View Item 

Show simple item record

On the Game Theoretic Foundations of Market Equilibrium with Assymetric Information
dc.contributor.authorBlume, Lawrence E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorEasley, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-14T23:20:09Z
dc.date.available2013-11-14T23:20:09Z
dc.date.issued1984en_US
dc.identifier.otherMichU DeptE CenREST RSQE D55en_US
dc.identifier.otherD830en_US
dc.identifier.otherD510en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100641
dc.description.abstractThe assumption that consumers and producers are "price takers" is crucial for the perfectly competitive model. This assumption has been justified in markets with many small, identically informed traders by studying the limit equilibria of large Cournot-Nash market games. In this paper we take a first step to an analysis of competitive behavior in markets with differentially informed traders.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipCenter for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michiganen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paperen_US
dc.subjectCournot-Nashen_US
dc.subjectMarket Gameen_US
dc.subjectLimit Economiesen_US
dc.subject.otherSearchen_US
dc.subject.otherLearningen_US
dc.subject.otherInformation and Knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.otherCommunicationen_US
dc.subject.otherBeliefen_US
dc.subject.otherExchange and Production Economiesen_US
dc.titleOn the Game Theoretic Foundations of Market Equilibrium with Assymetric Informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100641/1/ECON117.pdf
dc.owningcollnameEconomics, Department of - Working Papers Series


Files in this item

Name:
ECON117.pdf
Size:
1.562MB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.