View Item 

Show simple item record

Threat of falling high status and corporate bribery: Evidence from the revealed accounting records of two South Korean presidents

dc.contributor.authorJeong, Yujin
dc.contributor.authorSiegel, Jordan I.
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-04T18:55:03Z
dc.date.available2019-05-13T14:45:27Zen
dc.date.issued2018-04
dc.identifier.citationJeong, Yujin; Siegel, Jordan I. (2018). "Threat of falling high status and corporate bribery: Evidence from the revealed accounting records of two South Korean presidents." Strategic Management Journal 39(4): 1083-1111.
dc.identifier.issn0143-2095
dc.identifier.issn1097-0266
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/142958
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Ltd
dc.subject.othernonmarket strategy
dc.subject.otherpolitical network
dc.subject.otherstatus
dc.subject.otherbribery
dc.subject.othercorruption
dc.titleThreat of falling high status and corporate bribery: Evidence from the revealed accounting records of two South Korean presidents
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelBusiness (General)
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomics
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelFilm and Video Studies
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelManagement
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelUrban Planning
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelArts
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciences
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness and Economics
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/142958/1/smj2747-sup-0001-SuppInfo.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/142958/2/smj2747.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/142958/3/smj2747_am.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/smj.2747
dc.identifier.sourceStrategic Management Journal
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSeo, J. S. ( 2007 ). Contemporary history of South Korea ‐ 60 years. Translated by Sohn Jung In. Seoul, South Korea: Korea Democracy Foundation.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRider, C. I., & Tan, D. ( 2015 ). Labor market advantages of organization status: A study of lateral partner hiring by large U.S. law firms. Organization Science, 26 ( 2 ), 356 – 372.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRose‐Ackerman, S. ( 1975 ). The economics of corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 4 ( 2 ), 187 – 203.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRose‐Ackerman, S. ( 1978 ). Corruption: A study in political economy. New York, NY: Academic Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRose‐Ackerman, S. ( 1999 ). Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSantos Silva, J. M. C., & Tenreyro, S. ( 2006 ). The log of gravity. Review of Economics and Statistics, 88 ( 4 ), 641 – 658.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSauder, M., Lynn, F., & Podolny, J. M. ( 2012 ). Status: Insights from organizational sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 38 ( 1 ), 267 – 283.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSequeira, S., & Djankov, S. ( 2014 ). Corruption and firm behavior: Evidence from African ports. Journal of International Economics, 94 ( 2 ), 277 – 294.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. ( 1993 ). Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 ( 3 ), 599 – 617.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSiegel, J. I. ( 2007 ). Contingent political capital and international alliances: Evidence from South Korea. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52 ( 4 ), 621 – 666.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSiegel, J. I., & Larson, B. Z. ( 2009 ). Labor market institutions and global strategic adaptation: Evidence from Lincoln Electric. Management Science, 55 ( 9 ), 1527 – 1546.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSmith, A. ( 1976 ). In D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie (Eds.), The theory of moral sentiments. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceStock, J. H., & Watson, M. W. ( 2008 ). Heteroskedasticity‐robust standard errors for fixed effects panel data regression. Econometrica, 76 ( 1 ), 155 – 174.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSuh, S. ( 1996 ). Time of Reckoning. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/96/1227/cs3.html.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSvensson, J. ( 2003 ). Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross section of firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 ( 1 ), 207 – 230.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceThe National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. ( 1990 ). Investigative Report on High‐level Corruption Scandals during the Fifth Republic by the Special Committee of the National Assembly (NADB1199222190), July.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceVaughan, D. ( 1999 ). The challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceVan Vu, H., Tran, T. Q., Van Nguyen, T., & Lim, S. ( 2016 ). Corruption, types of corruption and firm financial performance: New evidence from a transitional economy. Journal of Business Ethics, 2 ( 1 ), 1 – 12.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWashington, M., & Zajac, E. J. ( 2005 ). Status evolution and competition: Theory and evidence. The Academy of Management Journal, 48 ( 2 ), 282 – 296.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWeisburd, D., Wheeler, S., Waring, E., & Bode, N. ( 1991 ). Crimes of the middle classes: White‐collar offenders in the federal courts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWheeler, S. ( 1992 ). The Problem of white‐collar crime motivation. In K. Schlegel & D. Weisburd (Eds.), White‐collar crime reconsidered (pp. 108–123). Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWooldridge, J. M. ( 1997 ). Quasi‐likelihood methods for count data. In M. Pesaran & P. Schmidt (Eds.), Handbook of applied econometrics, volume ii: Microeconometrics (pp. 352–406). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWooldridge, J. M. ( 2010 ). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data ( 2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceWorld Bank. ( 2017 ). World development indicators. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from www.worldbank.org
dc.identifier.citedreferenceYoo, Y. ( 1988, June). Cozy government‐business relationship during Chun’s regime. Sin‐dong‐a, Dong‐a Daily Newspaper, (title translated from Korean).
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAdes, A., & Di Tella, R. ( 1999 ). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review, 89 ( 4 ), 982 – 993.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAllison, P. D., & Waterman, R. P. ( 2002 ). Fixed‐effects negative binomial regression models. Sociological Methodology, 32, 247 – 265.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAlmenberg, J., & Dreber, A. ( 2009 ). Lady and the Trump: Status and wealth in the marriage market. Kyklos, 62 ( 2 ), 161 – 181.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAmsden, A. H. ( 1989 ). Asia’s next giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAmsden, A. H. ( 2001 ). The rise of “the rest”: challenges to the West from late‐industrializing economies. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAskin, N., & Bothner, M. S. ( 2016 ). Status‐aspirational pricing: The “Chivas Regal” strategy in U.S. higher education, 2006‐2012. Administrative Science Quarterly, 61 ( 2 ), 217 – 253.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBalasubramanian, P., Bennett, V. M., & Pierce, L. ( 2017 ). The wages of dishonesty: The supply of cheating under high‐powered incentives. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 137, 428 – 444.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBall, S., Eckel, C., Grossman, P. J., & Zame, W. ( 2001 ). Status in markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 ( 1 ), 161 – 188.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBarker, H. ( 2017 ). Family and business during the industrial revolution. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBaron, D. P. ( 2013 ). Business and its environment ( 7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice‐Hall.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBecker, H. ( 1963 ). Outsiders, studies in the sociology of deviance. New York, NY: Free Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBonacich, P. ( 1987 ). Power and centrality: A family of measures. American Journal of Sociology, 92 ( 5 ), 1170 – 1183.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBorgatti, S. P., Everett, M. G., & Freeman, L. C. ( 2002 ). Ucinet 6 for windows: Software for social network analysis. Analytic Technologies: Harvard, MA.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBunkanwanicha, P., Fan, P. H. J., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. ( 2013 ). The value of marriage to family firms. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48 ( 2 ), 611 – 636.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. ( 2015. Chapter 8). Count panel data. In B. H. Baltagi (Ed.), Oxford handbook of panel data econometrics (pp. 233–256). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceChavis, L. ( 2013 ). Social networks and bribery: The case of entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe. Journal of Comparative Economics, 41 ( 1 ), 279 – 293.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCheung, Y. L., Rau, R. P., & Stouraitis, A. ( 2012 ). How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide (NBER Working paper 17981). National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w17981.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCho, D. S. ( 1997 ). Mae Kyung Daily Newspaper. Korean Chaebols. Seoul. (title translated from Korean).
dc.identifier.citedreferenceClarke, G. R. G., & Xu, L. C. ( 2004 ). Privatization, competition, and corruption: How characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities. Journal of Public Economics, 88 ( 9–10 ), 2067 – 2097.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCyert, R., & March, J. ( 1963 ). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice‐Hall.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDittes, J. E., & Kelley, H. H. ( 1956 ). Effects of different conditions of acceptance upon conformity to group norms. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 53 ( 1 ), 100 – 107.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFisman, R. ( 2001 ). Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91 ( 4 ), 1095 – 1102.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFisman, R., & Miguel, E. ( 2007 ). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. Journal of Political Economy, 115 ( 6 ), 1020 – 1048.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceFisman, R., & Wei, S. J. ( 2009 ). The smuggling of art, and the art of smuggling: Uncovering the illicit trade in cultural property and antisques. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1 ( 3 ), 82 – 96.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGiordano, P. C. ( 1983 ). Sanctioning the high‐status deviant: An attributional analysis. Social Psychology Quarterly, 46 ( 4 ), 329 – 342.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGourieroux, C., Monfort, A., & Trognon, A. ( 1984 ). Pseudo maximum likelihood methods: Applications to Poisson models. Econometrica, 52 ( 3 ), 701 – 720.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGrassby, R. ( 2001 ). Kinship and capitalism: Marriage, family, and business in the english‐speaking world, 1580–1740. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGreene, W. ( 2007 ). Fixed and random effects models for count data. (NYU Working paper EC‐07‐16). New York University, New York, NY. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=1281928.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGreene, W. ( 2010 ). Testing hypotheses about interaction terms in nonlinear models. Economics Letters, 107 ( 2 ), 291 – 296.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGreve, H. R. ( 2003 ). Organizational learning from performance feedback: A behavioral perspective on innovation and change. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGreve, H. R., Han, J. Y., & Shipilov, A. ( 2016 ). Unequal bedfellows: Gender role‐based differences in multiplex ties between Korean business groups. Academy of Management Journal, 60 ( 4 ), 1531 – 1553.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGrolleau, G., Kocher, M. G., & Sutan, A. ( 2016 ). Cheating and loss aversion: Do people cheat more to avoid a loss? Management Science, 62 ( 12 ), 3428 – 3438.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHansen, C. B. ( 2007 ). Asymptotic properties of a robust variance matrix estimator for panel data when T is large. Journal of Econometrics, 141 ( 2 ), 597 – 620.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHuntington, S. P. ( 1991 ). The third wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceIngram, P., & Lifschitz, A. ( 2006 ). Kinship in the shadow of the corporation: The interbuilder network in Clyde River shipbuilding, 1711‐1990. American Sociological Review, 71 ( 2 ), 334 – 352.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJeong, Y., Siegel, J. I., & Chen, S. Y. ( 2017 ). A recentering approach for interpreting interaction effects from logit, probit, and other nonlinear models (Working paper).
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJeong, Y., & Weiner, R. J. ( 2012 ). Who bribes? Evidence from the United Nations’ oil‐for‐food program. Strategic Management Journal, 33 ( 12 ), 1363 – 1383.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKahneman, D. ( 2013 ). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKahneman, D., & Tversky, A. ( 1979 ). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47 ( 2 ), 263 – 291.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKang, D. C. ( 2002 ). Crony capitalism corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceShleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. ( 2002 ). The grabbing hand: Government pathologies and their cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKaufmann, D. ( 2006 ). Chapter 2.1. Myths and realities of governance and corruption. In World Economic Forum (Ed.), (ed) The Global Competitive Report 2005‐2006 (pp. 81 – 98 ). Basingstoke: Palgrave Mcmillan. Retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00818/WEB/GCR2005.HTM
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKern, M. C., & Chugh, D. ( 2009 ). Bounded ethicality the perils of loss framing. Psychological Science, 20 ( 3 ), 378 – 384.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKim, E. M. ( 1997 ). Big business, strong state collusion and conflict in South Korean development, 1960–1990. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKogut, B. ( 2012 ). The small world of corporate governance: An introduction. In B. Kogut (Ed.), The small worlds of corporate governance (pp. 1–52). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLancaster, T. ( 2000 ). The incidental parameters problem since 1948. Journal of Econometrics, 95 ( 2 ), 391 – 414.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLa Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. ( 1997 ). Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance, 52 ( 3 ), 1131 – 1150.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLa Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. ( 2000 ). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58 ( 1–2 ), 3 – 27.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceLa Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. ( 2002 ). Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance, 57 ( 3 ), 1147 – 1170.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMalter, D. ( 2014 ). On the causality and cause of returns to organizational status: Evidence from the grands crus classés of the Médoc. Administrative Science Quarterly, 59 ( 2 ), 271 – 300.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMcMillan, J., & Zoido, P. ( 2004 ). How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18 ( 4 ), 69 – 92.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMartin, K. D., Cullen, J. B., Johnson, J. L., & Parboteeah, K. P. ( 2007 ). Deciding to bribe: A cross‐level analysis of firm and host country influences on bribery activity. Academy of Management Journal, 50 ( 6 ), 1401 – 1422.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMerton, R. K. ( 1968 ). Social theory and social structure. New York, NY: Free Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMishina, Y., Dykes, B. J., Block, E. S., & Pollock, T. G. ( 2010 ). Why ‘good’ firms do bad things: The effects of high aspirations, high expectations, and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality. Academy of Management Journal, 53 ( 4 ), 701 – 722.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMøller, J., & Skaaning, S. ( 2013 ). The third wave: Inside the numbers. Journal of Democracy, 24 ( 4 ), 97 – 109.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceOlken, B. A., & Barron, P. ( 2009 ). The simple economics of extortion: Evidence from trucking in Aceh. Journal of Political Economy, 117 ( 3 ), 417 – 452.
dc.identifier.citedreferencePadgett, J. F., & Ansell, C. K. ( 1993 ). Robust action and the rise of the Medici, 1400‐1434. American Journal of Sociology, 98 ( 6 ), 1259 – 1319.
dc.identifier.citedreferencePadgett, J. F., & McLean, P. D. ( 2006 ). Organizational invention and elite transformation: The birth of partnership systems in Renaissance Florence. American Journal of Sociology, 111 ( 5 ), 1463 – 1568.
dc.identifier.citedreferencePark, J. R. ( 1988, October). The Ilhae foundation. Sin‐dong‐a, Dong‐a Daily Newspaper.
dc.identifier.citedreferencePhillips, D. J., & Zuckerman, E. W. ( 2001 ). Middle‐status conformity: Theoretical restatement and empirical demonstration in two markets. American Journal of Sociology, 107 ( 2 ), 379 – 429.
dc.identifier.citedreferencePodolny, J. M. ( 2005 ). Status signals: A sociological study of market competition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRhee, J. C. ( 2002 ). The state and industry in South Korea: The limits of the authoritarian state. New York, NY: Routledge.
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


Files in this item

Name:
smj2747-sup-0001-SuppInfo.pdf
Size:
552.3KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open
Name:
smj2747.pdf
Size:
7.119MB
Format:
PDF
View/Open
Name:
smj2747_am.pdf
Size:
2.250MB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.