Bargaining Theory Without Tears
dc.contributor.author | Binmore, Ken | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:20:02Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:20:02Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1989-12-01 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W90-10 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | C720 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | C780 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100625 | |
dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this article is two-fold. The primary aim is to provide a simple proof of a version of Rubinstein's bargaining theorem in a setting that is sufficiently general to cover the situations that typically arise in applications. In particular, the feasible set is not assumed to be convex and a reasonably general view is taken of the manner in which disagreement may arise. The secondary aim pursues some points made in Binmore/Rubinstein/Wolinsky. A detailed analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in a complicated non-cooperative bargaining model is unnecessary for most applications. Much heavy computation can be short-circuited by applying certain simple principles directly rather than deriving them anew each time they are required. The methodology is illustrated in section 8 for a model of decentralized price formation | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREST Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Bargaining Theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Rubinsein | en_US |
dc.subject | Sub-game Perfect Equilibria | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Noncooperative Games | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Bargaining Theory | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Matching Theory | en_US |
dc.title | Bargaining Theory Without Tears | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100625/1/ECON102.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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