When is Inducing Self-Selection Sub-optimal for a Monopolist
dc.contributor.author | Salant, Stephen W. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:22:12Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:22:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1987-02-19 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W87-32 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D420 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | L120 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100937 | |
dc.description.abstract | Stokey (1979) showed in an intertemporal context that, under reasonable assumptions, price discrimination is never optimal if a monopolist can pre-commit to a price path. This note explores the implications of Stokey's result for the optimality of inducing self-selection in the static quantity and quality contexts of Spence (1980) and Mussa-Rosen (1978). It is shown that Stokey's result carries over to these other contexts under appropriate curvature assumptions. Moreover, even under traditional curvature assumptions, inducing self-selection may be suboptimal. Necessary and sufficient conditions for discrimination to be optimal are derived for the two-type case. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREST Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject | Price Discrimination | en_US |
dc.subject | Self-selection | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Monopoly | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Monopolization Strategies | en_US |
dc.title | When is Inducing Self-Selection Sub-optimal for a Monopolist | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100937/1/ECON384.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
Files in this item
-
Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series
Working papers from the Department of Economics
Remediation of Harmful Language
The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.
Accessibility
If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.