Out of sight, out of mind: Legislative perceptions and congressional representation.

Abstract

Scholars of representative democracy have long struggled with basic questions related to representation: What do we mean by representation? How do we evaluate the quality or success of representation? These questions have been pursued with particular intensity by scholars who examine how members of Congress represent the constituents in their state or district. Central to the congressional literature are issues such as how members know the preferences of their constituents, and whether those preferences influence congressional decision-making. While scholars have explored these questions for half a century, we still do not have a consensus on the answers to these questions, or even how to proceed in addressing them. This research focuses on an aspect of congressional representation that has received far too little attention---legislators' perceptions of their constituents. I put forward a theory of legislative perception that addresses the central question of who is represented. My arguments are grounded in contemporary work in the field of cognitive psychology, which helps to shed new light on the representation puzzle. Information that is more easily accessible in individual legislators' memory is likely to shape who they see when the look at the district. This research examines both the mechanisms of legislative perception and the implications for congressional representation. Perceptions of constituency are issue-specific, and this research focuses on health and natural resources policy. I examine perceptions by conducting face-to-face interviews with professional staff to members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The interviews include structured survey instruments and are combined with a dataset consisting of economic, political, and demographic variables, which allow for the evaluation of alternative hypotheses from the political science and cognitive psychology literatures. I find that constituents who are organized and active, contacting the legislator more frequently and making larger financial contributions, are more likely to be seen than either the median voter or a representative sample of the district. These findings identify a cognitive basis for inequality in the everyday practice of representation on Capitol Hill. Legislators and their staff have a distorted view of their district that favors well-organized and well-financed constituents.