An Appraisal Theory of Empathy and Other Vicarious Emotional Experiences

Abstract

How does an observer feel an emotion for someone else who is going through an emotional experience? This phenomenon is called empathy when the observer’s emotion is the same as or similar to the other person’s emotion, or vicarious emotions more generally. In this dissertation, I introduce an appraisal theory of empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences. According to the theory, an observer will feel a vicarious emotion when they evaluate, or appraise, someone else’s emotional situation. If the observer appraises the situation similarly to how the other person appraises it, then the observer will feel a similar emotion and experience empathy. If the observer appraises the situation differently, then the observer will feel a different emotion, or will have a relatively unemotional reaction.

Chapter I introduces a central question that the theory raises: is empathy caused by an observer’s perception of someone else’s emotions, or by the observer’s perception of someone else’s situation? Chapter II reviews existing theories of empathy and introduces the appraisal theory of vicarious emotions. Chapter III presents empirical research testing whether observers’ vicarious emotions are affected by their appraisals, and finds that changing observers’ appraisals of who or what caused someone’s misfortune can make them feel vicarious anger that the other person does not feel. Chapter IV presents empirical research testing how observers’ vicarious responses are affected by others’ emotion expressions, and finds that when observers believe that someone’s emotion expression is not a reliable sign of their situation, they “mimic” that person’s expressions less. Chapter V summarizes the work and offers directions for future research.

The appraisal theory treats vicarious emotions as a part of normal emotion processes, which are driven by the same appraisals that make people feel emotions for themselves.