Formula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contracts
dc.contributor.author | Blair, Roger D. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Lafontaine, Francine | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-01-07T15:23:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-03-02T19:36:56Z | en |
dc.date.issued | 2015-01 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Blair, Roger D.; Lafontaine, Francine (2015). "Formula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contracts ." Managerial and Decision Economics 36(1): 33-43. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0143-6570 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1099-1468 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/109908 | |
dc.publisher | Cambridge U. Press | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley Periodicals, Inc. | en_US |
dc.title | Formula Pricing and Profit Sharing in Inter‐Firm Contracts | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.rights.robots | IndexNoFollow | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Management | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business and Economics | en_US |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/109908/1/mde2704.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/mde.2704 | en_US |
dc.identifier.source | Managerial and Decision Economics | en_US |
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dc.owningcollname | Interdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed |
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