Kantian consequentialism: Utilitarianism and autonomy.

Abstract

Kantian Normative theories abound, but most share a rejection of consequentialist normative principles and an emphasis on the importance of autonomy. According to many Kantians, consequentialism is inadequate for two related reasons. First, since consequentialist principles may require unacceptable sacrifices of some for the benefit of others, consequentialist principles do not adequately respect the autonomy of persons. Second, since any consequentialist normative principle is based on the value of consequences rather than respect for autonomy, consequentialism provides a misguided view of the basis of normative principles. In response to these objections to consequentialism, I argue that respect for autonomy does not generate moral demands which are inconsistent with those of a consequentialist normative theory. Any normative theory, grounded on an adequate notion of autonomy, will require the same kinds of sacrifices that allegedly undermine consequentialism. There are, of course, many possible autonomy-based normative theories. I focus on three important Kantian approaches and defend the following conclusions: (i) Kant's arguments for the universalizability formula of the categorical imperative do not rule out consequentialist normative principles. (ii) No priority of negative duties over positive duties follows from Kant's normative theory. More specifically, Kant's normative theory does not provide a rationale for Nozick's side constraints, Dworkin's trumps, or Nagel's agent-centered restrictions. (iii) Rawls's argument for the priority of liberty over welfare does not provide a plausible autonomy-based alternative to consequentialist arguments for the priority of liberty. In short, I argue that the demand to respect autonomy does not generate the desired rights-based theory. Indeed, I maintain that the contrast between Kant's normative theory and consequentialism is ill founded. These are the critical or negative conclusions of the dissertation. On the positive side, (i) I draw on the work of Rousseau and Harry Frankfurt and argue that autonomy involves the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to act on regulative higher-order desires and (ii) I present a consequentialist account of the importance of respect for autonomy. The resulting theory is, I hope, an interesting synthesis of traditionally Kantian concerns and consequentialist normative theory.