Chiefdoms and the economics of perversity.

Abstract

Based on a combination of ethnographic observation and theoretical argument a distinction is drawn between redistribution as defined by Elman Service and redistributive buffering---the allocation of resources or rights to resources from the chiefly center to households or local groups in time of need. Criticisms of redistribution arise from either the absence of local economic specialization (a criticism specific to the restricted form of redistribution defined by Service) or a theoretical reluctance to accept adaptationist or collectivist arguments premised on structural-functionalist interpretations of the role of chiefship. Counter to critiques of adaptationist arguments, it is shown that redistributive buffering is in the active economic self-interest of the chief, and is a common and significant mechanism in chiefdoms. The increasing emphasis on top-down, individualistic approaches has also masked the dynamic relationship in chiefdoms between household and political economies. Chayanovian models of household decision-making indicate that households will set production targets based on the balance between the marginal value of each additional unit produced and the increasing drudgery required for its production. Within systems employing redistributive buffering, however, this introduces instability as the political economy depends on increased marginal production to support the elite and provide the surplus necessary for buffering in time of want. But the success of such a system may lead to a changing balance point as each household sets its production targets, so that the natural tendency is for the size of the marginal surpluses available to the elite to shrink. The rise of Coles Creek hierarchies in the Lower Mississippi Valley is examined using these theoretical perspectives. Coles Creek has long contradicted most constructs for the rise of chiefdoms, as prestige goods are absent. Mortuary evidence indicates the rise of hierarchies and differential access to high-investment mortuary facilities, and changing patterns of resource utilization are examined. These patterns can be partially understood in terms of the differing responses of households to degrees of risk and uncertainty within a Chayanovian framework. Settlement data during these periods conform to the expected pattern for the rise of sociopolitical hierarchies and the apparent simultaneous rise of redistributive buffering.