Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Foreclosure, and Exclusive Dealing
dc.contributor.author | O'Brien, Daniel P. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Shaffer, Greg | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:21:50Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:21:50Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1994-11 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W94-15 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D420 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | L120 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | L140 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100893 | |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the incentives for market foreclosure when two upstream firms contract with a retail monopolist. We find that if nonlinear supply contracts are feasible, an exclusive dealing arrangement offers an upstream firm no advantage it would not have had without the arrangement. If a fully integratred (horizontally and vertically) firm would sell only one product, an upstream firm can foreclose its rival with a nonlinear supply contract and achieve the same profit it would receive if it required exclusive dealing. If a fully integrated firm would sell both products, the feasibility of nonlinear supply contracts renders it unprofitable to foreclose, with or without exclusive dealing. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Exclusive Dealing | en_US |
dc.subject | Nonlinear Pricing | en_US |
dc.subject | Market Foreclosure | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Monopolization Strategies | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Transactional Relationships | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Contracts and Reputation | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Networks | en_US |
dc.title | Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Foreclosure, and Exclusive Dealing | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100893/1/ECON344.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series
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