View Item 

Show simple item record

First‐price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy‐it‐now prices with Allais paradox bidders
dc.contributor.authorNakajima, Daisukeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-12-09T16:53:47Z
dc.date.available2014-12-09T16:53:47Z
dc.date.issued2011-09en_US
dc.identifier.citationNakajima, Daisuke (2011). "First‐price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy‐it‐now prices with Allais paradox bidders." Theoretical Economics 6(3).en_US
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837en_US
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/109604
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltden_US
dc.subject.otherBuy‐It‐Now‐Pricesen_US
dc.subject.otherD44en_US
dc.subject.otherD81en_US
dc.subject.otherAllais Paradoxen_US
dc.subject.otherDutch Auctions (Descending Auctions)en_US
dc.titleFirst‐price auctions, Dutch auctions, and buy‐it‐now prices with Allais paradox biddersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumDepartment of Economics, University of Michigan; ndaisuke@umich.eduen_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109604/1/TE502.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE502en_US
dc.identifier.sourceTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMaskin, Eric S. and John G. Riley ( 1984 ), “ Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers. Econometrica, 52, 1473 – 1518. DOI: 10.2307/1913516en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCoppinger, Vicki M., Vernon L. Smith, and Jon A. Titus ( 1980 ), “ Incentives and behavior in English, Dutch and sealed‐bid auctions. Economic Inquiry, 18, 1 – 22. DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1980.tb00556.xen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCox, James C., Bruce Robertson, and Vernon L. Smith ( 1982 ), “ Theory and behavior of single object auctions.” In Research in Experimental Economics ( Vernon L. Smith, ed.), 1 – 43, JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceEliaz, Kfir, Debraj Ray, and Ronny Razin ( 2006 ), “ Choice shifts in groups: A decision‐theoretic basis. American Economic Review, 96, 1321 – 1332. DOI: 10.1257/aer.96.4.1321en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGoldman, Steven M. ( 1979 ), “ Intertemporally inconsistent preferences and the rate of consumption. Econometrica, 47, 621 – 626. DOI: 10.2307/1910409en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKahneman, D. and A. Tversky ( 1979 ), “ Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263 – 291. DOI: 10.2307/1914185en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKarni, Edi ( 1988 ), “ On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions. Theory and Decision, 25, 211 – 217. DOI: 10.1007/BF00133162en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKarni, Edi and Safra Zvi ( 1986 ), “ Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank‐dependent probabilities. Economic Letters, 20, 15 – 18. DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKarni, Edi and Safra Zvi ( 1989 a), “ Ascending‐bid auctions with behaviorally consistent bidders. Annals of Operations Research, 19, 435 – 446. DOI: 10.1007/BF02283533en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKarni, Edi and Safra Zvi ( 1989 b), “ Dynamic consistency, revelations in auctions and the structure of preferences. Review of Economic Studies, 56, 421 – 433. DOI: 10.2307/2297556en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKatok, Elena and Anthony M. Kwasnica ( 2008 ), “ Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions. Experimental Economics, 11, 344 – 357. DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9169-xen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLaibson, David ( 1997 ), “ Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 443 – 477. DOI: 10.1162/003355397555253en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLucking‐Reiley, David ( 1999 ), “ Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet. American Economic Review, 89, 1063 – 1080. DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1063en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMacCrimmon, Keith R. and Stig Larsson ( 1979 ), “ Utility theory: Axioms versus paradoxes.” In Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox ( Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen, eds.), 333 – 409, Riedel, Dordrecht.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMyerson, Roger B. ( 1981 ), “ Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 58 – 73. DOI: 10.1287/moor.6.1.58en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceNakajima, Daisuke ( 2005 ), “ Systematic biases for optimal reserve prices, secret reserve prices in first‐price and Dutch auctions with the Allais paradox bidders.” Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Michigan.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceO'Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin ( 1999 ), “ Doing it now or later. American Economic Review, 89, 103 – 124. DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.1.103en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRiley, John G. and William F. Samuelson ( 1981 ), “ Optimal auctions. American Economic Review, 71, 381 – 392.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceStrotz, Robert H. ( 1955 –1956), “ Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. Review of Economic Studies, 23, 165 – 180. DOI: 10.2307/2295722en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWeber, Robert J. ( 1982 ), “ The Allais paradox, Dutch auctions, and alpha‐utility theory.” Discussion Paper 536, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAllais, Maurice ( 1953 ), “ Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école Américaine. Econometrica, 21, 503 – 546. DOI: 10.2307/1907921en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAthey, Susan ( 2001 ), “ Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information. Econometrica, 69, 861 – 889. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00223en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBose, Subir and Arup Daripa ( 2009 ), “ A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity. Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 2084 – 2114. DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.02.003en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCarare, Octavian and Michael Rothkopf ( 2005 ), “ Slow Dutch auctions. Management Science, 51, 365 – 373. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0328en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceChew, H. and N. Nishimura ( 2003 ), “ Revenue non‐equivalence between the English and the second‐price auctions: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, 443 – 458. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00004-0en_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


Files in this item

Name:
TE502.pdf
Size:
266.2KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.