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A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining

dc.contributor.authorMiller, David A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWatson, Joelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-12-04T18:56:50Z
dc.date.available2015-01-05T13:54:42Zen_US
dc.date.issued2013-11en_US
dc.identifier.citationMiller, David A.; Watson, Joel (2013). "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining." Econometrica 81(6).en_US
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682en_US
dc.identifier.issn1468-0262en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/101772
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.subject.otherSelf‐Enforcementen_US
dc.subject.otherEquilibrium Selectionen_US
dc.subject.otherBargainingen_US
dc.subject.otherRenegotiationen_US
dc.subject.otherDisagreementen_US
dc.subject.otherRepeated Gamesen_US
dc.subject.otherRelational Contractsen_US
dc.titleA Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargainingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness and Economicsen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDept. of Economics, University of Michigan, 611 Tappan St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109, U.S.A.; econdm@umich.eduen_US
dc.contributor.affiliationotherDept. of Economics, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093‐0508, U.S.A.; jwatson@ucsd.eduen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101772/1/ECTA10361.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ECTA10361en_US
dc.identifier.sourceEconometricaen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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