Issues, actors and options: Advocacy in the U.S. Congress.

Abstract

Why do legislators vigorously push certain positions and proposals, but not others? In this dissertation, I develop a game theoretic view of advocacy in which one's efforts to advance an issue are a function of its utility, the utility of other objectives, the behavior of relevant actors, available resources, and opportunities for compromise. When deciding to push given issues, legislators must therefore assess the costs and benefits associated with those issues and the effect of such efforts on their ability to achieve other valued objectives. Behavioral hypotheses are derived and illustrated with actions of House Energy and Commerce Committee members on the Clean Air Act of 1990. My central conclusion is that legislators will push issue positions when they "have to": that is to say, when acceptable compromises are unavailable, and when such efforts are the most efficient use of their resources. While its substantive focus is on advocacy in the U.S. Congress, this dissertation suggests useful ways of thinking about purposive, goal-directed behavior, more generally.