekeeping missions are designed to stabilize a country during ceasefires while the opposing sides attempt to negotiate a last peace. The UN Security Council has frequently cited the desire to protect civilians in the conflict area, and stop refugee outflows and their destabilizing influence in a region, when establishing these missions (see Dowty and Loescher 1996). By offering protection to civilians, peacekeeping missions can stop refugee outflows and prevent civil conflicts from diffusing to nearby countries (Beardsley 2011). For this reason,
states expecting refugees should be willing to join UN peacekeeping missions in their region to limit the inflows they fear.

In the tests that follow, I operationalize a state joining a multilateral humanitarian mission by coding whether the state contributed troops to a UN peacekeeping mission. This data is limited to only peacekeeping missions established in the case of civil war. It is arranged in directed-dyad-year format, so that every state has the opportunity to contribute peacekeeping soldiers to any civil conflict that is not their own in each year. For example, in 1994, Haiti can contribute troops to missions UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNOSOMII in Somalia, but it cannot participate in UNMIH, which was established in its own territory in 1993 and was ongoing in 1994.

To determine whether a state unilaterally initiated a militarized dispute with the country from which it was expecting refugees, I use data on international disputes produced by Maoz (2005). In this data, a militarized interstate dispute (MID) is an event that involves at least two states in which at least one state threatened, displayed, or used military force against the other (also see Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). In this directed-dyad-year data, every state has the opportunity to initiated a MID against any state engaged in civil conflict other than itself. Returning to Haiti in 1994, rather than contribute peacekeeping troops to Rwanda or Somalia, Haiti could act unilaterally by threatening these countries with war.

In the initial test of my hypotheses, I utilize a multinomial logistic regression model. This estimator allows me to examine the several possible courses of action a leader could decide to take in relation to one another. The leader can decide whether to join a peacekeeping mission in the area generating negative externalities for her country, unilaterally initiate a MID with the other state, or refrain from taking any action. When testing my hypotheses in this fashion, I use
the dependent variable *Intervene*. *Intervene* is assigned a value of 1 for any state who joins the UN peacekeeping mission, 2 for all states that unilaterally intervene against the war-torn country, and 0 for all states that refrain from taking any action in each particular case. When coded in this fashion, my data possess 424 cases in which states joined the peacekeeping mission, 18 cases in which a state took unilateral action in the form of a MID, and 15159 cases in which states did not intervene in the civil conflict.

*Test 2*

Following this initial test, I examine these two types of intervention in more depth. First, I analyze the number of troops contributed to each peacekeeping mission. While states can participate in peacekeeping missions for a variety of reasons (see Berman and Sams 2000; Lebovic 2004; Shimizu and Sandler 2002), I expect that states using the mission to limit externalities from the conflict to contribute more troops than states simply participating to gain prestige or to appease domestic groups. Most states do not contribute to each peacekeeping mission. Those that do participate, contribute a range of troops from 1 soldier (e.g., Brazil to UNAMIR in Rwanda, 1993) to 7243 soldiers (i.e., Pakistan to UNOSOMII in Somalia, 1994). The yearly count of each state’s contributions is not distributed normally. Instead, it appears to follow a negative binominal distribution. For this reason, I employ a negative binominal model to estimate my parameters of interest when analyzing the size of each state’s *Contribution*.

Second, rather than only examining whether or not a state initiated a dispute, I analyze the level of hostilities it displays towards its target. In Maoz’s data, the level of hostility ranges from 1 to 23, with larger numbers indicating higher levels of military engagement. In my data, *Highest Action* ranges from 0 (i.e., “No MID” for many of the dyads) to 19 (Guinea’s 2001
involvement in Sierra Leone). As the variable *MID Level* does not capture a continuous notion of hostility, I utilize an ordered probit regression to estimate my parameters of interest when analyzing the level of hostilities each state displays.

**The data**

*Key independent variables*

In each of these three models, I include my three main variables of interest: expected refugee flows, state strength, and the interaction of the two. First, I capture a leader’s expectation about the size of future inflows following the method outlined in Chapter 3. A leader’s expectation about the future is an unobserved variable; however, this belief should be informed by past inflows of refugees from the conflict territory. Therefore, I use the pattern of past refugee inflows to create the variable *Expected Inflows*.

To compute the *ex-ante* predicted probability of refugee inflows in year *t*, I construct a gravity model to predict the flow of refugees between states for all directed dyads from the year the dyad enters the data (*t*<sub>0</sub>) to the year before the UN mission, *t*-1. I regress the natural log of refugee flows from StateA to StateB [ln(Refugee flows<sub>AB</sub>)] on several predictors of refugee flows. Data on refugee flows come from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2012b).

I draw on standard gravity models of refugee flows to build my model (e.g., Iqbal and Zorn 2007; Karemera, Oguledo, and Davis 2000; Schmeidl 1997). These models postulate that the (log of) refugee flows from the source country (StateA) to the host country (StateB) will be directly proportional to their respective populations, and inversely proportional to their distance from each other. Furthermore, refugees are likely to follow the pathways of their compatriots who had previously fled. This indicates that host states that have received refugees from a
particular source country are more likely to receive additional inflows from that country in the future. I draw data on each state’s (logged) population from the World Bank (2012). Data on the natural log of the distance between States A and B are taken from Stinnett et al. (2002).

After estimating this model on the data from year $t_e$ to year $t-1$, I compute the predicted probability of refugee inflows from State A to State B in year $t$. This predicted probability represents the likely size of refugee inflows from the source country to the host country, and thus, what the host country’s leader would expect inflows to be absent intervention. I expect that as the leader of State B becomes more certain that her country will experience a large inflow of refugees from State A, if the conflict is left unmanaged, she will become more likely to take action against State A.

Second, to measure a state’s military strength, I follow the advice of Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu (1998) and Shimizu and Sandler (2002) and include each state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank 2012). Wealthier states tend to be strong and assume a disproportionate share of the peacekeeping burden in the post-Cold War era. Since this variable is skewed, I use the natural log of GDP, $\text{Ln}(GDP)$, in each of my models.

Lastly, to examine the conditional relationship I propose in my hypotheses, I include the interaction between refugees and state strength, $\text{Expected Inflows} \times \text{Ln}(GDP)$. I expected that strong states expecting continued inflows from a civil war will be more likely to engage in unilateral action against the refugee sending state than to participate in a multilateral peacekeeping effort.
Additional independent variables

In the models that follow, I include the following six additional control variables:

Democracy: Since democracies are more likely to participate in UN peacekeeping missions and refugees tend to flee to states with good human rights practices, I include each potential intervener’s -10 to 10 Polity IV Score (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) to capture Democracy.

Contiguity: As contiguous states are more likely to fight, and refugees tend to seek asylum in nearby countries, I include an indicator variable equal to 1 for Contiguity if both the target state and potential intervener share a land border (Stinnett et al. 2002); 0 if not.

Joint Democracy: Since democracies are unlikely to go to war with one another and refugees tend to seek shelter in areas with good human rights practices, I include an indicator variable for Joint Democracy equal to 1 if both the target state and potential intervener score a 6 or above on the -10 to 10 Polity IV Scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2010); 0 if not.

Alliance: Because alliance members tend not to fight and they receive low levels of refugees from one another, I include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target state and potential intervener share a military alliance (Leeds et al. 2002); 0 for all states without an Alliance.

Trade: I include a measure of trade flows between potential donors and recipients, as trade partners may be more interested in protecting those countries on whom they rely for economic growth. I take data on trade flows from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and include the natural log of trade flows in my estimations, Ln(Trade Flows).
Non-intervention years: I follow the advice of Carter and Signorino (2010) and include the cubic polynomial of years since a state last provided troops or instigated a militarized dispute with the post-conflict country to account for time dependence in the data.

Results

Table 5 displays the results of Test 1. In Test 1, I use a multinomial logistic regression to compare which states join multilateral efforts when facing refugee inflows and which take unilateral action. Begin by observing the negative, and statistically significant, coefficient on the interaction between a state’s capabilities and its expectations about the size of future refugee inflows, Expected Inflows*Ln(GDP), in Column 1- UN Peacekeeping. This result indicates that as a state expecting refugee inflows becomes stronger, its leader becomes less willing to contribute troops to multilateral efforts. This supports Hypothesis 6. Conditional on having high capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows are 4% less likely to join a humanitarian mission. Figure 1 provides a visual display of this result.

Figure 1. Effect of Expected Refugee Inflows as Strength Increases in Multinomial Logistic Regression
Given the interactive effect of state strength and expected refugee inflows, the non-interacted constitutive term, *Expected Inflows*, gives the effect of expected refugee inflows for weaker states. The results indicate that, conditional on having low capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows are over 200% more likely to join humanitarian missions. This supports Hypothesis 4. The non-interacted constitutive term, \(\ln(GDP)\) provides an understanding of how likely strong states are to support UN peacekeeping missions when they are not experiencing refugee inflows from the target state. The results indicate that when not faced with refugee inflows, stronger states are more likely to participate in multilateral missions. This finding supports the expectations of the existing literature (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002).

In this model, I do not find support for many of the control variables. Democracies, neighboring states, allies, and trade partners are no more likely to provide humanitarian assistance through multilateral efforts than other states. In addition, democracies are no more or less likely to join multilateral efforts in other democratic states. If one considers UN missions a form of intervention, then the democratic peace does not extend to these multilateral efforts (e.g., Bremer 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Levy 1988; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995). We may also think of such missions as providing support to a troubled country, rather than an intervention. In this case, there is no support for the notion that democracies support one another more than other dyads (Reiter and Stam 2002).

Column 2 of Table 5 displays the results of my first analysis on unilateral actions in response to refugee inflows. Unlike the results for multilateral action, Test 1 provides little support for my hypotheses. In particular, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis in favor of either Hypothesis 5 or Hypothesis 7. The statistically insignificant results presented in Column 2
on the interaction term $\text{Expected Inflows} \cdot \ln(GDP)$ and its constitutive parts indicate that strong states expecting larger numbers of refugee inflows are no more or less likely to take unilateral action against the refugee’s home country than other states.

| Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Decision to Join UN Peacekeeping Mission or Initiate a Unilateral MID |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| **Join Peacekeeping** | **Initiate MID** | **Join Peacekeeping** | **Initiate MID** |
| **Coefficient** | **Coefficient** | **Coefficient** | **Coefficient** |
| Expected Inflows | 1.059*** | 0.038*** | -2.222 | 0.101 |
| | (0.276) | (0.011) | (1.620) | (0.071) |
| Ln(GDP) | 0.241*** | -0.038*** | -0.529 | 0.098* |
| | (0.059) | (0.011) | (0.339) | (0.055) |
| Expected Inflows*Ln(GDP) | -0.038*** | 0.101 | 0.101 | -0.057 |
| | (0.011) | (0.005) | (0.071) | (0.048) |
| Democracy | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.098* | 0.098* |
| | (0.016) | (0.005) | (0.055) | (0.055) |
| Contiguity | 0.323 | 0.323 | 19.760*** | 19.760*** |
| | (0.642) | (0.642) | (0.977) | (0.977) |
| Joint Democracy | -0.331 | -0.331 | -14.672*** | -14.672*** |
| | (0.487) | (0.487) | (0.781) | (0.781) |
| Alliance | -0.270 | -0.270 | 0.669 | 0.669 |
| | (0.548) | (0.548) | (0.661) | (0.661) |
| Trade | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Non-intervention years | 0.334 | 0.334 | -1.586 | -1.586 |
| | (0.230) | (0.230) | (1.056) | (1.056) |
| Non-intervention years² | -0.445*** | -0.445*** | 0.541 | 0.541 |
| | (0.166) | (0.166) | (0.412) | (0.412) |
| Non-intervention years³ | 0.048** | 0.048** | -0.057 | -0.057 |
| | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| Constant | -8.660*** | -8.660*** | -10.348 | -10.348 |
| | (1.477) | (1.477) | (7.814) | (7.814) |
| N | 10985 | 10985 | 10985 | 10985 |
| Log pseudolikelihood | -1372.3298 | -1372.3298 | -1372.3298 | -1372.3298 |

However, my analysis of unilateral action provides much greater support of the existing explanations of MID initiation. In particular, democracies are more likely to initiate militarized disputes against refugee sending states, unless the state happens to also be a democracy. This result lends further support to the well-established pattern that democracies do not fight one another (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Bremer 1992; Levy 1988; Maoz and Abdolali
In addition, states neighboring one another are more likely to engage in disputes, regardless of refugee flows between them (e.g., Vasquez 1995).

In Test 2, I utilize a negative binomial count model and ordered probit to test my hypotheses, rather than the multinomial logistic regression. Using these modeling techniques allows me to consider the impact of expected refugee inflows and state strength on both the number of troops contributed to multilateral missions and the level of hostility to which they are willing to engage in with the refugee’s home state.

Table 6 shows the results of the negative binomial analysis of a state’s contribution of peacekeeping troops to each UN peacekeeping mission. Conditional on having high capabilities, leaders expecting refugee inflows contribute 4% fewer troops to a mission. Conversely, when leaders of weaker states are facing refugee inflows, they provide over 300% more troops to each mission than other states. Once more, Hypotheses 4 and 6 are supported.

**Figure 2. Effect of Expected Refugee Inflows as Strength Increases in Negative Binomial Regression**

![Graph showing the effect of expected refugee inflows as state strength increases in a negative binomial regression. The x-axis represents state strength measured as ln(GDP), and the y-axis represents the marginal effect of expected refugee inflows on participation in peacekeeping missions. The graph includes a line representing the estimated effect, as well as upper and lower bounds with dashed lines.](image-url)
This model also provides more support for past studies of state contributions to peacekeeping missions. In particular, wealthier states and states bordering the war-torn country are more likely to contribute troops to the mission (e.g., Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998). However, I find that democracies are less likely to contribute soldiers to any given UN mission. This result runs counter to extant work, which argues that the liberal principles upheld by democratic states encourage these states to participate in providing global peace (e.g., Lebovic 2004). However, since democracies are more sensitive to the costs of military deployment (e.g., Gartzke 2001; Koch and Gartner 2005; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Russett 1990), it should not be surprising that in most missions those democracies not threatened by the conflict will be unwilling to participate.

Table 7 displays the results from the second model of Test 2. Using an ordered probit model, I examine the highest military action a state is willing to take against the refugees’ home state. The results support Hypotheses 5 and 7. Conditional on having high capabilities, states expecting refugee inflows from a conflict are more likely to initiate a greater level of militarized violence against the refugees’ home country. However, leaders who are facing refugee inflows, but have low military capabilities, are less likely to take strong military action against the refugees’ home state.
Table 6: Negative Binominal Model of Troops Contributed to each UN Peacekeeping Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV= Troops contributed</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected Inflows</td>
<td>1.153*** (0.441)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.255*** (0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Inflows*Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>-0.036* (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.106*** (0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>5.679*** (1.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>-1.107 (0.684)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-0.109 (0.777)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0.005** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years</td>
<td>-0.607 (0.634)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years 2</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years 3</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.650 (1.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-3604.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.01*, P<0.05**, P<0.01*** Errors clustered by mission

Figure 3. Effect of Expected Refugee Inflows as Strength Increases in Ordered Probit

![Figure 3](image-url)
In addition to supporting Hypotheses 2 and 4, this model also provides support for past studies of militarized conflict. In particular, I find that contiguous states are more likely to engage in high levels of hostilities (e.g., Vasquez 1995) and that democracies are less willing to fight one another (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995).

**Table 7: Ordered Probit Model of Highest MID Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV= Highest Militarized Action</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected Inflows</td>
<td>-1.301* (0.728)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>-0.310 (0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Inflows*Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.059* (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.043* (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>5.839*** (0.825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>-4.842*** (0.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.195 (0.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years</td>
<td>-0.364 (0.531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years*</td>
<td>0.138 (0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years*</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut1</td>
<td>0.328 (4.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut2</td>
<td>0.530 (4.919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut3</td>
<td>0.615 (4.964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut4</td>
<td>0.711 (4.955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut5</td>
<td>0.822 (5.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut6</td>
<td>1.120 (5.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>10985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-50.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.01*; P<0.05**; P<0.01*** Errors clustered by mission
Discussion

Several scholars have begun examining the various ways in which states respond to the growing number of displaced persons seeking shelter from conflict situations (e.g., Adamson 2006; Lischer 2005; Rudolph 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Weiner 1992). As refugees often create or exacerbate tensions within their host states, irregular migration has become a cause of international action. The results of this study confirm this trend. I find that refugee inflows increase the likelihood of states starting militarized disputes with the refugees’ home state, as well as participating in multilateral efforts to establish peace and security in these war-torn areas.

I connect the literature on policy substitution to this work to examine how a leader determines whether to take unilateral or multilateral action in response to these threats. A leader must choose the policy which will best realize her goals at a price she is willing to pay (e.g., Most and Starr 1984, 1989). I find that a state’s military capabilities are crucial to a leader’s willingness to act alone. Unilateral action is useful when a leader has significant resources to bear upon the situation. Weak states, however, must substitute multilateral efforts for unilateral action.

This result not only corroborates our growing understanding of how leaders engage in policy substitution, but it also returns to an old notion about international organizations. In particular, it highlights the role of international organizations in aggregating the capabilities of their members (e.g., Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane and Nye 1974). Weaker states, which are unable to pursue international change on their own, are able to coordinate their efforts with other countries through such organizations. By directing their effort through international organizations, weaker states are able to realize many of their policy goals.
Summary

In this chapter, I analyze why some states, when facing externalities from ongoing conflicts, respond by issuing militarized threats, while others react through multilateral humanitarian missions. I argue that states choose between these two possible policies based upon their capabilities. Stronger states will eschew the principal-agent problems inherent in operating through multilateral organizations in favor of direct unilateral conflict with the country creating the negative externalities. Conversely, weaker states will seek to work through international organizations to achieve their policy goals because such venues allow them to aggregate their capabilities with other countries.

This work advances recent research highlighting how domestic unrest can lead to disputes between states by incorporating a third level of interaction - the international organization. Here, I explore when leaders will help alleviate the causes of their disputes through the use of international organizations. In this way, I add to recent scholarship blurring the lines between intra- and interstate violence (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Carment and James 1995; Saideman 2001; Saleyhan 2008; Trumbore 2003; Woodwell 2004). In doing so, I return to an old debate on the usefulness of international organizations, showing that such organizations are created strategically and are not only beneficial to their strong members, but also to weaker members (e.g., Keohane and Martin 1995).
Chapter 5.

Costly contributions in the multilateral setting

Introduction

When a state takes action in a multilateral setting, it must determine how much of the burden to shoulder. In Chapter 2, I argued that the costs and benefits a state derives from participation will inform this decision. In the context of post-conflict intervention, I argue that states that are receiving the largest number of refugee inflows from the war-torn area will be the ones most willing to shoulder the burden of more costly action. In particular, I expect that as a leader expects more refugees from the post-conflict country, she will receive a higher benefit from ensuring that civilians are protected and stability returns to the country than will leaders who are not experiencing these externalities. Given this benefit, such leaders should contribute more armed troops to the stabilization and reconstruction effort than will other leaders. However, I expect that because democratic leaders pay higher domestic political costs for troop deaths, these leaders will prefer to substitute armed troops with unarmed observers who see less direct violence. I test these hypotheses (8-11) using data on state contributions of military troops, police officers, and unarmed observers to each UN peacekeeping mission.

While much research exists on state contributions to UN peacekeeping, it does not pay adequate attention to the different ways in which countries participate in these missions. In particular, these studies do not distinguish between the types of personnel countries contribute to each mission. Instead, these studies focus on what share of the total UN troops each country
provides (Bobrow and Boyer 1997), annual aggregate contributions to UN missions (Lebovic 2004), or active peacekeeping soldiers (Victor 2010). Failure to consider the different manners in which states participate in UN missions is problematic because it obscures a state’s willingness to make costly contributions to the collective security system. Instead, unarmed military observers are treated the same as the soldiers who patrol the frontlines. This problem is especially noteworthy for the UN, as it frequently struggles to fulfill the level of personnel required by its peacekeeping mandates, particularly in terms of actual soldiers (see Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004).

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I present my research design. Then I discuss the data. Third, I present the results of my analysis before I discuss the insights my theory and findings provide for our understanding of the dynamics of peacekeeping. Lastly, I provide a summary of this chapter and its support of my general theory.

**Research design**

To test the hypotheses I derived in Chapter 2, I collect data on which states contributed to each of the United Nations’ post-Cold War peacekeeping missions and which type of contribution each state made: troops, police, or observers. I then arrange these data into a direct-dyad-year format in which each year, all states not party to the conflict have the ability to contribute troops to each ongoing UN peacekeeping mission. For example, in 1994, Haiti can contribute troops to missions UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNOSOMII in Somalia, but it cannot participate in UNMIH, which was established in its own territory in 1993 and was ongoing in 1994. Data provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2013) contain information on 51 peacekeeping missions across the world between 1993 and 2007.
Contributions of troops range between 0 and 9,769 (UK in UNPROFOR 1995). Contributions of police range from 0 to 604 (US in UNMIK 2000). Contributions of observers range between 0 and 77 (China in UNTAC 1993). Given the skew of each of these contributions, I utilize the natural log of each variable in my models: \( \ln(Troops) \), \( \ln(Police) \), and \( \ln(Observers) \).

I have argued that the decisions of whether to provide peacekeeping troops, police officers or observers to a post-conflict country are interdependent. A Breusch-Pagan test of equation independence reveals that, statistically, this claim is true at the 95% confidence level. To properly control for the bias correlated residuals may cause in the estimation, I employ a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Model. The SUR Model will allow me to account for the correlated equation errors, and to make comparisons about how the covariates affect each type of personnel contribution.

**Data**

*Key independent variables*

My models will contain two key variables of interest.

**Refugee Flows:** The first variable of interest is the number of refugees each state receives from each post-conflict situation each year. I collect data on directed refugee flows from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR 2012b). Flows of refugees are highly skewed. In this data, refugee inflows range from 0 for many dyads (e.g., Haiti to Guyana in 2000) to 1.5million from Iraq to Syria in 2007. Due to the skew of this variable, I will use its natural log in my models, \( \ln(Refugee\ Inflows) \).
**Democracy**: I use each state’s -10 to 10 Polity IV Score to capture whether each potential donor is a *Democracy* (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). Higher scores represent states that are more democratic.

**Additional independent variables**

In the models that follow, I include the following four additional control variables:

**Contiguity**: As contiguous states are more likely to fight and refugees tend to seek asylum in nearby countries, I include an indicator variable equal to 1 for *Contiguity* if both the target state of the peacekeeping operation and potential intervener share a land border (Stinnett et al. 2002); 0 if not.

**Strength**: I include a measure of state strength based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (World Bank 2012). Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu (1998) and Shimizu and Sandler (2002) show that wealthier states have disproportionately shouldered the peacekeeping burden since the end of the Cold War. Given the high rightward skew of GDP levels, I use the natural log of this variable in my model, $Ln(GDP)$.

**Alliance**: Because alliance members tend not to fight and they receive low levels of refugees from one another, I include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target state and potential intervener share a military alliance (Leeds et al. 2002); 0 for all states without an Alliance.

**Trade**: I include a measure of trade flows between potential donors and recipients, as trade partners may be more interested in protecting those countries on whom they rely for economic growth. I take data on trade flows from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and include the natural log of trade flows in my estimations, $Ln(Trade)$.
Results

Table 8 displays the results from the Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Once the SUR Model accounts for the interdependence of the two equations, the results may be interpreted similarly to how one understands coefficients generated from an Ordinary Least Squares model. As the results indicate, there is support for my hypotheses. Refugee inflows, democracy, and wealth each significantly predict increased contributions of troops, police officers, and observers to UN peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. These basic results support extant expectations that democracies (Lebovic 2004) and wealthier, stronger states (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002) participate more in peacekeeping efforts than do other states. These findings also complement existing research on the relationship between refugees and intervention (Salehyan 2008), indicating that refugee inflows can induce states to take action to stem these externalities.

Table 8. Refugee Inflows, Democracy, and Peacekeeping contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Observers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugee Inflows)</td>
<td>0.046*** (0.004)</td>
<td>0.037*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.013*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.002*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.004*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.002*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.159*** (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.195**** (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.065** (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.026*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.046*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.032*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.031 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.150*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.092*** (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Trade)</td>
<td>0.000*** (0.000)</td>
<td>0.000*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000* (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.501*** (0.078)</td>
<td>-0.924*** (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.621*** (0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>16089</td>
<td>16089</td>
<td>16089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01***
I complicate our understanding of peacekeeping by arguing that the various forms of personnel states contribute to UN missions are substitutes for one another. In Hypotheses 8 and 9, I posit that the benefits of stemming refugee inflows from conflict areas will induce a leader to pay the higher costs associated with troop deployment than rely solely on the provision of police officers and observers. Furthermore, these states should contribute more police officers than observers, as police can patrol for crimes behind the battle lines that are encouraging forced migration. The SUR Model provides strong support for these hypotheses. States receiving refugee inflows from a conflict provide 124% more troops than police, 354% more troops than observers, and 285% more police officers than observers to the peacekeeping mission. This result suggests that refugee inflows induce leaders to supply armed peacekeepers to the front lines and behind the battle lines to stop violence against civilians and stem refugee flows. Given the benefits of stabilizing the war torn country, and limiting externalities from the area, countries receiving refugees from the conflict zone are willing to pay the higher costs associated with contributing armed peacekeepers to unarmed observers.

Hypotheses 10 and 11 posit that democracies will provide fewer troops and police than observers because these countries are more sensitive to the cost of battle deaths. The results provide mixed support these hypotheses. I find that democracies provide fewer troops than police officers, suggesting that democracies substitute police contribution in place of placing soldiers on the front lines of the conflict. Furthermore, they provide the same number of troops and observers to missions. Additionally, democracies provide far more police officers to UN peacekeeping missions than they provide observers, rejecting Hypothesis 11. These findings suggests that democracies are less risk adverse in deploying police officers as they are to sending other personnel.
Figure 4. Comparison of Effect Sizes for Refugee Inflows and Democracy on Contribution Types

All effects significant at the 0.05 level

The control variables mostly preform as expected. Wealthier, stronger states supply more peacekeeping troops, police officers, and observers. This result confirms the expectation that these states have disproportionately shouldered the peacekeeping burden in the post-Cold War era (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002). It also indicates that financial need does not drive state contributions to peacekeeping missions (Berman and Sams 2000; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Victor 2010). Similarly, states are slightly more willing to contribute troops and police officers to their trade partners, but not observers. I find that alliances significantly predict the provision of police, and observer contributions, but not troops. States are only likely to contribute more observers to their allies than other states. They are unlikely to supply police officers to these missions. This suggests that while states are willing to monitor the behavior of their allies, they are not willing to contribute armed forces to intervene in the domestic affairs of their alliance partners.
Perhaps the most surprising result amongst the control variables concerns contiguity. I find that contiguity significantly predicts that states are less likely to contribute any type of peacekeeping personnel to their neighbors. There may be two explanations for this finding. First, contiguity may proxy a number of factors that induce neighbors to interact, including territorial aspirations, population migration patterns, trade, and familiarity (e.g., Vasquez 1995). I have argued that refugee flows are one of the main reasons why states intervene in one another’s domestic affairs. After controlling for the specific effect of these migration patterns, it may be that contiguity provides little additional incentive to participate in peacekeeping efforts in one’s neighbor. Second, the United Nations attempts to limit the participation of neighboring states in its peacekeeping missions for fear that these counties will use the intervention as an opportunity to gain undue influence in their competitor (Olonisakin 2008). The negative result for Contiguity may suggest that the UN is successful in this objective, unless the neighbor is receiving large externalities from the nearby conflict.

Discussion

The theory and findings I present here offer new insights into the dynamics of peacekeeping. First, many past scholars have examined the question of why states contribute peacekeepers to UN missions (Berman and Sams 2000; Blum 2000; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Lebovic 2004; Victor 2010). While this work has much merit, it has failed to consider the different ways in which states can contribute and how states make these policy substitutions. I argue that states make this decision based on the benefits they can derive from their participation, while avoiding the political costs associated with troop deployment. The data strongly supports this argument. Second, my results indicate that, on average, states do not contribute to UN
peacekeeping missions in an effort to capitalize on the UN’s resources or training from more sophisticated militaries. This finding overturns the popular argument for why countries participate in the UN’s multilateral efforts (Berman and Sams 2000; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Victor 2010). Soldiers from poor states do not overly populate UN missions and weaken the forces’ capacity to keep the peace in war-torn areas.

Strong international support is crucial to providing stability in war-torn areas and breaking the cycle of violence in post-conflict societies (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, the United Nations often struggles to attract broad based international support for its peacekeeping efforts. Understanding why states contribute to peacekeeping efforts, and the various manners in which they do, is central to solving the free-rider problem often associated with international organizations and multilateral missions (e.g., Murdoch and Sandler 1982; Oneal and Elrod 1989; Russett and Sullivan 1971). My results indicate that burden sharing is unequal in post-Cold War peacekeeping. States that value the good of peacekeeping and stabilizing a conflict area are the ones that provide the largest contributions of armed military personnel to these missions. In addition, wealthy states shoulder a disproportionate share of the peacekeeping burden, even when they are not experiencing externalities from the conflict (Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002). The logic of collective action predicts these patterns (Olson 1971). These findings are troubling in that they indicate that unless the conflict produces large refugee flows, and the major powers remain concerned about peace in the periphery, then many wars may fail to attract serious international attention or support.

As different types of military personnel have different effects on the UN’s ability to stop violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2012), it is important to understand why some missions are able to attract more robust support than are others. As armed soldiers
have the largest deterrent effect on violence against civilians, it is imperative that the UN is able to incentivize contributions of armed peacekeepers to the most violent conflicts. My work suggests that this may be possible, as states contribute to those conflicts whose violence generate the largest externalities. However, these results question whether multilateral action will be most successful in accomplishing the goals of its members when free riding problems exist (e.g., Martin 1992). If the participants are unable to successfully bargain with one another during the mission, principal-agent problems can undermine the success of the multilateral effort and encourage unilateral action in place of multilateralism (Drezner 2000). Of course, such unilateral intervention into conflict is one of the behaviors the United Nations was designed to prevent.

**Summary**

The goal of this chapter was to understand costly contributions by states in the multilateral setting. To get leverage on this question, I focused on state contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, asking why some states contribute troops while others send police officers or observers. I built from our current understanding of peacekeeping to posit that the various types of peacekeepers are substitutable options for leaders attempting to accomplish specific goals. I argue that one benefit states receive from participating in these missions is the ability to stabilize post-conflict situations and stem the externalities these areas produce. Given this benefit, states receiving the largest externalities from a conflict, should be more willing to pay the high financial and political costs of contributing armed troops and police officers to the war zone than other states. In addition, democratic leaders may be more hesitant to supply these armed troops, as they are more sensitive to the costs of battle deaths.
I find that the costs and benefits associated with each type of personnel deployment influences which types of peacekeepers a state is willing to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions. Refugee inflows increase a state’s willingness to contribute troops, police, and observers. However, as expected, states receiving refugee inflows are more likely to supply armed troops and police officers than unarmed observers. I also find that democracies are more likely to deploy each personnel type than are non-democracies (Lebovic 2004). However, democratic leaders are willing to supply the same number of military troops and unarmed observers. Democracies also tend to supply far more police officers than other personnel types. Together, these results indicate that states contribute more to multilateral efforts as their benefits from doing so increase, and as their costs allow.
Chapter 6.

The decision between the use of troops and aid in establishing post-conflict peace

Introduction

To this point, my empirical analysis of state contributions to the protection of civilians in war-torn areas has revealed three patterns. First, states expecting large volumes of refugee inflows provide more troops and react quicker to those conflicts from which they are experiencing the externalities. Second, when faced with refugee inflows, strong states prefer to initiate unilateral action against the refugees’ home state, while weaker states must rely on multilateral missions to aggregate their capabilities in an effort to achieve their policy goals. Lastly, states receiving larger refugee inflows are more likely to contribute troops and police than unarmed observers to conflict zones. Thus far, my empirical investigation has focused on a state’s willingness to contribute military support to humanitarian missions. I now turn my attention to a leader’s willingness to provide foreign aid to war-torn states.

In this chapter, I investigate a leader’s decision between the use of troops and financial aid in helping to establish post-conflict peace in war-torn countries. I ask why some states contribute peacekeeping troops, while others donate foreign aid, and still others provide both types of support in an effort to establish peace in post-conflict situations. Scholars have outlined the various reasons states contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding in war-torn states. These explanations include the benefits international organizations, like the United Nations, provide to contributing states (e.g., Bobrow and Boyer 1997), the ability such interventions provide
participates to stem externalities from the conflict zone (e.g., Hartigan 1992), and the domestic and transnational humanitarian pressure leaders face to provide relief to suffering populations (e.g., Nadelmann 1990). While each of these explanations has merit in explaining why states participate, we are still without an understanding of why some states are willing to take politically costly action in deploying large numbers of soldiers to these war-torn areas while others contribute to the cause from afar through foreign aid.

Several scholars have outlined the need for robust international support for post-conflict peacebuilding to be successful. If third parties are unwilling to supply significant levels of assistance to the post-conflict country, then the roots of the hostility are unlikely to be successfully removed and replaced with a sustainable peace (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000). This observation is particularly acute as the United Nations often fails to attract sufficient levels of support for its peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts (see Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004 for discussion). Additionally, the success of any peacebuilding tactic— from troop deployment to food aid— often depends on the international community’s willingness to use several other forms of mutually reinforcing methods of peacebuilding support (McGinnis 2000).

Combining research on why states contribute to peacekeeping/building projects and work on foreign policy substitution, I argued in Chapter 2 that states desiring to stem externalities from the war-torn country are more willing to supply high numbers of soldiers to the area than foreign aid because of the advantages military involvement in the area holds in overcoming a principal-agent problem. Democracies, who are more sensitive to the costs of troop deployment, will substitute such a policy with the use of foreign aid. In addition, wealthier states, which have a comparative advantage in financial contributions, will also seek to avoid the political costs of troop deployment.
This chapter proceeds in six sections. First, I present my research design. Second, I discuss my data. Third, I present the results of my analysis. Fourth, I provide robustness checks to my base model. Fifth, I discuss my findings in relation to the literature on post-conflict state building. Lastly, I summarize the support provided here for Hypothesis 12 and my theory more broadly.

**Research design**

To test the hypotheses I developed in the previous section, I need to identify post-conflict situations. I begin by identifying all civil wars in which the United Nations has established a peacekeeping mission since the end of the Cold War. While UN missions comprise only a sample of all possible military and financial interventions into post-conflict situations, I focus on these cases for three reasons. First, UN peacekeeping missions are established with the consent of the warring parties upon the establishment of a ceasefire (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004 for discussion). The establishment of a UN mission signals that a conflict is at its end. This ensures I have identified a post-conflict situation. Second, the United Nations does not intervene in all conflicts. Instead, the Security Council tends to establish peacekeeping missions in those cases that are highly salient to the international community, either due to the conflict’s severity (e.g., Beardsley and Schmidt 2012) or major power interests (e.g., Bennis1996; Gibbs 1997). Focusing on conflicts receiving UN mandates helps me identify those situations in which third parties have some interest in participating. Lastly, the United Nations works to dissuade third party interventions into conflict outside the auspices of UN actions (e.g., Olonisakin 2008). By limiting the scope of my analysis, I can largely ensure that states that wish to intervene in the conflict are able to do so absent international pressures not to take action.
I gather data on post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO 2013). Between 1993 and 2007, the UN established 51 missions around the world. I arrange these data into a direct-dyad-year format in which each year, all states not party to the conflict have the ability to contribute troops to each ongoing UN peacekeeping mission. For example, in 1994, Haiti can contribute troops to missions UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNOSOMII in Somalia, but it cannot participate in UNMIH, which was established in its own territory in 1993 and was ongoing in 1994. Troops contributions range from 0 to 9769 (the United Kingdom to UNPROFOR in 1995). Given the skew of this variable, I use the natural log of troop contributions as my first dependent variable, \( \text{Ln(Troops)} \).

After identifying the post-conflict situations, I gather data on bilateral aid flows from Tierney et al. (2011). These data are matched with the peacekeeping data, so that in each year all states not party to the conflict have the ability to provide foreign aid to the post-conflict country. Contributions range from 0 to \$4.22Billion (the United States to Iraq in 2006). Given the skew of this variable, I use the natural log of aid provision as my second dependent variable, \( \text{Ln(Aid)} \).

I have argued that the decisions of whether to provide peacekeeping troops or aid to a post-conflict country are interdependent. A Breusch-Pagan test of equation independence reveals that, statistically, this claim is true at the 90% confidence level. To properly control for the bias correlated residuals may cause in the estimation, I employ a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Model. The SUR Model will allow me to account for the correlated equation errors, and to make comparisons about how the covariates affect both troop and aid provision.
Data

Key independent variable

My models will contain three key variables of interest. The first variable of interest is the number of refugees each potential donor receives from each post-conflict situation each year. I collect data on directed refugee flows from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR 2012b). Like aid and troop provision between states, flows of refugees are highly skewed. In this data, refugee inflows range from 0 for many dyads (e.g., Haiti to Guyana in 2000) to 1.5 million from Iraq to Syria in 2007. Due to the skew of this variable, I will use its natural log in model, $\ln(\text{Refugee Inflows})$.

Additional independent variables

In the models that follow, I include the following six additional control variables:

**Democracy**: As democracies are more likely to participate in post-Cold War peacebuilding and refugees tend to migrate to countries with better human rights, I use each state’s -10 to 10 Polity IV Score to capture whether each potential donor is a *Democracy* (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). Higher scores represent more democratic states.

**Wealth**: As wealthier states have a comparative advantage in providing both troops and financial aid, and refugees may seek shelter in countries with better living conditions, I include each potential donor’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a measure of the state’s wealth (World Bank 2010). Due to the skew of this variable, I will use its natural log in model, $\ln(\text{GDP})$.

**Contiguity**: As contiguous states are more likely to fight and refugees tend to seek asylum in nearby countries, I include an indicator variable equal to 1 for *Contiguity* if both the target state and potential intervener share a land border (Stinnett et al. 2002); 0 if not.
**Alliance:** Because alliance members tend not to fight and they receive low levels of refugees from one another, I include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target state and potential intervener share a military alliance (Leeds et al. 2002); 0 for all states without an *Alliance*.

**Trade:** I include a measure of trade flows between potential donors and recipients, as trade partners may be more interested in protecting those countries on whom they rely for economic growth. I take data on trade flows from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and include the natural log of trade flows in my estimations, *Ln(Trade)*.

**Non-intervention years:** I include the cubic polynomial of years since a state last provided troops or aid to the post-conflict country to account for time dependence in the data.

**Results**

Table 9 displays the results from the Seemingly Unrelated Regression. Once the SUR Model accounts for the interdependence of the two equations, the results may be interpreted similarly to how one understands coefficients generated from an Ordinary Least Squares model. As the results indicate, there is strong support for my hypotheses. Refugee inflows, democracy, and wealth each significantly predict increased contributions of troops and aid to post-conflict situations.

Hypothesis 12 states that countries receiving large volumes of refugee inflows from a war zone will provide both troops and aid in an effort to stem these externalities. However, given the advantages the deployment of troops has over the provision of aid, leaders should be more willing to contribute troops than money. The SUR Model indicates that leaders facing refugee flows from the situation do contribute increased levels of troops and aid. However, refugee
inflows induce a leader to contribute more aid than troops. A one-unit shift in the number of (logged) refugee inflows induces a leader to provide 0.043 more (log) troops to the post-conflict country. To make this effect more concrete, consider that a 100% increase in refugees increases troop contributions by 3%. In the data, a state receiving 1100 refugees is likely to contribute just over 15 troops. Conversely, a 100% increase in refugee inflows increases aid provision by 43%. This translates to 1.8 Million aid dollars for every 1100 refugees.

These results confirm the expectations of the extant literature. Countries receiving externalities, and especially refugee inflows, from a conflict area are more likely to intervene in the conflict (e.g., Regan 1998, 2002; Salehyan 2008). They also build on this past work by showing that the intervention does not need to be militarily hostile. Instead, counties faced with these same pragmatic concerns about refugee inflows may join peacekeeping missions or provide aid to the conflict country in an effort to stem the externalities they faced. Furthermore, while these countries are more likely to intervene, they prefer to do so through pecuniary means, rather than provide military personnel to the area.

Given the domestic costs of deploying soldiers, democratic countries may be more willing to send financial aid to post-conflict countries than peacekeeping troops. My findings support this argument. Democracies provide 1 additional peacekeeper and $1.07 more in foreign aid to post-conflict countries than other regimes as they receive refugee inflows. This pattern also reveals that a democratic leader will be more willing to use foreign aid to promote post-conflict reconstruction than to deploy soldiers to the area. On average, democracies are willing to send $0.07 more aid dollars than to deploy 1 soldier.

These results paint an intricate picture of democratic international action, and support several views of democratic foreign policy. They confirm the argument that democracies are
more likely to participate in post-Cold War peacekeeping than are their non-democratic counterparts (Lebovic 2004). However, the fact that democracies are highly sensitive to the political costs of losing military personnel complicates this dynamic (e.g., Gartzke 2001; Koch and Gartner 2005; Morgan and Campbell 1991). Even while democracies are willing to support UN peacekeeping missions, they prefer to provide financial aid to the post-conflict country than send troops.

Given their comparative advantage in terms of their ability to spend cash, wealthier states should be more willing to utilize foreign aid spending than to send troops to UN peacekeeping missions. I find that a 10% increase in GDP leads states to spend 4% more in foreign aid expenditures in the post-conflict country compared to a less than 1% increase in soldier deployment.

This result supports extant scholars who argue that wealthier states are more likely to shoulder the peacekeeping burden in the post-Cold War area (e.g., Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Shimizu and Sandler 2002). It also suggests that while some states may participate in UN peacekeeping for the financial benefits the UN provides contributing states, on average, it is not the poor, weak states that are contributing most significantly to these missions (e.g., Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Victor 2010). Lastly, when considering both the financial and military actions of states, I find that wealthier countries prefer to supply aid rather than soldiers. This confirms the notion that states make foreign policy decisions based on their comparative advantage (e.g., Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan 2002).
Figure 5 provides a visual representation of these results.

**Figure 5. Comparing the Effects of Refugee Inflows, Democracy, and Wealth on the Provision of Troops and Aid**

Along with my key variables of interest, I included four additional control variables. The SUR Model produces a series of interesting results for the remaining control variables. First, neighbors to post-conflict countries tend to provide less foreign aid and fewer troops than other countries. In addition, contiguous states provide less foreign aid than they contribute peacekeeping personnel. These results are contrary to the literature’s understanding of proximity, in which scholars typically assume that actors nearby a conflict will be more likely to become involved in the dispute (e.g., Most and Starr 1980; Siverson and Starr 1990; Vasquez 1995). The finding that nearby states provide fewer troops may be the result of the UN’s efforts to limit the participation of neighboring states in its peacekeeping missions for fear that these counties will use the intervention as an opportunity to gain undue influence in their competitor (Olonisakin 2008). However, this does not explain why these states also give much less aid to their neighbors.

My results provide mixed supportive for the idea that allies tend to assist one another. States allied to the post-conflict country tend to provide more peacekeeping troops than do other
countries but they provide less financial aid to the area than are other states. I also find that states provide more foreign aid to their trade partners, but are no more likely to contribute peacekeepers than other states.

As a robustness check, I include mission fixed effects to the model. These results are reported in Table 9, as well. Despite adding the mission fixed effects, the general relationships between each of my independent variables and both aid and soldier provision remain the same. The only notable difference is that in the fixed effects model, I find that states are more likely to provide peacekeeping soldiers to their trade partners, though still at a lower rate than they provide financial aid.

Table 9. Seemingly Unrelated Regression for State Contributions of Troops and Aid in Post-Conflict Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Base Model</th>
<th>Mission Fixed Effects Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop Contributions</td>
<td>Aid Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
<td>Coefficient (Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugees)</td>
<td>0.043**** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.517*** (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.004*** (0.001)</td>
<td>0.065*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.023*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.374*** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.165*** (0.037)</td>
<td>-3.532*** (0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.038* (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.185*** (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Trade)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.555*** (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years</td>
<td>-0.121*** (0.012)</td>
<td>-1.114*** (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years²</td>
<td>0.017*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.229*** (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention years³</td>
<td>-0.001*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.013*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.262*** (0.076)</td>
<td>-7.697*** (0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>31374</td>
<td>31374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01***
Robustness check: The financial value of a soldier

In my initial analysis, I compared a state’s willingness to contribute peacekeeping troops and financial aid. In this analysis, a standard deviation increase in troops contributed was equivalent to a deviation increase in aid provided. In this setup, the cost of one soldier is equivalent to $1. Clearly, this is not true. A soldier’s cost to a state is generated by the money needed to train and supply the individual. This is in addition to the emotional costs associated with the loss of a life should the soldier die.

To make a better comparison between the contribution of a soldier and foreign aid, I try to estimate the financial value of a peacekeeper to her home state. This calculation is a practice in which the United Nations engages as it attempts to incentivize member states to contribute soldiers to peacekeeping missions (for example, see Berman and Sams 2000; Bobrow and Boyer 1997). To offset the costs of supplying troops to peacekeeping missions, the United Nations pays countries for their troops at a value of $1,028 per soldier contributed. To provide a better comparison between the contribution of a soldier and foreign aid, I use the UN’s estimation of a soldier’s value and multiply each soldier by 1000. Now, each soldier is equal to roughly $1000.

After making this adjustment, I re-estimate the base SUR Model. As Model 1 in Table 10 indicates, even though the coefficients on $\text{Ln(Refugees)}$, Democracy, and $\text{Ln(GDP)}$ grow along with the adjusted value of a soldier, the relationship between the provision of troops and aid remains the same. States receiving refugee inflows, democracies, and wealthy states each still provide more foreign aid to post-conflict countries than peacekeeping soldiers.

The United Nations pays contributing countries roughly $1,000 per troop for each month the soldier is deployed in the peacekeeping mission. In response, I also re-estimate the model...
after multiplying each solider by $12,000 to capture the yearly cost of the contribution. As Model 2 in Table 10 indicates, while the coefficients on Ln(Refugees), Democracy, and Ln(GDP) continue to grow along with the adjusted value of a soldier, the relationship between the provision of troops and aid remains the same. States receiving refugee inflows, democracies, and wealthy states each still provide more foreign aid to post-conflict countries than peacekeeping soldiers.

Table 10. SUR Estimates using Adjusted Troop Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$1000 per soldier adjustment</th>
<th>$12,000 per soldier adjustment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troop Contributions</td>
<td>Aid Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugees)</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.517***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>0.374***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>-0.489***</td>
<td>-3.532***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>0.119***</td>
<td>-0.185***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Trade)</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.555***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>-0.307***</td>
<td>-1.114***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.223***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.013***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.847***</td>
<td>-7.697***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>31374</td>
<td>31374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01***

Discussion

My work provides implications for our understanding of post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Many scholars have examined the question of why states contribute peacekeepers to UN missions (e.g., Berman and Sams 2000; Blum 2000; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Lebovic 2004; Victor 2010). While this work has much merit, it has failed to consider how peacekeeping
contributions fit into the larger domain of post-conflict peacebuilding. It has not examined the different ways in which states can contribute to peacekeeping and peacebuilding nor how states make these policy substitutions. I argue that states make this decision based on the benefits they can derive from their participation, while avoiding the political costs associated with troop deployment. I find support for the argument that democracies prefer to substitute financial support for military participation. Similarly, wealthy states use their comparative advantage to supply aid instead of military personnel. In addition, while I find that states experiencing externalities from the conflict area are more likely to provide peacekeepers than are other states, these countries are still more willing to substitute financial support for becoming involved in the conflict country.

We know that significant international support is necessary to help war-torn states successfully build sustainable peace within their borders (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). However, previous scholars have suggested that the major powers are hesitant to pay significant military costs to become involved in the conflicts of the periphery and provide this support (e.g., Gberie 2005; Rabkin 2005). My findings go a step further and indicate that even those states experiencing negative externalities from conflicts would rather buy their way out of providing the military personnel necessary to help restore peace and stability in other countries. These findings suggest that while the desire to stem externalities from the conflict zone (e.g., Hartigan 1992), and the domestic and transnational humanitarian pressure leaders face to provide relief to suffering populations (e.g., Nadelmann 1990) influence state decisions of whether to intervene in a conflict, states would still prefer to remain detached from ongoing conflicts.

I find that states facing externalities from conflict zones are willing to provide significant levels of aid to the war-torn country. However, providing large amounts of foreign aid may not
be enough to help alleviate underlying grievance within the state. Often, aid is only successful in helping to rebuild society if it is distributed and protected by military force (McGinnis 2000). By attempting to remedy conflicts through aid, without the necessary military support, states may be undermining their own goals of preventing further conflict and externalities, as the aid is captured by corrupt government officials or rebel groups using the war to become rich.

Summary

In this chapter, I provide an empirical analysis of how states make the decision whether to support efforts to establish peace in post-conflict situations. I argue that states will decide whether to contribute troops or financial aid based on the benefits they receive from participating, while trying to minimize their costs. One benefit states receive from participating in these missions is the ability to stabilize post-conflict situations and stem the externalities these areas produce. Given this benefit, states receiving the largest externalities from a conflict, should be more willing to pay the high financial and political costs of contributing armed troops to the war zone than other states.

My findings support this general argument. In support of previous research, I find that states facing externalities from the conflict area, democracies, and wealthier states are all more likely to contribute both soldiers and aid than their peers. However, these states each prefer to provide more foreign aid than contribute significant numbers of peacekeeping troops. This suggests that most states prefer to remain as uninvolved in the conflicts of their neighbors as possible.
Chapter 7.

An empirical analysis of refugee flows and foreign aid

Introduction

In Chapter 6, I began my empirical analysis of a leader’s use of foreign aid in helping to protect civilians, and displaced population, in war-torn countries. Here, I continue this line of inquiry by examining to where leaders are willing to provide foreign aid in the face of refugee flows. I have argued that leaders deploy troops and foreign aid to war-torn areas to help stem the externalities their countries face from this fighting. However, scholars often debate whether politicians take international actions for altruistic reasons, or whether their behavior is grounded in the state’s interests. In critiquing the United Nations’ actions in Bosnia, Israeli diplomat and politician Abba Eban remarked, “All governments take their decisions in the name of national interest and then explain them in terms of self-sacrificing altruism” (Eban 1995: 51). This sentiment has been expressed frequently in various classical works on political science, as well. For instance, Organski (1961: 69) states, “The plain fact of the matter is that national goals truly in the general interest are extremely rare; if they exist at all.” However, this view of altruistically-void politics is not ubiquitous. Lumsdaine (1993:3) argues, “Efforts to build a better world can effect significant change in international politics: vision, hope, commitment, conviction sometimes make a big difference.” In addition, Busby (2010) contends, it would be reckless not to consider the humanitarian motivations of a state alongside its realpolitik goals. Most recently, the debate between national interest/realism and altruism/humanitarianism has
received attention in the literature on foreign aid. Here, there is disagreement concerning whether political motivations drive a leader’s decision on whether to provide another country aid, as well as the decision of how much to give (see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005; Gibler 2008).

In this chapter, I examine support for Hypotheses 13a, 13b, 14a, and 14b. In conducting this analysis, I help adjudicate between these theories by focusing on foreign aid provided in refugee situations. Refugees are considered both targets for humanitarian concern and negative externalities from conflicts (e.g., Salehyan 2008). Given this duel nature of refugees, we can examine whether a leader provides aid more altruistically to refugee populations around the world, or only to those populations threatening her border and endangering national stability. I find that a leader is willing to provide foreign aid to the refugees’ home country when the country’s conflicts are generating refugee inflows for her. However, a leader is unwilling to provide aid to other countries receiving refugee inflows. This indicates that a leader’s concern for displaced people is largely driven by her desires to limit negative externalities from ongoing conflicts, rather than a feeling of altruism for refugees more broadly.

Understanding why leaders provide foreign aid is important for several reasons. Amongst these, I focus on two. First, my work illustrates that many states struggling to handle refugees are unable to receive the help they need. Neighboring countries are unwilling to help share the burden of providing for the displaced population, unless they too are affected. As refugees continue to seek protection abroad, and cause tensions in their host countries, long-term peace in the region is unlikely (e.g., Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Second, many displaced people will be unlikely to receive the help they need. This lack of support not only leads to continued flows of people, but also violence in and around refugee camps and lower levels of human security for the
displaced population (e.g., Achvarina and Reich 2006; Toole 1997, 2000). These problems are
exacerbated by the fact that many agencies dedicated to helping displaced persons are often
unable to attract substantial international support to effectively accomplish their goals of caring
for these populations (e.g., Nachmias 1997; Wijewardance 2007).

The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. I begin by describing my
research design. I then discuss the initial results of my analysis. Third, I provide a number of
robustness checks to my econometric models. I then discuss my findings in relation to the
literatures on foreign aid, altruism versus realism, and state responses to forced migration. Lastly,
I summarize the support this analysis lends to my theory on state protection of foreign civilians
outside their territory.

Research design: foreign aid to war-torn countries

To test my hypotheses, I gather data on aid flows from Tierney et al. (2011). I arrange
these data in a directed-dyad-year format, so that I may examine foreign aid contributions from
all potential donors to each state currently engaged in either inter- or intra- state conflict. Here,
all states have the potential to donate aid to any other state that is engaged in war. The data
contain 56,059 directed-dyad-years in which a potential recipient is fighting either an inter- or
intra- state conflict (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

Data on post-Cold War aid flows are available from 1992 to 2011. During this period,
3,698 aid transfers were made to warring states, whereas 52,361 (93%) directed-dyad-years
never saw the provision of aid. To test my first hypothesis on to which states a leader is more
likely to provide aid, I create the variable Give. Give equals 1 in all instances in which a state
donates aid to another country; 0 in all other cases.
The decision whether to provide aid to another country is the first stage in the foreign aid process. The second decision a leader must make is how much aid to provide (see Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005). Hypothesis 2 refers to this second stage of the decision. In my data, total aid contributions range from $569.10 USD (Portugal to the Philippines in 2001) to $7,200,000,000 USD (Germany to Russia in 1993). Given the large skew of this data, I include the natural log of this variable in my statistical models, Ln(Total Aid).

Given the two stage decision making process in providing foreign aid, I employ a Heckman Selection Model to test my hypotheses. This modeling decision is standard in the foreign aid literature, as it allows for a test of those factors that influence the decision to donate and the decision of how much to provide without giving the independent variables unwarranted significance in the second stage (e.g., Blanton 2000; Heckman 1976; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998).

My models will contain two independent variables of interest. The first variable of interest is the number of refugees each potential donor receives from each country engaged in war each year. I collect data on directed refugee flows from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR 2012b). Like aid provision between states, flows of refugees are highly skewed. In this data, refugee inflows range from 0 for many dyads (e.g., Indonesia and Japan 2003) to 2,197,821 from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 2001. Due to the skew of this variable, I will use its natural log in model, Ln(Refugee Inflows).

The second variable of interest is the number of refugees entering each warring state. Again, I collect data on directed refugee flows from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR 2012b). These flows range from 5 for several countries (e.g., Cambodia in
1993) to 1,629,218 (e.g., Pakistan in 1992). Due to the skew of this variable, I will use its natural log in model, \( Ln(\text{Recipient’s Inflows}) \).

In both stages of my models, I control for several variables that may partially determine foreign aid provision and correlate with both my dependent and independent variables of interest. In particular, I include four control variables.

**Wealth:** First, I include a measure of the donor’s wealth. Wealthier states have more resources to contribute to war-torn areas, and are a preferential destination for refugees seeking to rebuild their lives (e.g., Neumayer 2005). Given the skew of wealth between states, I include the logged variable, \( Ln(\text{GDP}) \) (World Bank 2012).

**Democracy:** Second, I include a variable capturing whether each potential donor is a democracy. Democracies tend to provide higher levels of humanitarian assistance to other countries (e.g., Noel and Therien 1995), and attract large numbers of refugees who are seeking a protection of their human rights. To capture Democracy, I include each donor’s -10 to 10 Polity IV Score (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). As a country’s Polity Score increases, the state is more democratic, and should offer higher levels of aid to recipient countries.

**Alliance:** Third, I include an indicator variable for whether a potential donor and recipient share an Alliance. Alliance members tend to receive low levels of refugees from one another (e.g., Teitelbaum 1984) and provide each other financial assistance in times of need (e.g., Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005). This variable is taken from Leeds et al. (2002) and is coded 1 if the dyad possesses and alliance and 0 if it does not.

**Trade:** Lastly, I include a measure of trade flows between potential donors and recipients, as trade partners may be more interested in protecting those countries on whom they rely for
economic growth. I take data on trade flows from Barbieri and Keshk (2012) and include the natural log of trade flows in my estimations, $\text{Ln}(\text{Trade Flows})$.

In the first stage of the models, I also include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the potential donor and recipient countries are in the Same Region (0 if not) because donors may be more willing to stabilize countries that are nearby and could create externalities for them. In addition, controlling for regional effects allows me to ascertain whether refugee inflows or other neighborhood effects are driving aid provision. Data on regions come from Bennett and Stam (2000).

Results

Table 11 presents the results of my empirical analysis. Model 1 is a baseline model of foreign aid provision in which I only include the refugee flows between the at-war country and a potential donor and the potential recipient’s refugee inflows with a control for whether the states were in the same region. In Model 1, I find that as refugee inflows increase from a potential recipient to another country, the state receiving the inflows is both more likely to provide aid and contribute a larger sum than other states. These findings support both Hypothesis 13b and Hypothesis 14b. A leader receiving refugees from a war-torn country is more likely to provide aid to that country, and a larger amount of assistance, than other leaders.

In addition, I find that states are neither more likely to donate to those countries receiving large refugee inflows, nor more likely to provide increase financial support to these countries to help with the refugee burden. This result undermines the altruism hypotheses: 13a and 14a. In particular, a leader does not appear to provide foreign aid for altruistic reasons. She only supports those refugee crises that are providing externalities for her country.
Table 11. Who Gives How Much to War-torn Countries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Robust Standard</td>
<td>(Robust Standard</td>
<td>(Robust Standard</td>
<td>(Robust Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Error)</td>
<td>Error)</td>
<td>Error)</td>
<td>Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV₂= Ln(Total Aid)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugee Inflows)</td>
<td>0.367***</td>
<td>0.164***</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Recipient’s Inflows)</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>0.764***</td>
<td>0.521***</td>
<td>0.476***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-0.120***</td>
<td>-0.144***</td>
<td>-0.144***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-0.680**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Trade Flows)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>0.242***</td>
<td>0.271***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>12.549***</td>
<td>-5.056**</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>2.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.541)</td>
<td>(2.083)</td>
<td>(1.885)</td>
<td>(2.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV₁= Give</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugee Inflows)</td>
<td>0.255***</td>
<td>0.183***</td>
<td>0.185***</td>
<td>0.177***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Recipient’s Inflows)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>0.437***</td>
<td>0.453***</td>
<td>0.439***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>0.154***</td>
<td>0.160***</td>
<td>0.170***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-0.533***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Trade Flows)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-0.030**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Region</td>
<td>-0.873***</td>
<td>-0.588***</td>
<td>-0.490***</td>
<td>-0.350***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td>(0.581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>56059</td>
<td>44193</td>
<td>36035</td>
<td>30858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-19152.15</td>
<td>-13161.76</td>
<td>-12861.28</td>
<td>-10816.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wald test of independent equations

|                      | X² = 14.45           | X² = 8.03            | X² = 0.76            | X² = 0.82            |
|                      | Probability 0.000    | Probability 0.005    | Probability 0.383    | Probability 0.365    |

P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01*** Errors clustered by dyad

Model 1 also indicates that, once I control for refugee inflows, a potential donor state in the same region as a warring country is less likely to contribute to its neighbor’s assistance. This
indicates that a leader is not necessarily interested in supporting her neighbors. Rather, she offers assistance when her neighbor’s troubles affect her own security.

Model 2 extends this analysis to control for whether the potential donor is wealthy and whether it is a democracy. The extant literature on foreign aid suggests that both of these factors should be correlated with higher levels of aid provision. Model 2 also offers statistical support for Hypotheses 13b and 14b: leaders receiving refugees from a war-torn country are more likely to provide aid to the refugees’ home country, and a larger amount of assistance, than other leaders. Once more I find that leaders are no more likely to support states receiving refugee inflows and provide no more assistance to these states than others. The hypothesis that leaders provide foreign aid altruistically (Hypotheses 13a and 14a) remains unsupported.

The model provides only limited support for alternative explanations. The results support the claim that wealthier states are both more likely to give and provide a larger amount of aid (e.g., Morgan and Palmer 2000). Conversely, Model 2 displays a more intricate dynamic concerning democratic giving than previously discussed in the literature. While I find that democratic leaders are more likely to provide aid, they appear less likely to offer large sums of financial support. Rather than supporting the idea that democracies desire to produce real change in the situation of recipient states- for humanitarian reasons (e.g., Noel and Therien 1995) or to extract concessions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009)- these results suggest that democracies are using aid as a cheap way to appear humanitarian while still avoiding significant involvement in ongoing conflict situations (e.g., Rabkin 2005).

In Model 3, I control for the trade flows between dyads of potential donors and recipients. As data on trade flows only exist through 2009, I cannot analyze the entire span of aid provision. Nonetheless, the results of Model 3 confirm those of the first two models. Leaders receiving
refugee inflows from an at-war state are more likely to contribute to that state, than are other leaders, and provide higher levels of foreign aid. However, a leader is no more likely to provide aid to a state receiving large inflows of refugees, and she is unlikely to provide any more aid to states in such a situation.

In addition, the relationships between wealth and aid provision, and democracy and foreign aid remain unchanged. Wealthier states are more likely to give and provide more assistance while democracies are also more willing to give, though they do not donate large sums. In this model, I find that, like democracy, trade flows produce different effects on a leader’s willingness to offer aid and provide a significant level of support. The results cut in the opposite direction than democracy. Higher levels of trade appear to diminish whether a country provides aid to its at-war trade partner. However, if aid is given, a trade partner provides more support than other countries.

Model 4 provides the full model I describe in the research design. Here, the analysis is limited to 2003 due to data on alliances ending in this period. However, once more the results remain consistent through each of the models, supporting Hypotheses 13b and 14b while failing to confirm Hypothesis 13a or Hypothesis 14a. A leader receiving refugees from a war-torn country is more likely to provide aid to that country, and a larger amount of assistance, than other leaders. She is likely to use foreign aid as a realist tool of state interest, rather than for humanitarian support.

Model 4 reinforces my previous findings that a potential donor state in the same region as a warring country is less likely to contribute to its neighbor, wealthier states are more likely to give and give more, democracies are more likely to donate but provide less aid, and trade partners are less willing to contribute but those that do offer larger amounts of assistance. In this

120
model, I also find that allies are less likely to give aid or confer significant amounts of financial help to their warring partners.

**Robustness checks**

My hypotheses that leaders receiving refugees from a war-torn country are more likely to provide aid to that country, and a larger amount of assistance, than other leaders were supported by the various models I presented. In none of the models is the humanitarian/altruism hypothesis supported. Note that when I included the full range of control variables, the Wald Test of independent equations lost statistical significance. This indicates that the decision whether to give is not affect the decision of how much aid to provide. Given that result, I present three additional robustness checks in this section. The robustness results are presented below in Table 12.

First, in Model 5, I include dyad fixed effects to the model to ensure that the results are not driven solely by cross-dyad variation, rather than within-dyad variation, given the occurrence of refugee flows from particular war-torn countries in various years. I find that both sets of results concerning refugee inflows are robust. However, in this model, neither Democracy nor Ln(Trade Flows) are statistically significant.

Second, I include whether the recipient state was a democracy, as non-democracies tend to produce more refugee outflows (e.g., Azam and Hoeffler 2002) and are more likely to be targeted for tied aid by states seeking policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009). Again I find that states receiving higher levels of refugee inflows are more likely to provide foreign aid to the refugees’ home country, whereas recipients receiving refugees obtain no more financial support. In Model 6, both democracy and trade flows significantly increase aid
provision. Here, I also find that more democratic recipient states tend to receive less aid than their autocratic counterparts, as suggested by the existing literature.

Lastly, Model 7 includes both whether the recipient state was a democracy and dyad fixed effects. Once more, my findings are robust: A leader receiving refugees from a war-torn country is likely to provide more aid to that country than other countries. However, states experiencing large refugee inflows are unlikely to receive assistance in handling this humanitarian crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12. Robustness Checks on the Amount of Aid Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV</strong>= Ln(Total Aid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 5 (Fixed effects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 6 (Democratic recipient)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 7 (Democratic recipient with fixed effects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Robust Standard Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugee Inflows)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Recipient’s Inflows)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Trade Flows)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Recipient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01*** Errors clustered by dyad

Discussion

My results provide several implications for the foreign aid literature. First, refugee flows influence which donors send aid to conflict situations. In particular, states provide foreign aid to those conflicts from which they are facing externalities. This study focuses on the issue of conflict externalities in the form of refugee flows. By focusing on one policy area, I am able to
determine the circumstances in which a leader will take action to induce these changes. Specifically, as the cost of the undesirable policy increases for a potential donor, that leader becomes increasingly willing to provide aid in an effort to induce change. However, a potential donor is unwilling to provide aid to change policies that harm others more than her.

Second, my results confirm the conclusions of several past studies. I find that while democracies and wealthier states are more likely to contribute foreign aid, democratic states tend to provide less aid to any particular recipient. This result is due to a selection effect in which while the majority of foreign aid donors are democracies, a few highly motivated autocratic donors tend to give large amounts of aid in particular circumstances (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2009). A further investigation of these results reveals that several oil rich countries in the Persian Gulf Region (e.g., Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) tend to provide large amounts of aid.

Returning to the larger debate on the motives of moral action, I find additional support for the hypothesis that leaders often take humanitarian action in support of more realpolitik concerns (e.g., Organski 1961). While a leader is concerned with displaced populations, she tends to only provide aid to handle the refugees when these individuals threaten her border. She is unwilling to provide humanitarian aid to other countries also receiving inflows. These results do not reject the idea that a leader may be moved by a moral motivation to provide assistance to displaced populations. Rather, they indicate that these motivations tend to only prompt action when the needy population threatens her security.

These results also add to a growing literature suggesting that refugees are a source for international action (e.g., Adamson 2006; Lischer 2005; Rudolph 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Weiner 1992). Refugee inflows induce leaders to intervene in conflicts (Regan 1998, 2002), start militarized disputes with the refugees’ home state (Salehyan 2008), and contribute to
peacekeeping missions in their area (Chapter 3). Here, I show that these externalities also induce leaders to fund efforts in the refugees’ home state to stop the outflows. The general theme of this research is that leaders wish to stem the flow of refugees into their states and use a variety of policy tools to accomplish this task. While much of this literature focuses on the use of punishments to end a conflict’s externalities, I extend this work to shown that leaders also employ economic carrots to accomplish these same objectives.

Summary

In this chapter, I added to the debate on whether leaders take humanitarian actions for altruistic or realpolitik reasons. I tested these competing claims by examining whether a leader provides aid to a country facing a humanitarian crisis in the form of refugee flows. I parse these motivations by observing when leaders provide aid to handle refugee flows. I find that a leader is willing to aid humanitarian crises when refugees threaten her border. However, she is unlikely to support other countries receiving refugees. These findings suggest that a leader is more concerned with providing for the stability of her state than altruistically assisting the needs of other countries or the displaced individuals.
Chapter 8.

Institutional design and the funding of post-war peacebuilding projects

“We must avoid getting into another UNRRA. The United States must run this show.” -- Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs William Clayton of the United States Department of State in proposing a new plan to rebuild Europe after World War II.

Introduction

In Chapter 7, I found that leaders tend not to provide aid altruistically to all refugee populations. Rather, they give when refugee inflows directly threatened their own stability. Additionally, they focus their aid to the refugees’ home country in an effort to help change policy and eliminate these externalities. In Chapter 8, I analyze Hypotheses 15 and 16, which posit that countries desiring to end externalities will be reluctant to provide aid through multilateral agencies, while democracies that want to externalize human rights protection broadly may be willing to use these institutions.

At the end of World War II, the United States partnered with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to reconstruct war-torn Europe. However, many policymakers, such as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs William Clayton of the United States Department of State, were dissatisfied with the direction of the recovery plan. They disliked having to cooperate with the United Nations’ bureaucrats and believed that much of the money was being misspent as it fell into the hands of corrupt country leaders. In response,
Clayton proposed what would become the Marshall Plan— a humanitarian aid program that explicitly tied aid to American interests and allowed the U.S. to keep a close eye on where money was sent and how it was used.

The Marshall Plan became a blueprint for many future foreign aid plans. Today, leaders often resort to bilateral aid programs to achieve their policy goals in recipient countries. Given this development, the literature on foreign and humanitarian aid has largely developed around the question of which states give bilateral aid and to whom. Scholars remain divided over whether and when aid is given for humanitarian purposes (e.g., Noel and Therien 1995) or as a coercive tool of foreign policy (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). In either case, they agree that the ability to target the recipient of the aid is important to donors. Directing their aid allows donors to guarantee which countries receive their assistance and how the money is used.

If leaders value the power to direct where and how foreign aid is used, then why do some work through multilateral aid organizations that force them to forfeit this ability? In this paper, I take a step back and return to Clayton’s critique of involvement in multilateral aid organizations. As multilateral institutions or organizations diminish a donor’s control over where and how aid is used, I seek to understand when leaders would be willing to operate in such contexts. In particular, I ask why leaders engage in multilateral post-conflict statebuilding projects when they are unable to control how their donations are used.

To answer this question, I begin with the common premise that states tend to engage in post-conflict peacebuilding for pragmatic reasons, such as stemming refugee flows and other externalities from war-torn areas (e.g., Hartigan 1992). Providing aid in such situations allows a state to influence policy change in the recipient country. Changing abusive policies can help
lower the number of individuals seeking to leave the country. Additionally, aid can provide security for displaced peoples so that these individuals do not seek shelter in the donor state.

Since aid can help diminish externalities created from nearby conflicts, it is important for a leader to have the ability to target her aid to particular situations and problems. A leader will want to guarantee that her support is used to limit the externalities her state faces. If a leader is experiencing a large inflow of refugees from a particular conflict, she will be unwilling to forfeit control of her donations to multilateral organizations. This is because the organization may not press for the policy changes she desires or may use the aid in a different conflict situation.

However, some leaders do donate aid to post-conflict countries through multilateral institutions. Drawing from the literatures on delegation to international organizations and foreign policy substitution, I argue that certain leaders can benefit from the use of a constraining multilateral context. In particular, democratic leaders can donate to these organizations to appease domestic factions that desire the promotion of humanitarian norms more broadly. The use of the multilateral context signals to other states that the leader’s intentions are benign (e.g., Thompson 2006). The country is donating aid to provide stability in war-torn areas and relieve human suffering. In addition, sharing the burden of post-conflict reconstruction with other countries allows the leader to appease her domestic factions without having to shoulder the more costly burden of unilaterally rebuilding the war-torn state (e.g., Morgan and Palmer 2000; Palmer, Wohlander and Morgan 2002).

Using a negative binomial count model of state contributions to the United Nations General Peacebuilding Fund (UNGPF), I find that leaders experiencing large inflows of refugees are less likely to contribute to multilateral post-conflict peacebuilding missions than leaders whose borders are relatively secure. Conversely, democratic states contribute more to the
UNGPF. These results build on earlier chapters that indicate that refugee flows drive humanitarian responses to conflicts, and highlight the strategic nature of humanitarian efforts. These findings also question whether many statebuilding projects will be successful in the long term, as leaders are unwilling to provide the significant backing scholars deem necessary to establish lasting peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). This is particularly important as the United Nations has recently reconfigured its peacebuilding activities to limit donor influence on projects. In effect, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission has struggled to attract donors to support its efforts in post-conflict areas.

The remainder of this chapter is comprised of five sections. I begin by presenting my research design. I then discuss my data and empirical models. Third, I present my results. I then discuss the implications of these findings for institutional design and norm building. Lastly, I conclude with a summary of my results and their support for my theory.

**Research design**

In this chapter, I test my argument about how the institutional context of post-conflict aid provision influences which states are willing to contribute to the United Nations General Peacebuilding Fund (UNGPF). I focus on the UNGPF because it is the primary multilateral institution through which the international community conducts post-conflict peacebuilding. The role of this institution is to coordinate all post-conflict aid from state and organizational donors. In this section, I recount a brief history of the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund in order to highlight the institutional features of Fund that provide constraints on donor leverage.

Prior to 2006, the UN’s peacebuilding efforts were conducted through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As part of the post-Cold War emphasis on protecting civilians and
rebuilding societies in the wake of conflict, UN peacekeeping mandates often called for intricate schemes of state building (Ratner 1995). During this time, it was Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s vision that UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding could “identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN 1992). Despite this evolution in demands on the peacekeepers, the UN had no additional budget to support reconstruction efforts. Instead, it continued to fund these projects through the taxes it levied on member states to support its traditional peacekeeping budget.

It took over a decade before the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change recommended the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate and fund these projects independently (UN 2004). During the 2005 World Summit, the member states of the United Nations stressed the interconnectedness of human rights and long-term peace and stability (UNGA 60/180), and supported the creation of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to fill the institutional gap between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Officially, the PBC is an advisory body to the Security Council and relies on voluntary contributions to its peacebuilding fund to conduct its work of disbursing funds supporting peacebuilding projects.

Today, there are several important differences between contributing to UN peacebuilding projects and UN peacekeeping missions. First, contributions made to the General Peacebuilding Fund are monetary in nature, while participation in peacekeeping requires the contribution of personnel. This difference results in peacebuilding participants not receiving financial compensation for their efforts. This also means that while deposits into the General Fund are voluntary, like participation in peacekeeping missions, the UN does not directly incentivize contribution to the UNGPF as it does for peacekeepers.
Second, if donating through the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund, a leader cannot direct where her money is used or how it is used. Contributions are aggregated in the Fund and dispensed by the PBC as it sees fit. This means that a leader fearing refugee inflows from country X cannot be certain that her donation will be used to stabilize the situation in X. For example, if a leader desires to fund projects in South Sudan, she cannot be sure the PBC will use her contributions for South Sudan instead of funneling the money to Timor-Leste or Haiti. Furthermore, even if the PBC is handling relatively few conflicts when the leader contributes, she cannot be sure what percentage of her deposit will be used to solve the problems in the situation on which she would like to focus. In addition to not being able to specify where her money is used, or how much of it is spent in her preferred location, she is also unable to designate how her money should be used. The PBC disperses peacebuilding money in a variety of ways across four priority areas. According to the PBC (2012), these areas are as follows:

- **Priority Area One**: “supports projects that attempt to address peace-sustaining processes, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as strengthening prisons, police forces and peacetime militaries.

- **Priority Area Two**: “supports projects that bolster good governance and promote national dialogue and reconciliation, including projects that promote human rights, aim to end impunity and stamp out corruption. There is also a strong focus on projects that strengthen the participation of women in the peacebuilding process.”

- **Priority Area Three**: “supports projects that stimulate economic revitalization to general peace dividends. Activities include strengthening economic governance through the promotion of partnerships with the private sector, the development of micro-enterprises, youth employment schemes and the management of natural resources.”
• **Priority Area Four**: “supports projects that rebuild basic infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, safe drinking water and proper sanitation.”

The way in which the PBC administers funding to its various projects means that if a leader is particularly concerned with reintegration projects (Area One) or promoting good human rights practices within the troubled area (Area Two), she cannot guarantee that her contributions will not be used for fighting corruption (Area Two), strengthening economic governance (Area Three) or rebuilding the state’s infrastructure (Area Four). The inability for the leader to control where and how her contributions are spent suggests that contributing through the General Fund, rather than providing directed aid to the problem area, should be an inferior tactic if the leader desires to prevent refugees, or other externalities, from entering her territory.

The manner in which the PBC and UNGPF developed makes testing my argument on contributions to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund ideal. When operating through this institution, leaders can neither target specific recipient states nor direct how their contribution should be used. In addition, contributions are voluntary and the UN does not provide rewards for participation. For these reasons, I construct my research design around state contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund.

**Data and empirical models**

To test Hypotheses 15 and 16 concerning the effect of institutional context on foreign aid donations to post-conflict situations, I collected data from the Peacebuilding Commission’s archives on all state contributions to the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund from 2006 (the year the UNGPF first collected donations) until 2011 (the most recently completed) year. Deposits ranged from 0 (the most common amount) to $32,124,458 by Norway in 2006 (PBC 2006-2011).
The yearly amount of each state’s deposits follows a negative binominal distribution. For this reason, I employ a negative binomial count model to estimate my parameters of interest.

Figure 6. Histogram of Deposits to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund

*Note: only non-zero contributions displayed

The empirical implications of my theory are that states who desire to extract policy concessions with their foreign aid will be less likely to contribute to causes when their ability to target such donations is constrained by an international institution that mediates the aid transfer, such as the UNGPF. Conversely, states responding to humanitarian pressures to take action will not be deterred from contributing; as such donations do not require substantial financial investments and may be applied to promoting humanitarian causes broadly. To test these implications, I need to operationalize which states would be interested in contributing to peacebuilding for foreign policy reasons and which states are driven by humanitarian pressures.
One of the most commonly recognized reasons states engage in peacebuilding projects in other countries is to prevent refugee inflows from those conflict areas (e.g., Hartigan 1992; Lischer 2008; Snyder 2010). Leaders desire to prevent inflows because refugees tend to cripple health systems (e.g., Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, 2004), strain food supplies (Jenkins, Scanlan, and Peterson 2007), shift demographics along ethnic, religious, and class lines (Saideman and Ayres 2000), and slow the economy as leaders react to these various problems (Murdoch and Sandler 2002, 2004). While contributing to the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund may not allow states to buy votes in the Security Council or make other policy trades, funding these peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts may help a state lower the levels of externalities it is receiving from conflict areas, while operating under the legitimizing banner of the United Nations (e.g., Hartigan 1992; Salehyan 2008).

For these reasons, I will use a state’s yearly refugee inflows to proxy its desire to stop the externalities affecting its borders. I gather data on yearly refugee inflows from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR 2012b). In my dataset, several states received only 1 refugee in a given year (e.g., Bahrain 2006, Haiti 2007, and Timor-Leste 2009). In 2007, Syria received the largest number of refugees in my dataset with over 15 million. Given the skew of this variable, I use the natural log of inflows in my models, \( \text{Ln(Refugee Inflows)} \).
Operationalizing the states in which leaders tend to be more sympathetic to humanitarian causes is more straightforward. The literature on humanitarian aid is clear that democratic leaders will be more likely to respond to humanitarian interests than their non-democratic counterparts will. Democratic leaders may wish to externalize their liberal norms or they may be forced to take humanitarian actions abroad to appease liberal factions within the state (e.g., Huntington 1991; Busby 2007). To capture Democracy, I use the -10 to 10 Polity IV scale (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). More democratic states have higher Polity Scores.

I follow the advice of Achen (2005) and Clarke (2005) and present parsimonious models in which I only include those control variables that should correlate with both monetary donations and my variables of interest, Ln(Refugee Inflows) and Democracy. Therefore, along with my variables of interest, I also control for state wealth, as richer states may have more...
resources at their disposal with which to fund international projects (Morgan and Palmer 2000). To capture state wealth, I include the natural log of each state’s Gross Domestic Product, $\text{Ln}(\text{GDP})$ (World Bank 2012). In addition, I include the number of total ongoing inter- and intra-state conflicts within the international system each year, as more conflicts are likely to increase the number of refugees any state is experiencing and provide more situations for which peacebuilding monies are needed. The variable $\text{Current Conflicts}$ ranges from 31 in 2010 to 37 in 2008 and 2011 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012).

**Results**

Table 13 displays the results of my models testing Hypotheses 15 and 16. Across all three models, my hypotheses are supported by the data. Model 1 presents my base estimates. As expected, states receiving a large number of externalities from ongoing conflicts are less likely to donate to the United Nations’ General Peacebuilding Fund, as they are unable to target where such aid is used. As a state’s level of refugee inflows increases by a standard deviation, the country is likely to contribute 53% less to the UNGPF. This result stands in contrast to previous work on who contributes foreign and humanitarian aid, which has found that states use their donations to extract policy concessions or stem externalities from recipients (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009; Kang and Meernik 2004; Roper and Barria 2007). While these results differ, they complement the existing literature more than they undermined this extant work. Here, the institutional context in which states can donate drives this divergence in results. When states are unable to target their aid, they are likely to look for other more direct methods of achieving their foreign policy goals.
Model 1 also supports Hypothesis 16. Even when they are unable to direct their aid at a particular conflict, democracies are willing to contribute 18% more to the UN’s post-conflict peacebuilding efforts than are non-democracies. In addition, as Figure 8 depicts, democracies have contributed over 96% of the UNGPF’s total monies to date. This result supports the argument that democratic leaders are responsive to domestic and international humanitarian groups that urge the government to promote civilian protection, democratization, human rights, and peace outside of their borders (e.g., Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Nadelmann 1990; Noel and Therien 1995). My findings add a new layer of intricacy to our understanding of democratic foreign policy. The result that democracies are likely to contribute to peacebuilding projects, even when they are unable to target their aid to specific situations, indicates that democratic leaders are concerned with promoting global peace and security in addition to stability and civilian protection in specific countries (Huntington 1982; Lipset 1996; Talbott 1996). In addition, these results indicate that democratic leaders can use a variety of foreign policies to appease humanitarian pressures. A leader does not need to focus on specific changes in any one situation to accomplish her broader objectives.

**Figure 8. Total Contributions to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund by Regime Type**
Models 2 and 3 are robustness checks on my initial findings. Model 2 includes a control for whether a country is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (coded 1 if a state is member to the P-5; 0 for all others). I include this control because scholars have shown that the major powers are more willing to contribute to efforts dedicated to policing conflicts and providing international peace and security than are other states (e.g., Mueller 2004). I find that these P-5 states are less likely to contribute to the UNGPF. However, the effects for my variables of interest remain the same: states experiencing refugee inflows from ongoing conflicts are less likely to fund post-war reconstruction projects through the UN, while democracies are more likely to contribute.

Model 3 controls for the members of NATO (coded 1 if a state is member to NATO; 0 for all others). I include this control because of NATO’s ongoing work in Afghanistan during the period of my analysis. States already engaged in reconstruction efforts elsewhere may be less likely to participate through the UN. The results of Model 3 suggest this is not the case. While the coefficient on the NATO variable is negative, it is statistically insignificant. Despite including this additional robustness check, the results for my variables of interest are unchanged.

In each of the models, I find that wealthier states contribute more. This finding is consistent with past research (e.g., Morgan and Palmer 2000). Conversely, the total number of ongoing inter- and intra- state conflicts within the international system is statistically insignificant in each model.
### Table 13. Yearly Contributions to the United Nations’ General Peacebuilding Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV</th>
<th>Model 1 (Base)</th>
<th>Model 2 (P5)</th>
<th>Model 3 (NATO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Robust</td>
<td>(Robust</td>
<td>(Robust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error)</td>
<td>Error)</td>
<td>Error)</td>
<td>Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Refugee inflows)</td>
<td>-0.746***</td>
<td>-0.793***</td>
<td>-0.758***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.177***</td>
<td>0.182***</td>
<td>0.189***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(GDP)</td>
<td>3.869***</td>
<td>4.060***</td>
<td>3.948***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Conflicts</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>-6.053***</td>
<td>****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.049)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>****</td>
<td>-0.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.769)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-76.444***</td>
<td>-84.278***</td>
<td>-76.762***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.384)</td>
<td>(9.596)</td>
<td>(9.698)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-1386.313</td>
<td>-1384.929</td>
<td>-1386.212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P<0.1*; P<0.05**; P<0.01*** Errors clustered by country

### Implications for institutional design and norm building

The effect of refugee inflows on multilateral peacebuilding contributions follows a substantially different pattern than for patterns of bilateral aid. Leaders desiring to end externalities from neighboring states are more likely to provide bilateral aid to these areas, whereas they are less likely to contribute to the UN’s peacebuilding efforts. I hypothesized such a relationship would exist because, in this institutional context, leaders are unable to target their financial contributions to a specific conflict area or direct their funds to projects they view as most useful for stopping refugee inflows.

In fact, one of the primary motivations behind the creation of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission and UNGPF was to limit the influence donor states could have in the war zone. Officials feared that allowing donors to have undue influence over the rebuilding state by conditionalizing aid would create circumstances in which the fledgling state’s long-term viability would suffer as its leadership was beholden to the interests of these donors, rather than to their people. UN members designed the PBC to coordinate donations by states and organizations,
removing the ability of donors to make demands on the new government, and ensuring a long-term commitment by the international community (Jenkins 2008). However, restricting how states could participate in the rebuilding of collapsed states curbed leaders’ willingness to contribute to the institution. Since its inception, the UNGPF has seen donations fall drastically from $120 million to $20 million in 2009 and $30 million in 2011 (Figure 9).

**Figure 9. Total Deposits to the UN General Peacebuilding Fund since its Inception**

![Graph showing total deposits to the UNGPF from 2006 to 2011](image)

For policymakers, these findings should underscore the importance of institutional design. Abbott and Snidal (1998) argue that states prefer to work through international organizations because such institutions are centralized and independent of state influence. While these features provide many benefits to their members, my research indicates that when institutions become too highly centralized or independent, states may be dissuaded from using the international organization. While the UN was able to make its peacebuilding process more centralized and independent under the Peacebuilding Commission, limiting unwanted influence in post-conflict areas, it achieved its goal with dramatic consequences for attracting contributions to the UNGPF.
As the PBC become more independent of its donors, states became far less willing to fund the Commission’s projects.

This raises the question of whether the short-term need to reconstruct societies after war outweighs the long-term effects of donor influence in the area. Problems with donor influence cannot arise if there are no donors to begin with. In such a circumstance, the international commitment to a sustainable peace may be woefully undersized. Without the effective capacity for building peace, these areas may be condemned to a perpetual cycle of instability, violence, and human rights abuse (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

States willing to participate in civilian protection through the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund, despite the severe limits the institution places on their ability to influence the situation, provide implications for understanding norm building. Throughout the history of the UNGPF, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway have made the most sizable contributions to the UN’s peacebuilding projects. These states are consolidated, liberal democracies. The behavior of these three states speaks to an emerging pattern of behavior for peacebuilders.

In the infancy of the UNGPF, the states promoting the use of this institution are ones that possess the norms embodied in it. These countries are not facing large externalities from the conflict zones in which they are funding projects. Unlike for providing direct aid or peacekeeping troops, there appears to be very little pragmatic or realpolitik reasons these states would continue to contribute to the UNGPF. Rather, strategic considerations drive leaders away from participating. The institutional design of the fund does not allow leaders to direct their contributions or tailor how their contributions are used. Instead, these states gain only the promotion of a new institution and the ideals associated with it. This pattern is consistent with the argument that norms are promoted by those states that have already internalized this behavior.
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), as the Scandinavian and Western European countries are longtime democracies with a record of promoting civilian protection, human rights, and peacebuilding (e.g., Lumsdaine 1993; Noel and Therien 1995).

Summary

In this chapter, I sought to understand how the institutional context in which states are able to donate financial aid influenced who contributes and when. I found that leaders who are interested in appeasing domestic humanitarian factions or who desire to broadly promote the protection of civilians and human rights are more willing to contribute to the United Nations General Peacebuilding Fund than are other states. Countries receiving externalities from conflict situations, who desire to change the policies of the at-war state, are less likely to contribute foreign aid through multilateral institutions that constrain the donor’s influence in the recipient country.

My research indicates that humanitarian efforts are driven by democratic leaders who must appease domestic factions in promoting peace and human rights abroad. This finding complements earlier research on foreign aid, which suggests that democracies supply foreign assistance to externalize their domestic behaviors. While bilateral aid may be used by democracies to both promote humanitarianism and extract policy concessions from recipients, I find that when states are constrained in their ability to attach stipulations to the aid they provide, those states interested in handling specific externalities are unlikely to donate to peacebuilding projects in the multilateral context. This finding suggest that highly constraining institutions should have more difficulty in attracting donations, as these institutions are only useful to a small
number of states. Indeed, the UNGPF has seen a drastic drop in donations since it was reorganized to limit donor influence in post-conflict situations.
Chapter 9.

Conclusion

Summary

I began my dissertation with the question of why leaders are sometimes willing to intervene in conflicts to protect civilians in the area. Most of the literature on humanitarian intervention focuses on the role of strong, liberal democracies in policing conflicts and providing support to civilians in war-torn areas (e.g., Huntington 1991; Jakobsen 1996; Western 2002). I showed that while these theories have great merit in explaining the behavior of some states, they not only miss variation amongst democracies, but they ignore the contributions of weaker, illiberal states.

I argue that one of the primary goals that both democratic and non-democratic leaders possess when faced with conflict in another country is to stem the externalities they face from the war. In particular, a leader desires to control refugee flows into her country. Refugee inflows can slow the economy (Murdoch and Sandler 2002, 2004), cripple the health system (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, 2004; Toole 1997, 2000), strain the food supply (Jenkins, Scanlan, and Peterson 2007), shift the demographics (Saideman and Ayres 2000), and create or exacerbate general tensions within a country. For this reason, when faced with refugees, a leader will be motivated to stop the inflow.

The desire to stop the refugee inflows induces a leader to take action in or against the refugees’ home state. Often, scholars focus on the violent confrontations such inflows create
between the refugees’ home and host countries (Cooper and Berdal 1993; Khosla 1999; Mueller 2003; Regan 1998, 2002; Salehyan 2008). Here, I suggest that these same pragmatic concerns can induce a leader to participate in humanitarian efforts to protect the at-risk civilian population. This is because civilians who are facing violence during a conflict are potential-refugees. If the leader can protect these civilians, then she can limit the number of refugees trying to enter her country. This argument helps explain why weak, non-democratic states participate in many of the same humanitarian missions as strong, liberal democracies.

I first test this argument on state contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, as UN peacekeeping as become focused on protecting civilians and promoting human rights in the conflicts to which it responds (Ki-moon 2011; Ratner 1995; UNDPKO 2013b; UNDPKO 2013c). I find that a leader who is expecting a large refugee inflow from a conflict situation is likely to contribute more troops to the area, react quicker to the crisis, and remain involved until she no longer fears the inflows. In addition, I find that a leader faced with incoming refugees is likely to contribute more costly armed peacekeeping troops and police officers than they are to provide unarmed observers to the mission.

Of course, when deciding how to respond to externalities from a conflict, a leader has more options than simply contributing peacekeeping troops to a United Nations mission. As the extant literature makes clear, the leader can initiate a dispute with the refugees’ home country in an effort to prevent further inflows (Cooper and Berdal 1993; Khosla 1999; Mueller 2003; Regan 1998, 2002; Salehyan 2008). I argue that the state’s capabilities influence this decision of whether to take this unilateral action against the refugees’ home country or to participate in the multilateral efforts. Consistent with this argument, I find that strong states, receiving refugee inflows, are more likely to initiate a militarized dispute with the refugees’ home country than are
weaker states. Additionally, these states are unlikely to join a multilateral peacekeeping mission to the area. Conversely, weaker states receiving these inflows are likely to aggregate their capabilities with other countries through a multilateral effort and are unlikely to initiate a dispute for the refugee’s home state.

Perhaps surprisingly, states try to avoid these options by buying their way out of military intervention with foreign aid contributions. I find that a leader expecting refugee inflows from a conflict area is much more likely to contribute financial aid to the war-torn country than she is to deploy troops to the area. This money is not given altruistically to all countries struggling to handle refugee populations. Instead, the leader is likely to focus her contributions on those states that are generating the externalities she faces. Given that this ability to target her contributions to a specific country is important to the leader, a leader experiencing refugee inflows is unlikely to donate resources to a multilateral agency, such as the UN General Peacebuilding Fund, to handle these externalities. Such agencies, or organizations, keep the leader from targeting her contributions at specific countries or dedicating the funds to certain policy changes. Instead, she will avoid these principal-agent problems and continue to utilize bilateral means of supplying foreign aid.

**Implications**

The theory and results I present throughout this dissertation have a number of implications for our understanding of international politics. In this section, I will continue the discussion of these topics that I began in the introduction to this book.

*Peacekeeping*
While the broad focus on my dissertation is on state participation in the protection of civilians throughout the world, I spend a significant amount of time on participation in UN peacekeeping missions. I begin with peacekeeping as a base for understanding civilian protection for two reasons. First, there is a precedent to claiming that participation in UN missions is humanitarian and promotes human rights and stability in the recipient country (e.g., Lebovic 2004). While these missions may not be “interventions,” their role in providing peace and protection to civilian population in war-torn areas is much less controversial than deciding whether any particular unilateral behavior or non-UN multilateral action is truly humanitarian in nature. Second, and relatedly, since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has increasingly solidified its explicit focus on promoting human rights and protecting civilians in war-torn countries (Ki-moon 2011; Ratner 1995; UN 1998; UNDPKO 2013b; UNDPKO 2013c). As the UN has made this explicit commitment to the protection of civilians, we can analyze which countries continue to participate in these missions now that they have evolved beyond simply providing a military barrier between two belligerent factions, as was originally the mandate of UN peacekeeping.

Scholars of peacekeeping have asked a number of the same questions I pose here: why do states participate, where do they send troops, and how quickly do they become involved. Traditionally, the answers have focused on democratic participation (Lebovic 2004) or the monetary compensation the UN provides contributors (Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Victor 2010). Here, I refocus the literature’s understanding of the benefits a state can derive from participating in peacekeeping missions. While the ability to appease domestic humanitarian groups and the financial kickbacks received from participating may influence the decisions of some leaders, many leaders receive utility from helping stabilize a war-torn country and stemming the
externalities they are receiving from the area. When focusing on these benefits, I find that leaders expecting refugee inflows are indeed likely to contribute more troops and to do so quicker than are others. These findings also indicate that democracies do not contribute as much as previously expected and that poor states are actually far less likely to contribute than are wealthier states.

The role of democratic peacekeepers is quite complicated. While democracies tend to deploy the same, or fewer, troops in any given conflict than are their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are much quicker to participate. This finding adds a layer of complexity to our understanding of democratic peacekeeping that scholars have previously overlooked. In addition, when I consider the various manners in which a state can contribute to a peacekeeping mission, I find that democracies tend to contribute more of each personnel type than non-democracies, but their contributions are dwarfed by those counties faced with externalities from the conflict.

Lastly, in addition to considering other benefits to peacekeeping and the different types of possible contributions, I also expand our understanding of peacekeeping by considering it as an alternative to unilateral action. To this point, scholars have treated military action through UN peacekeeping and unilateral action as two distinct options. I argue that states must make a decision about whether to peacekeep or begin a dispute with the targeted country. By adding this extra layer of decision making to a leader’s calculus, I highlight how the UN’s ability to aggregate its members’ capabilities makes it an advantageous avenue for many weaker states to pursue their policy goals.

*Foreign aid*
Along with peacekeeping, I explore a leader’s willingness to provide foreign aid to an at-war country. Just as a leader can decide whether to contribute peacekeeping troops or invade the refugees’ host country, she must decide whether to contribute soldiers or substitute that policy with foreign aid. Contrary to my initial expectations, I find that leaders are much more willing to supply financial aid to a war-torn country than they are to contribute troops to the area. I expected that since peacekeeping troops could do a better job at monitoring and stopping abuses of the civilian population, and thus limit the size of the forced migrants, a leader would prefer to contribute troops rather than supply aid. Instead, I find that leaders routinely try to gain concessions from the at-war country through aid, rather than sending troops to actively remedy the externality situation. This behavior is problematic, as aid is often misused by the recipient, or non-state actors, in post-conflict situations when the peacekeeping force is not large enough to enforce the denoted purpose of the aid (McGinnis 2000). Furthermore, this preference of attempting to buy concessions rather than support a peacekeeping mission may help explain why the UN struggles to attract enough soldiers to fulfill its mandates.

I also contribute to the foreign aid literature by helping to resolve an ongoing debate on whether states provide aid altruistically or for realpolitik purposes. Rather than relying on disjoint concepts (such as alliances vs. at-risk populations) to test the impact of altruism and realism on aid provision, I use a single, yet multifaceted concept to gain leverage on this question. One conflict can generate refugees that flee to several different countries. Tracing aid along patterns of refugee flows allows me to evaluate whether leaders support countries that are struggling to handle these inflows or whether they dedicate their contributions to those countries that are generating the externalities for them. I find no support for the altruism hypothesis either at the decision level of whether to donate aid or at the level of how much aid to contribute. These
results help support the realism argument made by several scholars (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009) while simultaneously showing that the decisions of whether to provide aid and how much are not divided between altruistic and realpolitik lines (e.g., Drury, Olson, and Van Belle 2005).

**Peacebuilding**

Scholars have long recognized the importance of strong international support in helping war-torn countries build a stable peace after their conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). The international community has responded to this challenge by creating several institutions to help the process of peacebuilding in post-conflict countries. One of the major concerns of the international community has been whether counties participating in the reconstruction of other countries have actually hindered the development of these post-conflict countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). Donors may be more concerned with extracting policy concessions from the fledgling state than helping it develop after its war. For this reason, the United Nations has created the Peacebuilding Commission to limit the influence of donors in post-conflict countries (Jensen 2008).

In highlighting the benefits donors receive from participating in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and focusing on their goal of stemming externalities from the conflict zone, I show that those countries who are most likely to participate in peacekeeping are the least likely to contribute to the UN’s peacebuilding projects. Countries receiving refugees from war-torn countries avoid participating in peacebuilding through the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission and General Peacebuilding Fund to retain more autonomy over how and where their aid is used. By trying to limit donor influence, the United Nations has alienated donors and seen contributions
drop dramatically. While states may participate in international organizations because of their centrality and independence (Abbott and Snidal 1998), too much centrality and independence may drive states away.

The dynamics of peacekeeping and peacebuilding that I have presented in my dissertation have implications for why the international community has found it very difficult to help democratize a country after conflict (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Coyne 2007; Pickering and Peceny 2006). Post-war reconstruction, and democratization, takes time. They require a long-term commitment by both the war-torn state and the international community. However, the states that are most likely to become involved in providing support in post-conflict situations, in terms of both peacekeeping support and foreign aid, are those states that have short-term goals. They desire to move quickly to stem externalities from the conflict zone. Once the refugee flows have slowed, these states are no longer willing to remain committed to the reconstruction efforts. While wealthy, democratic states have been willing to fund the UN’s peacebuilding projects, these contributions pale in comparison to the efforts states faced with refugees from the area provide in the short-run. Thus, one of the reasons the international community has found it very difficult to help democratize a country after conflict is that the time horizons of the participants differ from those that are needed for such projects to succeed.

International norms

In my work, I find a difference between states that promote the norm of civilian protection and those that actual shoulder the burden of its implementation and cement the practices into place. I find that democracies both react quickly to peacekeeping during humanitarian crises and financially support the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund. In the infancy
of the UNGPF, the states promoting the use of this institution are ones that possess the norms embodied in it. These countries are not facing large externalities from the conflict zones in which they are funding projects. Unlike providing direct aid or peacekeeping troops, there appears to be very little pragmatic or realpolitik reasons these states would continue to contribute to the UNGPF. Instead, these states gain only the promotion of a new institution and the ideals associated with it. This pattern is consistent with the argument that norms are promoted by those states that have already internalized this behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), as the Scandinavian and Western European countries are longtime democracies with a record of promoting civilian protection, human rights, and peacebuilding (e.g., Lumsdaine 1993; Noel and Therien 1995).

The quickness in which democracies promote civilian protection is consistent with the argument that countries in which norm entrepreneurs have freedom to further their interests will be the first to adopt new norms. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue, norm emergence is more likely to take place in situations in which norm entrepreneurs have organizational platforms through which they can influence a leader to adopt their practice. For humanitarian causes, these platforms are more likely to exist in democratic states where entrepreneurs have access to the media and political parties without fear of imprisonment or death. It is understandable, then, that democratic leaders are the ones that typically promote civilian protection and where instrumental in reshaping the post-Cold War collective security system (e.g., Frederking 2003).

However, while they promote these norms, it is not always these leaders that actively participate in solidifying the practice. Instead, many illiberal leaders, driven by an interest in preserving their political survival, are also participating in fulfilling these programs. I conclude from this behavior that the implementation of norms is not driven by states that already possess
the behavior, but by states on the fringe of the norm that lock-in the practice for *realpolitik* reasons— in particular, protecting civilians, or potential-refugees, to limit refugee flows into their territories. This finding supports the argument that states follow international laws and norms when it is in their interest (Goldsmith and Posner 2005). My project builds on this basic argument by distinguishing between why some states create and promote norms, while others only assist in cementing the practice.

The difference between norm creators and norm cementers raises the question of how norms change form and adapt as they transfer between these groups of states. While many humanitarian activists may have civilians’ best interest in mind, this concern may not transfer to those states engaging in the rhetoric of civilian protection. Here, I focus on the motivations of leaders that become involved in humanitarian action and argue that their interests do not always align with the international rhetoric or norm of civilian protection. These non-humanitarian motivations may have implications for the civilians targeted for protection by these leaders. The goal for these leaders is to stem the flows of refugees from entering their territory. In order to ensure they succeed at their mission, these leaders may order their soldiers to use any means necessary to stop flows of people and weapons from crossing their border. They may also simply ignore abuses by their own troops. If the troops policing the inflows feel it necessary to use high levels of force to achieve their objectives, abusive leaders are unlikely to flinch at these techniques. While future work is needed to determine if this dynamic has evolved, my findings suggest that such mutation of the norm is a realistic concern.

The willingness of leaders from illiberal regimes, like Egypt and Pakistan, to intervene humanitariantly in the domestic affairs of their peers also suggests that the norm of sovereignty is being eroded. Traditionally, states have regarded the domestic affairs of others as outside the
grounds for intervention. While they might intrude to force leadership or foreign policy change, leaders would not intervene against each other in the name of human rights. However, as states work to protect foreign civilians abroad, this highlights an emerging pattern of behavior working to shift how leaders view sovereignty. This change is important to the United Nations’ new policy of “Responsibility to Protect”. Will leaders embrace this changing of norms or is the responsibility just hot air (Stahn 2007; UN 2005)? Does it matter if their intentions are humanitarian or driven by a desire to secure their borders? This is an important area of research, as states have begun to operate under the notion of “Responsibility to Protect” increasingly (see Russian claims concerning Georgia, France with Myanmar, and NATO in Libya).

**Domestic politics**

This work advances research highlighting how domestic unrest can lead to interactions between states. I add to recent scholarship blurring the lines between intra- and interstate violence (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Carment and James 1995; Saideman 2001; Saleyhan 2008; Trumbore 2003; Woodwell 2004). In doing so, I uncover two particular salient points concerning domestic politics and international relations. First, domestic unrest due to refugee inflows can induce leaders to take both unilateral military action and multilateral humanitarian efforts to stem these externalities from entering their countries. While past scholars have discussed how domestic unrest can lead to international disputes (e.g., Salehyan 2008), I connect these dynamics to humanitarian actions. Furthermore, I find that liberal democratic states are often no more likely to participate in these missions than their non-democratic counterparts. This suggests that democracies are not always more sensitive to the costs of domestic tensions than non-democracies.
Second, my findings provide only limited support for the argument that democracies are more sensitive to the costs of troop deployment than their non-democratic counterparts, as they tend to shoulder the burden of providing armed military personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. This suggests that scholars should rethink how domestic support for an operation affects democratic risk aversion to troop deployment. In particular, do democratic leaders fear troop losses the same in war as they do in other military actions? Soldiers die during peacekeeping missions. The Black Hawk Down incident during UNOSOM II is a vivid example of how democracies must be cautious in participating in peacekeeping activities. Yet, democracies tend to supply more armed military personnel to these missions than do other regimes. Does the deployment of soldiers through a multilateral institution legitimize the action in manner that reduces the costs of troop deaths for these leaders?

Policy importance

The policy importance of this research is clear on many levels. First, if participation in today’s international collective security system is not driven by humanitarian motives, how can Western leaders be certain their intentions are carried out by those states to which they outsource the implementation of humanitarian projects? This question is of particular significance in an interconnected world in which individual citizens have few resources to hold transnational actors accountable for their actions (e.g., Grant and Keohane 2005). When civilians are harmed by those actors tasked with the responsibility to protect them, they are left with little recourse. For example, abuses by peacekeepers result in the offender being removed from the mission and punished by his home government. If the offender hails from an illiberal state, with little to no respect for human rights, it is hard to believe he will actually face consequences for his actions.
(Grenfell 2011; Morris 2010; Oswald and Bates 2010). My research highlights the need for policymakers to develop effective institutions for protecting civilians from the motives of those sent to alleviate their current conditions.

Second, and relatedly, this work highlights the importance of organizational design (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Recent research has focused on how major powers can force multilateral organizations closer to their ideal policy points (Voeten 2001) and legitimize their actions through the organization (Thompson 2006, 2009). What this scholarship misses, however, is how, and whether, the major powers can maintain control of their projects once they are implemented by the organization and its smaller members. Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have worked to focus peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions on democratizing the failing states (e.g., UN 1998). If participants in these missions are focused on their own aims of preventing refugee outflows, rather than the UN’s goal of establishing sustainable democratic governments, it is not surprising that many of these missions fail in establishing long-lasting democracies. Furthermore, if organizations like the UN are unable to effectively regulate the behavior of their members on the ground, then leaders will have an easier time extracting policy concessions from newly-formed states, severely threatening the democratic viability of the regime from the beginning (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006).

Third, since the establishment of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, a lively debate has evolved across academic disciplines and the policymaking world on whether states will embrace the concept and whether it will be successful in reducing human suffering (e.g., Abramovitz and Pickering 2008; Hassler 2010; Stahn 2007). My work here illustrates that one cannot overstate the importance of refugee flows in determining when and where leaders will be willing to intervene. The United Nations Security Council has already used this knowledge to its
advantage, identifying the threat of refugee flows as a major consideration in urging the international community to act in several major crises, including situations such as Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia (Roberts 1998). It appears that in circumstances in which refugee flows threaten the security of a third party state, the state’s leader is willing to intervene in the situation. In such cases, these leaders have been willing to work around the issues of sovereignty to stop abuses in the area, even when it means establishing precedent for future interventions or promoting democracy in the country. Motivating the international community to react to abusive situations seems achievable when there are visible signs of the violence.

Lastly, the United Nations faces a collective-action problem when requesting troops or funding for voluntary projects, such as peacebuilding or refugee reintegration, from its member states. Each member has the incentive to free-ride on the others by not participating in the action. However, it appears the UN is able to successfully overcome this issue in regards to peacekeeping through the mechanism discussed here. Actors that have a strong incentive for providing the good will pay the necessary price. Leaders expecting refugees to flood their country are willing to supply their own personnel to peacekeeping missions in hope of stemming these flows. Olson’s (1971) classic work on overcoming collective action problems appears to be substantiated through this interaction. A second mechanism discussed frequently is that actors can be incentivized to help provide the public good through the ability to acquire private goods in the process. A common conjecture is that by paying contributing states for their troops, the UN can successfully offset the cost of participation for some leaders who do not have a pressing interest in the conflict, making them more likely to participate. However, I find that this is not the case.
This finding carries importance for the UN for two reasons. First, if the money paid to contributing states does not significantly increase a leader’s willingness to participate in its missions, then the United Nations may be better off redistributing this money to other issue areas where it can have an impact. As matters currently stand, this money is provided by a tax all member states must pay to support peacekeeping efforts beyond their standard contributions to the UN budget. Many wealthy states have refused to pay this fee, which causes the United Nations to run a deficit in continuing to fund peacekeeping operations under its current arrangement (see Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004 for discussion). Second, if these monetary incentives are not enough to induce leaders to contribute their soldiers, then the UN must find another mechanism to overcome its collective action problem. It is not hard to imagine a situation in which refugee inflows may only threaten a handful of developing countries. In such a circumstance, the international commitment to a sustainable peace may be woefully undersized. Without the effective capacity for building peace, these areas may be condemned to a perpetual cycle of instability, violence, and human rights abuse (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).

Future work

In my dissertation, I provide a general theory of civilian protection. I began examining this argument through state contributions to peacekeeping missions. As I have argued throughout this book, my theory should be applicable to a series of other issue areas outside of peacekeeping. Leaders can use various policy tools to help handle the externalities of conflicts. They are not confined to deploying troops. For example, leaders fearing large volumes of refugees from a conflict should be more willing to fund projects dedicated to rebuilding war torn areas, providing protection to people in the area, and reintegrating refugees into society.
I have only begun exploring some of these other options. For instance, I focus on the provision of bilateral and multilateral aid in response to refugee inflows. When examining multilateral aid, I have focused on the UN’s General Peacebuilding Fund. This institution is constructed in a manner that does not allow potential contributors to target their donations to particular situations or projects. While I expect that leaders will be less likely to contribute through such institutions when they desire to change the policies of the recipient state, the differences in contribution levels many not be as drastic in situations in which leaders have more ability to control how their monies are spent. For example, leaders may be willing to fund projects that deal with specific issues, such as refugees, even if they are unable to direct their monies to specific groups of stateless individuals, as such projects will help to reduce international conflict at large. Further research should be dedicated to untangling how institutional design influences where, when, and how leaders will participate in the protection of civilians in contexts other than post-conflict aid provision.

Throughout this dissertation, I examine the tradeoff a leader faces in choosing whether to act unilaterally or through the United Nations. Recently, the United Nations has begun coordinating its humanitarian efforts with regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As regional organizations continue to play a large role in establishing peace between their members and providing security to the people of their community, leaders will have to make a decision concerning how to allocate their resources between these various venues, as well as to their unilateral efforts (Balas 2011). I believe a very fruitful avenue of future research will be to focus on the complex web of substitutable policies facing a leader. Not only must she make
decisions about whether to contribute troops or aid, or whether to act multilaterally or unilaterally, she must decide which venue is best for accomplishing her goals.

My dissertation and these avenues for future research focus on why states participate in responding to humanitarian crises and war in other countries. I focus on the motivations of leaders in protecting foreign civilians abroad. I argue that a primary motivation leaders have for intervening in crises is to stop refugee flows into their countries. This non-humanitarian motive should have implications for the civilians targeted by these leaders’ support. The goal for these leaders is to stop the flows of refugees from entering their territory. In order to ensure they succeed at their mission, these leaders may order their soldiers to use any means necessary to stop flows of people and weapons from crossing their border. They may also simply ignore abuses by their own troops. If the troops policing the inflows feel it necessary to use high levels of force to achieve their objectives, some leaders may be unlikely to flinch at these techniques. I believe it is important to investigate the effect these motivations have on the human security provided to the peacekept while missions are underway (Fortna and Howard 2008).

Conclusion

With over 10.5 million refugees seeking shelter abroad (UNHCR 2011) and conflicts continuing to produce externalities for the international community, I urge scholars to continue examining the ways in which actors respond to these threats. One of the most important steps forward will revolve around the choices leaders have in substituting various foreign policies. As multilateral action continues to be important for the international community, issues of contribution and free riding will persist amongst states. Understating why some states are willing
to make costly contributions through these venues is significant to policymakers as they attempt to design successful projects. I encourage scholars to continue working on this area of research.
References


Blum, Andrew. 2000. “Blue Helmets from the South: Accounting for the Participation of Weaker


the Policekeeping Approach.” Global Governance 11(2): 139-146.


Jones, Daniel, Stuart Bremer and J. David Singer. 1996. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-


Paulson, Henry. 2007. Statement by Treasury Secretary Henry M., Jr, following meeting of G7 finance ministers and central bank governors, Washington DC, 13 April 2007, [www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm070413-paulsen.htm](http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fm070413-paulsen.htm)


Regan, Patrick. 2002. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate*


