The adaptability of Leninist parties: A comparison of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

Abstract

The literature on complex organizations suggests that such organizations must adapt in order to survive, but that adaptation is a difficult and even risky process. During the 1980s, ruling communist parties demonstrated that they were incapable of adapting to changes in their domestic and international environments without collapsing. This rigidity and collapse was not inevitable, however. Another ruling party with Leninist characteristics, Taiwan's Kuomintang, demonstrated during these same years that Leninist parties are able to evolve toward democracy. Based on the theoretical literature and existing empirical data, a model of adaptation is proposed to indicate when adaptation is most likely to succeed. This model includes three components: changes among elite characteristics, the existence of a viable feedback mechanism for monitoring the party's performance, and the interplay of domestic and international environments. This model is used to evaluate the adaptability of two ruling Leninist parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In particular, changes in the principal tasks of the parties are explained by analyzing the demographic qualities of party elites, cadres, and rank and file members; the role of elections in the party's work; methods for enforcing party discipline; and the manner in which some environmental pressures have facilitated the willingness of party elites to undertake adaptive change, while others have been obstacles to adaptation. Despite the similarities in the organization of these parties and the political culture and traditions of governance that they share, the two parties have evolved along very different paths following the end of their civil war in 1949. In light of the model's prescriptions, it is unlikely that the CCP will be able to repeat the success of the KMT in moving away from its Leninist origins while remaining in power.