Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation
dc.contributor.author | Lasonen‐aarnio, Maria | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-12-04T18:57:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-01-05T13:54:43Z | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2013-12 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Lasonen‐aarnio, Maria (2013). "Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation." Noûs 47(4): 767-794. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0029-4624 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1468-0068 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/101801 | |
dc.description.abstract | What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evidential amplification . I focus on a popular and intuitive view of disagreement, the equal weight view. I take it to state that in cases of peer disagreement, a subject ought to end up equally confident that her own opinion is correct as that the opinion of her peer is. I say why we should regard the equal weight view as a synchronic constraint on (prior) credence functions. I then spell out a trilemma for the view: it violates what are intuitively correct updates (also leading to violations of conditionalisation), it poses implausible restrictions on prior credence functions, or it is non‐substantive. The sorts of reasons why the equal weight view fails apply to other views as well: there is no blanket answer to the question of how a subject should adjust her opinions in cases of peer disagreement. | en_US |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley Periodicals, Inc. | en_US |
dc.title | Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.rights.robots | IndexNoFollow | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Humanities | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101801/1/nous12050.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/nous.12050 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Noûs | en_US |
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dc.identifier.citedreference | Lasonen‐Aarnio, M. ( forthcoming ) “ Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat ”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research | en_US |
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dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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