When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?
dc.contributor.author | Bergstrom, Theodore C. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-14T23:22:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-14T23:22:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1979-03 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | MichU DeptE CenREST RSQE C15 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D720 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | D710 | en_US |
dc.identifier.other | H410 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/101077 | |
dc.description.abstract | H.R. Bowen showed that majority voting leads to a Pareto sufficient supply of a single public good if all voters have equal tax shares and if marginal rates of substitution for the public good are symmetrically distributed in the voting population. In general, however, even if preferences are identical and tax shares equal, majority voting is not Pareto efficient if income is asymmetrically distributed. Here we formalize and generalize Bowen's theorem. In the process we propose a new idea of public goods allocation system, a "psuedo-Lindahl equilibrium." Though it is Pareto efficient for an interesting class of societies, the informational requirements for implementing pseuco-Lindahl equilibrium are considerably less stringent than those for a true Lindahl equilibrium. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics, Department of Economics, University of Michigan | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Paper | en_US |
dc.subject | Bowen | en_US |
dc.subject | H.R. | en_US |
dc.subject | Lindahl Equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | Public Goods Allocation | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Social Choice | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Clubs | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Committees | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Associations | en_US |
dc.subject.other | Public Goods | en_US |
dc.title | When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently? | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101077/1/ECON063.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series |
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Economics, Department of - Working Papers Series
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