Murky (re)solutions: Cognitive determinants of individual response to collective threat.

Abstract

No current theory comprehensively addresses the cognitive basis of responses to social problems, or collective threats. This thesis reviews disparate theories--rational decision-making, efficacy, and stress-maintenance (coping) theories--to develop a general model of response to collective threats. This entails identification of cognitive constructs which influence such responses, and development of a questionnaire (ANTARCTIC) on which to assess them. Subsequent experimental analyses examine the effects of changes in particular beliefs on these constructs. ANTARCTIC is designed to be readily applicable to a variety of collective threats. It assesses beliefs about how threatening a problem is and what can be done about it, and attitudes towards generic response orientations and specific policy responses to the problem. Reliability and validity analyses generally support ANTARCTIC's design. In two experiments, involving 128 student subjects, three relevant cognitions about water pollution are manipulated. Experiment 1 manipulates judgments of extensiveness and solvability of threat. It tests the rationalistic "expected utility" hypothesis that higher judged threat and solvability should contribute individually and jointly to political activation. Experiment 2 manipulates beliefs about solvability and others' motivation to participate in solutions. It tests the hypothesis that various efficacy-related beliefs should jointly contribute to activation. In Experiment 1, it proves easier to deactivate subjects than otherwise. Threat judgments increase political activation; solvability judgments do not. As hypothesized by Rogers's "protection motivation theory," either threat or efficacy beliefs suffice to prevent deactivation. In Experiment 2, neither efficacy belief affects activation. The results are interpreted as indicating that collective efficacy cannot be considered a simple analog to self-efficacy, and that distal information in a causal chain stretching from individual action to eventual solution may not influence individual behavior. Most predicted forms of defensive processing are not evident, but there is evidence of procrastination (deferring anticipated harm in time) and faith that available solutions will be implemented when necessary. Also, increasing threat judgments increases most efficacy beliefs, and vice-versa, although logically these concepts should be negatively related.