Arming Strategies and State Behavior

Abstract

How do states strategize the acquisition of arms? Scholars of international relations have long focused on power, interests, and the wars states fight to realize their objectives. The role of arms—the machines that enable modern war—is often overlooked. Many studies presume that states that decide to fight can do so, that possessing weapons means being able to use them. And some of the most widely used proxies of state power equate the existence of industrial capabilities with the ability to produce and use arms in warfare. This study attempts to provide a counterpoint to these assumptions. States are enmeshed in a global trade network of arms and their supply chains. Because no state can entirely control its own materials, supply, or production, the ability to buy, build, maintain, and use weapons is a product of the approval—explicit or tacit—of other states. How does an arms-buying state strategize procurement in this context? I argue that buyers face a tradeoff between their autonomy and military efficacy. Because the continued use of modern weapons depends on maintenance, munitions, parts, and upgrades that the original seller is most equipped to provide, arms relationships are long term and suppliers can veto sales if they so choose, usually over policy disagreements. Autonomy is achieved by reducing the buyer’s dependence on any one supplier, typically via import diversification or by building domestically. Military efficacy, on the other hand, is driven by a highly integrated military, appropriately trained, with a high readiness rate for its advanced platforms. This is achieved by buying weapons that were made to operate together and forming long-term support relationships with suppliers. I argue that the choice to pursue autonomy and sacrifice military efficacy is a product of the buyer’s fear of abandonment in the face of threats. This theory has implications for how states arm, their subsequent behavior, and when and how they choose to develop domestic industries. It also sheds light on how states with highly diversified militaries will perform in battle, arguing that greater autonomy can allow the state to be more decisive in choosing to initiate conflict. However, reduced efficacy can mean states are most capable in low-intensity conflicts and are less capable in sustained high-end warfare. I test this argument using both quantitative and qualitative methods. I develop a novel arms import diversification score to asses the degree to which states facing threats change their arming strategies, and find that a reasonable fear of threat increases the likelihood a state will pursue a diversified import strategy. I then posit that states that diversify do so to enable offensive use of their weapons. A case on Argentina illustrates the complex dynamics of arming in the face of threats, and a quantitative test finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that a pro-autonomy arming strategy increases the likelihood of conflict initiation. Finally, I examine the rationales and methods for developing domestic defense industries by comparing the cases of South Korea and Israel, and find that the strength and consistency of relations with a principal supplier influence the form and capabilities of domestic industrial capabilities. This study provides a novel perspective on the strategies of arms buyers, highlighting the role of understudied aspects of arms relationships and their impact on international relations.