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Practice Patterns among Entrants and Incumbents in the Home Health Market after the Prospective Payment System was Implemented

dc.contributor.authorKim, Hyunjeeen_US
dc.contributor.authorNorton, Edward C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-02T15:12:28Z
dc.date.available2016-05-10T20:26:28Zen
dc.date.issued2015-03en_US
dc.identifier.citationKim, Hyunjee; Norton, Edward C. (2015). "Practice Patterns among Entrants and Incumbents in the Home Health Market after the Prospective Payment System was Implemented." Health Economics 24: 118-131.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1057-9230en_US
dc.identifier.issn1099-1050en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/110854
dc.description.abstractHome health care expenditures were the fastest growing part of Medicare from 2001–2009, despite the implementation of prospective payment. Prior research has shown that home health agencies adopted two specific strategies to take advantage of Medicare policies: provide at least 10 therapy visits to get an enormous marginal payment and recertify patients for additional episodes. We study whether there is heterogeneity in the adoption of those strategic behaviors between home health agency entrants and incumbents and find that entrants were more likely to adopt strategic practice patterns than were incumbents. We also find that for‐profit incumbents mimicked one of the practice patterns following entrants in the same market. Our findings suggest that it is important to understand the heterogeneity in providers' behavior and how firms interact with each other in the same market. These findings help explain the rapid rise in expenditures in the home health care market. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.en_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.subject.otherlong‐term careen_US
dc.subject.otherhome health careen_US
dc.subject.otherentry strategyen_US
dc.titlePractice Patterns among Entrants and Incumbents in the Home Health Market after the Prospective Payment System was Implementeden_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelStatistics and Numeric Dataen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPublic Healthen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelMedicine (General)en_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelScienceen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciencesen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness and Economicsen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelHealth Sciencesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/110854/1/hec3147-sup-0001-SI_appendix.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/110854/2/hec3147.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/hec.3147en_US
dc.identifier.sourceHealth Economicsen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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