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Should Congestion Tolls be Set by the Government or by the Private Sector? The Knight–Pigou Debate Revisited
dc.contributor.authorSalant, Stephen
dc.contributor.authorSeegert, Nathan
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-11T18:00:40Z
dc.date.available2019-09-04T20:15:38Zen
dc.date.issued2018-07
dc.identifier.citationSalant, Stephen; Seegert, Nathan (2018). "Should Congestion Tolls be Set by the Government or by the Private Sector? The Knight–Pigou Debate Revisited." Economica 85(339): 428-448.
dc.identifier.issn0013-0427
dc.identifier.issn1468-0335
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144304
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.titleShould Congestion Tolls be Set by the Government or by the Private Sector? The Knight–Pigou Debate Revisited
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomics
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelSocial Sciences
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144304/1/ecca12259.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/144304/2/ecca12259_am.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ecca.12259
dc.identifier.sourceEconomica
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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