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Monetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leaders

dc.contributor.authorClark, William R.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGolder, Sona N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPoast, Paulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-02T15:13:20Z
dc.date.available2014-10-06T19:17:43Zen_US
dc.date.issued2013-09en_US
dc.identifier.citationClark, William R. ; Golder, Sona N. ; Poast, Paul (2013). "Monetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leaders." International Studies Quarterly 57(3). <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100146>en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-8833en_US
dc.identifier.issn1468-2478en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100146
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.titleMonetary Institutions and the Political Survival of Democratic Leadersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumUniversity of Michiganen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherRutgers Universityen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherPennsylvania State Universityen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100146/1/isqu12013.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/isqu.12013en_US
dc.identifier.sourceInternational Studies Quarterlyen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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