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The Politics of M&A Antitrust
dc.contributor.authorMehta, Mihir N.
dc.contributor.authorSrinivasan, Suraj
dc.contributor.authorZhao, Wanli
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-05T15:06:21Z
dc.date.availableWITHHELD_14_MONTHS
dc.date.available2020-02-05T15:06:21Z
dc.date.issued2020-03
dc.identifier.citationMehta, Mihir N. ; Srinivasan, Suraj ; Zhao, Wanli (2020). "The Politics of M&A Antitrust." Journal of Accounting Research 58(1): 5-53.
dc.identifier.issn0021-8456
dc.identifier.issn1475-679X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/153651
dc.description.abstractAntitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish causality, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm–politician links and a falsification test. Additional findings suggest congressional members’ incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels: special interests, voter and constituent interests, and ideology. In aggregate, our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anticompetitive mergers.
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.publisherPrinceton University Press
dc.subject.otherDOJ
dc.subject.otherSenate Committee on the Judiciary
dc.subject.othermergers and acquisitions
dc.subject.otherHouse Judiciary Committee
dc.subject.otherD72
dc.subject.otherG34
dc.subject.otherG38
dc.subject.otherK21
dc.subject.otherpolitical economy
dc.subject.otherantitrust
dc.subject.otherFTC
dc.titleThe Politics of M&A Antitrust
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelBusiness (General)
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/153651/1/joar12291.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/153651/2/joar12291_am.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1475-679X.12291
dc.identifier.sourceJournal of Accounting Research
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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