The politics of policy implementation in post-Mao China: Central control and provincial autonomy under decentralization.

Abstract

In all territorial states, central and local governments are caught in a dilemma between general and particular interests. Such a dilemma is particularly manifest in policy implementation where tendencies toward central control and local autonomy come into conflict. While decentralization is very often suggested as a way out, its effects are largely indeterminate as a variety of content- and context-based factors intervene to dilute its intended outcomes. It is a primary purpose of this thesis to discern the actual effects of administrative decentralization on the norms and patterns of local policy implementation. For this purpose, the thesis suggests a theory of implementation under decentralization and provides a case study of provincial implementation of decollectivization in post-Mao China. Based on documentary survey and statistical analyses, the thesis traces the evolving pattern of provincial autonomy and provides case studies of three distinct patterns of implementation: pace-setting, bandwagoning, and delayed implementation. The thesis provides the following findings. First, while post-Mao decentralization expanded provincial autonomy, the norms of provincial discretion were volatile as it was fairly easy for the center to impose standardized implementation in the later stage of decollectivization. Second, the benefits of post-Mao decentralization were uneven in that some provinces were both willing and able to take advantage of the changes initiated while others held on to the norms of bandwagoning. Where structural conditions were extreme (either for or against decollectivization), provincial discretion was maximized in the form of innovation or resistance; and where conditions were moderate, provinces resorted to bandwagoning. Third, when the policy concerned is encompassing and administrative in nature (as compared to selective and allocative), its implementation is more likely to be a matter of compliance rather than bargaining as it is based on a stricter political rationale. In conclusion, decentralization does not automatically expand local autonomy, nor is central control necessarily weakened by it. Effects of decentralization are policy- and context-dependent and they should be empirically proven rather than taken for granted.