Co-optation & Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s Single-Party Dictatorship

Show simple item record Ang, Yuen Yuen 2016-01-10T00:34:18Z 2016-01-10T00:34:18Z 2016-01-07
dc.description.abstract What explains the persistent growth of public employment in reform-era China despite repeated and forceful downsizing campaigns? Why do some provinces retain more public employees and experience higher rates of bureaucratic expansion than others? Among electoral regimes, the creation and distribution of public jobs is typically attributed to the politics of vote buying and multi-party competition. Electoral factors, however, cannot explain the patterns observed in China’s single-party dictatorship. This study highlights two nested factors that influence public employment in China: party co-optation and personal clientelism. As a collective body, the ruling party seeks to co-opt restive ethnic minorities by expanding cadre recruitment in hinterland provinces. Within the party, individual elites seek to expand their own networks of power by appointing clients to office. The central government’s professed objective of streamlining bureaucracy is in conflict with the party’s co-optation goal and individual elites’ clientelist interest. As a result, the size of public employment has inflated during the reform period despite top-down mandates to downsize bureaucracy. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.subject co-optation; clientelism; dictatorships; authoritarianism; redistribution; public employment; China en_US
dc.title Co-optation & Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s Single-Party Dictatorship en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel Political Science
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel Social Sciences
dc.description.peerreviewed Peer Reviewed en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationum Department of Political Science en_US
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus Ann Arbor en_US
dc.description.bitstreamurl, Cooptation & Clientelism, posted 2016-01.pdf
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s12116-015-9208-0
dc.identifier.source Studies in Comparative and International Development, 2016, Online First, 1-22, DOI 10.1007/s12116-015-9208-0 en_US
dc.description.filedescription Description of Ang, Cooptation & Clientelism, posted 2016-01.pdf : First Online
dc.owningcollname Political Science
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