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Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?
dc.contributor.authorCostello, Anna M.
dc.contributor.authorGranja, João
dc.contributor.authorWeber, Joseph
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-20T17:06:10Z
dc.date.availableWITHHELD_13_MONTHS
dc.date.available2019-06-20T17:06:10Z
dc.date.issued2019-06
dc.identifier.citationCostello, Anna M. ; Granja, João ; Weber, Joseph (2019). "Do Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?." Journal of Accounting Research 57(3): 603-637.
dc.identifier.issn0021-8456
dc.identifier.issn1475-679X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/149564
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks’ call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.subject.otherregulatory enforcement
dc.subject.otheraccounting restatements
dc.subject.otherE58
dc.subject.otherG21
dc.subject.otherM40
dc.subject.otherM41
dc.subject.otherbanking
dc.subject.otheraccounting transparency
dc.subject.otherregulation
dc.titleDo Strict Regulators Increase the Transparency of Banks?
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelBusiness (General)
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149564/1/joar12255_am.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149564/2/joar12255.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-679X.12255
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Accounting Research
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