Emotion and ethical theory in Mencius.

Abstract

Early Confucian thought is still not completely understood. This is particularly so, I argue, in the case of Mencius (or Meng Zi XX, ca. 372-289 BCE), who was the first prominent follower of Confucius. I present a new reading of this early figure. The key problem in traditional analyses is in attributing to Mencius the view that a person's motivational capacities, especially her emotions, require cultivation in order for her to act and feel correctly. That reading, combined with certain important passages of the text, make it seem that Mencius is quite simply confused. For he seems in those passages to exhort people to do and feel what is right even though it is clear that they lack the kind of cultivation Mencius's view supposedly requires. What is more, he quite obviously expects such people to be able immediately to do and feel what is right. Once we leave the cultivation reading behind, I argue, pieces of Mencius's fall into place and a more or less systematic ethical theory begins to form. Far from being confused, I argue, Mencius combines a psychologically realistic account of the morally virtuous person, i.e. one which recognizes human limitations with respect to our emotional lives, with a plausible account of the control that we have and the responsibility that we bear for how we feel or don't feel toward one another.