On The Subjectivity Of Values.

Abstract

Emotivism thinks of the subjectivity of values on the model of the subjectivity of feelings. Existentialism thinks of the subjectivity of values on the model of choices. Nihilism, I argue, thinks of the subjectivity of values on the model of systematically false judgments. But I argue that these contemporary subjectivist theories of value misconceive the subjectivity of values. The nihilistic conception implicitly depends upon the very transcendental-objectivist outlook which nihilism explicitly denies. The existential conception cannot account for the rootedness of values within our selves. And emotivism denies, or at least fails to explain, the openness of values to critical thinking. I argue for a different, and in some ways new, conception of the subjectivity of values. Some desires are deeply interconnected with other desires and with beliefs and various modes of understanding. I propose to identify values with desires interconnected in this way. Crucially, the interconnectedness of these desires can explain both the rootedness of values and the openness of values to critical thinking: these desires are embedded in the organization of our selves, but are also open to challenge and change when the other desires, beliefs, and understandings with which they are connected are challenged or changed. I argue that this view of values can undergrid even radical social criticism, and that it is consistent with and in fact presupposed by ethical freedom. Finally, it suggests an analysis-procedure for approaching practical value-issues, and places moral values in an important, but probably not preeminent, position.