Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent Seeking: Free Trade Under the Prospect of Protectionism
dc.contributor.author | Leidy, Michael P. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hoekman, Bernard M. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:21:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:21:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1991-02-25 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE ResSIE D273 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D720 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | F130 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100848 | |
dc.description.abstract | In the literature on directly unproductive profit seeking or rent seeking, intervention-seeking by labor and industry groups is generally restricted to direct lobbying activity. However, import-competing producters may have an additional instrument to influence the decision to grant protection. Under well-establishaed injury criteria for protection import-competing producers have an incentive, either collectively or individually, to feign injury. To the extent that the free-rider problem can be overcome, orchestrating the appearance of injury is an intervention-seeking activity that may be complementary to DUP lobbying. When the established indicators of industry well-being include variables controlled by the prospective beneficiaries, tehrefore, free trade under prospect of protection is potentially accompanied by a concomitant spurious-injury distortion. Some of the positive and welfare implications of the theory of spurious injury are investigated in both a partial equilibrium framework and in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Research Seminar in International Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Seminar Discussion Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Free Trade | en_US |
dc.subject | Competition | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Trade Policy | en_US |
dc.subject.other | International Trade Organizations | en_US |
dc.title | Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent Seeking: Free Trade Under the Prospect of Protectionism | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100848/1/ECON303.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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