Negotiating federalism: Governors and the politics of state -federal relations.

Abstract

This dissertation argues that to understand gubernatorial behavior in the intergovernmental arena it is necessary to account for the interaction between their particular placement in the American federal structure and the specific political and economic contexts governors face within their own states. By theorizing specifically about gubernatorial behavior in the intergovernmental arena---both with respect to gubernatorial goals and to how those goals can be pursued given the institutional structure governors are located within---this project improves upon the dominant theoretical models which undergird many works on federalism and intergovernmental politics. Rather than governors as single-minded defenders of the principle of federalism---a protected or expanded zone of state discretion---or as seekers of a perfectly rational federal system, the model that emerges from my work is one of pragmatic political actors using the strategic opportunities that federalism creates in order to pursue their multiple goals in intergovernmental politics. Using personal interviews with gubernatorial intergovernmental staff; gubernatorial speeches; data on gubernatorial testimony before Congress; data on gubernatorial activism in the National Governors' Association; and case studies of the governors of Indiana, Michigan, Oregon and South Carolina I develop a model of gubernatorial interests in state-federal relations. This model emphasizes three sets of interests motivating gubernatorial activity in state-federal relations: the interests of the state, the interests of the governor as state-level institution, and the interests of the governor as an ambitious political actor. I then apply this model in two ways. First, I present a quantitative model of gubernatorial participation in intergovernmental activity. Second, I present a qualitative case study of gubernatorial efforts within two episodes of national welfare reform---Reagan's 1982 New Federalism proposal and the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. In the end, while I argue that one set of interests motivates much gubernatorial behavior in the intergovernmental arena---the interests of the state relative to the national government---gubernatorial pursuit of those interests is conditioned by each governor's position within the state institutional environment and by each governor's political ambitions. Moreover, efforts on behalf of each of these interests can lead to gubernatorial efforts to either expand or contract the zone of discretion that state governments have contrary to both the federalism as principle and rational federalism expectations.