Power and legitimacy: Assessing the role of norms in crisis bargaining behavior.

Abstract

The central aim of this work is to test the proposition that normative standards of behavior can influence state actions in security related conflicts. Specifically, I examine the construction of bilateral norms as the settlements of security related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent interactions over the same issue. My argument is drawn from the literature on signaling in game theory and economics. Specifically, I contend that norms act as signals which give meaning to other states' behavior in at least two important ways. First, they demonstrate to each party in a crisis that a solution to their dispute exists which both sides prefer to an escalation of the conflict. Second, security norms define a set of acts which are considered illegitimate by both sides. I test this argument against three prominent alternative models of crisis bargaining behavior: (1) a traditional realist theory of coercion, (2) a psychological model based on attribution theory, and (3) a domestic politics approach. I test the hypotheses derived from these four competing frameworks in two contrasting and complementary ways. First, I use probit analysis to perform a quantitative test on the population of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. Second, I select four of these crises which I examine through a series of more comprehensive and detailed case studies. I find strong support for the hypothesis that states can and do construct normative standards which guide their behavior in international crises. This result is particularly notable because I conduct my analysis in the area where normative standards should be least likely to influence behavior: security affairs. Realist coercion theory, on the other hand, receives mixed support, while the evidence supporting attribution theory is weak at best. Finally, I do find support for the contention that domestic politics affects crisis bargaining and may influence the effectiveness of international norms.