Emerging Operational Contracts in Competitive Markets.

Abstract

This dissertation consists of three essays, each dealing with an emerging type of operational contracts. The first essay considers a resource exchange model where the effects of collaboration and competition are intertwined. Exchanging resources often improves utilization and is intended to increase profitability of involved firms. However, it does not guarantee success in competitive settings. More efficient use of resources might actually leads to increased competition. We explore how resource exchange contracts impact the firms and consumers. The results indicate that the resource exchange tends to benefit both firms and the consumers in most situations, except for the extreme situations where simultaneously competition is strong and the purchasing cost is either very low or very high.

The second essay focuses on vertical pricing control contracts that manufacturers use to coordinate online and offline retailers. Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) policy requires all retailers to sell at the price suggested by manufacturers. Minimum Advertised Price (MAP) policy is less strict, as it allows retailers to sell at lower prices than the manufacturer suggested, as long as these lower prices are not advertised. This essay studies which of these two policies is more beneficial to each member of the supply chain. We show that manufacturers prefer MAP policy when the customers' valuations vary significantly and the information search requires significant effort. The MAP policy is also favorable to retailers and consumers under similar market conditions.

The third essay concerns the contractual issues when energy service companies (ESCOs) provide energy efficiency projects to residential clients. While performance based contracts have been proven successful in public, commercial, and industrial sectors, ESCOs face challenges in the residential sector. Residential clients often change consumption behavior after the project, which makes the real energy savings difficult to measure. Additionally, residential clients are much more risk averse and vulnerable to uncertain outcomes of projects. We show that piecewise linear contracts perform reasonably well. To further improve profitability, ESCOs can either reduce uncertainty of technology involved or develop the ability to verify post-project energy efficiency. We also make recommendations in monetary incentives and regulations from policy makers' perspective.