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Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
dc.contributor.authorKe, Shaowei
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Qi
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-03T15:22:19Z
dc.date.availableWITHHELD_12_MONTHS
dc.date.available2020-06-03T15:22:19Z
dc.date.issued2020-05
dc.identifier.citationKe, Shaowei; Zhang, Qi (2020). "Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion." Econometrica 88(3): 1159-1195.
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682
dc.identifier.issn1468-0262
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/155459
dc.publisherSpringer‐Verlag
dc.publisherWiley Periodicals, Inc.
dc.subject.otherambiguity
dc.subject.otherconvex preferences
dc.subject.otherhedging
dc.subject.otherRandomization
dc.titleRandomization and Ambiguity Aversion
dc.typeArticle
dc.rights.robotsIndexNoFollow
dc.subject.hlbsecondlevelEconomics
dc.subject.hlbtoplevelBusiness and Economics
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer Reviewed
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/155459/1/ecta200162.pdf
dc.description.bitstreamurlhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/155459/2/ecta200162_am.pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ECTA15182
dc.identifier.sourceEconometrica
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dc.owningcollnameInterdisciplinary and Peer-Reviewed


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