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Beyond Weber: Conceptualizing an alternative ideal type of bureaucracy in developing contexts
dc.contributor.authorAng, Yuen Yuen
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-05T18:17:21Z
dc.date.available2018-12-03T15:34:02Zen
dc.date.issued2017-09
dc.identifier.citationAng, Yuen Yuen (2017). "Beyond Weber: Conceptualizing an alternative ideal type of bureaucracy in developing contexts." Regulation & Governance 11(3): 282-298.
dc.identifier.issn1748-5983
dc.identifier.issn1748-5991
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/138260
dc.description.abstractThe study of public administration in developing countries requires that we look beyond the Weberian model as the only ideal type of bureaucracy. When we assume that there exists only one gold standard of public administration, all other organizational forms that do not conform to the Weberian ideal are dismissed as corrupt or failed. Drawing on neo‐institutional economics, I introduce an alternative ideal type of bureaucracy found in contemporary China. This model, which I call bureau‐franchising, combines the hierarchical structure of bureaucracy with the high‐powered incentives of franchising. In this system, public agencies can rightfully claim a share of income earned to finance and reward themselves, like entrepreneurial franchisees. Yet distinct from lawless corruption, this self‐financing (or prebendal) behavior is sanctioned and even deliberately incentivized by state rules. Although such a model violates several Weberian tenets of “good” bureaucracy, it harnesses and regulates the high‐powered incentives of prebendalism to ameliorate budgetary and capacity constraints that are common in developing countries like China.
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.publisherCUP
dc.subject.otherWeberian
dc.subject.otherbureaucracy
dc.subject.otherChina
dc.subject.othercorruption
dc.subject.otherdeveloping countries
dc.subject.otherincentives
dc.titleBeyond Weber: Conceptualizing an alternative ideal type of bureaucracy in developing contexts
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelPolitical Science
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelGovernment, Politics and Law
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/138260/1/rego12123_am.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/138260/2/rego12123.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/rego.12123
dc.identifier.sourceRegulation & Governance
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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