View Item 

Show simple item record

Credal Dilemmas
dc.contributor.authorMoss, Sarahen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-12T21:03:34Z
dc.date.available2017-02-01T18:21:45Zen
dc.date.issued2015-12en_US
dc.identifier.citationMoss, Sarah (2015). "Credal Dilemmas." Noûs 49(4): 665-683.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0029-4624en_US
dc.identifier.issn1468-0068en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/115897
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.en_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.titleCredal Dilemmasen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollowen_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPhilosophyen_US
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelHumanitiesen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Revieweden_US
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115897/1/nous12073.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/nous.12073en_US
dc.identifier.sourceNoûsen_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRaz, Joseph. ( 1986 ). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press, New York.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMoss, Sarah. ( 2013 ). “ Time Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy.” Ms., Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan. Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 5. Oxford University Press, Oxford.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceNagel, Thomas. ( 1987 ). “ The Fragmentation of Value.” In Gowans (1987), 174 – 87.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRailton, Peter. ( 1996 ). “ The Diversity of Moral Dilemma.” In Mason (1996), 140 – 66.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHare, Caspar. ( 2010 ). “ Take the Sugar.” Analysis, vol. 70 ( 2 ): 237 – 47.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRaz, Joseph. ( 1997 ). “ Incommensurability and Agency.” In Chang (1997a), 110 – 28.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSartre, Jean‐Paul. ( 1946 ). “ The Humanism of Existentialism.” In Jean‐Paul Sartre: Essays in Existentialism, Wade Baskin, editor, 31 – 62. Carol Publishing Group, New York.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSturgeon, Scott. ( 2009 ). “ Belief, Reason, and Logic.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, vol. 84 ( 64 ): 89 – 100.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSturgeon, Scott. ( 2010 ). “ Confidence and Coarse‐Grained Attitudes.” In Gendler & Hawthorne (2010), 126 – 49.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceTeller, Paul. ( 1976 ). “ Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference.” In Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, W. Harper & C.A. Hooker, editors, 205 – 53. D. Reidel, Dordrecht.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWalley, Peter. ( 1991 ). Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chapman and Hall, London.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWeatherson, Brian. ( 2008 ). “ Decision Making with Imprecise Probabilities.” Ms., Dept. of Philosophy, University of Michigan.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWhite, Roger. ( 2010 ). “ Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.” In Gendler & Hawthorne (2010), 161 – 86.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWilliams, Bernard. ( 1965 ). “ Ethical Consistency.” In Gowans (1987), 115–37. Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 39, 103 – 24.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWilliams, J. Robert G. ( 2014 ). “ Decision Making Under Indeterminacy.” Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 14 ( 4 ): 1 – 34.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBlackburn, Simon. ( 1996 ). “ Dilemmas: Dithering, Plumping, and Grief.” In Mason (1996), 127 – 39.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBratman, Michael. ( 2000 ). “ Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency.” Philosophical Review, vol. 109 ( 1 ): 35 – 61.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBratman, Michael. ( 2006 ). “ Thinking How to Live and the Restriction Problem.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 72 ( 3 ): 707 – 13.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBriggs, Rachael. ( 2009 ). “ Distorted Reflection.” Philosophical Review, vol. 118 ( 1 ): 59 – 85.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBroome, John. ( 1999 ). Ethics out of Economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBroome, John. ( 2001 ). “ Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope With Incommensurable Values? ” In Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, Christopher Morris & Arthur Ripstein, editors, 98 – 120. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceChang, Ruth, editor. ( 1997a ). Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceChang, Ruth. ( 1997b ). “ Introduction.” In Chang (1997a), 1 – 34.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceChristensen, David. ( 1991 ). “ Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.” Philosophical Review, vol. 100 ( 2 ): 229 – 47.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDorr, Cian. ( 2010 ). “ The Eternal Coin: A Puzzle About Self‐Locating Conditional Credence.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 24 ( 1 ): 189 – 205.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceElga, Adam. ( 2010 ). “ Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp.” Philosophers’ Imprint, vol. 10 ( 5 ): 1 – 11.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFoot, Philippa. ( 1983 ). “ Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 80 ( 7 ): 379 – 98.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferencevan Fraassen, Bas. ( 1984 ). “ Belief and the Will.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 81 ( 5 ): 235 – 56.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferencevan Fraassen, Bas. ( 1990 ). “ Figures in a Probability Landscape.” In Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, J.M. Dunn & A. Gupta, editors, 345 – 56. Kluwer, Dordrecht.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGauthier, David. ( 1997 ). “ Resolute Choice and Rational Deliberation: A Critique and a Defense.” Noûs, vol. 31 ( 1 ): 1 – 25.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGendler, Tamar Szabó & John Hawthorne, editors. ( 2010 ). Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGowans, Christopher, editor. ( 1987 ). Moral Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, New York.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHájek, Alan. ( 2008 ). “ Dutch Book Arguments.” In The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe, editors, 173 – 95. Oxford University Press, Oxford.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHedden, Brian. ( 2013a ). “ Options and Diachronic Tragedy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Article published online first. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12048.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHedden, Brian. ( 2013b ). “ Time‐Slice Rationality.” Ms., Dept. of Philosophy, Oxford University. Forthcoming in Mind.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHolton, Richard. ( 1999 ). “ Intention and Weakness of Will.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96 ( 5 ): 241 – 62.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHolton, Richard. ( 2004 ). “ Rational Resolve.” Philosophical Review, vol. 113 ( 4 ): 507 – 35.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHsieh, Nien‐hê. ( 2007 ). “ Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone? ” Economics and Philosophy, vol. 23 ( 1 ): 65 – 80.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJeffrey, Richard C. ( 1983 ). “ Bayesianism With a Human Face.” In Testing Scientific Theories, John Earman, editor, 133 – 56. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJoyce, James. ( 2005 ). “ How Probabilities Reflect Evidence.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 19 ( 1 ): 153 – 78.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJoyce, James. ( 2010 ). “ A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 24 ( 1 ): 281 – 323.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKaplan, Mark. ( 1996 ). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLevi, Isaac. ( 1974 ). “ On Indeterminate Probabilities.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 71 ( 13 ): 391 – 418.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLevi, Isaac. ( 1985 ). “ Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment.” Philosophy of Science, vol. 52 ( 3 ): 390 – 409.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMason, H. E., editor. ( 1996 ). Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. Oxford University Press, New York.en_US
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMcClennen, Edward. ( 1990 ). Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.en_US
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


Files in this item

Name:
nous12073.pdf
Size:
160.0KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.