A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods when Agents are Well-Informed
dc.contributor.author | Varian, Hal R. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:22:37Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:22:37Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1990-01-17 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST W90-1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D620 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | H410 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | L510 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/101019 | |
dc.description.abstract | I consider economic environments involving externalities and public goods where agents have full information but the regulator does not. For these environments I present a class of simple two-stage games whose subgame perfect equilibria are efficient allocations. In the case of two-party externalities, the equilibria involve compensation for the party upon whom the externality is inflicted. In the case of public goods, the equilibria are Lindahl allocations. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | CREST Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Externalities | en_US |
dc.subject | Public Goods | en_US |
dc.subject | Sequential Games | en_US |
dc.subject | Lilndahl Allocations | en_US |
dc.subject | Subgame Perfect Equilibria | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Externalities | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Public Goods | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Economics of Regulation | en_US |
dc.title | A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods when Agents are Well-Informed | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101019/1/ECON458.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series
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