Co-optation & Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s Single-Party Dictatorship
dc.contributor.author | Ang, Yuen Yuen | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-10T00:34:18Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-01-10T00:34:18Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-01-07 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/116599 | |
dc.description.abstract | What explains the persistent growth of public employment in reform-era China despite repeated and forceful downsizing campaigns? Why do some provinces retain more public employees and experience higher rates of bureaucratic expansion than others? Among electoral regimes, the creation and distribution of public jobs is typically attributed to the politics of vote buying and multi-party competition. Electoral factors, however, cannot explain the patterns observed in China’s single-party dictatorship. This study highlights two nested factors that influence public employment in China: party co-optation and personal clientelism. As a collective body, the ruling party seeks to co-opt restive ethnic minorities by expanding cadre recruitment in hinterland provinces. Within the party, individual elites seek to expand their own networks of power by appointing clients to office. The central government’s professed objective of streamlining bureaucracy is in conflict with the party’s co-optation goal and individual elites’ clientelist interest. As a result, the size of public employment has inflated during the reform period despite top-down mandates to downsize bureaucracy. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.subject | co-optation; clientelism; dictatorships; authoritarianism; redistribution; public employment; China | en_US |
dc.title | Co-optation & Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s Single-Party Dictatorship | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Political Science | |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Social Sciences | |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer Reviewed | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Department of Political Science | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus | Ann Arbor | en_US |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/116599/1/Ang, Cooptation & Clientelism, posted 2016-01.pdf | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s12116-015-9208-0 | |
dc.identifier.source | Studies in Comparative and International Development, 2016, Online First, 1-22, DOI 10.1007/s12116-015-9208-0 | en_US |
dc.description.filedescription | Description of Ang, Cooptation & Clientelism, posted 2016-01.pdf : First Online | |
dc.owningcollname | Political Science |
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