View Item 

Show simple item record

Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: The role of contingent transfers
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Heng
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-11T18:00:16Z
dc.date.available2019-07-01T14:52:17Zen
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.identifier.citationLiu, Heng (2018). "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: The role of contingent transfers." Theoretical Economics 13(2): 795-829.
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144281
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
dc.subject.otherinterdependent valuation
dc.subject.otherD82
dc.subject.otherD61
dc.subject.otherC73
dc.subject.otherDynamic mechanism
dc.subject.otherintertemporal correlation
dc.titleEfficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: The role of contingent transfers
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomics
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciences
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144281/1/thec294_am.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144281/2/thec294.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144281/3/thec294-sup-0001-Supplement.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE2234
dc.identifier.sourceTheoretical Economics
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMezzetti, Claudio ( 2007 ), “ Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: Surplus extraction.” Economic Theory, 31, 473 – 488.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGershkov, Alex, Benny Moldovanu, and Philipp Strack ( 2015 ), “ Dynamic allocation and learning with strategic arrivals.” Working paper, SSRN 2548740.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGroves, Theodore ( 1973 ), “ Incentives in teams.” Econometrica, 41, 617 – 631.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceHörner, Johannes, Satoru Takahashi, and Nicholas Vieille ( 2015 ), “ Truthful equilibria in dynamic Bayesian games.” Econometrica, 83, 1795 – 1848.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJehiel, Philippe, Moritz Meyer‐ter‐Vehn, Benny Moldovanu, and William Zame ( 2006 ), “ The limits of ex post implementation.” Econometrica, 74, 585 – 610.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceJehiel, Philippe and Benny Moldovanu ( 2001 ), “ Efficient design with interdependent valuations.” Econometrica, 69, 1237 – 1259.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKandori, Michihiro and Hitoshi Matsushima ( 1998 ), “ Private observation, communication and collusion.” Econometrica, 66, 627 – 652.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceKosenok, Grigory and Sergei Severinov ( 2008 ), “ Individually rational, budget‐balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus.” Journal of Economic Theory, 140, 126 – 161.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMcAfee, R. Preston and Philip J. Reny ( 1992 ), “ Correlated information and mechanism design.” Econometrica, 60, 395 – 421.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMertens, Jean‐François ( 2003 ), “ A measurable “measurable choice” theorem.” In Stochastic Games and Applications, N. A. T. O. Science Series ( Abraham Neyman Sylvain Sorin, eds.), 107 – 130, Springer, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMezzetti, Claudio ( 2004 ), “ Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: Efficiency.” Econometrica, 72, 1617 – 1626.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMierendorff, Konrad ( 2016 ), “ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines.” Journal of Economic Theory, 161, 190 – 222.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceMiller, Nolan H., John W. Pratt, Richard J. Zeckhauser, and Scott Johnson ( 2007 ), “ Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations.” Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 476 – 496.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceNoda, Shunya ( 2018 ), “ Full surplus extraction and within‐period ex post implementation in dynamic environments.” Working paper, SSRN 2382416.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceParkes, David C. and Satinder Singh ( 2003 ), “ An MDP‐based approach to online mechanism design.” In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 16 ( Sebastian Thrun, Lawrence K. Saul, and Bernhard Schölkopf, eds.), Neural Information Processing Systems Foundation, Inc.
dc.identifier.citedreferencePavan, Alessandro, Ilya Segal, and Juuso Toikka ( 2014 ), “ Dynamic mechanism design: A Myersonian approach.” Econometrica, 82, 601 – 653.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRahman, David ( 2010 ), “ Detecting profitable deviations.” Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceRockafellar, R. Tyrrell ( 1970 ), Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSaid, Maher ( 2012 ), “ Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization.” Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 2419 – 2438.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceSegal, Ilya ( 2003 ), “ Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand.” American Economic Review, 93, 509 – 529.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceVickrey, William ( 1961 ), “ Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders.” Journal of Finance, 16, 8 – 37.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAliprantis, Charalambos D. and Kim C. Border ( 2006 ), Infinite Dimensional Analysis: A Hitchhiker’s Guide, thirdedition. Springer, Berlin.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceArrow, Kenneth J. ( 1979 ), “ The property rights doctrine and demand revelation under incomplete information.” In Economics and Human Welfare: Essays in Honor of Tibor Scitovsky, 23 – 39, Academic Press, Boskin, New York.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAthey, Susan and David A. Miller ( 2007 ), “ Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations.” Theoretical Economics, 2, 299 – 354.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceAthey, Susan and Ilya Segal ( 2013 ), “ An efficient dynamic mechanism.” Econometrica, 81, 2463 – 2485.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBarelli, Paulo and John Duggan ( 2014 ), “ A note on semi‐Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games.” Journal of Economic Theory, 151, 596 – 604.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBergemann, Dirk and Juuso Välimäki ( 2002 ), “ Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design.” Econometrica, 70, 1007 – 1033.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceBergemann, Dirk and Juuso Välimäki ( 2010 ), “ The dynamic pivot mechanism.” Econometrica, 78, 771 – 789.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceClarke, Edward H. ( 1971 ), “ Multipart pricing of public goods.” Public Choice, 11, 17 – 33.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCrémer, Jacques and Richard P. McLean ( 1985 ), “ Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent.” Econometrica, 53, 345 – 361.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceCrémer, Jacques and Richard P. McLean ( 1988 ), “ Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions.” Econometrica, 56, 1247 – 1257.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDasgupta, Partha and Eric Maskin ( 2000 ), “ Efficient auctions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 341 – 388.
dc.identifier.citedreferenced’Aspremont, Claude and Louis‐André Gérard‐Varet ( 1979 ), “ Incentives and incomplete information.” Journal of Public Economics, 11, 25 – 45.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceDeb, Rahul and Debasis Mishra ( 2014 ), “ Implementation with contingent contracts.” Econometrica, 82, 2371 – 2393.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGershkov, Alex and Benny Moldovanu ( 2009 ), “ Learning about the future and dynamic efficiency.” American Economic Review, 99, 1576 – 1587.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGershkov, Alex and Benny Moldovanu ( 2010 ), “ Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information.” Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 144 – 154.
dc.identifier.citedreferenceGershkov, Alex and Benny Moldovanu ( 2012 ), “ Optimal search, learning and implementation.” Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 881 – 909.
dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


Files in this item

Name:
thec294_am.pdf
Size:
608.1KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open
Name:
thec294.pdf
Size:
351.7KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open
Name:
thec294-sup-0001-Supplement.pdf
Size:
155.1KB
Format:
PDF
View/Open

Show simple item record

Remediation of Harmful Language

The University of Michigan Library aims to describe library materials in a way that respects the people and communities who create, use, and are represented in our collections. Report harmful or offensive language in catalog records, finding aids, or elsewhere in our collections anonymously through our metadata feedback form. More information at Remediation of Harmful Language.

Accessibility

If you are unable to use this file in its current format, please select the Contact Us link and we can modify it to make it more accessible to you.