Mobilization and electoral success: Ideological parties in Jordan, 1989-1993.

Abstract

In states undergoing a transition to democracy, the success of ideological political parties can vary significantly from one election to the next. Examining Jordan, this dissertation offers a partial explanation---institutionally defined mobilization---for differences in electoral success achieved by ideological parties in successive elections by examining the strategies these parties use to solicit popular support. I argue that changes in the opportunities available to ideological parties to pursue party-based mobilization result in the differences in electoral outcomes. The degree to which parties have the ability to mobilize, however, is influenced by political institutions, particularly electoral rules. In response to changes in political institutions, parties alter their strategy for soliciting electoral support by either expanding their mobilization efforts or using the less successful strategy of social networking more frequently. Among the most important ideological parties in the Middle East ate Islamist parties whose success is said to depend on social networking rather than on mobilization. In Jordan, the main Islamist party was the Muslim Brotherhood, (which later evolved into the Islamic Action Front). The significant differences in the electoral results experienced by the Islamists from 1989 to 1993 allowed me to test whether changes in institutional rules effected the opportunities for party-based mobilization. Additionally, I tested whether the changes in opportunities for mobilization motivated ideological parties to use the less successful strategy of social networking that subsequently led to the electoral decline of the Islamists in the second elections. I also tested whether the degree of repression and the changes in economic conditions could account for the differences in electoral outcomes. The analyses revealed that even after accounting for repression, the effects of political institutions on the opportunities for mobilization are significant. Additionally, in Jordan, economic conditions had actually worsened rather than improved. Worsening economic conditions ought to have favored the Islamists in the second elections but did not. The dissertation concludes by briefly examining whether institutional rules have had a similar effect on the opportunities for mobilization in Turkey in the post-1983 period. Preliminary results indicate that similar institutions have been used in Turkey to shape the scope of mobilization in order to influence electoral outcomes. The importance of examining the linkages between mobilization and electoral outcomes and between institutional rules and mobilization is particularly crucial in democratizing countries where the trends in the first few elections foreshadow the future of competitive party systems.