Winning elections or representing interests? The multi-faceted strategies of the French Greens, 1997--2002.

Abstract

This study proposes and tests a theoretical framework for understanding New Party behavior in Western Europe. I address four important questions: (1) what are the objectives of new parties in Western Europe? (2) how do they reach these objectives? (3) what factors determine the behavior of new parties? and (4) how do the goals of these party elites and voters differ from those of their older, more established competitors? I develop a general model of new party behavior which I apply to the French Green Party---<italic> Les Verts</italic>---by analyzing the strategies of the party's elites and voters from 1997 to 2002. The model focuses on the interaction between party strategy and voter behavior and the institutional context within which the party is operating. This research contributes to the literature in three main areas: (1) political parties generally and New Left parties more specifically; (2) voters' motivations and (3) the influence of institutions. I open the black box of political parties to gain a more complete understanding of the multi-faceted behavior of the different actors which comprise the party. I find that the preferences of party elites and voters are not necessarily the same and that their behavior varies across electoral environments. The theoretical framework I develop can be used to answer fundamental questions about new party strategy and goals and the influence of political context and electoral institutions on the behavior of party elites and voters across Europe. The project has two key components. First, I identify the conditions under which the Green Party chooses a goal of winning elections over representing interests in both national and local elections. Unlike much previous research on new party behavior, I analyze the party's strategy under varying institutional environments. As the electoral rules vary across levels of government in France, I can test the influence of electoral institutions on behavior. I demonstrate that the party acts differently in different elections. Second, I identify the factors that influence Green voters' decisions to vote for their most preferred candidate in legislative elections. I show that individuals' vote choice combines both expressive and instrumental reasoning.