Ending Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation
dc.contributor.author | Avci, Sureyya Burcu | |
dc.contributor.author | Schipani, Cindy A. | |
dc.contributor.author | Seyhun, H. Nejat | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-03-01T19:35:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-03-01T19:35:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-02 | |
dc.identifier | 1305 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Corporation Law Forthcoming | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/117413 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to this day. Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring- loading. Overall, we find that as a result of these manipulative devices executives are able to increase their compensation by about 6%. We suggest a simple new rule to end all dating games in executive compensation. We propose that all grants of stock options in executive compensation be awarded on a daily pro-rata basis and priced accordingly. This proposal would leave no incentive to game option grant dates or manipulate information flow. | en_US |
dc.subject | incentive compensation | en_US |
dc.subject | stock options | en_US |
dc.subject | backdating | en_US |
dc.subject | securities regulation | en_US |
dc.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
dc.subject.classification | Finance | en_US |
dc.subject.classification | Law, History, Communication | en_US |
dc.title | Ending Executive Manipulations of Incentive Compensation | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Economics | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Finance | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevel | Management | en_US |
dc.subject.hlbtoplevel | Business | |
dc.contributor.affiliationum | Ross School of Business | en_US |
dc.contributor.affiliationumcampus | Ann Arbor | |
dc.description.bitstreamurl | http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/117413/1/1305_Schipani.pdf | |
dc.owningcollname | Business, Stephen M. Ross School of - Working Papers Series |
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