Marriage Markets and Bargaining Between Spouses

Abstract

Proposing marriage, an eager suitor might promise a lifetime of devoted service to the whims f his beloved. But a sensible young woman, even if she hasn't studied game theory, is likely to be skeptical. She is more likely to base her expectations about marriage on what she knows of the way her mother and other married female acquaintances have fared, than on her suitor's flattering, but unenforceable promises. At the time of a marriage, property transfers could be arranged between the family of the bride and the family of the groom, but it is simply not possible to write a premarital contract that legally binds the new couple to detailed courses of action over the course of their marriage. Most of the important decisions that they make will have to be resolved as they arise, after marriage. A theory of courtship and mating that deals satisfactorily with each individual's prospects in a marriage, must include postmarital bargaining between spouses. Conversely, since a person's bargaining power within a marriage may depend on the threat of exercising the "outside options" of divorcing and reentering the marriage market, a satisfactory theory of bargaining within marriage must include a theory of courtship and mating.