Exploring the Dynamics of Representation, Institutional Rules, and Policy Outcomes in the U.S. States

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on three separate issues related to representation, institutional rules, and policy outcomes in the states. Two of the three papers focus on a state-by-state comparison and measure how states differ in policy outcomes and descriptive representation. The final paper digs deeper to consider the individual-level behavior of representatives and the characteristics that drive those behaviors.

First, in the study of interstate policy choices, political science scholars highlight the importance of variables such as divided government, regionalism, and even neighboring effects. I argue that the literature ignores campaign contribution laws that vary from state to state. I examine previous theories along with these campaign contribution laws and find that states with lax campaign contribution laws are less likely to act on the regulation of payday lenders. More specifically, states with lax rules act more leniently and are less likely to enact regulation of payday lenders. In addition, previous theories also prove influential in the policy choice of regulation within and across the states.

Second, while one can easily imagine that larger minority populations produce more descriptive representation, what other state characteristics drive a state toward higher numbers of Black and Latino legislatures? This article responds to a debate in the literature over the role of professionalism in the percentage of minority legislators within a state. I hypothesize that states with higher levels of professionalism attract greater numbers of qualified Black and Latino legislators and help these candidates win more spots within state legislatures. The results of the analysis support this theory. Along with higher percentages of minorities within a state, higher levels of professionalism also influence the percentage of Black and Latino legislators within a state.

Finally, the third paper focuses on representation, payday lending legislation, and the influence of religion in legislative deliberations. The paper focuses the dependent variable on roll-call votes and speaking time in favor of regulation. The main hypotheses revolve around a representative’s religion. While I hypothesize that a representative’s professed religion influences a representative’s willingness to speak in favor of regulation and vote for regulation, the results do not support the hypothesis. I speculate on the reasons why the analysis shows no results for religion. Instead, variables such as campaign contributions, committee membership, the electoral safety of a district, and party all influence a representative’s time spent speaking in favor of regulation.