Political harmonics: Issue framing and attitude expression.

Abstract

Mass communication about political issues often carries an implicit frame, or a particular orientation toward the issue. Frames define the central idea of an organized package of arguments and rhetorical devices that constitute a specific point-of-view on the issue. Examples of such frames include "the domino theory" with respect to foreign policy issues, or "reverse discrimination" with respect to affirmative action. In a communication context, frames suggest the criteria or considerations the receiver should bear in mind when forming or expressing an opinion on the issue. Their impact on the receiver is to evoke, activate, or prime certain fundamental beliefs, such as social values or group stereotypes, while the receiver is contemplating the issue. This thesis describes a series of experiments, conducted with representative national samples and with college student samples, in which alternative frames for social issues were presented to respondents, using rhetorical devices such as symbolic language and visual images. Respondents were asked to express their opinions on issues that had been framed in one way or another. The expression of an attitude is depicted as a social judgment process, in which constructs such as values and beliefs are retrieved from long-term memory and combined into a summary opinion. Framing is believed to intervene in this process by priming specific constructs, which carry greater weight in the eventual opinion. The results of the experiments indicate that alternative frames for the same issue primed different sets of values and beliefs. These values and beliefs became more important predictors of issue attitudes under one frame relative to the alternative frame. Of particular note were the effects of "evaluative" frames, or frames that make disparaging suggestions about specific social groups, on the relationship between group sentiments (stereotypes and prejudices) and social policy opinions. Frames of this sort primed group sentiments to a greater extent than alternative kinds of frames, such that these attitudes became a more important predictor of support for social policies. These results are discussed with respect to their implications for theories about mass communication and the psychology of attitudes.