Securing Safety Critical Automotive Systems
Nasser, Ahmad
2019-08-23
Abstract
In recent years, several attacks were successfully demonstrated against automotive safety systems. The advancement towards driver assistance, autonomous driving, and rich connectivity make it impossible for automakers to ignore security. However, automotive systems face several unique challenges that make security adoption a rather slow and painful process. Challenges with safety and security co-engineering, the inertia of legacy software, real-time processing, and memory constraints, along with resistance to costly security countermeasures, are all factors that must be considered when proposing security solutions for automotive systems. In this work, we aim to address those challenges by answering the next questions. What is the right safety security co-engineering approach that would be suitable for automotive safety systems? Does AUTOSAR, the most popular automotive software platform, contain security gaps and how can they be addressed? Can an embedded HSM be leveraged as a security monitor to stop common attacks and maintain system safety? When an attack is detected, what is the proper response that harmonizes the security reaction with the safety constraints? And finally, can trust be established in a safety-critical system without violating its strict startup timing requirements? We start with a qualitative analysis of the safety and security co-engineering problem to derive the safety-driven approach to security. We then apply the approach to the AUTOSAR classic platform to uncover security gaps. Using a real automotive hardware environment, we construct security attacks against AUTOSAR and evaluate countermeasures. We then propose an HSM based security monitoring system and apply it against the popular CAN masquerading attack. Finally, we turn to the trust establishment problem in constrained devices and offer an accelerated secure boot method to improve the availability time by several factors. Overall, the security techniques and countermeasures presented in this work improve the security resilience of safety-critical automotive systems to enable future technologies that require strong security foundations. Our methods and proposed solutions can be adopted by other types of Cyber-Physical Systems that are concerned with securing safety.Subjects
Automotive cyber security Hardware security module Cyber physical systems Automotive safety Security monitoring Secure boot acceleration
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