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Information Flow Analysis and the Theory of the Firm
dc.contributor.authorClyde, Paulen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-01T19:30:30Z
dc.date.available2016-10-10T14:50:23Zen
dc.date.issued2015-09en_US
dc.identifier.citationClyde, Paul (2015). "Information Flow Analysis and the Theory of the Firm." Managerial and Decision Economics 36(6): 384-400.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0143-6570en_US
dc.identifier.issn1099-1468en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/113133
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.titleInformation Flow Analysis and the Theory of the Firmen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelManagementen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness and Economicsen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/113133/1/mde2676.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/mde.2676en_US
dc.identifier.sourceManagerial and Decision Economicsen_US
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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