The politics of Soviet strategic defense: Political strategies, organizational politics, and Soviet strategic thought. (Volumes I and II).

Abstract

Explanations of Soviet military policy generally fall into one of two categories: unitary rational actor models and organizational or bureaucratic politics models. This dissertation formulates three different unitary rational actor models and an organizational model which can be used to explain Soviet policy in strategic defense from 1966-1980, then tests the models to determine which most successfully explains Soviet behavior. One weakness of the unitary rational actor models is that they cannot explain why there was disagreement between civilian and military leaders on fundamental issues of military doctrine. The only rational actor model which can explain the Soviet force posture for air defense relies on demonstrably false assumptions. A well-formulated organizational model can explain these facts, as well as some organizational pathologies shown by the Soviet National Air Defense Forces. The findings suggest that military services, even when ostensibly closely directed by civilian and military superiors, often manage to pursue their own interests rather than the requirements of higher policy. Soviet civilian leaders generally had limited control over the formulation of military doctrine or over the force posture of Soviet military services, but arms control (especially the ABM Treaty) offered a policy handle which helped them to affect doctrine and force posture to a substantial degree.